PAKISTAN The First Twelve Years

Mazhar Ali Khan

OXFORD

PAKISTAN The First Twelve Years

The Pakistan Times Editorials of

Mazhar Ali Khan

Gul Hayat Institute

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Preface

The editorials published in this volume will come as a surprise to most readers. Those coming to them for the first time will be amazed by their literary quality and political consistency, which were the hallmark of the old *The Pakistan Times.* Even those who remember reading them when they first appeared will be struck by the contrast with what passes for journalism today.

The Progressive Papers Limited were born in 1946, the result of a stray suggestion by Mohammed Ali Jinnah to the effect that a new country needed a new press. It is ironical that the initiative was taken by Mian Iftikharuddin—one-time president of the Punjab Congress, close friend of Jawaharlal Nehru, and a fellow-traveller of the Communist Party of India (CPI).

When the CPI (unlike Maulana Maudoodi's Jamaat-i-Islam) opted for Pakistan, those of its members and sympathisers in the Punjab who were of Muslim origin were encouraged to join the Muslim League and help the 'progressive forces' inside the organisation. Thus, Mian Iftikharuddin and Mazhar Ali Khan, among many others most of them lifelong opponents of the League—found themselves temporarily inside enemy ranks during the crucial 1945-47 period. This meant that Mian Iftikharuddin was wellplaced to put into practice Jinnah's suggestion regarding the founding of a new chain of newspapers. Before long he bought out Daultana, Mamdot and other League veterans, making himself the largest single shareholder.

From their very inception, *The Pakistan Times* and its Urdu stablemate, *Imroze*, recruited their staff from the progressive intelligentsia. Faiz Ahmed Faiz was the first

editor of *The Pakistan Times*, with Mazhar Ali Khan as his deputy. *Imroze* was edited by Chiragh Hasan Hasrat, one of the great stylists of the time, with the assistance of Ahmed Nadeem Qasmi. In 1956. *Lail-o-Nahar*—a politico-cultural weekly the like of which has never been seen again in Pakistan—was launched with Sibte Hassan as its editor.

The Progressive Papers Limited were a unique phenomenon in the sense that, despite their oppositional character, they rapidly became the most influential chain of publications in the country. *The Pakistan Times*, which found it impossible to abide by an initial declaration of allegiance to the Muslim League for long, became the largest-circulated English-language newspaper in Pakistan. What appeared in its columns mattered.

In retrospect, the annoyance of the new Establishment is perfectly comprehensible. In Pakistan's early years, there was little effective opposition on a national scale. The Muslim League fragmented after Jinnah's death and Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, and regionalist formulations—the Awami League in East Pakistan and the National Awami Party in the Frontier and Balochistan—began to grow, thus enabling the civil service to dominate politics and wield power. *The Pakistan Times* and its sister publications became the conscience of the new state.

In the early days, politicians were far more tolerant of criticism, but even then they regarded Progressive Papers as an irritant. What made matters more difficult for successive governments was the decision by these publications to oppose tooth and nail the Pakistani Establishment's decision to tie itself to the coat-tails of Britain and the United States. While India remained neutral in the Cold War, Pakistan allied itself with the West. Mian Iftikharuddin's newspapers engaged in a well-argued crusade against this policy.

In 1951, Faiz Ahmed Faiz was implicated in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case—a half-baked attempt by the tiny Communist Party of Pakistan to organize a *coup* in collusion with nationalist-minded army officers. Faiz was

arrested, tried, and jailed; in his prison cell he composed some of his finest verses. Mazhar Ali Khan became the editor of *The Pakistan Times*, a post he occupied till the Progressive Papers were brutally taken over in April 1959 by the military dictatorship of General Ayub Khan.

During the transition from British influence to that of the United States, the army was subjected to heavy ideological pressure from Washington. Pakistan became a member of SEATO and later CENTO. Army officers were sent for training to the United States, and US intelligence services first became active in Pakistan during the 1950s. *The Pakistan Times* was not circulated in army messes for a number of years, although later the ban was lifted.

The impact of the newspaper can be judged by a number of different reactions.

During the Second World War, after Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union, Mazhar Ali Khan, on behalf of the Communist Party of India, had negotiated the release of imprisoned Communists with Captain Bill Short of British Military Intelligence. Subsequently, he and other Communists joined the British Indian Army to aid the struggle against Fascism. Mazhar—first a captain and later a lieutenant—was in the 4/16 Punjab Regiment and saw action at Monte Casino. He was on good terms with his senior officer, Colonel Packwood, who tried—unsuccessfully—to persuade him to stay in the army after the war.

In December 1953, Mazhar Ali Khan, by then editor of *The Pakistan Times*, received an angry letter from Brigadier Packwood, who at the time was serving in the 16th Punjab Regiment of the Pakistan army:

Dear Mazhar,

It will no doubt surprise you to see a letter coming from me, but I have been stirred to anger by *The Pakistan Times*. I have always been a supporter of your paper, though not of its creed, even in the days when it was banned in the army. Now I have forbidden it in the mess and in my lines. A few days ago you published a cartoon and an article which can do nothing else but bring the British Monarchy into contempt. It cut me particularly to the quick . . .

The letter contained other choice morsels along similar lines and only served to remind Mazhar Ali Khan that freedom, real and meaningful freedom, had still not been achieved.

In the years that followed *The Pakistan Times* consolidated its position in Pakistani society as the most solid pillar of antiimperialism. When Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt in 1956 as part of a crude attempt to topple Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had nationalized the Suez Canal, the government of Pakistan not only failed to oppose the aggression but actually fell in with Anglo-French schemes to wrest the canal back from Egyptian control. This created conditions for what turned out to be the finest hour of the Progressive Papers Limited. In a series of blistering editorials, Mazhar Ali Khan lambasted the Western powers and their Pakistani supporters. The campaigning stance adopted by *The Pakistan Times* led to mass demonstrations in support of Nasser throughout the country. Once again the Establishment was livid. Once again it failed to restrain Mian Iftikharuddin's newspapers.

An indication of how much the newspapers irritated successive regimes in Karachi and the US embassy can be gleaned from the fit of pique contained in the following personal letter, dated 27 January 1956, from American Vice-Consul Alan D. Wolfe:

Dear Mazhar,

I cannot deny having read the *The Pakistan Times* editorial today with considerable resentment. Your personal opinion of Ambassador Hildreth is not a matter of great concern to me, nor are your criticisms of what he chooses to say in his public addresses in Pakistan. I find your unwarranted attack on the United States, however, couched as it is in vicious, unfair and irresponsible language, personally offensive to a large degree.

In view of your expressed opinion of my country, you will understand if I find it difficult in conscience to accept your hospitality this evening. My apologies to Tahira [Mrs Mazhar Ali Khan]. In view of the friendly feelings which my wife and I hold for both of you, I can only express my hope that it was not you yourself who authored this regrettable article.

Wolfe's was a vain hope. The editorial bore 'dear Mazhar's' inimitable touch.

The popularity of the Progressive Papers made it difficult for civilian governments to ban the publications, which remained a thorn in the side of prime ministers, ministers, and US diplomats alike for over a decade.

On 8 October 1958, General Ayub seized power through a *coup d'etat*; he was fully backed by the civil service, which had feared the outcome of the country's first-ever general elections scheduled for March 1959. Growing mass discontent had led to suspicions that the elections might produce a radical result and consequent challenges to the domestic and foreign policies promoted by the military-bureaucratic complex. In retrospect, it can also be said that the military *coup* of 1958 sealed the fate of Pakistan as a unitary state. The Bengali population in East Pakistan felt isolated and overruled by an army in which their representation was negligible.

In December 1958, Mazhar Ali Khan was invited to a small party at Faletti's Hotel in Lahore. The host was the minister of commerce in Ayub's government, a rising star by the name of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. During the evening, Bhutto took Mazhar Ali Khan aside and warned him that the military regime was planning to do 'something awful' to the Progressive Papers. After the party, Mazhar Ali Khan drove straight to Mian Iftikharuddin's residence at 21 Aikman Road and apprised him of Bhutto's friendly warning. Both men believed that the government would, at most, impose newsprint restrictions or tighten censorship. Mian Iftikharuddin ruled out the idea of a pre-emptive appeal to the military ruler: 'Let him do his worst,' he told his editor. 'We will weather the storm.'

In the event, the storm could not be contained. General Ayub had told his first cabinet meeting: 'For us there is only one embassy in Pakistan. The US embassy.' Under American advice, the dictator instructed senior cabinet ministers to prepare for the take-over of the Progressive Papers. He had never liked the newspapers or their proprietor. On the day after the declaration of martial law, every newspaper in the country except *The Pakistan Times* and *Imroze* had published editorials welcoming the general as the saviour of Pakistan; *The Pakistan Times*, operating under censorship, chose instead to carry a comment on 'Soil erosion'.

In its 1950s heyday. *The Pakistan Times* elicited praise even from the enemy: the US newsmagazine *Time* described it as the 'best-edited newspaper in Asia'. Yet the government's seizure of the Progressive Papers was welcomed by every other major newspaper in the country. Freedom of the Press died that April. Mazhar Ali Khan describes those events in a poignant essay published as an epilogue in this volume.

What he does not say is that for eleven years the military regime prevented him from writing in any other newspaper. His voice was effectively silenced. In a rare speech in 1963 to the short-lived Civil Liberties Union, he said: 'For too long Pakistan has become a land of great silence: a silence born of fear, of apathy, of cynicism, of ignorance: a silence so oppressive that often truth finds expression only in uncertain whispers.'

Mazhar Ali Khan never gave up. During his brief tenure as acting editor-in-chief of *Dawn* in 1972, and later as the founder-editor of his own weekly *Viewpoint*, he sought to revive the tradition of the old *The Pakistan Times*. His editorials and opinion columns—most notably *Between the Lines*, which appeared in *The Pakistan Times* (1947-59), the Dhaka-based weekly *Forum* (1969-71, *Dawn* (1972 and 1992-3) and *Viewpoint* (1975-92)—were avidly consumed by both

friends and foes. Generals, civil servants, ambassadors as well as trade unionists, radical students, and intellectuals all regarded them as compulsive reading.

In the months before he died in January 1993, Mazhar Ali Khan had started writing regularly for *Dawn*. One of his last articles dealt with the origins of the mess in Kashmir today. He insisted that bungling by Pakistan's founding leaders, especially Liaquat Ali Khan, were partially to blame for the Indian occupation of the province.

During the Zia years, when Mazhar Ali Khan was arrested and detained at the Lahore Fort, the military intelligence officer interrogating him remarked: 'Your files are really amazing. You don't seem to have changed your mind at all over all these years.' Replied Mazhar Ali Khan: 'Thank you.'

One of the functions of this volume is to remind the citizens of Pakistan that, from the beginning, there were men and women dedicated to speaking the truth who rose above the mire of corrupted values regardless of personal cost. If this book can reawaken even a tiny proportion of the spirit of those times, it will have succeeded in its purpose.

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1971-1980 (1980)

Section 2



Section 1 How Far is Freedom Yet? National Day Comments



14 August 1951 The Fourth Anniversary

The people of Pakistan celebrate the fourth anniversary of their freedom with Indian guns casting their menacing shadows across the frontier that separates these two neighbouring States. The threat to Pakistan's integritysymbolised by the presence of Indian cohorts within easy striking distance of our borders—has not arisen suddenly, nor is it merely a manifestation of India's political aberrations. Its fundamental causes can be traced back to the bloody days of 1947, when Britain, compelled by circumstances to lay down the sceptre, sought to leave India and Pakistan involved in unending disputes that would sap their energy and delay the full consummation of their liberation from imperialism's tentacles. It would, of course, be puerile to throw all the blame on the British. Their machinations could easily have been defeated if India's leaders had accepted the creation of Pakistan with good grace and had agreed-to-settle all outstanding differences on the basis of justice and equity. This, however, was not to be. The hand of friendship extended by Pakistan was rudely spurned, and the anti-imperialists of vesterday came to conspire with Britain's representatives, in the hope of making some gains at Pakistan's expense. The seeds of conflict sown by Radcliffe and Mountbatten have by now grown into a jungle of suspicion and hatred, retarding the onward march of both countries and threatening their peaceful coexistence. During the last four years, Pakistan has ceaselessly endeavoured to achieve a rapprochement with India; but every such effort has been stultified by India's 98 20 refusal to abide by solemn international agreements or to accept a solution determined by the rules of international law. In recent weeks, India's brazen effort to consolidate her conquest of Kashmir by a wanton display of force has precipitated a crisis that may well engulf both nations in the vortex of a devastating war.

Preoccupation with the Kashmir dispute—Britain's vilest legacy-has compelled Pakistan to tolerate a number of imperialism's worst vestiges, which in normal conditions would have been banished soon after the attainment of freedom. Pakistan remains tied to the British Commonwealth; its future constitution is still on the anyil and the antediluvian India Act of 1935 serves in its place. The States and Excluded Areas remain isolated from the country, governed by feudal potentates or bureaucrats who shun the clean air of democracy and hold the people in the vicious grip of untrammelled authoritarianism. The rights of the individual receive no greater respect from Authority than before Partition, and the use of the Safety Laws has not been abandoned. Industrial progress has been exasperatingly slow; and most Provincial Ministries seem interested in trying to evade, rather than solve, the agrarian problem. Our educational system retains its obsolete outlook and the task of mass-education has got no further than the planning stages. An outflow of raw materials and the large-scale import of manufactured goods still dominate our trade pattern. The refugee problem has not been liquidated, unemployment has not receded, and, despite an overall abundance of basic necessities, want and the fear of want still stalk our land, all III SUILUUC

It is necessary to lay greater stress on the national tasks that have not yet been fully accomplished, rather than on Pakistan's achievements, in order to combat the corroding influence of complacency and inaction. It cannot be gainsaid that, in many matters, those who bore the burden of guiding national activity during these years of severe strain have been inhibited by the various abnormal factors governing the birth of Pakistan. It is equally true, however, that certain important

aspects of Pakistan's social, economic, and political life could have been transformed, and brought nearer to the ideals that inspired the Pakistan movement, without meeting any insuperable difficulties. Whatever the causes that have hitherto delayed progress where delay was not unavoidable, it is essential that the nation's attention should be concentrated on these shortcomings so that necessary steps can be taken to make up for past neglect. The danger that faces Pakistan cannot be underestimated, but the present emergency should not be allowed to serve any section of our rulers with an alibi for apathy and indifference towards the country's normal problems. In fact, it should be realised that every policy which strengthens the fabric of Pakistan, by satisfying the needs and aspirations of our people, helps directly to prepare the country for defence against aggression and to withstand an attritive cold war.

Four years form a short span in the life of a nation, especially when they are its first years. However, since its inception Pakistan has proved its economic viability as an independent State, destroying the hopes of its enemies and allaying the fears of its friends. Despite the hostility of its two nearest neighbours, Pakistan has also secured a place for itself in the international field, steadily expanding its diplomatic and trade relations. Internally, the passage of time is bringing to our people a deeper political consciousness and a more realistic approach towards the problems that face the country. Factors such as these certainly justify the Pakistani people's sanguineness about the future greatness of their State. But what may be regarded as the biggest achievement of Pakistan's first few years is that a country carved out of a bigger one-somewhat haphazardly-with its two wings separated from each other by thousands of miles, has been integrated as one united whole. Its vast and heterogeneous population—comprising different races, supporting different faiths, and speaking different langauges-has emerged as one people, united in their determination to preserve their country's integrity and protect its just rights. This broad 2000000

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 Minimum de la la la minimum de la mi Neve de la minimum de national unity—which transcends, as it should, all normal political differences—makes Pakistan invincible, for it ensures that, whatever the future may have in store for us, no aggressor shall ever find peace or rest on our soil.

14 August 1952 The First Quinquennium

Five eventful years have passed since the green and white banner of Pakistan was first unfurled, symbolising the creation of a new State, the birth of a new nation. On that auspicious day, seventy million hearts beat a little faster and as many heads were raised with pride and joy to see their new flag, acquired through years of relentless struggle. There were, however, particularly in the Punjab, thousands of our brothers and sisters who were forbidden by circumstances to celebrate the historic occasion. But they too, marching in pathetic caravans along dusty roads littered with the dead and the dying, scanned the horizon for the green and white emblem which would mark the end of their travail, bringing them to the Land of Promise where they need no longer walk with Fear as a constant companion or greet Death as a merciful friend. Even those who had drained the cup of human sorrow to its bitter dregs joined their more fortunate fellow-citizens in hoping that a new life was opening before them and, however monstrous the price exacted for it, they could look forward with certainty to the realisation of all that had been denied to them during the long night of slavery. That common hope was a precious possession, for it signified the people's faith in themselves and in the ability and integrity of the Great Leader who had unfalteringly led them to their first great victory-the establishment of Pakistan. The end of the first quinquennium since the inception of our State offers an appropriate opportunity for making a frank appraisal of what has been done and what left undone by the people of Pakistan and those who rule the country, to see how far we have come towards fulfilling the hopes and expectations of yesterday

and, thus, been able to determine the path for tomorrow's journey.

In order to underline the need for urgent change in the present conditions, it is unnecessary, as it would be wrong, to claim that these five years have been barren of all achievement. It cannot be gainsaid that the attributes of political sovereignty acquired on 14 August 1947 have to some extent been employed to further the interests of the country and its people. A beginning has been made, albeit hesitant and meagre, towards giving Government aid to indigenous industry. Similarly, some sort of agricultural planning has been initiated, and the right of the man behind the plough to be free of the burden of parasitic landlordism is widely admitted—even if little or nothing has been done to ensure that he can exercise this right. Pakistan's voice has begun to be heard in international gatherings, although too often it fails to achieve the clarity and strength that would command the unstitued respect of all friends of freedom and democracy. Under the pressure of the growing crisis in the West, some progress has also been made towards making our economy less dependent on our former British overlords. But, regrettably, little can be added to this list of minor achievements; and naturally, the mere absence of stagnation in certain fields can hardly provide cause for satisfaction to the citizens of a young State. On the whole, the country's progress has been tardy and tedious, and characterised by a haphazardness that brings no credit to the ruling party. The evil morass in which imperalism left us is still within sight, and in many important matters we have not severed the shackles of a humiliating past. It is often said, with some justification, that three, four, or five years in the life of a nation is too short a period over which to gauge its achievement. With equal plausibility, it is pointed out that the abnormal conditions which beset the birth of Pakistan have persisted to this day, hampering the work of developing the country into a prosperous and democratic State. It must be stressed, however, that these twin apologies seem to have

been given an exaggerated importance, and with the passing of every year their use has become more frequent, providing shelter from the rising storm of public censure for public servants who are timid and inefficient or selfish and dishonest. It needs to be realised more keenly that, if other countries have maintained the mass enthusiasm which brought them their freedom and have harnessed it to the tasks of reconstruction, Pakistan, too, can revive the revolutionary sweep of earlier days and tackle its myriad problems with the same fervour and willing self-sacrifice that brought about the fruition of a poet's dream. If in other lands national problems have not been put in cold storage because of international difficulties, there is no reason why this should be condoned in Pakistan. And, in any case, much more could have been done in spheres where long-term plans are not needed and the influence of adverse international circumstances is negligible.

The historian of the future will probably regard Pakistan's first quinquennium as a period of great confusion. He will be compelled to record how the ruling party, deprived of the Quaid-i-Azam's dynamic leadership, frittered away the fund of goodwill it had inherited and, unable to safeguard its position on the strength of concrete achievements, began to employ unseemly methods to retain its power. In five years, a whole series of Safety Laws and Ordinances have followed each other in quick succession, augmenting the ample provisions for authoritarian rule left to the rulers of Pakistan by the departing British. These so-called laws stifle freedom of expression, gag the Press, and add to the burden of executive tyranny that the people have to bear. In more than one Province, the door to an orderly change of Government has been barred by repeated postponement of elections or by perverting the process of democracy through shameless gerrymandering and manipulation of the electoral machinery. Not unexpectedly in these circumstances, education has languished, corruption has remained uncontrolled, and the general administration has not rid itself completely of the

methods of a foreign bureaucracy. The Constitution has been on the anvil for five long years and charges of unnecessary delay are monotonously answered with naive excuses by the self-avowed perfectionists who control the Constituent Assembly. More recently, some unexplained resignations from the Basic Principles Committee, and the mysterious silence of the chief designers of the promised masterpiece of a Constitution, have raised the fear that its final shape may not guarantee the untrammelled democracy to which both the leaders and the people of Pakistan are pledged. The rise of these undemocratic trends, and the snail's pace at which the debris of a century of imperialist misrule are being cleared. can be linked, almost directly, to the timidity shown by our rulers in the field of economic planning and activity. If the economy of Pakistan has not been transformed, if the living standards of our common people have not improved, if unprecedented unemployment stalks the land, and if deadly diseases are exacting a heavier toll of life than ever before, the responsibility for this state of affairs must be accepted by those who are unable to overcome their respect for the right of a few to own and control our national wealth—even when this means the forfeiture by many of their right to live. Our agriculture remains tied to antediluvian processes, and the vast majority of the millions who work on the land remain abject serfs under a vicious feudal system. Our industrial advancement has largely been made dependent on the benevolence of our erstwhile masters and their trans-Atlantic friends. It is not surprising, therefore, that the fruits of five years of industrial conferences, committees and subcommittees are disappointingly insignificant. In the international arena, our dispute with India over her aggression in Kashmir remains unsettled, because the ring-masters of the United Nations, in whose hands we have been content to leave the problem, are not interested in what is right or wrong, but in the sale of their help to the highest bidder. In other matters, our spokesmen have too often lent their support to the Western Powers, as if they were blissfully ignorant of the

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imperialist nature of the West's aims, and unaware of the fact that these wielders of napalm bombs and experts in germ warfare are determined either to control the world or wreck it. Although the magnificent support given to Tunisia and certain other Middle East countries has done much to raise Pakistan's prestige, the suspicion lingers abroad that we are in every possible sense a part of the British Commonwealth. It is absolutely necessary that the drift of previous years should be abandoned. The people of Pakistan must be allowed to enjoy their democratic rights and the rule of law must be restored. The new Constitution, without unwanted checks on the people's will, should be promulgated as soon as possible and country-wide elections held. The country's economy must be reorganised. And, in foreign affairs, Pakistan must sever her ties with the British Empire and its imperialist allies, and take her proper place among the nations pledged to safeguard peace and genuine democracy. If the vagaries of the recent past can be buried with due haste, and if we can follow the straight and democratic path, the second chapter of our post-Partition history can begin on a note of hope, for once our internal weaknesses have been conquered, no power on earth can hinder the country's onward march.

In retrospect, it appears that the people of Pakistan have been far too charitable to those who led the movement for liberation and, on its success, found themselves installed in positions of power and authority. Even when, after a cruel Fate deprived us of the Great Leader, many of the chosen leaders were found to have feet of clay, the people suppressed their growing discontent in the hope that, given more time, the leaders would check their own waywardness and betake themselves to the task of honouring their pledges. This has not happened. With so many of them involved in a disgraceful scramble for office, their responsibilities have been discharged either half-heartedly or not at all. The people have so far watched these antics with amused contempt or apathetic anger. The time has come when the people's benevolent noninterference in the doings or misdoings of their rulers must be replaced by sharp vigilance. Further indulgence can only be regarded a deliberate dereliction of a duty they owe to themselves and to posterity. It is necessary that the people should reorganise themselves on a political basis, not only for proper public co-operation with Governmental authority for the accomplishment of national tasks and for keeping a check on Ministerial work, but also because discontent among a people politically unorganised may give rise to unhealthy trends. Some progress towards a revival of political activity, as opposed to factional or personal intrigues, has already been made with the emergence of the Opposition parties; but a great deal more needs to be done before public frustration and apathy can be overcome and the widespread desire to improve present conditions canalised into healthy channels. The politically conscious sections of our people must realise that no expectation of reward or fear of revenge should hinder them from shouldering the tasks that face the nation. When the future of a whole people is at stake, petty alibis will not serve as a salve for an injured conscience, nor will they be able to change the harsh verdict of future generations. Our problems are not obscure; the remedies are well known: if the people of Pakistan can be mobilised for political action. and the wisdom and courage they undoubtedly possess are applied to the tasks awaiting their attention, by the end of another five years we could build in Pakistan an edifice based on social equality and economic justice, an edifice that would dazzle the world, bring joy to our friends, and confound our ayat Institute enemies.

The Seventh Year

After seven years the fact of our having acquired a homeland can no longer provide sufficient cause for complacent satisfaction. Our liberation from bondage and the struggle to protect our freedom must be regarded as only the first battle in the war to win for our people a new and happier

dispensation. Therefore, the joy and exuberance of today's national festival must not be allowed to dim our appraisal of the many tasks that lie ahead of us. The flags proudly fluttering above our heads, the gay buntings and lights, the parades and *melas*, are fittingly expressive of the joy in our hearts. But it is equally important that on this day each one of us should soberly and frankly assess what we, as a people, have made of our freedom. What has been the pace of our progress? How much nearer are our people to the realisation of their desires and aims? How truly has the country's future course been set by those at the helm? In answering these questions each citizen must carefully analyse the situation, and try to evolve a course of action that would help to strengthen the people's will to tackle the unfinished national tasks and hasten their march towards the goal which inspired them in their campaign for freedom and gave them a unity and cohesion unprecedented in modern history.

Pakistan has reached the seventh milestone of its brief journey as an independent State after an eventful year, which witnessed the culmination of certain trends and of the policy changes that were heralded by the political upheaval of April 1953. In the political sphere, the disintegration of the ruling Party has not been halted; and, even after the crushing defeat in East Bengal, no serious efforts are being made to resurrect the Muslim League, to purge it of elements whose bovine stupidity restricts their activity to a continuous search for new pastures, or to give it a definite political programme which could be submitted to the test of free elections. In East Bengal the Muslim League rules under Section 92-A, while in the Provinces of West Pakistan the Ministries owe their existence largely to electoral gerrymandering and their retention of power to the Centre's support. The Opposition parties have not succeeded fully in presenting to the people a clear-cut alternative to the Muslim League's misrule. In East Bengal the United Front, betrayed by the senile impetuosity and political aberrations of its former leader, has been driven out of office and no one knows when the Central Government

will consider it opportune to restore to the people the right to be ruled by a Government of their own choice. In the western zone, the Opposition parties, faced with repression and a denial of civil liberties, have so far been unable to muster sufficient strength to challenge the Muslim League. This unhappy state of affairs can be remedied only if the people take a more active interest in the country's political life; and this in turn requires that all fetters on political activity should be struck off and the rule of law ensured. The stagnation in the political sphere is, not unnaturally, reflected in most other fields of national activity. There has, of course, been gratifying progress in certain sections of the economic field; but the full benefit of the advance made has not always been transmitted to the people who most need relief. Agriculture has been expanded and millions of acres of new land are being brought under the plough; but, despite the beautiful promises enshrined in the ruling party's manifestos, its basic pattern remains completely feudal, thereby hampering all real progress and perpetuating a vicious form of social and economic injustice. The new factories that are going up in different parts of the country augur well for the future, but so far the mill-owners' rapacity and the Government's apathy have combined to allow the consumer to be fleeced without mercy. As a result of these and other factors, Pakistan's price structure imposes a heavy burden on the common man, already weighed down by an administration which has been unable to weed out corruption and profiteering.

...In the international field. Pakistan's main problem the disputes with her closest neighbour—remains unsettled, and the hopes raised last year by the Delhi talks were smashed by India's return to obdurate intransigence after an all-toobrief period of lucidity. On the wider canvas, Pakistan has virtually been made to abandon her neutralist position and to veer round towards a close alliance with the American bloc of Powers. The full implications of this change of policy, and its likely effect on our domestic policies and foreign relations, have yet to be fully understood by the people and necessary

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steps devised to safeguard the country from the dangers involved in our association with the chain of military alliances sponsored by America.

It would thus appear that in some respects the dawn of our freedom has been only a shade less dismal than the long night of slavery. Dark. overhanging clouds-whether they come from across the borders or have risen like evil vapours from the bogs and marshes which we have so far failed to drain—still cast an ugly shadow across our fair land. What then is our future? The timid of heart may surrender themselves to frustration and pessimism, the ignorant may turn back longingly to the past, and the feeble-minded may hope that some alien agency—for a reasonably small fee will contract to take care of our difficulties. The false prophets declaim that the foreseeable future offers no hope of release from the pervading gloom, that for long the sun will not brighten life in our fields and factories, our towns and villages, and that the mass of our people will remain cowering in their mud hovels and congested slums. This cannot be. The history of Man clearly shows that no earthly power can thwart the will of a nation determined to break off its shackles, and that, given a wise and courageous leadership. there are no obstacles that cannot be overcome. It also shows that national regeneration is possible only through national effort, the full mobilisation of the people's inherent strength and the proper harnessing of the country's total resources. To bring about the desired transformation, and to gear the tempo of our national effort to the demands of present circumstances, it is patently necessary to associate the people more directly with the formulation of national plans and their implementation; and it needs to be reiterated that this can best be achieved when democracy is unfettered and the nation's will is unhampered and unrestricted. Those who fear the people or lack confidence in them declare that what we see at the end of the trail is a mirage, a mere illusion born of unrealistic idealism; that the attainment of rapid democratic progress and economic rehabilitation is not for us; that the

mass of our people must for many decades remain satisfied with the barrenness created by their continued deprivation of social. economic, and political rights. This propaganda must resolutely be rejected and the purveyors of pessimism exposed as the friends of those who hold a vested interest in the *status quo*. We believe that if the vision and faith, the fervour and enthusiasm, the unity and determination, that fostered the birth of the State are revived, the clouds which darken our path can be banished and the caravan of our people led out of the wastelands to the verdure that gleams in the approachable distance.

14 August 1955 The Eighth Year

Looking back over the past year, it can be said that the eighth milestone of our journey as a free nation is posted on an eminence which we have attained after floundering through the valley of despair—frustrated by political uncertainty and the denial of liberty, and haunted by the fear that democracy may be altogether banished and authoritarianism enthroned in its desecrated temple. That this dread fear has now largely been dispelled provides cause for immense satisfaction; but the fact that not long ago it had completly dominated the nation's life calls for a careful appraisal of Pakistan's brief history, and of the factors that led us so near to a fatal pitfall. Since its very birth Pakistan's horizons have been clouded; the madness that accompanied Partition, the hostile acts of our nearest neighbours, and the machinations of other foreign Powers, cast their dark shadows athwart our path. The unfriendly fog of foreign origin could, however, have been scattered, if to the pervading gloom had not been added the poisonous pall of smoke spread by our own leaders. It is an unhappy fact, but one which no honest chronicler can deny or overlook, that for many years political events in Pakistan have been moulded by partisan malice or partisan desires, that political principles have frequently been sacrificed and election pledges betrayed, that many of the ruling party's representatives have far too often exhibited a depraving selfishness, a blinding lust for power, a shameless greed for office. Thus, while most of our leaders have, in terms of national objectives, wandered aimlessly, knowing not where they were or where they would go, the nation has virtually been marking time, paying in sweat and blood the price of strenuous endeavour but making little real advance towards the goal...

An objective analysis of the events of the last few years clearly shows that political instability, born of the Muslim League leaders' insatiable thirst for power, has been the root cause of Pakistan's seemingly chronic malaise. The first manifestations of this power-mania appeared during the lifetime of the Quaid-i-Azam, but after an unjust fate had deprived Pakistan of its Founder's guidance, the virulent affliction acquired the proportions of an epidemic. Apparently, the attainment of political independence was not viewed by the bright gentlemen who dominated the ruling party as only the first stage in the struggle for liberation, as merely the acquisiton of the right and opportunity to build a State free from all vestiges of its colonial past, as the start of an era which called for the highest wisdom and the most selfless endeavour. The ruling group conducted themselves as if their main task was completed on 14 August 1947, and they could thereafter give themselves up to a mad pursuit of the gains of office, unhampered by any responsibility to the country and its people, or by considerations of political ethics and self-respect. This attitude could only bring chaos and disaster: and it was not long after the green and white banner was first unfurled that the people's proud confidence and hopefulness, their desire to share the burdens of national endeavour, began to give way to dismal doubts and fears, to apathy and frustration. Divested of popular backing, the ruling party's squabbling factions became even more unscrupulous. Elections were gerrymandered, the services were suborned to serve the Muslim League by dishonest and unfair means,

political opponents were arrested without charge or trial, and murder plots and conspiracies were invented to justify acts of brutal, vindictive terror. With the people's voice stifled by repressive laws, the scramble for high places became more intense, more disgraceful, and more uninhibited. This state of affairs culminated in the Governor-General's decision to disband the unrepresentative Constituent Assembly and virtually suspend the Constitution. Before his promise of restoring democratic rights could be implemented, a host of political leaders and their camp-followers, either seeking dangerous short-cuts to Constitutional progress or demented by the desire to retain their positions, tried very hard to divert Pakistan completely from the democratic path. A fortunate combination of circumstances helped to frustrate their design of disaster. The intervention of the country's higher courts, the people's opposition—although subdued and hesitant and the sanity of a strong element within the Government, saved the country from plunging into the abyss after it had very nearly reached the point of no return.

The country's release from the danger that had threatened the destruction of all our hopes and dreams gives us the opportunity to guard effectively against its resurrection. It is necessary, in the first place, that the antics of those whose political actions are guided solely by self-interest are no longer viewed with indulgence. The frustration and apathy that have atrophied the people's will and destroyed their initiative must be overcome, and a vigilant public opinion created to unmask these self-adoring office-hunters. Their unprincipled wrangling has not only muddled our political waters but set a pattern of behaviour which has been followed by various other classes-with catastrophic results. Further, the misdeeds of these master-planners of factional crusades have lent strength to those who decry democracy and hopefully prophesy its failure. It is perfectly obvious, however, that Pakistan's future progress depends on our ability to establish a genuinely democratic system. We believe that if our political masters can be made to abandon the

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vagaries of the past, if they resist the temptation to pay more attention to the acquisition of office than to the responsibilities it entails, if they do not thwart the democratic process or corrupt the services for personal ends, they will clear the path for the country's onward march. Some hope has arisen that the evils of the past may be buried. It is the people's duty to ensure that this hope is not belied, so that Pakistan's body politic can be organised in such a manner that the people's collective wisdom and patriotism, their courage and stamina, can be harnessed to the task of building up a State worthy of our ideals and aspirations.

14 August 1956 How Far is Freedom Yet?

On this day, nine years ago, Pakistan became a free country. How much longer will it be before the people of Pakistan become a free people?

Territorial independence is not the same thing as popular freedom. A country is free as soon as a native government supplants a foreign one. The people are free only when they acquire the power and the right to bestow the custody of State power on governments of their own choice and making. This is, of course, no more than a platitude. It is necessary to repeat it, however, and to continue repeating it for two reasons. The first reason is that the gentlemen who found themselves in power when independence came immediately set about dinning it into the people's ears that since Pakistan had been freed, the freedom of Pakistan's citizens no longer mattered one jot. As a matter of fact, the less freedom they had the better, so they said, because henceforth it was the Government's responsibility to safeguard the freedom of the country, and how could the Government do it if the people kept meddling all the time? Anyone who maintained otherwise, anyone who objected to the curtailment of civil liberties or the promiscuous use of emergency laws, anyone who clamoured for more democracy or less centralisation of power, was either a fool or a traitor.

It is doubtful whether the people were ever completely taken in by this transparently false reasoning, but in the first flush of national independence, its fatal implications did not register as clearly as they should have done. Even today, after all that has happened during the last nine years, some members of the ruling junta can still be heard talking the same way, although rather shamefacedly and without much assurance. And even today they can find among us professional trumpeters to magnify their words and to shout 'bravo' to whatever they say. It is, therefore, necessary to remind the people, and to keep them reminded, that what they celebrate today is the deliverance of their country and not their own deliverance, that while they must rejoice on this day at the freedom which has come to their homeland, they must reserve their jubilations at their own freedom until the day when it is actually here. The second reason is even more important. Interested elements have begun to insinuate into the national consciousness the poisonous thought that democracy does not really suit the genius of our people, that it is some kind of outlandish claptrap which had better be kept away from our poor benighted people. The advocates of this view would have us believe that our people are congenitally unfit for any state higher than that of political serfdom. It rarely occurs to these gentlemen that they come of the same stock as the people they decry and do not belong to some special breed imported under some foreign-aid programme. In the present state of national demoralisation, however, such ideas have some fascination, not only for those who hope to gain by their acceptance, but also for those who will thereby invite their doom. Every time the ruling gentry manage to reduce national affairs to a particularly unholy mess, and they do it with almost clockwork regularity, the cry that goes up from numerous interested quarters is not for more freedom for the people, but for less, not for greater democracy, but for greater dictatorship. It is necessary to remind our people, therefore, and to keep them reminded, that they can never hope to be rid of their besetting ills until

they can personally attend to them, that their house will never be put in order until they take charge of it themselves.

It seems strange indeed that, nine years after independence, it should still be necessary to explain that freedom is a good thing and that democracy is neither dangerous nor undesirable. The phenomenon is easily understood, however, in the context of the direction, or rather misdirection, of our political life since independence. On the one hand, the core of our ruling class have steadily moved themselves further and further away from the danger of political contamination by contact with the masses, have come to rely more and more on the sanction of force rather than the sanction of popular opinion, and in consequence have almost completely divorced State policies, domestic and foreign, from national sentiment and the wishes of the people. Whether these policies are good or bad is beside the point. The point is that these policies are the brainchildren of bureaucratic scribblers in the Secretariats, of foreign experts, of big or small fry in the Government, and not a practical codification of popular desire. On the other hand, the bulk of the intelligentsia and the politically conscious elements, at least in West Pakistan, have either given up the fight or have become more and more resigned to the inevitability of a long period of waiting before better days come round again. And the people have been left out in the cold by both sides. No wonder then that a good many of them have come to believe that all politics is a fraud, that there is no hope for them and no future, unless some mysterious deliverer emerges from somewhere—a role that every one of our bungling politicians is only too eager to claim.

This dual process of political aggrandizement on the one hand and political demoralisation on the other began a long time ago, in fact soon after independence. When Pakistan was established it was the obvious duty of the leaders of the Muslim League to have the seal of national approval affixed to the deed of transfer of power drawn up by foreign hands. The Muslim League rulers, however, did nothing of the sort. They merely settled down in their chairs (until they started the game of toppling each other over) and tacitly fostered the doctrine that since the people had chosen the Muslim League as their mouthpiece to voice the Pakistan demand, the leaders of this body had thereby acquired a right, divine, absolute, and irrevocable, to rule Pakistan as they pleased. This initial lapse, however, could have been overlooked if the ruling gentry had made some effort to take the next obvious step towards democracy, namely if they had drafted a Constitution and enabled the people to set up a national Parliament and a representative Government. Again, the rulers did nothing of the sort. The only Constitution-making the late unlamented Constituent Assembly ever did, in seven years of its existence, was the passage of the Objectives Resolution. The only sop thrown to the people by way of recognising their political existence was the holding of piecemeal, gerrymandered elections in the Provinces on the basis of factional alliances. And all that these rehashed Provincial Assemblies and Governments did was to dedicate their entire time and energy to perennial personal intrigues, to an unending *dangal* of political catch-as-catch-can.

This phase of our political life, or lack of it, ended in October 1954, when the old Constituent Assembly was given the *coup de grace* and government by Ordinance began. During this interlude the Government and the law courts frequently appeared to be on the brink of a head-on clash. If this interlude proved to be rather brief and did not take on a deadlier form, the credit should perhaps, in part, go to our law courts. Nevertheless, this period did leave behind an important residue in our body politic. It brought about an unannounced but fairly visible shift in the balance of political power. In this redistribution, the professional bureaucrat gained at the expense of the professional politician. This represented a net loss for democracy because the former class is, both physically and mentally, even further removed from the commonalty of citizens than the latter.

Finally, in the middle of last year, a new Constituent Assembly was brought into being; the work of constitution-

making began to progress at some speed and hopes revived that the weary road away from popular freedom and democratic rule was about to end and a brighter path about to emerge from the haze of time. These hopes became more impetuous and less restrained when the Constitution was finally completed, in spite of the flaws, traps, and loop-holes that this document visibly contained. These hopes centred round three things. First, it was hoped that the men in control of national affairs would be constrained to respect the letter and spirit of the constitutional document they had themselves conceived and steered to completion—a deed for which they claim no end of credit. Second, it was hoped that the passage of the Constitution would be followed, almost immediately, by the announcement of some definite, or at least approximate, date for the convening of a General Election and the appropriate administrative and constitutional machinery towards this end immediately set in motion. Third, it was hoped that as soon as the prospects of a General Election became real our ruling junta would, in their own interest, lay off their favourite pastime of palace intrigues and revert to some form of constructive political activity, allowing their political rivals to do the same. None of these hopes has, unfortunately, found any substance to feed on. The prospects of a general election are as shadowy as ever, feuds and squabbles among the ruling gentry have grown fiercer, and the perversions of constitutional provisions and proprieties become nearly as constant as sunset and daybreak. It would be pointless to catalogue proofs; the events are too well known. Any vestige of doubt that the authors and custodians of the Constitution still attach some sanctity to this document will be removed by the latest performance of Governor Fazlul Hug. To save a few partisan skins, the East Pakistan Assembly has been prorogued twice within a few weeks with a shamelessness that must be unique in the annals of constitutional bodies.

How far then is freedom yet? When will the day of independence coincide with the day of freedom? When will

the people's rule begin? When will the Constitution actually begin to operate, for at the moment we are Governed Merely by its interim provisions? Obviously, general elections to all elective bodies in the country, and particularly to the National Parliament, are the very first step towards this goal. This is the very beginning of the road. To be able to take this step, to be able to begin this road, it is the duty of all patriotic citizens, and of all political elements and parties who still retain a conscience, to unite and concentrate on two demands: the demand that a date for General Elections be publicly set immediately, and the demand that until elections are held, the present constitutional structure be maintained and the spirit of constitutional provisions respected. Much greater public vigilance is needed than some people imagine even to retain our direction towards the beginning of this road, for elements are still at work among us to lead us back into the lawless wilderness of personal rule.

23 March 1957 State of the Republic

While the first rays of the sun must dissipate the murky shadow of night, they do not always bring the comforting warmth that people expect with the morn. The delayed dawn of democracy in Pakistan-which was ushered in amidst joyful celebrations one year ago-has certainly illumined the path that we must follow; and, as a happy consequence, the public ear is no longer tortured by the din of the prowlers of the night who made the dark period of deprivation more horrible by brazenly clamouring for the perpetuation of some form of dictatorship. But with most people the numbness of mind and body after being left out in the cold for years does not seem to have been fully overcome; in certain essential respects national endeavour still suffers from near-paralysis and we stand almost where we did last year. That Pakistan's progress in many fields continues at a satisfactory pace is indeed gratifying; but this should not be allowed to divert the

people's attention from the fact that the battle for democracy and social justice has yet to be fought and won, and that until the opponents of political and economic reform have been defeated, the country will not be able to tread with real confidence the path that leads to its rendezvous with destiny.

The first task before the people of Pakistan is to carry forward the democratic process begun last year; for otherwise uncertainty will continue to mar the future of the land. On the occasion of the birth of the Republic we were constrained to point out that the laying of the foundations could give only temporary satisfaction, unless this was followed within a reasonable time by construction of the superstructure envisaged in the constitutional plan. Stressing the urgent necessity of consulting the electorate on the pattern of governance devised for the country and allowing the people to choose their rulers, we had voiced the demand that Pakistan's first General Election must be held within twelve months of the Republic's inauguration, and that, in the meantime, the ruling parties must build up new traditions and conventions that would strengthen rather than vitiate the democratic fabric of the Constitution. If their willingness and ability to breathe life into the Constitution by earnestly giving effect to its most important political provisions were to be regarded as a test of whether the country's rulers had sincerely abandoned the attitude which imposed such a long period of travail on Pakistan, it would appear that they have not passed the test, that they remain wedded to the ways of authoritarianism. As far as the General Election is concerned, apart from the fact that certain election appointments have been made, we are no nearer that great day than we were a vear ago...

Pakistan has during recent years taken big strides in industrial development, and, despite the absence of proper planning and control, the expansion of industries has continued at a reasonable pace. There are, of course, a number of problems relating to Pakistan's transition from an agricultural country to one with a mixed economy which

need to be tackled more effectively; among other things, the administration must aim at a better system of priorities in nurturing industrial units, check the prices of indigenous goods, speed up the development of power resources, and remove the various bottlenecks that impede trade. All this should help to reduce the imbalance in our economy; but the real economic problem that faces Pakistan is that of stagnation, even deterioration, in the agricultural sector. Agricultural regeneration clearly must take precedence over all other problems, not only because of the food shortage and the fact that continued food imports threaten to hold up all developments plans, but also because, without higher standards of production in agriculture, Pakistan will run short of industrial raw materials, and without higher standards of living in the villages, the market for our industrial goods will remain severely restricted. Further, apart from being wasteful and inefficient, the present system condemns the biggest section of our population to a life of ignorance, indigence, and ill-rewarded toil. The yield per acre in Pakistan is about the lowest in the world, primarily because the big landlords are on the whole not sufficiently interested in farming, and the rack-rented tenants lack the incentive and opportunity to improve their methods. We see that while the people starve and food is purchased abroad at a heavy cost, and while lakhs of hard-working peasants fret in idleness, vast tracts of land lie waste and millions of cusecs of water run down uselessly to the sea. The feudal system, for which Authority seems to have great respect, prevents the renovation of agriculture; it keeps the mass of our people at a low level of subsistence and emasculates their political and social rights; it threatens our economic viability and thereby our political independence. The country can either preserve the privileges of the mighty lords of the latifundia or it can preserve its economic and political independence; it cannot possibly save both, and it has little time left to make a choice.

It needs to be clearly understood that Pakistan's future progress will be governed largely by the manner and speed

with which we tackle these twin problems-that of ensuring due regard for the fundamental principles of democratic polity and that of evolving a rational land system. They are rightly called twin problems because, apart from exercising almost equal influence on our national life, they are closely interlinked. In the first place, the custodians of political power are, quite often, themselves the beneficiaries of feudal privilege: therefore, they will anyhow continue to hinder the introduction of agrarian reforms. And those among the present ruling group who have no direct vested interest in feudalism also realise that the liberation of the peasant from the economic and social shackles that make him politically ineffective will ultimately break up their monopoly of power. Similarly, if unfettered democracy is established in the by the Pirs and Mirs and Khans and Nawabs-the peasant will begin to exercise his right of vote more courageously and more judiciously, and thus secure at least some of his demands through a more representative legislature. Political autocracy and feudal privilege tend to support each other. because one cannot easily survive without the other. The struggle against political oppression and the antediluvian agrarian set-up must, therefore, be a joint effort. And today's situation underlines the fact that this struggle for a more just dispensation cannot be postponed any longer without promoting economic chaos and political frustration. It is essential, therefore, that all political elements capable of thinking beyond their own personal or group interests should unite to overcome the grave peril that faces the nation. Only in this way can we ensure that the country's steady advance will not be thwarted, that the Nation will soon reach its full stature, and that every citizen of the Republic will be able to stand up straight and unbowed, proud of his inalienable rights, free from the burden of hunger, free from the fear of oppression.

14 August 1957 **Ten Years**

We celebrate today the tenth anniversary of the dawn of freedom. Whatever changes fortune may bring us and whatever occasions, happy or sad, may in future befall, the fourteenth day of August will forever remain the most important date in our national history. This day, therefore, should be a day of rejoicing, not regret, of hope, not despair, of looking forward to the happiness of unborn tomorrows. not of looking back on the heartache and the pain of unhappy vesterdays. And yet it is not so with us, and rarely has been. Year after year on this day, the shadow of uncertainties, the memory of wrongs endured and hardships gone through, the deadweight of a seemingly changeless polity, inhibits the joy and obstructs the song, and although we still devoutly greet the day, the sight is clouded with anxieties and the heart yearns for a fuller and a more carefree hour. Why should it be so? It is not because the country has made no material progress during the last ten years. It has, We have set up many new light industries, even though their products are neither cheap nor plentiful enough to lighten the daily cares of the great majority of our people. We have built dams and barrages and brought vast new areas under cultivation, even though our daily bread has become more scarce than ever. The defences of the country have been consolidated and we face no immediate threat of aggression, even though some very grave disputes with our closest neighbours are still unresolved. Above all, we have, at long last, obtained a Constitution for the land, even though its most important provisions still await the birth of popularly-elected legislatures.

This record, however inadequate, should yet have provided the common man with material enough for national self-confidence and hopeful resolve. It has done nothing of the kind. In public and in privacy, inside homes and out in the market place, the speech of the people is sick with disgust

and frustration, streaked with impotent anger. There are many reasons for this, but there is one basic cause which enters into them all. And this basic cause is the complete exclusion of the people from the power which should have devolved on them with the coming of independence, the power which has been rightfully theirs ever since this day ten years ago, but has been withheld from them by a succession of selfappointed coteries. For ten years, one person (or group of persons) after another, with the help of a few cronies and camp-followers, has set himself up as the custodian of the people's political belongings, and each such regime has been speedily undone by the jealousies, intrigues, and machinations of rival pretenders. With the passage of time these conflicts in the ruling camp have sharpened, the methods of attaining or retaining power have become more ruthless and more corrupt, the contact between the rulers and the ruled become steadily more remote. Crises, emergencies, deadlocks, enthronements and dethronements, squabbles and hand-clasps, attachments and defections, are all enacted within this same small group which changes shape and colour with every change of season and ever remains the same. In none of these transactions have the people ever had a hand and in many of them even the present hand-picked legislatures are allowed little voice. And this is the cause-this arrogation of power by an apparently irremovable few, this forcible suspension of the people's right to choose their own government and call them to account through popular institutions—for all our ills, political, economic, moral, and psychological. It is because of this that politics' and politician' have become terms of abuse and political organisation has become practically extinct. Because of it, the wealth of the land has become fair spoil for anyone who has some political capital to sell; because of it normal commercial routines have given place to smash and grab methods for permits and licences, and the black market is the only market for many goods. This is the cause of corruption in high places and low, the cause of the prevailing mentality to make speedily what you can, for

tomorrow your Ministry or the Ministry of your friends might die. Because of it honest praise has been replaced by grovelling and flattery, honest criticism supplanted by slander and blackmail.

And yet these abuses, and the state of mind they have engendered among our people, are by no means native to our national genius or national temperament, as many prophets of doom would have us believe. They are as artificial and as hand-made as the arbitrary political structure which has given them birth. They will endure as long as the present irreparable political structure endures. It is foolish to hope or pretend that any coalitions, combinations, or permutations can give to this structure either strength or stability. Under the present circumstances all parliamentary coalitions will be coalitions of the same few people whom no political ideal holds together, all combinations will be the combinations of the same irreconcilable personal interests. One hears some talk these days of a 'National Government' composed of the present parliamentary Parties. Nothing could be more unrealistic. How can you have a 'national' Government in whose composition the nation has had no voice? When not a couple of these groups have been able to keep house together, how will half a dozen of them live happily ever after?

There is, therefore, only one remedy to the situation: the reversion of power into the hands of the people. And there is only one method whereby it can be done—free, impartial General Elections, the setting up of genuinely representative parliamentary institutions and the total enforcement of the Constitution...

23 March 1958 A Republic in Travail

Pakistan's first Republic Day, it might be remembered, was celebrated with great pomp and ceremony, as if it really marked the severance of all our links with an unhappy past. Brave speeches were made at mass meetings and generous promises showered on the people: colourful processions and parades marched through gaily bedecked streets: dazzling banquets were arranged; and special emissaries were invited from all corners of the globe to witness the beginning of an era of democratic freedom for the people of this land...

Fully two years have passed since that day of rich promise. Pakistan remains burdened with an undemocratic regime, its governance vested in legislatures that mock the electorate's right to choose and change their rulers. Effective authority is still concentrated in a few grasping hands, while the people are as far removed as ever before from the centre of power, their problems unattended, their demands ignored. Many of the country's laws can still be suspended by executive fiat: and even its new Constitution can be amended by the President if, in his opinion, such amendment is necessary in order to remove some constitutional or political difficulty. While enforcement of the Constitution still awaits Pakistan's first-ever General Election, powerful voices have begun to inveigh against the pattern of our fundamental law and to suggest dangerous alternatives. This document is certainly not free from flaws, and a rational revision of some of its provisions is an essential task. But, in the first place, many of those who call for immediate changes in the Constitution seek to make it less, and not more, democratic. Secondly, an attempt to introduce major changes in the Constitution now is bound to resurrect the danger of yet another postponement of the elections: this, in turn, could easily lead to chaos. Fortunately, however, most people now realise that it would be extremely short-sighted to work for some minor alteration in the plan at the risk of destroying the whole edifice. This is indeed most heartening, and if such public pressure is maintained it should help to frustrate the designs of those who fear the elections because they fear the people.

Not surprisingly, during this prolonged period of constitutional confusion. Pakistan has drifted from crisis to crisis. Over the last twelve months, for example, there have

been three Prime Ministers at the Centre, and three Chief Ministers in West Pakistan-apart from a few months of direct gubernatorial rule-and if in East Pakistan the Ministry has so far remained more or less unchanged, it is not for any lack of effort on the part of those who seem to judge every political issue in terms of the narrowest personal or factional interests. In the absence of effective popular sanctions, a distressingly large number of political leaders have felt free to manoeuvre and intrigue without any regard for political principles or moral scruples. While certain parties have shown no great loyalty to pledges or programme, individuals have considered themselves free to search for richer pastures without any loyalty to their parties; and during crucial sessions, when votes attain inflationary prices, the Assembly floor has been crossed in different directions by the same Member twice, or even thrice, within twenty-four hours...

How and when will the nation's travail be brought to an end? Firstly, let it be realised that we cannot sit back and hope that some guardian angel will cleanse our stables; the responsibility is wholly ours, and it will either be tackled by us or not at all. Further, it is plain that our system of government cannot be blamed for the fact that the nation is still marking time. And, while it can be said that the people have been guilty of apathy, let us also remember that since 1946 they have not been consulted on any major national issue, and that they have been betrayed and tricked by their leaders again and again. It will, however, not be easy to do so now, because the people have already shed many of their illusions; and as the exposure of parties and leaders continues. they will learn to guard their votes more jealously and use them more judiciously. Finally, no one has yet presented a more hopeful alternative to the political system enshrined in our Constitution. Those who talk of dictatorship or revolutionary councils forget that the people have seen these methods at work in Pakistan, and they rightly feel that the remedy is much worse than the disease. We believe, therefore, that if the democratic process is restored in our country, and if the people are given the opportunity to decide who should rule the country and what policies they should follow, we will soon start finding the right solutions to our national problems, and gradually build up a stable, strong, and prosperous State.

14 August 1958 Eleven Years of Freedom

...For almost a decade now, the political arena has been the safe playground of men cursed with unlimited greed and gifted with limited ability. Every year has been a year of crisis, and every season the season of intrigue. It almost seems that the only stable factor in our political life has been a constant instability. Governments have come and gone with bewildering frequency, and usually for reasons that do not have the remotest connection with any public or national issue. Thus, year after year, Pakistan's annalists have been compelled to record pledges that are never redeemed, professions that are never honoured, predictions that never come to pass, alliances that never last, and explanations that tend to mystify because they yeil rather than unfold the truth.

Not surprisingly in these circumstances. Pakistan has drifted steadily towards economic ruin and political disaster: its agriculture languishes, its industry falters... Falling production and rising prices combine to make life increasingly difficult for the common man, while wasteful Government expenditure, the vulgar ostentation of the rich few, and the widespread corruption, add greatly to his bitterness. Prompt and drastic measures are necessary to save Pakistan from virtual bankruptcy; but our rulers seem to be content with obtaining foreign gifts to feed the people and relying on heavier doses of foreign aid for maintaining some semblance of continued economic development.

Pakistan's increasing economic dependence on foreign aid has, since the process began in 1953, been matched by its rulers' increasing reliance on Western guidance and advice in

formulating their policies—and both forms of dependence greatly help and strengthen each other. Since, today, almost every major national project—ranging from some heavy industry to a sanitary scheme in an over-grown village—is at least partly financed by foreign gifts or loans, a whole army of foreign advisers, consultants, and contractors has invaded our land; and quite often their advice can be rejected by Pakistani experts only at the cost of abandoning the disputed project. In foreign affairs, Pakistan's more or less independent role during the first five years of its existence has given way to a policy of siding almost always with the West. This has, apart from other consequences, damaged Pakistan's relations with the whole non-Western world. Nothing illustrates the weakness of our present foreign policy more clearly than the fact that Pakistan appears willing to make friends only with those who are willing to be friends of the West-and this is an ever-narrowing circle. But what makes the tragedy more pathetic is that the Pakistan Government's allegiance to the West has no reciprocal basis. On none of the issues which really matter to Pakistan—with Kashmir heading the list—have we received any sympathy or support from our Western friends, nor is such help-which was said to be the price that we were to receive for joining their pacts and alliances—ever likely to be made available. Obviously, our foreign policy has brought us to a dead end, and it would be catastrophic to try to maintain its present direction.

The only relief in this dismal prospect is provided by the assurance that Pakistan's first General Elections will be held early next year; and, if only because our rulers dare not order another postponement, it is reasonable to assume that this promise will not be betrayed now. Apart from the fact that the elections will allow full enforcement of the Constitution and thus block the road to authoritarianism, they will show the people that they themselves are the real sovereigns in Pakistan. It is quite possible that, confused by the clamour of the political market-place, the people will return to power many among those who have been responsible for creating the present mess. However, even if this does happen, the fact

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that they will have been elected to proper legislatures, and not mere caricatures of representative institutions, should help them to devise policies more closely linked to the country's needs. But one would like to hope that, even in the first election, the people will try to drive away from the seats of power all those who have been guilty of neglect or ineptness or worse in governing the country. They must realise that tolerance and patience are excellent qualities in regard to individual conduct, but in the affairs of the nation, tolerance of misrule, of the misuse of power, of corruption and bribery, and patience in the face of denial of their rights, are not virtues but weaknesses which sap the morale of the nation and which must be stamped out if we are to mould Pakistan's destiny in accordance with the ideals and aspirations that inspired the struggle for its achievement.

²³ March 1959 Pakistan: Retrospect and Prospect

This day marks the anniversary of a major turning point in the history of our people, the end of an era of compromise, and the beginning of a decisive stage in the people's renewed struggle for freedom. Gradually, as the policy of dependence on Whitehall for special safeguards, and acceptance of alien authority as the arbiter of our national destiny, began to give way before the people's urge to cast off their chains, thousands of earnest political workers joined the battle and carried the message of freedom from carpeted pandals and rich drawing-rooms to the humblest hamlet and the darkest hovel. The movement developed an irresitible sweep because it was the expression of the people's urge to be free-free from foreign misrule, from the fear of involvement in distant wars, from political subjugation and economic exploitation; free to build an egalitarian society and harness our huge resources for the common weal.

Unfortunately, the achievement of freedom was sullied by senseless slaughter and rapine. This vast suffering shocked

and stunned our people, but it did not dishearten them. They willingly paid the price of liberty, confident that in the haven they had sought and worked for, their wounds would be healed and their tortured minds comforted. The people were then ready to answer any call to action, to reconstruct their broken lives and build up the new State. Dismay and despair began to spread when they saw that a host of self-seekers had secured high places, that with many of those who assumed power in their name the promise of pelf and position was far more attractive than the promises they had made to the people. Politics was soon replaced by intrigue; corruption spread in all fields; and honest political workers were harried and hounded. Elections were either not held at all or gerrymandered and falsified. The Constitution was deliberately delayed from year to year, and when completed it was not implemented, not because it was unworkable, but merely because it could not offer—as no democratic Constitution ever should—a firm written guarantee of lifemembership in the Government for those in power. Thus, the freedom won after a prolonged struggle by the efforts of countless thousands of political workers and unknown heroes, who suffered torture and incarceration and, sometimes, even death, was frittered away by politicians whose lust for power seems to have suppressed all decent political instincts.

In these circumstances, it is utterly wrong to say that democracy has failed in Pakistan—because democracy was never given a fair chance. On the other hand, the absence of real democracy was responsible for the mess created by the small coterie of politicians and officials who ruled the country for almost twelve years in different combinations and under different labels. In fact, it is obvious that no ruling group, however efficient and well-intentioned, can carry out its programme fully without organised public support, and that mobilisation of the people for any cause is possible only through a healthy political life. The conclusion is inescapable that the present regime should start planning without delay for the establishment of a democratic polity. It has been

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announced on more than one occasion that it is the Government's intention to establish a democratic form of government as soon as possible, and that its pattern will be decided upon in consultation with the people. This declaration is, however, being interpreted in different ways by different people. For example, it has been suggested that the proposed consultation with the people should be through a Commission or some other Government agency. If this matter is seriously pondered over, it will be realised that such a consultation can neither be satisfactory from the Government's viewpoint nor will it satisfy the people. The best, perhaps the only, way to consult the people is to ask them to elect their nominees to sit together in a National Assembly. The principle of nomination of men of learning has also been hinted at; but in the year AD 1995, it is a little difficult to debate this question with any seriousness. It would clearly be far better to have no Assembly at all than to have one that has no democratic sanction. The suggestions regarding a limited franchise are also not likely to be either acceptable or useful. Neither a literacy qualification nor the grant of voting rights to men of property, nor the removal of women from the voters' list, can help to eliminate the factors that have vitiated past elections. In the same way, an indirect election is highly undesirable. because, apart from other reasons, it is easier to buy over a few dozen or even a few hundred persons rather than tackle millions of voters. To ensure that the people may send in the best available men, the first prerequisite is that the elections should be conducted with scrupulous honesty; and there can be no doubt whatsoever that the present regime is fully capable of ensuring that the ballot will not be tampered with by anybody. Given a clean election, it is reasonable to assume that a majority of the National Assembly will consist of genuine representatives of the people who will honestly serve the national interest.

It has been said that elections of any type should be avoided until the present Government has been able to accomplish the more important national tasks. This objection

apparently rests on the premise that political life tends to impede reform. In actual fact, however, mere executive action is never sufficient to guarantee the full success of Government's ameliorative measures; it needs to be backed by political education and debate, so that the people's real wishes can be made known and their voluntary assistance enlisted in the tasks of reconstruction. However, even if it were conceded that the Government's hands are too full just now, and that it should be given time to complete the process of land reforms and the purge of corrupt or inefficient officials, these tasks have already been taken in hand and will be completed before the end of the year; therefore, preparations for the creation of a National Assembly should be started immediately, because it will take at least six months to finalise the voters' lists and make other necessary arrangements. Another objection to this proposal is that, in the present circumstances, it is likely to allow the discredited and dishonest politicians to stage a come-back. In the first place, the fact that the elections will now be clean and honest should help to eliminate the worst political racketeers and create room for honest political workers. But if there is lack of faith in the people's ability to make a proper choice in today's circumstances, a way out would be to lay down that the interim National Assembly should have no legislative powers, and its main function should be to discuss and ratify the Constitution whose promulgation will pave the way for Pakistan's first General Election.

We earnestly hope that the Central Government will give proper consideration to these issues, realising that the real consummation of Pakistan's freedom, through the restitution of sovereignty to the real sovereign—the people—will not only end Pakistan's prolonged political crisis, but also restore Pakistan's prestige and position in the comity of free nations.

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Gul Hayat Institute

Section 2: Midsummer Madness Partition and Its Repercussions

Gul Hayat Institute



Gul Hayat Institute

10 August 1947 Division of the Forces

Not long ago some people proclaimed that the cause of the division of India would founder on the rocks of the country's defence problems. These pessimists held that to attempt the division of the Indian Armed Forces was to ask for ruin and chaos. Prominent among those who insisted that the Armed Forces should remain united for ever and ever were British die-hards who maintained that united defence was essential if Pakistan and Hindustan were to remain tied to Britain economically, politically, and militarily. It soon became obvious, however, that if the two States were to emerge as truly independent and sovereign, there was no other choice except to divide the Armed Forces. This realisation must have weighed heavily with our national leaders when they decided to break up one of the finest fighting forces in the world. Not many will dispute that the method of division outlined by the All-India Partition Council is fair and just; it also goes to show that when you seriously intend to do something, a suitable way of doing it can always be found. The situation demanded that the division should be part territorial and part communal. The relations between the future Governments of the two Dominions, and the guarantees against discrimination they can give to the minority personnel. will largely determine whether this division becomes more and more communal or more and more territorial. It is gratifying that those most vitally concerned, the men and officers of the former Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, are reported to be fully satisfied with this solution. The division

of men has taken place; the machines remain to be divided. We hope that, in the allotment of military equipment, aircraft, armoured vehicles, naval units, ordnance factories, and other stores, justice will be done to Pakistan. Even though the division of the Forces has become a fact, there are still some people who continue to prophesy disaster. The Koi-Hais maintain that the destruction of regimental 'tradition' will do irreparable damage. Tradition is important, but not as important as these gentlemen would have us believe. They forget that the former Indian Army, despite the political strings which had been visible of late, was in the main an alien body which did not possess the emotional and psychological impetus produced by the consciousness that the cause one fights for is not only righteous but is also the accepted cause of one's countrymen. Without any such patriotic urge, a tradition of sorts had been built up in the old Indian Army, a regimental patriotism which was never really a substitute for the genuine article. The formation of the INA demonstrated the flimsiness of this tradition. The two armies, when division is complete, will have their roots in the people. Their moral fibre will be strengthened by the knowledge that the salt they eat, whether it comes from the mines of Khewra or the Indian Ocean, is indigenous, not foreign. The latest and most surprising recruit to the ranks of these prophets of despair is no less a person than Mr Gandhi. His contention that, after the division, the two armies will perpetually stand on the border line in battle array, waiting for the first shot to be fired, is curious indeed. Unless it is the translation of a subconscious desire to join Babu Purshottam Dass Tandon in his proposed Crusade against Pakistan, we fail completely to understand Mr Gandhi's thesis. If the two States have Governments friendly to each other, as we sincerely hope they will, we see no reason at all why a similar friendship should not also exist between the two armies. There is provision in the Division Plan for the retention of administrative control by the Supreme Commander for a limited period. As soon as division is complete, this joint

control by the British representative must make room for joint defence plans, dictated by the interests of the two States, and we see no reason why these plans should not be drawn up in a spirit of friendliness and co-operation. Once the two States are formed and the two armies constituted, the scope for future co-operation is unlimited, given good will on both sides. The defensive requirements of a State, apart from the requirements of internal security, are governed by her international relations, or in other words by the orientation of her foreign policy. There is too much loose talk flying round these days of the dangers confronting Pakistan and Hindustan both from each other and from foreign aggressors. This is sheer nonsense, and the only thing that can give substance to these imaginary fears is our own stupidity. Whatever differences the people of Pakistan and Hindustan had among themselves have already been settled by the materialisation of the division itself, and as for the hostile camps outside the Indian subcontinent, we have nothing much to do with either one or the other. We consider that Mr Gandhi and his henchmen are doing little service to either Hindustan or Pakistan by conjuring up terrible visions of mutual bloodshed and discord instead of stressing the urgent necessity, and what we consider to be the far greater probabilities, of peace and co-operation.

8 August 1948 Trust and Betrayal

In view of the possible developments in Kashmir the British Government is reported to be seriously considering the withdrawal of all British officers serving in the armies of Pakistan and India. Whether or not Whitehall decides to give 'quit' orders, we think it is time the Pakistan Government reviewed its present policy of allowing non-Pakistanis to hold positions of high authority in the services. We have no reason to doubt that British officers in the Pakistan Army will continue to serve the State truly and loyally as long as they are in this country's uniform. A recent report that they have jointly sought the British government's permission to remain in the Pakistan Army even in the event of a war, and the declaration, made some weeks ago by a high-ranking British officer to a gathering of Army officers in Rawalpindi, that the British officers would never let down the Pakistan Army. shows that they do not regard their service in Pakistan merely as a pension-earning period. But however genuine and honest their intentions, it cannot be denied that their dual allegiance places them in an awkward situation. The British officers themselves will agree that it is anomalous for an independent sovereign State to have its army officered by citizens of another country who are at the beck and call of their own government. It should not be difficult to come to an arrangement whereby British officers needed by the Pakistan Army and willing to serve our country are freed from their present obligation to obey orders from Whitehall. The question of Britishers in the Civil Services requires even more urgent action, for recently two civilians of the gubernatorial states have compromised themselves rather seriously. In their case, the solution is both simple and obvious, for there is no question whatsoever of their being indispensable to the State. Some days ago, commenting in these columns on the reply given by the British Commonwealth Office to Mr Ghulam Mohammad's allegation against Lord Mountbatten, we asked Sir Francis Mudie to explain how and why he, as Governordesignate of West Punjab, had given his assent to a policy of non-interference with Sikh plans for the slaughter of Muslims in the East Punjab. The West Punjab Governor has maintained an indiscreet silence, thereby lending overt support to the statement made by the British Commonwealth Office. Now, an Indian government Press Note reveals that Sir George Cunningham, the former Governor of the NWFP, during his tenure of office, wrote a personal letter to Sir Rob Lockhart, the then Indian C.-in-C., warning him that the Frontier tribes were going to infiltrate into Kashmir and alleging that the Frontier Government was 'actively helping in this,' and he

doubted if he 'could stop this'. The Indian Government has strongly denied that their C.-in-C. kept this letter a secret, as alleged by a section of the Indian Press, and further states that this was the first authoritative intimation it had of the 'impending trouble in Kashmir'. To what extent Cunningham's letter is based on facts is of little consequence. At this stage it is equally unimportant whether this forewarning of the tribesmen's intention to go to the aid of their Kashmiri brethren had any effect on Indian policy and subsequent events in Kashmir. The important thing is that a Governor of a Pakistani Province sent information on a matter of vital importance to the C.-in-C. of another State, and that the Frontier Cabinet as well as the Central Government had no knowledge of this blatant fifth-column activity. Cunningham is now out of our reach, and is probably somewhere in England receiving his pension from Pakistan's coffers: but he will have done some service to the future of Pakistan if the fact that so high an official has, for all practical purposes, been acting as an informer to a foreign country breaks the complacency of the leaders of our State, who seem to be wedded to a policy of blind trust in British good intentions, despite the series of disastrous events which, thanks to British actions, accompanied the birth of Pakistan.

6 August 1947 The Unchanged Tune

The determination to fight for the unity of India has been expressed during the last few weeks by many Hindu leaders, from the Hindu Mahasabha as well as the Congress. The ravings of these gentlemen could have been ignored as the impious wishes of frustrated politicians whose dream of a vast empire has not been realised. But the recent statements of the President and the General Secretary of the Congress. issued simultaneously from New Delhi and Karachi, cannot be so lightly dismissed. Speaking with all the authority which attaches to their offices, Mr Shankar Rao Deo and Acharya

Kripalani have stated emphatically that the Congress believes in and will strive for a united India. A move for a united India today in the context of the impending establishment of two independent States can only be read as a move to disrupt. and if possible dissolve, Pakistan. We should have thought that the history of political events in recent years would have convinced the Congress leadership of the fact that Muslim India has not the slightest intention of ever becoming a junior partner in the Government at Delhi. In the past, attempts to deny to the Muslims of India the right of complete selfdetermination have considerably retarded India's progress towards freedom, and have taken a heavy toll of human life and happiness. Whatever doubts our friends of the Congress may originally have had, it should be perfectly clear to them now that, for the Muslims, Pakistan was and is no bargaining slogan. Pakistan is the concrete expression of the urge of the Muslim people for freedom, and now that it has been achieved. Tandon's threats of an armed conquest. Birla's vision of Pakistan being an economic desert, and the intrigues of Patel, cannot deter the Muslims from their destined path. They can only regard such activity as a clear moral breach of the Congress acceptance of the June Plan, and an attempt to disrupt and weaken Pakistan to such an extent that it is forced to live at the mercy of its bigger neighbour. Along with these irresponsible speeches and statements, the Congress policy in the Frontier, and Congress attempts to-force-all-the States into the Indian Union (Hyderabad because it has a Hindu majority and is geographically and economically linked to India, and on the other hand Kashmir because it has a Hindu Maharaja) show that, even after the acceptance of Pakistan, the Congress attitude towards Muslim aspirations remains confined and cribbed by the selfish interests of Hindu big money. The Congress would do well to remember that the Muslims have fought a long and desperate battle to achieve their freedom and they will not, under any circumstances, submit to domination from outside... We earnestly desire that, in the future. Pakistan and Hindustan will work in the

closest co-operation for their mutual benefit. We hope that the Congress will come down to earth and deal with Pakistan in a fair and just manner, on the basis of friendliness and full equality.

26 September 1947 **The Denunciation**

Master Tara Singh and Udham Singh Nagoke have, in a joint statement to the Press, called on Hindus and Sikhs to put a stop to the killing of women and children and the attacks on refugee convoys. We strongly welcome their statement and sincerely hope that they will be able to enforce their advice on their followers. It is regrettable that, in the statement, the Sikh leaders have said much that is contrary to established facts and much that could better have been left unsaid. But at this stage we shall not quarrel with them either on their unfortunate choice of words or on their lack of wisdom in putting all the blame on the Muslims for what has happened in the Punjab since March this year. The picture of events they have attempted to draw is that of poor harmless Sikhs forced to draw their kirpans in sheer self-defence against all the murder and looting. This we hold is not true, and if the Sikhs leaders are convinced of this view-point, their capacity for self-deception must be truly colossal. Be that as it may, we have no intention of joining the game of apportioning guilt between the parties despite the provocation provided by statements of this type. We think it is most unwise for either the Press or the leaders of the two Dominions to continue such controversies in public, as the result can only be a feeling among the followers of both parties that they as the aggrieved party have a right to strike the last blow, and in the exercise of this supposed right, those circumstances which they think have given them the 'last blow' will continue to become the first blow in a new series of criminal acts. We also feel that the Sikh leaders have not shown much statesmanship in stating that they may have to continue the fight against Muslims. While in this respect we commend their chivalry in wanting to fight man to man, we cannot refrain from pointing out that such a declaration of intended war is not likely to help towards bringing the situation back to normal. With all these lapses of reason and statesmanship we shall not quarrel. The Sikh leaders themselves should know how best to argue with their followers in order to put a stop to their activities. The important thing is that Master Tara Singh and his righthand man have had the courage to frankly admit that their followers are guilty of horrible and shameful acts, and they have appealed to them to call a halt to the killing of women and children and the attacks on the refugee trains, convoys and caravans. They have also expressed the hope that the Muslims on their side will also stop this devilish warfare. We are in the completest agreement with these two wishes of the Sikh leaders. The last week has provided a number of instances of horrible attacks on refugee convoys, and lest there be complacency in either Government, we wish to emphasize that these instances have occurred on both sides. The happenings may have differed in the number of casualties inflicted, on account of the difference in the efficiency of the killers or the inefficiency of the forces of law and order, but the fact remains that there are forces on both sides which. despite the professed intentions of the two Governments, continue with their nefarious task of killing and looting innocent persons. These forces must either be made to desist from their lawlessness or be ruthlessly crushed. The two Governments and the responsible leaders of the parties have no other choice. IISIIIUIE

⁵ December 1947 **The Master Speaks**

Master Tara Singh has broken his spell of a long and welcome silence, which is reported to have been dictated by some purely physical malady. Addressing a press conference in the Indian capital the Sikh leader delivered a series of vitriolic outbursts against Pakistan, against Muslims, and against anything and everything connected with both. He reiterated his slogan of making the Chenab the Indo-Pakistan boundary line, on the basis of Hindu and Sikh property left in Pakistan. He opposed the return of any Hindus or Sikhs to Pakistan, and asked for the immediate evaluation of those still in this country. While passing the profound remark that the protection of its citizens and their rights was the first duty of any State, he blatantly called upon the Indian Government to stop protecting Muslim life and property: for according to him all Muslims, whether in India or Pakistan, are the sworn enemies of India. He condemned the restriction placed on the entry of his *jathas* into the United Provinces, and called for a change of the war-front from Jammu to Lahore, And finally, with whatever authority he has, he declared that war between India and Pakistan was inevitable, and prophesied that it would not wait longer than six months. We will not attempt to analyse all that Masterji has said, for most of his sayings baffle any sane political analysis. We will only say-most emphatically—that men of his type are a menace to their people and country. The Government and the people of India can see for themselves whether it is Master Tara Singh who is a danger to the peace and prosperity of India and the freedom of its citizens, or the Muslim minority against whom he raves and rants so much. We would also like to point out to the Master that if his illogical demands were carried to their natural conclusion, that is, if all Muslims in the Indian Union were sent to Pakistan and the total territory of the subcontinent divided on a communal property basis. India and not Pakistan would stand to lose. Master Tara Singh's statement has coincided with a declaration by Babu Rajendra Prasad, the newly-elected Congress President: speaking at a Bombay reception in his honour, he said that India had no quarrel with Pakistan which could lead to war, and that his country desired to maintain friendly relations and live in peace, for the good and prosperity of both countries. We are convinced that this is also the view of those who really matter

in Indian politics, and therefore we recommend to our countrymen not to take too seriously the fulminations of frustrated individuals like Master Tara Singh, for to do so is to give them added strength as against those in India who stand for decency, democracy, and peace...

14 January 1948 Unto Death

On Tuesday, 13 January, Mr Gandhi commenced his fast for an indefinite period to bring about a reunion of hearts among the warring factions of our unhappy subcontinent. Will this supremely tragic gesture stay the hand poised to kill and hush the voices raised in hot dispute? We do not know. There was a time when one could safely prejudge the popular reaction to a given stimulus, when the commonly-accepted values that governed collective social and political conduct were well known. One could have foretold without any misgiving, a few months ago, that any outrage against a woman or a child would be denounced in our ancient and civilised land, that any cruel or unjust act or fraudulent and dishonest utterance would stir the conscience and arouse the indignation of the members of all communities. One can no longer make similar generalisations today with any amount of self-assurance. Murder and rape and pillage are denounced only if the criminals happen to belong to the opposing camp, otherwise they are glossed over or condoned, not publicly perhaps, but certainly in the counsels of one's own heart. In the last few months many hearts have ceased to bleed for human suffering and human pain, and many a conscience has lost the edge of its innate sensibility to right and wrong. Can all this damage to the moral self of the Indian and Pakistani peoples be suddenly and dramatically retrieved by one man who decides to lay down his life in sorrow? Can one man really shoulder the burden of a multitude's sins and carry them with himself into non-existence? Such miracles have happened but not often. If one went by mundane probabilities,

Mr Gandhi's fast may mean that the only rational voice in the vast Indian Dominion will soon be stilled, and the only patch of light in the black night of hate will soon flicker and die. If this happens, will not the self-effacing decision lead to results precisely antithetical to those for which the decision was taken? A noble death may be great, but a noble life is much greater. To lay down one's life for a seemingly hopeless end may be ethically satisfying for oneself, but it should be far more satisfying to preserve one's life for it unless one is satisfied that the struggle will allow of no alternative but death. Mr Gandhi knows his own mind and the mind of his people much better than we do, but we cannot help feeling that it is far more important for the people of Pakistan and Hindustan to preserve his living voice than to revere his sacred memory. For India the silencing of this voice would mean the removal of the most powerful liberal and hum<mark>anising influence in national politics, and for Pak</mark>istan it would mean the elimination of the most effective opposition to the fanatical forces bent upon the extermination of their co-religionists in the other Dominion. It is the duty of the people and the Governments of both the Dominions, therefore, to strive as hard as they can towards the end that can wean the Mahatma's resolve from its fatal culmination. How can this be done?

In the murky period of the last few months, there have been days, even weeks, when the clouds appeared to lift and the sun peeped briefly through, over a ravaged and bloodsoaked land. But such intervals have been brief and unreal. And they have been brief and unreal because they did not derive from any fundamental and lasting understanding over basic political issues but from improvised agreements over matters of lesser import. Unless one Dominion is bent on destroying the other, and the destruction will certainly not be one-sided, it is difficult to see why this accord cannot even now be arrived at. We know that there are problems that appear insoluble today, like the problem of Kashmir, but surely there are some canons of justice and democracy that could be invoked to settle them provided one were prepared to eschew intrigue and casuistry that aim not at a just but at a favourable decision. We, in Pakistan, have nothing to gain and everything to lose by a prolongation of the present conflict between the two Dominions and we have repeatedly expressed our anxiety to settle all differences by just and democratic methods. A large section of the Indian peoples, we are sure, also desire to be left in peace. There is no reason, therefore, why all thinking men should not seriously ponder over and formulate practical proposals to rid the lives of the two peoples of fear and violence and insecurity, to give substance to the magnificence of freedom, and replace the appalling magnitude of our present misery by universal happiness.

16 January 1948 Road to Peace

The first two days of Mr Gandhi's fast have witnessed a widespread sympathetic response throughout the subcontinent of India. Hindus and Muslims, Congressmen and Muslim Leaguers, citizens of India and Pakistan have expressed their appreciation of Mr Gandhi's mission and deep anxiety for his precious life. But so far the only two concrete proposals which seek a way out of the present unsatisfactory situation have come from two Pakistan leaders. Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Pakistan's Refugee Minister, has suggested a joint conference of the leaders of Hindustan and Pakistan and 'a bold and honest attempt to remove all causes of friction.' Mian Iftikharud-Din, President of the West Punjab Muslim League, goes further. His analysis of the present disturbances is that the leaders of both the Dominions have left incomplete their task of achieving real freedom and democracy for every section of the people. He contends that while both Pakistan and Hindustan have got rid of foreign domination, they have failed on two issues: firstly, the granting of full protection and equal rights to the minorities and, secondly, the bringing of freedom

to the people of the Indian State. He calls upon the two Governments to get together and settle these two questions. otherwise he thinks there is a grave danger of even their present achievements being undone. He also suggests the formation of coalition ministries and the exchange of officials and goodwill missions between India and Pakistan. The suggestions made by Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din are not new and have been put forward by him and other leaders before now. There can be very few who disagree with him on the question of minorities and the States. The protection of minority rights is a vital part of the Constitution of India, and the leaders and rulers of Pakistan have also unequivocally pledged themselves to protect all non-Muslims in Pakistan. That this protection has not been forthcoming can only be described as a colossal failure of leadership on both sides. It cannot be denied that if horrible massacres of innocent human beings are to be stopped, the two Governments must act in unison to see that their declared policies are effectively implemented. As far as the States are concerned, if both sides eschew geo-political considerations, a simple, just, and fair solution is going begging: that the people of each State should be given full freedom, including the freedom to decide for themselves which Dominion they want to join. Regarding the formation of coalition ministries and the exchange of officials, there is likely to be a greater divergence of opinion, largely because some people may think that, though desirables it is now too late to be of any use. It must, however, be remembered that whatever truth there may be in this argument applies only to the East and West Punjabs. There are three other Provinces of Pakistan and eight Provinces in India to be considered, and that safeguarding the lives and honour of the four crore Muslims in India and the many lakhs of non-Muslims in Pakistan is an absolute essential if the two countries are to prosper... Delhi has so far remained largely unmoved by Mr Gandhi's undertaking, although it was events in that city which strengthened the resolve of the great Indian leader to fast unto death. To its shame and dishonour the streets and walls of India's capital are resounding, probably for the first time, to cries of 'Gandhi *murdabad*,' and 'let Gandhi die,' Despite these unfavourable signs, we hope that sanity will prevail over madness and that men of reason and good will will triumph over those who seek to prolong the present. Mr Gandhi's fast has focused attention on the need for a resolute struggle on both sides of the border to banish the demons of hatred and violence. It should, therefore, rally all those elements who desire peace in and between the two countries. If this happens, the way is paved for a joint agreement on all the disputes between India and Pakistan. There can be no doubt that all other paths lead only to chaos.

6 February 1948 The First Step

Five days after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, the Indian Government has taken the first concrete step forward and banned the RSSS throughout the territories of the Indian Dominion. This has followed the resolution adopted by the Indian Cabinet on 2 February which declared the Government's determination to root out the forces of hate and violence that are at work in our country and imperil the freedom of the nation and darken her fair name'. The communique issued by the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs announcing the ban further states that the RSSS have been found circulating leaflets exhorting people to resort to terroristic methods, to collect firearms, to create disaffection against the Government and suborn the police and the military. The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh has been functioning for many years now, and under the garb of promoting the spiritual and physical well-being of the Hindus has organised itself as a militant fascist party, preaching hatred and spreading the cult of violence. When the recent phase of communal rioting started, the RSSS with its other allies regarded it as an opportune moment to make a bid for power. As blood continued to flow and innocent heads hit the dust, as women were dishonoured and infants mercilessly butchered, the RSSS went from strength to strength.

By the end of last year it had spread its tentacles to every Indian city and Province. Its propaganda reached every Hindu; it not only had a considerable mass following, but succeeded in making influential friends in the Government, in both the services and the Central and Provincial Cabinets. Nor was the Congress organisation free from its corroding influence. The Indian Government were not unaware of the part that the RSSS had played in the Punjab and elsewhere. They were aware of its growing influence and must also have known of the conspiracy against the Central Government, of which the extermination of Indian Muslims and the murder of Mahatma Gandhi were a part. But even as late as November last year, at an All-India conference of Home Ministers, it was decided that no action should be taken against the RSSS as such, but only those of its members who infringed the law of the land should be dealt with. This policy of drift and vacillation has taken a heavy toll; not only have thousands of innocent persons been killed and millions rendered homeless, but India and the world have lost one of their greatest men. All this need not have been if the leaders in the Government of India had shown a fraction of the courage and vision of Mahatma Gandhi. The question which is agitating the minds of the people, not only in India and Pakistan but throughout the world today, is: what of the future? Who will win? The dregs of Indian society, who distributed sweets when the tragic event took place, have not given up the struggle and intend to lie low for some time so that the people's sorrow is forgotten, their anger vitiated by direct action against a few scapegoats and their demand for a purge of the administration side-tracked by talk of 'unity in the face of disaster' and other meaningless slogans. Or will final victory still lie with Mahatma Gandhi and the millions in the country who support his aims and ideals? The first decision of the Government in this connection has received wide welcome. But it is universally felt that only if this decision is regarded by the Nehru Government as the first step in the fight against the forces of evil and darkness, then alone might we see the completion of the noble work for which Mahatma Gandhi died. If, however, it is the only step, and after

a few weeks or months the RSSS, under some other name. raises its ugly head, and its allies, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Akali party and the Princes are allowed to exist and stage a come-back of their perverted ideology, then the future is dark and dismal and the Mahatma has lived and died in vain — Muchof course, depends on the common people of India who know that their beloved leader's murder was definitely not the 'act of a foolish young man' as Master Tara Singh and his like would have them believe, but a part of the huge conspiracy which seeks to put in power the worst reactionaries in the land. In this struggle for the ideals for which Mahatma Gandhi stood, we in Pakistan are vitally concerned and have an important part to play. For the future of both peoples and both countries is inextricably linked, and to the extent that we base our future policies on the last will and testament of Mahatma Gandhi-that without communal amity and without Indo-Pakistan accord there can be be neither freedom nor progress for either-to that extent is the future happiness and prosperity of this sub-continent assured

7 October 1947 Rights of Minorities

Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, after a tour of the East Punjab and some of the Phulkian States, has brought back a message from the Muslims of the East to their co-religionists in Pakistan. They have asked us most emphatically and in complete unanimity to stop all acts of retaliation against the minorities in Pakistan for the sins of the non-Muslim majority in Hindustan. This message is identical with that Mr Gandhi is preaching to the non-Muslims in India. In all that has happened in the Punjab and elsewhere in the last few months, and is happening today despite the efforts of the best men on both sides, the spirit of revenge and retaliation has been largely responsible for keeping alive and spreading the fires of hatred and violence. We have in these columns repeatedly pointed out the insane futility of the logic which attempts to justify the murder of an innocent non-Muslim in Lahore for the death of an equally innocent Muslim in Amritsar, and which supports the burning or looting of a Muslim house in the East in return for a non-Muslim house in West. We condemn such thinking and the resultant acts of individuals or organisations, not because, Christlike, we believe in turning the other cheek and forgiving every evil act: on the contrary, we urge the severest punishment of those guilty of the heinous crimes which have of late sullied the honour and good name of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, We hold that this lawless law of private retaliation does not go anywhere near the punishment of the criminals. On the contrary, it merely adds to the list of innocent victims of crime. In these days, however, when people's morality has sunk to the lowest depth, one cannot stop at pointing out the moral wrong in a certain course of action and rest assured that it would receive attention from the public. Therefore we stress that what in this context is morally wrong is also most inexpedient, because the result such actions achieve is the exact opposite of the intentions of the perpetrators. Those who avowedly or tacitly condone retaliation regard it as a weapon to prevent further aggression on the other side. This argument may have been listened to, but the facts of the last few months have shown that an act of retaliation only leads to counterretaliation and so on ad infinitum. We sincerely hope that the appeal of the unfortunate Muslims from the East Punjab will be heeded by their brethren in Pakistan; coming as it does from an afflicted people, it should have the force of a demand.

> 17 October 1947 Minorities and Loyalty

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Mr Suhrawardy in a recent statement has condemned those leaders of the majority communities who make repeated demands for assurances of loyalty from the minority communities, imposing fantastic tests and insisting on the satisfaction of these ridiculous conditions as a price for

protection. Mr Suhrawardy has spoken words of wisdom and truth which will be welcomed by all those who are still capable of cool thinking and, we sincerely hope, will get the attention they deserve from the national leaders of both Dominions. It is absolutely fantastic to demand from every single Muslim in Hindustan, as a condition precedent to his being allowed to live in the country, to publicly recant his belief in the two-nation theory and express regret for his support for the division of India: as stupid as it would be for the leaders of Pakistan to demand of every non-Muslim in this country to express his abhorrence of the idea of a united India and do public penance for his past opposition to Pakistan. When the division of India was planned and settled, it should have been clear to the leaders of both parties that the creation of two Dominions would leave in each millions who were opposed to the political ideals of the future leaders of each State. If this former opposition either to Pakistan or United India was to be regarded as a disqualification for their future rights as citizens, this fact should have been publicly proclaimed. This was not done because it was not thought necessary, as it really is not. The loyalty of the minority community as a community must surely be taken for granted unless there is definite proof to the contrary. So far none of those leaders with whom this demand has become almost a mania has brought forward any concrete fact to support his thesis that the minority community is nothing short of a potential fifth column. The facts are that, in both Constituent Assemblies, the accredited leaders of the minorities saluted the flags of the two States as their own and expressed their fullest loyalty to their respective States. Both Constituent Assemblies have also given unequivocal pledges to protect minority rights in every possible way. One cannot help wondering whether this morbid demand for lovalty proceeds from an uneasy conscience seeking to excuse the misdoings of their own community and that it has been inspired by the aggressor's logic which must give the victim a bad name in order to hang him. Events in both countries since 15 August have given no indications to show that the minorities are a potential danger to either State. On the contrary, as Mr Suhrawardy has pointed out, it is the majority communities in both States who have been found guilty of disloyalty. It is they who have flouted the law of the land, killed innocent fellow-citizens, and reduced life in their country to a shambles. If guarantees of loyalty are needed, if assurances of fealty to the State and their governments are to be asked for, they should in justice be demanded from the guilty sections of the majority communities and not from the innocent victims of their aggression...

6 November 1953 Minorities Rights

It is a tragedy of the first magnitude that, even after six years of political independence, India and Pakistan have failed to guarantee the rights of their respective minorities. When Partition was agreed upon, it was expected that the old conflicts would gradually be buried and that the minority communities living in the two States would be assured an honourable existence on the basis of full equality. This hope, shared with equal enthusiasm by the Quaid-i-Azam and Mahatma Gandhi, has been belied, and those who between them control the destiny of the peoples of this vast sub-continent have proved incapable of guiding it along the path chosen for them by the two great leaders who helped, more than anyone else, to bring Pakistan and India into existence. The ruling parties of the two States were solemnly pledged to a policy of not discriminating against any section of their citizens. The Congress leaders had repeatedly promised that they would safeguard the due rights of the Indian Muslims and other minorities. The Muslim League leadership was bound by similar pledges, which are enshrined at their lucid best in the speeches of the Quaid-i-Azam, particularly those made soon after Partition, and which constitute a part of the historic Lahore Resolution of 1940 when the Muslim League, outlining the Pakistan plan, declared that, 'adequate, effective, and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.' Ample testimony is available to show that during the last six years these assurances have been ignored, and that the minorities in both States are being treated as second-class citizens: the latest evidence in this regard has been provided by the proceedings of the Indian Muslims' Convention recently held at Aligarh and the walkout of the non-Muslim block from the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

In India the situation is that, while the country's Constitution is free from communal disabilities, the Muslims can find little solace in the equality of their constitutional status when they see that the exercise of the rights given them on paper is effectively hindered by the prejudice and suspicion which guide the policies and, even more so, the actions of such a large section of the majority community's representatives. That in India communal incidents frequently mar public peace, that avenues for employment are severely restricted for India's Muslims, and discriminatory laws have been used to deprive many of their property, that their loyalty to the State is suspected, and any effort on their part to protect their rights is made at the risk of inviting charges of treason, that administrative impartiality is rare and even the Congress leaders try to gain Muslim votes by resorting to cheap blackmail, are some of the factors responsible for creating the feeling of widespread insecurity and frustration. Few persons seem to realise that, apart from what this means for the minority, such a state of affairs is harmful to the larger interests of the State.

In Pakistan, on the other hand, while the absence for a long time of communal clashes is most gratifying, the position with regard to most other matters concerning the interests of the minorities has been almost as bad as in India. And now, in the framing of Pakistan's new Constitution, the ruling party has evolved a plan which imposes various types of unwanted disabilities and restrictions on Pakistan's non-Muslim citizens. The directives laid down by the Quaid-i-Azam are being ignored and, in violation of the policy formulated by the new Central Cabinet after Mr Mohammed Ali suddenly took Khwaja Nazimuddin's place, the Muslim League leaders have accepted a number of undemocratic and discriminatory proposals. Guided primarily by the desire to retain office, they are, in an effort to placate various pressure groups, accepting even those suggestions which not long ago they themselves characterised as impractical or unnecessary. Instead of trying to build a constitutional structure that would foster the implementation, in actual practice, of the Islamic principles of full democracy and social justice, they have merely sought to use the name of Islam to cloak their real designs. Their duplicity is exposed by the fact that, where the application of Islamic principles threatened their own interests, the issue has been shelved; thus for twenty-five years money bills will be exempted from the provision that legislation considered repugnant to the Holy Koran and Sunnah may be challenged before the Supreme Court. This provision gives a power to the Supreme Court which may well be misused and, in any case, which the directly-elected representatives of the people could be expected to exercise without any extra-parliamentary check. Further, to deny all Pakistani non-Muslims the right to be elected as Head of the State serves no practical purposes and, as was accepted by all concerned, the deletion of this provision would have made no difference at all-except to eliminate a minority grievance. Lastly, some of the Congress amendments, including the one which provoked the walk-out, could have been accepted without having any effect on the constitutional plan envisaged by the present Muslim League leadership. In these circumstances, therefore, the Congress group's drastic gesture of protest is understandable.

It cannot be gainsaid that the future security of the minorities in India and Pakistan is of vital importance, not

only because it intimately concerns the lives of crores of human beings, but also because it has a strong effect on Indo-Pakistan relations in other fields. It is also a factdespite assertions to the contrary by the leaders of both sides-that in this matter, as in most others, there is a great deal of reciprocity, and that effective safeguarding of the rights that the minorities have been promised is a task that can be achieved only if both Governments implement the policies and pledges which form the basis of the agreement governing the sub-continent's partition. The adjustments required in both India and Pakistan to achieve this end are dictated by the exigencies of the present situation and by the sacred promises made on behalf of the two States. We would like to hope, therefore, that the policy of ignoring the demands of the minorities will be reversed in both countries, and that in Pakistan the constitutional pattern will be so amended that the reasonable objections and fears of the non-Muslim minority can be overcome.

19 Aug<mark>ust 1947 The Award</mark>

The one-man Boundary Commission has at long last given its award. Referring in these columns to the way the Commission was functioning, we had suggested that it was nothing more than a hoax perpetrated on the Muslims of India. We had repeatedly demanded that the delimitation of the frontiers between the States of Pakistan and Hindustan should be strictly on the basis of contiguous Muslim majority areas and any concessions of territory on the basis of 'other factors' should be reciprocal and by the mutual consent of the two parties concerned. This alone could have guaranteed justice to both sides. Instead, a British lawyer sat in judgment and played at the jig-saw puzzles of *tehsils. thanas*, and villages, and as a result we see that all the influence he could get up on the basis of 'other factors' has militated against the Muslims, when in view of the fact that Pakistan was the

smaller and the poorer State it should have been otherwise. Despite the claims of its author, we hold that the award is most unfair and unjust and certainly not the 'non-political' award of a detached judge. Our most exaggerated fears regarding the danger of British efforts to placate the unreasonable demands of the Sikhs, backed up by the landgrabbing leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress. have proved to be true. In the Punjab the notional division had been unfair, but the final award has gone much further and hacked off some of our richest tracts of land. The blow has been the hardest in Gurdaspur District, where the two Muslim tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala, with a Muslim majority of 52.1 and 55.06 per cent respectively, have been thrown into Hindustan along with the Pathankot tehsil, taking away from Pakistan the rich Muslim industrial town of Batala. A part of Lahore district has also been broken off, and Radcliffe has gone to the trouble of drawing a village-tovillage boundary. But the Ajnala tehsil of Amritsar district, contiguous to the district of Lahore, with a 60 per cent Muslim majority, has been completely forgotten. The tehsils of Zira and Ferozepur, with a clear Muslim majority contiguous to West Punjab, have been dismissed with talk of 'disruption of communications'. Mention is not even made of the *tehsils* of Jullundhur and Nakodar. We notice that where the Muslim right to non-Muslim territory on grounds of 'other factors' was fully established, as for instance over certain canal headworks, this brilliant lawyer has suggested joint control, and we fail to see why similar joint control could not have worked for the non-Muslims. In the division of Bengal and Assam, again the "other factors' have worked against Pakistan

The most glaring injustice is over the division of Assam, where large Muslim-majority parts of this province were not even considered for cession to Pakistan because they did not adjoin the district of Sylhet but were contiguous *only* to Eastern Bengal. Thus legal quibbling, fallacious arguments, and principles which work only to the benefit of one party

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have deprived us of large parts which by right and any conceivable principle belong to Pakistan. Ever since Pakistan became absolutely unavoidable, the British have endeavoured to make its establishment as difficult as possible, and this is but one more step in their policy to please the powerful capitalists of Hindustan. Through the device of 'other factors' they have done so at the cost of Muslim interests. The division of the Puniab and the introduction of the clause of 'other factors' in this division was supposed to benefit the Sikhs. The final line, however, while it has taken away a lot from the Muslims, has done little for the Sikhs. They still remain more or less equally divided between Pakistan and India; their shrines, for which so much noise was made in India and in London, still remain in Pakistan. The British politicians probably hope that they will, even after the handing over of power in India, continue to fish in troubled waters, or they may hope that the State of Pakistan, weakened sufficiently, will remain forever dependent on the good will and help of the combination of British and Hindu capitalism. Whatever their motives, the award is wrong, unfair, and unjust, and we cannot help hoping for the day, however far off it may be, when a return to sanity on the other side of the border will see this wrong righted. The Muslim people, through their accredited leader, were pledged to accept the award. Bad as it is, we do so, and, unlike other communities, we do not threaten to use the argument of 'cold steel'. Our foremost need is peace—peace to build up our lands, to rehabilitate those of our brothers who seek refuge within our border from the East, peace to implement the regeneration of our country and its people...

In a sense the real battle for Pakistan has begun only now. The Muslim people have no alternative but to accept the challenge and devote themselves wholeheartedly to the task of building up their homeland. The choice before us is either to allow our heritage to be mortgaged to a bigger power or to make even greater sacrifices than we have done before to keep ourselves free and independent, and this task calls for all the courage and steadfastness, all the ability and hard work we are capable of.

28 August 1947 The Punjab Problem

The decision of the Quaid-i-Azam to visit the Punjab is an indication of the gravity of the crisis which faces the Muslims of Northern India. In recent history the present orgy of barbarism has no parallel except perhaps the events which followed the failure of the Rising of 1857. That was ninety years ago. It was the hour of our defeat, and British imperialism, wanting to teach a lesson to a presumptuous people who dared attempt to liberate their country from foreign subjugation, let loose a reign of terror over the countryside. Today we have achieved a State of our own in a part of this subcontinent—a State where we hope to build up a free life for its people. In this house of our victory, certain forces have organised a similar reign of terror against our brothers across the borders. Wanton and ruthless killings are going on as a result of an organised plan. We do not know what sinister designs are at play and what hidden hands have aided and abetted preparations for this massacre. The fact remains that the Muslims of Eastern Punjab are being butchered in thousands merely because they are Muslims. This has led to retaliation in certain parts of West Punjab, which result is as unfortunate as its cause and deserves equally to be condemned. This vicious circle of attack and counterattack must be broken. The extent of the disturbances and the tremendous loss of life, the dislocation of lakhs of people have created problems which can no longer be dealt with on the provincial level. It is right therefore that the Quaid-i-Azam, as Head of the Pakistan State, accompanied by the Prime Minister, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, should be in Lahore to study and deal with the situation. The problems which face the Government of Pakistan are two fold. One, the care and resettlement of the three lakhs or more of refugees who have sought shelter in

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Pakistan, and secondly, the problem of ensuring security of life and a living to those who can remain in Hindustan. The task of putting an end to lawlessness on both sides of the border will have to be dealt with in conjunction with the Indian Dominion. We think that the Governor-General and Prime Minister of Hindustan should also come to the Punjab, and we urge the Heads and Prime Ministers of both the States to remain in the Punjab till peace is finally restored. The continued presence of the highest officials of the two States will ensure that all-out efforts are made by provincial Governments to implement their promises of help and succour to refugees, it will make certain that evacuation where necessary is carried out, and that problems of land and property left by evacuees are speedily settled. Above all, this provides the hope that the police and military forces will be fully and properly used, for unless the Governments resort to the severest military measures and mete out just punishment to all those guilty of committing or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, we can see no end to the present wholesale murder and looting. They probably have a large number of other matters of state to deal with, but nothing in the national or international field can be half as important as putting a stop to the killing of the thousands of innocent persons now going on.

6 September 1947 The Decisions

The high-level conference of the representatives of India and Pakistan, which first met on 29 August, reassembled in Lahore on 3 September to finalise their plans for the restoration of law and order on both sides of the border, and to consider the various problems arising from the wave of communal frenzy which, during the last few weeks, has devastated large parts of the Province. During these four days, the Dominion Prime Ministers and the Indian Defence Minister and Pakistan Communication Minister accompanied

by the Ministers of the East and West Punjab Governments extensively toured the affected districts, and held almost daily informal conferences, which must have given them a clear picture of the real situation in the Punjab. The conference reiterated the firm determination of the Governments to deal ruthlessly with the criminals who have caused human suffering on a scale not known in India for at least a century. It expressed the unanimous resolve of both governments to co-operate fully in implementing the decisions previously arrived at regarding the protection of minorities, the care and feeding of refugees, and the speedy evacuation of those who wish to migrate from their homes. The conference further decided that both the Governments would make an effort to achieve the restoration of the women who have been kidnapped during the disturbances, and would not recognise any forced conversions or marriages. We have stated before, and we repeat, that the decisions taken at these joint meetings can bring back peace to the Punjab if they are honestly implemented. In this connection, the intention to investigate the conduct of certain officers who have aided and abetted the carnage is a welcome step, and we hope that both Governments will keep themselves and the people informed of the action taken. The conference has also taken cognisance of the fact that exaggerated rumours are being circulated, often completely without foundation, and that certain newspapers have been giving publicity to wild reports and have aggravated this mischief by the nature of their comments. We have had occasion previously in these columns to comment on the mischievous role certain newspapers are playing, and have expressed the fear that their activities would help to spread communal warfare to other parts of India. Recent news from Bombay, Calcutta, and Peshawar indicates that this is already happening. There are elements in this country who openly support Fascist theories of blood and violence, and their narrow communal chauvinism has been given strength by those who circulate exaggerated, one-sided stories of horror. In Calcutta the short-lived peace has been

broken and Mr Gandhi, whose excellent efforts had achieved a unity in that city, a unity that augured well for the future of both India and Pakistan, went on a fast unto death to bring Calcutta and the whole Indian sub-continent back to sanity. Reports from that city indicate that the recent outburst of violence is the result of the activities of people who have come from outside. We do not know what secret organisations are at work and how many cities are receiving the attention of these agents provocateurs who wish to reduce the newlygained freedom of India and Pakistan to a shambles. We hope that both Governments will act boldly and fulfil their promises to take drastic action against offending persons and agencies who are playing into the hands of the worst enemies of freedom. Regarding the Punjab, the decision that both the West and East Punjab Governments will issue a daily communique giving a factual report of occurrences from their respective territories is wise. It would have been wiser still if a joint communique were issued, and each Government gave the representatives of the other full facilities to set up an organisation to verify all reports of disturbances.

19 September 1947 The Rejoinder

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in a statement from Delhi, has replied to a speech in Lahore by the Pakistan Premier. Part of his reply, we feel, is based on misunderstanding or misreporting. The first point taken up by the Indian Premier is Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's statement that there are forces who seek to destroy Pakistan. Pandit Nehru has imagined that this reference imputed motives to the Indian Government. Unless it is a case of guilty conscience on behalf of some of his colleagues, we do not see why he should come to this conclusion. We do not believe that Pandit Nehru's Government has any such intention, and we welcome his reiteration to this effect. as also his declaration that his Government desire and seek nothing but the rapid establishment of lasting foundations of amity between Pakistan and India. But

it cannot be denied, as we have often pointed out in these columns, that there are parties and persons who are carrying out an organised campaign of terror and slaughter against innocent Muslims, with the political objective of forcing them to migrate to Pakistan. Responsibility for the motives and acts of these insane beasts does not fall on Pandit Nehru's shoulders, except in so far that his primary task as the Head of the Indian Government is to defeat their ends and to expose and destroy them, even if some of them occupy positions of power. The peace and prosperity of both Hindustan and Pakistan will be jeopardised for decades to come if those who seek to gain political ends by methods which only the most depraved of human beings could employ are not crushed with utter ruthlessness. Regarding the second point, we commend Pandit Nehru's frank admission of cases of dereliction of duty by officials, and we strongly urge the governments of both sides to root out those official saboteurs who, under the garb of zealous nationalism, are directly responsible for horrible deeds of killing and slaughter. The third main point of Pandit Nehru's statement was refutation of the charge that the Governments of India and East Punjab had not honoured and implemented the joint decisions. The words of the Pakistan Premier were that the Governments of India and East Punjab had not been able to honour the decisions jointly arrived at. We do not know why the correct version of the Pakistan Premier's speech was not published in Delhi, and we can only conclude that even here there is evidence of the secret hand of those who desire to create as much trouble as possible between the two Dominions. We have no intention of attempting to sit in judgment on the controversy between the two Prime Ministers, or to decide which of them bears the mote in his eye and which the beam. We cannot, however, refrain from expressing complete disagreement with Pandit Nehru that every Muslim refugee camp in the East Punjab and every group of evacuees have been given military protection. This sweeping statement, obviously based on Government reports, is completely contrary to facts...

28 September 1947 The Engineered Storm

Junagadh State is providing an interesting interlude in the otherwise grim political atmosphere of the Indian subcontinent. This State, in a moment of impish inspiration. decided to accede to Pakistan. The announcement of this decision has raised a sudden storm in Sardar Patel's States Department and among certain Princes of that area. The States Department has rushed troops to the 'Thanas' on the borders' of the State, threats have been made that all its communications with the outside world would be cut off and an important ruling prince has issued a public statement calling the accession to Pakistan of this small State a menace to Kathiawar and an ultimate danger to the Indian Dominion itself. The State is a very ordinary one. It has no special history of repression or revolt, and even its name was probably unknown to a very large section of the people of Pakistan. No attention has been paid to this State by the national leaders of Pakistan, and we do not know of any visits, open or secret, or any negotiations which preceded this step. The State ruler, in making his choice, merely exercised a right which is inherent in the British plan, a right which was not only agreed to by the Indian National Congress but strongly favoured by its most important leaders, as opposed to the right of a State to remain-independent. Attempts have been made to browbeat the ruler into revoking his decision. The falseness of the charges which have been levelled against the State has been exposed by circumstances. The fact that no communal conspiracy exists is borne out by the Sheikh of Mangrol's decision to join up with the Indian Union, and Mr Menon, who visited Junagadh on behalf of the Indian Union, advised the non-Muslims to stay in their homes, obviously only after he had received satisfactory assurances from the ruler and his Government. Nothing has been more stupid in this storm in a teacup than the statement that, as a result of this move on the part of Junagadh, war

was imminent between the Kathiawar States to start off with. and later between Pakistan and India. We are not aware of the mobilisation of the Junagadh State forces, and even if they were mobilised, the State cavalry and infantry have a strength of 173 horse and 219 men respectively-the figure being inclusive of the bagpipe band! The fear of an invasion of the Indian Union by this gallant force, even if the Pakistan Government decided in a fit of insanity to support such a venture, is really too absurd a proposition even to be discussed by anybody, except of course a ruling Prince. Since all attempts have failed to force Junagadh into joining the Indian Union, the States Ministry have now issued a communique in which they take their stand on the principles of democracy and self-determination, and point out the State's geographical position. They state quite rightly that 81 per cent of the population of Junagadh are non-Muslims, that the State territory is completely intermingled with the territory of other States who have acceded to the Indian Union, that its system of communications has so far been administered by the Indian Union, that in view of this a referendum should be held and the question should be determined by a free expression of the will of the people of the State, and that the Government of India are prepared to try to solve the question by friendly discussions with the Dominion of Pakistan.

The principles laid down by the States Department are welcome indeed. What is amusing is the Department's inability to see that what is sauce for the goose can and should be sauce for the gander. Their policy of 'heads I win and tails you lose' cannot really be justified by any amount of clever arguments. The Indian government have so far accepted without demur the accession of a very large number of States, and the will of the ruler, which has often undergone a change under the persuasive influence of Sardar Patel and his henchmen, has decided the fate of the people. The principle of allowing the people of a State to decide their future is a very laudable one, and we hope the Government of Pakistan will enter into negotiations with the Indian Dominion and see that this principle is applied to every State in the Indian sub-continent. This is the only honest way of dealing with the whole question. The Congress really cannot force the accession of one State to the Indian Union because its people desire it and allow the admission of another State because its ruler would like to have his headquarters at Delhi. The concern which the States Department has shown for the non-Muslims of Junagadh should be repeated in the case of the Muslims of Kashmir, whose country is, we learn, on the verge of being bartered away by the Maharaja for the assurances and considerations being offered to him by the same States Department. If the Congress means business and is true to its oft-expressed policy, let it approach the Pakistan Government and thus solve the whole question of Indian States in the only right way that it can be solved.

7 November 1947 Untimely Move

Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman's decision to leave the Indian Union and settle in Pakistan cannot be regarded as anything but an untimely and unwise move. He may have very strong personal reasons for doing so, in which case he should have made up his mind three months ago, not after he had accepted the responsibility of leading the Muslim League group in the UP Legislative Assembly and the Constituent Assembly of India. He seems to have chosen a wrong time 'to make room for young blood', and his plea that he cannot reconcile himself to learning Hindi is not a very strong reason; if the millions of other Muslims in the United Provinces or elsewhere have to reconcile themselves to the Devanagri script, they expect their leaders to do so also. The Muslim leaders of the minority provinces must realize that their first and foremost responsibility is the Muslim masses whom they have so far led and represented, and who in the circumstances of today need, more than ever before, a leadership which will get them an honourable and self-respecting place in the political life of the Indian Union.

15 January 1948 Outrage

A large number of non-Muslim men, women and children have been killed in and near Gujrat. All these innocent souls were in our charge. Pakistan had guaranteed them protection until they crossed our frontier. We have betrayed our *ideals* and broken our pledged word. We have seen the official version of the outrage that traces the origin of the trouble to a hasty act on the part of the escort guarding the train and a series of total misunderstandings that followed. This does not alter the fact that people who call themselves Muslims, fellow citizens of Pakistan, have been guilty of gross savagery and inhuman brutality, that the name of Pakistan has been blackened and besmirched and the name of our people and our religion has been once more dragged into the dust. It is painful to play the role of a prosecutor against one's own people, but this has to be done if one possesses a heart and a conscience and believes in what one's God has enjoined and one's leaders have taught. If one is bent on being dishonest, there is always room for pettifogging and casuistry to gloss over and condone the most horrible crime conceivable, but given the minimum of decency and sense one has to draw the line somewhere. We have not the slightest hesitation in saying that whoever lays violent hands on-an-innocent and defenceless man, woman or child is a savage and a barbarian. a plague-spot in the wholesome body of civilised society, and the sooner society is rid of him the better. He deserves no mercy and no quarter, and anyone who seeks to justify his crime on any ground whatsoever is a potential criminal himself. Whoever aids or abets such savagery, whatever his motives and whatever the end he has in view, is also an enemy of society, a traitor to Pakistan and a disgrace to the creed he professes. We demand, therefore, that every single individual who committed, aided or abetted the Guirat outrage should be tracked down and sent to his doom. It is not enough

to bow our heads in shame. We had much rather lift up our heads and look for the causes and the agencies that still make the perpetration of such heinous deeds possible. It is difficult to believe that, in the many hours that elapsed between the commencement of the trouble and its culmination, nothing more could have been done to stop it than actively was done. Apart from the mad-men who committed the crime, some official agency, we do not know who, must also share the blame for what has happened. There must have been either indifference or lethargy or lurking unwillingness in some quarter that held back the hand of law from dealing out sterner measures before the fell deed was done. Pakistan has no room for spineless rats and unprincipled knaves, and we demand that if any official is proved guilty of negligence or indifference towards duty, he should be brought to book. Murder and rape are horrible enough crimes in ordinary times. but the commission of these crimes today against another community amounts to far more than murder and rape. It amounts to fratricide and incest, for it is a direct invitation to the murder of our brothers and the dishonour of our sisters who are less happily placed than we are. In the name of these innocent and defenceless brothers and sisters, millions and millions of them, in the Indian Dominion, we demand from our Government and our leaders that they should formulate and enforce immediate measures to persuade, cajole, or coerce the citizens of the State into more civilised conduct, and we demand from our people that they should put away the cruel and inhuman practices that have so thoroughly debased the names of India and Pakistan. It is hardly necessary to say that we expect a similar attitude from the peoples and the leaders of the Indian Dominion, but we cannot and we should not wait for complete peace to prevail in India to establish the reign of law and humanity in our own great land.

Section 3: Democracy Or Legalised Dictatorship? National Politics

Gul Hayat Institute



Gul Hayat Institute

I. CHANGES AT THE CENTRE

26 August 1947 Call to the Nation

The Quaid-i-Azam's call to the Muslim Nation 'to preserve the peace of Pakistan for the sake of Pakistan' has come at a time when it was most needed. Events in the East Punjab have cast a shadow of gloom over the life of the new-born State and the Muslims of Pakistan are being put to the severest test in their history. As Mr Jinnah has pointed out, the enemies of Pakistan would welcome nothing better than that widespread disorders should break out within its borders, thereby causing administrative dislocation and impeding the work of national regeneration and reconstruction. We would go further and say that there are people who are planning to disrupt the State of Pakistan and reduce further its already small territories. The Quaid-i-Azam has pointed out that a recrudescence of arson, loot and murder in Pakistan is no help to the sufferers in the East Punjab and elsewhere, nor will it solve any problem but cause further loss of innocent lives and more suffering for large masses of humanity. It is, he said, by building up our State that we can best reply to the death and destruction inflicted on our people elsewhere and not by 'acting on first impulses and getting lost in the confineless wilderness of physical revenge and retaliation'. These words of Quaid-i-Azam are words of wisdom and should find a response in the mind of every thinking Muslim. The events of the last fortnight have been such that it is wellnigh impossible for even normal persons to prevent themselves from joining those bitten by the madness of hatred and revenge. If, however, we force ourselves to cool thinking,

we can only come to one conclusion-that what the Quaid-i-Azam has said and demanded of the Muslim people is the demand of the times. After many trials and tribulations the Muslims of India have managed to exercise their right of self-determination and are in possession of a sovereign State. Had this right to decide our own fate been conceded earlier by the majority community in India, the Indian sub-continent, would have been spared the horrors it has gone through in the last two years. The State we have achieved is not as large as we expected, nor has the division been carried out on any definite principles. Be that as it may, it is our State and here the Muslim people can build up a life for themselves. Those who are indulging in the wanton killing of our brothers, a large part of whom have been unjustly left outside our borders, are hoping that the chaos they generate may spread to our State and lead to its break-up. The responsibility for preventing this is ours. While the agony of the Muslims in the East Punjab moves us to the depth of our hearts, we cannot gave way to retaliation in our own State because this will only strengthen the hands of our enemies, and cannot in any way help the crores of Muslim living beyond our borders.

...We must realise that a weak and unstable Pakistan will be a loss not only for the people of Pakistan but for all the Muslims of India. Therefore it becomes our foremost duty to defeat all efforts made from within our State or from across our borders to weaken and disrupt Pakistan.

18 February 1948 The Quaid-i-Azamt Institute

We welcome the prompt contradiction, direct from the Private Secretary to the Quaid-i-Azam, of a report published by our local English contemporary to the effect that, due to indifferent health, the Quaid-i-Azam was likely, in the very near future, to retire from the Governor-Generalship of Pakistan, and further that it had already been settled that the Nawab of Bhopal was to succeed him not only as the Governor-General, but, strangely enough, also as the Quaidi-Azam! The report was received with the greatest scepticism, but all the same the authoritative assurance that Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah is in 'very good health' and that the question of the Indian Prince becoming his successor 'does not arise' will be greeted throughout the country with widespread joy and relief. For should the Quaid-i-Azam, at some remote future date, choose to retire from his onerous post, his successor must obviously be a person with a record of public service, known and respected by the people of Pakistan.

9 July 1948 The New Ministry

The Central Government's decision to form a new Ministry, to be known as the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions. will be widely regarded as a wise and essential step. No one, except perhaps a few decrepit Nawabs and their paid agents, will dispute that such a Ministry was absolutely necessary. The tribal areas and the States of Pakistan cover a considerable portion of our country; the importance and urgency of bringing civilisation and real democracy to the people of these areas and integrating them with the rest of the country cannot be minimised. Already, in many Pakistan States, a people's movement is under way and the rulers are using all the weapons in the armoury of despotism to maintain the status quo and prevent the people from coming into their own; in many places Muslim League workers have been arrested and horrible atrocities perpetrated by the State administrations. This calls for immediate action. In the tribal areas also, the new ferment is at work. The people are gaining a new consciousness and building hopes of a new and better life in the future. Human considerations apart, the latent wealth and the strategic importance of these parts demand that the new dispensation should reach these people as soon as possible, so as to eliminate for all time the danger of a brave and simple people being exploited by mad mullahs and scheming politicians. It could be said, with a great deal of justification, that this task should have been taken in hand many months ago. The Indian counterpart of the new Pakistan Ministry started functioning almost before 15 August 1947 and it has already achieved a great deal...

The Pakistan Government have only now begun to give this matter their serious attention. We are certain, however, that other preoccupations were responsible for this delay and not any lack of keenness on the part of our national leaders to deal with the problems. That the Pakistan Government fully realise its importance is shown by the fact that the new Ministry will be under the direct control of the Quaid-i-Azam himself. It is meet and proper that a single Ministry should deal with the tribal areas and the Pakistan States; for these two parts of Pakistan's territories are largely interlinked and the problems facing them, to a great extent, are similar. Both are backward politically, socially and educationally; both are governed by a medieval system where the word of the ruling prince or the tribal chief is regarded as the final law; and both are economically undeveloped but possess vast resources which can be harnessed to serve the interests of the local people and the State of Pakistan. To remedy the existing ills and to create conditions for bringing a new life to the people of these areas will be the new Ministry's major task; it must, as a first step. introduce genuine political reforms and set up administrations which will make a beginning in this direction. Real democracy must begin to function as soon as possible, so that by the time the new constitution of Pakistan is introduced the people of the States and tribal areas can take their place with their brethren of Pakistan's Provinces on a basis of complete equality.

7 October 1948 British Governors

It is gratifying that a Pakistani has been selected to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Shaikh Ghulam Hussain

Hidayatullah, the first Muslim Governor of any Province in Pakistan. It is difficult, however, to understand why Sind is specially favoured by the Central Government and has always been given a Pakistani Governor, while the other four Provinces of our State continue to be 'governed' by foreigners. The argument that a Provincial Governor today has no special powers does not in any way justify the continuance of foreign nationals as the heads of our Provincial administrations, for if this office merely provides a ceremonial figure-head, it is all the more necessary that he should be a Pakistani. However good or bad the present British Governors may be, there can be no doubt that Pakistanis with as much or greater integrity and ability are available to take their place. We can, therefore, think of no good reason why the appointment of British Governors, originally made, it is reported, for one year only and in order to make for a smooth change-over from the past regime, should be allowed to continue. Apart from other reasons, grave charges have publicly been levelled against two British Governors of Pakistan's Provinces (one of whom is no longer here): charges which have been neither explained nor refuted. Nor has Pakistan, during and since its inception, any particular reason to be grateful to the British for any support or sympathy in the grave issues facing our country. In these circumstances the general feeling among our people that the present British Governors should be replaced as soon as possible by suitable Pakistanis is fully justified. There are not many people in Pakistan opposed to the appointment of foreigners to posts where they are really needed, but to keep them in offices for which better Pakistanis can easily be found is clearly a bad policy. We hope the Central Government will give this matter the urgent attention it deserves.

4 November 1950 Civil Service Reorganisation

In consultation with the Provincial Governments, the Government of Pakistan has decided to reorganise the seniormost cadres of the country's civil services on a more ŵ

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centralised basis. The new Civil Service of Pakistan is intended to replace the present Pakistan Administrative Service and the Political Service, and will be constituted with the officers now serving in these two Services, along with a certain number to be selected from the Pakistan Army and the various Provincial Civil Services. The main feature of the scheme is that there will no longer be a provincial cadre or 'commission' and all officers will be liable to serve in, and be transferred to, any part of the country. The advantages expected by Government from this arrangement are that provincialism will be rooted out, officers will gain wider knowledge and experience of the country's problems, and greater administrative uniformity and homogeneity will be achieved. How the transferability of officers from province to province after their first posting—which even today need not be in their home province-can help to eliminate provincialism is not explained, nor has it been shown why a broad administrative uniformity cannot be attained without such drastic centralisation. As for the gain of greater knowledge about the country's problems, frequent interprovincial transfers will certainly please the travel-minded officers or the keen linguists and even help to some extent those who are later to serve in the Central Government. For the vast majority, however, who during their tenure of service will only be called upon to administer the districts or otherwise deal with purely provincial tasks, the advantage of knowledge gained about other provinces will probably be outweighed by the disadvantage of not having sufficient knowledge of the province to which they are transferred. The personal inconvenience to officers and the extra expense involved also deserve some consideration. If it is said, in refutation of such criticism, that inter-provincial transfers will be almost as rare as they were in the old days, then the purpose of centralising the new Service to such an extent is simply not understood.

Details are not yet available regarding control of the new Civil Service and it is not known if the Central Government will take over most of the powers now resting with the Provincial Governments with regard to such matters as transfer, promotion, and discipline. If, as is suspected, the Provincial Governments' authority over the senior officers manning the administration is to be seriously reduced in favour of the Central Government, this will constitute a serious encroachment on the autonomy of the provinces perpetrated through a back door. Apart from being highly undesirable, it is both surprising and regrettable that a change of such great importance should be made without consulting either the Central Parliament or the Provincial Assemblies.

The decision not to include the judicial branch of the present PAS in the Civil Service of Pakistan will be welcomed if it can be regarded as a first step towards complete separation of the judiciary from the executive. If such a desirable change is to be ushered in, the proposed Judicial Service should not be confined to the PAS class of judicial officers. It should include all magistrates and the lower tier of judges, and should completely be freed from executive control. Unless it is followed to its logical conclusion, this bifurcation of the senior Civil Service may simplify the work of training and appointing the officers concerned, but it will not bring about the badly-needed reform in our present system of administering justice.

17 October 1951 National Tragedy

So soon after the death of the Quaid-i-Azam, a cruel Fate has confronted Pakistan with another national tragedy in the sudden loss of the Great Leader's first lieutenant. The ghastly assassination of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan has dealt the nation a shocking blow. The country mourns not only the tragic end of its first Prime Minister, but also the passing away of a person who had devoted a lifetime of service to the cause of emancipating the Muslims of India. It is impossible yet to overcome the sense of grief and shock, and to attempt a proper assessment of the far-reaching effects that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's death will have on our country's future, but it is apparent that the absence of his unifying and moderating influence from the Party and the Government he had led with such rare ability and integrity will be keenly felt for years to come.

For the person who perpetrated the foul and dastardly crime, and the diseased minds which conceived it, no words of condemnation can be too strong. They are guilty of an inhuman, cowardly murder, which will bring undying personal sorrow to the relations and many friends of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. They are guilty of trying to stab the country in the back at a time when Pakistan is faced with the gravest crisis in its history. They are guilty of a political crime which can do untold harm to the cause of Pakistan's progress and development and may retard the political growth of its people. Whatever one's political views or party affiliations, on this question there cannot be any room for a difference of opinion. The cult of political assassination never has, and never can, serve any useful purpose. If anything, violence against individuals invites further violence, and in the madhouse of personal vendetta, public interest is completely lost. Whatever the motives of those who have reddened their hands with blood, their crime cannot be condoned in any way, nor can it be forgotten for a second that they have done the gravest possible disservice to the people and State of Pakistan. We have not the slightest doubt that every political party worth the name, and every sane person, will unreservedly condemn the criminal act which has deprived the country of a faithful and tried public servant, and whole-heartedly support every sincere effort made to extirpate the elements responsible for introducing the cult of the bullet into our country's political life.

However poignantly we may feel about the personal aspect of the fateful tragedy that was enacted at Rawalpindi, its effect on us as citizens of the young State of Pakistan must be given far greater importance. The pain and tears must be forgotten in order to take stock of the political

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position, so that the nefarious designs of those who may seek to take advantage of the situation created by the untimely demise of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan can effectively be countered and defeated. It is our first and foremost duty to maintain perfect discipline and, thus, destroy all chances of the country's enemies trying to foster turmoil and chaos. In other countries faced with crises of a similar nature we have seen the attempts made by foreign Powers or their local agents to disrupt national unity and thereby secure gains which were otherwise barred to them. This must not be allowed to happen in Pakistan. The aims of our internal and external enemies must be frustrated by further developing our sense of duty and loyalty to Pakistan. The great national tragedy calls upon all sections of our people to assume greater responsibilities than ever before. We humbly pray that Almighty God may give us the fortitude and wisdom to pass through this period of severe trial and, overcoming all difficulties, guide the country's destiny along the path of democratic progress and high achievements.

21 October 1951 The Pindi Tragedy

As the first shock of the ghastly tragedy enacted at Rawalpindi on 16 October is beginning to wear off, the people are naturally asking whether the evil design of the assassin could have been frustrated by better security arrangements. Firstly, it is said that the public should not have been seated so near the dais from where the Prime Minister was to address the gathering. This is clearly an afterthought, prompted solely by the successful perpetration of the horrible crime. The meeting, it should be remembered, was organised by a political party, and in normal circumstances too great a distance between the speaker and the people, or the creation of some sort of a protective curtain, would have provoked adverse comments from a diametrically opposite point of view. Despite some talk of premonitions, it is obvious that no one had the slightest suspicion that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's life was in serious and imminent danger. However, even if it is accepted that there was nothing wrong or unusual in having the distinguished speaker's platform only a few vards away from the crowded meeting, there are other points on which the people will want satisfactory answers. It is customary on such occasions for the Prime Minister to have a protective guard of policemen in plain clothes, who should have been sitting in the first two or three rows and in front of the dais facing the meeting. If the security policemen were posted in such positions of vantage, they do not seem to have been able to make any move in the performance of their duty. Further, if it is true that the killer. Said Akbar, was a police suspect and that the local authorities had been warned by the Frontier Police of his visit to Rawalpindi, it is surprising that no attempt was made to keep a vigilant eye on his movements. particularly when his arrival in Rawalpindi coincided with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's tour.

With regard to what happened immediately after the Prime Minister was shot, there are many different versions, and even eye-witness accounts of the happenings do not tally with each other on certain details. The existence of some confusion is understandable; but it seems that for some time nearly everybody present lost his head completely. It has been reported that the crowd had to be kept back by rifle-fire over their heads, that a number of senior officials ran away in search of safe shelter, and that for many important minutes the situation was, to put it mildly, out of control. It is even more tragic that no proper attempt seems to have been made to administer first aid to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and, although it cannot be said with certainty, it is possible that he bled to death. After many precious minutes had been wasted, he made an extremely uncomfortable journey to the hospital where the best available medical aid failed to revive him. It is equally strange and regrettable that a more determined effort was not made to take the criminal into custody or to cordon off the group which had gathered round him. It is clear that

whoever killed the assassin has made investigation of the crime much more difficult and has, in fact, helped those who planned the dastardly deed. It is absolutely necessary that the episode should be subjected to a sifting enquiry so that the real truth can emerge and the various rumours circulating throughout Pakistan, and in foreign countries, can be confirmed or contradicted. It is also necessary, for similar reasons, that whatever information is available to the Government about the Prime Minister's assailant or those known to be associated with him should be made public as soon as it is confirmed. Already the circulation of reports which had to be contradicted later has confused the people, and rumour-mongering has added to their bewilderment. It is essential that investigation of the Prime Minister's murder should be pursued with speed and vigour so that the culprits can be brought to book and, what is equally important, their foul motives fully exposed before the people of Pakistan.

19 October 1951 New Appointments

When a country is suddenly bereft of a leader who has borne the largest share of the burden of guiding its destiny, it may seem that the vacuum would almost be impossible to fill. Yet when such a time comes, however great the national loss, if the nation has life and vigour it succeeds in finding other men to take the place of the fallen leader. So it was when the Quaid-i-Azam's untimely death orphaned the people of Pakistan. So it will be now that the life of his political successor has tragically been cut short by the evil hand of a hired assassin. Faced with the serious situation created by this foul crime, whose base motives and ramifications have not vet been fully uncovered, the Central Cabinet has done well to take immediate decisions about the necessary reorganisation of the Government. In normal circumstances, as the first step towards finding a new Prime Minister, the Muslim League Party in the Parliament should have been

asked to elect a new leader: but in view of the emergency it was perfectly correct to dispense with formalities and give the country a new Government as early as possible. In any case, it can be taken for granted that the Cabinet's selection will be endorsed by the Muslim League Parliamentary Party and the Parliament.

The new appointments are likely to be accepted by the people with general satisfaction. In the existing circumstances, the first consideration that must have weighed with those who made the choice was that there should be no contest for the vacant office and that the Prime Minister should be one who would best command the loyalty and respect of his colleagues and the country's esteem and good will. For a variety of reasons. Khwaja Nazimuddin was the obvious choice. The elevation of Mr Ghulam Mohammad, one of the senior-most Central Ministers, to the office of Governor-General will also meet with general approval. Rumours of his failing health had raised the fear that the Government would lose the services of an able expert. As the Head of the State—which appointment is a tribute to his hard work in the country's service-Mr Ghulam Mohammad will not be subjected to the strain of departmental work and at the same time his advice and guidance will be available to the Government. The Central Cabinet will further be strengthened by the return of Sirdar Abdur Rab Nishtar, who during his two years in the Punjab has considerably-enhanced his prestige as an administrator.

In the present crisis, those who are being called upon to accept new and heavier responsibilities can safely expect the people's fullest support in dealing with the major national problems that face our country. There are many of these, but the question which must now be given the highest priority is the need for creating conditions which will make it impossible for political terrorism to flourish in Pakistan. The exact implications of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's dastardly murder may not be known for some time, and it would be unwise to formulate any conclusions on the basis of unproved evidence, but it is absolutely necessary that Pakistan's political atmosphere should be cleared of all elements that foster the use of terrorism to attain political ends. It should be realised that, unless this can be achieved, the danger exists that democratic functioning will become difficult and Pakistan may be reduced to the status of a backward feudal autocracy. Success in this direction is made easier by the fact that every political party will certainly be prepared to give the Government its unstinted help in creating conditions which are a prerequisite to the future progress of Pakistan and the welfare of our people.

25 October 1951 The New Cabinet

Khwaja Nazimuddin's selection of the new Central Cabinet is in keeping with his declared intention of maintaining perfect continuity in administrative and political policies. No startling changes have been made in the personnel of the Ministry or its numerical strength, and there has been practically no reshuffling of portfolios. In fact, it is quite possible that if the late Mr Liaguat Ali Khan had been spared by fate he may well have carried out a more drastic reorganisation of the Central Government. The present Prime Minister's decision to move with caution will generally be received with satisfaction and, within the self-prescribed limits of one-party rule, there can be no quarrel with his choice of new Ministers. As we said a few days ago, Sirdar Abdur Rab Nishtar's transfer to the Centre will bring the Cabinet an accession of strength. The appointment of Mr Mohammad Ali to fill the vacancy created by Mr Ghulam Mohammad's elevation to the high office of Pakistan's Governor-General will also be welcomed in view of the former Secretary-General's reputation for ability and hard work. Further, the fact that Chaudhry Nazir Ahmed has been left out of the Cabinet will certainly not be lamented by anyone except his personal friends, while many will regard

his departure from an office of such great importance to the country as an unmixed blessing.

While further comment on the work of the Nazimuddin Government must wait until they have had time to formulate their plans and policies, it is necessary to draw attention to a major national issue which has come to the fore after the tragic death of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. Hitherto, with the exception of Mr Mandal and persons who may be regarded as experts, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has restricted his choice of colleagues to representatives of the Muslim League. This procedure is unexceptionable in ordinary circumstances and is in accord with normal democratic practice. But in view of the fact that conditions in Pakistan have, since its very inception, been abnormal, there is considerable weight in the argument that non-Muslim League elements should be given a place in the Government—at least at the Centre—to make it more broad-based and more representative of the people. In regard to Pakistan's national problems—internal as well as external—our people have always shown a unity of purpose that must be the envy of many a nation. It would certainly be of considerable advantage to the country to allow this national solidarity, which has been further cemented by the Rawalpindi outrage, to be expressed in practical terms by the formation of a coalition Government at the Centre. We hope Khwaja Nazimuddin will give this matter the attention it undoubtedly deserves and consider it from the national point of view rather than that of his party.

^{21 April 1953} – avat Institute Change at the Centre

Recent rumours about an impending change at the Centre have materialised in a most unexpected manner with the dismissal of the faction-ridden Government headed by Khwaja Nazimuddin. It was no great secret that the second Muslim League Cabinet since the establishment of Pakistan was a house divided against itself, that on a number of major

issues the old band of Central Ministers held widely divergent views, and that, with a few exceptions, they spent a great deal of their time and energy in trying to strengthen their own position or weaken that of their rivals. While this continuous political fencing inside the Cabinet destroyed what little cohesion it ever had, it is also true that the reputation of more than one outgoing Minister was sullied by persistent charges of corruption and nepotism. But the main factor responsible for the general sense of relief evoked by the Governor-General's dramatic decision finds direct mention albeit in the mildest terms-in the official communique announcing Khwaja Nazimuddin's dismissal. The Governor-General's conclusion that the Cabinet of Khwaja Nazimuddin had proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country will receive country-wide endorsement, for even those not closely interested in politics had begun to feel that a great deal was wrong with the way the country's affairs were being managed. To give only a few examples. the Government's policy of drift and inaction had allowed the food situation to deteriorate to a level where starvation became possible, while the current economic crisis, instead of being tackled with vision and boldness, was used as a cloak to cover the Government's inability to devise and implement a clear-cut policy to overcome the malaise that grips our economy. Similarly, on the political front the Nazimuddin Government's record is barren of all tangible progress, whereas its inherent weaknesses and the repeated attempts to ensure its own viability by a series of intricate and changing factional alliances have created a variety of new complications. These and various other sins of omission and commission had made Khwaja Nazimuddin's continuance in office highly undesirable; and it can be said with confidence that in a country with stronger democratic traditions, and with less constitutional scope for the defiance of public opinion, the Nazimuddin Cabinet would have met its nemesis very much earlier and without the constitutional head of State having to use his special powers.

Khwaja Nazimuddin's claim that he still is the de jure Prime Minister of Pakistan and that the Governor-General's dismissal of his Cabinet was 'illegal and unconstitutional' is not likely to win the ex-Premier much sympathy. In the first place, the letter of the law seems to support the official view that the Governor-General can depose a Ministry merely by 'withholding his pleasure' from it: and further, since Khwaja Nazimuddin himself has on more than one occasion taken advantage of similar provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935, which may rightly be regarded as being-to use the ex-Premier's words—'against the basic principles of democracy', his plea in the name of democracy, made in his own interests, cannot be given the serious attention it might have received otherwise. Be that as it may, the political aspect of the issue raised cannot be ignored. It certainly does appear anomalous, as Khwaja Nazimuddin has hinted, that the Governor-General should have the power to dismiss the Prime Minister when the former's appointment is subject to he latter's recommendation. The answer to this constitutional problem, however, is not that the Prime Minister should be allowed to perpetuate his own power by freely using the 'emergency' provisions of the present constitution. It also needs to be remembered that the Constituent Assembly was created long years ago, by Provincial Assemblies elected on a restricted franchise, and for the sole purpose of registering Muslim India's verdict in favour of Pakistan, and that its representative character has further been vitiated by nominations and the piecemeal filling of vacancies. Quite obviously, the only real solution to the constitutional tangle which has arisen at the Centre, and a veritable host of other allied problems, lies in holding new elections as soon as possible to give the country a directly-elected Parliament that could act with confidence based on the people's renewed mandate.

It is, therefore, heartening to note that in his first broadcast to the nation Mr Mohammad Ali, the new Prime Minister, has stressed the all-important fact that 'democracy must function effectively in the country'. The new regime will be performing a historic duty if it can implement the Premier's pledge to 'ensure fair and free elections to representative institutions at all levels' so that 'the people of Pakistan can be represented by those who enjoy their confidence'. We firmly believe that impartially-conducted, country-wide elections are a necessary pre-requisite to Pakistan's progress, and that the holding of such elections on a democratic basis is a task whose importance in our history will rank second only to the establishment of the State. If this country is to develop in accordance with the wishes of the people who fought and won the struggle for Pakistan, all undemocractic trends must be resisted, so that the frustration among our people can be eliminated and Pakistan made safe for genuine democracy. Apart from this essential task, whose urgency cannot be minimized, the new Central Government will be expected to make a clean break with the policies of their predecessors, who leave behind a legacy of chaos and confusion, inefficiency and bungling, short-sightedness and timidity, and a lack of respect for the democratic rights of the people. While the replacement of the worst sinners of the Nazimuddin Cabinet is bound to raise hopes of better days, and the new Prime Minister's attitude promises that the grave problems facing the country will be tackled with greater vigour and determination, it would be premature to give a definite opinion about the new Cabinet.

It will be some days before a clear picture of the recent events emerges from the dust raised by Khwaja Nazimuddin's sudden fall: the full implications of the new appointments also need to be studied; and, what is by far the most significant factor, the new Prime Minister should be given the opportunity to formulate and enunciate his policies, for these will, in the last analysis, determine the future of his Government. We would, however, like to emphasise that, if Mr Mohammad Ali is to succeed where other Muslim League Premiers have failed, he must overcome the narrow outlook of the average Muslim League leader and be able to give precedence to national demands over the needs of his party or group. It is also necessary to point out that, however laudable his intentions, the new Prime Minister will be able to achieve little if he allows himself to get bogged down in the morass created by some self-seeking individuals in the Muslim League Party. Nor should Mr Mohammad Ali attach much importance to the loud chorus of adulatory approval provoked by his appointment among a wide section of Muslim Leaguers, for, apart from reflecting a feeling of relief at Khwaja Nazimuddin's exit, such praise is readily available to every new incumbent of a high office in Pakistan. We hope that the change at the Centre means something more than a change of faces and names; but whether Mr Mohammad Ali will bring about the changes in policies required by the people's interests, only time can show.

16 March 1954 The Shaky Centre

If, as now seems fairly certain, the Muslim League is convincingly defeated in East Bengal, the Central Government's representative character will be further vitiated. Even today, the Constituent Assembly—which controls or is controlled by the Central Government—is by no means a shining example of democratic functioning. In the first place, the body was elected for the specific_task_of_framing a constitution for the country, and it was meant to function as a Parliament only for a very limited period. The Constituent Assembly has failed miserably to accomplish its main task, and it has for seven long years prevented the creation of a democratically-elected Parliament. Further, a large part of its membership comprises persons who were chosen by the old Provincial Assemblies, which were elected on a limited franchise and with a restricted mandate to decide only one question, namely, whether or not the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent should be partitioned. The Constituent Assembly should, therefore, have drawn up a constitution and speedily

made way for a new Parliament directly elected by the people and fully representative of national opinion. This has not been done, presumably because those who occupied the seats of power were afraid—and quite understandably—of risking their position by going before the people in a country-wide election. Even in the matter of filling vacancies, patently undemocratic methods have been adopted to ensure the return of nominees of the League junta. The Centre's weak structure is further exposed by the fact that many of the Ministers nominated to office with the Constituent Assembly's approval are political nonentities, mostly without any redeeming feature, who in their own provinces would not be able to face the people even in an election to some small town committee or District Board.

The situation has now changed drastically. Whereas before the East Bengal elections, the Muslim League could at least claim that certain democratic formalities had been respected, after the Party's debacle in that Province there can be no excuse whatsoever for the retention of power at the Centre by an organisation whose leadership has been repudiated by more than half the country's population. In these circumstances, Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din's plea, reiterated in the Assembly the other day, calling for the immediate dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, acquires greater justification and urgency. It is of interest that, with one exception, no member of the Muslim League Party stood up to argue against the Azad Party MCA's demand. Only Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan opposed the plea with the suggestion that if Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din was convinced that the Parliament no longer enjoyed the country's confidence, he should himself set an example in this respect and resign his seat. Such a counter-point may have served some purpose in a debating society for juveniles, but in a Parliamentary debate on a question of vital importance to the country and its people, one would expect the Muslim League representatives to devise a more serious argument for the rejection of this demand, or to confess that their attachment to office is greater

than their regard for democratic principles. If the Muslim League spokesman was not merely being facetious, he should know that the resignation of one member would be a futile gesture which would have no effect on the situation, for Muslim League legislators are certainly not going to follow anyone's example of self-abnegation in order to prove a point of principle. Nor does it provide any weighty reason in favour of retaining the present Constituent Assembly to argue, as has been done by some other apologists of the Muslim League, that it is a sovereign body and, therefore, legally it cannot be dissolved. This contention is equally meaningless. for legally the Constituent Assembly could rule the country for another hundred years, but not even the Muslim League leadership would dare to advocate such a course of action. Both morally and politically, it is quite plain that the Constituent Assembly has by its prolonged inaction lost whatever sanction it ever had to govern the country. particularly when the East Bengal elections are likely to prove that the Muslim League does not enjoy the support of the people. All these factors make it absolutely essential that the present shaky Centre should be disbanded and elections held to create a new Constituent Assembly that would enjoy full public support and be able to give the country not only a democratic constitution but also a Government supported and sustained by a clear mandate from the people. It should be realised that, in the last analysis, sovereignty rests with the people, and that continued attempts to thwart their will can only invite the gravest political consequences. nstitute

28 March 1954 Laya The Only Solution

The Pakistan Prime Minister, having rejected all sane advice, appears determined to proceed with the self-allotted task of ruling the country as the head of a Government whose representative status has been unmistakably repudiated by the electorate, and of compelling the Constituent Assembly

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to remain in existence even though a vast majority of its members fully realise that they no longer have the right to speak or act in the name of the people of Pakistan. In different circumstances, Mr Mohammed Ali's display of eagerness to expedite the writing of a new constitution for the country might have won him a measure of applause, and his promise to complete this task within a matter of months and to hold General Elections for a new Parliament before the end of next year might have created some interest among the people, despite the fact that his predecessors had also made similar diversionary pledges with an air of earnestness but had always been able to find some excuse to revert to the policy of delay and drift. If in the past the leisurely manner in which the Muslim League leadership performed its duties in the field of constitution-making was validly attributed to the League MCAs' mortal fear of facing the people in a fair electoral contest, the danger that these gentlemen will persist in the pursuit of a policy motivated solely by the desire to prolong their political lives is much greater now, after the ruling party's historic debacle in East Bengal. However, even if one were to accept that Mr Mohammed Ali and his friends are genuinely interested in completing the Constitution in accordance with the latest timetable announced for the purpose, and even if one could be persuaded to ignore the fact that a party split into warring factions and riven by unending intrigue is singularly incapable of properly performing a national task of such vital importance to the country's future. there still remains the basic fact that, particularly in view of the Muslim League's unmitigated defeat in East Bengal, most of the Constituent Assembly members represent no one but themselves.

This fundamental fact, however unpalatable it may be for some, can neither be denied, nor ignored, nor circumvented. Presuming that the present Constituent Assembly is able to produce some sort of a patchwork which it thrusts on the country as its new constitution, what moral or political sanction will its decisions have?

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How can any democrat advocate that a body which was elected indirectly by Provincial Legislatures representing only a small part of the electorate, and which has during the seven years of its existence given ample proof of its utter incompetence and lack of initiative, should be recognised as the sole repository of Pakistan's sovereignty? Surely, only by denying the first principle of democracy, that sovereignty rests with the people, can the wording of the British Parliament's Indian Independence Act be quoted as authority for accepting the right of the present Constituent Assembly to exercise its wide powers in perpetuity and even in defiance of the clearly-expressed will of the people. Since arguments based on principles do not always appeal to the Muslim League gentry, we would also like to point out that if the Central Government adhere to the policy outlined by Mr Mohammed Ali they will be creating a variety of serious political and constitutional complications. The only way to avoid a grave crisis—and it also offers the only democratic solution to the existing tangle—lies in dissolving the Constituent Assembly and holding country-wide elections within the next few months, preferably under the acgis of an all-parties caretaker Government at the Centre, to bring into being a body whose voice would echo the aspirations of the people and, therefore, both inside the country and abroad, would command the respect due to a democratic and representative national Parliament.

20 September 1954 PRODA Repeatvat Institute

The Muslim League Parliamentary Party's sudden decision to repeal the Public Representative Offices Disqualification Act will shock and bewilder public opinion throughout the country. A law designed to check maladministration and corruption among politicians will soon be removed from the Statute Book at the instance of the very gentlemen whose ungentlemanly activities it was intended to control. The

sponsors of the move have given no reasonable explanation for their keenness to destroy a weapon which ordinarily no honest politician need have feared. Presumably, they dare not disclose their real motives and have not yet been able to devise the cloak of sophistry needed to cover their naked shamelessness. It cannot possibly be argued that the PRODA's aim of cleansing our public life has been achieved and it can now be discarded without disadvantage, for it is generally realised that corruption, jobbery and nepotism are on the increase, and new records are being set in maladministration and the abuse of official power and position. The anti-PRODA faction are reported to have said that the PRODA was a bad law and that it was being abused as an instrument of oppression. With regard to the principles involved, it may be undesirable to prescribe special punishments for a certain category of citizens; but if the circumstances which had made such legislation necessary and the manner in which it has operated are kept in mind, it cannot be denied that the enactment was fully justified and that the discrimination it makes between Ministers and ordinary citizens has not adversely affected the former's interests. The fact that action under PRODA has never been followed by prosecution under the ordinary law—as was originally contemplated-has, in actual fact, allowed the culprits to get off with exceptionally light punishment for their crimes. Further, although the general consensus of opinion in the country is that the PRODA has not been used often enough or with sufficient severity, even if it be accepted that this law has been misused the case for its repeal gains no strength. If misuse of a law provided sufficient cause for its abrogation. Pakistan's Statue Book would soon be denuded of a very large number of our penal laws. If these anti-PRODA perfectionists have discovered certain flaws in the Act under discussion, surely the proper thing would be to remove these shortcomings by suitably amending the measure. And while these fine gentlemen are in the mood to examine Pakistan's laws from the high plane of perfect justice

and equity, let them first pay attention to such legal monstrosities as the Frontier Crimes Regulation, the Bengal Regulation, the Security Act, and the host of Safety Acts and Ordinances.

It is not without interest that Mr Hashim Gazdar, whose proposal for the repeal of PRODA has suddenly been revived, was among the Act's most vociferous supporters in 1949, and that the bunch of East Bengal MCAs agitating for its repeal were responsible—before being driven out of office by their constituents-for invoking the PRODA to deal with a political opponent who could not be silenced otherwise. To accuse these Muslim League leaders of changing their principles as often as they change their factional loyalties, or of being guided solely by narrow-minded expediency, is to stress the obvious. The Muslim League Party's lack of logic does not end here. If the PRODA is being repealed because it is a bad law or has been misused, why should past disqualifications under this Act be sustained or pending cases be allowed to proceed? The compromise effected by the Party completely exposes it as the handmaid of a coterie of powerhungry morons, blinded by self-interest, whose main purpose in life is to retain by any means the monopoly of political power they have acquired. Apparently, for these gentlemen, no principle of political morality is so sacred that it cannot be sacrificed for personal or factional gain, no promise so important that it cannot be betrayed, and there is no loyalty that transcends their single-minded devotion to their own selfish interests. If democracy in Pakistan had not been emasculated with such thoroughness, and these so-called leaders were unable to ignore the wishes of the people with such brazenness, a decision like the one that has been taken by the Muslim League would have led to its representatives being hounded out of office within a few days. It is indeed amazing that persons likely to be prosecuted under a particular law should be able to save their skins by ordering its repeal. The Prime Minister—who is, virtually ex officio, the President of the Muslim League and Leader of the Parliamentary

Party—should see to what depths of degradation his Party is being dragged by men who have no moral or political right to the power they are exercising in support of such dubious causes. If the Muslim League's top leaders have not been rendered completely powerless, they must assert themselves and revoke the Party's disgraceful decision to repeal the PRODA, or they must accept the opprobrium such an act so richly deserves and also realise that they have willingly accepted the role of being the foremost grave-diggers of the Muslim League.

26 October 1954 The New Set-up

There can be no disagreement with the reasons outlined by the Governor-General for proclaiming a state of emergency in the country; and few tears will be shed over the virtual suspension of the Constituent Assembly. This body had failed miserably to accomplish its allotted task, and had thus completely forfeited its right to speak or act on behalf of the people of Pakistan. Rocked by petty intrigues and selfish manoeuvring, riven by personal rivalries and factional jealousies, the group controlling the Constituent Assembly had proved to the hilt that it was utterly incapable of exercising proper control over the policies of the Central Government or giving the country a constitution suited to its needs and acceptable to the people. Public demands for dissolution of the Constituent Assembly had continued to mount in recent years, and particularly after the East Bengal elections. A body of men gifted with greater self-respect than that with which the coterie in power was endowed would have bowed before the will of the nation and made room for the people's genuine representatives. This would have provided a better solution to the crisis with which we were faced, and allowed these gentlemen to make a more graceful exit from the positions of power they were occupying as usurpers. It would also have made it unnecessary for the

Governor-General to take the drastic and extraordinary step of using his special prerogative to find an effective remedy for the unhappy situation created by a band of guilty men whose lust for power had overcome their sense of patriotic responsibility and whatever respect they ever had for democratic principles.

In the circumstances, it was inevitable that the old Cabinet, which included certain ring-leaders of the warring factions in the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, should be disbanded. The reconstituted Central Government is certain to function with greater cohesion and efficiency, and thus be able to eliminate the worst features of an administration which, apart from its planlessness and inefficiency, was like a house divided against itself. The composition and character of the new Cabinet are likely to cause a certain amount of surprise and, from the political stand-point, some criticism. It needs to be realised, however, that, as far as the people are concerned, the personnel of the Government has little importance: what really matters is the policy it is going to pursue. While the association with the Government of political elements who enjoy popular backing would be highly desirable, it should also be remembered that the new Cabinet is avowedly a caretaker Government, whose main task is to give the country a stable regime until elections can be held to elect a new Constituent Assembly. The unequivocal declaration made by the Governor-General---which has been fully endorsed by the Prime Minister-that sovereignty must be restored to the people, and that the new elections will be held without any delay, has naturally been welcomed by all sections of the people. We earnestly hope that the Central Government will take early steps to convene a new Constituent Assembly, elected directly by the people in an honest and impartial election. We would suggest that a high-powered election commission should be appointed immediately to make all necessary preparations, with the special responsibility of ensuring that the election is completely free from the interference prompted by unscrupulous politicians and effected through the misuse of the Executive's power. In treading this democratic path lies the best

guarantee of the country's salvation and progress; with the removal of the stumbling block of an unrepresentative Constituent Assembly, which had tried to repudiate all responsibility to the people, the new Central Government has been given the opportunity to perform an act of great national service—by giving our people the right, of which they have been deprived for so long, to order the affairs of the country through properly elected representatives.

³ November 1954 **The Cross-Roads**

Certain moves connected with the reconstitution of the Central Government had lent strength to the report that the new Government would be formed with the collaboration of popular elements. Mr Mohammed Ali has, however, denied that any such development is in the offing. The Prime Minister's disclaimer is likely to cause widespread disappointment. Particularly in today's circumstances, the replacement of most Muslim League stalwarts in the Central Government by the representatives of other political parties would generally be viewed as a change for the better. This would not only meet the demands of retributive justice but also help to purge the Government of weak and venal elements who were responsible almost as much as anybody else for creating the unholy mess which prompted the Governor-General's intervention. The change suggested in the character of the Central Cabinet would also bring the Government added political strength and help it to evolve realistic policies to deal with the country's different problems. And if a proper Coalition Government could be formed—although to achieve this desirable end the ruling party will have to discard many of its prejudices and change its whole attitude—one would confidently expect the Centre to ensure that free elections are held and that unscrupulous politicians are not allowed to misuse the administrative machinery and frustrate the people's political aspirations by perverting the poll.

Before we go on to discuss future possibilities, it is necessary to take note of an important issue connected with the recent developments. Since the Governor-General's Proclamation, the question of its legality has been the subject of much private speculation and some public comment. Most of those who approve of the step taken have tried to gloss over its legal implications; but we believe that, in order to dispel the existing confusion, the question must be discussed fully and frankly. It seems to be a fact that there is no existing legal provision which allows the Constituent Assembly to be suspended or dissolved by the Governor-General. In the Proclamation itself and its subsequent interpretations, no attempt has been made to show that the action taken was sanctioned by some provision of the written law. In fact, it was this lacuna in the relevant law-drawn up for us by the British Parliament—which allowed the Constituent Assembly to regard itself as a permanent, self-perpetuating body whose rights could not be amended or withdrawn by any authority. At the same time, it is generally conceded that the Constituent Assembly had become the plaything of an irresponsible group of Muslim League politicians, endowed with an insatiable hunger for power, divided into faction gangs, and adamantly unwilling to admit that the ultimate political authority is vested in the people. Ignoring the growing demand for disbandment of the Constituent Assembly, the majority group had shamelessly declared that they were determined to cling to power at all costs. With the country on the verge of chaos, something had to be done. What was the way out? Under the circumstances, no strictly legal remedy was available, and apparently nothing short of a revolution could have driven these gentlemen out of the position they continued to occupy as usurpers. Such a revolutionary step was taken by the Head of the State—acting in the name of the people—to avert the gravest political crisis in Pakistan's brief history.

Respect for constitutional procedures is an essential part of the democratic process and a pre-requisite to the rule of law. If democratic conditions had existed in this country, making it impossible for anyone to thwart the clearlyexpressed will of the people, there could have been no possible justification, moral or political, for the violation of this principle. It can be said, however, that in the absence of democratic conditions such steps become necessary, and that history provides many examples of extra-legal methods having been adopted to serve democratic ends. But we should be fully aware of the dangers inherent in the resort to extraconstitutional remedies: and in history a far larger number of examples are available of such methods being used to usher in authoritarian regimes. It must, therefore, be realised that only the most extraordinary circumstances can make the adoption of such means acceptable to the people, and that it would be an invitation to disaster if abnormal methods were looked upon as a precedent and the inhibitions imposed by the Constitution discarded even to deal with normal political problems. We earnestly hope and trust that in Pakistan the purpose for which the drastic operation was performed will be faithfully served. This is the supreme test facing those who have assumed power, and have taken upon their shoulders a terrible burden. In appraising the Governor-General's action, it needs to be realised that there was no real alternative before the country except to get rid of the Constituent Assembly. Nor is there any alternative today except to elect a new body that would be fully representative of the people. No one can, with honest motives, even dream of seeking to restore the defunct Constituent Assembly to life. Even if, as might well be possible after a few weeks, the disbanded Assembly could be persuaded to support the new Central Government-as it has supported every Government in the past-or to accept its own dissolution, it would now serve no useful or healthy purpose. At this stage, the Governor-General's action can best be judged by the political results it is going to produce and not in the light of legal arguments.

This is how the majority of our people will judge the events of the last few days—from a political, rather than a legal, stand-point. It is equally certain that they will abide by the sensible advice given by the Prime Minister in his recent broadcast and judge his new Government not by their 'words and promises' but by their 'deeds and actions'. Both the Governor-General and the Prime Minister have pledged themselves to bring about a full restitution of the people's democratic rights. We believe that the faithful implementation of this unequivocal declaration offers the only real solution to our crisis. It is not possible, therefore, to endorse the various compromises that are being suggested. It is argued, for instance, that in order to save time, the existing Provincial Assemblies should be asked to elect a Constituent Assembly to finalise the Constitution; or that a Constituent Assembly of 'men of talent' should be nominated by the Governor-General. The talent-hunters seem to ignore the fact that the assistance of technically qualified or otherwise able persons can be secured without destroying the very basis of democracy. The school of time-servers used to speak with equal vigour, and on the same grounds, in favour of the different formulae produced by the defunct Constituent Assembly. The fallacy of their argument is obvious for, given a realistic and honest approach, it should not take more than two or three months to devise a constitutional plan for Pakistan. It is also obvious that most of these Provincial Assemblies cannot be regarded as representative bodies and that, therefore, to give all authority to their nominees would be to invite another round of power politics; and, finally, that only a directly-elected Constituent Assembly can properly represent the people and determine the country's constitutional pattern on their behalf.

22 December 1954 The Main Task

Mr H.S. Suhrawardy's inclusion in the Central Cabinet undoubtedly merits the approval with which it has been received by different sections of political opinion. Although

the Awami League leader has made it plain that he has accepted office on the distinct assurance that he was being asked to join a non-party Government, and that he had not done so as a representative of the East Bengal Unified Front. the fact remains that Mr Suhrawardy does represent a party which enjoys the confidence of a vast majority of East Bengal's electorate. His presence, therefore, makes the Central Government more broad based and enhances its representative status. It is, however, far more important that Mr Suhrawardy's assumption of office—and the allotment to him of the portfolios of Law, Constitutional Affairs, and Elections—brings with it the promise of the early restitution of full democracy. As has been pointed out in these columns previously, in the situation created by the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the personnel of the Central Government carries little significance; even the ability of an individual Minister, or of the Cabinet as a whole, to deal efficiently with the day-to-day problems of administration is not as important as it would be in ordinary circumstances. What really matters, today, is the Government's willingness and ability to restore to the people their democratic rights and to ensure that Pakistan does not deviate from the democratic path. The fact that the Governor-General in his Proclamation promised to give back to the people their right to decide the form of government they wanted and to choose their rulers, and that this pledge was subsequently endorsed by the Prime Minister, was largely responsible for winning popular support for the unorthodox procedure adopted by them to end the mess created by the intrigue and chicanery which distinguished the last Muslim League Government at the Centre. Later, however, this question was apparently relegated to the background, and it seemed that the Central authorities were far too busy in dealing with other tasks to give much thought to the implementation of the Governor-General's and the Prime Minister's pledges.

With Mr Suhrawardy's arrival on the scene, the most important political issue before the country, namely that of holding new elections, would appear to have regained the priority it deserves. The statements and speeches made by Mr Suhrawardy recently, before his appointment was announced, confirm the newspaper reports that the question of elections figured prominently in his discussions with the Governor-General and the Prime Minister. That in his first press conference as a member of the Central Cabinet. Mr Suhrawardy has held out the 'categorical assurance' that fresh General Elections would be held without undue delay clearly indicates that the Central Government has not resiled from the unequivocal declarations made on this subject by the Governor-General and the Prime Minister. If this assumption is correct, it constitutes the best possible augury for the future...

11 March 1955 Tragic Failure

The apparent failure of the move made by Mr I. I. Chundrigar in the Federal Court—with the approval of the country's highest judicial tribunal-to end the present litigation over the disputed constitutional issues, and to restore untrammelled democracy in the country within the next few months, will be viewed by all genuine democrats as a dismal tragedy. When the proposal for compromise talks was mooted a few days ago, and an early General Election was put forward as the first aim of the suggested settlement out of court, it was hoped that the Central Government would seize the opportunity to end the unseemly legal controversy and enter into negotiations to devise a foolproof formula to ensure the early restoration of political power to the people-a goal to which both parties are now avowedly pledged. It will be recalled that the Governor-General had clearly stated, in his Proclamation of 24 October 1954, that the Constituent Assembly was being dissolved because it had failed to accomplish its allotted task and no longer represented the will of the people. 'The ultimate authority,' the proclamation declared. 'vests in the people who will decide all issues, including constitutional issues, through their representatives, to be elected afresh. Elections will be held as soon as possible.' This stand was fully endorsed by the Prime Minister soon afterwards, and from time to time other Central Ministers reiterated the promise that democracy would soon be resurrected.

When, later, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan filed his petition before the Sind Chief Court, and even more so after the Court's verdict in his favour, the more discerning observers realised the danger of the old Constituent Assembly returning to power and trying to rule the country. The jubilation over the Court's independence was, therefore, tempered by fears for the country's future. It was felt that-unless, of course, the Federal Court reversed the findings of the Chief Court—the only alternatives before the country were that either the unrepresentative Constituent Assembly would return to power or the present Government would disregard the judicial verdict; and it was not very easy to make a choice between the two evils. Cause for further anxiety was provided by the fact that the Central Government's earlier keenness to hold fresh elections began to wane. Even the democratic leaven in the 'Cabinet of talents' provided evidence of a changed attitude. For example, Dr Khan Sahib, the veteran Red Shirt leader, who has generally been regarded as an uncompromising believer in democratic principles, does not seem greatly perturbed by the present state of affairs and talks, with surprising equanimity, of elections after a year or eighteen months from now. Mr H.S. Suhrawardy, who, before his elevation to office, had been campaigning for immediate elections, and had held the view that six months were sufficient to create a new Constituent Assembly, is now equally vague on this point and seems to be engaged in longterm plans for electoral reform. This situation could only be interpreted to mean that ...whichever side wins the court case, the people's case for the restitution of their democratic rights is likely to be lost.

The oppressive gloom was to some extent alleviated by the proposal made on behalf of Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan for a

compromise based on the simple democratic principle that the people must be allowed to choose their rulers and decide on the country's future form of government. Karachi's prompt response to the suggestion, and the arrival of three Central Ministers in Lahore, ostensibly to negotiate with Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan. strengthened the hope that Pakistan would be saved from any deviations and that the two groups, acting jointly, would guide the country back to the path of democracy. This hope has been dealt a grievous blow by the events of the last few days. During their brief, and utterly futile, visit to Lahore, the Central Ministers did not consider it worthwhile to meet Maulyi Tamizuddin Khan or Mr Chundrigar. It seems that all they did, in regard to what was supposed to be the object of their journey, was to question the validity of Maulyi Tamizuddin Khan's credentials. The Advocate-General and Mr H.S. Suhrawardy have said that the negotiations could not be started because Maulyi Tamizuddin had no authority to speak on behalf of the MCAs. For the Government to ask the other party to produce a plenipotentiary. armed with a *carte blanche* from all or even a majority of MCAs, seems rather odd. Political negotiations are never conducted with such legal formalities. It was, in any case, unrealistic to have expected Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan to equip himself at such short notice with an irrevocable power-of-attorney from all MCAs, for, apart from the time factor, a number of MCAs are either in the Government or are known to support it. The crucial question is, if a compromise is agreed upon, will it be possible to obtain the approval of at least two-thirds of the Constituent Assembly's total membership? Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan and his supporters, and others working for a settlement, believe that, if both sides make a concerted effort, it is not only possible but most likely that the required majority will be available to accept and faithfully implement the agreement. The Government representatives have not tried to belie this claim, but they want some sort of a guarantee before they even sit down to discuss the issues involved

We feel strongly that even if the Government harbour genuine doubts on this point, the stakes are so high that they

should anyhow agree to make the attempt, for even if it fails they will have tried to do the right thing. Mr Suhrawardy's earlier remark, that he and his colleagues had come to Lahore merely to examine the authority possessed by Mr Chundrigar. appears to be inane and frivolous, and one would have thought that the Law Minister realised more than anyone else the importance of ending the present constitutional crisis, which has cast grave doubts on the legality of the membership of a large part of the present Cabinet, including that of Mr Suhrawardy, and which threatens to keep Pakistan in the doldrums for a long time. In a later statement, contradicting his earlier stand that the Government did not wish to take any steps as long as the matter rested with the Federal Court, the Law Minister has said that the door to negotiations is not closed, that the Government would be willing to resume negotiations if a reasonable assurance were given that the other party could deliver the goods', and that it was essential for any compromise to guarantee that 'both sides would honour their commitments'. With this there can be little disagreement. But surely the only way to fulfil these obvious requirements of a settlement is for the Government representatives to meet Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan and his friends and discuss the relevant political and legal issues. Political negotiations-particularly when, as in the present case, they are related to complicated questions-can hardly be conducted with any hope of success through press statements. We earnestly hope that the Central Government will revise their attitude and make a serious effort to reach a settlement that would end the present crisis and give the country a democratic set-up; and, quite obviously, this must be done immediately, before the Federal Court delivers its judgement, for thereafter it will probably be too late.

17 April 1955 Democracy or Legalised Dictatorship?

The recent Federal Court pronouncement on the Governor-General's powers-made, ironically, in its judgment on certain

appeals contesting the validity of the Sind Goondas Act-has compelled the Central Government to revise their plans for perpetuation of the present set-up. Instead of trying to give the country a constitution promulgated and enforced by Ordinances. it has been decided to call a Constituent Convention to endorse the constitutional scheme prepared by the Government. While this enforced change of policy may seem to envisage a slight improvement on what clearly amounts to establishing an uninhibited dictatorship, it cannot be accepted as a satisfactory solution to the grave constitutional crisis which holds the country in its vicious grip. In view of the Federal Court's clear pronouncement that the Constituent Assembly was the authority competent to legislate on constitutional matters' and that that 'Assembly alone could amend these Acts', the validity of the Governor-General's latest proclamation would appear to be doubtful. In calling the Convention, and then deciding its composition, the Governor-General has, once again, assumed constitution-making powers which, the Federal Court clearly stated, he does not possess. Apart from the doubtful legality of the procedure now outlined, and the fact that summoning of the Convention may amount to contempt of Court, this body obviously does not answer the demands of democracy. Seven out of the Conventions's sixty members will be nominated by the Central Government, while the rest will be elected by the existing Provincial Assemblies. These Assemblies do not possess a mandate of any sort from the people on constitutional issues, and two of them were elected over four years ago. In the NWFP, most MLAs are the personal nominees of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, and their election was made possible only by the use of every conceivable dirty trick to defeat the will of the people. The situation with regard to the membership of the Punjab Assembly is not very much better. In Sind, the majority group of MLAs have since their election given sufficient evidence of their total incapacity to guide the destinies of the people. In East Bengal, the machinations of the Muslim League leadership have succeeded in splitting the majority party; and, if the claims of the Prime Minister are to be accepted, the

gentleman chosen by Karachi to be the Leader of the House is an unrepentant traitor to Pakistan. Further, the Convention can be dissolved at any time by an order of the Governor-General. There is good reason to fear that such a body will either become an arena for the Muslim League oligarchy's unending factional struggle for power, or a machine for rubber-stamping the Central Government's decisions. In either case, it cannot properly perform the important task that is being entrusted to it.

The second step taken recently by the Central Government is to ask the Federal Court of Pakistan, under Section 213 of the Government of India Act of 1935, to advise them on how to revalidate the laws which have been declared invalid. It is claimed in a Press Note on the subject that it is the Central Government's intention—'as in all other matters, so in this'— to abide by the decision of the Federal Court and continue steadfastly to uphold the rule of law'. These noble sentiments would ordinarily have been received with a measure of relief, but the Government's declaration will, in today's circumstances, be viewed with a certain amount of scepticism. The people are bound to ask why no one thought of invoking Section 213 before the Governor-General's fateful Proclamation of 24 October 1954. And why, even today, is not the Federal Court being asked to give its opinion on other, even more vital, constitutional issues? For example, had the Governor-General any right to dismiss the Constituent Assembly? Has he any power to summon an ad hoc Constituent Convention? Will the decisions of this body be valid? Presumably, the Government merely wants the Federal Court to find a legal loop-hole for escaping from the serious consequences of the emergencies they have created or declared. If this presumption is correct, it amounts to an attempt to use the authority of the Federal Court in order to legalise, by implication if not directly, actions which are palpably illegal. If the Government are sincere in their professions of respect for the constitutional issues that have arisen, this would be the real test of their sincerity, for only then can it be determined whether the Government will abide by the Court's ruling even if it compels them to surrender power or share it with a representative body.

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One would like to hope that these issues will, in any case, come up before the Court, so that all confusion and doubts can be removed. It is, finally, necessary to stress that to save the country it is now not sufficient to abide by the letter of the law; it is equally necessary to act in the true spirit of democracy and ensure that democratic institutions are revived in a manner which is not only legally sound but actually transfers effective political power to the people, who, in the words of the Governor-General's first proclamation, are the ultimate sovereign in Pakistan.

This may appear to be a harsh analysis of the Government's intentions: but we earnestly feel that today's situation calls for complete frankness. The yeil must be torn off, and the people and the Government must be made to see the truth and allow it to guide their future actions. It needs to be realised that the plan envisaged in the Governor-General's latest Proclamation is likely to lead the country not to democracy but to legalised dictatorship. The only way out of the present morass is for the old Constituent Assembly to be recalled immediately. The first task before it should be to revalidate all the laws that have lapsed, including those which the Governor-General did not include in his attempt at revalidation by Ordinance. Thereafter, the Constituent Assembly should enact a law calling for the election of an interim Parliament to which the Central Government should be made responsible. To avoid delay, the Parliament should be elected indirectly, by the Provincial Assemblies. The representative character of this body could rightly be questioned, but such an objection can hardly be raised by those who are prepared for a similar body to be given the power to write the country's constitution. And, in any case, control of the Government by such a body would be infinitely better than the present position, with the Government responsible to nobody but itself. The Assembly should next pass a law calling for the election of a new Constituent Assembly on the basis of adult franchise, within a fixed timelimit and under the control of an impartial authority. This

constitution would not only be perfectly valid, but would also be sanctified by public support. After having performed these essential tasks, the old Constituent Assembly should dissolve itself. It has been argued that once the Constituent Assembly is recalled, it may well, as in the past, refuse to act in a responsible manner, and thus create a brand new crisis. We firmly believe that if the Central Government works unitedly towards this end, if the various political parties supporting the Government use their influence, and if public opinion is allowed to exercise its pressure on the old MCAs, a sufficient majority would easily be found to work on the lines suggested here. Under this three-pronged pressure, the old Constituent Assembly dare not refuse to carry out these essential patriotic tasks. This is the only method which will not only satisfy the demands of law but also ensure that the present drift towards dictatorship is halted. The delay that may thus be caused in the solution of certain constitutional problems would most definitely be a small price to pay for the re-establishment of genuine democracy. No such issue, whether of East-West parity or West Pakistan's unification, has any real significance when compared with the fundamental issue of the future of democracy in Pakistan with which are linked the aspirations and wishes of our people and the question of the country's progress towards the ideals which inspired the movement for freedom.

³ May 1955 Conventional Tangle

The Central Government's decision to postpone the elections to the Constituent Convention until after the Federal Court has given its opinion on the relevant constitutional issues will meet with general approval. Press reports of the Governor-General's latest Order gave the impression that the second postponement of the elections was the result of Authority's respect for the country's highest judicial tribunal, and certain publicists will probably cite this action as further

evidence of the Government's resolve to adhere strictly to the path of constitutional propriety. It is, however, difficult to accept the interpretation that the wisdom of such a postponement has dawned upon the Government only now, weeks after this course had been suggested in public comments on the present situation. The Prime Minister's reference to the subject in his first-of-the-month broadcast shows that the change of policy was due to necessity rather than virtue. He said that the elections have been put off in deference to the demand of certain Provinces—and the reasons for this irresistible demand are well known. In the Punjab, the two rival groups in the Muslim League are determined to strengthen their own factional position, and are engaged in an all-out struggle to capture every possible seat in the Convention: and neither of the two faction leaders has accepted the Centre's request for the unopposed election of six Central Ministers by the Punjab Assembly. The situation has become so serious that the Prime Minister considered it necessary to hold out the thinly-veiled threat that the present Punjab Ministry may have to be disbanded in order to achieve the purpose for which he and two of his colleagues recently made a dash to Lahore. Efforts to reach a compromise that would satisfy the Centre's need of obtaining safe entry into the Convention for half-a-dozen Central Ministers, and also pacify the warring factions, are continuing. It is obvious, however, that it would have been dangerous for the Central Government to run the hazards of an election without a patchup between the local leaders. In the Frontier Province—although the Prime Minister has bravely declared that the situation is now under control-there is as yet no guarantee that the Muslim League Assembly Party will resile from its attitude of non-co-operation except on its own terms. In Sind, despite Mr Khuhro's peculiar tactics, there are strong indications to show that the orders from above may be flouted by a large number of MLAs. In East Bengal, the situation is even more unhappy from the Central Government's point of view. Mr H.S. Suhrawardy, who seems to have replaced Mr

Fazlul Huq as the Centre's favourite candidate for assuming charge of that Province, finds himself in a hopeless minority in the United Front group...

The present Government has followed a strange policy since it assumed power. It has accepted certain elementary principles of democracy, but only after allowing some of its prominent spokesmen to argue against them, and after external circumstances had made it necessary for it to do so. Every such concession seems to have been wrung from the Government against its original inclinations. It cannot be denied that if immediate steps had been taken after the Proclamation of 24 October 1954 to restore democracy in the country, the people's fears and misgivings would have been allayed, and a great deal of the chaos witnessed during the last six months could have been avoided. It will be remembered that, although the Governor-General had promised to hand over political power to the people and to allow their duly elected representatives to order a new constitution, no step was taken in this direction for many long weeks. Even after the issue had been taken to court, the Government's approach to the question of creating a new constituent body was half-hearted and reluctant. Their first efforts towards this consummation were again stultified by provisions which would have made the Convention originally proposed a complete farce. Certain recent steps do create the possibility of the country being allowed to travel along the road to democracy, but the strange manner in which these decisions have been announced leaves ample ground for serious doubts about the Central authorities' intentions. Since these gentlemen were willing at one stage to give the country a Constitution promulgated through Ordinances and to rule it without a Parliament, people may well ask if it is not possible---should the Federal Court accept the Governor-General's unrestricted right to dissolve the constituent body-that the power of dissolution will be used to vitiate the democratic character of the new dispensation. It is clearly necessary in the interests of democratic progress in Pakistan that these doubts should be set at rest. The Government can do so by acting on clear-cut principles and giving the people an irrevocable assurance that there will be no deviation from democratic methods under any circumstances.

Further, the conventional tangle in which the Muslim League Assembly Parties are enmeshed, and the manner in which the Party's constitution is being flouted and veteran job-seekers are struggling to recapture or retain power, clearly prove that the majority group likely to be returned to the Constituent Convention will be eminently ungualified for the job of giving the country a new Constitution. This situation reinforces the demand that the constituent body—whether. subject to the Federal Court's verdict, this is the old Constituent Assembly or the new Convention-should not take upon itself the burden of giving the country a final constitution. It would be doing the people of Pakistan the greatest possible favour if it satisfied itself with making immediate arrangements for General Elections to a new Parliament and Constituent Assembly. This proposal will probably be criticised on the ground that it involves further delay, but we feel strongly that the delay thus caused, if any, will be a small price to pay for ensuring that the country is given the opportunity to elect a Parliament representative of the people and to save itself from leaders who have given substantial proof of their ineptitude, and even of their unwillingness to allow their predilections for personal power politics to be overcome by considerations of public weal. Those who decry democratic methods because they do not lead to quick results should realise that even if the democratic path allows only slow progress, it is the only certain way of achieving the objectives for which Pakistan was created and which still evoke the support of the overwhelming mass of our people. Failure to observe the decencies of democratic life provides no guarantee whatsoever of anything being achieved in a hurry-beyond chaos and confusion. We earnestly hope, therefore, that the Central Government will seriously reconsider the policies it has pursued during the

last six months and that it will evolve a clear-cut plan to restore genuine democracy in this country as soon as the Federal Court's decision is known and a constitutional method for achieving this end is clearly outlined.

25 July 1955 National Coalition

The fond hope entertained in some quarters that the new Constituent Assembly would make a clean break with the traditions of its predecessor, and that, eschewing the game of power politics, it would devote itself with all possible speed and earnestness to the task of laying the foundations of a democratic structure for Pakistan's future polity, has largely been belied. The Assembly's hurried and expensive first session, held for some undefined reason at Murree, was conducted somewhat haphazardly by the leaders of the Government and, therefore. little business of any consequence was done, and the little that was achieved cannot be said to provide any great cause for satisfaction... What, however, is far more significant than the meagreness of the Constituent Assembly's tangible achievements is its failure to give the country a clear-cut indication regarding the future shape of events that are to guide the destiny of our people. The atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty and confusion has been allowed to continue, thus helping to divert the attention of all concerned from the major problems facing the country to the manoeuvres that are taking place for factional and party alliances. It is no great secret that the Assembly's three main groups, and their host of sub-groups, spent most of their time at Murree in trying to work out advantageous formulae for reorganisation of the Central Cabinet, Quite often, the utterances of the leaders of various parties in the House had little to do with the subject; their declarations or recantations were guided mainly by, or intended to influence, the secret confabulations that began soon after the day's meeting and at times continued till shortly before the next day's session. The speeches and statements that have been made by the chief negotiators since the Assembly's adjournment follow a similar pattern. It is fairly obvious now that the decision to delay the convening of a meeting of the Constituent Assembly as the Federal Legislature, and the slogan raised by more than one party leader that constitution-making should be given priority over reconstitution of the Central Cabinet, stem from a desire to see the tug-of-war brought to a successful end before making any major moves. If their avowal of self-abnegation were genuine, it would be worthy of commendation; but a little probing reveals that the rival claimants to high office are merely waiting for a suitable opportunity to stake their claim, and that their timidity springs only from the fear of making any move that may jeopardise their chances of assuming power.

The present position appears to be that both groups of East Bengal's representatives, namely, the United Front and the Awami League, are eager and willing to form a coalition at the Centre with the Muslim League. The Muslim League Parliamentary Party, on the other hand, seems to be suffering from schizophrenia. The Prime Minister seeks an alliance with the United Front, presumably on the understanding that he would be allowed to continue in his present office; but the other, far more powerful, group of Muslim Leaguers, whose leadership is as vet in some doubt, seem to favour a coalition with the Awami League. It is also said-that-the Awami Leaguers have decided that they will join such a coalition only if Mr H.S. Suhrawardy heads the new Government, while the United Front's dominant section are equally determined to ensure that, if this happens, their Party will neither join the Central Government nor co-operate with it. These circumstances have given the West Pakistan Muslim Leaguers a position of great vantage, and they have been trying, not without success, to get both the East Bengal parties to accept their main demands, while the parleys are being allowed to drag on. The present fluid situation cannot, however, last for very long, and the Muslim League

leadership would do well to realise that if they continue to bargain for the sake of bargaining, they are likely to create serious complications, particularly in East Bengal. The alternatives before the country are that either there will be a showdown in the tripartite tussle for power, and the Muslim League will in choosing one of the two East Bengal parties as its ally drive the other into the Opposition, or that the three parties will form a coalition and take joint responsibility for a National Government at the Centre. The second alternative is obviously the better one from every conceivable point of view, even if today it appears to be difficult of achievement. Hitherto, the Muslim League leaders, and particularly the Prime Minister, have tried to widen the split in the United Front, presumably in order to retain power for themselves by weakening the biggest threat to their Party. If this policy is continued in today's circumstances, it will mean leaving an important group out of the Central Government. and it may also result in depriving East Bengal of a stable Ministry. Since the United Front and the Awami League are both pledged to the common twenty-one point programme. their differences are largely personal and, therefore, not insurmountable. If a sincere effort is made by those in the Muslim League leadership who really count to gain the cooperation of both East Bengal parties, and if the rank-and-file of these parties—who see the advantages of a National Coalition and are not too interested in the distribution of the loaves and fishes of office-mobilise public opinion in its favour, the chances of ending the traditional scramble for power, and persuading the three parties to co-operate, are not too dim. In any case, the advantages to be gained by the country through the formation of a National Government are so obvious that we would like to hope that the saner sections of the different parties will make a concerted attempt to secure an adjustment of the party leaders' differences and, thus, give the country a Government pledged to uphold the rule of law and determined to ensure its progress along the path to untrammelled democracy.

12 August 1955 Change at the Centre

The most common reaction to the final outcome of the longdrawn-out confabulations of the parties directly concerned with the formation of a new Central Cabinet will perhaps be one of relief. The change at the Centre having become inevitable after the creation of a new Constituent Assembly. delay in carrying it out was creating confusion and reviving the atmosphere of intrigue and unprincipled manoeuvring. This feeling will further be strengthened by the fact that the change marks the end of what might be called an *ad hoc* Government—formed somewhat haphazardly and regarded generally as a stop-gap arrangement—which was led by a person who enjoyed no real support among any section of the people, who had sought to prolong his political life by fostering a split in the East Bengal United Front, and whose reputation for political sagacity or an ability to get things done was certainly not enhanced during his tenure of office. It would, of course, have been far better if a National Government had been set up with the support of the three main parties in the Constituent Assembly. This would not only have facilitated the task of constitution-making, but would also have ensured greater political stability in East Bengal by bringing to an end the wrangling among the leaders of the two Bengal groups. It is, therefore, greatly to be regretted that the commendable efforts made in this direction by Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, after he had been asked by the Governor-General to form a new Government, could not fructify. It would appear that it was by then too late to achieve this desirable end, largely because the Muslim League leadership's earlier policy of pitting one Bengali group against the other had succeeded only too well. Thus, despite the fact that both the United Front and the Awami League stand pledged to the same political programme, it was found impossible to reconcile the personal differences between their leaders to make them join a National Coalition.

While the United Front adjusted itself to the changed situation following Mr Mohammed Ali's resignation, and, besides any other compromises that it may have made, gave up the demand that the former Prime Minister should continue in office, the Awami League took the firm stand that their leader must be called upon to head the new Government. Mr H. S. Suhrawardy, his expectancy whetted by the oft-repeated promises of a powerful section of Muslim League leaders, demanded the richest plum as the minimum price for the Awami League's co-operation; having failed to obtain the Prime Ministership, he has walked out of the Government, while his party has started talking of principles and pledges. The thesis adumbrated by the Awami League MCAs in explanation of their final refusal to join the Government suffers from the grievous drawback of being in the nature of an afterthought, for it seems obvious that most of their present qualms of political conscience would have been regarded by them as a bearable burden if Mr Suhrawardy had been invited to ascend the Prime Ministerial gaddi. The Party showed no serious signs of anxiety when Mr H.S. Suhrawardy joined a nominated Cabinet, when he peddled the plan for a partlynominated Convention, or threatened the country with Martial Law as the only alternative to his undemocratic scheme, when he remained unmoved by the continuation of Section 92-A in East Bengal, or when he supported the proposal for a selective validation of laws; but with a dexterity that is seldom witnessed in other countries, the Awami Leaguers have performed a complete somersault on a number of issues, and have suddenly become conscious of their adherence to the canons of democracy. By placing a price on his support. Mr Suhrawardy has done grave harm to himself and to the country. Normally, one would have welcomed the emergence of a reasonably strong Opposition; but to be really useful an Opposition party must be based on principles and not on the deprivation of an office of one's own choice. Personal differences cannot lead to a healthy Opposition group, and one would prefer a numerically smaller, but cleaner,

Opposition to what the Awami League is likely to provide either at the Centre or in East Bengal. Considering the stakes involved, one would have expected that the operation of the personal factor would be reduced to the minimum in arriving at final decisions with regard to the formation of the Central Government in a period as crucial as the one through which the country is passing. We would, anyhow, like to hope that Chaudhri Mohammed Ali will not give up his efforts to broaden the base of his Government and that every possible means of securing the co-operation of the Awami League, even at a later date, will fully be explored. Since it was not found possible to bring about a National Coalition, it seems quite logical that the two largest parties in the Constituent Assem<mark>bly should have got together to form the Gove</mark>rnment; and it is gratifying that representatives of the non-Muslims, as members of the United Front, will be directly associated with the ruling party.

With regard to the election of Chaudhri Mohammed Ali as the Leader of the Muslim League Party and his consequent selection by the Governor-General to undertake the task of Cabinet formation, the only objection that can be raised is that the new Prime Minister is not a politician and that he has risen to his present position from the Services. Whatever weight one might attach to this objection, it casts no adverse reflection on Chaudhri Mohammed Ali: it does, however, provide a sad commentary on the front rank of the politicians who guide the affairs of the Muslim League. In fact, looking over the list of the leading Muslim League stalwarts, the battered veterans of many a factional war, one can hardly resist the conclusion that the Muslim League Assembly Party made its choice in a rare moment of lucidity. Chaudhri Mohammed Ali's wide experience as an administrator, his integrity and capacity for hard work, will be accepted as desirable assets for the new Government even by those who disagree with some of his political opinions... In any case, particularly in the context of today's circumstances, the question of which parties and persons constitute the

Government will not concern the people a great deal. They are rightly far more interested in the policies that are going to be pursued at the Centre, in the hope that a clean break will be made with the unhappy past, and that a clear-cut political and economic programme, based on the rule of law and the fullest restitution of the people's civic rights. will be agreed upon by the Muslim League-United Front Coalition and implemented with the required efficiency and sincerity.

19 August 1955 Counsel of Despair

While Mr Firoz Khan Noon's advocacy of certain fundamental principles of democracy, and his criticism of the Muslim League leadership for disregarding them, will meet with general approval, his view that a benevolent dictatorship would be better for the country than a moth-eaten democracy needs to be exposed as a dangerous counsel of despair. The validity of Mr Noon's demand that the elections to the proposed West Pakistan Legislature should be held on the basis of proportional representation cannot be contested; and it is indeed surprising that the Muslim League leaders and their former ally, Mr H. S. Suhrawardy, should have resorted to such a transparent manoeuvre to deny due representation to the Opposition parties and the various groups and individuals inside the ruling party who are likely to defy the mandate of the Ministerial faction. It will be recalled that at one stage it was intended that the Provincial Assemblies should elect their representatives to the new Constituent Assembly by a majority vote; but the widespread public clamour against this undemocratic innovation, and the fear that the Courts might be called upon to adjudicate the issues involved, persuaded the Government to change its mind on the question. It is patent that, in an indirect election of the sort envisaged to create a single legislature for West Pakistan, it is absolutely essential to adopt the system of a single transferable vote. There is not one good reason for abandoning a principle that has been accepted for similar elections in the past. The Muslim League must find other means of saving its Provincial Assembly parties from disruption: it cannot possibly be allowed to tamper with the electoral process in order to maintain some semblance of Party discipline within its ranks. Mr Firoz Khan Noon is on equally solid ground when he suggests that Section 223-A of the Government of India Act of 1935 should be revalidated, and that Section 92-A should either be repealed or drastically amended so that it can no longer be used for partisan purposes. But when Mr Noon goes on to declare that if these or similar demands are not accepted, it would be preferable for such a democracy to be replaced by a benevolent dictatorship, he is bound to forfeit the sympathy of all genuine democrats.

This is not the first time that the former League leader has expressed such an opinion. He made a similar remark during a recent Constituent Assembly debate, but it seemed then that he had spoken in levity in order to press home a certain point. His serious reiteration of this view in a recent press interview cannot, however, be ignored. Mr Noon seems to forget that, even where the disease appears to be chronic and the cure extremely difficult to achieve, the remedy does not lie in killing the patient, but in persistent, dogged efforts. Mr Noon is not alone in thinking that merely because democracy is not working satisfactorily in this country, it should be scrapped and some form of dictatorship given a chance. Those who advocate this solution to our country's problems are not only blind to the facts of political life in Pakistan, but also seem to be equally ignorant of the lessons of history. In the first place, it is obvious that democracy has not failed in this country, for the simple reason that it has not so far been allowed to function. Since the dawn of freedom. the people's democratic rights have steadily been whittled down, the electoral process has deliberately been perverted on more than one occasion in order to prolong the life of the ruling clique, civil liberties have been restricted, and various

unpleasant means have been discovered to thwart the genuine expression of the people's will. Further, it is a historical fact that personal dictatorship, however benevolent it may have seemed to be at the start, has always led to the ruin of the country which submitted to the deprivation of the people's democratic rights, either through apathy and confusion or in an effort to find a short-cut to progress. Mr Noon and others who suggest that a dictatorial regime would help to save the country from its present ills are doing no service either to the people or to themselves. They are merely adding to the confusion and making more difficult the task of giving Pakistan a democratic polity. Mr Noon would do well to abstain from preaching the imaginary advantages of benevolent dictatorship because, particularly in view of the fact that when in office he accepted many undemocratic decisions without demur, it may be said of him that, like certain other politicians in this country, his love of democracy is only a temporary expedient to be employed against his political opponents, and that if democracy cannot give him the opportunity to return to power he is prepared to see the country sink to the degradation and chaos of dictatorship.

28 September 1955 Repressive Laws

While, for technical and other reasons, the Constituent Assembly was not expected to repeal any of the vast array of repressive laws whose validity is sought to be maintained in West Pakistan's different regions after the establishment of One Unit, the line of argument taken by the Government spokesmen in defence of such lawless laws as the Frontier Crimes Regulation and the Bengal Regulation of 1818 will certainly shock public opinion. It is even more surprising that these obnoxious measures should have found their stoutest defender in the Central Minister for States and Frontier Regions, whose role in the struggle for freedom, and whose experience of repression in the British period as well as in the post-Partition era, provide him with

intimate knowledge of the fact that the powers given to the Executive by these laws are invariably exercised to curb legitimate political activities. Dr Khan Sahib, with extraordinary naivete, stated that it was 'not the laws which were bad, but the people at the helm of affairs who made laws good or bad'. While it is true that the weapon of arbitrary arrest and detention is liable to greater abuse in evil hands, it is completely fallacious to argue that such laws can safely be left on the Statute Book in the hope that our future administrators, out of the goodness of their hearts, will refrain from misusing them. In the first place, a law which violates the most fundamental concept of justice. namely, that a person can be deprived of his rights and liberties only if his alleged guilt is fully proved in a fair trial, cannot possibly be justified on any count, and least of all on the tenuous plea that, under some sort of self-denying ordinance, Authority will abstain from its misuse. The point to bear in mind is that a law of this nature is always liable to be misused: such misuse merely becomes more offensive when the motivation is either personal or political. Further, even if for the sake of argument one were to accept the validity of Dr Khan Sahib's argument, can it be said that the band of Muslim League stalwarts who are likely to man the nominated Government of West Pakistan are pledged so clearly to uphold the rule of law that they will refuse to employ the weapons that are being placed in their hands? How many of these gentlemen are likely to act as conscientious objectors when they find that their positions of power can be protected only through a continuance of their favourite policy of ruthless repression? Quite obviously, Mr Khuhro and his ilk cannot allow any such illusion to be fostered. In fact, the expected ascent of these gentlemen to the seats of power in West Pakistan makes it all the more necessary that the armoury of the repressive laws inherited from the British regime, and subsequently augmented by the Muslim League leadership, should immediately be put out of their reach. But, even apart from the personal equation which has been introduced into the argument by the Government's spokesmen, the real point is that such laws have no place in a democratic polity, where every

citizen must be guaranteed his liberties unless he is convicted by a proper court of law in an impartial trial and has been given every opportunity to defend himself.

29 September 1955 Electoral Farce

The procedure approved by the Constituent Assembly for elections to the proposed West Pakistan Legislature paves the way for the enactment of an electoral farce. The various electoral colleges that will choose this body can hardly be described as democratic institutions whose integrity and representative character cannot be impugned. The heterogeneous brood comprises a host of nominated *jirgas*, a number of municipal committees, and four Legislative Assemblies, with only one factor common to them all, namely, that they have little right to speak and act in the name of the people. Apart from the antiquated method of representation retained in the tribal areas and certain States. and the unwarranted grant of special political powers to certain municipalities—some of which are partly or wholly nominated—the Provincial Assemblies concerned are known to have been elected through a complete perversion of the democratic process, under conditions of brutal terror and with the unashamed interference of the administrative machinery. It might be said that the present Government has no choice but to accept these institutions at their face value if further delay in implementing the Government's constitutional plans is to be avoided. This argument is not very convincing, because, quite obviously, an undemocratic policy is not the only time-saving expedient available to them. If the authors of the One-Unit plan wanted a democratically elected West Pakistan Assembly, they have certainly had time enough, since the scheme was decided upon, to finalise the arrangements for a General Election. No attention whatsoever was given to this all-important matter; and it has now been decided to put off proper elections for an unconscionably long period of eighteen months. This is not all. The method finally devised for constituting the West Pakistan Legislative Assembly further vitiates its claim to a representative status of some sort. Instead of acting on the generally-accepted principle that indirect elections should be governed by the system of proportional representation, it has been decided that the electoral colleges will elect their nominees by a majority vote. In the absence of any other satisfactory explanation for the adoption of this innovation, it is wellnigh impossible to avoid the conclusion that the ruling party's desire to function without an Opposition in the Legislature has overcome the last vestige of its democratic conscience.

In fact, Mr Gurmani, the chief Government spokesman on the subject, virtually admitted the validity of this charge when he propounded the novel thesis that because the Opposition groups in West Pakistan only enjoyed 'microscopic representation' it was justifiable to wipe them out completely. This is an extraordinary proposition. First, elections are gerrymandered, ballot-boxes are filled with bogus votes. Opposition voters are terrorised to stay away from the polls; and, later, the 'microscopic representation' gained by the Opposition parties is used as an excuse to eliminate them altogether by a cheap electoral manoeuvre. In the Bill itself, it had been said that the system of proportional representation could not be accepted because, in view of the small quorum involved, the counting would take a long time. During the debate, a number of equally fantastic arguments were used to bolster up the Government's weak case. It was said, for example, that, since in direct elections a majority vote was considered good enough, it should be accepted for indirect elections also. The obvious fact is that, even for direct elections, proportional representation offers a more democratic method, but for indirect elections of the sort envisaged in the Bill it is absolutely indispensable. Nor can the novel decision to hold the elections district-wise. introduced presumably to meet the exigencies of the intra-Party struggle, be regarded as an improvement; for it is likely

to encourage parochialism and will also give rise to the strange spectacle of six or seven MLAs—a simple majority of a district's total membership-electing a larger number of representatives to the West Pakistan Assembly. Surely, this certainty is much worse than the fear expressed by Mr Gurmani that each MLA would vote for himself: and further. the danger of deadlocks arising in district-wise elections is palpably greater than if the Assembly were to sit as one body and elect its representatives on the basis of a single transferable vote. It scems plain that, guided by the experience of the recent CA elections, the Government has overridden important democratic considerations in order to avoid the inconvenience of facing an Opposition in the West Pakistan Legislature. This short-sighted policy deprives a vast section of our people of a voice in ordering their affairs, reduces the West Pakistan Assembly to an obedient tool of the ruling party, and militates against the development of a healthy democracy in Pakistan.

25 April 1956 The Crisis Ripens

The latest of Pakistan's many Ministerial crises—the basic cause of which lies in the unbridgeable difference between the number of active aspirants to Ministerial office in the ruling group and the number and type of Cabinet seats available—has ripened to full maturity. With both sides almost equally confident of ultimate victory, or at least willing to risk their all in the battle rather than accept a truce, it was inevitable that the cold war should be intensified. We do not know yet if any compromise plans were seriously mooted at Karachi. But even if a patch-up had been possible at this late stage, what good could it bring? No one any longer expects the West Pakistan Government—no matter who heads it—to be able to fulfil any of the generous promises with which the path to integration was sought to be made a little easier. All that the people expect and demand is that early elections, conducted honestly and fairly, should be held. And it is quite possible that a compromise among the warring factions would have made further delay and postponements a great deal more likely. The latest development does not, therefore, come in the place of some satisfactory alternative. It will meet with public approval also because it may help in the long run to transport the tussle for power from the arena of factional bouts to the political stage, and the people may be spared the unedifying spectacle of a party permanently split into squabbling gangs of grabbers. The emergence of a new party among the West Pakistan MLAs will also compel the ditherers in their ranks to make up their minds one way or the other. and thus eliminate, or at least reduce drastically, the tribe of fence-sitters, who cause a great deal of confusion because their names appear on the supporters' lists compiled by both contestants. It may thus be said that the recent happenings certainly cannot worsen matters, while the possibility exists that the political situation will begin to improve. In preparation for the battles to come, the battered standard of the Muslim League has been dyed in new colours. However, if it is expected that a newly-drafted, brightly-printed manifesto can save the Party from withering away, the gentlemen who guide its affairs are obviously subject to the most fantastic delusions. In which corner are the Muslim League's previous manifestos gathering dust? How much of the 'immediate programme' outlined by the Party bosses at every election has been implemented during the last nine vears? In fact, the seventy-five-chapter draft manifesto reads. for the most part. like a list of the Muslim League's sins of commission. The only radically new feature of the document represents a cheap publicity-seeking stunt in an attempt to steal the Jamaat-i-Islami's thunder. The Muslim League desires that 'it should be obligatory for every Muslim candidate for election to any elective body to learn, to read and understand the Holy Quran' and, further, that the Public Service Commissions should, in making appointments or recommending promotions to posts in Government

departments, treat 'intelligent understanding' of the Holy Quran as 'a great merit' for Muslim candidates. This is not only exploitation of religion without all shame, but the thin end of the Fascist wedge which will allow some Sanhedrin of the Muslim League's making to usurp the people's right to choose their own representatives and judge every man's worth and honesty for themselves. The twin proposals have absolutely nothing to do with genuine respect for religion or intelligent understanding of Islam's democratic spirit; they are a transparent device to regain the Muslim League's lost monopoly of power and arm it with a new lever to browbeat the officials by making promotions dependent on considerations other than those of honesty and efficiency obviously, in order to be able to misuse the administrative machinery for party ends.

On the other hand, we have Dr Khan Sahib and his brand new Republican Party, brought into being because the Muslim League was no longer prepared to tolerate him as Chief Minister. This has been done with the help of many outstanding veterans of the Muslim League's factional wars whose desire for office promptly overcame any party loyalty they may ever have possessed. It is, of course, just as well that Dr Khan has abandoned his unorthodox—and rather ridiculous-non-party status, which meant that since his position as head of the Government depended on the good will of the Muslim League, he had no real authority or responsibility. It is strange that he should not have taken this step much earlier, instead of inanely preaching that the people should eschew party politics. It is stranger still that the Republican Party has been launched without a programme of any sort. We presume this fatal deficiency will be met fairly soon; but the past reputation of most of the bunch of ex-Leaguers who are Dr Khan's colleagues cannot foster the hope that the Republican Party's programme will be radically different from that of the Muslim League, or that the Muslim League type of political leader will be particularly interested in faithful implementation of any promises that are made. Be

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that as it may, the process of the new party's emergence will be watched with keen interest—in particular for the effect its formation will have at the Centre.

It is indeed most gratifying that the leaders of both sides are now firmly committed to allowing the West Pakistan Legislature-which is scheduled to meet in about three weeks-to determine the validity of the claims of the two rivals to rule the Province. The demand for summary dismissal of the Cabinet and the threat of the Legislature's disbandment are happily in abeyance—happily, because, whatever the precise constitutional position, either course would have left an aftermath of bitterness and created grounds for the suspicion that extra-constitutional methods were being brought into use once again. Particularly in view of the hazardous years which Pakistan has traversed recently, it is essential that the constitutional process should in no way be perverted, and that all disputes of this nature should be decided in strict accordance with the Constitution and universally-accepted democratic conventions. No sane person can be enamoured of the West Pakistan Legislature or regard it as the repository of real democratic power: nor do we know, or think it matters very much, which side will gain a majority in the Legislature. The important thing for Pakistan today is that the letter and spirit of the Constitution should be safeguarded and protected from violation. That is why it is absolutely necessary to ensure that, in the forthcoming scramble for votes, the executive machinery of the State must let the electorate completely alone. Recently, there have been allegations, right or wrong, of official interference in purely political matters. Civil servants, police officers, and even the Governor and the Head of the State, have been accused of taking sides in group or party politics. Any action or utterance which even savours of such interference must scrupulously be avoided by all concerned. And, lastly, it is absolutely essential that a firm date must be set for the General Election. for as long as country-wide elections are not held the danger will persist that, the new Constitution notwithstanding, Pakistan may be revisited by the uncertainty and despondency born of the danger of democracy being throttled. The administrative side of the task can and must be completed within the next few months. And if the Provincial Legislatures cannot be expected to play their part expeditiously, the National Assembly should, through a constitutional amendment, make provision for the General Election to be held by the fall of this year, so that the country is able to face 1957 with hope and confidence.

31 August 1956 The Political Scene

The promise that the confusion which has for so long dominated the political scene in Pakistan would soon be dispelled has, once again, failed to reach the stage of fulfilment. A depressing murk still obscures the path that would allow the people to redeem in full their democratic rights, help them to banish unprincipled political manoeuvring, and create conditions for the emergence of efficient and stable governments, subject to the popular will and both unable and unwilling to flout the spirit of the Constitution by deliberate distortion of the letter of the law. A little over a month ago, the Prime Minister solemnly told the country that he would in the very near future announce a policy and programme, and, either in order to persuade the Coalition Party to accept his line of action or as evidence of his seriousness, he broadly hinted at the possibility of his resigning office and even of using strong-arm methods. Reports from Karachi show that after one month of cogitation the promised programme had shrivelled into a prosaic catalogue of the main problems facing the country, namely, the food shortage, the seasonal danger of floods, and the necessity of holding early elections. All this is really nothing new; nor could it ever have led to disagreement within the party. Surely, there could be no question of anyone opposing the declaration that the problem of floods should be tackled or that the food shortage should be remedied; and the need for holding elections as early as possible could hardly be discounted publicly. Quite obviously, no question of policy was allowed to disturb the gentlemen who joined the Coalition Party meeting or the factional confabulations that preceded and followed it. They dealt mainly with the problem nearest their hearts, namely, the question of who should occupy which Ministerial chair. On this plane the Prime Minister's plan of action was certainly a great success: he has obtained the support of a majority of MPs and will now be able to continue in office. It does not seem to matter very much that his own party has virtually repudiated his leadership, or that the very base of the two-party Coalition has cracked; for those who sit at the top of Pakistan's political structure seem to have acquired a hard epidermis that is immune to barbs and arrows of indigenous make. It is also rather odd that, without any previous discussion, the newly-formed Republican group should consider itself to be a part of the Coalition Party. However, even if the Prime Minister feels that it is no longer necessary for him to threaten his supporters with a political programme, he should at least try to end the confusion that he has helped to create, either by obtaining his party's sanction for his present role, or by joining them in their mood of sulking self-pity and forced self-abnegation, or by becoming a member of the party on whose support his continuance in office now depends.

The political mess at the Centre has been accompanied by strange happenings in the Provinces, particularly in the eastern wing. The United Front Party has been persuaded to ask the Sarkar Cabinet to do the proper thing and resign, but only after a great deal of unnecessary delay, which naturally gave rise to doubts and misgivings in the public mind about the intentions of those in authority. If the party directive is not overtaken by some unexpected development, the East Bengal Chief Minister will have performed an act of singular service to the country by at last walking out of an office to which he had forfeited all claims. While the party has acted correctly, fallacious attempts to justify the unjustified prorogation of the Provincial Legislature by the Governor, and its view that Mr Sarkar should have been allowed to disband the Assembly, are completely untenable. These trends reveal that a few months of power have reduced the United Front-which once stood pledged to a twenty-one-point programme based on the people's demands-to a coterie of office-greedy politicians, in no way better than those whom they had ousted with such hopeful success. It is utterly ridiculous to demand that the United Front rump should be allowed to retain office without at any stage having been able to secure the support of a majority in the Provincial Assembly. It is equally inane to suggest that Mr Sarkar could properly ask for the Legislature's dissolution without once having obtained a vote of confidence and without the guarantee that new elections would be held within a few weeks or months. It is perfectly clear that the Central Government's latest decision on the East Bengal crisis was the only one possible in the circumstances, without violating elementary democratic propriety, and we would like to hope that the East Bengal Governor will be asked—as soon as is possible after the certification of the budget for a brief interim period—to call upon the Opposition leaders to form a new Ministry. Every step must be taken to ensure that the United Front in its frustration does not create a crisis which would deprive East Bengal of an opportunity of being-governed by the Legislature.

West Pakistan has been comparatively calm in recent months, since the Provincial Legislature was hurriedly adjourned; nevertheless, the situation in this wing is by no means satisfactory. The ruling party has gathered around it a quaint conglomeration of office-hunters; and to ensure that it can retain its present strength, Ministerial posts are being created and distributed with an abandon that certainly equals the Muslim League leaders' disregard of the limits imposed by ordinary democratic decency. Nor, on the other hand, is there any sign to indicate that the Muslim League leaders have learnt a lesson from the debacle they have had to face in West Pakistan and at the Centre. Deserted by the bulk of its adherents, the attenuated party seeks to rebuild itself by the use of empty slogan-mongering and cheap chauvinism. These tactics are unlikely to lead to its resuscitation, but if, by some freak circumstance, the Muslim League returns to power, the people can expect no better results than those to which they were victim during the long period when this party enjoyed a complete monopoly of political authority in the country. In these circumstances, it becomes even more urgently necessary for the Central Government and the National Assembly to give serious thought to their primary responsibility to the country, namely, the holding of our first General Elections. Unless free elections can be held in the very near future, the political scene is likely to acquire even darker hues, and there is a possibility that the people, groping to find a way out of the chronic crises, may seek to employ unorthodox methods which in the long run are bound to harm the country. The authorities must, therefore, lay down a definite schedule for all stages of the General Elections and demand that the Provincial Governments adhere to it. At the same time, every honest political party should support this demand and mobilise sufficient political pressure to make it impossible for any Government to postpone or by-pass the elections. The holding of these elections may not provide a panacea for all the country's ills, but there can be no doubt that it is an essential first step towards a cure.

10 September 1956 ayat Institute Prime Minister's Resignation

The Prime Minister's decision to quit the Muslim League, and to resign the high office he has held during recent months on the strength of political parties other than his own. follows inevitably from the factional clash in the West Pakistan arena—which gave birth to the ruling Republican Party and also deprived the Muslim League of its dominant position at

the Centre. Although Mr Mohammed Ali tried very hard to ensure that the debacle in Lahore should not upset the delicate political arrangement at Karachi, it was clear from the beginning that the change he feared could not be put off for very long. The Republicans have, of course, always declared that they would stand by Mr Mohammad Ali, but the prominent unemployed among the Republican MCAs soon began to suggest that they should be given their due share of the spoils. However, it was the Muslim League rump in the National Assembly who forced the issue. Reduced to a powerless group, these gentlemen made it perfectly plain that they were not prepared to act as the fifth wheel of the Coalition. They expected Mr Mohammed Ali to function as a Muslim Leaguer and accept the party's dictates, while he wanted the group to lie low and support him on all issues. Not unnaturally, therefore, his relations with the party of which he was Leader were increasingly marked by a mutual lack of confidence and respect. A break had for some time been imminent. It was precipitated by Mr Mohammed Ali's refusal to attend the meeting of Muslim League MCAs and their refusal to attend the Coalition Party meeting. He indicated thereby his preference for the leadership of what had virtually become a new Coalition Party, rather than that of a group of frustrated and disgruntled political leaders who could offer him only their company in the wilderness-a career of wandering without a realistic-sense-of direction, and therefore without end and without hope.

Mr Mohammed Ali has, of course, acted rightly in resigning his office, even though the manner of its announcement indicates that the step has been taken primarily to avoid being called a turn-coat, and to prepare the way for his resumption of the Prime Ministership under a new label with some dignity and on a more secure basis. Be that as it may, the group of Muslim League leaders who are arrayed against him today are hardly in a position to arraign him. Men who do not seem to have any but a primeval loyalty to their own interests or those of some narrow faction accuse

the Prime Minister of being disloyal to what is left of his party and of sacrificing his principles to satisfy an excessive attachment to office. But who will throw the first stone at Mr Mohammed Ali⁹ Mr Daultana⁹ Mr Khuhro⁹ Or Mr Abdul Oaivum Khan? These are names which, in the public mind. no longer merely signify individuals: much more do they stand for the worst evils in our political system-the deliberate perversion of elections, corruption of the administration to serve partisan ends, ruthless repression, intrigue and duplicity without limit. The charges framed by the gentlemen of the Muslim League-because of their authorship—are not likely to be endorsed by any public jury in Pakistan, Mr Mohammed Ali will, however, have to face the critical judgment of the people on different grounds, and he has not qualified himself to expect any great leniency. The people see that, despite all the promises that he has been making, there is little to show that his pledges are anything more than sops to public opinion, and they see no reason why his failure to fulfil them, or even to make a determined attempt to do so, should be condoned.

What has taken place so far is the result only of the impact of the political change in the western wing. Recent developments in East Pakistan are also certain to affect the pattern of the Central Government. Thus, if Mr Mohammed Ali is called upon to head a new Cabinet, as appears more than likely, he will not be able to offer any guarantee of stability at the Centre. With the installation of the new Ministry in East Pakistan, political power will tend to gravitate towards the Awami League. When the effects of this shift reach Karachi, it will necessitate further Cabinet changes. In any case, whether the present set-up is maintained. or the Awami League is brought into the Central Coalitionwith or without the withdrawal of the United Front-the chances are that the balance at the Centre will remain precarious and the Ministry's life will always be in sufficient danger to provide cause for its devotion of the bulk of its time and energy to measures motivated mainly by the desire

to prolong its existence. From every conceivable point of view, therefore, it is absolutely essential that the country should be saved from the present political drift; and it is equally plain that the only way to achieve this is to hold Pakistan's first General Election without any further delay, so that the democratic forces can assert themselves, try to steer away from the dangers we have known, and set course for the achievement of national objectives which everyone seems to recognise but so few work to implement.

12 September 1956 Shift at the Centre

The political scene at the Centre has undergone one of the usual kaleidoscopic shifts. Contrary to general expectations, which were partly confirmed by the carefully drafted statement accompanying his resignation, Mr Mohammed Ali has declined to accept the responsibility of trying to form a new Cabinet; and the task has, logically, been entrusted to the Leader of the Opposition. Mr Mohammed Ali has so far given no reason for his refusal to continue in office despite the fact that—as has again been stressed by him and by the President—he still enjoys the support of a majority in the National Assembly. The majority support available to Mr Mohammed Ali could not, however, be regarded, on realistic reckoning, as a factor that promised a reasonable measure of permanence—even judging by the standards set by Pakistan's quick-change politicians. The remnants of the United Front, having lost control of their base in East Bengal, were obviously clinging to Mr Mohammed Ali in the hope that he would remain in office and thus allow them to do so also. Their support could have been withdrawn at any stage if another candidate for the Premiership offered them a longer lease of life in the Government. The Republicans, piqued by Mr Mohammed Ali's prolonged dilly-dallying over the question of joining their Party, were beginning to tug at the strings which had kept them on his side, and many of the veterans in their ranks had begun to think loudly in terms of replacing him. They might well have done so as soon as they were able to agree on the replacement. It is obvious that Mr Mohammed Ali, if he had continued in office, would in effect have been a puppet Prime Minister, without any firm political strength of his own and dependent entirely on the support of groups brought together almost by accident in an alliance of convenience. He has, therefore, acted wisely in refusing to become the titular head of a Cabinet composed of the representatives of parties which owed him no allegiance. Mr Mohammed Ali's decision is also welcome because it provides a rare example of a Pakistani politician resigning his high office on grounds of political propriety, instead of unleashing a campaign of intrigue to save his position, or waiting pathetically to be hounded out.

The latest turn of events at Karachi marks the total eclipse of the Muslim League—for the first time since the birth of Pakistan. This development is bound to have far-reaching effects on the future of our country and, therefore, deserves the most careful analysis. For the present, however, we will examine the more immediate consequences of the change that has taken place and the manner in which it is likely to affect the people. The satisfaction that most people will feel at the severance from our body politic of the parasitic growth which was once recognised as the main national party cannot be wholly free of anxiety for the future. The very first question is whether Mr H. S. Suhrawardy can give the country a stable Government. In the purely arithmetical sense, this depends on the alliances that the Awami League leader is able to make in the National Assembly... But even if he obtains a clear majority-and it seems more than likely that he will be able to coalesce with the Republicans and muster sufficient strength in the National Assembly-it is doubtful whether such an alliance would be able to rid the Government completely of the evils of the past. The political difficulties involved are fairly well known. The Republican Party, for example, has yet to evolve a programme of any sort, and its

personnel, consisting mainly of former Muslim Leaguers, does not encourage extravagant hopes of anything worthwhile emerging from the collective intellectual endeavour of the party bosses. The Awami League's own programme is reasonable enough, but, apart from the shortcoming that its detailed provisions relate mostly to East Pakistan, the fact that Mr Suhrawardy, when he was last in office, showed considerable indifference both to his Party and to its programme by itself constitutes a serious uncertainty. However, the people's expectations have been belied so often during the last nine years that they are not in a mood to demand or expect too much. They will be quite willing to treat Mr Suhrawardy's Cabinet as an interim arrangement—a regime that need not introduce any startling changes to justify its existence. They will be reasonably happy if it can refrain from adding to the existing chaos in Pakistan's affairs, and, what is by far the most important of all current issues, if it can give the country its first General Election within twelve months and ensure that the election is not rigged and gerrymandered. While there are a number of other important matters to be dealt with, the problem of allowing a genuinely democratic set-up to be established will provide Mr Suhrawardy with his first and most crucial test.

14 September 1956 Old Promises Renewed

Mr H.S. Suhrawardy's first major policy statement has too familiar a ring to evoke any great enthusiasm among the people. In a speech replete with worn-out platitudes, the new Prime Minister has merely presented a list of the problems that confront the country and declared—in the manner of each one of his predecessors and in similar words—that the new Government would do its best to tackle these problems with all possible speed. The tasks outlined by Mr Suhrawardy include cleansing of the administration, elimination of corruption, holding of General Elections as soon as possible and without official interference, speedy resettlement of the refugees, trying earnestly to secure a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir dispute and to promote friendly relations with India, establishment of complete unity between East and West Pakistan, and so on. These questions undoubtedly deserve the highest priority. But it is strange that Mr Suhrawardy did not deal in detail with any one of the many issues he touched upon or say anything new or tangible with regard to them. Admitting that his speech sounded rather trite, he said in explanation that all parties make more or less the same promises and that the difference lies in implementation of the programme. This half-truth cannot easily be accepted, but if it were it would mean that the new Government has no new objectives and that the people should suspend their judgement until they can judge its ability to ensure that the old pledges are fully honoured.

The present Government's main task is to ensure that the General Election is held without avoidable delay, and in an atmosphere of complete freedom. In this regard Mr Suhrawardy said that so little had hitherto been done towards the preparations for holding the electoral contest that it would be impossible to honour Mr Mohammed Ali's pledge that the country would go to the polls in February or March 1957. This assertion cannot be contested, but the people would have been gratified if Mr Suhrawardy had proceeded to set a realistic target-date for the election. Further, while welcoming his reiteration of the assurance that official interference with the election will not be allowed, the people had a right to expect that Mr Suhrawardy would give a categorical assurance that the Safety Laws would not be used against political parties and their adherents. It would also have been heartening to hear of the new Government's determination to take up seriously the question of the various other curbs on civil liberties illegally enforced by the police, and to fully probe the grave crimes allegedly committed by the custodians of the law in Karachi and elsewhere. It will also be noted with dismay that, whereas the Prime Minister has listed a

number of measures for expanding and re-organising agriculture and increasing agricultural production, he has made no mention of the urgent need for agrarian reforms an issue that figures prominently in his party's twenty-one-point programme. Lastly, Mr Suhrawardy's reference to the country's foreign policy will be widely regretted by those who are aware of the weakness of Pakistan's position on certain international issues, and have noticed the mess created by the inept handling of the Suez dispute. Presumably in great haste to assure the world that his stand is different from that of the Awami League, Mr Suhrawardy has pledged himself to protect and safeguard all the pacts and agreements made by the previous Governments—not because he regards his Government to be an interim regime, or because he does not have sufficient time to initiate major policy changes, but because he thinks Pakistan should ally itself to the free democracies. How is the Prime Minister going to follow a policy of 'good will towards all and malice towards none' if his Government remains true to pacts which tie Pakistan to one power bloc in the Cold War? And in relation to the alliance with the socalled free democracies, what will the new Government's attitude be towards the Suez dispute, or the French war in Algeria, or the numerous other conflicts between the 'free' democracies and the Asian and African peoples struggling for their national freedom?

These and a host of other important questions require clear-cut answers from the new Government, if it is not to share the obloquy that attaches to the regimes that have gone before it. Unless a more rational stand is taken by Mr Suhrawardy and his colleagues on the various questions of foreign and domestic policies that will come up before them, we fear that the hopes roused by his ascent to the highest political office in the land will begin to dissipate, while the public misgivings—created by the ease with which he can sometimes ignore his party's programme—will tend to deepen.

22 March 1957 West Pakistan's Crisis

The denouement of the political drama—played out mostly behind the scenes—that has engaged West Pakistan's attention in recent months will be deeply deplored by those who respect the Constitution in both letter and spirit, and who believe that in the long run the employment of strongarm methods usually creates more difficulties than it can ever resolve. Belving the fond hope that the adoption of the new Constitution would help to inculcate a new attitude among those who hold the reins of power, the hand of high authority has, once again, interfered with the normal democratic process to deal with a political crisis which would otherwise have led to the discomfiture of the ruling party. By invoking the emergency provisions of the Constitution and suspending the Legislature, the President has prevented the creation of a happy precedent—that a Legislature should be allowed to vote a Ministry out of power, instead of either the Legislature or the Ministry being sacked. The Proclamation is silent on the reasons which prompted the Governor and the President to reach the conclusion that the Government of the Province of West Pakistan 'cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution'. In view of the Muslim League's uncontested claim to a clear majority in the House, and the Republican Ministers' unambiguous threat that the Assembly would be dissolved if they lost their majority, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the gubernatorial initiative and the President's drastic step were taken in order to save the Republican Ministry from a defeat made certain by large-scale defections from its ranks.

In the background of the present crisis lie the undemocratic methods used to create One Unit, the unorthodox manner in which its first Cabinet and Legislature were formed, and the continuous, unrelenting struggle for power which has engaged the main political groups, and which culminated in the Muslim League's break with Dr

Khan's Cabinet and the formation of the Republican Party. The war of nerves has continued since then, and the methods used by both sides have kept alive the traditions of intrigue and chicanery, pressure and blackmail, established during the factional squabbles of Muslim League leaders-with one notable exception, namely, that, unlike certain former Muslim League Chief Ministers, the West Pakistan Chief Minister, has not so far invented criminal conspiracies to put away his opponents. The people have witnessed the strange spectacle of those who swore undying opposition to One Unit, who were dismissed from high office because of their refusal to bend their knee before Central orders, soon becoming its chief defenders. And those who were its main architects, who delved deep into history in order to develop the thesis that One Unit was the culmination of a historical process of thousands of years, who greedily grabbed the seats of power from the ousted opponents of One Unit, are now the plan's chief critics—and on the basis of their opposition to One Unit have succeeded in securing a majority against the Republican Party. It is plain that all this political manoeuvring, the unashamed somersaults, the unprincipled shift from one party to another and from one policy to another, is motivated mostly by an insatiable lust for power.

While we hold no brief for the Muslim League and often strongly oppose its policies and tactics, it needs to be clearly stated that Dr Khan Sahib's present position is absolutely untenable. It will be recalled that in April last year the Republican Party Leader had declared publicly that, whereas he had the constitutional right to do so, he would never recommend dissolution of the Provincial Legislature because, in the absence of necessary preparations, new elections could not be held quickly. He further said in a broadcast early this year that he would resign from office whenever he lost support of the majority in the Legislature. Faced with defeat, Dr Khan has apparently changed his opinion on both counts. Dr Khan accuses the Muslim League of bribery and corruption, and justifies his advice to the Governor in favour of dissolution by saying that the Assembly is unfit to rule the Province. He conveniently forgets that the methods that Republican stalwarts have used to gain or retain the support of MLAs were no different from those of the Muslim League. Nor can it be argued that the Assembly is a representative body only when a majority of its membership votes for Dr Khan Sahib, and that it becomes a useless body when, in exercise of its constitutional rights, it seeks to replace the Republican brand of Ministers. We are also reminded of Mr H.S. Suhrawardy's statement when the East Pakistan Assembly was threatened with dissolution in somewhat similar circumstances; he declared then that dissolution of the Assembly would be a betrayal of the Constitution, because the advice of a Chief Minister who has lost the Assembly's support is not worthy of consideration, and that when a Ministry loses the confidence of the House, it is the Governor's duty to call upon the Leader of the Opposition to form a Ministry. How does the Prime Minister justify the action taken in West Pakistan?

In these circumstances, the best way out of the present crisis is that the President's Proclamation should be revoked and the Legislative Assembly restored without delay irrespective of whether it spawns a Republican or Muslim League Ministry. Despite its unrepresentative character and the tendency of its main groups to ignore both scruples and principles, persons responsible to the Assembly have a greater right to rule the Province than the nominees of one or two individuals. It should, however, also be realized that this Assembly, with its large percentage of political tricksters, will always breed factionalism and intrigues and instability. It is necessary, therefore, that elections should be held as soon as possible. It is extraordinary that since Pakistan was created, whenever a political party succeeds in capturing the citadel of power, it does everything possible to avoid facing the electorate. The present ruling parties are certainly no exception. It will be remembered that, early in 1956, the West Pakistan Chief Minister gave a categorical assurance

that new elections would be held in the Province by the end of that year. Now he prefers not to mention any target-date. Similarly, the longer Mr Suhrawardy remains in office, the more vague become his references to an election time-table. This by-passing of the people, apparently because of our leaders' lack of faith in themselves, has been the bane of Pakistan's politics. If, therefore, this disgusting merry-goround is to end, the higher authorities in Pakistan must make up their minds to allow the people to vote their rulers into power. And this can mean nothing besides new elections on the basis of adult franchise. No spurious substitute, like the so-called One Unit elections, where electoral colleges of all types--with a lack of democratic sanction their only common feature—were made to return a motley crowd of men to form a Legislature which has been ruling the Province in the name of the people with whom it has no real connection, will be acceptable to the people. Early democratic elections offer the only hope of Pakistan's redemption; all other paths can only help to take us deeper into the jungle of authoritarianism.

25 March 1957 The Democratic Path

It will generally be agreed that among the national issues referred to in the speeches of State dignitaries on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Republic, the most important problem facing the country is that of establishing full democracy and ensuring its smooth working. The President, in his broadcast to the nation, drew pointed attention to the malaise reflected in the 'peculiar working of our parliamentary system': he expressed the view that the application of the British system of governance to our conditions had created a situation in which 'Ministers when in power had to devote their ingenuity to keeping the parliamentarians happy even at the cost of the elementary requirements of administration'. Calling upon the people to give their serious consideration to the task of remedying this situation, the President suggested that the American system of administration should be studied by the people because it might, with necessary modifications, prove more suitable to conditions in Pakistan.

We would submit that the root cause of the malady afflicting Pakistan does not stem from any inherent difficulties in the system of democracy we have adopted: it arises primarily from the fact that those conventions and constitutional provisions which seek to ensure its democratic functioning have too often been bypassed and ignored. The problem in Pakistan is not that the Legislature exercises too much control over the Executive: it is that the Executive exercises too much control over the Legislature, and, even more so, that the electorate is allowed to exercise hardly any control over either the Executive or the Legislature. If fullfledged democracy is established in Pakistan, if elections are held regularly and in accordance with a plan which guarantees that they reflect the unfettered will of the people, there is no reason why the worst features of the present political situation should not be eliminated. When MLAs are elected by unrepresentative electoral colleges, when a junior administrative officer can virtually nominate a dozen 'representatives of the people', or a majority of the members of a defunct Legislature from each district can elect themselves and a few extras to the new Assembly, it is certainly not surprising that normal democratic-values are completely disregarded. We believe that by itself no change in the political system will bring about the desired reform; what we require far more urgently is a genuine change in the attitude of those responsible for working the existing laws, so that the people are given the opportunity to rid our political life of elements who devote themselves to the pursuit of personal or factional ends.

The Prime Minister, in a Republic Day message, also touched upon the problem of democracy in Pakistan; but his views on the subject seem to err on the side of complacency. He claimed that the 'veil of frustration' had been lifted from the people, and that his Government had done its utmost to uphold democratic conventions and institutions. When-in direct contradiction of the view expressed by the Prime Minister in relation to East Pakistan—the Constitution stands suspended in West Pakistan, the people are likely to regard his claim with a certain measure of scepticism. Naturally, Mr Suhrawardy's policy statements will be judged in terms of the action that is taken by the Centre to overcome the West Pakistan crisis. Further, and this is of crucial significance, the Prime Minister has, once again, set a tentative target-date for Pakistan's first General Election. If the Government can really guarantee that the country will be allowed to go to the polls within twelve months, whatever the failings of the present Coalition Government, the people will undoubtedly acclaim it for this essential act of service to democratic ideals. And while there has not so far been much evidence of agitated activity to substantiate the Prime Minister's statement that the Government was 'straining every nerve' to hold the election as soon as practicable, the people will look forward to an honest effort on the part of the authorities to honour the pledge given by the Prime Minister. It is necessary to point out that if elections are not held by March 1958, the poll will have to be postponed for another ten months because of our climatic conditions. This realisation should spur the Government to prompt action, both legislative and administrative, in an effort to ensure that, before the second anniversary of the Republic is celebrated, Pakistan will be able to replace the present patchwork by a solid Governmental structure whose democratic character cannot be impugned--so that, with the door to retrogression effectively barred, Pakistan's advance along the democratic path becomes a reality.

17 July 1957 **The Restoration**

The restoration of the Republican Ministry will evoke real joy only among those who expect to benefit by the return to

power of the more fortunate group among the Bourbons of West Pakistan politics. As far as the people are concerned, the Centre's decision to revoke the President's Proclamation under Section 193 will meet with a measure of approval, but only because it brings to an end an undemocratic form of government and reinstates the Provincial Legislature. The fact that the West Pakistan Assembly is not a representative body, that its election was an ugly parody of the democratic process, or that many of its members are unburdened by political principles and loyalties, provides no argument for its arbitrary suspension or dissolution—especially at a time when this step cannot be followed by early elections and the only alternative to parliamentary rule is gubernatorial dictatorship. It also needs to be realised that in Pakistan today the very existence of the Legislatures, however inept their functioning might be, furnishes cause for considerable satisfaction, for their suppression can only help to strengthen authoritarian trends and further delay the establishment of unfettered democracy.

However, while in principle the return to constitutional normalcy in West Pakistan undoubtedly merits approval, the manner of its accomplishment has certainly not been unexceptionable. In the first place, the choice of determining the complexion of the new Ministry after Dr Khan Sahib's fall was not left to the Legislature; in fact, certain quarters go so far as to say that its resuscitation was made conditional on the Assembly's willingness to support a Republican Ministry. Secondly, the show of strength staged by the Republicans recently-in order to convince the Governor that they could form a stable Ministry-borders on the farcical. for. as some League leaders pertinently pointed out, if a similar offer had been made to the Muslim Leaguers (or even to some other political group), they too would have been able to muster a clear majority-perhaps even bigger than that of the Republicans—with a judicious disposal of the plums of office. The queer way in which Dr Khan Sahib was asked to resign immediately after his resumption of office and make way for Sardar Abdur Rashid indicates that sharp differences of a

largely personal nature existed within the Party or among those in high authority. Further, Sardar Abdur Rashid's appointment as Chief Minister may well make for cohesion among the Republicans and their friends, but it is rather doubtful whether the Governor acted properly in calling upon him to head the Cabinet without his formal election as Leader of the Party. In any event, since Dr Khan Sahib cannot transfer to anyone else the majority support that he once enjoyed, it is but proper that his successor should face the House and obtain a vote of confidence within a few days.

Whatever the legal position may be—and it is said that the next session of the Assembly can be delayed until the third week of September—political morality demands that the new Chief Minister should summon the Legislature as soon as it is physically possible to do so after he has taken over the administration. Some of his colleagues and party tacticians will probably advise him to defer a meeting of the Assembly until he can consolidate his own position or further demoralize his opponents. This would be a short-sighted policy; it has been tried again and again, and, while bringing no lasting benefit to its authors, has caused a great deal of political confusion in the country. We hope Sardar Abdur Rashid will be able to reject such advice and follow the straight path, even if it offers greater risks. While the restoration of the Legislature to its full authority is an essential step, it cannot by itself be expected to bring about any real change-in-the political atmosphere or in administrative policies. That will depend on the people's ability to ensure that Pakistan's first General Election is held early next year, and on the way in which they exercise their hard-won right to choose their Governments through the ballot box.

26 August 1957 The Promised Election

The 'election in March' slogan, with which Mr H.S. Suhrawardy had sought to prove his democratic intent, has

been abandoned without even a word of regret or apology. The Prime Minister had promised the people of Pakistanand he reiterated this pledge again and again during his recent tour of Western lands-that, come what may, the General Election would not be delayed beyond March 1958. Mr Suhrawardy backed this promise with the daring declaration that he had never gone back on his promised word and would not do so now; and in one of his statements on the subject he even implied that if the General Election was not held before March he would not remain in office. The last occasion on which he repeated his election-in-March promise was on 31 July, in London, at the famous luncheon meeting arranged by the Commonwealth Press Correspondents' Association. However, on his arrival in Pakistan a few days later, it was noticed that Mr Suhrawardy's mood and tone had undergone a startling change. At first he merely refused to reiterate his oft-made promise until he had studied the relevant files; later, he said that the matter was under close examination; and now he has openly confessed his inability to honour his main pledge to the people--which his supporters used to cite as the main justification for his acceptance of office.

Even if the Prime Minister feels that he can go back on his biggest promise to the people of Pakistan with impunity, he might, at least, concede that they have the right to an explanation for the strange happenings that have come to light in recent weeks. It is no longer disputed that the Election Commission had told the Government that they required a full fourteen months, after the relevant laws and rules had been promulgated, to complete their preparations for the General Election. When, for no good reason at all, the necessary legislation was delayed, the Commission are reported to have warned the Government of the possible consequences of such delay. It seems strange that, instead of taking action to speed up the legislative and rule-making work. Mr Suhrawardy should have proceeded glibly with his promise-making routine. The Prime Minister has said that in his opinion the Commission is doing its best to hold the

elections as early as possible. Apart from the fact that this opinion conflicts with the views of some of his colleagues, the people would like to know why-if the Commission is working with all possible speed—there has been so much delay. Further, is it true that, apart from legislative hindrances, the men and money required by the Commission are not readily available? And if no satisfactory answer can be given to these questions, is one to believe that Mr Suhrawardy's promise of a March election was mainly a propaganda stunt. or that the changed political situation in East Pakistan has persuaded the Awami League to soft-pedal (the cynics might even say sabotage) the election preparations? Whatever the truth, it is clear that a more definite explanation needs to be given by the Prime Minister. The people cannot be satisfied with his vague declaration that the election will be held in 1958 --- as early as possible. They want to know the reasons for the delay, with full exposure of those responsible for it. and the steps that are being taken now to ensure that the work of making the arrangements for Pakistan's first General Election will no longer be subject to further postponement of essential tasks as a result of inefficiency or half-heartedness on the part of the Government.

29 August 1957 Gurmani's Exit

Mr M.A. Gurmani's unceremonious exit from gubernatorial office will cause little surprise and no regrets; for the people, it merely marks the fall of yet another knight-errant who joined the political struggle in no cause but his own and allowed no rules of any sort to hinder his pursuit of power. His forced resignation does not, however, signify any change in the character of the war; it merely brings the latest battle to an end. In this seemingly unending war between rival factions and groups, principles play no real part, political parties are used as mere pawns, the distinction between foes and temporary allies—all allies being temporary—is not always very clear, and consideration of the public weal finds expression only in worthless promises and meaningless manifestos. As long as this state of affairs continues—and it is likely to continue until the people can exercise freely their right to choose their rulers and throw out those who ignore the people's behests—no shift in the fortunes of the men engaged in the struggle involves any issues of direct public interest, and no factional victory, however spectacular, can bring either stability to the ruling parties or hope of political redemption for the people.

It might not have been considered necessary to say anything more on the subject for the present, but since Mr Gurmani claims that he has 'tried to establish healthy conventions' as Governor and talks feelingly of the 'dignity of the high office he held, it appears necessary to review the salient features of his strange career. In his political *alma mater*, the Unionist Party, he quickly gained for himself a reputation for single-minded devotion to drawing-room bargains as a means of furthering his own cause, and since then Mr Gurmani has done nothing to warrant a reappraisal of his worth as a political tactician. During the struggle for Pakistan, Mr Gurmani was content to watch the Indian Muslims' battle for a separate homeland from the safety of the sidelines and to wait for the winner to be proclaimed by his British friends. Having done his bit for the British *raj* during a most crucial period of history, Mr Gurmani then entered the service of a feudal potentate, presumably as a nominee of the British Government. And it was from the Bahawalpur base that he succeeded in effecting a back-door entry into the Central Government. As a Central Minister he remained completely isolated from public life, wholly oblivious of the need to obtain popular sanction for his continuance in office. His political activity was limited to factional moves and counter-moves; and as he flitted from one Ministry to another, he worked assiduously to improve his position—mainly by serving the ends of whosoever held the sceptre in his hands. After his appointment as Governor-first of the Punjab and then of West Pakistan-Mr Gurmani

continued to play his favourite game of political intrigue, without much regard for the constitutional or traditional restraints that govern the conduct of the executive head of the Province. To mention only a few instances, he sought a party's ticket and fought an election without relinquishing office; he helped to form a new party and nurtured it until it gave up his patronage, engaging himself in petty squabbles and low-level manoeuvres; and he dismissed Ministers and Ministries or suspended the legislature with little evidence of respect for his oath of office or some sense of duty to the people. Therefore, his new-found sensitivity to the dignity of the office he has been compelled to quit is, to say the very least, a trifle belated.

We have described Mr Gurmani's peculiar political role at some length, not because those who outmanoeuvred him and brought about his downfall were guided by any except factional motives, but in order to stress the fact that he meets a well-deserved nemesis and should not be allowed to parade himself as a martyr to some public cause. Secondly, Mr Gurmani's rise and fall shows that power gained through dubious means cannot last, that in the final analysis popular support is the only sure basis of political strength. This lesson needs to be learnt by Mr Gurmani as well as by those who rejoice in his discomfiture and regard it as a great victory. It also needs to be realised that as long as our political life is governed by the motives and morals of the jungle, no one can say for how long he can walk in the sun with safety, or when another trap will be sprung to end a meteoric career. There is only one way to a stable political life--and one that will-also allow matters of vital national interest to be dealt with properly—namely, the path of real democracy.

4 October 1957 Gurmani's Statement

When, about five weeks ago, Mr M. A. Gurmani was asked to vacate the gubernatorial chair, he declared—with a show of deference to constitutional propriety—that he would issue an explanatory statement immediately after he had relinquished his office. The fulfilment of this promise (or threat) has been greatly delayed; and now, instead of telling the people 'all about it,' the ex-Governor has found a new hobby-horse, and he presents himself as a selfless champion of One Unit--over whose birth, it will be remembered, he officiated as a ruthless midwife. Comment on Mr Gurmani's new-found love for democratic principles and the sovereignty of the people is hardly necessary, for it is well known that he has never had much respect for either. It will be noticed that in his historical survey of Pakistan's constitutional development, he has, with unusual modesty, tried to minimise his own significant role. Perhaps Mr Gurmani is trying to forget-what the people cannot possibly have forgotten--that he was a party to every attack on the Constitution made in recent years, that he eagerly sought to destroy our democratic institutions and push Pakistan over the brink of authoritarianism, and that as Governor he was actively engaged in political intrigue, launching new political parties, creating or breaking up factions, cajoling or browbeating MPAs. And since the setting up of a 'national' Government is not a practical proposition, the only point made by Mr Gurmani which deserves serious consideration is his laboured contention that the existing legislatures of Pakistan are not competent to make any constitutional changes. His argument is utterly fallacious, for if it had been the intention of the Constituent_Assembly to ensure that the Constitution should remain unchanged until new legislative bodies were elected, it would have simply laid down this condition in the Constitution itself. No such restriction exists. Further, to stress that the interim legislatures are ad hoc creations of the Constituent Assembly is to forget that the Constituent Assembly itself was an *ad hoc* creation of the old Provincial Assemblies, which had long ago lost whatever mandate or representative character they had ever enjoyed. As far as the political aspect of the matter is concerned, whatever might be said about any other part of the Constitution, the integration of Provinces in West Pakistan was carried out under such shameful circumstances that no sanctity whatsoever attaches to these measures. None could be better aware than Mr Gurmani himself of the methods used to pave the way for this so-called corner-stone of Pakistan's Constitution. Its working has clearly shown that its supposed administrative advantages were largely imaginary. What is more, as time passes, more and more people believe that the experiment has failed and the sooner this awkward structure is removed the better it would be for the country. It is. indeed, an extraordinary example of effrontery that those who helped to foist One Unit on the people against their will are now shouting in favour of consulting the people before removing this burden from their backs.

11 October 1957 Suhrawardy's Strategy

Gradually, as the Prime Minister's speeches become less restrained, the strategy guiding his current propaganda campaign has begun to unfold. Originally, it was made out that his intervention—which, if sincere, should not have been delayed until after the Republicans had cemented their alliance with the National Awami Party—against the move to replace One Unit with a zonal federation was guided solely by a burning desire to prevent any further delay in holding the General Election. This gambit soon became utterly valueless, because no political party in the country desired a postponement of the elections—and, in contradiction of his earlier statements, Mr Suhrawardy himself has now admitted this fact.

The Prime Minister's second line of argument is that, for him, West Pakistan's integration is a matter of faith, and that he is prepared to sacrifice his political allies but not his political principles. In reality, however, Mr Suhrawardy has performed more than one somersault on the question of One Unit and the method of its establishment. On the other hand,

the Awami League is bound by its Council's resolutionadopted in Mr Suhrawardy's presence-which lays down that the question of merging West Pakistan's Provinces should be left open and decided in accordance with the people's wishes. Thus, in taking his present stand, the Prime Minister has not only repudiated his alliance with the Republicans, but he has also rejected his own Party's policy on the question. This is not all. The Prime Minister has shown an extraordinary lack of balance in equating the continuation of One Unit in its present form not only with stability in the country but also with Pakistan's very existence. This stale slogan must, of course, be rejected as arrant nonsense, and Mr Suhrawardy's confusion-mongering exposed. Stability does not come through forcibly maintaining a plan devised by power-hungry political perverts and executed through blackmail. Nor, it should be realised, can such tactical shifts of policy help to find a niche in West Pakistan for the Awami League. And no one is prepared to believe that Pakistan's existence would be jeopardised by any constitutional amendment. Equally reprehensible—because it threatens the prevailing national unity on the subject of Kashmir—is the Prime Minister's reference to Kashmir in the context of the debate on One Unit. His claim that the Kashmiris would be discouraged from seeking accession to Pakistan if they were denied the possibility of fully integrating their State with West Pakistan cannot be based on ignorance, because Mr Suhrawardy must know that the special constitutional provision relating to Kashmir was introduced with the unanimous approval of the Kashmiri leaders: therefore, one can only conclude that this argument has been developed in defiance of truth and honesty. The danger of using the Kashmir issue for partisan political ends is too obvious to need further stress.

Ignoring the rest of his specious arguments, we wish to draw attention to the most sinister aspect of the Prime Minister's plan, namely, his desire to disband the Provincial Ministries and impose President's Rule in both Provinces, in order, ostensibly, to ensure that the General Election is fair

and impartial. Every move that seeks to guarantee honest elections deserves support, but the Prime Minister's proposal seems to have other ends in view. If Mr Suhrawardy believes that the Election Commission would not be able to fulfil its mandate of holding elections without outside interference if the Ministries remain in office, why should he exempt his own Government from immolation in the interests of fair elections? The people cannot possibly accept the theory that Mr Suhrawardy's dictatorship is the only guarantee of free elections, particularly since rumours persist of unorthodox deals being made in Karachi and Dacca to obtain support, financial and political, for the Awami League. In any case, the Prime Minister's proposed action would be utterly unconstitutional; and for one who presents himself as the lone, heroic defender of Pakistan's Constitution to suggest a step that would violate the fundamental law of the land is strange—and revealing.

Lastly, Mr Suhrawardy has had the temerity to declare that no power can ever break One Unit. It is hardly necessary to point out that such presumptuousness has no place in a democratic country. The people have the power and the right to dispose of One Unit as they please—Mr Suhrawardy's latest posture notwithstanding. In fact, the One Unit scheme enjoys no sanctity whatsoever even in the minds of those among the people who are not strongly opposed to it. Therefore, its replacement can be decided upon whenever sufficient votes are mustered in favour of the amending Bill in the Legislatures. Mr Suhrawardy should realise that the heady wine of power has before now persuaded many politicians to make such dictatorial pronouncements, but ultimately they have all had to swallow their brave threats of overriding the law and the people's will, or they have rudely been thrown out of the positions they gained without popular sanction and sought to retain without regard for the people's sentiments.

13 October 1957 Suhrawardy Resigns

Apart from the patently partisan reactions to Mr H.S. Suhrawardy's resignation, his sudden exit from office, viewed objectively, will be regretted only because, in clearing the way for the country's sixth Prime Minister within a decade, it will tend to recreate an atmosphere of political instability and uncertainty, and thus, lower Pakistan's prestige in the eyes of the world. For a number of reasons, it would have been better if the status quo ante, in the Provinces as well as at the Centre, had been maintained until the General Election. Otherwise his departure cannot be regarded as any great loss to the country, for Mr Suhrawardy's Government, despite the Awami League's written programme, presented no new policy to the country: they set no shining example of rectitude and impartiality; and they were unable to improve upon their predecessors' poor performance in the matter of promise-fulfilment, Just as Mr Suhrawardy continued to follow the course set by the last two Muslim League Governments, it seems likely that the new Government which will emerge from the current parleys at Karachi will not deviate from these general policies. While this fact provides no cause for satisfaction in most spheres of our national life, it does show the fatuity of the argument that Mr Suhrawardy's departure will be followed by a harmful change of policy in regard to the Kashmir issue.

In assessing the present situation, it is necessary to remember that the crisis was created largely by Mr Suhrawardy himself. His vitriolic propaganda campaign against the majority group in the Coalition he headed clearly showed that he was deliberately trying to wreck the Coalition Government. Whether or not he actually approved of the Republican-NAP alliance—allegedly so that he could then try to oust his Republican allies—his intervention against the move was inexplicably belated; and it is also extremely odd that, without first consulting his colleagues or raising the issue in a meeting of the Coalition Party, the Prime Minister

began his attack on the Republicans in a tone and language that left little ground for later explanations or reconciliation. In fact, Mr Suhrawardy had declared in one of his more recent speeches that the Coalition was no longer in existence. Presumably, he had hoped that he would be able to continue in office despite the Republicans by creating an opportunity to split the Party, and by gaining the support of other splinter groups. He and his advisers seem to have ignored the fact that the Republicans commanded a majority in the Coalition Party and their voice could not easily be ignored. When the Republican Party leaders formally announced the withdrawal of their support from Mr Suhrawardy, and asked the President to take appropriate action on the ground that the Prime Minister no longer enjoyed the support of a majority in the Parliament, they undoubtedly had a good case. However even though there is no provision in the Constitution prescribing such a condition—if Mr Suhrawardy really did suggest that a session of the Parliament should be called to enable him to prove that he still enjoyed the confidence of the House, his claim should have been put to the test. Even if, in the present case, the outcome might not have been different. it is certainly necessary to build up a convention that any dispute over parliamentary strength should be settled by the Parliament assembled in a proper session.

With regard to the future, there can be little serious public interest in the names of Mr Suhrawardy's successor and others who will find themselves elevated to the vacant Ministerial chairs. The game of power politics has been played for so long in our country that its ups and downs no longer cause keen excitement. However, there will be general agreement that what the country needs today is a stable Ministry that will be able to pay a reasonable measure of attention to governmental tasks. and, in particular, a Ministry that will devote itself in real earnest (and not just in empty words) to the task of giving the country, as soon as it is physically possible, a General Election whose impartiality and fairness cannot be impugned by any honest person.

29 November 1957 The Unsteady Centre

Although the Prime Minister's election as Leader of the Coalition Party at the Centre raises the presumption that the Republican Party and the Muslim League are likely somehow to save their uneasy partnership from early collapse, such a *rapprochement* is still by no means certain. Even more uncertain is the possibility of their being able to evolve a formula that would resolve their main differences and enable the present Ministry to remain in office until the General Election. Among the numerous points of conflict that divide the leading parties in the Coalition, the one that has received the widest publicity is their clash over the electorate question. On this issue the Muslim League and its friends are making a great deal of noise, declaring that for them the question is one of fundamental principle, and that the Republican Party would be dishonouring a solemn agreement if it now refused to support the change in the electoral law demanded by the Muslim League. For either the Muslim League or its offspring, the Republican Party, to talk of broken promises is, to say the least, most presumptuous. The path they have traversed is littered with dishonoured pledges, defaced pacts, and betrayed manifestos. In the present instance, one might well ask which of the contradictory promises on the subject made by both the parties at different times is to be respected? Should the Republicans honour their manifesto and the stand that they took when the Electorate Bill was last before the National Assembly? Or should they show greater regard for their adherence to separate electorates whenever faced with the danger of being driven out of office by the Muslim League's intrigues? And, as far as the Muslim League is concerned, should it stick to its present stand or the written commitment that its leaders made at the time of the National Assembly's Murree session and have reiterated on more than one later occasion?

If only partisan motives could be eliminated from consideration, it is clear for all to see that Pakistan's present situation demands that no major constitutional change should

be attempted before the General Election, for the simple reason that any such attempt—whether it pertains to reform of the One Unit set-up or transformation of the system of election—is bound to upset the election schedule. It is useless for the advocates of either of the proposed constitutional amendments to argue that the change they desire can be made without postponing the elections beyond November 1958. This may be true in theory, but it is perfectly obvious now that for a number of reasons, both political and administrative, it is virtually impossible to push through any major constitutional amendment without seriously risking further delay in the holding of Pakistan's first General Election. And this delay is something which no honest citizen can countenance. Therefore, irrespective of the merits of the proposal jointly agreed upon by the National Awami Party and the Republican Party for replacing One Unit with a zonal federation, and irrespective of the arguments that the Muslim Leaguers muster in favour of separate electorates, present circumstances demand that the Constitution, as it stands today, should not be touched before the elections. It is absolutely essential that all our energies should be devoted to the task of ensuring that the country's first poll is held within the next twelve months and in an atmosphere of complete freedom, so that the people's genuine representatives can man the Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies, and, after first making the existing Constitution fully effective, bring about any constitutional changes that are considered necessary.

Apart from this vital factor, it needs to be realised that if the Republican Party acquiesces in the Muslim League's demand for separate electorates, it will open the door to many far-reaching complications. In the first place, the decision is not likely to be accepted by the people of East Pakistan with equanimity. They will regard it as an imposition by the representatives of West Pakistan, because it overrides the views of nearly all important political parties in that Province. Secondly, separate electorates will create an unnecessary and undesirable cleavage between the Muslim majority of Pakistan and the minorities, giving them a feeling of separateness which can do no good and may have unpleasant consequences in the future. And, in any case, it is quite obvious that the attempt to secure passage of such an amending Bill will create political disruption in both wings of the country. The Muslim League would, therefore, be welladvised to give up its partisan demand. Plainly, the Party is eager to bring about the change because it hopes to make some electoral gains in East Pakistan as a result of separate electorates; otherwise it would have accepted the Quaid-i-Azam's clear pronouncement ruling out communal electorates in Pakistan. If, however, even in these critical times, the Muslim League is not prepared to sacrifice narrow party gain for national interests, then, even at the risk of seeing the present crisis worsen before it clears up, the Republicans should abide by the position taken by their Party's Organising Committee. It should at the same time be everyone's aim to give the country a stable Government at the Centre—and one that will save it from the chaos that is likely to follow any attempt to change an essential part of the Constitution.

12 December 1957 The Way Out

The unedifying spectacle of Pakistan's prolonged political debauch has not been ended yet. For many years now, the ugly scene has remained almost completely unchanged; the main actors might have been cast for different roles at different times, but essentially the roles have remained the same: and the motive force has always been the same greed for power, served by the same intrigue and unprincipled manoeuvring, the same disregard for promise and precept. Today, once again, it is by no means certain that the latest crisis at the Centre will be overcome in a manner that would allow a smooth transition to democratic rule and expedite the full enforcement of the Constitution. The country's main political groups and parties, having acquired their positions

of influence by historical accident rather than by democratic sanction, have been playing a dangerous game, with their eyes short-sightedly riveted on the seats of power. They apparently do not realise, or do not care, that the stakes are really very much higher, and that they have virtually been gambling with the country's future.

With regard to the latest developments at Karachi, the Muslim League Prime Minister's resignation should cause no real surprise. The ill-assorted Coalition headed by Mr Chundrigar had to fall apart sooner or later; and when the Republicans and Muslim Leaguers failed to agree on the separate electorate issue, it was inevitable that the Cabinet should crumble. However, what has naturally caused a great deal of surprise is the President's inexplicable decision to call upon Mr Chundrigar to form a new Government. It will be recalled that a little over two months ago, when Mr Suhrawardy submitted his resignation and demanded that he should be allowed to form another Government, his request was not accepted on the ground that the proper and democratic procedure was to give an opportunity to the Leader of the Opposition to head a new Government. Why has this shortlived precedent been set aside? Why was the Leader of the Opposition not summoned on the present occasion? Or, if for some reason that was not considered feasible, why was not the leader of the largest party in the Parliament given the chance to form a Government? It is perfectly obvious that Mr Chundrigar's resignation amounts to a confession of failure, an admission that he could not secure a majority in the Coalition for his Separate Electorates Bill. And the hasty prorogation of Parliament ordered at his request shows that the Prime Minister could not face the House with any hope of saving himself from a vote of no-confidence. How then did Mr Chundrigar qualify for receiving the President's summons to form another Cabinet?

It is not yet clear whether the Muslim League leader will be able to get together a combination of splinter groups and stray individuals or turncoats that could claim the allegiance of a majority of MPs. If Mr Chundrigar somehow carries out the commission that has been entrusted to him by the President, the accompanying scramble will probably provide the country with even bigger surprises than it has been its misfortune to witness during the last few years. If, however, as appears most likely at the moment, the caretaker Prime Minister is unable to scrape together a sufficient number of MPs to pass muster, the only alternative before the President will be to call upon either the Leader of the Opposition or the Republican Party Chief to undertake the responsibility of heading a new Government. This should be done without undue delay, particularly in view of the fact that the new alliance headed by the Republican Party and the Awami League has already demonstrated that it enjoys the support of a clear majority in the House. We earnestly hope that the President will make no attempt either to influence political parties or Members of Parliament to back a particular person for the Prime Minister's office, or to impose any conditions on the majority coalition before calling upon their representative to form a Ministry. Such negotiations are no part of his constitutional duties, and can only detract from the dignity of his high office. The President should accept the verdict of the Parliament, as represented by a majority of its members, and take appropriate steps to speedily end the present crisis. As soon as the new Ministry has been installed, it should be made to face the Parliament without delay, so that the body which is the real repository of political power is given the earliest possible opportunity to approve or reject the new Government.

...All Members of the Parliament who are conscious of their duty to the country must at this critical stage rise above partisan considerations, and work to put into office a stable coalition that pledges itself to maintain the constitutional *status que*, and to hold elections within the next twelve months. If they can do so, they will save the country from a painful period of turmoil and confusion: if they cannot, they will open the door to endless intrigues, a series of unstable

governments, and further delay in holding the elections which could easily take the country nearer to the abyss of dictatorship.

18 December 1957 The Eighth Cabinet

A people who have for years been fed on false promises, who have since they were declared free been denied their most elementary political rights, and who have seen national affairs steadily deteriorate in neglect because the country's self-appointed rulers have been too busy with factional feuds, cannot be expected to show any enthusiasm for the eighth Central Cabinet that has been installed in power at Karachi. The new combination of Ministers that has risen from the turmoil created by the Muslim League's dangerous policies consists mostly of well-known faces; it has no new policy to offer the country; nor can it evoke any hope that Pakistan's many old problems--which have not been solved for the simple reason that they have not been tackled yet—will now be dealt with more earnestly and vigorously. The Coalition headed by Mr Firoz Khan Noon has come into existence primarily to prevent the Muslim League from foisting separate electorates on the country and thereby delaying the General Election: it is natural, therefore, that the predominant reaction to its victory should be one of negative satisfaction--in that the country has been saved from the follies committed or contemplated by the Muslim League regime and the graver dangers that the country might have faced if a prolonged political deadlock had encouraged undemocratic trends.

Even though—notwithstanding the new Prime Minister's repetition (in his own words) of the traditional promises made on such occasions—the Noon Ministry has not aroused high expectations, the people do expect it to fulfil its main pledge, namely, to hold the elections within the next eleven months. The Government must, therefore, immediately withdraw the orders given by the Muslim League Prime Minister and issue instructions for the completion of all the necessary electoral arrangements in accordance with the existing laws. The Election Commission must, henceforth, be given all the help it requires, so that there is no possibility whatsoever of the election schedule being upset once again. Apart from the question of its timing, the Government must guarantee that Pakistan's first country-wide election will not follow the ugly pattern evolved in certain Provinces for ensuring that the party in power can be victorious at the polls irrespective of the wishes of the voters. The machinery set up for handling the various jobs connected with the election must be allowed to function with complete impartiality, and misuse of sources of official patronage and the exercise of official pressure must be eschewed. If the new Government can discharge these responsibilities with honour, it will have done more than any previous Ministry to make democracy safe in Pakistan.

In today's circumstances, it is important that the Noon Ministry should not be disturbed before the General Election—except, of course, in the event of its backing out of its promise to hold the election by November 1958. Although the Coalition's component parties together enjoy a substantial majority in Parliament, the Awami League's refusal to accept office, and its leaders' crude hints that they are extremely keen that Mr Suhrawardy should be made the Prime Minister, create an ideal situation for the intriguers to busy themselves once again. Such a development must be avoided, if only because frequent Ministerial reshuffles, usually involving a clash of personalities rather than of principles, do not help to enhance Pakistan's prestige abroad: nor can such changes increase the people's respect for the Government or make it easier to run the administration. And, as has been clearly proved in the last three months, the game of unmaking and making Ministries creates situations which could be exploited for unconstitutional and undemocratic purposes. Further, the Noon Ministry, as at present constituted, is not fully representative of East Pakistan's political parties, and this

situation may well be taken advantage of in that Province by those who do not hesitate to exploit provincial feelings and jealousies. For all these reasons it appears necessary that the Awami League should be persuaded to join the Government. Mr Suhrawardy's group, unlike the National Awami Party, has no other major policy differences with the Republicans, whereas the question of dismantling One Unit before the General Election is no longer a live issue. There is thus not a single good reason why the Awami League should not join Mr Noon's Cabinet. If Mr H. S. Suhrawardy considers it beneath his dignity to accept any office other than the Prime Ministership, the Party should ask its other representatives to join the Cabinet. However, even if their decision to stay out cannot be changed, the Awami League must under no circumstances dishonour its pledge to maintain the Noon Ministry in power; for if it does so, in order to bring about another Ministerial scramble, Mr Suhrawardy and his friends will attract strong public opprobrium for creating crises with the sole purpose of serving the interests of their Party.

22 January 1958 General Elections

The lunatic fringe of the Muslim League having retreated from its ridiculous position that there should be no elections without separate electorates, this slogan has now been taken up by the Jamaat-e-Islami. With a fanaticism uninhibited either by practical considerations or by rational political principles, the leaders of the Jamaat maintain that, before all else, the electorate issue should be decided through a countrywide referendum, and that it does not matter one jot if such a reference to the people delays the General Election by one or two years. These political fossils have the temerity to declare that the holding of early elections has no real significance in Pakistan, and that it is much more important that the nation should be split into different sections for political purposes. It is of interest to note that these gentlemen have seldom attached much importance to the people's voice. During the last ten years questions of soul-shaking importance to the country have from time to time come to the fore, but never before now has the Jamaat-e-Islami been sufficiently agitated to demand that the people should be consulted on any of these issues.

The arguments that they advance in favour of their fantastic demand have been dealt with on numerous occasions and no longer require serious rebuttal. It is palpably illogical to suggest that, unless the system of separate electorates is accepted immediately, Pakistan will disintegrate or the people's faith in the country's future will be weakened; and it is equally fatuous to claim that separate electorates provide the answer to every political problem facing the country whether it is the controversy over provincial autonomy or Pukhtoonistan, the question of national language or the Province-wise allocation of foreign exchange. On the other hand, it is quite obvious that by dividing the people politically on the basis of religion we would be encouraging fissiparous tendencies; and by declaring that the people of Pakistan do not—and never will—constitute a nation, we would only encourage those who want to weaken this country, drive a wedge between different sections of our people, and create conditions which they can exploit to Pakistan's disadvantage.

Those among the advocates of separate electorates who shout about the danger of alien influence seeping into the country must realise that national integration inside Pakistan is the best safeguard against unhealthy foreign influences. It is really quite easy to see that the joint electorate system will help to bring about greater cohesion and unity among the people. It will be agreed that those who insist on the introduction of communal electorates have not been able to present a rational case in support of their stand. In fact, the desperate tone of their utterances makes it quite plain that their primary aim is to make political capital out of the present situation. While, on the one hand, they are probably afraid of facing the electorate except on their own terms, on the other, they want to forge campaign slogans that would allow them to exploit the people's religious beliefs. If their minds were not so dangerously perturbed by the fear of their groups suffering a political decline, they should be prepared to submit the question of electorate to the people during the General Election and abide by their verdict...

28 May 1958 Grain and Chaff

The approach of the promised General Election has brought about a gradual revival of genuine political activity in Pakistan. Although the fears and frustrations of recent years have not disappeared altogether, they are beginning to abate; and many who had turned away in disgust from the intrigue and chicanery substituted for democratic politics find their interest reawakened by the fact that the chances of the elections being held within the next six or seven months are definitely brighter today than they have ever been before. It now seems almost certain that those who want to fight the elections on their own terms, or not at all, will fail in their bid to change the electoral law and thus secure yet another postponement of the battle of votes. The atmosphere in the country has changed to such an extent that even the known enemies of democracy, who had, after the 1954 *coup*, begun to agitate blatantly for the abandonment of democratic principles, no longer consider it worthwhile to advise the rulers of the country to try any dangerous short-cuts to stability.

Whereas some political groups are making honest efforts to educate and organise the people, many others are interested only in electioneering. New political leaders are being born, others are emerging from prolonged hibernation to join the scramble, and political parties which prefer to function in the calm coolness of drawing-rooms are learning to face the heat and dust of the public platform. Among the active campaigners we find a number of familiar faces trying very

hard to persuade the people to forget their past deeds and utterances and to accept them at their present face value. For example, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan now talks of 'establishing the sovereignty of the people,' criticises his opponents for foisting representatives of the idle rich on the country with the help of the bureaucracy, and berates nepotism and corruption and all the other administrative evils for which his name was accepted as a byword during the time he was in office. Mr H.S. Suhrawardy has, after many long years, been persuaded to set up a regular party organisation in West Pakistan, and to put forward a shining new manifesto with which he, presumably, hopes to dazzle the people so much that they will not be able to examine the credentials of his party too carefully. And both the Muslim League and the Awami League leaders are trying to win over West Pakistan's big landlords in order to strengthen their own party's position in the coming electoral tussle. The landlords possess a great deal of money and influence, but the bulk of the votes are in the hands of the poor class of villagers. Therefore, on the one hand, these gentlemen weep with the cultivator in his misery, sympathise with the tenant for his deprivation of the most elementary human rights, and talk of the desirability of land reforms based on peasant proprietorship; but this does not prevent them from wooing the support of the most reactionary among the landlords and declaring that neither the laws of equity nor the injunctions of Islam allow any part of Pakistan's latifundia to be acquired without payment of compensation on a scale that makes the proposal totally impracticable.

The people are also being introduced to Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, who strongly condemns almost every policy that was pursued during the period when he occupied one or another key position in the Pakistan Government. He has also sponsored the slogan—which has lately been echoed by the Muslim League President—that Pakistan should send its troops across the cease-fire line and go to the succour of the people of Occupied Kashmir, and that anyhow war between

Pakistan and India is inevitable. It is strange that these two gentlemen never made any such suggestion when their advice was given great weight in Government councils, and that the inevitability or desirability of such a conflict dawned upon them only after they had been driven into the Opposition and, even more so, when the elections appeared within sight. They cannot be so naive as to be unaware of the fact that the proposed march on Srinagar would lead to a full-scale war between Pakistan and India, and that, apart from other considerations, membership of Western military pacts makes it impossible for Pakistan to embark on any such venture. And, lastly, if their advice were sincere, and not merely an election stunt, they would be expected to make their suggestions in secrecy to the Central Cabinet, because such policy matters clearly cannot be decided upon from the election platform. It also seems plain that, whether it is their intention to present themselves before the people as very brave men or to embarrass the present Pakistan Government, the only effect of their war speeches will be to strengthen the position of the Indian Government at home on the Kashmir question and other Indo-Pakistan issues, and to lose for Pakistan some of the large fund of sympathy that it has won from world opinion because of the reasonableness and justness of its case on Kashmir.

While the revival of political activity is a happy sign of Pakistan's return to political health—because it is most important for the country's future that all issues of public importance should be placed before the people for their judgment—this process can be made to yield the best results if the leaders of all parties will pledge themselves to show some respect for the accepted rules of political warfare. For example, they could refrain from abusive personal attacks, which may please the more frivolous elements among an audience but cannot help prove an argument or further the process of politically educating the electorate. Further, every effort should be made to prevent the disturbance of the peace and hostile demonstrations at public meetings, for these exhibitions of intolerance and bad manners can be arranged quite easily and cheaply, and they do not provide any argument in favour of or against a particular party: their only effect is to vitiate the peaceful atmosphere required for a clean and proper election. All political parties should also make a serious effort to resist the temptation of pandering to provincial or tribal prejudices. And. lastly. our politicians must learn, for the sake of the country as well as in their own interests. to refrain from making extravagant promises or sponsoring chauvinistic slogans. Such slogans cause a great deal of confusion, and even though they may win some applause from impressionable persons, the gain is short-lived, for ultimately our people will learn to separate the grain from the chaff.

11 June 1958 Elections or Referendum?

Realising that, for political as well as psychological reasons, it is absolutely essential that nothing should now be allowed to stand in the way of Pakistan's first General Election, most of those who were, during recent months, pleading vociferously for a referendum to decide one or another constitutional issue have wisely retracted their demands. With the country hovering on the brink of another political crisis, with the people still not wholly convinced that elections will be held this year, or next year, or at any time in the foreseeable future, it is plain that the introduction of new constitutional processes would cause a great deal of confusion and may well endanger Pakistan's democratic future. The importance of the issues that have been suggested as fit subjects for decision by referendum cannot be denied; nor can it be claimed that the National Assembly is so completely representative of the nation that no such reference to the electorate is necessary. However, if the National Assembly is to be bypassed and all issues of national importance are to be decided in this way, why not submit Pakistan's foreign policy to a similar test? Why not ask the people to declare whether they favour a rational scheme of land reforms, and if the Constitution should be amended to delete the Article which makes payment of compensation obligatory before the acquisition of private property? Why not seek a popular vote on the West's foreign aid programme or Pakistan's industrial policy? None of these problems is less important than that of One Unit or the electoral system. But, quite obviously, it would be wrong, particularly at this stage, to demand that the people should be called upon to decide these issues in a direct vote, because it is by far more important to ensure that elections are held in Pakistan without further delay, so that the present half-baked parliamentary regime can be replaced by governments drawing their strength from legislatures elected by the people, and our two-year-old Constitution can be fully enforced.

However, there still are certain political leaders, led by the Amir of the Jamaat-i-Islami, who persist in demanding that a referendum on the electoral issue should be held immediately. Of course, they know fully well that there is no possibility of the present National Assembly agreeing to amend the Constitution in order to make a referendum possible; for if a sufficient majority could be mustered for this purpose, it would have been much simpler to ask the Assembly to reverse itself once again on the electorate question. Therefore, the demand for a referendum appears to be nothing more than an empty slogan. This view is confirmed by the line of propaganda followed by the advocates of a referendum at any price. Elections held on the basis of joint electorates are anathematised, and it is said that they would 'inflict a severe blow on the solidarity and integrity of Pakistan.' These prophets of doom would have us believe that Pakistan rests on such a weak basis that joint electorates would shake its foundations. Apart from the fact that the integrity and solidarity of Pakistan require greater cohesion among the different sections of its people rather than the encouragement of communal and fissiparous tendencies, these gentlemen certainly do not strengthen their cause by virtually equating it with Pakistan's very existence. Equally fallacious is their argument that a referendum would not delay the elections: for anyone who cares to study the implications of organizing a country-wide referendum will agree that the work connected with it, and, if the electorate rules are subsequently changed, the reprinting of electoral rolls and the re-delimitation of constituencies, could not possibly be accomplished before two years.

Therefore, it is perfectly clear that the choice before the people is either to have a referendum or to have the elections within the next six months or so. They cannot possibly have both. In the circumstances, there can be no doubt that the mass of our people will want elections to be held in accordance with the Election Commission's published programme: for they know that the other path can lead the country to disaster. We would, therefore, like to hope that those who are not using the referendum slogan as a means of avoiding the elections will abandon it completely, and join hands with those who are demanding that the programme of the elections should now be announced and made irrevocable by the Election Commission.

19 June 1958 Heredity and Politics

Whether one believes in the primacy of heredity or the effects of environment in determining the life-expectation and characteristics of living organisms, it must be accepted that in Pakistan precedence is given to hereditary rights and privileges over a host of other factors. Our social and economic systems have always recognised the importance of heredity, and the opportunities that an individual gets in life depend very largely on what he has inherited. Nor has this principle been wholly absent from the field of politics.

The elevation of Mr Saadullah Khan to the West Pakistan Cabinet is only the latest example of political office being inherited. In this Province there are a host of political leaders, in the ruling party as well as in the Muslim League, who have inherited an interest in politics from their fathers along with the wherewithal to pursue this interest.

There will, of course, be considerable doubt as to whether elevation is the right word to use in the case of Mr Saadullah Khan. As an engineer he was hitherto engaged in constructive activities; but, whatever portfolio he might be allotted, it is extremely doubtful if he will be able to make a similar claim now. As a senior official in the Civil Secretariat, he enjoyed great respect; it is doubtful whether, despite his personal qualities, he will be able to escape his share of the odium that attaches to the actions of some of his colleagues. And whereas he had a permanent, pensionable job, it is fairly certain that this present employment cannot be treated as anything else but temporary.

Of course, as a man and an administrator, West Pakistan's newest Minister will stand head and shoulders above many of his colleagues. It is also true that few of them can consider their own inclusion in the Cabinet any more justified than that of Mr Saadullah Khan. Nevertheless, it seems to be an unhealthy principle that any person's parentage should determine his place in the country's political life.

12 October 1958 Administrative Clean-up

There can be no doubt that the mass of our people will view with genuine approval the administrative clean-up that has been undertaken following the change of regime in the country. It is a well-known fact that over many years corruption, favouritism and inefficiency have been corroding the body politic of Pakistan, and that the various groups of politicians who held the reins of authority for brief periods were always so deeply involved in the scramble for power and pelf that scant attention was paid even to the most urgent national problems. As a result, the people's lives were becoming steadily more burdensome and their outlook more pessimistic. The unchecked inflation, the worsening state of law and order, bribery and nepotism, falling trade balances, and stagnation in agricultural and industrial production, are problems that could have been tackled effectively if the ruling parties had not remained deaf to public clamour, and if those in high office had not shut their eyes to the fact that the country they ruled was taking a dangerous plunge towards the abyss of ruin.

The new administration has rightly given first priority to the task of overall administrative reform. The statements and Orders issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator and the Zonal Administrators clearly indicate that such patent evils as black-marketing and profiteering, hoarding and smuggling, the illegal trade in permits and licences, corruption and favouritism, inefficiency and slackness, will receive Authority's immediate attention. It can be said with confidence that the authorities will not fail in their efforts to root out the parasitic and evil growths which had spread so far that they threatened to paralyse our economy. This hope is strengthened by the promptness with which infringements of the price-control laws have been dealt with. Of the first step taken in connection with such anti-social crimes, the most important is the arrest of Mr M. A. Khuhro, who has been held under the Hoarding and Black Marketing Act, on the charge of having sold a Chevrolet car in the black-market and being in the possession of another brand new vehicle. Further comment on the case is not possible since it will soon be put before a court of law, but it may be pointed out that the most significant aspect of the matter is that henceforth a person's wealth or position will not make him immune to the law. Hitherto, laws meant to protect the economy were often used against the small dealers, persons guilty of over-charging in terms of pies, but the big sharks were able to garner their vast illegal profits without any serious hindrance, and if they ever got caught in the net they were soon rescued by their influential friends in high places. With the elimination of influence-peddling and all its attendant evils, accompanied by the restoration of discipline among all ranks of the administrative services, it should be possible to free the administration of the various undesirable pulls that have prevented its proper functioning. And it need hardly be said that the new regime will be able to secure the willing cooperation of every honest citizen in its campaign against those elements in our society who, through illegal and dishonest means, have grown rich at the cost of the ordinary people and of the country's economic equilibrium.

26 October 1958 The Central Government

The formation of a new Cabinet at the Centre should be welcomed as a step towards normalisation of the administrative structure. The *ad hoc* arrangement hurriedly made after the promulgation of Martial Law was sufficient to deal with the more pressing problems. Within a fortnight the dyarchy--or, in the President's words, the two-man regimewas able to buttress the administrative machinery, to ensure strict enforcement of the measures adopted to ease the food situation, and to deal effectively with the smugglers and hoarders whose greed for profit was beginning to corrode the country's economy. But the bigger task of planning and policy-making clearly required that governmental authority should vest in a body of men who would be collectively responsible for all major decisions. The Cabinet's main function will be to examine the schemes prepared by the various Government Departments, and, after thoroughly discussing the issues involved, to formulate plans for economic and administrative reforms. This function could not easily have been delegated to any other body. Further, it is equally necessary that implementation of the policies evolved and the day-to-day working of the Government should be closely supervised: and obviously it was physically impossible for two persons to keep a vigilant eye on the vast and expanding fields of Government activity.

Now that a full-fledged Cabinet has been set up, it will be confidently expected that the major tasks facing the country-which the Prime Minister and Chief Martial Law Administrator has already outlined in his speeches—will be taken up with speed and efficiency. Among these the most important is the rehabilitation of Pakistan's agriculture, and as has correctly been pointed out by General Avub--this not only requires better use of the land-through better implements, good seeds, and scientific methods of plantcare—but also better use of the men who till the land, through reform of the land system. Its next task will be the reorganisation of Pakistan's industry by eliminating waste of productive capacity, by boosting production to the optimum, by ensuring the steady supply of raw materials and machinery replacements, and by taking steps to control the prices of indigenous goods so that industries can be made to run without fleecing the consumer. Similarly, in various other spheres a fairly drastic departure will have to be made from past policies to achieve the best possible results. Among a host of other matters, legal reforms, improvement of the educational system, rehabilitation of the displaced persons, and rationalisation of the social welfare set-up, should be taken in hand without delay. These tasks are not impossible to accomplish: similar problems have been tackled with quick success in other countries. In fact, there is no reason at all why Pakistan should not be able to end its malaise. The malady is well known; the cure is not obscure. All that needs to be done is to apply the right remedies with courage and determination: and we carnestly hope that this will now be done

The new team that now holds the reins of power cannot be unaware of the heavy burdens they shoulder. They have not only to clear up the accumulated mess of a decade's maladministration, devise realistic policies, and see that they are faithfully implemented, but in sharing power they also share responsibility for the restitution of democratic institutions in Pakistan, in accordance with the promises made on more than one occasion by the President and the Prime Minister. The people of Pakistan may judge them today primarily by the success of their administrative policies; but as the years pass, the regime will be judged by the present and future generations of Pakistanis, and by the rest of the world, by the success it achieves in giving this country a stable polity and a sound economy, both fashioned in conformity with the wishes of our people.

29 October 1958 Change at the Centre

The assumption of the office of President by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, following the decision that Major-General Iskander Mirza should step aside, is the logical culmination of the process of change that began three weeks ago with the promulgation of Martial Law and abrogation of the Constitution. This step completes the break with the past, and should enable the new regime to plan Pakistan's future polity without any inhibitions imposed by the personal predilections of a President who had been in the thick of the political battles of recent years. In actual fact, the outgoing President could not disayow a measure of responsibility for the unhappy state of affairs which paved the way for the collapse of the Constitution even before it could be fully enforced. Many people in Pakistan will, therefore, agree with the comment made recently by a British journal that, 'it is a common view in Pakistan-as, indeed, in some other countries-that most of the politicians deserve to be stoned: but it is hardly for General Mirza to cast the stones'.

Apart from reflections arising from past events, the end of the dyarchy will eliminate all chances of confusion in regard to the question of responsibility for the new regime's policies. The former President has said in his explanation for relinquishing the reins of office that his resignation was necessary in order to avoid any 'semblance of dual control', and to eliminate the impression that the President and the Prime Minister 'may not always act in unison'. However that may be, it was even more important to avoid the possibility of a duality of purpose. And, further, Genneral Iskander Mirza's departure will help to remove the impression that the present regime was the answer to the suggestion made from time to time by small groups of individuals that he should assume dictatorial powers.

The declarations and policy statements that General Mohammed Avub Khan has made as Chief Martial Law Administrator and Prime Minister will acquire a new significance with the removal of General Iskander Mirza from the centre of the stage. The hope will now be strengthened that the new regime will grapple more effectively with the tasks it has outlined for itself—in particular the job of bringing to book the corrupt and criminal elements. It may also be expected that efforts by those in the administration who have not been able to change their way of thinking to find scapegoats—and thus to divert attention from the real remedies for the ills with which the country is afflicted—will not be tolerated, and that the new Government will evolve a rational outlook towards the various questions it will be called upon to decide. Lastly, one hopes that the machinery devised for resurrecting representative institutions will be governed by the fundamental principles of democracy—and there will be no possibility of manoeuvres to create a certain office for a particular person.

^{27 March 1959} Political Purge yat Institute

The Public Offices (Disqualification) Order will be widely welcomed by the people as a step towards cleansing Pakistan's political life by disqualifying all persons who are proved guilty of corruption, jobbery, wilful maladministration, misuse of public funds, or any other abuse of official power or position. The new law virtually revives the Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act, which was enacted in 1949 but, unfortunately, was used only against persons who, while guilty like many others of misconduct, had offended the ruling clique by their factional manoeuvrings. And when PRODA was repealed five years later, the ruling party was again actuated by undesirable motives, in that it sought to save some of its supporters from the effect of proceedings under this law. The people will earnestly hope that none of the factors responsible for making PRODA a partisan weapon—which was wielded only against the opponents of the ruling group and was allowed to rust through disuse as long as the miscreants remained loyal to the men at the top—will be allowed to interfere with the process of justice.

The rules prescribed by the Government should ensure that, on the one hand, it will not be possible to employ the Public Offices Disgualification Order for victimisation of a citizen who has honest political differences with those in power, and that, on the other, no discrimination will be allowed by turning a blind eye towards the misdeeds of persons who (some of them out of sheer habit) are prepared to say that day is night and night is day if they feel that they can thereby please someone in authority. The Law Minister is aware of this danger, and of its harmful consequences. He has given the assurance that the vice of PRODA, namely, its 'vindictive' and 'selective' application, will not be repeated. If this safeguard can be made a definite guarantee, the law for the disqualification from public life of corrupt politicians will be supported by every citizen. In fact, earnest political workers will approve of the measure even more enthusiastically because it is meant to separate the black sheep from the rest of the flock. So much has been said against the politicians responsible for the mess in this country-and, certainly, not without cause—that there is some danger of our people equating the corrupt tribe of politicians with honest political workers who seek to serve the national interest and the revival of whose activity is necessary for the mobilisation of our people for properly grappling with various national tasks.

Further, the addition of a fine as punishment for persons convicted by a PODO Tribunal is unobjectionable. It has been laid down that where a person has been held guilty of misusing public funds or otherwise deriving direct benefit from his misconduct, he will be forced to make good all the money he has misappropriated or wrongfully acquired. The term 'Public Office' has not been defined vet; comment on this facet of the new law must, therefore, wait until a clarification is made available. It is difficult to understand why the new Order will not apply to a person 'for anything which was the subject of proceedings against him under PRODA' It will be recalled that when PRODA was repealed. certain cases were pending before the courts or were in the offing: and in certain other cases, the disqualifications imposed on certain politicians were removed by a special order of the then Governor-General. If the conduct of all who have held public office since 1947 is now going to be properly investigated, one sees no reason why those who escaped the net in 1954 should be exempted from action under the new Order, if the charges in each case are considered to be genui<mark>ne.</mark>

A great deal will, of course, depend on the rules framed by the Central Government for enforcement of the Order. The Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act was a worthwhile measure, and if it had been applied with scrupulous honesty and impartiality, corruption may not have spread its roots and branches as it has done. Improper use of the law destroyed some of its sanctity, and in certain cases those arraigned before a tribunal were tempted to wear a martyr's halo. It is of the greatest importance, therefore, that not only should justice be done but that the procedures evolved must leave no room for any doubt in the public mind about the prosecution's bona fides. We would also suggest that a special agency, manned by persons of unimpeachable integrity, should be set up for sifting the evidence laid before the Government with regard to a possible case against a citizen under the Public Offices (Disqualification) Order. This will, firstly, make for greater impartiality. It will also help to expedite the work of preparing and sifting the cases. Speedy accomplishment of this task is important for various reasons, but mainly because Pakistan's interests can best be served by the earliest possible return to normalcy in all fields. In fact, the Government should set the investigation agency a timelimit of three or four months for completing and filing all cases arising out of the past activities of certain politicians. This would allow the guilty men to be dealt with swiftly, and also prevent the creation of an atmosphere of uncertainty.

And, lastly, let us remember that such action against a politician held guilty of corrupt practices should not really be necessary, and in a sense it would appear to be merely a negative step. Of course, politicians convicted of any crime should be suitably punished; but the best political purge is that which is carried out by the people themselves. For example, in Great Britain today no politician suspected of being even mildly corrupt would dare face the people at the polls. This is not something uniquely British; the same state of affairs exists in many States and will soon be created in Pakistan, once elections can be held honestly and regularly. and the people are made to realise their political responsibilities. Clean and free elections are an essential part of the people's political education, and when our people are allowed to taste the fruit that has been promised to them for twelve years but has always been kept out of their reach on some pretext, they will grow and mature and be able to grasp the full significance of their political rights and discriminate carefully between those who deserve their votes and others who are not worthy of the people's trust. 11ayat IIISt

II. CONSTITUTIONAL OUTOOK

12 August 1947 Pakistan's Constituent Assembly

It is meet and proper that the first name to be signed in the Roll of Members of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, which is now at work at Karachi, was that of Mohammad Ali Jinnah—

a name which, more than any other, symbolises the Muslim struggle for national freedom. The inaugural session of this august body, which is vested with full sovereign powers in the name of the people of Pakistan, was short and businesslike. The first glimpse was given to the world of the shape of the future State in one aspect, by the unanimous election of a non-Muslim as its first Chairman. Mr Mandal's election may be a small thing in itself, but it indicates that as far as the Muslim people are concerned, they consider that the battle is over and they are eager to see that the smoke is allowed to subside. Mr Jinnah's farewell message to Hindustan, wishing it all peace and prosperity, as also his categorical promises to safeguard the rights and privileges of minorities in Pakistan, was of a piece with the same spirit of tolerance and good will. We fervently hope that this will engender similar feelings among the leaders of Hindustan. In the words of the Quaid-i-Azam, the past should be buried and the two sovereign States build up their future relations on the basis of justice and equity. We should have thought that the Constituent Assembly at Delhi would have had the courtesy to send its greetings and good wishes to its counterpart, meeting at Karachi. There is still time for the Congress to give up its wailing and lamentation at an artificial unity destroyed, because a much higher, greater and more lasting unity of the Indian sub-continent can be attained by the working of the two sovereign States. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan has before it days and weeks of hard toil, for not only has it to frame the Constitution of the new country, but it will simultaneously function as the highest legislative organ in the land until such time as the new Constitution comes into force. It is not possible at this stage to visualise in detail what the framework of our future Constitution will be, but we sincerely hope that the Constitution will be such that all real power is vested directly in the people and that our Constitution-makers will avoid the example of those assembled at Delhi who have accepted many ugly features of the 1935 Act in order to introduce various 'checks and reservations' to safeguard certain vested interests.

8 June 1949 Pakistan's Future Constitution

The President of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly is the first person in a position of authority to set a target date for the preparation of our new Constitution. During a press interview in London, Mr Tamizuddin Khan declared that the Pakistan Constituent Assembly was expected to reach the stage of considering the draft Constitution by about the end of 1950, and that the first election would be held a year after the completion of the Constitution. That some date, however far off, has at last been announced will be generally welcomed; but the fact that three and a half years after Pakistan's inception the Constituent Assembly will only have reached the stage of considering a draft, and that it may take many long months to finalise its work. is certain to evoke considerable criticism. No one can deny the importance of the task in hand and the necessity for ensuring that the foundations of this new structure are laid with due care: but it should also be realised that the rapidly deteriorating political situation in the country demands that genuine democracy be introduced as early as possible. It is quite obvious that unless the present gulf between the people of Pakistan and those who rule in their name is bridged, the confused political situation, which has brought chaos to more than one Pakistani Province, will endure and continue to sap the country's morale. The growth of a healthy political atmosphere is absolutely essential for our progress and development, but as long as the country remains bound by the Government of India Act of 1935, with its paraphernalia of Safety Acts and Ordinances, genuine political progress will always be throttled. The Constituent Assembly must hasten the progress of its work and we suggest that the question of franchise, on which there can be no difference of opinion, should be formally decided without further delay, so that the laborious task of preparing new voting lists, including every adult Pakistani man and woman, can be started at once without waiting for the Constitution to be finalised and proclaimed. It is also essential to give the maximum publicity to

the recommendations of the various Committees of the Constituent Assembly, so that their proposals can be tested and tempered on the anvil of public criticism. So far no one seems to have any but the vaguest ideas as to the form and shape of our future constitutional structure. There is general agreement in the country on the broad principles outlined from time to time by our national leadership as the basis of Pakistan's future Constitution. It can be said with confidence that hardly a single honest Pakistani will quarrel with Mr Tamizuddin Khan for his London declaration with regard to matters like adult franchise. full democracy, equality of rights and justice, and complete cultural and religious freedom for the minorities. The really important thing, however, is the interpretation of these laudable principles. The possibility of divergent views arises as soon as a universally accepted principle is given a practical form to govern the actual working of the Constitution. For instance, the principle of adult franchise, suggested by the West Punjab Franchise Committee, has been widely acclaimed, but their advocacy of the system of indirect elections has been condemned with almost equal unanimity as a retrograde measure, which would vitiate the effect of the broad franchise. It is also fairly certain that Mr Tamizuddin Khan's reported remark that the American Constitution was nearer the Islamic system of Government than the British will cause much heated argument among constitutional pundits. The Constituent Assembly must ensure that the democratic ideals to which the leaders of the nation stand pledged are not smothered by the system of checks and balances so favoured by the British in India: democracy in Pakistan must be pure and unfettered, for the people will not tolerate anything which hampers the free expression and exercise of their democratic will.

6 October 1950 Constitutional Outlook

The first glimpse of the future constitutional structure of Pakistan, provided by the recently-published

recommendations of the Constituent Assembly Committees on Basic Principles and Fundamental Rights, has belied all the fond hopes raised during the last three years by pretty official promises. Not only are the two reports a very poor effort technically, but, what is by far more serious, they have put forward a plan that offends against most of the universally-accepted principles of democratic polity. There is much of importance that the Committees have not touched. as for instance. Pakistan's status vis-a-vis the British Commonwealth and the question of popular representation for the States, while in what has been outlined the most objectionable features appear to be the virtual abolition of provincial autonomy, the creation of conditions for a dictatorship of the political party in control of the executive, and the absence of sufficient guarantees to safeguard the liberty of the citizen. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the people's reaction to the doings of the legislators has been sharp and, in the main, hostile, With one or two exceptions, the country's Press has voiced the bitter public disappointment at the two documents professedly produced after three years of unremitting toil and has called for a radical reshaping of the foundations on which the constitutional structure of a free and independent Pakistan is to be built. Further, with the exception of the official Muslim League, almost every political party and group in the country has severely criticised the proposals; and now dissenting voices are beginning to be heard even in the ranks of the ruling party despite the dictatorial discipline maintained by its bosses. The Khan of Mamdot has felt constrained to disobey the Party Whip and vote with the Opposition in the Pakistan Parliament, while five Muslim MLA's from East Bengal have issued a strongly-worded statement condemning the proposed 'unconstitutional Constitution' and demanding the resignation of their provincial representatives in the Constituent Assembly.

All this is sufficient to indicate that the self-congratulatory sentiments expressed by those responsible for preparing the

blueprint of Pakistan's new Constitution are not widely shared in the country. If the Muslim League leadership were possessed of higher democratic traditions, one would expect it to take some notice of the unusual unanimity with which the draft Constitution has been disapproved of by the people and their representatives. But we have seen in the past that those in power are becoming adept at turning a blind eve to everything that runs counter to their own whims and wishes. On more than one occasion the Prime Minister of Pakistan has expressed complete ignorance of any difference between his pronouncements and public opinion in the country, when it has been quite obvious that an unbridgeable gulf existed between official policies and national sentiment. Whatever the Central Government's attitude as far as other questions are concerned, at least in the matter of the country's future Constitution it should have discarded its practice of ignoring the voice of the people and paying heed only to the plaudits of its Party henchmen or the sycophants who crowd round every group in power. The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly show, however, that the Government, on the strength of its majority in a House whose representative character has been further diluted by nominations, is riding rough-shod over all efforts to improve on the extremely unsatisfactory drafts placed before the Constituent Assembly by its Committees. The despotic gentlemen seem to be unaware of the fact that a country's Constitution cannot be treated as an ordinary Bill, to be rushed through the House by the force of a legislative majority. The matter is not a sectional issue, and since it equally concerns every citizen of the State a sincere effort should be made to ensure that the final Constitution is such that it receives the willing allegiance and respect of the overwhelming majority of Pakistan's people. If a jerry-built structure, unsuitable for and unwanted by our people, is not to be foisted on the country, the Muslim League leadership at the Centre must change its present unhealthy outlook on the constitutional question and be prepared to accept outside opinion so that the final result of

the Constituent Assembly's prolonged labours is something that conforms to democratic ideals and to the wishes of Pakistan's freedom-loving people.

23 November 1950 Postponement

The Constituent Assembly's decision to defer further consideration of the Report on Basic Principles will be greeted with widespread public approval. Although this postponement inevitably means further delay in the promulgation of Pakistan's new Constitution, the people will willingly submit to the extension thus given to the Government of India Act of 1935 if they are assured that the constitutional blueprint now before the country can be improved sufficiently to give them a truly democratic form of government. The document produced by the Basic Principles Committee, after many long months of cogitation, was so utterly unsatisfactory, even as an interim report, that it evoked an unprecedented storm of protest from wide sections of our people. It is gratifying that the Muslim League leadership has chosen to bow before public opinion on this issue. While deference to popular demands should always be a first principle with every Government pledged to democracy, in the matter of writing Pakistan's future Constitution it is necessary for the Central Government to make special efforts to ensure that its actions are supported by the largest possible majority in the country. As Mr Liaquat Ali Khan himself implied, during his speech on the resolution recommending that discussion of the Report be postponed, the task of preparing the Constitution cannot be regarded as a party issue, since it vitally concerns the future of the entire nation. Further, the restricted franchise on which the present legislators were elected, the indirect method of this election, and the subsequent addition of nominated members, can legitimately create public misgivings about the representative character of the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, if these defects cannot be removed, it is

particularly essential that the Constitution-making body should take proper notice of what is said about its work by the people and the national Press.

The Report on Basic Principles has now been referred back to its authors by the Constituent Assembly, with the directive that they should reconsider their own recommendations and take into account any concrete and definite suggestions, made before the end of January next, that are in conformity with the Objectives Resolution. It is hoped that those who disagree with the proposals of the original Report will take full advantage of the opportunity thus given to suggest necessary changes and improvements. It should be remembered, however, that the final responsibility remains with the Basic Principles Committee, for it can, after a period of two-and-a-half months, send back its Report to the House without displacing a single comma. The share of public opinion in helping to remould the principles on which our Constitution is to be based will be determined entirely by the Members of this Committee. It is of the greatest importance, therefore, that these gentlemen should not imagine that the task allotted to them is a mere formality or no more than a tactical move on the Central Government's part to allow the bubble of popular dissatisfaction to subside before it rushes through the original Report. Even if no 'concrete and definite' proposals are submitted for their consideration, it will be their duty to reexamine the Report and redraft it in the light of the intense criticism that it has provoked. The main objections to the outline of the proposed Constitution are well known, and, although outside suggestions can be most useful, we have no doubt that the Committee is quite capable of making its revised proposals conform to the popular demand for greater democratisation and more effective safeguards against the danger of authoritarianism. It is obvious that unless the Basic Principles Committee approaches its task in this spirit, it is possible that—despite the best efforts of individuals or groups to put forward a better draft-the Constituent Assembly's

commendable decision to stop the passage of the original Report will have been a sheer waste of time.

15 April 1952 The Language Problem

The Constituent Assembly's recent resolve to refrain from taking an immediate decision on the language question and to deal with the matter when it comes up is professedly motivated by the desire to allow consideration of the issue in an atmosphere free from tension and acrimonious debate. There can be no doubt that an important question of this nature should not be decided upon hurriedly, nor should the decision be taken in consultation merely with emotion or sentiment—to the exclusion of reason and practical considerations—or on the basis of a majority vote. It should, however, also be realised that prolonged delay in arriving at a solution is fraught with many dangers. Therefore, it is essential that early steps should be taken by the Constituent Assembly to reach a decision on the language question, in consultation with public opinion in both wings of Pakistan, and that the slogan-mongering of recent weeks should yield place to calm consideration of the issues involved.

Until a few months ago it was more or less taken for granted that Urdu would be the only State language of Pakistan; but, judging from the storm of protest raised by Khwaja Nazimuddin's declaration to this effect during his last tour of East Bengal and the subsequent events in that Province, it is clear that most people in East Pakistan had never wholly reconciled themselves to this position and that they now want Bengali to be given equal status. In the keen, and sometimes bitter, controversy that has ensued, it seems to have been forgotten by those who dogmatically assert their particular viewpoint that the grant of a formal right to one language or the other cannot automatically lead to its acquiring the position of the country's *lingua franca*. A common language for the whole country is, indeed, desirable, but it can only emerge after a lengthy process of evolution, and any attempt to impose a particular language on a large section of the people would merely strengthen their resistance and thus defeat the very purpose that is sought to be achieved. In the heat of the country-wide debate that has followed the agitation in favour of giving Bengali the status of a State language, few have stopped to explain what exactly they regard to be the function of a State language, what steps should be taken to introduce the national language or languages where English now holds sway, and what place should be given to the various regional languages. It is necessary that all these questions should be thoroughly examined before an attempt is made to lay down a definite linguistic pattern for the country.

In West Pakistan, although the people of the different linguistic units would naturally like their local languages— spoken by the mass of the people—to be encouraged in every way, there is general agreement that Urdu should be adopted as the *lingua franca*. For historical and other reasons, it is already the most widely understood language in this part of the country, it has been nurtured and enriched by many generations of our best writers and poets, and it is already accepted as a secondary official language in the various Provinces and States of West Pakistan. Further, public sentiment is strongly in favour of adopting Urdu as the State language. In East Bengal, however, these conditions do not exist, and the geographical distance separating the two parts of our country inevitably adds to the difficulties. It is essential, therefore, to examine the demand of the East Bengal people with great sympathy and to study the precise implications of having two State languages before pronouncing final judgment on the question. So far no detailed and clear-cut proposal seems to have been put forward by anyone and much of the discussion on the question has been somewhat airy. However, if the people of East Pakistan are firmly resolved to gain recognition for Bengali as a State language, this right should not be opposed by the

people of West Pakistan. But, whatever the ultimate decision taken on this point, it is extremely important that concrete efforts should be made to rescue our national languages from the state of neglect in which they have been kept during the decades of foreign rule, so that our people are no longer hampered in their educational development by the barrier created by the domination of our national life by a foreign language. Once serious efforts are initiated to examine this question from the standpoint of practicability, there are good grounds for hoping that it will be possible to reach a just solution of the language problem that would be acceptable to all concerned.

11 January 1953 Basic Principles

The basic constitutional structure proposed by the BPC Report [appears] to be based on an unhappy admixture of divergent constitutional concepts which fails to provide a set-up suited to the peculiar conditions of Pakistan. While it is hoped that the authors of the Report will make an honest effort to recast their proposals in such a way that the demands of Pakistan's different units can be adjusted without leaving any cause for rancour and bitterness, thereby providing the opportunity for greater national unity and solidarity, it is necessary to examine other features of the constitutional proposals now before the country. Apart from the question of whether the State of Pakistan should be one administrative unit, or a proper federation, or that, in view of the geographical and other factors, a confederal pattern should be evolved between East and West Pakistan, the issue which has provoked the most interest is the BPC's effort to formulate a plan for what they would like the people of Pakistan to regard as an Islamic Constitution. In this regard, a number of constitutional innovations, existing in no country in the world, not even in States which are populated wholly by Muslims, have been suggested. The propaganda motif is throughout fairly obvious.

In the items included in the Directive Principles of State policy, no attempt has been made to define clearly the problems involved or suggest effective means for their solution, and some of the injunctions are so burdened with qualifying clauses that they can safely be ignored or deferred for an indefinite period. For instance, the directive that 'steps should be taken to eliminate *riba* as soon as it may be possible to do so' has little practical value. Similarly, the injunction that the State should endeavour to discourage amongst the Muslims of Pakistan parochial, tribal, racial and other similar un-Islamic feelings, etc.) amounts to the incorporation of an overworked cliche, which sounds particularly fatuous in view of the manner in which the BPC has dealt with the provincial question. And this clause may be interpreted by some to mean that there is no need to help the non-Muslim communities to acquire a feeling of being a part of the Pakistani nation. Further, the proposal that the Head of the State should be a Muslim would appear to be totally redundant in a country where the Muslims form about 90% of the population. It will merely create a feeling of inferiority among the non-Muslim nationals of Pakistan, giving them the impression that they are being treated as second-grade citizens. And, lastly, a profession of allegiance to the Holy Quran and Sunnah is repeatedly mentioned, even with regard to the exercise of clemency by the Governor-General, but the inclusion of these parenthetical clauses does nothing more than to provide a screen of Islamic phraseology without introducing the democracy and social justice which form the content of Islamic policy. It is of interest, however, that the Holy Quran and the Sunnah are not mentioned in relation to the 'suitable' provision of pay and allowances for the Head of the State and the Ministers. If their emoluments had been restricted in accordance with Islamic tradition, more people would have been convinced of the BPC's sincerity.

The BPC have also suggested a provision laying down that no legislature should enact any law which is repugnant to the Holy Quran and the *Sunnah*. This is not included among the Directive Principles; instead, a complicated procedure has been devised to implement this injunction. It is recommended that the Head of the State should appoint a Board consisting of persons 'well-versed in Islamic laws'; that if a Muslim Member raises an objection at any stage in the discussion of a Bill, the measure, when passed by the Legislature, will be sent along with the objection to the Head of the State, who will ask the Board for its opinion; and if the *ulema* are unanimously of the view that the objection is justified, the Bills will be sent back to the Legislature for reconsideration. A similar procedure is recommended for the Provinces. In the first place, it is extremely doubtful if any such machinery is at all necessary. With a large Muslim majority in every Legislature of Pakistan, it is inconceivable that any measure should knowingly be passed which is repugnant to the tenets of Islam. Nor can it be assumed that a Legislature would do so unwittingly, for even if none of its members are wellversed in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah, which is almost impossible, advice and criticism on this point would readily be available from outside. The method devised by the BPC is anyhow utterly unacceptable for a number of reasons. In the first place, the Boards will be nominated by the Head of the State or the various Heads of the Units, which in fact, means that the Cabinets will determine the personnel of these Boards and, being paid agents of the Government, it is more than likely that the *ulema's* advice will be tempered by their gratitude to those who have provided them with lucrative jobs. Further, the decisions of these Boards will become the subject matter of a theological controversy between different sects or those who uphold different interpretations of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. In case of any difference of opinion among the members of the Board, the matter has been left to the discretion of the Head of the State and, in any case, the final decision will still be taken by the legislature itself, except that, if it is acting against the opinion of the Board, the measure must be supported by a majority of its Muslim members. This procedure, apart from strengthening the feeling

among non-Muslim legislators that they have been denied equal rights, is highly undemocratic and is likely to lead to various undesirable complications. Even if the authors of the BPC Report are determined to pacify those among the *ulema* who have no influence with the people and are seeking political power and authority through the backdoor, a simpler procedure could have been devised to make such advice available to the legislature—without restricting its powers in any way or allowing one member to adopt dilatory tactics.

The widespread opposition to the proposal for Boards of *ulema* should not be ignored by the Constituent Assembly. As for alternative proposals on the same lines, the only concrete suggestion that has so far been made is that, instead of such Boards being appointed to advise the Head of the State or the Heads of Units, they should advise the Supreme Court and the High Courts and that any law which is considered to be repugnant to the Holy Quran or the Sunnah should be challenged in, and be adjudicated upon by, the courts—in consultation with the Board of *ulema*. While this alternative would certainly allow the legislatures to function smoothly, it creates even graver complications. Quite obviously, the courts cannot be asked to interpret a body of ethical precepts and moral injunctions without their having been properly codified; and the setting up of Boards of *ulema* with quasi-judicial authority would again lead to widespread controversy which must be avoided, particularly when it relates to the decisions of our highest courts. The only sane way of ensuring that the true spirit of Islam is fostered in this country is to establish a fully democratic State and leave it to the good sense of the representatives of the people to establish a society which conforms to Islamic ideals. Any attempt to create a class of clerics or law-givers who can defy or bypass the will of the people is undesirable from every point of view. That this was also the view of the Quaid-1-Azam is perfectly clear, and we would recommend that those who take pride in having been the Quaid-i-Azam's associates should read the statements and speeches made by him, soon after the establishment of Pakistan, on the future pattern of our State.

6 September 1954 Constitution-making

The Central Muslim League Assembly Party continues to tackle the important task of Constitution-making as if it were an issue which concerns the Party but has little or no significance for the people. In defiance of all canons of democracy, the Muslim League has retained its complete control over the Constituent Assembly by the simple expedient of refusing to hold new elections, while byelections have been gerrymandered and not unoften seats have been filled through nominations. As a result, it is generally accepted that whatever democratic sanction could once rightly have been claimed by this body, elected eight years ago on a limited franchise, has by now been completely vitiated; and that, today, the gentlemen who insist on functioning as the sole custodians of Pakistan's national sovereignty represent no one but themselves. It cannot be gainsaid that in a direct and free election, the vast majority of our MCAs would suffer the fate of those of their colleagues who faced the electorate in the East Bengal election. It is interesting that, although for reasons not unconnected with factional manoeuvring, the unrepresentative character of the Muslim League MCAs from East Bengal has at last been recognised by the spokesmen of the Muslim League in West Pakistan, and Mr Nurul Amin and his group are being told in clear, and often rude, terms that they have no right whatsoever to speak on behalf of East Bengal, and even that they should not meddle with West Pakistan's affairs.

Apart from the undeniable fact of the Constituent Assembly's undemocratic character—which cannot be explained away by legal quibbling about the vaguely-worded Indian Independence Act of the British Parliament—the manner in which the Constitution is being framed is equally reprehensible. It seems fairly obvious that in devising constitutional formulae, the party and its various groups are far more interested in ensuring their own political viability than in giving the country a constitutional structure suited to its needs and capable of safeguarding its progress towards genuine democracy. As a result, after more than seven years of toil we are still not within reach of the goal; not only this, but the path to be followed by the people has been obscured by the dust of confusion raised by the chronic intra-party struggle for power, and no one knows when the prolonged stalemate will end or in which direction we will be led by the crisis-stricken and divided ruling party. The darkness is intensified by the fact that, having assumed a monopoly of the right to frame the country's Constitution, the functions of the Constituent Assembly have virtually been usurped by the Muslim League Assembly Party. All vital discussions take place in the party meetings, and the issues are placed before the Assembly only when some sort of a compromise has been reached among the warring factions. With constitutional compromises being hatched in secrecy, rumours and inspired leaks' are about the only source of information left to the people. It is not surprising, therefore, that public interest in the country's new Constitution is on the wane: and, whether or not the apathy and frustration created by the Muslim League's resort to undemocratic stratagems, and by its tardiness and bungling, are the result of a deliberate policy, the situation is certainly fraught with grave danger to the country's future.

country's future. In the latest of its many crises, the Muslim League has apparently rejected the proposal for merging the provinces of West Pakistan into one unit. Following the failure of this move, it is reported that a scheme for a zonal federation of some sort has been put forward by certain West Pakistan MCAs. No further information is yet available, and it is always difficult to make a forecast about the schemes which emerge from the fertile brains of our Muslim League leaders. But if the new proposal conforms to the constitutional arrangements first suggested in these columns more than two years ago-and often described as the confederal plan-it would seem that some at least among the Muslim League MCAs are veering round towards a saner view of Pakistan's constitutional problems. Be that as it may, there is no guarantee at all that the present Constituent Assembly is capable of evolving a sensible constitutional pattern for the country, and there are good reasons to fear that, despite the League leaders' solemn pledges, many more years will be lost before a new Constitution is drafted and promulgated. We would, therefore, reiterate our belief that the best, and even the quickest, way of ensuring that Pakistan can replace the Government of India Act of 1935 with a truly democratic Constitution lies in dissolving the present Constituent Assembly and entrusting the task to a representative body elected directly by the people.

15 October 1954 Constitutional Crisis

Following recent political developments and the strange antics of certain Muslim League leaders, particularly the manner in which certain important Bills were rushed through the Constituent Assembly, the demand for this body's dissolution has gained new adherents. While East Bengal's attitude was never in doubt, the realisation is growing in other provinces, specially in the Punjab, that the vast majority of our MCAs have no right to speak or act on behalf of the people. Even from within the Muslim League, voices of protest are being heard in condemnation of the constitutional farce being enacted by the ruling party's dominant faction. Although the belated awakening of many of these Muslim League gentlemen and their supporters may largely be due to factional causes, this fact does not detract anything from the justice of the demand itself or make less significant the move among a large section of Punjabi Muslim Leaguers for effective steps to resist the imposition of the new Constitution. The Punjab Chief Minister, in his first press conference since the development of the latest constitutional crisis, spoke on the subject with considerable caution. He refused to lend his support to the demand for dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, rightly pointed out that re-election of MCAs by the present Provincial Assemblies would hardly make any difference as far as the Punjab was concerned, and, in the name of the Muslim League's solidarity, rejected the suggestion for an understanding with the East Bengal United Front. Mr Firoz Khan Noon seems to hope that it will be possible to amend the Draft Constitution in a manner that would safeguard the rights of West Pakistan's provinces, and feels that he may still be able to get the Constituent Assembly to accept the zonal scheme—which, as we have often pointed out, offers the only rational solution to Pakistan's constitutional problems. However, it is difficult to find cogent reasons in support of Mr Noon's optimism: nor is his opinion likely to be endorsed by the other Punjab Muslim League MC As.

The attitude of the Punjab Muslim League will probably be defined at the pre-Convention meeting summoned by Mr Noon. If these gentlemen can take a united stand and persuade the Muslim League MCAs representing this Province to accept a mandate, and also to attend all important Constituent Assembly meetings, they could create an impasse that would compel the ruling group to change its plans. However, such a development appears doubtful, not only because of the likely operation of other pulls and pressures, but also because these gentlemen have no definite objective and no clear plans. While the actions of the Punjab Muslim League leaders will be watched with some interest—but with little hope of useful results-the growing realisation that the present Constituent Assembly has completely forfeited its representative status, and that the hotch-potch it has produced cannot serve as a Constitution, will strengthen the demand for its early disbandment and for the election of a new body by the people. Not considering those who think they are safely installed in

the seats of power, the only group which accepts the present Draft Constitution is that represented by the Jamaat-i-Islami, whose spokesmen refuse to discuss the real issues involved and have taken the inane stand that opposition to the strange, illogical formulae devised by our squabbling Constitutionmakers is somehow a disservice to Islam. But apart from these coiners of shibboleths, public opinion has not been misled by the promise of General Elections into blindly accepting any Constitution that is produced by the discredited leaders assembled at Karachi. It is being increasingly realised that a country's Constitution must enjoy the support and respect of the mass of its people, and also that, in Pakistan's circumstances, it will be possible to attain such a Constitution only when the present Constituent Assembly has been disbanded and the people are allowed to freely elect a body of men who will, with all possible speed, perform this task in accordance with the people's wishes and the country's needs.

The New Assembly: Its Structure

While the impending revival of parliamentary government at the Centre provides cause for deep gratification, it is necessary to examine closely the structure of the new Constituent Assembly and appraise its representative capacity. How good are the credentials of the eighty_gentlemen who will exercise political power in the name of the people? Can they claim with honest confidence that they possess an unblemished right to act and speak on behalf of the nation? This claim is, in the first instance, vitiated by the fact that the Assembly has not been elected directly by the people. Eight of its members will either be co-opted by the Assembly itself, and will thus be nominees of the majority group, or they will be selected by limited electoral colleges to be set up for this purpose. In either case, they can hardly be characterised as the properly authorised representatives of the people of the areas concerned. The rest of the Assembly's membership, with two exceptions, comprises persons elected by the four Provincial Assemblies. The fact that the old Constituent Assembly was indirectly elected provides no argument whatsoever for re-employing this unsatisfactory procedure eight years after the advent of freedom. Apart from other basic objections to this method, it is obvious that in 1946 when India's two major political parties, advocating clear-cut policies on the main issues involved, were riding on the crest of their respective national movements—a direct election would have made hardly any difference in the electoral verdict. In today's Pakistan the situation is completely different and, therefore, totally unsuited to indirect elections. The state of flux that exists in this country, the confusion created by fast-changing factional alliances, the doubtful manner in which most elections have been conducted, the facility with which the leaders of the ruling party switch over from one policy to another, make it imperatively necessary that those who are going to frame the fundamental law of the land should be elected by, and be responsible directly to, the people.

Even those who are either inherently allergic to facing the common people, or who believe for some other reason that there is no great disadvantage in electing the Constituent Assembly through the method of indirect elections, must realise that the circumstances prevailing in Pakistan rule out the acceptance of the recent elections as a true expression of the people's will. With the solitary exception of East Bengal, the Legislatures of all the other Provinces were elected long years ago and were not given a mandate of any sort on the constitutional issues before the country. Even in Bengal, the political situation may well have undergone some change since the Provincial Assembly was elected early last year; and it is relevant to recall that this body was kept in a state of suspended animation until a few days ago. But the position in regard to the Provincial legislatures in West Pakistan is utterly fantastic. The Punjab Assembly, for example, was elected four-and-a-half years ago, and even in the matter of guiding

the affairs of this Province its term is about to end; the position of the Sind and NWFP Assemblies is not far different. It is also well known that the manner in which the elections to these bodies were conducted completely demolishes the claim that they represent, or ever represented, the people of their respective areas. The NWFP Assembly provides a classic example of the electoral process being perverted to save the ruling party from the people's wrath; the election was held under conditions of ruthless terror, official pressure was freely used, bogus votes were polled by the thousand, opposing candidates and their supporters were arrested and harassed, and every other conceivable trick was employed to deprive the people of their right to be represented by persons of their own choice. While the NWFP election under its Muslim League Ministry remains in a class by itself. the representatives of the ruling party in the Punjab and Sind did not lag far behind in their efforts to get their official candidates returned at all costs. Quite obviously, the nominees of these legislatures can be accepted as proper representatives of the people only by shutting one's eyes to all accepted democratic principles and traditions.

This, however, is not all. The events that preceded the recent elections to the Constituent Assembly make the representative status of the new MCAs even more uncertain. In Sind, the Pirzada Ministry, installed not long ago with the Centre's aid and abetment, was suddenly dismissed to pave the way for Mr Khuhro's return to power, presumably because this hardy League leader had promised to co-operate fully in implementing the Central Government's constitutional plans. The dismissal of the Noon Ministry in the Punjab was a direct result of the factional squabble over the list of official Party candidates for the Constituent Assembly elections. Further, we witnessed the strange spectacle of two Provincial Governors sacrificing the dignity and impartiality of gubernatorial office and defying the healthy ban on public servants' participation in active politics in order to contest the elections as Muslim League candidates. These

manoeuvres were not, however, considered sufficient to make the Provincial legislatures safe pocket boroughs for the dominant group of Muslim League leaders. Therefore, in Sind a vicious reign of terror is said to have been inaugurated in order to frighten the MLAs into subservience: conspiracies and plots were discovered, and a number of prominent politicians were arrested. Although the actual polling of votes was probably conducted without any duress-and in the Punjab this was allowed to happen only after a High Court order to this effect—it is no great secret that in most Provinces the administrative machinery was mobilised to persuade the MLAs to vote for the official list of Muslim League candidates. District officers are said to have rounded up MLAs, particularly those whose lovalty was considered doubtful, and sent them to the polling stations under police observation. In violation of the mandatory provision for a secret ballot, some Muslim League MLAs are reported to have been instructed to show their ballot papers to the Returning Officer: and it is also said that in at least one Province the League bosses were able to examine the contents of the ballot-box after the poll in order to draw up an accurate black-list of the secret rebels. It has also been alleged that in certain places threats of dire consequences were held out to those suspected of harbouring intentions of defying the Party mandate. In the absence of any provision for election petitions, the accuracy of these and other allegations cannot be determined judicially. But the known facts are sufficient to confirm the view that the Constituent Assembly elections were not free from official pressure. Can it be said in these circumstances that the Constituent Assembly's structure is based on the sure foundation of popular support, that its membership is truly representative of the people, and that, therefore, its title to the supreme power of shaping Pakistan's future polity cannot be disputed? The answer clearly being in the negative, the people have a right to demand that the new Constituent Assembly should not be allowed to inflate its responsibilities or exaggerate its authority, but that it should

confine itself to the main task with which it can claim to have been entrusted by the people, namely, the restoration of genuine democracy.

2 July 1955 The New Assembly: Its Tasks

An unbiased analysis of the new Constituent Assembly's background and structure, and of the developments that are maturing in tense behind-the-scenes negotiations, leads inevitably to the conclusion that this body can help to end Pakistan's long night of travail only if it unreservedly accepts the truth that its authority is limited by the circumstances governing its emergence, and that its main tasks are to restore the rule of law, to create conditions that would make impossible a revival of the dangers through which the country has recently passed, and to ensure that Pakistan's nascent democracy is allowed to grow to its full stature. Far too often in the past, far too many of our leaders have worshipped at the shrine of democracy as long as they have been blessed with the desired favour of power, but, like all impatient and greedy supplicants, they have, at the first sign of a threat to their positions of privilege, transferred their devotions, in unashamed apostasy, to the temple of authoritarianism. If this country is to progress and prosper, if its people are to flower into mature nationhood and attain the high destiny which inspired the dream of a separate homeland, Pakistan must resolutely and undeviatingly pursue the path of democracy-however great the besetting difficulties, and howsoever it may affect the political fortunes of the individuals and groups in power who seem to harbour the insane illusion that they have been ordained to rule or misrule the country in perpetuity. It is no secret that a dominant section of the Central Government have, in accepting the Constituent Assembly's resuscitation, merely made a virtue of necessity; and it is well known that the concessions made to democracy were wrung, bit by bit, from most unwilling

hands. Even today, the prime interest of most Government leaders seems to be to ensure the safety of their seats of power, and to this end they are engaged in cementing personal or group alliances, in factional intrigues and unprincipled manoeuvres. It is, presumably, a facet of the safety-first policy that the Constituent Assembly is not being allowed for the present to meet as the Federal Legislature and, as far as its Constitution-making duties are concerned, it seems to be the Government's intention to present a pre-fabricated Constitution at the opportune time and ask the Assembly to endorse it immediately, without giving the people an opportunity to study or criticise the constitutional plan which has been prepared in mysterious secrecy.

The likely course of future events is as yet uncertain, for it is not known how the bigger parties and groups will align themselves in the new Assembly. In West Pakistan, the main Muslim League factions seem determined to hang togetherfor the usual reason—but there is not the slightest guarantee that the coalition of factions that was formed at the time of the Constituent Assembly elections will remain intact and withstand the strain of the distribution of the loaves and fishes. of office either at the Centre or in the Government of West Pakistan if the present plan for its integration is accepted by the Assembly. In fact, the Muslim League's unending intraparty tussle for power, which is responsible for creating much of the mire in which Pakistan has been bogged down, is likely to be intensified and, unless effective means can be devised to check the more harmful activities of these heroes. they may once again muddy the waters-over which we must chart a wary course—and thus endanger the safety of the journey on which we are about to embark. As far as East Bengal is concerned, it would appear that both the United Front and the Awami League are eager and willing to become the chief partner in the coalition that is likely to emerge at the Centre. The Central Government seems to be divided on the question of choosing its allies, and certain members of the Cabinet are palpably pulling in different directions. The

outcome of this particular tug-of-war will probably have a decisive influence on the future shape of things. Further, as distinct from the disgruntled elements who may temporarily espouse democratic causes, a sizeable Opposition group is likely to be formed in the new Assembly: this raises the hope that the rational point of view on Pakistan's constitutional problems will be advocated forcefully and that a strong effort will be made to ensure that the new Constituent Assembly does not, like its predecessor, become a tool in the hands of the ruling party's factions.

In a few more days, the picture presented by the new phase in Pakistan's brief and stormy history will be brought into better focus, and the people will be able to judge for themselves the worth of the changes that are introduced and the merits of any new policies that are formulated. We earnestly believe that, however generous the promise of changes in approach and policies, the coalition which comes out on top at the Centre must be persuaded to take a realistic view of the situation confronting the country and to recognise the political and moral limitations which bar the Constituent Assembly from taking final decisions on the shape of Pakistan's future polity. The Constituent Assembly must be asked to accept the logic of these limitations and allow it to govern its programme of work. Apart from validating all the laws that have been declared invalid by the Courts, including those that do not figure on the Governor-General's list, the Assembly's chief duty will be to function as the country's interim Parliament. In the field of Constitution-making it should give the people a democratic electoral law-based, preferably, on the principle of proportional representationand order new General Elections to be held within the next six months. It would in this way ensure that the country's Constitution will not be delayed beyond a few months and, what is of prime importance, that it will be framed by a fully representative body, deriving its authority directly from the people. Such a Constitution alone can be accepted by them with the willing respect that should be regarded as an essential

attribute of a country's fundamental law. In its quest for a new Constitution. Pakistan has taken many a hasty and false step, and in retracing each such move more delay and confusion have resulted. The process of alternately moving forwards and backwards without any clear sense of direction and without making any progress, as if under the orders of a demented drill-master, must be ended. The nation's representatives must now plan carefully and begin the march forward to the goal when they are certain that an overwhelming majority of the people approve of the objective and the route chosen. Only thus will it be possible to ensure that the long-delayed morn of Pakistan's freedom is no longer thwarted; that the dark, over-hanging clouds are swept away and the country is freed from the shadow of fear; and that the people of Pakistan can strike off their shackles—both old and new—and play their part in building up a strong, prosperous and democratic State

11 January 1956 Constitutional Compromise

While detailed comment on the Constitution Bill must await thorough study of the document, it is now possible to examine its salient points and appraise the main political trends that it embodies. The constitutional formula before the country clearly represents a compromise between the advocates of a unitary form of government and those who demand unabridged autonomy for the federating units-with the scales weighted in favour of the former school of thought. A novel feature of the constitutional compromise is that the parties directly concerned do not seem to have accepted it without reservation as the best possible arrangement. Apart from the fact that the important question of joint or communal electorates has had to be left undecided, rumblings of discontent with regard to certain other issues can be heard above the chorus of sycophantic praise with which certain politicians greet every major pronouncement of official

policy. The possibility exists that the patchwork evolved after prolonged bargaining may not succeed in holding together the component groups of the Coalition Party. We would like to hope that necessary adjustments will be made in the present attitudes of the group leaders to avoid yet another in the series of major deadlocks with which the history of Constitution-making in Pakistan is littered, for a new crisis may once again bring the country face to face with the threat of the enthronment of authoritarianism. Largely because of the presence of this danger, the dominant public reaction to this long-delayed task having reached the stage of the preparation of a Draft Constitution will be one of relief. During the long years of factional wrangling over Pakistan's future constitutional structure, it had become obvious that, apart from the difficulties that inhere in the task, the group in power at the Centre had consciously used the absence of an agreed constitutional formula as an excuse for clinging to office without new General Elections. Therefore, whatever one might think of the constitutional pattern now evolved, and even if one differs with its basic provisions, the fact that the new Constitution will be followed by General Elections provides cause for satisfaction. This satisfaction has, however, been vitiated by the provision that amendments to the Constitution must secure the support of a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly. In normal conditions, such a provision might not have been contested, but considering Pakistan's circumstances, and the incontrovertible fact that the present Constituent Assembly is by no means representative of the people, it is absolutely necessary that, at least for the first five years, the Constitution should be amendable by a simple majority of the Assembly or, as a compromise between flexibility and rigidity, a majority of the Assembly's total membership, with the added safeguard of a longer period for giving notice of constitutional amendments. To retain the present proposal is to give the proposed Constitution a sanctity to which it is not entitled. And to fetter the future National Assembly—which will be

the country's first democratic parliament—in the matter of changing the Constitution is both unjust and undemocratic.

With regard to the main constitutional proposals, it can be said with certainty that, in many respects, they represent a definite improvement on the two BPC Reports which different Muslim League Ministries had sought to inflict on the country, and on the Government of India Act of 1935, whose basic pattern has been retained in the Draft. In the context of Pakistan's conditions, one of its most important points is that the cry for a restricted franchise-raised in maddening frustration or deliberate mischief—has been ignored and the basis provided for the country's governance in accordance with the principles of democracy. All the shackles enshrined in the Constitution of British India or devised by Muslim League stalwarts have not been removed, but their burden has been lightened and certain safeguards have been introducted to protect the ultimate authority of the Legislature. Among other things, the fantastic scheme to allow ad hoc Boards of *Ulema* or the judiciary to exercise a virtual veto over all legislation has been replaced by a more reasonable procedure for making the country's laws conform to Islamic injunctions-without whittling down the powers of the Legislature. It seems logical to suggest that the work of the Commission to be appointed for this purpose should not be confined to narrow channels but that it should be guided by a sound grasp of the broad Islamic principles-of-social justice and human equality. While the emergency powers available to the Central Government have been restricted, the fear, born of past experience, that these provisions may be used to serve partisan political ends needs to be allayed by a clearer definition of the conditions under which they can be invoked. Similarly, the President's right to dissolve the National Assembly or dismiss the Ministry goes far beyond the power usually accorded to the Head of the State under the parliamentary system of government. Although a time-limit has been set on direct Presidential rule, in consonance with the concept of the sovereignty of parliament the President's

powers should not be so wide. Further, the Fundamental Rights laid down lose a great deal of their value by the retention of laws which sanction preventive detention and give the Executive almost unabridged authority to ban public meetings or close down newspapers. Unless the host of Safety Laws now in force are repealed or radically changed, this part of the Constitution is likely to remain a dead letter. And the effect of the various provisions underlining the equality of all citizens is reduced considerably by the discriminatory rule that the President and the Vice-President must be Muslims. While this disqualification is unnecessary and has no practical significance, it does provide cause for a genuine grievance to Pakistan's non-Muslim minorities. In the matter of division of powers between the Federal Government and the Provinces, it would appear that the Centre will remain in a dominant position and, particularly through its control of the country's economy, be able to direct the policies of the Provinces. It appears necessary that greater fiscal autonomy should be accorded to the Provinces. However, in this and in other allied fields the guiding principle is that of convenience and workability. Only experience can show whether the present formula will work to the satisfaction of the Provinces and the Centre.

It is hoped that the points we have raised here, and others which require clarification or emendation of the Draft, will be tackled in the Constituent Assembly in a manner that will help to make Pakistan's future Constitution more rational and democratic. It needs to be realised, however, that the country's future development does not depend entirely on what is written into the Constitution or left out. Large parts of it, as, for example, the Directive Principles, have little more than academic value. What, however, is of the greatest importance is that the Constitution should not hinder or obstruct the will of the people. Being an instrument in the hands of those elected to power, it must be a pliable instrument and one which cannot be perverted for undemocratic purposes. The Constitution must be a faithful and incorruptible servant of the people's rights. It might be destroyed in the process, but those who attack the sanctum of democracy should not be assisted by any weak parts of the Constitution. Pakistan's new Constitution must, therefore, ensure that the people's right to rule themselves, and to determine the country's future polity, is not restricted in any way. To satisfy this essential prerequisite to Pakistan's emergence as a democratic State, it is necessary that an irrevocable date for the first General Election, within a reasonable period of the Constitution's promulgation, be laid down: that the provision regarding constitutional amendments is changed in order to allow the democratically elected National Assembly to make whatever revisions it considers necessary; that the President's powers in relation to the Legislature are clearly defined and there is no doubt left that the elected Legislature is the repository of political power; and that proper provision is made to ensure that elections will not be gerrymandered or otherwise perverted.

4 March 1959 Future Constitution

Since the abrogation of Pakistan's Constitution, which was proclaimed nearly three years ago but had not been fully enforced when it was abandoned, the new regime's leaders have repeatedly pledged themselves, in general terms, to the restoration of a democratic form of government. These declarations are most welcome, but there has been no clear indication so far regarding the pattern of our future Constitution or the process of Constitution-making. Now, the Foreign Minister, who is also one of Pakistan's most eminent lawyers, has referred to constitutional matters in somewhat greater detail: and since he has also invited the people to think seriously about the method of choosing public representatives and the delimitation of constituencies, it is pertinent to initiate a discussion on some of the issues raised by him.

On the important question of its timing, Mr Manzur Qadir said that 'the framing of the Constitution will not be delayed a moment later than the most opportune moment' but... not before completion of 'the process of the re-education of the people and putting the country on an even keel', and further that it would be wrong 'to hurry through the framing of the Constitution and create a situation which had existed in Pakistan before 7 October'. While it is necessary to move with caution, it will generally be admitted that the unhappy situation with which Pakistan was afflicted before 7 October was not due to hasty implementation of the Constitution; on the contrary, it was a result of the prolonged, deliberate delay that marked the process of Constitution-making, and the fact that its enforcement was held up without proper cause for more than two years. In fact, if full democracy had been established in Pakistan soon after its emergence as a sovereign State, its people would in all probability have been spared the misery and bitterness which has been their lot for a whole decade. When twelve years have already passed since the country's independence without a new Constitution. the opportune moment' cannot be conceived in terms of the distant future; it must be made to materialise as soon as practicable. It is, thus, necessary that the preparation should be started now, because only if plans are taken in hand right away will Pakistan be able to give itself a Constitution within a reasonable period.

The Foreign Minister has stressed the need of reeducating the people and of ensuring that past events, marked by the blind pursuit of personal benefit, are not allowed to recur. There can be no disagreement with this aim. However, Mr Manzur Qadir is as well aware as anyone else of the fact that the people cannot be held responsible for the perversion of democracy in Pakistan, for the simple reason that they have never been allowed to exercise their democratic rights. The last General Election took place in 1946 on a restricted franchise, and a part of the Indian Constituent Assembly, which was indirectly elected, became Pakistan's Parliament

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and Constitution-making body. This body was vested with sovereign authority until it was arbitrarily disbanded in 1954; after a prolonged battle in the courts, it was replaced by another body again elected indirectly by the Provincial Legislatures and other even less representative electoral colleges. It is true that new Provincial Legislatures were elected, but these elections were in most places marred by official interference, gerrymandering and corruption. With the Centre's connivance, Provincial strong-men resorted to every dirty trick they could think of in order to manipulate the vote, and more often than not they were successful.

In these circumstances, it is unfair and incorrect to imply that democracy has failed in Pakistan; the fact is that it has never been properly tried. It is equally unfair to suggest that our people are not equipped to choose their rulers wisely, because they have never been allowed to do so. Mr Manzur Qadir's statement that 'some dependable persons will be selected by nomination to devise the process of representation' is likely to cause misgivings, and it runs counter to earlier declarations by those in authority that the Constitution would be framed in accordance with the wishes of the people. His explanation that 'selection of persons' by 'nomination' was better than election if that selection was honest is most surprising, particularly when it comes from a person with his legal training and background. Of course, it is true that merit can be recognised through nomination, but surely not political merit. In the selection of persons who are to speak in the name of the people, even more important than expert knowledge is their ability to understand the people's problems and to represent their demands and aspirations. And, while the system of elections is inherently capable of rectifying its mistakes, once the principle of nomination is accepted in the field of politics, it can lead to wrongs that are irremediable.

In view of these and other factors, we would earnestly suggest that the Government should decide and announce that democracy will be introduced as soon as possible, and that it will not be fettered. For example, it should reject the suggestion that the franchise for Pakistan's future Legislatures should be

restricted. However well-intentioned such advice may be, it is wholly unrealistic. Whether the limitation is based on literacy or some property qualifications, past experience tells us that it does not provide an answer to any of our problems. In the first place, dishonesty and illiteracy are not synonymous; in fact, if given the proper opportunity, namely, a fair election, the people would probably elect a Legislature that would be richer in intelligence and integrity than those that were foisted on the country during the last decade. Who was responsible for the mess in Pakistan? Men with property, men with a smattering of education, politicians, officials, businessmen and landlords share the guilt in varying measure, but the people likely to be disfranchised under any such plan-the poor peasant, the land-labourer, the labourer—are completely blameless; and they hope that the present regime will give them all the privileges to which the citizen of a free State is entitled—not take away from them what rights they were allowed even in the past.

If the stipulation regarding clean elections can be satisfied—and in today's circumstances it can be—Pakistan's future Constitution should—without any qualms—be based on direct elections and adult franchise, and the body created to draw up and ratify Pakistan's new Constitution should also be created on this basis. It is possible, of course, that in some places people will make the mistake of choosing persons unworthy of their trust, but this risk has to be taken in every democratic State, and the risk is worth taking because the alternatives to democratic rule and democratic progress conjure up far more frightening prospects.

III. ONE-UNIT PLAN

24 November 1954 West Pakistan's Integration

In his recent broadcast, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has formally placed before the country the Central Government's decision to weld the Provinces and States of West Pakistan into a single administrative unit. The need for a drastic change in the present set-up, which is illogical, cumbersome, and wasteful, has long been realised. Although the Muslim League leadership had sought to perpetuate the existing arrangement. it was widely felt that West Pakistan's integration in some form or other was a prerequisite to a rational solution of our constitutional problem. To achieve this end, two serious proposals have been put forward: the confederal or zonal plan and the One-Unit scheme. The former, which has been supported in these columns since it was first adumbrated about three years ago, envisages the abolition of all feudal principalities and the emergence of a zonal federation in West Pakistan with three or four provincial units. This plan would have brought about complete unification in all those matters of common interest which could best be administered by a zonal government, leaving to the Provinces subjects which are primarily of local interest or require separate treatment due to linguistic differences or other regional peculiarities. It would also have dispelled the fear of domination by a Province like the Punjab and minimised the risk of the country's progress being thwarted by inter-provincial bickerings and jealousies. Conforming more closely to the demands of geographic and social factors, it would have achieved a larger measure of willing unity in West Pakistan. The confederal or zonal plan, it will be recalled, had already gained considerable popular support; and even advocates of the one-unit idea had come to accept it as a necessary first step towards their goal. It can be said with certainty, therefore, that this scheme would have been endorsed by the representatives of all sections of our people.

The Central Government have, however, now decided to go ahead with the One-Unit plan. One immediate and substantial gain that this plan will bring the country is the abolition of all Princely States; and whatever other differences people may have with certain policies of the Central Government, every true democrat will whole-heartedly welcome this happy development. With regard to other

relevant matters, although Mr Mohammad Ali has promised that the rights and interests of the smaller units will be safeguarded and that the whole zone will be given a more efficient administration, no opinion can be formed on the practicability of Government's proposal until its details are made known. A committee of administrative experts is now said to be drawing up the blueprints for West Pakistan's new constitutional arrangement. The detailed plan should be made public as soon as possible, so that the various issues involved can be discussed frankly and thoroughly. It needs to be stressed that if the constitutional pattern now being devised is to be accepted as a permanent solution to Pakistan's prolonged constitutional crisis, and if it is to obtain the respect and support that a country's Constitution should receive, it must be evolved with full democratic sanction. In today's circumstances, it is possible- and, perhaps, easier-to foist a decision on the country without submitting it to the people for their approval. This would, we feel, be a short-sighted policy and one that may create unnecessary complications. We would, therefore, strongly appeal to the Central Government to act in the spirit of the Governor-General's Proclamation and hold free and fair elections without any delay, so that any new constitutional plan can be implemented with the consent of the people's representatives.

31 August 1955 One-Unit Plan

While examination of the One-Unit Bill, which is now on the anvil. can be deferred until its main provisions have been finalized, it is necessary to review the more salient features of its background. The history of Constitution-making in Pakistan makes unhappy reading, due largely to the Muslim League leadership's congenital inability to take a greater interest in the responsibilities of office than in its benefits. Almost from the very beginning this essential task has been subordinated to partisan motivations. The BPC Reports and the ingenious formulae devised from time to time have all borne the unmistakable stamp of political manoeuvring, and in no way represented a genuine effort to evolve a rational constitutional plan that would conform to the demands of various factors that should determine Pakistan's future polity. A major hurdle was presented by the fact that one Province of Pakistan, with more than half the country's total population, is separated from the rest of the country by over a thousand miles of alien territory. This unchangeable factor clearly ruled out a unitary form of government; it also demanded that the federal structure should leave a vast field for the Provinces' autonomous functioning. At first our Constitution-makers proposed a federal type of government with a strong Centre: but, for sound and valid reasons, East Bengal refused to accept it. The scheme was, therefore, amended drastically to reduce the weightage given to the smaller (West Pakistan) units. This proposal shifted the centre of power to the eastern wing and would have allowed one Province, separated from the others, to dominate the rest of the country. It was, with equal justification, rejected by the representatives of the western zone. Later still, a compromise of some sort was devised and was reluctantly accepted by the Muslim League leadership—in order to maintain some semblance of party unity after the debacle in East Bengalbut this plan, conforming to no clear-cut pattern, bristled with contradictions and promised to lead the country to constitutional chaos.

As time passed, it came to be generally accepted that a sensible constitutional plan for Pakistan must envisage the grant of the widest possible regional autonomy, so that East Bengal could be allowed to govern itself in all matters in which its problems were different from those of the other Provinces or essentially regional in character. It was also realised that such wide autonomy could not possibly be given to all the units of West Pakistan. Apart from the fact that the Princely States in this zone had no real basis for a separate existence, the Provinces of West Pakistan are bound together by a number of important links, such as an accepted indigenous *lingua franca*, a similar pattern of economy, a common river system, a single communications network, and inter-dependence in various other essential matters. Further, it was agreed that inter-zonal parity depended for its successful working on the integration of the different units in West Pakistan. It was soon apparent that the best solution to the problem was offered by what has been known as the zonal or confederal plan... This scheme was, at one stage, even accepted by a majority of West Pakistan's Muslim League MCAs. This interregnum of lucidity was, however, short-lived. Soon after the dissolution of the old Constituent Assembly on 24 October 1954, the dominant faction of West Pakistan's Muslim League leadership abandoned the zonal scheme and raised the slogan of One Unit for West Pakistan.

In view of the peculiar situation that had been created, it was presumably felt that any plan emanating from the Central Government would be accepted. The disgraceful manner in which the agreement of the Provincial Assemblies was sought and obtained has not really made very many converts to the scheme or enhanced the country's reputation for adherence to democratic methods. The One-Unit proposal was put forward in this atmosphere and its details were worked out in this spirit. It seems, however, that even after the restoration of parliamentary rule in the country, there has been little change in the attitude of its authors. Any-criticism of the proposal, or any expression of honest doubts and misgivings, is frowned upon as a grievous sin, and the futile argument is put forward that failure to adopt the One-Unit plan in precisely its present form will be tantamount to inviting chaos and disruption. It is, of course, true that many persons are opposing the integration of West Pakistan for purely selfish reasons. We have a host of former Provincial satraps who feared eclipse in a bigger unit or who had expected a big share of the loaves and fishes of office and have been disappointed. Some members of the Civil Services, who calculate every political move in terms of their emoluments

and prospects of promotion, are apparently not yet satisfied with the repeated guarantees that have been held out to them: and the civil servants, unfortunately, seem to wield considerable political influence. There are also the diehard provincialists who are blinded by prejudice and can think or act only in narrow circles, and who, lacking a concrete political programme, have found a God-sent opportunity in the One-Unit plan to come forward as the heroic defenders of the people's rights. It is, on the other hand, equally true that many of the One-Unit's sponsors are guided solely by the desire to consolidate their positions of power, and to save the Muslim League from being decimated piecemeal, province by province; and that a large proportion of their supporters comprise the class of yes-men who applaud every Government policy as a matter of principle. Be that as it may, the issue must be viewed in the cold light of reason and the final decision taken by the people after a serious appraisal of its advantages and disadvantages.

It is our considered opinion that the zonal or confederal scheme offers the best answer to Pakistan's complicated constitutional problems. It gives the country a sane basis for parity between the two zones, and provides for West Pakistan a federal system that would give this region all the benefits of integration without any of its feared drawbacks. In fact, even without the necessity imposed by East Bengal's peculiar position, some such form of integration in West Pakistan was absolutely essential, and we held and advocated this view even when the Muslim League leadership was, in the defence of party interests, determined to preserve the illogical *status* quo. Some of the western units are complete anachronisms, and their boundaries deserve to be wiped out immediately: others are deficit zones which depend for help and sustenance on their neighbours. The cry for their complete separation is, therefore, a cry of despair which has no basis in terms of practical realities. It would clearly be best if West Pakistan were divided into three or four sub-units and coalesced into a well-knit federation which, with the passage of time, may

follow the worldwide trend towards centralisation and ultimately become a single administrative unit. This process of amalgamation by stages would allay the fears of the people of the smaller regions, and also reduce the danger of lack of effective control of the administration because of the vastness of the undeveloped areas that are suddenly being integrated. What perhaps is most important of all is that this plan could be implemented with the maximum possible agreement among the people of West Pakistan. Although the One-Unit plan is nearing its final stages, there is no reason why it should not be amended suitably in order to make it a more feasible and more acceptable proposition...

2 September 1955 The One-Unit Bill

... Apart from the basic considerations involved which we outlined two days ago, a study of the Establishment of West Pakistan Bill clearly shows that, as it now stands, the measure does not deserve the support of any democrat. The most important clauses of the Bill, namely, those laying down the electoral law, are a complete mockery of the basic canons of democracy. The Provincial Assemblies, which, where they exist, will function as electoral colleges for the new Legislature, have nearly reached the end of their terms. The Punjab Assembly, for example, should normally be dissolved early next year. When these bodies themselves are soon to lose whatever representative status they have enjoyed, it seems highly improper that they should be empowered to create a new body, on whose life no limit of any sort has been placed. Further, indirect elections have been decided upon, on the plea that direct elections would cause a great deal of delay. It will be recalled that the One-Unit proposal has been on the agenda for more than six months, and that if its sponsors were really interested in holding elections, the necessary preparations could very nearly have been finalised by now. Quite obviously, unless a beginning is made towards

setting up the necessary electoral machinery, the excuse of direct elections causing delay will always be available to avoid the people's direct verdict on their policies and actions. But even if, for the sake of argument, this excuse is accepted in the present case, there is no reason whatsoever for the quaint procedure that has been proposed for the indirect elections, for which the only fair method is that of proportional representation. The sponsors of the One-Unit Bill, however, have abandoned this accepted procedure and have decided that the different Assemblies and other bodies should elect their nominees to the West Pakistan Legislature by a majority vote. Their latest decision on this point is that, instead of the whole body electing its representatives, the voting will be conducted district-wise. This will make no difference to the undemocratic character of the proceedings. The only explanations that could be put forward by the bright legal experts who drafted the Bill is that the method of a single transferable vote would involve a very small quorum and that the counting would take some days. This is indeed the height of frivolousness. The country is told to sacrifice an essential democratic right because the price of its exercise is that the counting of votes will take a few days. The method in their madness is, however, clear, namely, to ensure that the dominant cliques in the Assemblies are given a monopoly of the seats in the One-Unit Legislature and that the Opposition parties and groups remain_completely unrepresented.

This is indeed a poor augury for the dawn of democracy that has been promised by the authors of the One-Unit plan. Further, it is reported that an extremely top-heavy administration is being devised to replace the present set-up, and that it is for this reason that the sponsors of the move no longer claim that it will bring any great economy in expenditure on the administrative machinery. It is also rumoured that it is proposed to give enhanced powers to the officials: this clearly raises the danger of the administration becoming more bureaucratic and, therefore, less responsive to public demands and needs. It is clearly imperative that, even if the basic structure outlined in the Government's blueprint for the integration of West Pakistan's units remains unchanged, the One-Unit Bill must be amended in certain essential respects. The proposed method of indirect elections should be abandoned in favour of the system of a single transferable vote, and the impartiality of the voting must be guaranteed beyond even a shadow of suspicion of official pressure. The scheme for West Pakistan's administrative structure should form a part of the Bill and not be left to some committee of officials. And, above all, the Bill itself should lay down that General Elections will be held within the next six months, and that the Legislature thus formed will have the right to initiate changes in the structure of West Pakistan in any manner it considers proper. Unless these provisions are incorporated in the Bill, it will probably remain unacceptable even to those who approve of the One-Unit scheme but do not regard it as a means of bypassing democracy and prolonging the people's deprivation of their basic democratic rights.

17 October 1955 West Pakistan Integration

...The emergence of the Province of West Pakistan, apart from the advantages or disadvantages that may inhere in the new administrative set-up, cannot by itself bring promise of any startling improvement in the life of our people. Its progress will depend largely on the nature of the policies devised by the new Government and the manner of their implementation. In this regard, the fact that the merger has, as was expected, led to an amalgamation of the dominant Muslim League groups of various units provides ample cause for anxiety. A majority of the West Pakistan Government's nucleus, which has already been installed in office, comprises Muslim League leaders whose barren political past offers no guarantee of a fruitful future; and, presumably, the choice for

filling the remaining vacancies will be confined to their confraternity. These gentlemen have often been invested with positions of power; and, invariably, they have emerged from each such test with their reputations more frayed and with the public affairs with which they were charged in a worse state of chaos. They have for a long time basked in the glory of power acquired through the efforts of others and, neglectful of the responsibilities that political power embraces, have engaged themselves single-mindedly in the shameless pursuit of personal or factional ends. Can they suddenly be divested of their old habits of thought and action? Will they now cease to misuse their authority, refrain from corrupting the administration, and subordinate their ambitions to the demands of public welfare? In the context of their past experience, no one should expect the people to place much faith in the miraculous transformation that has been promised; the onus of proof lies squarely on the Government's shoulders, and positive evidence of a radical departure from the ineptitude and indifference of previous Muslim League regimes must be provided before the liquidation of the obloquy that attaches to its component groups may be expected.

Generous promises have been made regarding what may be expected of the West Pakistan Government. They make impressive reading but will fail to enthuse our people, who have, since Partition, been surfeited with pledges that are often repeated but seldom honoured. Public judgment on the Government will be guided by the fruits of its actions, not by the rich foliage of its words. We have been told that the people's standard of living will be bettered and genuine social justice established through a rapid increase and a more equitable distribution of national wealth, that the benefits of education and medical aid will be spread to the far-flung villages and the backward areas, that the administration will be cleansed by rooting out corruption and inefficiency, that civil liberties will not be trampled upon and true democracy will be established, that the people will be delivered from local tyrannies, and that free and fair elections will be held as soon as possible. Hitherto, the only promise that has been stated in concrete terms is Dr Khan Sahib's categorical pledge that the Safety Act will not be used against the Press.

The West Pakistan Chief Minister's clarification of his views on the Frontier Crimes Regulation will also be read with gratification. This is an excellent beginning in one particular field; but it is only a beginning. A great deal more needs to be done in the matter of restoring the people's civic and political rights before it can be claimed that our governance is based on the unalloyed rule of law. It is, further, urgently necessary that all the Government's policy statements should be amplified...

The West Pakistan Government has indeed taken upon itself a very heavy burden of responsibilities. In one sense its task of reform is not a difficult one, for in the last eight years so little has been accomplished that any genuine attempt at improving the people's living conditions will stand out in bold relief. On the other hand, however, the existing mess is so complete that a very special effort will be required to set matters right. Further, the manner in which the One-Unit plan was nurtured, the unorthodox methods with which legislative support for it was sought and gained, and the strange procedure adopted for inducting the present Government into office, are circumstances that add to the burden. The absence of a representative Legislature, which could control the Government and share responsibility for its policies, should make the situation even more oppressive for those in the Cabinet who possess a political conscience and do not regard the One-Unit plan as a convenient means of acquiring or retaining political power. The fact that the present Government has been installed after a vital change in the administrative structure calls for the greatest circumspection in the formulation of its policies and the utmost vigilance in their implementation. Hitherto, the main opposition to the present integration plan has come from the smaller Provinces. Their suspicion that the Punjab, as the

biggest single unit, is likely to dominate the new Province will have to be dispelled if the scheme is to work satisfactorily. It is equally necessary, however, to guard against the danger that, in order to pacify these areas, their representatives may be allowed to blackmail the Government into forcing the Punjabis to make unfair sacrifices. It also needs to be realised that if the West Pakistan Government fails to live up to the expectations that it has sought to rouse. this will not merely lead to a routine change in its personnel; such an eventuality is likely to endanger the constitutional experiment with which it is linked. It will not only make it exceedingly difficult to deny the demand for restoration of the status quo ante, but also leave an aftermath of increased inter-provincial bitterness and confusion and, thus, create a host of new complications. Those who have assumed authority in the Province of West Pakistan must squarely face these facts. Above all else they should realise that their primary and most important duty is to make arrangements for the earliest possible establishment of a democratic Legislature. If the West Pakistan Government cannot faithfully discharge this and other major responsibilities, it will inevitably fall a victim to the accumulated wrath and frustration of the people and join the many Muslim League regimes in the limbo of the irretrievably bankrupt politicians.

20 April 1958 Dangerous Words

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's latest declaration on the subject of One Unit betrays a surprising lack of political balance and a narrowness of outlook. Addressing a party meeting in Peshawar the other day, he is reported to have said that 'now when all constitutional means are exhausted, we will resort to direct struggle after 'ld': that One Unit must be smashed because the 'Pathans have become real slaves of Punjabis, economically as well as politically': and that this would be 'a final and decisive struggle against One Unit, for whose maintenance leaders from Punjab have stood as one man'. He further revealed that the form of his direct action would be that batches of political workers would enter the Tribal Areas, in defiance of the existing restrictions, 'to carry our message to our tribal brethren'.

With regard to the first target of his proposed civil disobedience campaign, it will generally be agreed that there is no real justification today for keeping the Tribal Areas sealed off from the rest of the country. However, it is also quite obvious that a direct-action campaign to achieve this end would be a wrong and highly inopportune move. While such a campaign is unlikely to expedite the removal of an anomaly which forces a large section of our people to live in medieval conditions, it could easily help to create sufficient chaos in the region to provoke large-scale repression or even lead to circumstances that would be used as an excuse to upset the election schedule. Thus, instead of helping to extend democracy to a part of the country that is kept under an antediluvian dispensation, it may well destroy what little there is of democracy in other parts of our land...

It is easy to understand and appreciate Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's opposition to One Unit and his desire that it should be replaced as soon as possible by a more rational constitutional scheme. As was expected, the fact that integration was brought about without the people's consent has, apart from the intrinsic merits or demerits of the plan, created bitter resentment among the people, particularly in the smaller Provinces. What, however, makes Abdul Ghaffar Khan's utterances unpalatable and dangerous is his parochialism, his impatience with normal political methods, and his inability or refusal to understand that the people of the Punjab are as much victims of the present set-up as those of any other Province. He chooses to forget that, if certain Punjabi politicians backed One Unit, others opposed it tooth and nail; and that the architects of One Unit found willing helpers from other Provinces who were prepared to destroy anything if only their place at the high table of authority was

guaranteed. In fact, the One-Unit plan was for most of its supporters no more than a means of consolidating their position and weakening their political opponents. Further, it is necessary to point out that the slogan of 'Pushtoon culture' and language in danger is both false and harmful when it is known that Punjabi culture and language are equally neglected, that Sindhi culture and language get no sustenance, and that even Pakistan's official languages are deprived of the help they need to find the place that has been accorded them in the Constitution. It is equally wrong and harmful to talk of the enslavement of the Sindhis and Pathans by the Punjabis or of Punjabi capitalists exploiting the smaller Provinces. Slogans of this type usually emanate from a mind that has no clear-cut programme of national regeneration based on social justice and the liquidation of feudal and other vested interests

Respect for Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's anti-imperialist past and sympathy with him for his sufferings at the hands of the Qaiyum administration cannot blind one to the fact that his present policies do not serve the interests of either his party, or the Pathans, or the people of Pakistan. For example, today it is the foremost duty of every democrat to devote all his energies to the most important task facing Pakistan. namely, the holding of free and unfettered elections before the end of this year, and to suspend all controversies which might distract attention from this need. Any move which endangers the elections is a disservice to the people of Pakistan. Anything which helps to strengthen the hands of those who are interested in the elections is a right and correct step. However, we have seen that, driven by frustration or impatience. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan has knowingly deviated from the path of political rectitude, for this approval of the Syed Group's recent alliance with the Muslim League can have no justification on the purely political plane. And he could not have been unaware of the fact that, if this deal had fructified, it could easily have lead to the resurrection of a separate electorate system, and, in consequence, to the

postponement of the General Election for at least two years. These are poor tactics for a political leader of such vast experience, and these moves are rendered more harmful by an irrational dislike or fear of the Punjabis and by a tendency to equate the people of the Punjab with a handful of unscrupulous leaders. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan would be well advised to take a more objective and broader view of the situation and revise his policies. For, if his dangerous words are, later on, matched by equally dangerous deeds, he will be responsible for creating a situation that is bound to hamper Pakistan's democratic progress.

2 July 1958 West Pakistan's Future

While differences of opinion persist in regard to the factors responsible for the failure of the One-Unit experiment, it is generally conceded now that the integration of West Pakistan has failed completely to yield the promised results. In the first place, the integration scheme was launched under the worst possible auspices; apart from the fact that it was foisted on the people and its authors were unable to cloak their ulterior motives, these avowed champions of unity soon found themselves involved in factional fights on the lowest conceivable level. Further, whereas a more efficient administration had been promised, the administrative machinery has become less amenable to control and more cumbersome. No serious effort has been made to bring the backward areas of the new Province to the level of those which are slightly better served and better administered. The promise that the new Province would allow the burden of taxation to be lightened has also proved false. It was said that the abolition of the different Provinces and States would make it possible for the Government of the Province to overlook local vested interests and carry out progressive economic policies: this promise has also been belied. In these circumstances, even if the scheme were inherently feasiblewhich it is not-there was no possibility of its being found workable.

Obviously, this state of affairs cannot be left unattended without inviting acute discontentment and a worse state of confusion and chaos. The remedies that are being suggested vary greatly, and some could well turn out to be worse than the disease itself. It has been suggested, for example, that the status quo ante should be restored, resurrecting even those principalities which came into existence by the accident of history, and have no linguistic, ethnic or geographic raison *d'etre*. Another solution mooted is that the Divisional Commissioners should be given wider powers, so that some measure of administrative efficiency may be achieved through decentralisation of executive authority. A variation of this scheme, put forward after a conference at Nathiagali between certain Frontier NAP leaders and some members of the West Pakistan Cabinet, suggests the creation of four administrative zones with Sub-Committees of local Ministers functioning at the zonal headquarters. And there has been some talk about these zones being put in charge of Lieutenant Governors with advisory committees to assist them. None of these schemes. however, can provide any real solution to the problems of this region, which seem to have been accentuated by the halfbaked integration plan. We still believe that West Pakistan's special circumstances-namely, the existence of different linguistic and ethnic groups who desire local autonomy-and the need for administrative integration to deal with certain important subjects, require that the present set-up should be replaced by a zonal federation. While it is perfectly plain that West Pakistan's

While it is perfectly plain that West Pakistan's constitutional structure must sooner or later be suitably changed, the latest move towards this end is both unexpected and perplexing. The recent Nathiagali talks were obviously not confined to purely administrative matters, as suggested by an agency report emanating from Karachi. The President's participation and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's optimistic forecast about the early dismemberment of One Unit clearly

indicate that the Nathiagali parleys were political in character. Be that as it may, the people are wondering what exactly these negotiations portend. The people would certainly like to know whether President Iskander Mirza acted on his own initiative in calling such a conference, or was acting on behalf of the Central Government. If he took this step without the advice of the Cabinet, quite apart from the question of propriety, the possibility of certain complications cannot be ruled out. And if the move has the approval of the Cabinet, what precisely does the Noon Government want? Hitherto, it has sought to preserve the present set-up without any change until the elections. The most important thing before the people is to see what effect any of these new plans will have on the General Election. Since the issue is anyhow of vital public concern, we hope that the parties to the Nathiagali conference will take the people into their confidence about the nature of their talks and the conclusions they reached, so that their plan will be tested on the touchstone of public opinion before any effort is made to implement it.

IV. MEDIEVAL TERRORISM

²⁶ October 1949 First Fruits

The two weeks that have elapsed since its promulgation have proved the draconian Public Safety Ordinance to be nothing more nor less than an instrument of political repression. In more than one Province of Pakistan political workers and journalists have been arrested and detained without trial, while there is no evidence to show that the measure has been used anywhere to break up spy-rings or summarily deal with interprovincial gangs of criminals, for whose expeditious apprehension it was alleged to have been enacted. If, after the explanation given by a Deputy Minister on behalf of the Central Government, there were reasonable persons who still doubted the rightness of the country-wide protests against the addition of another weapon to the well-equipped armoury of the Executive, or who naively took at their face value the eloquent assurances of the Deputy Minister, the first few instances of the use of this Ordinance should have changed their minds for them.

In the West Punjab, to quote only one example, two known Muslim Leaguers were arrested under the Public Safety Ordinance a few days ago. No explanation was offered by Government for this drastic step, and without even the pretext of a judicial inquiry, without giving the victims a chance to deny or disprove the charges levelled against them, these two members of the political party in office at the Centre and in every Province of Pakistan were sent to jail by a dictatorial fiat. This event, naturally, caused a great deal of public resentment and strengthened the popular demand for repeal of this fascist law. Two or three days ago, again without a word of explanation, these two Muslim League workers were released. While their early release is welcome, it merely means that because of insistent public pressure one among many wrongs has been righted.

The arrest and subsequent release of these two political workers in the West Punjab completely exposes the claims of omniscience, infallibility and unimpeachable motives made on behalf of Government by those who seek to justify its recent betraval of democracy. It needs no great intelligence to see that the West Punjab Government has given away the whole show. In the first place, the public has the right to know why these two citizens were arrested. Were they accused of fifth-column activity? On what evidence was action taken? Who examined this evidence and who ordered their detention? And if their guilt was fully established, as it should have been according to the most solemn professions of Government spokesmen, why have they been released now? Does public clamour make their alleged offence less heinous? The people know now what value to put on Government's assurance that action under the Safety Laws would only be taken against persons found guilty of antiState activity. In this case, the guilt seems to be primarily on Government's head. The Provincial administration is guilty either of the illegal and wrongful confinement of two innocent nationals of Pakistan or of deliberately letting loose two proven enemies of the country. It is for the West Punjab Government to declare which is true and what action is being taken against the officials responsible for either of the two serious offences.

The second most glaring example of what, in the absence of proof to the contrary, can only be regarded as gross misuse of the Ordinance is provided by East Bengal in the detention of Maulvi Abdul Hamid Khan. The services to the Muslim League and to Pakistan of this veteran leader are too well known to be recounted; many go so far as to say that we largely owe the referendum victory in Sylhet to his influence and untiring efforts. It is extremely difficult to believe that such an old and tried servant of the Muslim people was found guilty of conspiring against the State that he had helped so much to build. It is far easier to give credence to the opposite view, that his deep loyalty to the people compelled him to criticise those who now occupy the seats of power, but were busy elsewhere when Maulvi Abdul Hamid Khan was fighting the Bengali Muslims' battles, and that this is his only 'sin'. In East Bengal, as everywhere else, no reason has been given for the incarceration of Muslim Leaguers and other political workers; presumably, when it comes, the hackneyed reply, inherited from our former British masters, will be that Government cannot possibly take the people into confidence and thereby dry up its sources of information.

When the Safety Ordinance is trampling underfoot the sacred civil liberties of the people, it is irritating to see the Pakistani Provincial Governor, who was welcomed by a section of public opinion as the custodian of people's rights, trying to defend what is obviously indefensible and using the same arguments, if not the same words, that a Jenkins or a Glancy would have used. If the forthcoming elections in the West Punjab are going to be held in the present stifling atmosphere, with the people bound and the Press muzzled, with every official arrogating to himself the right to decide who as a loyal patriot deserves to breathe freely and who is to be imprisoned without trial as a foreign agent, the electorate cannot be expected to regard this as a faithful fulfilment of the Governor-General's promise of free and democratic elections.

Public opinion in Pakistan has expressed itself with considerable force and condemned the Safety Ordinance as an unwarranted attack on the people's fundamental rights as free citizens of a free State. It would, therefore, enhance the prestige of the Central Government if it showed sufficient moral courage to admit that it has made a wrong decision and immediately withdraw this undemocratic, undesirable and unnecessary Ordinance. Failure to do so can only create a wide gulf between the Government and the people of Pakistan and will, unavoidably, place before the Muslim League the choice of siding either with one or the other.

7 February 1951 Medieval Terrorism

In a news report published in this newspaper a few days ago, it was alleged that Mirza Mohammad Ibrahim, a detenu under the Punjab Public Safety Act, had been severely maltreated in the Lahore Fort by certain representatives of the administrative department that is supposed to check lawlessness and protect the rights of the citizen. Although the incident is reported to have taken place many weeks ago, it was brought to light only recently after Mirza Sahib's brother, who is the editor of a Peshawar newspaper, succeeded in obtaining the Punjab Government's permission to interview him. If these charges—which have not been contradicted so far—are true, it is a very grave matter indeed. It is bad enough that the law of the land should allow our countrymen to be arrested and gaoled without being properly charged or tried. But when a person, whose innocence is suspect only in the

eyes of the detaining authority, is kept in solitary confinement in a police dungeon, instead of being lodged in an ordinary jail, and, furthermore, is beaten, abused and humiliated in many other ways, the system that allows such happenings deserves severe condemnation. Such barbaric treatment of a prisoner not only constitutes a violation of the country's laws. but is also an offence against all canons of civilised behaviour. In the eyes of the public, in such cases, the guilt of the persecutors is far greater than the supposed guilt of the persecuted individual, and should be treated as such by the Government. The present case is all the more reprehensible since the victim of alleged police *goondaism* is a political worker and one of Pakistan's most respected citizens, the acknowledged leader of an important section of our population and the President of their organisation, the Pakistan Trade Union Federation

We earnestly urge the Government to take cognisance of the matter and order an impartial inquiry into the incident. It is essential that, to serve the ends of justice and to inspire confidence in the findings, this inquiry should not be the usual departmental affair, in which the truth is often sacrificed for the sake of what is euphemisticaly called the department's honour and reputation. The investigation should be entrusted to a really independent Committee—none of whose members should be under the control or command of the Punjab Police Department-headed by a Judge of the High Court. With regard to Mirza Mohammad Ibrahim, and all others detained for their political views, we reiterate our oft-made demand that in order to make the General Election a little more democratic, they should forthwith be released. Mirza Sahib is a candidate for a Lahore seat to the Assembly and it is, to say the least, extremely unfair that he, and others like him, should be denied the right to approach the people for their support.

It is, in any case, necessary that some foolproof rules and regulations should be laid down to govern the living conditions of the victims of preventive detention. The first provision must be that detenus should not be left in the hands

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of the Police or the CID and should be sent to a jail immediately after their arrest. It is also necessary, since their guilt is unknown and unproved, that they should be given preferential treatment in the matter of facilities for reading and writing, food, clothes, and interviews, while a maintenance allowance for their families should also be sanctioned. A number of these concessions were granted to its State prisoners by the British Government of India. The Government of Pakistan should, at least, treat its citizens with equal consideration. Finally, we should like to repeat that the police institution maintained at the Lahore Fort should be disbanded. There are strong enough reasons against the very maintenance of a such a place of 'interrogation', but if the Government cannot break away from British traditions so completely, it should at least remove its Special Police Establishment from this magnificent architectural monument. The Punjab people still regard the Lahore Fort as a reminder of Sikh and British atrocities against those who strove for freedom. Let it now serve as a place of purely archaeological interest, rather than as a relic of medieval terrorism.

12 May 1<mark>951</mark> Latest Arrests

A large number of Communists and Leftists, mostly leaders of workers' and peasants' organisations or progressive littérateurs, have been arrested under the Safety Laws in the Punjab, Sind, and Karachi. No official explanation has, so far, been given to justify this country-wide round-up except for the vague charge that those detained were likely to be 'a danger to public peace and order'. It has, however, been stated that the arrests are in no way connected with the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case and also that Government's action is directed against the individuals concerned and not against any political party. If those who have been arrested, without a specific charge and with no prospect of being tried, had been suspected of complicity in the Conspiracy Case, action under the draconian Safety Laws would have been somewhat understandable, although even in that case—since a trial is going to be held—the use of ordinary legal procedure in the future would not handicap the Government in any way. But to arrest a large number of political workers and writers who are not even accused of illegal activity of any sort—on mere suspicion is contrary to every tenet of democracy.

Although the arrests seem to have been carried out under the Central Government's instructions or, at least, under a centrally co-ordinated plan, responsibility in the Provinces for the further unwarranted use of the Safety Acts rests with the Provincial governments. In Sind, the large-scale arrests of *Hari* leaders have been interpreted by Pir Illahi Bakhsh as an attempt to stifle the Opposition and clear the way for the electoral victory of Mr Khuhro's Muslim League. Kazi Mujtaba, a Muslim League MLA, has also expressed regret at the arrests when, he claims, the *Hari* leaders were negotiating with him for a Muslim League-Hari Committee alliance. Clearly Mr Khuhro needs to explain why his Government has found it necessary to incarcerate the representatives of so large a section of Sind's population. Mr Mumtaz Daultana owes the Punjab people a similar duty. Only when the Governments concerned offer a proper explanation for the drastic action taken will it be possible to judge whether even the slightest justification existed for the round-up of the leaders of a large section of West Pakistan's workers and peasants. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Muslim League Governments have misused their special powers in order to weaken their political opponents.

29 May 1951 Safety Act Again

The arrest and detention without charge or trial of Mr Ahmad Ali Khan, Assistant Editor of this newspaper and President of the Punjab Union of Journalists, Mr Ghayyur-ul-Islam,

another member of our Editorial staff, and Mr Zaheer Babar, a Sub-Editor of the Imroze, is yet another act of unexplained oppression. As in the case of the recent round-up of Communists and Leftists, mostly leaders of peasants' and workers' organisations or writers, no explanation has beenand none is likely to be-offered by the authorities for the use of the Public Safety Act to incarcerate these three journalists, who were known to interest themselves in cultural and literary pursuits and whose only 'political' activity was an active participation in the affairs of the local journalists union. The fact that the Government does not even consider it necessary to tell the people why such a large number of Pakistani citizens are being deprived of their civic rights would seem to indicate that those in power today have lost their former much-vaunted respect for civil liberties. To say the least, this is most deplorable, particularly in the Punjab, where before Partition the resistance of an anti-national coalition was broken by a civil-disobedience movement launched in the name of civil liberties, and where the Muslim League organisations is pledged to the repeal of all Safety Laws. Even if the dominant group in this party has now resiled from its earlier unconditional opposition to detention without trial, the recent large-scale arrests are not even in consonance with the amended policy enunciated by the Punjab Muslim League's present leaders, who have declared on more than one occasion that the Safety Act would be used only in the most extreme cases involving the security of the State. That, as ever before, the Safety Act is being used indiscriminately against those who incur the Executive's disapprobation or suspicion is obvious from the long list of persons who have been made its victims. We whole-heartedly support the demand put forward by the Civil Liberties Union some time ago, and recently endorsed by thirteen Karachi organisations representing different sections of political opinion, that all those at present detained under the Safety Laws should either be tried in a court of law or be released immediately.

22 May 1952 Political Prisoners

It is the usual practice in a democratic State that when its citizens are incarcerated for political reasons they are given special privileges and are not subjected to the rigours of ordinary jail life. The provision of extra amenities and facilities is all the more necessary in the case of those who have been deprived of their liberty without proper charge and without a trial of any sort. It is extremely regrettable, however, that the Governments of Pakistan's Provinces have not wholly abandoned the British policy of denying decent treatment to political prisoners and detenus. In the Punjab, despite a great deal of talk about the liberalisation of detention rules, conditions still are far from satisfactory, while the situation in other Provinces is probably much worse. It was reported in this newspaper vesterday, on the testimony of a relative who interviewed him recently, that Mirza Mohammad Ibrahim, the country's leading trade union leader, is being kept in confinement under the most wretched conditions. If the facts related are true, the scandalous state of affairs calls for immediate investigation and early redressal of Mirza Sahib's just grievances. It is also known that other political detenus have recently been subjected to solitary confinement, which is normally a form of punishment usually reserved for offences committed in jail. We urge the Political Prisoners' Aid Society and the Civil Liberties Union to take up the cudgels on behalf of the persons who are rotting in prisons vat mstitute for an unknown crime.

The least that the Government can do is to grant all political detenus decent living conditions. They should be kept in the better class of jails, and, whenever possible, in or near their home-towns. The practice of sending political prisoners to distant jails or places climatically unhealthy should be stopped. Further, the helpless dependents of detenus should be given adequate maintenance allowances, so that punishment for the unproved sins of the parents is not visited

upon their innocent children. Interviews with relations and, particularly where detenus have no relations in Pakistan, with friends should be allowed liberally. They should also be permitted to obtain books and newspapers of their own choice. None of these or other similar demands, which have repeatedly been brought to Government's notice by or on behalf of the detenus, can be regarded as unreasonable. In fact, it is reported that some of them have already been conceded, but their implementation is being held up by the administration's customary inefficiency and red-tapism. The matter is of sufficient importance for the Chief Minister to take a personal interest in the question. The demands that have been accepted should be implemented without further delay and the other points should be reconsidered in a spirit worthy of a Government pledged to safeguard the rights of our citizens

24 March 1955 The Safety Act

The Punjab Government have decided that wherever action under the Public Safety Act is contemplated against anyone for having made a public speech that is considered objectionable, and the accused person contests the version of his speech reproduced by the CID, he will be called upon to go to the place (where he made the original speech) and make a statement denying the allegation made by the Government'. In the event of his complying with the Government's request to publicly contradict the CID report of his speech, no action would be taken against the speaker under the Public Safety Act. The Punjab Chief Minister made this announcement in the Legislative Assembly recently, after accepting the implication of a supplementary question that the reports of public speeches prepared by the CID were not always correct. Malik Firoz Khan Noon is undoubtedly motivated by the best of intentions in making such a novel concession to the would-be victims of the Safety Act; but it would appear that he has not pondered over the practical difficulties that are likely to arise if the procedure suggested by him is adopted.

In the first place, it will give the CID a new handle to harass political workers: on the basis of a concocted report the CID will be in a position to ask any public speaker to revisit the scene of his oratorical performance and publicly contradict what he is supposed to have said according to the Police diaries. There is, of course, no law in existence under which the person accused of having made an objectionable speech could be forced to do so. In any case, his refusal to accept this informal arrangement-because it is both inconvenient and undignified—will automatically be accepted as proof, or even as an admission by him, of his guilt, followed by his detention or prosecution under the Safety Act. It also needs to be borne in mind that it would, for obvious reasons, be completely impossible for the Government or the public speaker concerned to summon the same or any audience to hear his retraction, and that the contradiction made in the presence of one or two CID officials is hardly likely to serve the purpose which the Government seem to have in mind. And, lastly, even if somehow all these insuperable difficulties could be overcome, to work the scheme outlined by the Chief Minister it would probably be necessary to set up a new branch of the Police—which may be called the Department of Contradictions-to cope with the crop of cases of this nature that are likely to occur in different parts of the Province.

different parts of the Province. A proper study of the problem should convince the Punjab Government that, as this so-called law now stands, it is more or less impossible to mitigate the severity of the Public Safety Act or to eliminate the possibility of gross injustice in its operation. If the Government are interested in safeguarding the rights of the citizen against the Executive's highhandedness, the only real solution lies in its total repeal. As has often been pointed out, the ordinary law of the land is sufficiently comprehensive to deal with objectionable speeches or any other offences which come under the purview of the Safety Act. The main purpose served by this unsavoury piece of legislation is to deny the accused person adequate facilities to defend himself and to make his arrest and detention possible without proper proof of his guilt. If it is intended that the Safety Act should be so amended, and the method of its application so changed, as to guarantee due respect for the elementary principle of law that a person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty, the only way to achieve this desirable end is to remove the offending Act from the statute book. Only thus can the Punjab Government convince the people that it is genuinely interested in safeguarding their civil liberties and saving innocent persons from being harassed by the executive authorities.

19 Se<mark>ptember 1955</mark> Ghaffar Khan's Arrest

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's arrest under the Baluchistan Public Safety Regulation, for defiance of the ban on his entry into the Province imposed by the local authorities, presumably with the approval of the Central Government, will generally be regretted. This unexpected development is all the more deplorable because the Red Shirt leader has already spent a long period in jail under the obnoxious Frontier Crimes Regulation and, later, as a detenu. After his release from prison, for eighteen months he was confined to the Punjab, and it is only a few months ago that he was permitted to return to his own Province as a free citizen. According to a spokesman of the Baluchistan administration, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, apart from an earlier informal warning, had been served with an order asking him not to enter Baluchistan, and that he had been arrested for violation of that order which was a 'cognisable offence'. However, neither the local authorities nor the Central Government have deigned to disclose why it was considered necessary to bar him from visiting Baluchistan. It is an accepted principle of democracy that

before a citizen's liberty is restricted, there must be sound reasons for doing so, and any such action taken must conform to the due process of law. The fact that a variety of Safety Laws, giving arbitrary powers to Authority, still disfigure the statute books of Pakistan's various units does not absolve the Government of all responsibility in this regard. Even the use of these lawless laws is, on rational interpretation, limited to the purposes for which ostensibly they have been devised. Thus the very least that is expected of the Government is that before recourse to such repressive measures it should show to the satisfaction of the people that the action taken is motivated by the demands of public interest or safety.

In the absence of any authoritative explanation, it seems safe to assume that the Red Shirt leader's campaign against the One-Unit plan provides the only cause for the decision to keep him out of Baluchistan. If this assumption is correct, not only would the employment of the Public Safety Regulation appear to be *mala fide*, but, quite obviously, the Government's decision is both unwise and undemocratic. With the One-Unit Bill still under debate in the Constituent Assembly, any attempt to gag public discussion of the issues involved is ill-advised and reprehensible. The use of repressive laws to smother criticism of any constitutional measure betrays a refusal to understand the simple fact that the Constitution must be based on the willing acceptance of all sections of the people, and that any attempt to foist a constitutional structure on the country without general approval is an open invitation to political chaos. Further, the use of such methods to protect the One-Unit Bill demolishes the claim that a majority of the people in every unit of West Pakistan is in its favour, and it falsifies the pledge that its passage will usher in an era of unfettered democracy in which the rights of the people, and particularly those of the smaller units, will be fully safeguarded. In fact, such action can only intensify public fears and suspicions, make more difficult the achievement of agreement among the people of the different regions, and provide a handle to unfriendly foreign critics.

Constitution-making in Pakistan has already been marred by the partisan outlook of the main groups in the Constituent Assembly. The imposition of bans and restrictions on political workers can only worsen the situation by increasing the existing confusion and heightening the conflicts between different sections of our people.

This does not mean, however, that we agree wholly with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's views on the subject of the Constitution or that we consider his act of defying the bar. however unjust it may be, as a politically correct move. Nevertheless, we feel strongly that repressive action against him has no justification and that every democrat, including those who are his inveterate opponents, should support the plea for according him full freedom to propagate his views. In a democratic State it is only through the uninhibited clash of views that a vigilant public opinion can be built up and a synthesis of the various solutions offered for our national problems achieved amicably and through constitutional methods. By dealing with political opponents on what might be called the administrative level, rather than on the political plane, those in power do not provide any real answer to the problems facing the country and can succeed only in creating further bitterness and tension...

8 June 1956 Safety Laws

The latest Ministerial pronouncement in the matter of repeal of the Safety Laws has modified the Chief Minister's original promise so drastically that the reasons for which it was greeted with general applause are not likely to survive the modification. It will be recalled that about a fortnight ago Dr Khan Sahib promised that a repealing Bill would be moved during the Budget session of the Provincial Legislature to remove the Safety Laws from the statute book: he further declared that his Government wanted to surrender the power of ordering the arrest and detention of any citizen without trial. However, even before the plaudits of those who want to see democracy established in Pakistan had died down, the Provincial Government seems to have had second thoughts on the subject, and it was reported on the strength of advice from persons close to the Ministry that, as has happened again and again in this country, the promise of full restoration of civil liberties was not likely to be honoured. Instead, it was said that changes limited in scope would be introduced in the relevant laws through a Governor's Ordinance after the session of the Assembly had been adjourned. As we pointed out a few days ago, neither the change of procedure nor the change in the Government's intentions can meet with popular approval. It was clearly necessary that a measure as important as the Bill to repeal the Safety Laws should have been discussed by the Legislature, and the Press and the people given the opportunity to express their views on the subject. That this has not been allowed to happen is bad enough. What is infinitely worse is that the purpose of the proposed amendment has been narrowed down considerably.

Dr Khan Sahib's original announcement was interpreted liberally, and it was expected that not only would the various Safety Acts be abrogated but that steps would be taken to do away with the offending part of every other law, whether Provincial or Central, which makes preventive detention possible. This is not to happen. The timid position taken by the Law Minister on the last day of the West Pakistan Assembly's Budget session was that before the end of this month an Ordinance would repeal only those sections of the Provincial Safety Acts which permit preventive detention. This apparently means that the other parts of some of these vicious laws, for example those allowing arbitrary action against the Press, or permitting arrest and search without warrant, or sanctioning a judicial process that does not conform to the requirements of a fair trial, will remain in force. That is not all. Mr Pirzada Abdus Sattar's statement also made it perfectly plain that the Government has no intention of moving a single step in the direction of restoring

civil liberties beyond amending the relevant Provincial Safety Acts in respect of preventive detention. The Frontier Crimes Regulations are to remain in force: the Bengal Regulation of 1818 will still be with us: the Central Security Act will continue to be available for use by the Provincial authorities; and it is not intended to amend the ordinary criminal law or such measures as the *Goonda* Act to eliminate the possibility of their misuse for political purposes. It is most regrettable that the declaration which had heartened the people with the hope that it was genuinely intended by the present Ministry to establish in this Province the untrammelled rule of law has been abandoned so readily. It is not definitely known whether the retraction has been the result of pressure from the Central Government or of a difference of opinion within the Provincial ruling party, or whether the baneful propaganda of the Muslim League had its effect. But, whatever its cause, Dr Khan Sahib's precipitate retreat cannot help to improve the stature of his Party or brighten the prospects of genuine democracy being established in this country after a General Election held in full freedom—and not under the ugly shadow of a host of lawless laws whose continuance shames us before the world

V. GHOSTS OF YESTERDAY

6 December 1949 Ghosts of Yesterday

The Governor-General of Pakistan has recently been pleased to grant an interview to Malik Sir Khizar Hayat Tiwana. It is not known why the Head of the State was persuaded to receive the person most hated by the people of Pakistan, nor do we know what was discussed between the Quaid-i-Azam's successor and the agent of those who sought to thwart the Quaid's mission of securing an independent State for our people. We would like to believe that the meeting had no bearing on any matter of public concern, but if Khwaja Nazimuddin and Khizar Hayat Tiwana had met merely on the basis of past acquaintanceship to converse on the weather or *shikar*, why was the Court Circular of Pakistan blackened with a name that is synonymous with wilful national betrayal? Even if some measure of personal friendship had ever existed between the two, we have no doubt that Khwaja Nazimuddin, who has direct knowledge of the role played by Khizar Hayat, would forego the doubtful pleasure of renewing it in order to respect the sentiments of Pakistan's people. Maybe the interview was officially arranged, in which case the people of Pakistan, and especially of the West Punjab, have a right to ask the Central Government why a man who dare not show his face in the streets of Lahore, and who is compelled to remain incognito while travelling anywhere in Pakistan, should have been honoured in this way? On the other hand, if the interview was allowed on Tiwana's request, what has he to say to the Governor-General either on his own behalf or on behalf of his foreign masters? Again, if the meeting was arranged by the increasing number of his friends at the Centre, what was their particular object? Did they want him to give technical advice with regard to the working of the Safety Acts and Ordinances?

Those who may seek to minimise this issue should realise that interviews by the Head of the State have a special significance which cannot be ignored. Just as a Quisling or a John Amery could never have been admitted to the palaces of their respective kings, we feel strongly that the doors of the Karachi Government House should never be darkened by the figure of a Khizar Hayat. It is not our intention to discuss disrespectfully any action of the Head of the State. But the Governor-General is a symbol of the present Government and. therefore, his smallest action is rightly assumed to express official policy. It is against this new trend in the Central Government's policies of making alliances with elements despised by our people that we wish to raise our voice. By himself, Khizar Hayat deserves to be completely ignored and his name would find prominence in our columns only if he were tried by a national tribunal for his many crimes against the people. But he too is a symbol--of slavery to foreign interests, of gross betraval and of

deliberate help to forces that even today are working against our country. In itself even the grant of an interview has a limited importance, but there are other indications also to show that the Unionists and their ilk are being patronised by those in power.

This policy of joining hands with known traitors must be resisted, for in the long run it can only work as a wedge between the national leadership and the people. We are not unmindful of the virtues of forgiveness, and we would not object to our national leadership's alliance with any section of Pakistanis who were honest in their past political differences with the overwhelming majority of our people, and who were now sincerely prepared to work for public good: but the line must be drawn when persons who knowingly worked as enemy agents try to re-enter the fold of politics by the back door. The Tiwanas are really no longer a danger, no matter how much their faithful friends may try to help them. The men who tried to stab us in the back at a time of the greatest danger will never be regarded by the people with anything but well-deserved hatred. The danger is not that any of them will rise to positions of influence among the people, but that they will drag the present national leadership down to the depths of their own degradation...

The Central leadership should go to the people with the full confidence that they will support every policy formulated to further their welfare and strengthen the country. The present period of national reconstruction requires as much enthusiastic public co-operation as was necessary to achieve the right to establish a State of our own... In this task, these ghosts of yesterday have no place, and any attempt to make them join the ranks of those who seek to lead us in the battles of today and tomorrow will only cause confusion and chaos.

15 April 1954 Zafrulla Must Go

The serious move inside the Muslim League Assembly Party for a vote of no-confidence against Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan, one of the most unpopular and least representative members of the Central Government, is primarily a reflection of the country-wide demand for his immediate removal from office. It is possible, even likely, that some of the sponsors of this move are motivated by the desire to create a vacancy in the Cabinet which one of them may be asked to fill. It might even be true, as a local contemporary with a special interest in the Foreign Minister's survival has alleged, that some of them are out to gain 'cheap popularity' by bringing about his downfall. Be that as it may, the latter charge only lends further weight to the fact that an overwhelming majority of those in this country who think about such matters is wholeheartedly in fayour of Chaudhri Sahib's removal from an office which he has held for so long with such little distinction. Many of our people are, of course, opposed to the Foreign Minister mainly because of his active membership of a certain sect; but even if it is accepted by Pakistan's rulers that a person's religious faith should not bar his rise to political office, in Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan's case there are a host of other reasons for accepting the popular demand that he should be compelled to relinquish the position he occupies.

In the first place, in a democratic set-up such widespread public clamour for a Minister's removal is in itself sufficient justification for his resignation or dismissal. In normal circumstances, any incumbent of a public office who has some respect for public opinion, or is-endowed with a modicum of self-respect, would have bowed before the people's unambiguous demand. In fact, it is widely believed that in lucid moments the Foreign Minister has expressed his intention to resign, but the head of his community will not allow him to quit an office of such importance. It is not difficult to understand why Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan has been unable to evoke any support among the people. His past is a sordid story of loyal service to a foreign regime, which for good and sufficient reasons imposed a special trust in Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan and his community. He is one of those career politicians who not only stood aloof from the

Indian Muslims' struggle for Pakistan but were not even interested in the country's freedom from the British. Since Partition, as Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan has been a glorified failure. His predilection for the Anglo-American bloc has prevented Pakistan attaining the position to which she was entitled among the countries of Asia and Africa: mainly for this reason, every move initiated by him has fizzled out almost before its plan was finalised; and, despite, or because of, his diplomacy through marathon speeches, the Foreign Ministry's record is barren of any significant achievement. Notwithstanding the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility, Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan, as the author and instrument of a weak and ineffective foreign policy, cannot be allowed to use the acquiescence of his colleagues as an alibi.

Those who are trying to bolster up Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan, whether on sectarian grounds or for factional motives, are faced with a virtually impossible task. Mere repetition of the Foreign Minister's appraisal of his own ability cannot really help his cause: nor can any sane person accept the theory—formulated by a local contemporary—which implies that the Foreign Minister is the only honest man in Pakistan. The same source has put forward the pathetic plea that the mere fact that Chaudhri Zafrulla represents no one but himself should be ignored because, the newspaper asks, who else does?' This damning admission by the Foreign Minister's most rabid supporters should spur the Muslim League Assembly Party to cast off all its deadweight-starting with the Foreign Minister. Another, somewhat subtler, attempt to keep Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan in his present office has been made by holding out the 'threat' that in the event of his removal from the Cabinet he may be made the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Pakistan. This is the only interpretation possible of the relevant piece of journalistic sophistry, because, surely, the highest judicial post in the land cannot possibly be offered to a gentleman who is the subject of a country-wide controversy, and who is-we

hope-being removed from the Government because of the simple and incontrovertible fact that the vast majority of the people have no confidence in him. It is unthinkable that such a proposal should have been even seriously considered, particularly when the highest rungs of the country's judiciary can provide men of far greater calibre and legal acumen, and when the harmful consequences of politicalising judicial posts are well known. If Chaudri Zafrulla Khan must be found a job, let it be something like the membership of the Hague Court where he cannot meddle with Pakistan's affairs. As far as the Foreign Ministership is concerned, the best service he can now do to Pakistan's foreign relations is to submit his resignation; and if he is inhibited from doing so by personal disinclination to give up the post or for other reasons, let him be told in unmistakable terms by his party that he is no longer wanted, that he must go.

9 October 1954 Zafrulla Goes

Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan's election to the International Court of Justice will generally be welcomed, not only because it gives Pakistan a seat on the world's highest judicial tribunal, but also because it means that he will now be leaving the Foreign Office. Apart from those who objected to Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan's continuance in his present office on religious grounds, it was widely felt in the country that his lack of representative status, the inept manner in which he has functioned as Foreign Minister, and his ingrained devotion to the cause of the West, disqualified him for the onerous task of acting as Pakistan's official representative in her dealings with the rest of the world. While we would like to hope that the new Foreign Minister will be someone who is in every way better suited to fill this important post, it is even more important that the policy of which Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan was the chief architect should be submitted to a thorough scrutiny. Whatever satisfaction Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan's departure from the Cabinet may bring, the change at the Foreign Office will have little effect unless it is followed by a proper appraisal and revision of our foreign policy and the manner of its implementation by our diplomats. We suggest, therefore, with all possible emphasis, that the people and Parliament should give due attention to the question of Pakistan's foreign relations and compel the Government to submit all major issues to democratic discussion before embarking on any new ventures that are likely to influence the future of our country for many generations.

23 August 1958 On Unionism

Mr Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash's pride in his Unionist past is not likely to increase the number of his admirers, for his declaration will remind people of the crucial time when the Unionists prevented the formation of a Muslim League Ministry in the Punjab—something which might have made the transition to Pakistan smoother and less painful.

However, the more discerning observers will readily accept his claim that the Unionist Party did not oppose the establishment of Pakistan. Let us remember that the Unionists could only have seriously opposed or favoured Pakistan if they had seriously desired freedom for the sub-continent. Since the Party's *raison d'etre* was perpetuation of the British *raj*, it is unfair to accuse it of either supporting or opposing the establishment of Pakistan.

The Republican Party's stand on One Unit also reminds one of the manner in which the Unionist Party used to fight elections. Two or three Unionists fought it out among themselves in a constituency, and then the winner was accepted as the rightful party member who clearly deserved the party ticket. The Republicans' stand on One Unit is similar. Although as with many of its leaders, the party was created to serve One Unit, the issue is now left open and members are allowed to canvass for and against One Unit—

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depending on whether one or the other slogan is likely to bring them more votes.

These matters are primarily of concern to the Republican Party itself. What concerns the people much more is the spate of criticism that has followed the Chief Minister's recent tour of the Province, alleging that, as in the days of the Unionist Party, the administrative machinery was in many places mobilised fully to make the Chief Minister's meetings successful. Since in war and elections truth is often the first casualty, it is difficult to say how far these allegations are correct. But even if one tenth of the charges are true, the matter calls for prompt remedial action. The practice of misusing official authority for purely political propaganda must be stopped if the General Election is to be fair.

And, lastly, while on the subject of the Chief Minister's tour, we would like to remind him that the Muslim League leaders have enthusiastically endorsed his proposal for a probe into illegally acquired wealth, and that it is now his duty to bring forward necessary legislation during the Assembly's next session.

VI. THE RAWALPINDI CONSPIRACY CASE

¹⁰ March 1951 Charge of Conspiracy

The Prime Minister of Pakistan has made a sensational disclosure, alleging the existence of a deep-laid conspiracy to 'create commotion in the country by violent means and, in furtherance of this purpose, to subvert the loyalty of the defence forces'. Those who have been listed as ring-leaders of the conspiracy are two senior officers of the Pakistan Army, Major-General Akbar Khan and Brigadier Latif Khan, the Editor of this newspaper, Mr Faiz Ahmad Faiz, and Begum Akbar Khan. The Prime Minister's statement will no doubt shock public opinion and the first reaction, anyhow, will be one of surprise amounting almost to incredulity, because among those said to be involved are persons hitherto well known for their loyalty

and devotion to Pakistan. It is not easy to believe that these persons were the ringleaders of a conspiracy intended to destroy the integrity of Pakistan or, in any other way, to help the enemies of our country. However, the charges, made by no less an authority than the Prime Minister of Pakistan, who is also the Defence Minister, are of so grave a nature that if they are proved true, no Pakistani would condone or extenuate the offence of the guilty persons.

The two military officers have been detained under Regulation III of 1880 and the two civilians, presumably, under the Public Safety Ordinance, instead of being tried according to the ordinary law of the land. The two officers, it seems, have also been summarily dismissed from service without a Court Martial. Further, the Prime Minister's statement contains only a general charge, without specifying the nature or the precise intent of the plot.

Arrests for purely political motives or to overcome a political crisis have not been unknown in this country. In the present case, the allegations made are far more serious and the persons involved far more important. It is obviously necessary, therefore, that there should not be the slightest suspicion in the public mind about the *bona fides* of the Government's action.

The country's normal legal machinery, whether it be military law or that which embraces the ordinary citizen. is sufficiently comprehensive to deal effectively with those guilty of having acted as enemies of the State. We put forward the demand for a proper trial not merely because it is the first principle of justice that no person should be condemned without being proved guilty and without being given a fair chance to defend himself. but what is far more important. because a full exposure of the plot would give a healthy fillip to public confidence and morale. Further, if proved guilty in a court of law, the country would unanimously support the imposition of any penalty on the guilty persons commensurate with the magnitude of their crime. It is meet to point out that in other free countries, trials of those accused of crimes against the State are invariably held in open court and that this procedure helps to strengthen the foundations of the State.

23 March 1951 Conspiracy Case

The Pakistan Prime Minister's latest statement, in reply to a Parliamentary question, on what will probably go down in history as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case throws a little more light on a matter that has been the subject of a great deal of undesirable speculation and rumour-mongering-in Pakistan as well as outside. In contrast with the extremely vague charge of 'seeking to create commotion in the country' made in his original announcement, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, giving a general idea of the case, stated that the two high-ranking Army officers had conspired to seize effective power after the removal of the existing authorities, both civilian and military, and that their intention was to set up a military dictatorship. Further, it is said that certain other civilians and Army officers are also involved, and that the accused had planned to enlist the support of 'Communist and revolutionary elements' in order to set up a 'Government on the Communist model, but under military domination', for which purpose economic and Constitutionmaking missions were to be invited from abroad.

The Prime Minister's declaration that his Government intends to bring the accused to trial will be welcomed by every section of opinion in the country. In view of the grave nature of the charges and the high status of the persons accused of being the ring-leaders, it is necessary that the case should be put before the highest judicial tribunal in the land and heard in open court. The interests of justice demand that the guilt of the accused should be fully established before requisite punishment is meted out, while thorough exposure of their actions and intentions is essential to acquaint our people with all the facts so that public judgement can endorse the Government's decision in the matter. We hope, therefore, that a bureaucratic conception of what information should be withheld from the people in the name of security will not operate and that a proper trial of those considered guilty of planning to halt Pakistan's progress towards democracy will be held as soon as possible. Until Government is in a position to give more facts, it would be best to treat the case as being *sub judice* and refrain from guesswork about the extent of the plot or the aims of those held to be the plotters.

Every section of political opinion in Pakistan-from the Muslim League, on the Right, to the Communist Party-has expressed its strong disapproval of resort to military *coups d'etat* for bringing about political changes in the country. There can be no doubt that every serious-minded Pakistani will realise that military dictatorships are the hallmark of reaction and that, as history bears witness, they cannot help any country's march towards genuine progress. Whatever the motive of those who are said to have been engaged in a conspiracy for this purpose whether it was overriding personal ambition or perverted political concepts or an admixture of both—the country as a whole is rightly gratified at learning that such a plot did not succeed. The Pakistan Prime Minister can rest assured that, irrespective of the many differences that a large part of our people have with his party's policies, every responsible political group and every sane individual will unreservedly condemn any attempt to bypass democratic methods and introduce political changes through a military dictatorship, and that the country will uphold the imposition of due punishment on those who are proved guilty of any actions, in pursuance of such a purpose, which might have had serious consequences for Pakistan and her people.

15 April 1951 Havat Institute Conspiracy Case Trial

The official Bill, moved in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on Friday, authorising the setting up of a Special Tribunal to try the persons who have been arrested and detained in connection with the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, is likely to get a mixed reception. The fact that a proper trial is to be held and that the Tribunal will consist of three judges of the Federal or High Courts of Pakistan will generally be welcomed by the people. The denial of the right to release on bail can also be understood, but many will question the wisdom of the other special changes in normal legal procedure envisaged by the Bill. Firstly, the whole trial is to be held *in camera* and—presumably, arising from this—without a jury. The right of appeal or petition for revision has also been abrogated and only the Governor-General will be able to review and mitigate the sentences imposed by the Tribunal. In most other matters, the procedure as laid down for a High Court will be followed by the Tribunal, except for certain changes apparently intended to speed up the trial and the provision that the Tribunal can take cognizance of an offence committed by the accused even if it has not been listed among the prosecution's charges.

We have already suggested in these columns that the best course for Government would be to hold an open trial, in accordance with ordinary legal procedure, and stated our reasons for holding this view. Parliamentary discussion on the measure may reveal why the procedural and other restrictions are considered necessary by the authorities. In any case we hope that, while discussing the Bill, the Constituent Assembly will bear in mind that it is not sufficient that justice should be done; that it should also appear to be done is of almost equal importance. An additional reason for holding a public trial is that the case has received a great deal of publicity in the world Press. It would, therefore, be in the country's interest to place the real facts before the world in order to end the ill-informed conjectures that are being published as news, often with intentions that cannot be regarded as friendly.

VII. THE LAST WORD

8 April 1959 Civil Service Re-organisation

The demand put forward by the Provincial Civil Service Association (Executive Branch) for the appointment of an

impartial commission to examine the structure of the civil administration in Pakistan, and to recommend such changes as would make its working more efficient, deserves full support. Year after year this Association has drawn Authority's attention to the fact that the distinction between the different cadres of the civil service is a hang-over from the British regime. Special privileges and facilities were then given to the senior civil service because originally it was meant only for the British: and the rules and procedures devised in those days were intended to keep the native civil servants in their proper places. Later on, many Indians were admitted to the senior service; and since Partition almost all the posts have been occupied by Pakistanis. The set-up has, however, been maintained intact, although the change of personnel was in itself of sufficient significance to justify a survey of the administrative structure with a view to finding out whether two such watertight compartments are at all necessary, and how the services should be re-organised. It is further said on behalf of the PCS Association that, conditions of recruitment having changed, many of its members are better qualified—quite apart from their experience—than the young men who have recently entered the CSP, and yet the former are treated as inferior beings and are denied the opportunities that would be available to them if merit alone guided the selections for higher posts. With promotion blocked on grounds other than those_of_suitability or efficiency, it is natural that persons working in the junior cadre should feel dissatisfied and frustrated. In the past, the PCS Association has asked for the

In the past, the PCS Association has asked for the provincialisation and immediate integration of the civil services or the reservation of twenty-five per cent vacancies in the CSP for members of the PCS: and in making these demands they are supported by the conditions governing the recruitment and promotion of civil servants in a large number of other countries. However, they have now merely suggested that the whole position should be submitted to a careful scrutiny by an independent commission—presumably, meaning thereby a body that is not manned wholly by persons belonging to the ICS or the CSP. There can be no possible objection to this request even from those who believe that the PCS Association's case is not half as strong as they would have the world believe. We would, therefore, strongly urge the Central Government to accept their suggestion and appoint such a commission—comprising persons who have experience of the administration's working and will not allow their recommendations to be influenced by preconceived ideas or prejudices—so that this long-standing grievance of an important segment of the services can be dealt with speedily and satisfactorily.

This was Mazhar Ali Khan's last editorial in **The** Pakistan Times

Gul Hayat Institute



Gul Hayat Institute

Section 4: Disgraceful Exhibition Politics in the Provinces

Gul Hayat Institute



Gul Hayat Institute

I. EAST BENGAL

12 November 1949 East Bengal

It is becoming increasingly obvious that the lack of regular news from East Bengal provides no ground for any complacency with regard to the political situation in that distant Province of Pakistan. Faced with serious economic and social problems, separated by more than a thousand miles from other Provinces and surrounded by Indian territory, the need for economic and political stability in that important part of Pakistan is perhaps greater and more urgent than anywhere else. As far as the task of strengthening and safeguarding East Bengal's economy is concerned, the Central Government has done a great deal; the success of the measures recently adopted now depends on the ability of the Provincial Government to implement the plans and policies drafted under the direct supervision of and largely financed by the Central Government. But, in view of the disturbing reports that are received every now and then, we sincerely hope that no one in Karachi considers that all that had to be done in East Pakistan has already been done and that the Central leadership can now sit back with equanimity.

Political dissensions within the East Bengal Muslim League, which raised their head a long time age, are known to persist in an extremely acute form. Details of the issues involved are not known, but it seems fairly certain that the pattern of the conflict is not dissimilar to those which have disgraced more than one province in West Pakistan. As a necessary concomitant of factional strife, corruption among the services is widespread, adding to the burdens of the people

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and making the Muslim League regime even less popular. Recently, serious allegations of misconduct have been made against a prominent East Bengal Minister, hush-hush visits to Karachi are being paid by local Muslim League leaders and it is rumoured that a big split in the Cabinet is threatened. Even if persuasion by the Centre can prevent further serious developments, for the present at any rate, such periodical patching up of 'differences' is not likely to improve the Ministry's working in any way. The Provincial Committee of the Muslim League, deliberately confined to a small section of the people, has ostensibly made itself a party to the scramble for personal power: although at a certain stage a number of good resolutions were passed by its Working Committee, there is little or no possibility of this organisation being able to clean up the growing mess in East Bengal politics.

Popular discontent against Ministerial policies has shown no signs of abatement, nor does the Government seem to be particularly concerned about gaining the support of the people. Apart from the long list of administrative evils, unremedied so far, the Ministry has done nothing to solve any of East Bengal's major economic problems. To take only one example, the Abolition of *Zamindari* Bill is still in the stages of preliminary discussions and, as time passes, the hopes raised by the announcement of its principles are being replaced by fears that the measure when enacted will bring no relief whatsoever to the mass of East Bengal cultivators, although ample provision has been made to ensure that the landlords and sublandlords receive enormous amounts of money as compensation.

The defeat, some months ago, of the official Muslim League candidate in an Assembly by-election proves that a wide gulf exists between the people and the Government. Neither the Ministry nor the League organisation has been able to re-orientate its policy in order to rescue the name of the Muslim League from disrepute. Instead, Safety Acts and Ordinances are being used indiscriminately and ruthlessly to stifle all criticism and the familiar slogans of 'disruptionists' and 'fifth columnists' are freely bandied to shield the Government's inability or unwillingness to fulfil the wishes and demands of the people.

24 July 1953 Civil Liberties in East Bengal

In the gloomy story of conditions in East Bengal related by Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani during his current sojourn in Lahore, the account of the state of civil liberties in that Province forms the darkest chapter. Against the background of the sorry state of affairs in Eastern Pakistan and in view of the approach of the long-postponed elections, the problem of civil liberties assumes unusual significance. The shortcomings and failures of a Government may be put up with for a long time and the hardships and sufferings they bring may be patiently borne by the people in the hope that, sooner or later, the rulers may be changed through an unfettered exercise of the franchise. But with the suppression of civil liberties the right to vote becomes largely meaningless and this hope tends to disappear or recede into a very distant future, causing intense bitterness and a deep sense of frustration among the people. This state of mind constitutes the most formidable impediment to the democratic process.

By refusing to remove the existing restrictions on individual liberty and political freedom the East Bengal Government is only adding insult to the injury inflicted upon the people by the unconscionable postponement of the elections and its failure to hold nearly thirty by-elections for the past four years. It will be recalled that on the eve of his assumption of office, the new Governor, Ch. Khaliquzzaman, had assured the people of freedom and fairness at the elections. It is certainly no indication of his Government's desire to honour his pledge that several hundred political detenus continue to languish in prison, a daily newspaper has been ordered to furnish security for having reported a starvation death and the teachers of private educational institutions have been prohibited by an Ordinance from taking part in political activity.

^{1 March 1954} East Bengal Elections

The latest reports from East Bengal amply substantiate the charge made recently by Mr H.S. Suhrawardy that a 'reign of terror' has been let loose in that Province, in order to ensure the Muslim League's return to power. According to unofficial estimates, nearly 800 political workers belonging to different Opposition parties have been arrested, which, added to those detained previously, brings to four figures the number of citizens incarcerated, mostly without charge or trial, for the sin of trying to exercise their constitutional right to work and vote for a political party of their own choice. The Public Safety Act is being prostituted in the interests of the party in power; the Press has been victimised; offices of Opposition parties have been raided by mobs: Opposition leaders have been attacked by hooligans; official succour is being promised to Muslim League candidates; and the ruling party's election fund is being built up with the help of Government officials. Although the last charge has never been denied, presumably because the facts are too well known, the widespread repression is justified by Muslim League-leaders- and their apologists in the name of safeguarding law and order and protecting the integrity of the State. It is sought to explain away the denial of the people's democratic rights by accusing the Opposition parties of trying to disrupt public order and by falsely alleging that they are seeking to destroy Pakistan. This propaganda line has been taken up even by those elements who not long ago were heaping ridicule on the Muslim League for the adoption of such mean and transparently stupid tactics. The principle of the big lie cannot, however, save the Muslim League and its unprincipled sycophants from their well-deserved nemesis, for the people

of Pakistan have not forgotten the misdeeds of Messrs Qaiyum Khan and Khuhro, nor the cock-and-bull stories of conspiracies and anti-State plans with which these gentlemen sought to justify their fascist methods of retaining power.

It is perfectly obvious that fear of electoral defeat has compelled the Muslim League leadership to forget its promises of free and fair elections, and that the people of East Bengal are being given a dose of the treatment which was tried out in the Frontier Province, Bahawalpur and the Punjab. It is as yet difficult to say whether the Muslim League will be able to terrorise and hoodwink the people of East Bengal sufficiently to secure another lease of power. But there can be no doubt that what little claim the ruling party ever had to public support has been destroyed by its resort to such disgraceful tactics. The East Bengal election was in many ways considered to be a test for the new leaders of the Central Muslim League who had justified their *coup de grace* against the Nazimuddin group in the name of democracy, efficiency and much else. In Mr Mohammed Ali's loud professions of solicitude for the democratic way of life many politicians saw, or pretended to see, 'a ray of hope' for the restoration of civil liberties and the rule of law. With the Bengal elections still more than a week away, the Muslim League leadership has failed miserably to live up to its most important pledge, namely, to ensure impartial elections, and even the peddlers of the 'ray of hope' theory cannot deny that either they themselves were deluded or they were trying to delude the people. The darkness in East Bengal is probably at its worst today. But the ruling party's latest betrayal of its promises should spur the Opposition parties to intensify their efforts to vote the Muslim League out of power; and one would like to hope that the common people, undeterred by the Muslim League terror and uninfluenced by their electiontime blandishments, will support the Opposition in their struggle to end the regime of a party which has forfeited its right to remain in power by reason of its persistent attacks on the democratic rights of the people, its lack of respect for

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public opinion, its whole-hearted devotion to factional wrangles and selfish manoeuvres, and the complete absence of any programme or policy except to retain possession of the seats of power—by fair means if possible, by foul means whenever necessary.

^{9 March 1954} Prime Minister's clarification

The Prime Minister's clarification of his earlier statement about the political future of East Bengal will be read with considerable satisfaction by all Pakistanis—except, of course, for the microscopic minority who seem to hold the view that the emasculation of democracy is its best service. His recent declaration—that 'whatever the results of the election in East Bengal, the security and stability of Pakistan will not be allowed to be jeopardised'—had widely been interpreted as implying clearly that even if the Opposition parties scored a victory in the electoral tussle, they would not be allowed to form a Government; it was, therefore, described in these columns two days ago as 'an ominous threat to the East Bengal people's right to choose their own rulers and to the very existence of democracy in Pakistan'. Mr Mohammed Ali has now promised, in fairly definite terms, that if the Opposition gain a majority in the new East Bengal Legislature 'they will be able to form a Ministry', explaining that his previous remarks had been made in reply to a British newspaper's editorial which had forecast that the Muslim League's defeat in East Bengal would be 'a blow to Pakistan's security'. The Prime Minister said that what he had really meant was that 'no provincial Government, whatever its complexion, would be permitted to jeopardise Pakistan's security'. In this context, and accepting his explanation at its face value, the Prime Minister's stand would appear to be unexceptionable. Nevertheless, it is necessary to reiterate that the security of Pakistan cannot—as some of the ruling party's spokesmen are wont to do-be confused with the Muslim

League's retention of power, and that the people will not allow their democratic rights to be overridden on the basis of any such confusion. The issue is of such great importance that Mr Mohammed Ali would be well advised to deal with it in greater detail and give the people the fullest possible assurance that the Muslim League will not be kept in power under any pretext if it is defeated at the polls, and that the Central Government's special powers will not be used for the purpose of keeping any other party out of office if it gains a majority in the Legislature. The dangers inherent in the people losing faith in democracy, and in their ability to change a Government by means of the ballot, are so obvious, and have been pointed out so often, that they need not be recounted here. The doings and sayings of Muslim League leaders during the East Bengal election campaign, the large-scale arrests of political workers, and the odd manner in which Section 92-A is going to be imposed in the Province, have naturally given rise to the fear that the Government does not intend the current election to be a fair contest and that, even if they can overcome the various obstacles put in their path, the Opposition parties' legitimate bid to assume power will, if necessary, be thwarted by other means. Mr Mohammed Ali's clarification of his stand will to some extent allay these suspicions; but if he really wants to ensure a clean election in East Bengal, he must immediately undo the wrongs done by his party-men and give an unequivocal assurance that his Government will abide by the people's verdict.

Gul Hayat Inst 19 March 1954 The Rout

No doubt now remains of the Muslim League's complete rout in East Bengal. Never before, in the history of parliamentary strife, has the party in power suffered such an ignominious and decisive defeat; and never was such a nemesis so richly deserved. The Muslim League was elevated to power by the people's urge to live in freedom, to smash the shackles of foreign domination and eliminate the danger of domination by the majority community, to gain for themselves a homeland where they could build a new democratic life. Having assumed office on the strength of its promises to create a new order based on social and economic justice and the guarantee of equal rights for all citizens, the Muslim League did not take very long to tear up its manifestos and betray its pledges. With exceptions so rare that today they hardly deserve mention, the leaders of the party, on whom the people had lavished so much trust and confidence, were found within the first few years to be small men, distinguished mainly for their selfish ambitions and unlimited capacity for intrigue. Turning their backs on the people and ignoring their aspirations, the Muslim League leaders became single-minded devotees of personal power and pelf, strutting on Pakistan's political stage with the arrogance and vulgar ostentation of petty medieval despots. The organisation which, under the Quaid-i-Azam's leadership, had once commanded the loyalty of millions was gradually reduced to an esoteric circle of favoured job-hunters; and its standards, which had once been the symbol of hope for the people, now lie enshrined in a temple where Mammon is the only ruling deity.

With its pursuit of power as an end in itself, the personal squabbles of its leaders, and the unending factional wars raging at all levels of what remains of the organisation, the Muslim League has sunk deeper and deeper into the morass of its own creation. Unconcerned with the problems of the people, its administration has become the last word in corruption and nepotism, bungling and inefficiency, short-sightedness and planlessness. Isolated from the masses, it has sought to retain power—whenever it was considered feasible—by resort to every trick in the armoury of fascism: arrests without charge or trial, suppression of the Press, denial of the right of public meeting, misuse of administrative power, gerrymandering of elections, and, in certain cases, complete perversion of the electoral machinery. Despite—or, in one

sense, because of—these factors, the people of East Bengal, where Muslim League misrule has probably been seen at its worst, have banded together and successfully accomplished the laudable task of removing the Muslim League from the seat of power; and the thoroughness with which the United Front has done this job, which may well be regarded as an essential prerequisite to Pakistan's progress, is shown by the details of the election results in East Bengal.

What of the future? As far as the people are concerned, they will undoubtedly desire an early opportunity to complete the good work begun in East Bengal. The growing demand for a new Constituent Assembly, directly elected by the people, is unanswerable, and the leaders of the United Front have done well to clarify their position on this point. Efforts, however, are being made to inveigle the United Front into some sort of a compromise with the remnants of the Muslim League, and those very persons who, until a few days ago, were impugning the integrity and patriotism of the United Front leadership are now talking in terms of a United Front-Muslim League coalition both in East Bengal and at the Centre. We do not know what the plans of the United Front leaders are, but it is obvious that they would be betraying the very basis of their election fight if they are tempted to form an unprincipled alliance with the Muslim League. With regard to East Bengal the United Front's right to form a Government has been so well established that the Muslim League leadership cannot possibly be so insane as to think of denying it by a prolongation of the Section 92-A regime. At the Centre, after the Muslim League's total collapse in East Bengal, the present Constituent Assembly has no moral or political right left to continue its own existence as the sole custodian of our national sovereignty... The United Front leadership should realise that they have shouldered certain important responsibilities on behalf of the people of Pakistan and that any short-cut to office which adversely affects the Front's election pledges would be an act of disservice to the country and an invitation to another period of confusion and widespread frustration. Therefore, in co-operation with all the democratic elements in West Pakistan, the United Front must insist on immediate dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and country-wide elections to replace it with a democratically elected and representative body. The demand is as just as it is irresistible, and it offers the only sure path to making democracy safe in Pakistan.

^{1 June 1954} East Bengal Crisis

The dismissal of the Fazlul Hug Ministry and the imposition of Governor's rule in East Bengal signify the most serious political crisis that has been faced by this State since its inception. Although precedent for similar action exists, earlier use of Section 92-A, in the Punjab and Sind, was made in radically different circumstances. In these two Provinces the Muslim League Ministries had become extremely unpopular and the majority party, riven by prolonged factional wranglings, had fully proved its inability to provide these Provinces with a stable administration. In East Bengal, however, there is no indication to show that the United Front has lost any of the public support that won it such a decisive victory at the polls; nor can it be said that the Party had been given sufficient time to tackle the various problems with which it was confronted. Further, the fact cannot be ignored that the East Bengal Assembly represents a majority of Pakistan's total population, and that if the United Front's just demand for reconstitution of the Constituent Assembly had been accepted the responsibility for forming a Government at the Centre may well have devolved upon its leaders. The virtual suspension of the Legislature, which came into being in fair and free elections only a few weeks ago, makes the Central Government's undemocratic action all the more regrettable, and the fact that the Safety Act has been used to arrest a large number of the United Front's supporters, including one dismissed Minister, is likely to exacerbate the

tense situation in East Bengal. Even those who consider that Central intervention was unavoidable cannot deny that the whole affair has been handled with extreme tactlessness, and the circumstances in which the drastic action has been taken, coupled with the uninhibited jubilation of the Muslim League Press, are likely to create an adverse reaction in East Bengal, with the possibility of consequences which no true friend of Pakistan can contemplate with equanimity.

The broadcast speech of the Prime Minister of Pakistan justifying his Government's decision contains a variety of charges against Mr Fazlul Hug and some of his colleagues. The gravamen of the indictment is that the United Front Ministry failed to maintain law and order. The question of the responsibility for the recent killing at Narayanganj is an extremely controversial matter. Well before any effective investigation could have been conducted, the Prime Minister seemingly came to certain definite conclusions, which, in the beginning at any rate, were not shared by all of his colleagues. The United Front leaders, on the other hand, have held a different view and have also made serious allegations about the responsibility for the carnage. It is worth noting in this context that, while Muslim Leaguers in East Bengal have accused the Fazlul Hug Government of failure to save Bengali lives, their counterparts in this zone have levelled the contrary charge that the East Pakistan Government failed to save the lives and properties of non-Bengalis. In any case, although the cruel and wanton loss of life in East Bengal during recent weeks is a very serious matter, one would have expected the Central Government to wait for a judicial investigation of the incidents before resorting to stern punitive measures. This had become all the more necessary in view of the difference of opinion between Dacca and Karachi. The Centre should have provided the people with positive proof of the veracity of its conclusions before taking the final step, if only to avoid the suspicion that the Muslim League leadership was taking advantage of a grim tragedy to further the interests of its Party. With regard to Mr Fazlul Huq's wavering on the

constitutional issue, it must be remembered that the United Front has always stood for complete provincial autonomy and that this demand figures importantly in its election manifesto. Therefore if, during his early negotiations with the Centre, Mr Fazlul Hug gave the impression that he was willing to repudiate his Party's manifesto and come to terms with the Central leadership without the approval of his colleagues, this may provide added proof of the gentleman's political instability but it can hardly furnish cause for his dismissal. In any case, with the country's future Constitution still on the anvil, every political party and every citizen of Pakistan has the right to criticize or suggest constitutional formulae. It is equally obvious that the demand for provincial autonomy cannot be equated with disruption, for overcentralisation of the Government, where it is unnecessary or impracticable, does not foster national unity and is only likely to encourage provincial jealousies. As far as Mr Fazlul Hug's indiscreet speeches are concerned, we have already stated in these columns that if he did in fact utter the words with which he was credited, he could not expect any Pakistani to support him or even condone his utterly ridiculous statements. However, after Mr Fazlul Hug had been severely criticised for his queer utterances by his own colleagues and important leaders of the United Front, including Maulana Bhashani, and after he had categorically denied having made the objectionable remarks attributed to him and had wholeheartedly repudiated their sinister implications, one feels that it would have been wiser to allow the United Front itself to deal with its leader. Central intervention of a different nature may have been justified if it was genuinely felt that Mr Fazlul Huq really harboured anti-Pakistan plans or if he had persisted in what may rightly be regarded as anti-Pakistan propaganda. The Centre's hasty and ill-advised decision to dismiss the Fazlul Hug Ministry and impose a Section 92-A regime is, we fear. likely to be interpreted. particularly in East Bengal, as a refusal to allow that Province to exercise its right of deciding who should be its rulers.

There can hardly be any disagreement with the objectives outlined by the Prime Minister in his explanatory broadcast. It is obvious that law and order must be maintained, the life and property of every section of the people fully protected, and the economic life of the Province safeguarded against disruption. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether these ends will be better served by the Centre's policy of imposing direct Central rule upon the Province and denying the United Front the opportunity which had been given to it under a clear mandate from the people. Mr Fazlul Huq's rambling cannot easily be accepted as a sufficient cause for the virtual disfranchisement of a whole Province and for what will be interpreted as victimisation of the United Front. We would like to hope that the Central Government will reconsider their decision and that, instead of keeping East Bengal under a gubernatorial regime, which, however efficient it may be, can never elicit public support, they will restore democratic Government in the country's biggest province.

East Bengal Prospects

The gratification caused by the East Bengal Governor's recent assurance that the Section 92-A regime would not be retained 'for a day beyond the period for which it was absolutely necessary' will be considerably vitiated by some of his other utterances, particularly those which indicate that he has been asked to undertake long-term schemes of economic or administrative reforms. Experience has shown that, even where the advisability of applying the drastic remedy of suspending democratic rule is generally conceded, any delay in the restoration of the people's democratic rights is advisable. In the peculiar circumstances which led to the imposition of Section 92-A in East Bengal, when the necessity of the action taken is widely disputed and the Centre has been accused of bias and partisanship, it is all the more necessary that the period of gubernatorial dictatorship should

be exceedingly brief. It is hardly necessary to point out that, however benign and well-meaning the present administration may be, it cannot be accepted for very long as an alternative to a Government headed by persons chosen by the people. The main task allotted to Major-General Iskander Mirza is that of restoring law and order, eliminating the fear of rioting between different sections of the people, and bringing the Province's economic life back to normal. Judging from the Press reports available, this mission has well-nigh been accomplished. The return to complete normalcy would further be facilitated by reversing the policy of repression which was, presumably, considered necessary to smother the strong public reaction expected after the dismissal of the United Front Ministry. Already the Press has been freed from precensorship. The next step should be the release of the 772 or more persons detained under the Safety Act, except, of course, for those considered guilty of some crimes, who should be tried in a court of law and suitably punished. With regard to determining the responsibility for the ghastly events at Narayanganj and Karnaphulli, we agree fully with the East Bengal Governor that this important task can only be entrusted to an impartial judicial commission. Such a commission should be appointed immediately. It is, however, by no means necessary or desirable to keep East Bengal under Section 92-A until the investigation is complete. It should now, therefore, be the Governor's prime duty to discuss with the majority party in the Assembly, namely, the United Front, the formation of a popular Ministry to take over the Government. If an earnest effort is made in this direction, we see no reason why it should not be possible to restore normal political life in East Bengal. Whether the Central Government will allow such a development to take place is problematical. The Governor's declaration that he is not going to tolerate the activities of 'political agitators' but that he would welcome the co-operation of 'constructive workers'-when it is adjudged in the background of a complete ban on the United Front meeting and the news that preparations are being

made unhindered to hold a Muslim League conference—is likely to create the suspicion that during the Section 92-A regime he is expected to pave the way for the Muslim League's political rehabilitation. Such a plan cannot possibly succeed, for whoever else may fill the political vacuum being created in East Bengal, it cannot be the discredited and inept coterie of leaders who control the ruling party in that zone; and the attempt itself will do a great deal of harm by weakening confidence in the Governor's promise of an absolutely impartial administration and by reducing the effectiveness of his plea for the people's co-operation. We hope, therefore, that General Iskander Mirza will not be a party to the Muslim League's manoeuvrings and that he will try his best to give East Bengal a democratic Government in the shortest possible time.

6 February 1955 East Bengal Scene

The political scene in East Bengal continues to present a picture of utter confusion. When, last year, the stranglehold of East Bengal's unrepresentative clique of Muslim League leaders over the Central Government was tinally broken, it was hoped that the Centre would view the situation in that Province more realistically and take early steps to restore normalcy. This expectation was heightened by the Prime Minister's frequent references to his desire to end the gubernatorial dictatorship, by the declarations made by different Government spokesmen that the law-and-order situation in East Bengal was most satisfactory, and by Mr Suhrawardy's inclusion in the Central Cabinet. Not a single tangible step has, however, been taken to pave the way for the restoration of constitutional government, and it is impossible to forecast with any degree of certainty when the Central Government intend to fulfil the pledges given in this regard by the Prime Minister. The suspension of the East Bengal Legislative Assembly has been accompanied by a

blanket ban on virtually all political activity. Except for short periods, public meetings and processions have not been allowed in most districts of the Province. The political vacuum thus created has prevented the people of East Bengal from appraising the actions of their leaders and influencing the course of events. At the same time, the manner in which negotiations are reported to have been conducted between certain sections of the United Front and the Central Muslim League leadership has also tended to obscure the principles involved and to intensify the personal or group conflicts which have caused deep fissures in the United Front. In these circumstances, the meeting of its Parliamentary Party scheduled for 17 February, if it takes place at all, is likely to be devoted entirely to intra-party differences. The existence of these differences does not, however, as the Muslim League Press exultantly claims, provide a sound argument for the continuation of the Section 92-A regime in East Bengal. Apart from the fact that the split in the United Front was, from the very start, deliberately encouraged by certain responsible Muslim League leaders, and that the situation has been made worse by the latest round of negotiations, it needs to be realised—and leaders of the Muslim League should for obvious reasons be the first to accept this statement—that complete unity and solidarity cannot be regarded as a prerequisite to the acceptance of a party's claim to form a Government when it commands a clear majority in the Legislature. Whether Mr Fazlul Huq can retain the leadership of the United Front Parliamentary Party, or he is replaced by someone else, does not in any way affect the rarty's right to be given an opportunity to form a Ministry. It could be argued that the present state of the United Front will not allow it to give East Bengal a stable Government. This, however, takes us into the realm of pure speculation, and the democratic process cannot be halted on the basis of such prognostications. The United Front will anyhow have to face this test when the Assembly is resuscitated: and if the leader of the Party fails to obtain a majority in the House, he will automatically forfeit

his claim to head the Government. But the mere possibility of such a development taking place cannot be used as an excuse to further delay the restoration of democracy. It further needs to be realised that this democratic decision is necessary not only in order to restore normal conditions in East Bengal, but also because the Legislature must be brought back to life so that it can ratify the new Constitution that is now under preparation. We earnestly hope that further delay will not be allowed to make the political situation in that Province even more confused and that an early decision will be taken to withdraw Section 92-A in East Bengal.

8 March 1956 Fazlul Huq's Appointment

The appointment of Mr Fazlul Hug as Governor of East Bengal, and its announcement immediately after all matters connected with Constitution-making had finally been settled. will cause little surprise. It had been strongly rumoured during recent weeks that Bengal's veteran politician had set his heart on rounding off his variegated public career with the ascent of the gubernatorial gaddi in his own Province, and that he had made a firm request in this behalf to the Prime Minister some time ago. The issue is reported to have been clinched after Mr Fazlul Hug's return from his latest trip to East Bengal, and before he finally agreed to forego-the demands formulated at Dacca-in his meetings with local leaders of the United Front and the leaders of other parties-and to accept on essential points of dispute the stand of the Muslim League group in the Coalition Party. It has also been said that, as the only influential leader of the United Front rump, his presence in East Bengal was considered absolutely necessary to save the Sarkar Ministry from being thrown out of office as soon as the reprieve granted to it by the unorthodox postponement of the Budget session has run its course and the long-delayed session of the East Bengal Legislature has to be called. The most alarming of such reports, however, is the forecast that Mr Fazlul Huq's appointment is a prelude to the East Bengal Assembly being disbanded once again. We earnestly hope that this depressing rumour will not be confirmed by events, for that would be too cruel and too ironic a blow to the people's aspirations—especially after all the wordy tributes to democracy that the country has heard during the last few days.

Be that as it may, it is anyhow an unhealthy development that gubernatorial appointments should be made under the strong suspicion that the decision is part of a political bargain. Nor is it a wise move to appoint an active politician as Governor, because the head of the provincial administration is supposed to act with judicious impartiality, and it is an accepted principle that he should be trusted by all political parties. For an active political leader to be elevated to the Governor's post, and particularly, as in East Bengal's circumstances, when his assistance is urgently required to save his party's Ministry from downfall, is a serious violation of democratic traditions. The fact that the earlier selection of the present Governor of West Pakistan provides a precedent for Mr Fazlul Hug's appointment does not, however, create any justification for the step. In fact, impartial observers would point out that the developments that have taken place in this wing following that brazenly political appointment should have served as a warning against repeating what clearly is a grave error of policy. What, however, is rather amusing in the context of Mr Fazlul Huq's appointment is that it has been criticised from the standpoint of democratic principles by certain newspapers which have never considered themselves bound, on the same principles, to express the slightest disapproval of the appointment of the West Pakistan Governor or his continued participation in active politics.

8 September 1956 The New Ministry

The installation of a new coalition Ministry in East Pakistan, headed by the Awami League, will be greeted with joyful

relief by everyone whose attachment to democratic principles is genuine and not merely a matter of convenience. Sinceonly a few months after it was formed-the Sarkar Ministry forfeited its right to rule the Province, because in deviating from its election pledges the United Front lost the support of some of its component groups and a large number of other MLAs, East Pakistan has hovered on the very edge of the steep decline leading to total dictatorship. During this period every known trick was shamelessly employed to maintain Mr Sarkar and his friends in office, and he made assiduous efforts to buy the majority he needed to secure the Chief Ministerial gaddi for himself. By-elections were avoided, the Assembly was either not called, or, when a session could be postponed no longer, the Legislature was either adjourned or prorogued before it could exercise its power to change the Government; the Ministry was expanded unduly, and unprincipled intrigues and factional alliances completely replaced normal political activity. But, despite its single-minded devotion to the task of clinging to office, and primarily because it had alienated the people's sympathies, it became more and more difficult for the United Front rump to retain its hold over the sceptre. The Centre and, even more so, the Provincial Governor gave Mr Sarkar all possible help, but even their efforts could not save the situation. The choice before the Centre now was either to prolong the artificial emergency by reimposing Central rule for an indefinite period or to bow before the dictates of the Constitution and allow the Leader of the Awami League Party to form a new Government. That it has chosen to follow the latter course undoubtedly redounds to its credit, because any of the other alternatives open to it would have endangered the future of democracy and caused bitter frustration among the people. Nevertheless, the fact that it was a matter of considerable doubt whether the Central Government would do the right thing, and refrain from perverting the democratic process, shows that the foundations of democracy in Pakistan are still weak and insecure, and that the people must for long maintain a careful vigil if the country is to be saved from democracy's fair-weather friends—those who take shelter in semi-fascist theories and undemocratic practices at the first sign of a threat to the position of their favourite faction.

The Awami League has taken over the reins of authority under extremely difficult circumstances. It will be no easy task for the new coalition to steer a clear course in East Pakistan's muddy waters and avoid the sandbanks that have wrecked more than one previous regime... The new Ministry will also find that many among those in high positions in the country had exerted themselves fully to keep it out of office even after it had become clear that no stable Government could be formed without the co-operation of the Awami League and its allies; and there is the danger that some of those whose tactics have been thwarted may try to prevent full Central co-operation being extended to the new Cabinet. We would like to hope that partisan considerations and prejudices will be overcome, so that, even if the composition of the Central Government remains unchanged, the novel juxtaposition of parties in the Parliament and the East Pakistan Assembly does not stand in the way of the two Governments working together smoothly to accomplish common tasks. If this can be assured, there are reasons to hope that the new Ministry, with its close links with the people and a positive political basis, will be able to overcome the difficulties it has to face, give the Province a clean and honest administration. and make a sincere effort to implement its election promises.

And, finally, a great deal will depend on the new Ministry's attitude towards the people and their problems... Far too often, after the assumption of power by a political group the people are left out of the reckoning, and the winning over of MLAs becomes the party leaders' main occupation, with intrigue. unprincipled manoeuvring, and plain bribery, as the chief weapons in the dirty war for power as an end in itself. Not only are the consequences of such methods disastrous for the country, but in these battles every victory is Pyrrhic, every triumph ends in bitterness, because intrigue breeds further intrigue, and almost before one phase of the struggle has ended preparations are under way for the next round. It will fervently be hoped by all serious-minded democrats, irrespective of their party affiliations, that East Pakistan's new rulers will abandon the evil methods of the past and resolve firmly that, notwithstanding any attempts that are made to persuade them to do otherwise, they will not give up their programme, depend directly on the people for political support, and scrupulously abide by the rules of the game.

7 April 1958 Disgraceful Exhibition

The exhibition of rowdyism witnessed during the East Pakistan Assembly's last session, before its prorogation on Saturday, will long be remembered as one of the most disgraceful among the many strange episodes that make the history of parliamentary institutions in Pakistan such depressing reading. Even if the Opposition leaders believe that, since his installation as the protector and arbiter of the rights of the Assembly and its Members, the present Speaker's words and actions have lacked the judicial impartiality expected from the Chair, the seriousness of this charge does not help to extenuate their gross misconduct. Whatever the grievances of KSP and Muslim League leaders, they should have registered their protest against Mr Abdul Hakeem in the accepted parliamentary mode of criticising the Speaker-and without divesting themselves of the decency and dignity required of all public representatives sitting in a Legislature. Nor can it be said that the opposition parties acted under sudden provocation and should, therefore, be easily forgiven. It is obvious from the nature of their attack on the Speaker that they had come fully prepared to disrupt the proceedings of the House, and that they wanted to insult the Chair, not so much for anything the Speaker had said or done, but as a means of protesting against the Governor's order of proroguing the Assembly. This makes their decision to disturb the session even more reprehensible. Whatever their motives, the gentlemen responsible for creating Saturday's shameful scenes must be made to realise that rotten eggs and rubbish do not constitute an argument of any sort, and they certainly cannot help to strengthen the Opposition parties' claim to rule the Province.

It is plain that the strange performance of the Opposition leaders was a result of their deep disappointment at losing the cup of office when it was so near their lips. After having sought to capture power with Mr Fazlul Huq's over-zealous help, and having asked for immediate prorogation of the Assembly, Mr Abu Hossain Sarkar and his friends cannot logically object to suspension of the Assembly's session by the Awami League Government. But the deprivation of office does not always improve the reasoning power of politicians. particularly with those who after once tasting the joys of office become convinced that the only important thing in political life is to return to power—as an end in itself. irrespective of the means employed to achieve it. However, in fairness, it must be admitted that a not dissimilar spirit animates a large section of the Awami League; and that, during this party's term of office, many of its leaders have been guilty of misdeeds very similar to those which inspired their main slogans against the ruling party during the last election. Apart from instances of maladministration and corruption, the Awami League Ministry has been guilty of the sin of misusing its power to interfere in Assembly byelections: and. what is more, it is now riven by factional and personal differences.

The lessons of the current East Pakistan crisis are thus fairly easy to read. The Awami League nearly lost its Government by following in the footsteps of its predecessors: it can save itself from going the way of the Muslim League only by adhering faithfully to its election programme and eschewing strong-arm tactics and power politics. It must also strive for the restoration of unity within its ranks by throwing out the rank opportunists and office-hunters whose corrosive influence is destroying the Party. The fact that the NAP, the main victim of its repressive policy, has been responsible for giving the Awami League Ministry another lease of life not only does credit to the NAP, but should show the Awami League leaders that respect for political principles is an essential ingredient of political stability; and that, if such cooperation is to be maintained, the Awami League must make itself worthy of disinterested support. The Opposition parties should also think seriously over the manner in which they have sought to oust their opponents and realise that a return to such political tactics can only do grave harm to the country by destroying stability and thus endangering the very base of democracy; and also that they will drastically reduce the life expectation of their political parties if they ignore the people's desire for early elections and continue to manocuvre for purely personal or partisan ends.

20 June 1958 East Pakistan Crisis

Last-minute efforts to save the Awami League Ministry in East Pakistan—through a new agreement with the National Awami Party—having failed, the Ata-ur-Rehman Government has been compelled to resign, after suffering an adverse vote in the Assembly on a cut motion. Its fall will generally be viewed with alarm and dismay, not because the Ministry had made any startling achievements, or even kept its conduct above reproach, but because the people are justifiably sick and tired of frequent, mostly unprincipled. Ministerial changes. They also realise that the present crisis could easily jeopardise the General Election and involve the country in a convulsion that would weaken its democratic foundations. The parties primarily responsible for allowing this to happen. namely, the Awami League and the National Awami Party, are certainly not unaware of the grave repercussions that the latest developments can have throughout the country; and yet -000

they were unable to pull together in order to thwart the efforts of a coalition which, whatever certain KSP leaders might say, seeks to restore the system of communal electorates, mainly in order to avoid facing the General Election for another year or two.

The biggest factor responsible for the Awami League's peculiar lack of resistance against the KSP attack is the deep rift that divides the Party into two main groups. It seems obvious now that Mr H.S. Suhrawardy and Mr Mujib-ur-Rehman were not particularly interested in helping to keep the Ata Ministry in office. Therefore, their manoeuvres were apparently aimed at ensuring that the NAP-AL negotiations did not succeed. Apart from personal rivalries between the party's bosses, the organisation was also split by numerous squabbles on a lower level, over minor offices and small fayours. As a result, it became difficult to check the numerous defections which depleted the strength of the Awami League and its coalition partners. And, lastly, the Government's failure to handle the food and epidemics situation with efficiency, and rumours that some of Mr Ata-ur-Rehman's colleagues were taking advantage of their position to line their own pockets, had deprived the party leadership of the support of many in the rank and file whose loyalty could otherwise never have been impaired.

As far as the National Awami Party is concerned, its final decision to remain neutral in the tussle for power provides no salve for its Assembly Party's rightly-troubled conscience. Apart from the fact that by remaining neutral the NAP sealed the fate of the Ata Ministry as effectively as it could have done by voting with the Opposition, its position defies all logic. For if the NAP felt that the Awami League Ministry deserved to be thrown out of office, and that its exit would create a reasonable chance of a stable alternative Ministry being installed, they should have voted with the Opposition. If, on the other hand, they felt that the downfall of the Ata Ministry would throw the door wide open to chaos; that no stable Ministry could be set up to replace the Awami

League Coalition, and that Article-93 might be promulgated and enforced for a long time, the NAP should have continued its support of the Awami League Government irrespective of all other considerations. It would have been a totally different matter if, right from the beginning, the NAP had kept away from Ministerial squabbles, and voted on each question purely on its merits without bothering about the fluctuation of Ministerial fortunes. But the NAP Central Parliamentary Board will remember that, only three months ago, the NAP Assembly Party helped to maintain the Ata Ministry in office. It is difficult to see what basic change in the situation had taken place since March this year to justify the Party's sudden change of policy. Nor can the formulation of a five-point programme, which NAP leaders are peddling in legislative markets, help them to escape their share of the responsibility for precipitating Pakistan's latest political crisis.

No definite indication is yet available to show what the future holds for East Pakistan and the rest of the country. Will the Opposition parties be able to muster a clear majority and form a Government? What will be the basic programme of the new coalition? Although Mr Abu Hossain Sarkar has been commissioned to form a new Ministry, final answers to these questions will be available only after another three or four days. One would, in any case, like to hope that the crisis will not be allowed to spread and that, whatever may happen in East Pakistan, there will be no Ministerial changes elsewhere, so that the elections can be held in accordance with the schedule laid down by the Election Commission.

26 June 1958 Article 193 Again

Although, on purely administrative grounds, a plausible case can be made out in favour of the Central Government's decision to suspend parliamentary government in East Pakistan, it would have been far better, for a host of political reasons, if Mr Ata-ur-Rehman had been given another opportunity to establish his claim to the support of a steady majority in the East Pakistan Assembly. The Governor's report that a stable Ministry could not be formed in the Province, in addition to the fact that the Budget had to be passed before 30 June, certainly created a difficult situation and gave a strong handle to those who anyhow favoured the imposition of President's rule in East Pakistan. Nevertheless. it cannot be said that resort to Article 193 had become absolutely unavoidable. The voting on the no-confidence resolution against the Sarkar Ministry clearly showed that the Awami League and its allies had managed to obtain the support of a majority in the Legislature. The majority that the Awami League Coalition enjoyed before it was ousted from power a few days ago was not substantially greater than that which it has now been able to muster, and Mr Sarkar's claim to rule the Province was a great deal weaker because his brief victory was due entirely to the National Awami Party's mistaken policy of remaining neutral on the crucial cut motion which was being treated by both sides as an issue of confidence. With regard to the Budget, Mr Ata-ur-Rehman's confident claim that he would be able to secure its passage should have been put to the test, and Article 193 promulgated only if he had failed to make good his promise.

This would obviously have been a wiser course to follow. In the first place, the imposition of President's rule is not a popular move under any circumstances: and it is likely to be resented much more when, as in the case of East Pakistan, the seat of authority lies more than 1,000 miles across the ocean, and when the representation of the Province concerned in the Central Government is weak. Further, the possibility exists that the chaos created in one Province will spread to other parts of the country. If efforts are now made to break up the Coalition at the Centre, it may lead to changes which will not only endanger the holding of elections before the end of the year but also stultify the Constitution, whose full enforcement awaits Pakistan's first General Election. The fact that strange political developments are rumoured to be taking place in West Pakistan makes more real the threat of extraconstitutional action being taken in the name of saving the country from the effects of an emergency which, of course, will have been created by the would-be 'saviours' themselves. In these grave circumstances, it is necessary that the period of President's rule in East Pakistan should be as brief as possible. As soon as the Budget has been certified, the Governor should be instructed to apply himself to the task of finding out which political party enjoys the confidence of the Provincial Assembly so that it can be asked to form a new Ministry.

While we do not approve of the suspension of parliamentary government in East Pakistan (for the fourth time since the present Legislature was elected), those who are shouting the loudest against the betraval of democracy need to be reminded that they themselves are largely responsible for the present unhappy situation. The most important factor in East Pakistan's latest crisis has been the split within the Awami League which deprived Mr Ata-ur-Rehman of the full support of his party bosses. If Mr H. S. Suhrawardy and Mr Mujib-ur-Rehman had not betrayed Mr Ata-ur-Rehman, the betrayal of democracy they complain about would not have been possible. Therefore, the injury that has been done to the party is largely self-inflicted, and the Awami Leaguers are primarily the victims of their own clever intrigues. On the other hand, while we have strongly criticised the NAP's role during the recent crisis, it is of interest to note that a large number of political groups are trying to make a whipping boy of the NAP-presumably, in order to prove that they can pass muster as friends of certain so-called friends of Pakistan. The facts, however, show that the NAP had given the Awami League ample notice that its support would be available only on the basis of its five-point programme. The Awami League had enough time to take a clear-cut decision in regard to the NAP's offer. Instead, its leaders prevaricated, some pulling in one direction and some in the other. Seemingly, the Mujib-ur-Rehman group had

hoped that, during this crisis, they would be able to topple Mr Ata-ur-Rehman as Leader of their Party, and that somehow a new coalition with a new Awami League Chief Minister would then emerge. Only when they realised, after the Awami League Ministry's defeat on the floor of the House, that in trying to change horses in mid-steam the party was likely to be submerged, they performed a quick somersault and accepted the NAP's demands. The opportunism of the Awami League leaders is illustrated further by the fact that as soon as the chances of Mr Ata-ur-Rehman heading a new Cabinet became remote they started questioning the validity, and even the existence, of their latest agreement with the NAP.

However one's sympathies may be divided between the different actors in the drama, no honest appraisal of East Pakistan's fast-moving events can avoid the conclusion that they strengthen the case for ensuring that elections are held before the end of this year. Obviously, the present chaotic state of affairs cannot be ended without giving the people of Pakistan an opportunity to pronounce judgement on the conduct of various individuals and groups who have held the centre of the political stage for a number of years. To prolong the life of the existing Legislatures and the Governments that they have thrown up, or are likely to throw up, would clearly be a disservice to the nation, almost as harmful to the country's interest as any move to disregard and bypass the Constitution in order to set up a non-parliamentary regime.

Gul Hayawrenstitute

22 June 1947 Saving the Investments

The people of the Frontier Province have been given the right under the British plan to vote on their future. Within a month the electorate will decide whether the Province is to join Pakistan or the Indian Union. The League leadership is confident, and the Congress leadership sorely afraid, that the Pathans will choose for themselves the path of common sense. and will not be misled by the machinations of the Khan brothers. Talks initiated by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, whom the Hindu Press loves to call the Frontier Gandhi, are reported to be going on between the Congress and the League. He conferred with the Quaid-i-Azam on Thursday despite the boastful Press statement of his Secretary that the Frontier Gandhi could never dream of such a thing. The original Gandhi has also started offering public prayers for the success of the talks between the Quaid-i-Azam and Abdul Ghaffar Khan. What are the demands of the Congress clique in the Frontier? One would have thought that with the future of the Pathans in the crucible, the demands of the Congress would hinge on fundamental principles and the discussions would relate to high constitutional issues, to the future of the tribes or the economic development of Pathanland. But what has reached us through Press reports so far, leaving out the window dressing, shows that these fighters for complete independence who always call the Frontier League a body of 'toadies, landlords and jobhunters' are pressing for a settlement on the basis of a 'fair' division of the loaves and fishes. They are prepared to accept Pakistan, we are told, even to join the Muslim League, if only Mr Jinnah would let Dr Khan stay in office, if only the existence of the Khan brothers' private army, the Khudai Khidmatgars, would be guaranteed. It seems clear that, having realised the danger of a complete break-up of the Khan family's monopoly of power, office and patronage, the Congress leaders are negotiating and are prepared to be satisfied with a part, if getting the whole is no longer possible. Mr Gandhi, the apostle of Indian unity who even today talks in terms of one India, in loyalty to his most faithful servants, has taken up cudgels on their behalf and expressed his support for a sovereign State of Pathanistan. He has even become concerned for Pathan life and culture and the Pushto language. In his latest prayer meeting he calls the referendum 'premature' and 'a leap in the dark'. He appeals to the Muslim League to settle with the

Khan brothers and avoid a 'conflict'. Why should the lords of the Congress fight shy of the referendum? What Mr Gandhi is trying so hard to avoid now is exactly what he pressed for so insistently in talks with Mr Jinnah in 1944. Surely it is clear and just that the people of the Frontier should be allowed to decide for themselves what they want. The all-out Congress support for an independent Pathanland, when they have accepted Pakistan only under protest and with such bad grace, would be amusing were it not a serious attempt to weaken and disrupt Pakistan. It is the Congress High Command's last throw to save the heavy investments through Khan Brothers Ltd., the sole agents of Congress plutocracy in the area. The issue before the Frontier people is clear. We are confident that, despite the attempts of Congress agents to create confusion in the ranks of the great Pathan people, their emphatic answer from both sides of the border, regarding what they want, will be one simple word-Pakistan'.

(This was, in all probability, Mazhar Ali Khan's first editorial in **The Pakistan Times**).

12 July 1947 Diverse Tongues

The controversy over the Pathanistan demand by the Frontier Congress clique has been before the Indian public for many days now. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress 'expert' on the Frontier question, had so far maintained a discreet silence. He has spoken at last through a despatch addressed to his Public Relations Officer in London and succeeded merely in making confusion more thoroughly confounded. He makes three points in this letter: that a mere boycott of the referendum is no 'breach of faith'; that the Pathanistan demand is only a demand for an autonomous province in either Pakistan or Hindustan: and that the Frontier Congress desire no truck with Afghanistan. The question of whether the Congress boycott is a breach of faith or not is an ethical

issue between the Congress High Command and the Viceroy. The Congress are welcome to all the quibbling they are capable of. However, the people of the Frontier would like to know whether the Congress accepted (as Pandit Nehru implies) the 3 June Plan, including the clause regarding the referendum in the Frontier, or whether, as Abdul Ghaffar Khan proclaims, 'the referendum was the subject of correspondence between the Congress Working Committee and the Viceroy and the former never agreed to the referendum in the Frontier on the issue outlined for it'. What exactly is the Congress position? Secondly, the Pandit has reiterated the definition of Pathanistan, as given time and again by Mr Gandhi. This definition is in direct contradiction to the ranting of the Congress leaders in the Frontier Province who maintain that by Pathanistan they mean an independent sovereign state. Which out of these two interpretations is authoritative? If Pathanistan connotes mere Provincial autonomy, then according to Abdul Ghaffar Khan himself, this guarantee has already been given to him by the Quaid-i-Azam. The question with regard to the Frontier Province, although of purely academic interest, again shows how difficult it is for poor mortals to understand what the final Congress position is. Pandit Nehru has categorically stated that the Frontier Congress do not desire any amalgamation with Afghanistan, and we have Qazi Ata Ullah, a Frontier Congress Minister, who says, 'if we are to join any one we will prefer Afghanistan than Pakistan, for with their international outlook the Khudai Khidmatgars in alliance with Afghanistan will be a stronger bulwark in the defence of India than the Pakistan dominion with their communal outlook and friendship with other Western Muslim States'. The Qazi wants to be one with Afghanistan, not in the interests of the Pathans or the Afghans, but because thus 'a stronger bulwark for the defence of India' will be created. What self-sacrificing loyalty to his salt! The Khudai Khidmatgars with their 'international outlook' object to Pakistan's friendship with Western Muslim States. No one

need waste time to ask questions regarding this brilliant analysis of international politics by the wise Oazi. The final straw in this bundle of confusion, which is likely to break the back of the most patient student of current politics, is Abdul Ghaffar's statement that he would be prepared to join Pakistan if given proper assurances about the future of the Khudai Khidmatgars. Why are the Khudai Khidmatgars anxious to have a special future different from that of the other Pathans? It is difficult to understand how leaders who owe allegiance to the same principles, and are members of the same organisation, can speak in such conflicting terms. It is not for us to say which of them is speaking the truth and which the opposite of truth. We can only conclude that the Congress High Command is striving its hardest to disrupt the Pakistan State. The actions of the Congress, in the Frontier or in Delhi, cannot change the decision of the Pathans which is already a fact and merely awaits formal declaration. The future shape of things in the NWFP is for the elected representatives of that Province to decide, sitting with those of the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan, in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. The ravings of the Frontier Congress at the loss of power, prestige and patronage, the gnawing anxiety of Abdul Ghaffar for the future of his private army, and the puerile threats of 'trouble' will not, and cannot, change the course of events-a course that can easily be foretold.

19 July 1947 The Frontier

The sands of time are running out for the Congress in the Frontier province as each day brings nearer the establishment of Pakistan. The announcement of the 3 June Plan, giving Pathans the right to decide their own future, sounded the death knell of this clique, tied in perpetuity to the apron strings of the Congress High Command. Forced to face the people, the Khan Brothers, aided and abetted by the Hindu Press and Hindu Congress leaders, started a campaign of throwing dust in the eyes of their countrymen. To confuse the issue, the slogan of Pathanistan was raised. It meant nothing more than an attempt to go into Hindustan by the back door—a miserable trick which failed miserably. The thousands of Pathans who voted in the Green box knew exactly what they were voting for. The Congress boycott slogan was an admission of defeat even before the battle began. The boycott, however, was only a technical boycott: the Congress campaigned for all it was worth; its propaganda lorries chased each other round the countryside, its leaders raved and ranted, the heavily-armed 'non-violent' Red Shirts paraded through town and country—only the Congress would not ask for votes in the Red box for the very simple reason that it could not get very many. The tactics of the Khan group have since become more frenzied and more intricate. Abdul Ghaffar Khan is active again on the bargaining front. His son Abdul Ghani Khan breathes fire and thunder and plays at soldiers with his Zalme Pakhtoon. Dr Khan proclaims that only Pathans will move him out of his ministerial chair. What is all this pother about? The Pathans' verdict will soon be known, their representatives will draw up the future Constitution and they will elect the persons to rule them. Why then the secret parleys, the threats of violence and the 'stay-in strikes'? If Abdul Ghaffar has genuine fears at the hands of Punjabis and Sindhis, which he never had at the hands of *marwaris*, he should inform the world what they are. If his fears are for Pathan rights and interests and not for the self-created privileges and interests of the Khan brothers, then let these be tested on the anvil of public opinion. While the father is engaged in peace parleys, the swashbuckling son shouts: 'Talwar se lenge Pathanistan'. From whom is this miserable Sancho going to take Pathanistan when Pathans rule the land? The mental state of the impulsive Dr Khan is even more pitiable: every time he opens his mouth he contradicts himself. He promised to resign if thirty per cent of the electorate voted for Pakistan: since a much greater number have done so, he changes his tune and says he will

stay in office and the Pathans alone can remove him. He further said that even if all his Khudai Khidmatgars joined Pakistan he would not. Fall from power is always pathetic but it need not always be undignified. Dr Khan Sahib could still salvage both his dignity and his patriotism if he reconciled himself to the verdict of his people instead of trying to sow the seeds of civil war among them by provocative disruption.

30 July 1947 Frontier Policy

The obduracy of the Frontier Congress in refusing to quit office after their decisive defeat in the referendum runs counter to all laws of political decency. Along with the Congress refusal to resign, the Zalme Pakhtoon it seems has begun its task of terrorising the people. The last few days have brought reports of the assassination of Muslim League workers in many places. In the teeth of fierce Congress opposition, the Pathans, by a vast majority, voted themselves into Pakistan. If the Ministry does not accept the verdict of the people, the only honourable course left to them is to resign and make room for those who represent the true aspirations of the people. They must realise that their present policy is certain to lead to civil war, which according to their repeated proclamations they and their Congress gurus want earnestly to avoid. Dr Khan in a flash of honest thinking had realised the wisdom of resigning from office if the League won the referendum. but he has been overruled by his younger brother, the power behind the Khan-Khanna throne. Many months ago, when the Pakistan issue was still in the melting pot, the Khan brothers determined to fight for Akhand Hindustan, and challenged the League to fight the issue out before the electorate of the Province. When the time came for the battle of votes, and the two ideologies of Pakistan and Akhand Hindustan stood before the Pathan people to make their choice, the Congress ran away from the fight. They are

now demanding a General Election. If the referendum was their Moscow, their present policy will make the next elections their Waterloo. Dr Khan should realise that the benevolent support of Mr Gandhi for the Pathanistan slogan can only lead to its complete exposure as a move to disrupt Muslim solidarity and weaken Pakistan; and the Afghan Government's notes giving unsought advice can only be treated by the Muslims of India as an unwarranted interference with the internal affairs of a sovereign State. The only course of action sanctioned by common sense and hallowed by genuine patriotism is for the Frontier Premier to give up his alliance with the Patels and Gandhis, to join hands with the Muslim League and shoulder the tremendous tasks of reconstruction facing the Pathans. The constitutional tangle of the NWFP will soon be solved in spite of the Congress, inability to abide by the rules of the game. The next problem which demands the attention of League leaders is that of the relations of Pakistan with the Tribal Areas. The history of the independent tribes since British rule was established is a complicated one. The territory was ostensibly not rich enough for imperialist exploitation. So Britain's only interest in the tribesmen was dictated by imperialist military strategy. A quiet Frontier was wanted to allow British arms to keep Afghanistan in the British sphere of influence in view of fears of Russian expansion; a somewhat turbulent Frontier was not always undesirable, to show the need for a big Indian Army and to ensure that it had a training ground. Pakistan has no fears of Russian attacks, and as for Afghanistan, we hope to live in peace and friendship with all our neighbours, with mutual respect for each other's independence and sovereignty. Therefore the British method of winning over the tribes by large subsidies alternating with aerial bombing is not for us. The Forward Policy provided by bombers and tanks must yield to a policy which seeks to establish friendly relations between the tribal territory and the settled districts. Pakistan should offer all help for the future development of the territory, which is reported to be

rich in mineral wealth. This would make for the tribes settling down and devoting their attention to the arts of peace, since now war is no longer on the agenda. With the development of industry the people could be rescued from their present boredom and poverty, which are the main problems of the tribesmen. The tribesmen have maintained a freedom from direct foreign rule: in alliance with Pakistan they can achieve freedom from hunger and want, from ignorance and illiteracy. This, however, is a long-range programme. The first essential is to convince these brave people that our intentions are the friendliest possible. To do so we must liquidate the legacy which Britain leaves us of aids and ransoms, of bribery and bombs. The old Frontier policy must be buried and a policy based on mutual trust and good will devised to take its place.

27 Au<mark>gust 1947</mark> The Frontier

In the last few days events in the North-West Frontier Province have moved with great speed. The constitutional rights and wrongs of the dismissal of the Khan-Khanna Ministry can be left for legal pundits to argue about, but it is obvious that a Congress Ministry which was refusing to acknowledge allegiance to the State of which the Frontier Province had become a part by the will of the people directly exercised, was an anachronism which could not be tolerated for long by the people of the Province. When the Pakistan flag was being hoisted on 15 August in Cunningham Park and lakhs of Pathans from both sides of the borders were gathered there to salute the flag of the new State, the Frontier Ministers were seen reclining in the Premier's bungalow reading newspapers from Delhi. It is better that they should continue their sit-down strike elsewhere and allow others to work in creating a genuine Pathanistan within the Muslim State of Pakistan. We said on many occasions that Dr Khan Sahib and his friends could not for long remain sitting on the fence, being in but not with Pakistan. We had urged them to

accept Pakistan and work for the batterment of the Pathan people as its loyal citizens, joining hands with the leaders of the Muslim League. This was their patriotic duty; for their loyalty to the Pathan people should have transcended their loyalty to the Congress High Command. But this they refused to do for reasons known only to them. If the reported decision of Dr Khan Sahib to resign from active politics and devote himself to rural uplift is correct, we welcome it as a wise step. While we would have preferred to see all Pathans stand shoulder to shoulder to face the immense task of reconstruction, failing this it is best that the Frontier Congress should leave the field clear for the Muslim League and desist from providing obstruction in its work. The League Ministry taking office in these circumstances will have to be particularly vigilant, and we confidently hope that the promises made by the new Premier to safeguard the interests of the common man and to root out all corruption and jobbery will be fully implemented. The Premier's assurances to the minorities and the congratulatory messages of Congress leaders are also a step in the right direction and will be welcomed by all friends of the Frontier.

10 May 1949 Frontier Plotting

It will be remembered that the Frontier Government's 'discovery' of a conspiracy to murder Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, announced with such brazen confidence about two months ago, was treated by the people and Press in Pakistan with a certain amount of scepticism. The nearly-martyred Premier had declared that a group of Hazara Red Shirts and Muslim Leaguers, in collusion with certain elements in India, had hatched a deep-laid plot to assassinate him, overthrow his Government and thereby stop the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan; it was also alleged that money was being received from outside the country in return for vital information. Further details were not made public and people were left to think out

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for themselves how the murder of a Provincial Premier could have led to a *coup d'etat*, or how such an unfortunate occurrence was expected to be the deciding factor in the Kashmir Plebiscite. These and other doubts, arising from the fact that the 'disclosure' coincided with the Budget session of the Frontier Assembly, were more widely felt than expressed; so serious were the charges that many thought it wiser to refrain from comment and await further developments. Later, more than one Frontier leader described the whole business as a cheap stunt meant to divert public attention from the Qaiyum Ministry's increasing unpopularity; it was said that the plot to create the murder plan had been necessitated by a perfectly legal and constitutional move to overthrow the Ministry and that by arresting one and threatening other MLAs the Premier had managed to give himself another lease of life. During the same period the Frontier secession tried to cover up the secession of one faction in the League party by trying to identify it with the *jagirdari* issue; increased restrictions were placed on the public and the Press; and attempts, fortunately unsuccessful, were made to limit the power and jurisdiction of the law courts. And now, before the habeas corpus petitions filed by the Opposition MLA and five others could be heard, their release has been ordered. The official communique, presumably intended to explain this sudden decision, is a peculiar document; with extreme naivete, the world is told that 'investigations carried out at the order of the Provincial Government by the CID indicate that there is doubt as to the guilt of the accused and in view of that, further detention of these persons is not justified'. Were these persons then arrested without sufficient proof? What was the basis of the elaborate and hair-raising story of foul deeds being planned at the instance of mysterious pundits and of valuable information being sold to Sheikh Abdullah? Were the original statements of the Frontier Premier based on bazaar rumour or were they merely the product of some police officer's fertile brain? And in any case, why should it take two long months for the CID's doubts to mature? Whatever be the truth, the Frontier Premier owes the people of Pakistan a better explanation than the one

furnished by the non-committal official communique justifying the release of this batch of detenus: what really needs to be justified is their arrest and eight weeks' detention. Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan's actions as Premier have seldom conformed to the standards of good government and his ideas about democracy and the rule of law would put any Basuto to shame. His Government's inability to tackle the problems of the common man and the policy of ruthless repression are earning the Ministry and the Muslim League widespread opprobrium among the Frontier people. We have no doubt that when democracy can be restored in that Province, the people will ensure that for the future they choose representatives devoted more to public service than public office. But in the present case, the Frontier Premier's action cannot be dismissed with the hope that it brings his nemesis nearer. The 'murder plot' may be regarded by his advisers as the latest in parliamentary tactics, but it has had unfortunate country-wide and even international repercussions. The Indian Government lodged a protest with the Pakistan Government; and certain injudicious remarks by the Indian Premier led to a counter-protest from Karachi. The gross irresponsibility of the Frontier Government in handling this case must be properly investigated and the real truth established. If a conspiracy of some sort did exist, who and where are the culprits? And if the whole affair was a piece of sensationmongering, the Frontier Premier is guilty of illegally detaining a number of innocent persons, of using highly objectionable methods to secure his own political ends, and of causing the Government and people of Pakistan a great deal of unnecessary embarrassment. In either case, the Central Government should take immediate action in the matter.

25 June 1949 Mr Qaiyum's Inanities

Dizzy with power, the Frontier Premier raves and rants at everybody who dares raise his voice in protest against the Frontier Ministry's politics. Inebriated with his own

importance, flattered by sycophants among both officials and MLAs, feared by the timid and tolerated by some for the sake of so-called 'unity'. Mr Abdul Qaiyum Khan has now even started talking like a fascist dictator from Latin America. His recent diatribe against the Punjab Press is devoid of all reason, while his allegation that the Lahore newspapers had been bribed by Frontier *jagirdars* merely betrays the primitive crudeness of his own mind. If this tinpot dictator was not telling a deliberate lie, he should have the moral courage to name the newspaper concerned. If he cannot do so, because this charge, like the fairy-tales of murder plots and conspiracies, is a creation of his own brain, and he still wishes to be regarded as a gentleman, he should apologise publicly for maligning the whole Lahore Press. The Frontier Premier should not talk so much, if he can do no better than the arrant nonsense he inflicted on his Abbottabad audience. Mr Abdul Qaiyum *blames* the Punjab Press for exposing the misdeeds of the Mamdot Cabinet, for criticising the inactivity of the League organisation, and for demanding the earliest possible end of Section 92-A. According to him, responsibility for all that has happened in the West Punjab falls entirely on the Lahore Press and not on the unprincipled politicians who exploited the name of the Muslim League, deceived the people and were interested only in their own power and prestige. However stupid such an argument, Mr Abdul Qaiyum Khan's keen advocacy of it is not difficult to understand. This Frontier leader seems to be labouring under the delusion that a manoeuvred majority in the Legislature and the support of a gerrymandered League organisation give him the licence to ride roughshod over people's rights and contravene every rule of decent, democratic government. The latest outburst on the part of Mr Qaiyum probably means that he has managed to convince Mr Liaquat Ali Khan that as Frontier Premier he is indispensable and irreplaceable. But we hope this is not true, for unless Mr Qaiyum can learn to change his ways he is probably a far more serious danger to the Frontier's stability than many of those whom he has so

light-heartedly jailed. The Central Government must seriously think of cleaning up the mess in the Frontier, and if no other solution is possible, new elections on the basis of adult franchise should be ordered.

21 December 1949 Frontier Problems

Mr Liaguat Ali Khan's recent tour of the North-West Frontier may be regarded as an unqualified success if its main purpose was to test the loyalty of the Pathans to the State of Pakistan. The enthusiasm with which the Premier was greeted in the Frontier States, the Tribal Areas and the Frontier Province provides ample proof of the people's devotion to their country and their desire to see it strong and prosperous. This, however, could hardly be the object of the Premier's visit, for no grounds exist for any misgivings with regard to the Frontier people's patriotism. There may be a handful of interested persons working to keep the 'Frontier problem' alive or even a few paid agents of foreign powers trying to create trouble, but there is no reason for anyone to fear that any such moves will find a welcome among the brave and honest people of this area. But this does not in any way mean that the Frontier regions can or should be neglected by the Central Government. The people of this important part of Pakistan face many acute problems, which should receive the Central Government's most urgent attention. The autocratic regimes in the Frontier States and the backwardness of the Tribal Areas are probably two of the most important, while the Qaiyum Ministry constitutes a problem by itself.

As far as the States are concerned, we have on many previous occasions wholeheartedly endorsed the popular demand for all political power to be vested in the hands of the people, and we repeat that such a transformation is necessary not only because it would be just and democratic, but also because it provides the surest guarantee of stability and greater strength, both material and moral. The Tribal Areas deserve to be tackled a little more carefully, but here too the need for changing the present administrative structure is as great. Certain declarations have been made with regard to the future development of these parts and it would be no surprise to learn that some Committees are fiddling with files marked 'Tribal Areas'. but so far no clear indications are available to show how government intends to replace the British system of Governing the area through heavy subsidies to tribal *maliks* or in what way it will bring the necessary economic security to the lives of our tribal brethren. The social, political, and economic development of the tribal territory deserves the highest priority and we hope that those in authority are aware of the necessity for speeding up their plans.

The situation in the Frontier Province is far from satisfactory and we have repeatedly drawn the Centre's attention to the various iniquities perpetrated by the Qaiyum Ministry. But it seems, we hope incorrectly, from some of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's utterances that he has been satisfied with the Frontier Premier's 'explanation' of the public clamour against his regime. Even during the Pakistan Premier's stay in the Province, the Frontier Government could not refrain from misusing the Safety Act, this time to pillory a journalist, when the obvious and proper course for any civilised administration would have been to put the alleged offender on trial under the ordinary law. The absence of civil liberties, however, is only one facet of the NWFP's administration: other evils like nepotism and corruption are by no means unknown and it is quite obvious that on the whole the common people are extremely dissatisfied with the present state of affairs.

If the Pakistan Premier's tour is to be really useful, his first-hand study of the situation in the different Frontier regions must lead to the adoption of a more definite policy towards the various local problems. We would like to hope that the polite speeches made by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan in the Frontier States or the Frontier Province do not mean that, as far as he is concerned, the doors to immediate and badlyneeded reforms are closed.

28 February 1951 Frontier Elections

The NWFP Premier revealed recently that a General Election on the basis of adult franchise would be held in that Province before the end of this year. The decision not to prolong the life of the present truncated Assembly will generally be welcomed, but those who have any knowledge of political conditions in the Frontier Province will agree that unless the Qaiyum Ministry can be prevailed upon to restore full civil liberties, the proposed elections will be neither free nor fair. Today, the free use of the Frontier Crimes Regulations, the Safety Act, and other medieval security measures, has stifled all political life, and Opposition parties virtually function as illegal organisations. Their active members are hounded by police sleuths, hundreds of them have been arrested and detained without trial, or with a trial that mocks the normal process of civilised laws, while a variety of pressures are used to silence or win over the Government's critics. The local Press is effectively gagged and is in any case very undeveloped. The Muslim League organisation, deprived of what little internal democracy it ever had, has been made completely subservient to the Ministerial faction and can hardly be regarded as a live political party.

An atmosphere of fear---created by the ever-present threat of internment, externment, or arrest—is hardly conducive to the free exercise of the people's right to vote. No election held under these circumstances can be confused with the usual democratic practice, and unless the Frontier Government can be persuaded to reverse its present policies, its title to rule the Province in the name of the people will be as untenable after the elections as it is today. It is, perhaps, of some significance that after announcing his plans for the election at a public meeting, the Frontier Premier asked his audience to compare the situation in his Province with Afganistan's undiluted oligarchy. He pointed out, with considerable pride, that the people of the NWFP enjoyed far greater rights than the citizens of their northern neighbour. Afghanistan. This is undoubtedly true, but, unlike Mr Abdul Qaiyum Khan, the people of Pakistan will not be satisfied with a status that may be better than that of Afghanistan's downtrodden masses but certainly does not come up to ordinary democratic standards. Unless normal civil liberties are restored in the Province and some freedom of expression and association for the Opposition assured, the proposed General Election will not solve any of the NWFP's problems and the goal of genuine democracy will once again be bypassed in favour of something that can only be described as its caricature.

28 April 1951 Khudai Khidmatgars

In response to an assurance given last month by the Frontier Governor that the Government would consider the question of releasing the detained Khudai Khidmatgar leaders if they clarified their party's position *vis-a-vis* Pakistan and pledged loyalty to the State, Khan Yahya Jan, a former Congress Minister, has issued a press statement explaining his party's stand. Citing, as an example, the oaths of allegiance to the State taken by their leaders, he avers that the Khudai Khidmatgars' loyalty and allegiance to Pakistan is 'unquestionable and beyond doubt'. With regard to their alleged association with the Pukhtoonistan racket, Mr Yahya Jan states that his party only seeks to change the name of the present North-West Frontier Province to make it conform to the nomenclature of the other Pakistani Provinces.

In view of the forthcoming General Election in the NWFP, the question of lifting the ban on the Khudai Khidmatgars and releasing their leaders will, presumably, be considered at the highest level. It is a fact that, like many other political parties and groups, the Khudai Khidmatgars were in the past opposed to the idea of Pakistan and performed strange antics to prevent its fruition. But the other such parties, some of them with no claim to genuine convictions or a record of public service, have not been denied existence. The Khudai Khidmatgars were penalised because they were alleged to have continued their opposition to Pakistan even after its establishment and on the charge that they are not prepared to live as loyal citizens of our State. These charges are denied by the Khudai Khidmatgars.

It is of great importance that the real truth about them should be established. This is demanded by every tenet of democracy and justice. Impartial adjudication would have been the best course to adopt in order to test the validity of the grounds on which the present Frontier Premier took action against the Khudai Khidmatgars. But if it is not possible at this stage to put the matter before a court of law, the decision about them should be taken by the Prime Minister of Pakistan in consultation with the Frontier Governor. When action was originally taken, Mr Abdul Qaiyum was trying to stabilise his new Ministry, and today he is faced with an election that will decide its fate. Considering his reputation for not possessing an over-sensitive political conscience, we urge Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to give the matter his personal attention and ensure that full justice is done to a political group which feels that it has been unfairly treated.

³⁰ December 1951 Future of Democracy

Recent events in the NWFP cannot be dismissed lightly as the result of the aberrations of an over-ambitious politician which concern only the persons who found their way to the Legislature barred by official interference, misuse of executive authority, and deliberate perversion of the election machinery. The glamour of the candidates defeated at the polls by such methods is fully justified and, except for those whose own past record in the matter of political fairness is sullied, they deserve public sympathy. It is, however, much more important to realise that even if one per cent of the charges levelled against the Frontier administration are true, and the various allegations have not so far been disproved, then the people of the Frontier Province have been deprived of their democratic right to choose their own rulers. It is hardly necessary to dilate upon the serious consequences that are likely to arise from such a situation. Apart from other factors, it is obvious that if a Provincial Ministry is allowed to perpetuate its regime by flouting the Constitution and disregarding the elementary rules of democracy, it is likely to create mass discontent. frustration, and cynicism. and undermine the people's faith in democratic institutions and the rule of law.

There can be no doubt that the restoration of full civil liberties in every Province of Pakistan has become a task of major national importance. The Frontier Ministry's protestations of innocence in the matter of election malpractices can carry little conviction when it is seen that even after having won the election, and despite the support of such a large majority in the Assembly, the policy of political repression has not been abandoned but intensified. Following the formation of an All-Parties Constitutional Rights Defence Committee, its Convenor, Mr Fida Mohammad Khan, and two other political workers have been interned and gagged. They cannot leave the Peshawar District or *tehsil* without the previous written permission of the Deputy Commissioner or address a public meeting and, what is utterly ridiculous, they have been ordered 'not to disseminate any news or propagate any opinion'. The Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif has been ordered not to leave the area of the Nowshera police station. Similar notices are reported to have been served on hundreds of others. The palpable misuse of security laws for political ends is not confined to the Frontier Province...

As the custodian of the Constitution it is the Centre's duty to ensure that the Constitution is honoured and respected in every part of Pakistan; the Centre also has special responsibilities as far as the elections are concerned. Therefore, unless the Qaiyum Ministry can refute the charges levelled against it by the representatives of every political

party in the country-including the Muslim League-the Central Government should set aside the recent Hitlerian elections and allow the Frontier people to exercise their franchise once again under an impartial administration. Further, the Central Muslim League organisation-unless it accepts the verdict of its opponents that it is no longer a genuine political party but a conglomeration of groups led by persons who are either in office or are trying to capture power- must take necessary action to set its house in order. In fact, the developments that have taken place in the Frontier Province, and may be repeated in Sind or East Bengal, make it absolutely necessary for all Pakistanis—irrespective of party affiliations-to get together and devise effective means to safeguard their most valuable heritage—the inherent right of our people to political freedom and a truly democratic form of Government

Frontier Ministry

The vacancy created by the inclusion of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan in the Central Cabinet has been filled in a manner that brings little credit to the Frontier Muslim League Assembly Party, Whatever the reasons which governed the new Pakistan Premier's selection of the former Chief Minister of the NWFP as Central Minister for Food and Industries, the nomination of the Provincial Inspector-General of Police to head the Frontier Ministry is, to say the least, a novel political experiment. Apart from its other implications, the appointment of Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan as Chief Minister-which, significantly, was first announced at a police parade—indicates either that no one in the Muslim League Assembly Party was considered fit to inherit Abdul Qaiyum Khan's mantle or that the imposition of a senior police officer on the party was the only way to control personal and group rivalries. In any case, it is obvious that Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan will, at any rate for the present,

continue to guide the destiny of his Province. He has been able to secure the appointment of a personal nominee, the rest of the Ministry remains unchanged except for the promotion to Ministership of a Parliamentary Secretary known for his devotion and loyalty to the outgoing Chief Minister, and Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan intends to retain the Presidentship of the Frontier Muslim League and his membership of the Provincial Assembly. This means that the new Ministry will remain wedded to the policies of Abdul Qaiyum Khan, who will continue to function as de facto Chief Minister of the Province. Such a state of affairs will naturally not satisfy those who were beginning to see in the recent ministerial changes a promise of the NWFP's release from authoritarianism and a return to the rule of normal law: it will also disappoint those who forgave Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan many of his political sins on account of his practical and direct approach to both administrative and political problems.

With regard to the new Chief Minister. it cannot as yet be said with certainty whether he is merely expected to hold the fort temporarily for the ex-Chief Minister or whether the Provincial League has been given a new leader on a more or less permanent basis. In either case, the unorthodox expedient adopted to maintain the Muslim League's unity creates an unhappy precedent and is likely to make more turbid the already muddy waters of Muslim League politics. Apart from the effect it may have on what remains of the Muslim League's prestige, the transfer of officials to the 'political front is bound to further damage the impartial, non-political character of the services by nurturing dreams of attaining political power through the Muslim League's back door among officials whose duty demands their complete dissociation from every political party-even, or most of all, the Muslim League. At this stage it is difficult to do more than to comment briefly on the principles involved in the latest unexpected development in Pakistan's kaleidoscopic political scene. It will be some time before any estimate of the political consequences of Abdul Qaiyum Khan's surprise move can be made. Similarly, no early forecast can be made of what practical effect it will have on the political life of the Province if Sardar Abdur Rashid is allowed to establish himself as the Chief Minister. The new Chief Minister brings with him a high reputation for integrity and efficiency as a police officer: but no one can contend that his successful career in the police can provide a guarantee of his being able to shoulder the varied burdens of a Chief Minister. Further, nothing at all is known about Sardar Abdur Rashid's political predilections. We are compelled, therefore, to defer further comment on the peculiar situation that has arisen in the Frontier until the issues become clearer and the new Chief Minister makes known the political policy he is going to follow.

30 October 1953 Collapse of a Khanate

Ever since Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan's unsolicited elevation to the Central Cabinet was announced, he has been compelled to devote a great deal of his time and ingenuity to maintaining his hold over the NWFP Muslim League. Creating an unhappy precedent, the ex-Chief Minister ignored all his political lieutenants and selected the Inspector-General of Police to head the new Frontier Ministry, obviously in the hope that as his successor is a non-political person, and one who did not figure on the list of eager contenders for the gaddi, he was more likely to remain loyal to his benefactor and safeguard his interests. The Khan introduced another peculiar innovation when he decided not to relinquish the Presidentship of the Provincial Muslim League-in defiance of his own pet thesis that the Chief Minister should always head the provincial League organisation. For the first few months all went well, and the Food Minister paid frequent visits to the Frontier to ensure that his word was still law in that Province, which he regarded as a political Khanate, and to deal personally with any signs of a revolt against his leadership. As time passed, however, the move for dispensing with Abdul Qaiyum Khan's rule by remote control became a serious matter, and the consequential dismissal of Khan Jalaluddin Khan from the Ministry, instead of frightening the anti-Qaiyum Muslim Leaguers into quiescence, only added fuel to the fire. What part Sardar Abdur Rashid played in these developments is a matter of conjecture, but, whatever the stage at which his support was enlisted for the revolt, the Frontier Chief Minister seems to have realised that it would be suicidal for him to continue to hold the fort for Abdul Qaiyum Khan. Having gone to Peshawar recently to reassert his position, the Food Minister soon realised that—as happens with every dictator-during his absence his position had been completely undermined and that his Khanate, created after five years of toil and at the cost of many a democratic principle, had irretrievably begun to crumble. Faced with certain defeat, the Food Minister thought it wiser to retreat; he has, therefore, given up the Presidency of the Frontier Muslim League, pretending to make a gift of what had virtually been snatched away from him, and has even described Sardar Abdur Rashid as his leader

Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan's exit from the Frontier's political stage will undoubtedly be received with widespread relief in the Province as well as outside. Whatever its effect on the NWFP Muslim League's internal politics, and it is as yet too early to hazard a forecast, it will generally be hoped that the new Muslim League leadership will take tangible steps to repair the ravages of Qaiyum Khan's dictatorship. That the Muslim League will be strengthened as a result of his departure is certain, but by itself this has no significance of any sort for the people. If those now in authority in their own right have not ousted Abdul Qaiyum Khan for purely personal reasons, they must make a clean break with all his undemocratic traditions. The victorious group of Muslim Leaguers may well feel pleased at having succeeded in their efforts to bell the cat, but for the mass of the people the time

for real rejoicing will come only when the former Chief Minister's oppressive policies are reversed. Unless the rule of law is restored and all political detenus are either released or tried in a court of law, unless the executive's interference in politics is effectively banned and the judiciary's impartial functioning encouraged, and unless the people's democratic rights and their dignity and self-respect are given back to them, the current sense of relief is likely to be short-lived. Only when they can breathe freely and once again guide the affairs of their Province will the people feel that the shadow of Qaiyum Khan has really been banished from the land. We earnestly hope that these just demands of the people will be met and that no other Muslim League leader will try to follow in Qaiyum Khan's footsteps. The people of Pakistan will watch with keen interest future developments in the Frontier Province as well at the Centre, for in Karachi's political jungle, where a ruthless factional war is raging, the Food Minister will find his position considerably weakened after the collapse of his Frontier Khanate.

7 January 1954 Commendable Decision

The Central Government's highly commendable decision taken with the concurrence of the Frontier Ministry—to release unconditionally all political detenus in the Frontier Province, to withdraw nearly all internment or externment orders, and to restore their confiscated properties to the victims of political brigandage, richly deserves the wide approbation with which it has been received. The pall of gloom under which the Frontier Province was placed at the initiative of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, in order to make the Province safe for his dictatorial regime, has at long last been lifted and the freedom-loving Pathans have been restored their self-respect and civil liberties. By righting what was clearly a grave wrong, the Central and Provincial Governments have paved the way for the Frontier Province's return to political

health; and it can be stated with confidence that this significant decision have will a beneficial effect not only in the Frontier Province and the tribal territory but in all parts of the country, and it should also help to rehabilitate Pakistan's international prestige. While the Ministers concerned certainly deserve credit for reversing the processwhich has been in evidence since the birth of our State—of imposing ever heavier restrictions on the rights and liberties of the people, even greater credit is due to those who stood up courageously to Government repression, refused to accept the humiliating terms offered them from time to time, and preferred to spend long years in jail to vindicate their patriotism and integrity rather than secure their freedom at the price of authenticating the false charges that were levelled against them by the Qaiyum Government. The release of the Frontier detenus is also a great victory for the people of Pakistan, who have for the last four or five years been agitating against the injustice done to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and those of his colleagues who were not prepared to buy their freedom in exchange for support to the Muslim League Ministry.

Without underestimating the importance of the decision, it should be realised that the happy development in the Frontier Province constitutes only the first step towards the establishment of the rule of law, and that a great deal more must be done before the Government can claim that their oftrepeated pledge to make Pakistan a fully democratic State has been fulfilled. Apart from other factors, the release of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan has been robbed of a great deal of its grace by the internment order which seemingly will for the present prevent his return to the Frontier. If this interpretation of the official Press Note is correct, we strongly urge the Frontier Government to withdraw an order which lacks all justification and seems to be a sop to those who were responsible for the earlier policy of vindictive repression. This doughty fighter for his country's freedom must be restored to his people without any delay. Further, the

act of sanity with regard to the Frontier's detenus must be followed by similar action in the other provinces of Pakistan—particularly in the Punjab, where the tragic events of last March led to the incarceration of many persons without proper trial, and in East Bengal, where a General Election is in the offing. In fact, the public demand that the Government should not deprive any citizen of his freedom unless his guilt is proved in an impartial court of law is irresistible, and no amount of sophistry can make our people accept the principle of what is euphemistically called preventive detention. The Government must, therefore, undertake early steps to repeal the various lawless laws which allow the Executive to bypass the Law Courts and tyrannise the people. As long as the Muslim League leadership does not muster enough courage to cleanse the Statute Book of these undemocratic measures which are undoubtedly a stumbling block to Pakistan's progress—its title to rule the country will remain tainted and its homilies on the ideals of democracy will retain their present hollow sound. We hope, therefore, that the leaders of the Muslim League will accept the demand for the immediate release of all political detenus and give their earnest consideration to the need for revising the burdensome structure of the laws governing the civil rights of our people.

20 July 1955 Frontier Folly

The dismissal of the Rashid Ministry completes the latest round of the Central Government's arbitrary interference with the working of the democratic process in the various Provinces of Pakistan. Since Partition the special powers enjoyed by the Centre under the Government of India Act of 1935 have repeatedly been invoked to dismiss Provincial Ministries and to dissolve or suspend the Legislatures. Sometimes the action taken has been justified by circumstances and has correctly been followed by new elections, which alone can vindicate the application of such a

remedy; but far more often Ministerial changes have been brought about in the pursuit of factional ends, and without prior reference to the Legislature or a subsequent appeal to the electorate. In recent months, however, this process has not only attained extraordinary speed, but it also seems to have undergone a change of purpose. While factionalism is certainly not dead, the frequent use of its special powers seems to be motivated by the Central Government's eagerness to ensure that its plans for the future governance of the country are accepted without demur by all the Provincial satraps. Soon after the Central Cabinet was reorganised towards the end of last year. Ministerial heads began to fall... The Central Government's action in the Frontier Province leaves the puny State of Khairpur as the only unit in the country which has been spared the application of the Government of India Act's undemocratic provisions.

In the present case, no explanation has been vouchsafed by the powers that be for the drastic step that has been taken. The Frontier Governor's laconic communique merely constitutes an announcement of the change, while the otherwise voluble spokesmen of the Central Government are maintaining what may be interpreted by some to be a guilty silence. Anyhow, the reason for the peremptory dismissal of the Frontier's second Muslim League Ministry is no secret. Ever since Sardar Rashid, on rather belated second thoughts, began to oppose the One-Unit plan, it was considered fairly certain that his days as Chief Minister were numbered. It is perhaps necessary to point out here that we hold no brief for Sardar Rashid. In fact, during his tenure of office we found it necessary on more than one occasion to criticise his Government strongly for continuing the repressive policies of his predecessor. Further, his promotion to the Chief Ministership from the post of Inspector-General of Police was in itself an unhappy innovation of which no democrat could approve. And it is also a fact that the doubtful representative character of the Frontier Assembly was further vitiated by the manner in which certain by-elections were

conducted during his regime. Be that as it may, none of these factors can provide any justification for the manner of his dismissal. Our main objection lies against the resort to special executive powers in order to settle what is palpably a political dispute, which should have been settled on the purely political level. It will probably be argued by the Central Government's apologists that by changing his position on the One-Unit question. Sardar Rashid had forfeited the support of the Muslim League Assembly Party which had given its unanimous approval to this plan. The validity of this argument could have been accepted only if the Party or the Assembly had been asked to pass a vote of no-confidence in its leader before his dismissal from office. Far from initiating such a consultation, the Muslim League President has considered it expedient to cancel the meeting of the Provincial League Council which was scheduled to be held today at Abbottabad. It may also be said that the Frontier Assembly is not truly representative of the people; but here again, the remedy lay not in dragooning it into accepting a certain course of action, but in disbanding the body and ordering new elections. Lastly, the fact that three Ministers of Sardar Rashid's Cabinet have chosen to join the Government headed by Sardar Bahadur Khan, or that the new Chief Minister is likely to gain a majority in the Assembly Party, cannot help the Government's weak case, for with most of the tribe of Muslim League MLAs a change of circumstances brings about a quick change in loyalties and they can usually be induced to endorse almost any Government action-after the event.

The point we wish particularly to stress is that, if Pakistan is to emerge as a fully democratic State, Authority must bind itself to the fundamental principles of democracy. Irrespective of the merits or demerits of the One-Unit plan, and without appraising any of the reasons on the basis of which Sardar Rashid is said to have changed his mind on this issue, it is necessary to realise that the use of arbitrary methods to solve political tangles invariably does more harm than good. Even where the Constitution now in force provides legal means of

evading the demands of democracy, the temptation to gain quick results thereby should be resisted, for the danger exists that these short-cuts may lead the country to a dead-endwhere the only alternatives before the leadership will be either to retrace their steps or to blast the half-built edifice of democracy and march forward over its debris-along uncharted and dangerous paths. The Central Government must realise that the aims they have outlined can best be achieved by the adoption of unexceptionable methods. And even if their attainment is delayed by a strict adherence to democratic methods, this will be a small price to pay for securing the maximum possible agreement on their programme and dissipating the atmosphere of doubt and frustration. The impatience and pique exhibited by the Central authorities in regard to the problem created in the Frontier was sheer folly; we earnestly hope it will not be repeated. It should be realised by all, and particularly by those who guide the country's destiny, that the river of Pakistan's political life must be allowed to follow its natural course, it must not be obstructed, it must not be dammed. It may gently be guided; but efforts to stem its flow can either turn it into a stagnant bog or compel it to break its banks and flood the countryside, destroying the sheltering verdure that it should feed and sustain, spreading chaos and misery instead of enriching the lives of our people, and becoming an obstacle in our path instead of serving as a channel for the nation's journey towards progress and prosperity.

Gul Hanyevyjabnstitute 17 August 1947 The Punjab Ministry

The announcement of the formation of the League Ministry gives the people of West Punjab their first national Ministry. To put their own representatives in power the Muslims have fought for four long years the evil combination of British bureaucrats,

Muslim renegades and Machiavellians of non-Muslim political parties. 15 August should have been a day of great joy for the people of this Province. It was here that the Pakistan Resolution was passed. It was the Punjab which has been in the forefront of the struggle against those who sought to deprive Muslim India of her right of self-determination. It might truly be said that the battle for Pakistan was fought and won in the Punjab, and it was the Punjabis who bore the brunt of the suffering that went with the struggle. But the dawn of the new era finds the Punjab divided, with the boundary line still undecided in the hands of a British lawyer and with no guarantee that the decision would be just and fair. The Eastern part of our homeland is ablaze with burning homesteads and is drenched in innocent blood. Muslim Punjab, therefore, greets the new Ministry with a heavy heart. The names which form the Ministry hardly need any comment, for these names have become well known during the years of struggle against Khizar and his gang. If some individuals miss the name of a favourite they must realise that the assumption of office by the League does not give our leaders any added privileges, it only increases their heavy load of responsibility. In the West Punjab they have to initiate a thorough overhauling of the administrative machinery which, through years of bureaucratic misrule, is almost everything a democratic administration should not be. They have to undertake schemes to banish forever from our land the spectres of poverty and ignorance, nakedness and starvation. The diverse problems which confront them will need all their time and energy, all their vigilance and wisdom... The new Ministers will represent the hopes and aspirations of our entire people, and among these the most sincere and the most fervent are the hopes for the happiness and welfare of our brothers in the East.

²¹ August 1947 The First Step

The first order passed by the Muslim League Ministry will be welcomed by all as a step in the right direction. The hand-

written Government communique issued when the Ministry was merely two days old gives a solemn pledge to the people of the Punjab that the Government will faithfully implement all the promises made in the League Election Manifesto for 1944. This promises to get rid of the age-old oppressions imposed by the British Sirkar and its agents, which had made life in our towns and villages a weary burden. Along with this promise for the future the Ministry has taken certain immediate decisions. The release of all detenus under Section 3 of the Public Safety Act is putting right a grievous wrong done to many a law-abiding citizen. The removal of the ban on the keeping of swords by non-Sikhs was a necessary step which removes one of the stupidest discriminatory actions of the last regime. The most popular of the new measures is the withdrawal of powers from Honorary Magistrates and Honorary Registrars, etc. These gentlemen, with a few rare exceptions, were the tribe of sychophants who were always prepared to swear that the day was night if only the white Sahibs deigned to smile on them; it is right and proper that they be swept off the face of the Province. The Ministry can expect public support in every step it takes to remove the shackles of the past and make our long-suffering people free from fear of oppression by officials and local tyrants: and bring back to their lives the laughter and song, the initiative and virility which were lost long decades ago to foreign imperialists. In normal times these decisions of the new Government would have received the tumultuous applause of an enthusiastic public. But the League Ministry has assumed power under the most inauspicious circumstances. Some lakhs of our brethren have been separated from us through the evil award of a British lawyer. The Punjab is ablaze with the fires of communal hatred. Thousands of homes have been destroyed, and innumerable men, women, and children have been killed or wounded with inhuman barbarity. The last few days have seen the influx of tens of thousands of refugees from the East who no longer find life possible in their ancestral homes. Dark clouds hover over the horizons of our future. The only visible

ray of hope is in the will of the Muslim nation to fight with a renewed determination all the difficulties which beset our new born State of Pakistan. It is in the context of a confidence in the grit and determination of our people to create a life worthy of the Muslim people, and to be strong enough to defend and succour our brethren across the borders, that we welcome the first step taken by the Ministry. The Ministries will deserve to remain in power only if they can give the people a lead in scrapping the old and building a new life based on freedom, justice and equality for all.

6 January 1948 The New Assembly

The West Punjab Assembly has commenced its first session as the Assembly of a free people. The Government and the Legislature are no longer cribbed and confined by an unchanging alien Constitution, no longer restricted by the over-riding authority of a British-appointed Governor or hampered by an Executive over which it could not exercise full control. While freedom has brought wider powers, the way in which freedom was achieved has created new and difficult problems. The burden of responsibility on our Government would have been onerous enough even in normal circumstances, but the events of last year have increased it a hundred-fold. The new Assembly meets under the shadow of a grave crisis. Lakhs of men, women, and children thrown out of their homes have to be rehabilitated; the gaps in our economic structure created by the non-Muslim exodus have to be filled: the administration has to be overhauled and corruption stamped out. These and various other urgent tasks call for the speediest possible action. The greatest importance, therefore, attaches to the present meeting of our Provincial Legislature. It provides a vital test for the elected representatives of the people. The League Government and even the League Assembly Party are on trial before the people and will be judged not by their fine speeches but by their

concrete achievements. The judgement of the people is likely to be severe, for their sufferings have been great and their patience and fortitude beyond praise. The people do not expect miracles, but they do expect a bold and definite beginning to be made. Their judgement will be based on no utopian ideals. for the leaders of the League have themselves laid down a standard which in the circumstances of today can be regarded as an essential minimum. In 1944, the Provincial Muslim League drew up a comprehensive thirteen-point manifesto which outlined the League programme for a free and prosperous Punjab. It was on the basis of this programme that the last elections were fought and won. Shortly before the present Ministry assumed power, we drew its attention in these columns to these promises and called for their early fulfilment. A few days later, the League Ministry, in its pledges to the people of the Province, asked for a certain amount of respite to carry out its social and economic policy. Since then many weeks and months have passed—a period of acute trial and tribulation for the people. Conscious of the magnitude of the problems which faced our State and our Province, the people have waited with patience and given their Government the respite it needed. With the commencement of the present session all eyes in West Punjab are focused on the women and men who will for the next three weeks discuss and decide measures of the greatest importance. While it would be wrong_and_unfair to pass judgement on our legislators before they have properly begun their work, we cannot refrain from saying that, so far, whatever proposed measures (both official and non-official) have been brought to public notice seem to have been put forward with a keener eve for the Press and public galleries than for the serious crisis confronting this Province. We profoundly hope, however, that our fears regarding the lack of concerted measures to meet present-day demands are unfounded, and that the Ministry intends to bring forward legislation in keeping with its electoral pledges which will take our Province forward on the road to progress.

15 June 1949 The Liaquat Formula

The arrival of the Pakistan Premier in the West Punjab has made him the hub of what passes for political activity in this benighted Province. The scene of the next battle for prestige and personal power is now laid at Rawalpindi; the public mud-slinging has given way to confabulations and intrigues behind closed doors, while interviews with Mr Liaguat Ali Khan are being sought with great eagerness. The main object of all this activity is still supposed to be the question of Sir Francis Mudie's recall, although it is said that since the announcement of what is called the Liaquat Formula, there has been considerable deviation from the objective, and many a prominent Leaguer is devoting himself to working out possible panels of gubernatorial Advisers, measuring his own chances by the laws of elimination, permutation, and combination. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's plan for the future governmental set-up is supposed to offer a solution that should be acceptable to all. Sir Francis remains Governor for some months; this is expected to satisfy one faction, who will promptly claim a signal victory. It is agreed that after some time, the British Governor is to be sent away; the other faction, therefore, can also rejoice and start planning a Day of Deliverance. The question of Advisers is also being handled with consummate diplomacy; according to press reports, the Advisers will be appointed by the Provincial League, without the humilating procedure of having to submit a panel of names to His Excellency the Governor, but, presumably, with the prior approval of the Central Government. The Advisers are to be given full powers and, in case of conflict with the Governor, the Centre will function as the arbitral authority. Neither of the two groups has as yet pronounced a verdict on this formula, but political pundits feel that the odds are in favour of some sort of a compromise being accepted by both; if necessary, 'unity' among the League's ranks will be restored in the name of Kashmir, the

refugees, or some equally weighty national problem. Whatever its face-saving possibilities, it is difficult to understand how the latest formula is supposed to help the Province in any way or even solve the questions brought to the fore in the recent wrangling. The British Governor remains, but authority over the Province will now be shared with nominees of Maulvi Bari, acting in consultation with the Centre and the Central League, where Messrs Mamdot and Daultana occupy positions of considerable influence. During the six months of Mudie rule, not a single major provincial problem has moved any nearer to a satisfactory solution; the allotments check, the anti-corruption drive, refugee rehabilitation, etc., are all in as unholy a mess as ever before, while the general administration has probably become even more bureaucratic and indifferent to public opinion. There is no guarantee that the Mudie-Bari combination, with the Centre exercising remote control, will succeed in pulling the West Punjab out of its present stagnation and along the road to progress. It is true to say that most people in the West Punjab do not consider themselves directly involved in the 'Recall Mudie' controversy, just as they were not prepared to become partisans in the disgraceful Mamdot-Daultana tussle. They do not want Sir Francis Mudie to continue as Governor. just as they do not want other foreigners to hold important executive posts, for which Pakistanis can easily be found; and the six months of Section 92-A rule has given them no grounds for wanting to make an exception in this case. The prospect of the Provincial League leaders returning to power. as Advisers instead of Ministers. owing no responsibility to the people, is certainly not going to create any enthusiasm.

What then is the way out? As has been repeatedly stressed in these columns, the Central Government's primary task should be to hold new elections in the West Punjab as soon as possible. The Pakistan Premier's visit to the West Punjab will give some satisfaction if he announces an early date for the elections and instructs the Provincial Government to make all arrangements for holding direct elections on the basis of adult franchise, in anticipation of the Constituent Assembly suitably amending the Government of India Act of 1935. It is interesting to note that so far Chaudhry Khaliguzzaman and Central Muslim League have expressed no opinion on the West Punjab tangle. If this is not merely an admission of political bankruptcy, but may also be interpreted as abdication of political authority as far as the West Punjab is concerned, it should be regarded as a happy augury. For if the next elections are to be truly democratic, the Pakistan Muslim League, dominated by Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, Mamdot, Daultana and their stooges, had best refrain from nominating official League candidates. Such a self-denying decision would raise hopes of a representative Provincial Assembly being elected and open up possibilities of a genuine and democratic Muslim League organisation being created after the elections

24 June 1949 Into the Fire

The Pakistan Premier's announcement of his Government's decision regarding the forthcoming West Punjab elections is the first really good news received by our people since the Mamdot Ministry was dismissed and the formation of a Daultana Ministry prevented by dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. The fact that the elections are to be held on the basis of adult franchise and direct representation will be universally welcome; but it is most deplorable that the distant target date of next summer or autumn for holding the elections is still regarded as purely tentative. Five long months have been wasted in unnecessary Committee work, when this correct decision could have been taken by the Central Cabinet in five minutes and this period utilised for making the necessary administrative preparations. Unless the urgency of the matter is fully realised, we fear that interested parties will succeed in further delaying the elections and many an agonizing summer and autumn may pass before democracy is

restored in the West Punjab. When Section 92-A was promulgated, the Governor-General's communique, correctly analysing the Punjab situation, laid great stress on the importance of holding new elections. It seems that since then the Centre has been prevailed upon to abandon the clear-cut policy of regarding this as the only possible method of obtaining a decent democratic Government in this Province. The Liaguat formula and the events leading up to it do not redound to the credit of the League leadership, either Central or Provincial. The West Punjab Cabinet was dismissed and the Legislature dissolved because of widespread corruption and intrigues, their unrepresentative character, and because the administration was being carried on for the benefit of the few and little or no heed was being paid to the hopes and needs of the many. The Governor-General did not just condemn the Mamdot Cabinet, but rightly pilloried the whole Provincial political set-up. It should be remembered that the present Provincial League Council is a direct legacy from that disgraceful period. Its membership is largely bogus and its elections were conducted by Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman's personal nominees, who had their black and white lists and paid little regard to rules and procedure. Like the ex-MLAs. most League Councillors are known to represent only themselves; their reputations are equally sullied by allegations of corruption, and their capacity for low-level intrigue is unquestioned. Public reaction in the West Punjab to Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman's leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League was quite definite, if somewhat unceremonious. It is the same Council which elected Mr Mumtaz Daultana as its President; and, when he considered it expedient to forget all the eloquent promises of unending 'field work' and 'direct service to the people', this galaxy gave further proof of their political acumen by electing Maulvi Bari—the joint candidate of Messrs Khaliquzzaman, Mamdot and Daultana. No League workers could have been elevated to this high office under worse auspices, and no one could have done less to disassociate himself from his discredited sponsors, by turning

to the people and honestly working for their demands. True to the Daultana tradition, Maulvi Bari has talked a great deal of Kashmir, refugees and the common people, but, under his leadership also, the League has confined its 'work' to passing resolutions and raising slogans. Some weeks ago the anti-Mudie agitation was launched and treated by its keenest supporters as a matter of life and death. But the promise of office with some authority, in the shape of the Liaquat formula, has suddenly questioned all their anti-British ardour; and, in total disregard of logic, the Prime Minister's reiteration of his Government's general policy on nationalistation, and his routine assurance that complaints against Sir Francis Mudie would be investigated, are being hailed as glorious victories. The Bari faction's exaggerated stress on the Governor's alleged anti-League activities, to the exclusion of a host of other serious problems being tackled half-heartedly and improperly or not at all, now comes into proper focus, and Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman's wire-pulling behind the scenes becomes explicable. It is fairly obvious that the League leadership has begun to feel, with good reason, that on their post-partition record they cannot repeat the election performance of 1946; hence the urgent need for a 'sympathetic' administration, preferably under direct control of the League. If these worthy gentlemen imagine that mere control of the Government machinery can ensure electoral victory, they are reckoing without their host-the people of the West Punjab, who are sick and tired of an inept and selfish leadership, and who have learnt how to fight back against undue official pressure. While no one expected the West Punjab League ever to do the right thing, it is difficult to understand why the Centre is playing into the hands of a group of persons who have repeatedly been disowned by the people in whose name they profess to speak. Five months ago the Central Government, for very good reasons, dismissed a properly-constituted Muslim League Cabinet, at least constitutionally representing the electorate; but, for no good reasons, it has now agreed to foist on the Province five nominees of the Provincial League President. These nominated Advisers will in no way be answerable to the people, their responsibility to the Centre will be so remote as to be useless, and to regard the League Council as a sort of Provincial Parliament, as has been suggested, is absolutely ridiculous. By introducing the direct rule of a political party, however hallowed its past, the Liaguat formula will be creating a most dangerous precedent; no true democrat can accept a plan which sayours so much of fascism. The proposal is bad enough, judged by democratic principles, but its practical consequences are likely to be absolutely disastrous. The intrigue and wrangling of last year will certainly be revived, the administration will deteriorate even further and, once again, the scramble for office and official favours will besmear the name of this Province. The Central Government. as if to further try the patience of the West Punjab people, is throwing them from the frying pan into the fire. Today, the Centre's main duty towards the West Punjab people is to ensure that the present snail-like pace of election work is abandoned, that the preparation of electoral lists and delimitation of constituencies is taken in hand immediately, and that there is no gerrymandering to suit influential persons. Its second major responsibility is to ensure that the elections are fairly and impartially conducted and that there is no official interference of any sort. The question of an interim regime is not of soul-shaking importance as long as these tasks are efficiently and honestly executed. But, in any case, the Centre should not get involved in formulae which aim at boosting the fallen prestige of political groups who have invariably ignored the interests of the people and betraved their trust

19 August 1950 Punjab Elections

The promised imminence of General Elections in the Punjab has begun to stir the turbid waters of political life in this

province. Political parties, groups, and individuals, according to their lights, are busy completing preparations for the contest. Manifestos are being refurbished, new slogans are being coined, and even the most misanthropic of intending candidates have begun to wear a permanent smile—especially at the dinner and tea parties to which their agents and leading supporters are frequently invited. The Muslim Leaguers also are extremely busy on their own peculiar level, so much so that they could not even think of organising public meetings in connection with the celebration of Pakistan Day. The factional struggle in the Muslim League will now be decided under the experienced chairmanship of Sind's most adept schemer, Mr Ayub Khuhro, who has been selected by Mr Yusuf Khattak to guide the fateful proceedings of the forthcoming session of the Provincial League Council. The meeting on 20 August should be the final round in the present phase of the struggle; and it will be known thereafter which of the two discredited groups is likely to dominate the Muslim League and use its past good name for opportunist ends.

While pre-election activity, in all its variety, gains in intensity, it is necessary to pay attention to certain problems of common concern to all those who desire the people's verdict to be free and democratic. In the first place, since the voters' lists were published, there has been a welter of complaints from all parts of the province to the effect that the electoral rolls are incomplete and riddled with errors. There is a strong and, under the circumstances, justifiable demand for extension of the period for the further enrolment of voters. It is reported, however, that the Government are not likely to change their present time-table, the excuse being that a further extension would be contrary to the rules and that it is really uncalled for. The first plea ill becomes the Punjab administration, with its doubtful reputation for respecting rules and laws, and, in any case, it is obvious that regulations and rules should be governed by public interest and not vice versa. As for the second argument, the fact that in Lahore alone about one lakh possible voters, it is estimated, have not

been registered provides some indication of the real state of affairs. When the original lists are prepared so inefficiently, the twenty-one days allowed for additions and corrections are clearly inadequate, particularly for the rural areas. It needs to be remembered that responsibility for this inefficiency and the inordinate delay that has taken place in preparing the electoral lists is solely that of the administration. We strongly urge, therefore, that the existing rules should be amended to allow another three weeks for enrolment of the thousands of men and women who have not been listed, for rectification of errors and for hearing objections to bogus names. Even if the grant of such an extension delays the election by about a month, the advantage of having a clean and complete voters list outweighs any inconvenience that may be caused by this brief postponement. It should, however, be possible to accept this public demand and still adhere to the schedule of holding the elections before the end of this year-if necessary, by providing for the publication of separate supplementary lists.

Ever since the Punjab elections were announced, we have consistently urged the Government to ensure that the people can express their will without unwanted trammels and restrictions. In this regard, some of the measures announced by the Government, governing the conduct of the election. can help to make it a less unwholesome affair if the authorities make an honest and impartial effort to see that all the bans are strictly observed. It will, of course, be the Punjab Governor's personal responsibility to ensure that the Advisers and other officials do not use their position in the administration unduly to influence the electorate. Apart from the necessity of preventing corrupt practices and eliminating official pressure, we wish to draw the Governor's attention to the recent reiteration by an officer-bearer of the Civil Liberties' Union of a long-standing popular demand, namely, that the use of the Safety Laws for political reasons should be suspended for the period of the elections. We wholeheartedly endorse this demand, and hope that the Governor will take the necessary action in the matter, in order to avoid all danger of political victimisation for election purposes at the instigation of interested persons and parties who are in a position to influence the decisions of the executive.

14 March 1951 Punjab Elections

During the first few days of the Punjab elections, polling booths throughout the Province have not been as crowded as was expected, nor is there any reason to believe that the situation may improve. In Lahore, one of Pakistan's most politically-conscious cities and the natural hub of Punjab politics, the percentage of votes cast is estimated at no more than thirty per cent of the listed voters, while in the rural areas the figure is probably much smaller. The low poll betrays a regrettable lack of public interest in the outcome of the first General Election since the establishment of Pakistan, and also the first electoral contest on the basis of adult franchise ever to be held anywhere in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. The educational and political backwardness of the electorate is partly responsible for its lack of enthusiasm over exercising an important democratic right, but the weightier factor seems to be a feeling of scepticism and apathy, engendered, presumably, by the long months of unprincipled personal and factional wrangling in the Punjab. The various squabbles of the top leaders in the Punjab Muslim League over the loaves and fishes of office seem to have created widespread disgust with the 'game' of politics and have lent support to the cynics who declaim that almost every politician, whatever his party or group affiliations, is interested primarily in his own future and not that of the country or people. The general dissatisfaction with the state of affairs within the Muslim League need not have led to public frustration but, unfortunately, the Opposition parties entered the arena too near the elections to make a serious impression on the Province, and some of them continued to pay unintended homage to the Muslim League by aping its methods and approach, namely, the use of personal influence or other non-political pressures, instead of appealing to the people on clear-cut political principles and a definite programme.

As far as the election results are concerned, it is clear that in Lahore and other big towns the Muslim League is certain to be defeated and that it now looks towards the political backwaters of the Punjab to gain a sufficient number of seats in the Assembly to form a Ministry. Commenting on this aspect of the election, Mr Liaguat Ali Khan, President of the Pakistan Muslim League, said recently that, even if this were true, it merely meant that his organisation enjoyed the support of the country's 'backbone' and that the villagers knew better than the 'so-called educated people'. Without in any way trying to detract from the political importance due to the Punjab peasantry, it is not possible to agree with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's implied inference that the absence of support in the towns is something of which the Muslim League can justifiably be proud. A better explanation of this situation would be that, where people are more keenly aware of political issues and less liable to extraneous influences, they are definitely opposed to being governed by Mr Mumtaz Daultana. If the Muslim League succeeds in forming a Ministry in the Punjab, as seems most likely, the organisation should be grateful more to its political opponents than to the Muslim League representatives in this Province. By their inability to fulfil the earlier promises of putting up a single list of candidates, the Opposition parties have virtually made sure of giving the Muslim League a clear majority in the Legislature, possibly without even gaining a majority of the total votes cast in the Province ...

20 March 1951 Election Malpractices

With the polling of votes in the Punjab elections drawing to a close, complaints of malpractice and allegations of official

interference have reached such serious proportions that, even if they are only partially true, doubts about the representative character of those who will be returned to the Assembly cannot easily be dismissed as mere propaganda. Following a similar boycott in Rawalpindi, it is reported that most of the non-Muslim and Jhang Districts have withdrawn from the contest in protest against alleged official discrimination and the use of unfair means, while newspaper offices are being inundated with complaints of the same nature from candidates and voters. It is possible that in a few cases the withdrawals and the accompanying charges against Muslim League nominees or officials are an attempt to save face by the defeated candidates, but this cannot possibly be true in every case. The Muslim League has also made charges of the same sort, claiming with regard to one or two constituencies that the election has not been fairly conducted. Further, it is known that in some areas the electoral law forbidding the provision of transport by the candidate or his representatives has been openly violated, and the injunction against racial or caste propaganda blatantly disregarded. Whatever the truth of the charges and counter-charges, the matter is of such vital importance to the Province that an impartial inquiry is called for in every constituency where a *prima facie* case has been made out against any candidate or official. The normal remedy of filing an election petition is, of course, open to every candidate, but few are likely to involve themselves in tardy and expensive legal proceedings and, in any case, responsibility in the matter of ensuring an impartial election rests with the Government at least as much as it does with the people.

While detailed information is not yet available from the Districts, those who have witnessed the polling in Lahore at close quarters will readily admit the existence of widespread dishonesty and corruption. Incorrect voters' lists, and absence of sufficient information about the voter to provide some ready check on impersonation, have contributed to large-scale bogus voting, particularly among the women. Unscrupulous

election 'experts' are taking full advantage of this, and it is no great secret that batches of women were actually hired by rival candidates to visit a number of polling stations in turn and cast 'their' votes again and again. They were transported from one polling booth to the next in tongas, cars, and even trucks, which had obviously been paid for by the candidates' representatives. The agents whose duty it was to look after these professional voters were equipped with bottles of methylated spirit and cotton wool for speedily cleaning their thumbs before reaching the next polling station. A large part of this sort of 'electioneering' took place in full view of the public, and there can be no doubt that if any effort had been made by the authorities to detect and check malpractices of this type, a great deal of the corruption could have been stopped. No such attempt seems to have been made, with the result that, according to some estimates, over three-fourths of the votes cast in Lahore on Sunday were illegal. While we appeal to the people to resist every attempt made to buy their votes and to expose all dishonest practices, those Government officials whose job it is to prevent such illegal doings must be asked to take their duties more seriously.

8 April 1951 New Ministry

The return of normal constitutional Government—ending the twenty-six months of gubernatorial dictatorship—would normally be viewed with satisfaction by every section of political opinion. But the fact that one of the two warring factions responsible for the mess in the Punjab has succeeded in capturing power defeats the object for which the old Assembly was dissolved, and has given the Province a Ministry which is not radically different from the earlier Muslim League Ministries. It is clear that the recent election has not satisfied the democratic aspirations of the people, for they have not succeeded in taking away political power from the elements that have ruled this Province for decades.

Whatever the causes that have allowed the Muslim League to gain such a large majority in the Assembly, and most of them do not redound to the organisation's credit, the fact remains that the Muslim League has seemingly received a new lease of life and is likely to govern-or misgovern-this Province until the next General Election. Just as the Opposition group in the Assembly is too small to threaten the Ministry, the members of the Muslim League Assembly Party have been carefully hand-picked to obviate all chances of a serious challenge to Mr Mumtaz Daultana's authority from within the Party—on either a factional or an ideological basis. The bulk of them are landlords or representatives of landlords—a class whose habitual allegiance to the party in power and pursuit of self-interest are rarely deflected by such luxuries as a social conscience or political principles. The personnel of the Cabinet confirms the impression that, in view of the factors already listed and the full Central support that he enjoys, the new Muslim League Ministry will be dominated completely by Mr Daultana. None of his colleagues has an outstanding record of public service or a reputation for more than mediocre ability. The public life of one Miniter dates from the recent election, the two who have had previous experience of Ministerial or quasi-Ministerial responsibility did not distinguish themselves in any way, while the others owe their political rise solely to the circumspection that kept them on the Daultana bandwagon.

These circumstances may add to Mr Daultana's estimate of himself as a successful politician and enhance his reputation for skilful manoeuvring among his loyal cronies. But his assumption of office with such uncontrolled power a boon denied to his predecessors—increases his moral and political responsibilities and deprives him of any future alibi for not being able to implement his long list of pledges to the people of the Punjab. Mr Daultana's exultation at the victory scored over his political opponents should now be tempered by the realisation that he bears the heavy burden of the election promises contained in the two Muslim League manifestos drafted by his own pen. At press conferences or in Assembly debates, it may be possible for the new Punjab Premier to ward off criticism by quibbling over the provisions—some of which have deliberately been kept vague-of his second manifesto. But in the fields and factories of the Punjab. the common people are not going to be satisfied with lawyers' arguments and, if the Ministry does not live up to its pledges, their wrath will certainly make itself known. Further, if the new Ministry intends to solicit public co-operation or, at least, hopes for public tolerance, it must resolutely fight against the ignoble tradition of jobbery, nepotism, and favouritism bequeathed to it by past League administrations. The fact that more than half of the new Ministers were directly associated with previous Muslim League regimes will not allow most people to form a favourable opinion about the present incumbents until they can conclusively prove their bona fides by hard and honest work. Finally, Mr Daultana should also realise that he himself has a past to live down. His unsavoury, and often unprincipled, political actions following his withdrawal from the Mamdot Ministry have not endeared him to the people.

Whereas we endorse Mr Mumtaz Daultana's plea to the Press that his Ministry should be given a chance to work, and that its administrative policies should be judged on their merits, we would like to hope that, with his ambition fulfilled, the Machiavelli in Mr Daultana has been overcome or suppressed.

^{26 March 1953} Havat Institute The Punjab Situation

Few tears will be shed over Mr Mumtaz Daultana's inglorious exit from the stage of Ministerial politics in the Punjab which he has dominated for the last two years. Mr Daultana's brief career constitutes an extraordinary epitome of political bungling and ineptitude. and his long list of political misdeeds reduces to complete insignificance his promise of good

intentions with regard to some of the problems facing the Province. Mr Daultana's rise to power is a story of intrigue and chicanery, of disloyalty to his political friends and unprincipled alliances with persons who could be used as stepping-stones to cheap success, of electoral gerrymandering and misuse of the administrative machinery, and of a lack of political scruples which would be reminiscent of a minor Machiavelli were it not distinguished by repeated failure. The hope that once he had achieved his ambition Mr Daultana would harness his ability-with which he was reputed to be equipped in fair measure—to public service was grievously brief, and as Chief Minister he continued to employ the same unsavoury methods to retain power and consolidate his position. That is why the record of his Ministry is so barren of positive achievement, and the abrupt ending of his tenure of office finds him with few supporters within his party and few sympathisers outside it. While on the whole Mr Daultana will be regarded as the costliest political failure of the Punjab's post-Partiion history, his greatest act of disservice to the Province was the peculiar role he played during the last few weeks. Driven by an overweening ambition, he sought to make political capital out of the Direct Action movement, which was connived at or directly assistedpresumably with the purpose of browbeating the Centre into according Mr Daultana a special position in the Muslim League hierarchy. It should have been anticipated by Mr Daultana and his advisers that against the background of widespread public discontent-accentuated by a severe economic crisis---a movement of this sort was bound to overflow the channels defined for it by its authors or their patrons. Even when it had become obvious that an unorganised mass upheaval had been unleashed, and that certain anti-social elements had started taking advantage of the situation to commit crimes of a most heinous nature, the Punjab Government made no proper effort to stem the tide and, in fact, some of their actions only helped to spread the flood. In these circumtances, Martial Law was imposed in

Lahore and the Army given the unpleasant task of restoring law and order—for the Pakistan Army a novel burden, which it has borne with restraint and efficiency.

While we earnestly hope that there will be no further recrudescence of lawlessness in any part of the Punjab, and that the people will take stock of the whole situation and realise how their religious sentiments have been exploited, it is absolutely necessary that all the circumstances which led to the recent trouble should be investigated by a powerful and impartial commission—with wide terms of reference which would probe not only the orgy of violence and the Punjab administration's responsibility in the matter, but also the various political aspects of the chain of events...

With regard to the latest action taken by the Centre to deal with the Punjab situation, the manner in which Mr Firoz Khan Noon has been elected to the Chief Minister's office is likely to be a handicap, Further, Mr Noon will be working with an Assembly Party which has failed miserably to perform its duty of controlling and guiding the Daultana Ministry, and which is motivated largely by the self-interest of its individual members, whose instability can be judged by the willingness of nearly every factional group to worship the rising sun. While we will reserve further comment on Mr Noon and his qualification for the task that has been entrusted to him, it is necessary to reiterate that neither in the Punjab nor in any other part of the country can the state of chronic crisis be overcome without the application of drastic remedies. As far as the political crises are concerned, what Pakistan needs is country-wide General Elections that would give the people a chance to decide who should rule them at the Centre and in the Provinces...

⁵ April 1953 **The Noon Ministry**

After a whole week of cogitation and non-stop consultations with the horde of Muslim League MLAs eager to serve their

new Chief—preferably in a Ministerial capacity—Mr Firoz Khan Noon has selected a Cabinet that will not satisfy many people in the Punjab besides the Ministers themselves and their personal friends. In fact, the Noon Ministry is such an extraordinary combination of nonentites and undesirables that-in a world where comparisons are unavoidable-we are beginning to wonder if our indictment of the Daultana Cabinet was not unduly harsh. It seems quite obvious that either, in the tumult of a mass scramble for office, Mr Noon allowed himself to be guided by what is euphemistically called practical politics and forgot the brave promise he had made on his arrival in Lahore, or that the Muslim League Assembly Party is virtually bankrupt of 'merit and suitability'-the criteria which were to govern the Chief Minister's choice of his colleagues. With regard to the three considerations which Mr Noon claims have guided his decision, to say that the gentlemen forming the new Government are 'acceptable to the public' is to treat the democratic aspirations of the Punjab people with a levity bordering on contempt; as for the present bunch of Ministers being 'capable of discharging their responsibilities', those already tried have been found wanting, while the apprentices show little promise of blossoming into brilliant policy-makers or administrators; and with regard to the party's backing, any other group would undoubtedly have received as much support as the present Ministry is guaranteed, for a vast majority of the band of selfless heroes who constitute the Muslim League Assembly Party are men of principle, of constant fidelity-for they owe their loyalty to the Ministerial chair and not to the person who occupies it.

Apart from these general considerations which made Mr Noon's landlord-dominated Cabinet an unpleasant surprise for the Punjab. it is amazing that it has been considered proper and advisable to include Mr Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash in what is supposed to be a Muslim League Ministry. A relic of the Unionist Party, Mr Qizilbash was one of the few Punjabi Muslims who made assiduous efforts to disrupt the national front of Indian Muslims, who knowingly played the game of Pakistan's enemies and set in motion the chain of events that culminated in the frightful 1947 holocaust. This fine gentleman, whose record of post-Partition association with the Muslim League was sullied as recently as the 1951 Assembly elections when he opposed and defeated the Muslim League candidate, has been entrusted with a number of important portfolios including, rather ironically, that of refugee rehabilitation. It is also extremely odd that two Ministers have been chosen from the outgoing Ministry. virtually dismissed from office allegedly for grave misdeeds. If Mr Daultana was asked to resign for his Government's mishandling of the Punjab situation, it is difficult to understand how Messrs Dasti and Leghari can be absolved of all blame and responsibility. Like the rest of their former colleagues, these two Ministers, afflicted with a chronic attachment to office, were fully associated with every action of the Daultana Ministry, including Mr Daultana's statement of 6 March: and in fact one of them flew to Karachi to plead with the Centre on Mr Daultana's behalf. Their inclusion in the new Ministry is bound to foster misgivings about the Central Muslim League leadership's role in the Punjab imbroglio.

We see thus that Mr Firoz Khan Noon, already severely handicapped by the manner of his elevation to Mr Daultana's hurriedly-vacated *gaddi*, has found himself a team which is not likely to be much of an asset in tackling the wide range of complicated problems that confront the Punjab, particularly when Mr Noon himself has had hardly any experience of working with the mases of our people and, during his varied career, has always owed his position not to public support but to nomination from above. It is, of course, largely true that individuals do not count for much and that the more important factor determining a Government's achievements and its future fate—is the nature of the policies formulated and the manner in which they are implemented. With regard to the Noon Ministry's intentions we have little to go by, and it would perhaps be uncharitable to judge Mr Noon's future course of action by his political past. His platitudinous, clicheridden utterances since his nomination for the present post provide no indication of his having grown in political stature sufficiently to be able to pull the Punjab out of the existing morass and put it on to the path of progress and prosperity, giving our people the decent, honest and clean administration to which they are entitled. However, taking note of the plea of Mr Noon's friends, we are willing, albeit without much hope, to give Mr Noon and his Ministry a chance to disprove the misgivings which we share with the vast masses of the Punjab people; but we would like to reiterate that the critical political situation in the Punjab, and in most other Provinces of Pakistan, calls for the application of the only democratic remedy useful in such situations--an appeal to the people through country-wide elections, whose fairness is guaranteed to the satisfaction of all participants.

^{23 May 1955} The Chronic Malady

The political quicksands of the Punjab have swallowed up vet another Muslim League Ministry— the fifth inept group of Muslim League gentlemen who were undeservedly elevated to high office, enjoyed a monopoly of power for a year or two, and have been thrown out without much ceremony, leaving behind them only the memory of one more phase in the unending, unprincipled factional struggle for power that has dominated the Punjab Muslim League since the advent of freedom. It is a strange irony that Mr Firoz Khan Noon, who entered the Ministerial throne-room through the back door opened for him by the Centre, following a serious factional bust-up, and occupied the position Mr Mumtaz Daultana had been compelled to vacate under strong Central pressure, should now be dismissed by the Governor, acting in the name and with the approval of the Central Government. The Punjab Governor has with 'deep regret'

withheld his 'pleasure' from the Noon Ministry, because, according to the Government House communique, it 'does not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly'. If Mr Noon had indeed forfeited the support of his party, democratic propriety demanded that the party should have been allowed to express itself on this disputed point before the Ministry's dismissal. Ex post facto endorsement of the Governor's action by the Muslim League Assembly Party will have little value, for it is well known that a sizeable majority of this gallant band of politicians is devotedly loyal to the sceptre itself, rather than to the person who wields it. It is also difficult to accept the implication that responsibility for the steady deterioration in the administration' rests wholly with Mr Noon and those of his colleagues who remained loval to him, and that the four 'rebel' Ministers—who have been included in the new Ministry—are paragons of all the administrative virtues, or that they and their new competers will be able to end the public discontent and the demoralisation among the services. The denouement of the drama being enacted on the Punjab's political stage does not seem to be available in the official script and must, therefore, be sought elsewhere.

Mr Firoz Khan Noon's statement on the subject, describing himself as a martyr in the cause of democracy, is also not likely to be accepted by impartial observers as a correct analysis of recent events. While Mr Noon is on firm ground when he complains against the manner in which his Ministry has been replaced by a new one, he seems to forget that his own accession to power was also the result of orders from outside and that the Assembly Party elected him only after his nomination by the Centre. And, if Mr Noon's 'position as leader of the Party was unassailable', he should have boldly met the challenge of the 'rebel' Ministers and called a party meeting to take disciplinary action against them for their unprecedented act of sending in their resignations direct to the Governor without informing their leader. Such a meeting would have allowed the question of confidence in the Chief Minister to be determined in a democratic manner. Further, if Mr Noon's stand in regard to the creation of an amalgamated legislature for West Pakistan was motivated by democratic considerations, and the move was not intended merely to safeguard his own position in the One-Unit set-up, it is strange that an issue of such public importance was not brought before the party or put to the people. With regard to the question of nominating the Punjab's representatives to the Constituent Assembly, Mr Noon's original proposal, that the job should be entrusted to a triumvirate, was only a shade less undemocratic than Mr Daultana's suggestion that the party should surrender its rights to the Centre. It appears obvious that, if the ex-Chief Minister's avowed love for democracy had not found such belated expression, his sudden downfall would have excited greater public sympathy and the relevant gubernatorial fiat would have evoked greater criticism.

The political issues that are now being raised by the spokesmen of the rival factions may not be entirely unrelated to the latest developments, but the main cause of the Nth round of the intra-Party tussle we have just witnessed is the chronic malady with which every Muslim League leader is afflicted and which has brought the Muslim League to its deathbed—an unrestrained lust for office. Coupled with a rather rare absence of all political scruples, an utter lack of devotion to political principles of any sort, and the ability to change personal loyalties at short notice, the Muslim Leaguers' uninhibited pursuit of power and pelf has created an unholy mess which has poisoned the country's political atmosphere and reduced politics to a game of intrigue and chicanery, played in the drawing-rooms of Ministers or selfappointed candidates for Ministerial office. The people never figure in their reckoning, except when they are to be bamboozled or coerced at the elections to vote for persons supported by those in authority; while indepenent political initiative has been suppressed with the help of a host of arbitrary laws. The organisation of the ruling party lies paralysed; and its Assembly parties are consulted only when it is considered safe to do so. The latest battle in the Punjab,

which saw many a scarred veteran of former intra-Party frays enter the lists, closely followed the general pattern of the Muslim League's seasonal struggles. The issue at stake, namely, the nominations to the Constituent Assembly, was not the sole cause of the conflict which had been brewing for some time. It became the casus belli by an accident of time rather than because of any essential factors. And, in any case, unless the Punjab leaders completely disbelieve the Prime Minister's declaration that the set constitutional procedure would be followed for nominations, the ostensible cause of the action was eliminated a few days ago. But the fight went on, because, with the Muslim League being what it is, such fights must be carried on to temporary victory or defeat temporary because, whichever side wins, when the redistribution of the loaves and fishes is over, the ground will be ready for another battle followed by another scramble. These indisputable facts lend further strength to the view that the Muslim League and its guilty men must be driven out of their positions of power if the country is to be saved from the evil consequences of their misdeeds...

IV. BALUCHISTAN

29 June 1947 Baluchistan

On 30 June the representatives of Baluchistan, consisting of the *Shahi Jirga* (excluding the Kalat State nominees) and nonofficial members of the Quetta Municipality, will be called upon to record their vote in favour of joining either of the Constituent Assemblies. From all indications, public opinion in that Province is overwhelmingly in favour of entering the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Only isolated voices are heard (as one was the other day) that Baluchistan should negotiate with the Congress as well as the League, and side with that body which offers the most advantageous terms. Apart from the fact that any hesitation in choosing between Muslim India and Hindu India reflects ill on the national consciousness of those who advocated this petty bargaining, did they not pause to think that the Congress could now offer them nothing? The Congress no longer finds it practical politics to take a Muslim Province directly under its wing. It now knows, to its cost, that the game is not worthwhile; and instead of figuring as a directly interested party in the coming referendums, it encourages its stooges to discard their old labels and assume newer and ostensibly more appealing ones. The NWFP has to offer Baluchistan an object lesson. Having despaired of drawing the Frontier Province into its fold, the Congress has signalised its defeat by boycotting the referendum, under pretexts which do not invest its necessity with even a semblance of virtue. If Khan Abdul Ghaffar had broken away from the Congress on the ground that by accepting Dominion Status it had betrayed its creed, we would have credited him with honesty and consistent principles. His leadership was Congress-sustained and now stands exhausted of its entire dynamics. The Frontier referendum is expected to be a certain walk-over for the League a certain... The example of the Frontier Khanate should not be lost upon Congress henchmen, if there be any, in Baluchistan. It is not only geography, but religion and ideology as well, that render Baluchistan's kinship with Pakistan all the closer. It is hoped that the Baluch Province will enthusiastically respond to the call of the great leader who has served it, and the rest of Muslim India, for ten years, with a wholehearted devotion, singleness of purpose and unrivalled sagacity. There will be efforts, maybe some of them determined and even ingenious, to disrupt Muslim unity in Baluchistan: but it is for the Baluchis to present a solid, invincible front against all such machinations...

13 December 1947 Baluchistan

The issue of the future of Baluchistan has been brought to the fore by the Sind Prime Minister's plea for its amalgamation

with his Province. The plea has been endorsed by Qazi Isa, the President of the Baluchistan Muslim League. The two leaders seem to differ only on one point, and that is whether Quetta should be the permanent capital of the new enlarged Province or only its summer capital. This, no doubt, has some significance to Ministers and future Ministers, but there are other matters of greater importance to be considered in any discussions regarding the future of this Province. The first is the present deplorable economic and political condition of the Province. Baluchistan is one of those strategically important tracts of land which were annexed by the British Government for reasons of high Imperial policy. Military strategy being their sole interest in the Province, nothing has mattered to them as long as the roads and cantonments were safe for their armies. The Imperial Government of India, therefore, set up an autocratic regime in the Province that dealt with the people through tribal lords, through bribery, corruption or terrorisation. The seat of power and authority was and is occupied by an official known as the Agent to the Governor-General, Resident and Chief Commissioner. He is assisted by a number of officers from the Political Department. It is clear that after the establishment of Pakistan there is no room for a regime of this description, and the first task for our leaders is to scrap this vestige of imperialism and set up an administration which is democratic and linked closely to the people whom it governs. It is a matter of regret that, let alone a drastic change in the system of administration, not even the personnel of the old administration have been disturbed, and Baluchistan has continued to be an island of autocracy in a Pakistan surging with new life. This is problem number one, and must be remedied at once.

The Government and leaders of Pakistan have also to pay attention to the most practicable programme whereby the present administration can be made to give way to a system which conforms more to the pattern of government in other parts of Pakistan. Along with a speedy democratisation of the administration of the Province, the major task of developing its vast agricultural and industrial resources must be undertaken. The anomaly of a potentially rich country, with its people living a poverty-stricken nomadic or pastoral existence, cannot be allowed to go on. The question of whether Baluchistan is to be amalgamated with Sind or not is really a secondary question. If the factors we have listed above can speedily be guaranteed by such an amalgamation, it probably would be welcome. The decision in any case is one which must be made in the interests of and by the common people of Baluchistan.

30 March 1948 Kalat's Accession

The State of Kalat has, at long last, acceded to Pakistan. If the Khan had taken common sense as his guide, he would have realised in the very beginning that such a step was inevitable and acted weeks ago. He ignored both wisdom and discretion and busied himself with creating an anti-Pakistan front among his people through the so-called Kalat National Party. He adopted delaying tactics which, coupled with his self-contradictory statements, led one to suspect that there was more going on than met the eye. The defection of Las Bela, Mekran and Kharan from the Baluchistan Federation, of which the [Khan of] Kalat was the nominal head, was a step in the right direction and under the circumstances fully justified, whatever quibbling constitutional pundits say. This took away from the Khan's suzerainty territory almost equal to Kalat itself, and doubtless prodded him to wake up from his dreams of independent sovereignty. Though robbed of much of its grace by the Khan of Kalat's very peculiar tactics, his decision to do the right thing is most welcome. We will not, therefore, bother about the Indian States Ministry's disclosure, strongly denied by the Khan of Kalat, that two months ago Kalat applied for accession to India. The Kalat business has ended in a complete victory for Pakistan which, however, is not by any means a defeat for Kalat. For the

future we trust that Kalat and its people will flourish and develop as an integral part of Pakistan and will be given all assistance to travel, in company with their Muslim brethren of the rest of the country, along the road to prosperity and full democracy.

8 October 1958 Crisis in Kalat

The Khan of Kalat's activities since his return from a grand tour of Europe and America had made his arrest inevitable. The ex-Ruler gave out publicly that he was thinking of taking legal action to secure the revival of his Principality, but, at the same time, he engaged himself in a vitriolic campaign in favour of Kalat's secession from Pakistan, and in pursuance of this aim he is reported to have been mustering hostile tribal *lashkars*. While he had hitherto refused to accept the validity of Pakistan's Constitution, he now began to match mutinous deeds with seditious words, and apparently wanted to take advantage of the confusion created in West Pakistan by the One-Unit controversy to raise the banner of revolt. By ceremonially lowering the Pakistan flag from the ramparts of the Miri Fort and hoisting the old Kalat standard, and refusing to visit Karachi to discuss his grievances with the President of Pakistan, the Khan threw an open challenge to the Government established by law. He probably hoped that he would be able to blackmail the Pakistan Government into accepting his demands, but he was simultaneously, getting ready to back them up with the force of arms. And if there were any doubts about the Khan of Kalat's intentions, they have been set at rest by the fact that he resisted arrest and his retainers shot at the representatives of the Pakistan Government, and, after his surrender, provoked a clash by trying to prevent his deportation.

While the Government's prompt action in scotching the Khan of Kalat's rebellion will undoubtedly meet with general approval—although one hopes that he will be brought to trial,

so that his accomplices can be exposed and his hirelings cannot present him to the people as a martyr to some cause-the fact that eleven years after its creation Pakistan can still be faced with a feudal revolt provides cause for deep anxiety. It clearly needs to be realised by Authority that the necessary administrative action that has been taken will not by itself solve the problem. The crisis in Kalat will yield only to a careful plan to foster democracy in the area and create institutions that will help to fill the vacuum of leadership caused by the liquidation of the Khan's regime. India's experience shows that the elimination of Princely States is not only an imperative task but one that should be accomplished with reasonable speed. In Pakistan, unfortunately, Government policy towards its feudal principalities has been hesitant and confused, with the result that a number of these States exist even today and, where they have been eliminated, undue respect has been shown for the Rulers' privileges. In Kalat, for instance, the Khan was entitled to call himself the Khan-e-Azam, he was given a large privy purse and special import licences, and allowed to maintain a host of armed retainers. The use made by the Khan of his special position should convince Pakistan's rulers that there can be no compromise between feudal despotism and genuine democracy, and that, if we are really concerned about the stability and prosperity of the region, medieval traditions and privileges favouring a few at the expense of the many must be completely wiped out. The policy of pampering the Khans and Nawabs, who were petty puppets in 1947, of bribing them to surrender in little driblets authority which anyhow could not remain theirs for long after the departure of the British, has caused many complications in the past; and it will create new difficulties unless the Government can be persuaded to realise that the so-called rights of would-be kings and chieftains must be extinguished, so that the people can flourish and their rights can be fully guaranteed.

In the circumstances, it is clearly necessary that all agreements entered into by the Pakistan Government with the Rulers of existing or extinct Principalities should be carefully revised and submitted to Parliament for its sanction. Where such an agreement tends to maintain the fiction of some sort of an autonomous status for any of these States, or otherwise accords undemocratic privileges to a Ruler, the agreement should be suitably amended. And if the Rulers harbour any illusions about their position, they should be compelled to accept the fact that Pakistan is a sovereign State, and that its unfettered sovereignty, which vests in the people, is exercised by Parliament: that this body has the right to make any arrangement it considers convenient for a particular part of Pakistan's territories: and that no petty Prince will be allowed to produce a parchment given to his ancestors by some British freebooter in support of some claim that seeks to hinder Pakistan's march towards complete democracy.

V. SIND

22 December 1949 More Confusion

The latest development in Sind politics would have excited considerable interest if Mr Khuhro's sudden emergence as the champion of popular causes could be interpreted as anything more than a factional move on the political chessboard of that benighted Province. The Working Committee of the Sind Muslim League, with Mr Khuhro as President, has recently passed a number of resolutions; among other less important declarations, the Committee has put forward the demand for the immediate abolition of jagirdari and has called for the withdrawal of all Safety Laws. In normal circumstances, its advocacy of urgent land-reforms and the restoration of civil liberties would have earned the Sind Muslim League country-wide approbation; but in the context of Sind's political situation, when the prominent local politicians are known to have mastered the tactics made famous by Messrs Mamdot and Daultana, no new trend in factional policies can be accepted at its face value. Since

every action of the so-called leaders of Sind has to be regarded as a part of their struggle for personal supremacy, the conclusion is inevitable that Mr Khuhro's Muslim League has discovered a conscience, not so much to help the people of Sind as to harm Mr Yusuf Haroon and his friends, both in Sind and at the Centre.

In the last round of the Khuhro-Haroon battle for power. the Sind Premier succeeded in by-passing or overcoming the various obstacles placed in his way by Mr Khuhro. The Provincial Muslim League President failed in his attempts to drive the Muslim League Premier out of office and replace him with somebody more worthy of the President's trust. Although both protagonists are wont to make considerable use of democratic phraseology, and claim that their actions are guided solely by an irrepressible passion to serve the people, it has become abundantly clear that the political storms in Sind are totally unrelated to the problems of that Province and that the victory of either one or the other faction cannot, even remotely, be regarded as a victory for the Sindi people or any principle of democracy. It is now generally realised that no rules govern this game of personal powerpolitics and that the politicians who have plagued the Provinces of Pakistan since its inception are mostly unburdened with strong moral scruples or political principles. The means used in Sind to further their petty personal ends, as elsewhere, have been far from clean, and the Muslim League organisation, instead of trying to stem the rot, has allowed itself to be used as a mere pawn in the game.

Against this background, the fine words spoken by Mr Khuhro or his group of followers among the Muslim Leaguers, and the resolutions passed by the the Sind Muslim League Working Committee in support of certain popular demands, possess no great significance. Mr Khuhro's espousal of a good cause, for ulterior motives, does not promise any happy results, while the danger exists that his use of popular slogans may cause a great deal of confusion among the people of Sind.

10 November 1949 Sind and the Centre

The Sind Premier's resignation and his immediate reappointment to the same office will be viewed with considerable concern by all thinking persons. In normal circumstances, when a Prime Minister enjoys the support of the people in whose name he governs, such a step would not be anything unusual, and all that democratic usage would require would be an early appearance of the new Cabinet before the Legislature to obtain a vote of confidence. But the Sind affair is far from being so simple and straightforward. About nine months ago a strange precedent was created to make Mr Yusuf Haroon the Premier of Sind when he was not even a member of the Provincial Assembly. During this period he has been unable to get himself elected to the House, despite his official position and the fullest support of the Centre. When it is known that, legally, Mr Haroon could not have continued in office after another few weeks, the drama enacted last Monday in Sind Government House can only be characterized as a lawyer's trick to bypass the constitutional stipulation that a Minister cannot remain in office if for ten consecutive months he is not a member of the Provincial Legislature.

So far Mr Haroon has not considered it necessary or expedient even to seek the approval of the League Parliamentary Party: but it may be said, in extenuation of the unorthodox doings of the self-appointed lords of Sind, that just as nine months ago the Sind Assembly had accepted him as Premier, this august body was likely to agree to the latest arrangements. In the abstract his argument may possess some force, although even legislative sanction is not sufficient to condone a violation of the Constitution: in actual fact, however, even this prop will not stand the first test of democracy. The landlord-ridden Sind Assembly is known to represent only an insignificant percentage of Sind's population: it is the same illustrious gathering that supported

Mr Khuhro until he was dismissed by the Quaid-i-Azam and, similarly, gave Pir Illahi Bukhsh its fullest confidence as long as a court of law did not debar him from further sullying the name of his Province. During the next ten months, Mr Yusuf Haroon may succeed in persuading Mr Khuhro to give him the League ticket for some by-election; he may also convince the Returning Officer or an Elections Tribunal that he is a qualified voter and then he may even win the election. Failing this he could go on repeating his present performance after every nine months and twenty-nine days, if the Centre perseveres in its present obliging mood. In either case, it is highly probable that a majority of the Sind MLAs will support him and raise no objections of any sort as long as their petty personal demands are satisfied by the administration. It is quite obvious that, if matters were left to the judgement of these gentlemen. Mr Haroon, or anyone else for that matter. could misrule Sind for the rest of his life

Constitutional antics apart, Mr Yusuf Haroon has given the people of Sind no cause to share his own opinion of himself. namely, that his continuation as Premier, by hook or by crook. is in the best interests of their Province. When Mr Haroon was selected to head Sind's third post-partition Ministry, the absence of any but a vague political record was taken by some to augur well for the future. His youth and inflated bank balance were cited as assurance of some spark of idealism and a measure of selflessness. But, like others of his ilk in Sind and elsewhere, Mr Haroon's policy has been to defeat in actual practice what he publicly declares to be his intentions. Proper rehabilitation of refugees, liberation of the Haris from the clutches of a tyrannical feudalism, the pledge to end factionalism and clean up the administration-all his promises remain empty words, completely unrelated to his day-to-day work as Premier. The new bunch of MLAs he now has as colleagues do not betoken any change for the better in the Haroon Ministry's policies; they merely signify one more shift in the factional alignments inside the Sind Muslim League. On the contrary, a further deterioration may well be expected. The three new Ministers

are not unknown to Sind politics. Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur possesses the well-earned reputation of being one of the most reactionary and unreliable politicians in a land where politicians of his class enjoy no great reputation either for espousing the cause of progress or for consistency. The other two. Mr Maula Bakhsh Soomro and Mr Rahim Bakhsh Soomro, are brother and son of the late Mr Allah Bakhsh, whose position in Muslim politics was similar to that of Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana. It is not implied that these two gentlemen should be debarred from public life on account of their ignoble past history or family affiliations, but we are convinced that the possession of family influence of this sort as their only qualification should not have been allowed to elevate uncle and nephew to Muslim League Ministerships.

Political life in Sind is dominated by unprincipled factions headed by unscrupulous leaders. The Assembly offers no hope of being able to throw up a stable, honest and efficient Ministry. In these circumstances, the misdeeds of the local Muslim League leaders no longer cause any great surprise, but the people have a right to ask why the Centre has not acted in Sind as it did in the West Punjab. The provocation offered by the Khuhros, Pirs, Haroons, Talpurs and Soomros has been such that, in comparison, the best efforts of Messrs Mandot and Daultana are almost reduced to the level of juvenile pranks. Further, these multiplied delinquencies, from the highest degree of official high-handedness and tyranny to the lowest degree of intrigue and chicanery, have taken place under the very nose of the Centre. Yet, for some incomprehensible reason, the Central Government has been satisfied with ... patronising one or the other of Sind's ever-changing factions. Its latest act, if the popular interpretation of it be true, of allowing Mr Yusuf Haroon to flout the spirit of an important provision of the Constitution, is the crowning folly of a policy which is difficult to understand and impossible to approve. It should be made quite clear that we hold no brief for Mr Khuhro and would equally condemn any attempt on the part of the Centre to exercise its influence on his behalf. It is necessary to do so in blunt words because it is

being rumoured in certain quarters that a *rapprochement* between the ex-Premier and the Central Government is now considered possible and that negotiations are likely to be conducted through the good (*sic*) offices of no less a person than Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman.

Apart from the Central Government's Constitutional duties towards the Provinces of Pakistan, in the peculiar conditions of today it also shoulders onerous political and moral responsibilities. When, in correct discharge of these responsibilities, the Centre ordered the dissolution of the West Punjab Legislature, the decision was widely welcomed as recognising the people's right to be rid of an Assembly which, aiding and abetting the evil machinations of a small coterie of political adventurers, had proved its unworthiness and forfeited its right to exist. The Governor-General's analysis of the Punjab situation applies even more aptly to the conditions in Sind. The Central Government's obvious duty is to order new elections in that Province, to be conducted without the confusion and delays that have taken place in the West Punjab. This course offers Sind the only chance of a badly-needed political clean-up. We hope no unhealthy influences reflecting the paltry motives of 'important' leaders will prevent the Centre from taking a step justified in the light of its own judgement on the Punjab and so clearly demanded by the best interests of Sind and its people.

23 March 1953 Sind Imbroglio

With the oft-postponed Sind Assembly elections scheduled to take place in May, the President of the Pakistan Muslim League has sought to clear the decks for action by ruling that Mr M. A. Khuhro ceased to be President of the Sind Muslim League fifteen months ago when the Provincial Legislature was dissolved. Khwaja Nazimuddin's verdict is based on the contention that Mr Khuhro was, like all other Muslim League MLAs, merely an *ex officio* member of the Provincial League

ful Havat

Council and that, since his membership automatically lapsed with the Assembly's disbandment, his continuation in office after 30 December 1951 was unconstitutional and, thus, all his orders and actions since that date are *ultra vires* and ineffective. It is not without significance that the operative part of the Muslim League Chief's ruling relates to the activities of the Sind Muslim League Parliamentary Board, with regard to which he has laid down that applications for nomination as League candidates in the forthcoming elections will now be received by its Secretary and that the acting President of the Provincial Muslim League will not be treated as President of the Parliamentary Board.

Whatever else may be said about Mr Khuhro, even his worst enemies will concede that he does not accept defeat easily. True to form, he has issued a statement contending that Khwaja Nazimuddin's ruling is based on 'wrong information', as he (Mr Khuhro) was duly elected to the Provincial Muslim League Council from Larkana sometime in December 1951. The redoubtable Mr Khuhro, who seems to believe that he has an inalienable right to control the Sind Muslim League, further argues, citing the Punjab precedent, that in any case Khwaja Nazimuddin has no right to give a ruling on the point in dispute as it is the Provincial League's prerogative to decide whether or not ex-MLAs should remain ex officio members of the League Council. Mr Khuhro has also declared that the Parliamentary Board failed to elect a Secretary and that, therefore, applications for 'tickets' 'shall continue to be received by the League office as hitherto'.

It would be utterly irrelayant to discuss the constitutional aspect of the case. Just as a similar situation in the Punjab was treated by different League personalities in accordance with the way it might have affected their personal or factional interests, so the present constitutional tussle in Sind is an attempt to cloak what will widely be regarded as an unprincipled scrarable for power. That this analysis is not uncharitable is proved by the fact that the Muslim League's Central leadership slept over Mr Khuhro's illegal occupation of the Presidential office for fifteen

months, and that he, in turn, claims to have become an 'underground' member of the Council in his own right a little before the Sind Assembly's dissolution. The real issue seems to be that the Central party leadership desires to eliminate Mr Khuhro from the Sind Muslim League, so that this body can be re-organised to fight the Assembly elections under the leadership of a person more acceptable to the Centre. Mr Khuhro does not favour this plan to secure his eclipse, and is apparently determined to retain control of the party organisation so that he may, once again, be able to rule the Province with a faithful stooge installed as Chief Minister. In the present circumstances, it is difficult to see how the Central League can achieve its aim without dissolving the Sind Muslim League—as has been done in Karachi and Baluchistan—for if all his documents are in order Mr Khuhro could presumably contest Khwaja Nazimuddin's ruling in a court of law. The only alternative to this drastic course of action is that the Central leadership should engineer a revolt against Mr Khuhro inside the Sind League Council, but, judging from the confidence with which Mr Khuhro has called a meeting of the Council to consider the issue, the prospects of such a move succeeding do not appear to be bright. The latest imbroglio in the affairs of the Sind Muslim League should provide ample food for thought to those few who still believe that this once-mighty organisation can even now be called a popular political party; and, as far as the common people of Sind are concerned, they will fervently hope that this new quarrel among the masters of the Muslim League does not lead to a sacrifice of the interests of the Province and that the Assembly elections will be held on the dates announced without waiting any longer for the Sind Muslim League to prepare itself for the event.

11 November 1954 Pirzada's Fall

Although it seems rather strange that the Pirzada Ministry should be dismissed on charges of maladministration by the

Khan of Mamdot, and that the Sind Governor should then call upon Mr Ayub Khuhro to form a new Government, the forced removal of Mr Abdus Sattar Pirzada from the Chief Minister's gaddi will not cause any regret beyond the circle of his factional allies or the beneficiaries of his regime. Nor can the ousted Chief Minister—in view of the manner in which he himself was elevated to this high office and the methods he used to prolong his tenure—object to the Governor's intervention from the democratic standpoint. It will be recalled that Mr Pirzada was chosen to head the Sind Ministry in most peculiar circumstances. Having been dropped from the Central Government, presumably because he had attracted a large share of the obloguy which led to the dismissal of the Nazimuddin Cabinet, he appeared on the Sind scene when PRODA disgualifications or the fear of action under this law had created a near vacuum in the leadership of the Muslim League Assembly Party, After inveigling the Centre into blessing his venture, and acquiring the MLAs' support on the strength of a series of personal alliances and factional pacts. Mr Pirzada assumed control of Sind's destiny. His term of office has brought no relief to the people of this benighted Province, and its perennial intrigue, maladministration, oppression, and corruption, have shown no signs of abatement. Nor did he succeed in curing Sind's chronic political instability. Within a few months of its formation, the Ministry was riven into hostile factions, and Mr Pirzada succeeded in clinging to office only by persuading the Governor to dismiss certain Ministers and later to prorogue the Assembly without even allowing it to discuss the Budget's Supplementary Demands. In a desperate bid to consolidate his position. Mr Pirzada sought to buy the support of his party by expanding his Ministry, which at the time of its dismissal comprised twelve full-fledged Ministers. In these circumtances, Mr Pirzada's fall will widely be regarded as the appropriate ending for another ugly chapter in Sind's post-Partition history, and few will sympathise with him or take much notice of his complaint that he has been made the target of political victimisation.

In fact, it was most likely that, in the absence of the Centre's backing which was his Ministry's main prop, and with the return of Mr Khuhro to the Ministerial arena, Mr Pirzada would anyhow have been humbled to the dust before long. It would, of course, have been more appropriate if it had been left to the Assembly to rid the Province of Mr Pirzada's inept team of Ministers. In any case, perhaps the only reason for which disinterested observers may disapprove of Mr Pirzada's exit is the nomination of Mr Khuhro as his successor. Sind's new Chief Minister is well known to his Province and the country. His return to power cannot, therefore, provide much cause for jubilation or kindle the hope that his promise to serve the people is anything more than the traditional tribute to political probity paid by every Sind Chief Minister immediately after his appointment. In appraising the political situation in Sind, it is necessary to realise that a substantial share of the guilt for the sorry state of affairs rests on the Muslim League Assembly Party, the bulk of whose members seem to be concerned only with feathering their own nests and are either too ignorant or too selfish to take any serious interest in problems connected with public welfare. Therefore, and particularly when country-wide elections are reported to be in the offing, it would be in the fitness of things to disband the present Sind Assembly and ask the people to choose a new body in a genuinely free election. It also needs to be realised that in landlord-ridden Sind, to conduct an election impartially it is not enough to ensure that ballot-papers are not pilfered and bogus votes are not cast; it is equally important to protect the mass of the rural population from the waderas, who terrorise the poor villagers into political submission and, it is said, not unoften resort to murder and brigandage to retain their political ascendancy...

22 March 1955 Conspiracy in Sind

With the discovery of 'a deadly conspiracy' by the Sind Government on the eve of the Provincial Legislature's Budget

session, and the subsequent arrest of a large number of the present regime's prominent political opponents, the storm which had been brewing for many weeks has burst over Sind's troubled scene. The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly has been arrested under Section 302 of the PPC, on charges of complicity in a murder plot: Pir Illahi Bukhsh, a former Chief Minister, has for the same reason been detained, reportedly, under the Safety Act; certain other MLAs have also been arrested, and it is considered likely that many more members of the anti-Khuhro clique will soon swell the number of politicians incarcerated on the grave charge of conspiring to assassinate the members of the Khuhro Cabinet and to create a commotion in the Province. In making his melodramatic and—judging by the facts he related—rather premature public announcement, Mr Rashidi declared that his Government would proceed according to law' and that it would soon 'institute a regular inquiry by the CID'. Mr Khuhro held out the further assurance that there would be no large-scale arrests and that no one would be arrested without sufficient evidence. Yet, within twenty-four hours of the decision to start a regular police inquiry, a number of people have been arrested. Are we expected to believe that in Sind, where undetected murders are by no means rare, the CID has suddenly acquired a degree of efficiency that borders on the miraculous? Nor have the other Ministerial promises been honoured, for it is reported that people are being detained under the Safety Act, and the list of suspects is said to be a fairly long one. These facts, and the background of an intense factional

These facts, and the background of an intense factional fight against which the murder plot has been discovered, lead one to suspect that Messrs Khuhro and Rashidi, in their eagerness to defeat the plan to oust them from office, might have invented the whole conspiracy to deal effectively with their rivals, just as Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan did in the Frontier Province under more or less similar circumtances. We hold no brief for Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur's politics; in fact, we have always been extremely critical of his reactionary political views; nor are we impressed by his talk of the inherent nobility of the Talpur clan and their inability to do anything that is 'mean'. Nevertheless, whatever his frailties or failings, no one can condone the manner in which the Sind Government has sought to liquidate the Talpur group, unless, of course, the veracity of the charges levelled against them is proved before an impartial judicial tribunal. A few hours before his arrest, Mr Talpur categorically denied Mr Rashidi's charges, and said that the story of a conspiracy was a farce concocted in order to 'terrorise and victimise the noble landed aristocracy'. His supporters are equally vehement in their denials and they fully endorse the counter-charge that the conspiracy has been invented by the Khuhro-Rashidi group in an attempt to save their Ministry. It will generally be agreed that Mr Talpur and his friends must be given a fair chance to defend themselves, and that the privileges to which any accused person is entitled under the normal law of the land must not be abrogated one bit in their case—if in Sind all notions of justice and fair play, of political honesty and decency, are not to be consigned to the dustbin. The peculiar circumtances in which Mr Rashidi made his startling revelation, and the manner of the widespread arrests that followed his announcement, clearly show that the procedure being followed in the case is, to say the least, rather unusual. It is necessary, therefore, to reiterate our demand that the case should be investigated by an impartial Central Government agency, so that the truth can be brought to light and the guilty men can be exposed and purged from Sind's politics.

That a serious conspiracy has been hatched in Sind is perfectly obvious. Nor should such a development cause very much surprise. In that faction-ridden Province, with big landlords dominating the political scene, almost anything is possible, and no political or quasi-political action, however unethical or bizarre, is beyond the capacity of most of Sind's squabbling Muslim League leaders. The point to decide is whether the group now in jail are the authors or the victims

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of this conspiracy. Was a murder plot discussed in the Central Government office occupied by Mr Talpur until three days ago, or did a plot-to-invent-a-murder-plot mature in the Sind Secretariat? It is clearly of the greatest importance to establish which of the two groups is responsible for the tragi-comedy now being enacted in that benighted land, not so much to determine the strength of the rival factions in the Muslim League Assembly Party, but in order to pin the guilt on those responsible for severely damaging Pakistan's internal political stability and her international prestige. The issue, we feel strongly, is of sufficient importance for the Central Government to intervene in the affair and promptly set up the machinery required to establish the real truth. What now happens at Hyderabad, where the Sind Assembly is meeting under the shadow of police bayonets, is no longer of any great significance. The main problem before the Government and people of Pakistan is to find the real culprits in Sind's criminal conspiracy, and to take adequate legal and political steps to hound these political gangsters out of Pakistan's public life—which they have been allowed to pollute and sully for many long and weary years.

¹⁵ April 1955 The Sind Mystery

The mystery regarding the alleged conspiracy in Sind is becoming more and more enigmatic. Spokesmen of the Sind Government have for some reason stopped regaling the public with sensational stories of how the alleged conspirators wanted to capture power by assassinating the Sind Ministers and creating a commotion in the Province. The Central Government has reportedly decided against intervention in what is described as an internal affair of the Province. The Sind Police are still supposed to be investigating the 'deadly conspiracy', but it is not known what progress, if any, has been made towards obtaining evidence that would stand the test of an impartial trial and establish the veracity of the charges levelled against their political opponents by the Sind Ministers. And while the courts have provided temporary safety to some of the accused persons, the Sind Government's future intentions regarding the large number of prominent politicians arrested during the last few weeks remain a secret. More recently, the detention orders against two former Chief Ministers, Qazi Fazlullah and Pir Illahi Bukhsh. have suddenly been withdrawn, but along with a third, Pirzada Abdus Sattar, they have been externed from the Province of Sind. Apart from the confusion created by the unorthodox manner in which the Sind Government are dealing with the case, reports from Karachi reveal the emergence of a new factor, making the situation more complex. It is reported that negotiations are currently taking place between certain Central Ministers and the leaders of the anti-Khuhro group for a political settlement of some sort. In this connection the Central Law Minister, Mr H.S. Suhrawardy, has had a number of meetings with Qazi Fazlullah, who is alleged to be one of the ring-leaders of the conspiracy.

It will be recalled that the general round-up of the Sind politicians who refused to accept Mr M.A. Khuhro's leadership—just before the Budget Session of the Provincial Asembly—was described by the Sind Government as a case of the law being allowed to take its normal course. It was claimed that some of them had been arrested for non-payment of land revenue and other Government dues, while the others were said to be involved in a conspiracy to murder the Sind Ministers and create disturbances. With regard to the first category, it is strange that, even three weeks after their arrest, the cases against them have not been submitted for adjudication by the proper authorities, and that many of them apparently continue to be detained under arbitrary laws. The situation with regard to the second group is stranger still. As we said some time ago, these peculiar developments in Sind need to be investigated impartially... In fact, if the Sind Government have a genuine case, there is no reason why they should not accept such a proposal; but, quite obviously,

the issues involved are so important that the question cannot be left to the good sense of Messrs Khuhro and Rashidi. Therefore, we would again appeal to the Central Government to revise its earlier decision and, irrespective of the results of the political negotiations with the anti-Khuhro faction, take immediate steps to order an impartial inquiry into the recent events in Sind and thereby assure the people that it is prepared to safeguard the rule of law and prevent the victimisation of political opponents through misuse of executive power.



Gul Hayat Institute

Section 5: The Word-Eaters The Muslim League and Other Parties

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I. THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

6 April 1949 Sabotage

Once upon a time, not many years ago, the Muslim League was justly regarded as the sole representative of India's ten crore Muslims. It stood unrivalled among political organisations for the integrity and unity of its leadership and the complete solidarity of its following. The Muslim League set itself a clear-cut political objective and, in less than ten years, saw the fruition of its plan to gain a separate Muslim homeland. But since the establishment of Pakistan, this great organisation has sunk steadily into the mire. Active public support for Muslim League policies has declined considerably and its front-rank leadership stands sharply divided into two main categories—those in office, and those trying to get into office. Recently, a suggestion has been made that the present chaos, the widespread corruption, inefficiency, and stagnation are all due to the sins of certain individuals and that, as such, the organisation is in no way blameworthy. When, however, these same individuals are elevated to high political office, and the organisation is unwilling to move a single inch towards its own reform, how can any one expect the people not to start waving black flags instead of green? The manner in which the Pakistan Muslim League has been organised, and the way it is being run, leaves an honest person no alternative but to conclude that those at the helm of affairs are either blind or intent on sabotaging the organisation which they profess to serve. The recent meeting of the All-Pakistan Muslim League Working Committee merely provides one more illustration of utter incompetence or worse on the part

of the gentlemen concerned. Not a single decision of direct interest or value to the people was taken: various matters were discussed and conveniently shelved. The biggest decision of the session was with regard to the formation of Pakistan Muslim League units in the States. As if the factional battle in progress in every West Pakistan province and the Federal Capital were not bringing enough opprobrium to the organisation, a new battle front on a wide scale has been opened. The States Muslim League, which has so far enjoyed official patronage, has its own branches, and now Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman and his galaxy of so-called leaders will set up parallel organisations, thereby adding confusion to the already confused situation and providing the State Rulers with a God-sent opportunity to play off one Muslim League against the other. We have never been particularly enamoured of the States Muslim League; both before and after Partition its functioning has been inefficient, slow, and hesitant, and it has never displayed sufficient courage to carry through its appointed tasks. Recently it had exhibited some signs of life and set itself the correct objective of securing self-government for the people of every Pakistan State. Whatever its shortcomings, and there are many, the States Muslim League had at least evolved a fairly unambiguous programme and was pledged to implement it. If the Pakistan Muslim League considered the former organisation's aims inadequate or its functioning faulty, what steps did Chaudhry_Khaliquzzaman ever take to set matters right? And, in any case, what alternative does he offer? The complete silence with regard to their future intentions *vis-a-vis* the States is most ominous. Does the Working Committee endorse the policy of unmasterly inactivity adopted by the Pakistan Government? Does it approve of the Khan of Kalat's appointment as Pakistan's representative to the UN? Does it endorse the views expressed by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. Pakistan Premier and member of the Working Committee, about the so-called reforms in Bahawalpur? If the Working Committee answers these question in the affirmative, then it is quite obvious that

its intention is to save and serve the Rulers, and that its new States Leagues will be as remote from the aspirations and needs of the common people as are the existing Provincial Muslim Leagues. And if, on the contrary, the Pakistan Muslim League has suddenly felt the urge to work for the introduction of real democracy in the Pakistan States, why does it not say so? What hidden motives are working behind the scenes, we do not know; but, obviously, the issue between the two organisations can be judged by one criterion only, namely, the effect it will have on the freedom movement of the States people. We consider the Pakistan Muslim League's action to be unwise because it is likely to create disruption among the ranks of political workers in the States and provide the Rulers and their agents with an effective handle to break the people's solidarity, and finally, because we have no guarantee that the present office-bearers of the Pakistan Muslim League are interested in the States beyond relishing the idea of visiting them as the Ruler's specially-honoured guests. The complete hash made of the State people's movement is far from being the only example of bungling by those who head the Muslim League today. It is quite correct to say that, whatever their motives, nine times out of ten these gentlemen leave undone or sidetrack every right move and undertake with gusto every task likely to be harmful to the people. It is becoming increasingly clear that, if the future of this organisation is irrevocably linked with the Khaliquzzamans, Mamdots, Daultanas and their ilk, that day is not very far when the importance of the Muslim League will be purely historical.

16 August 1950 Inglorious Exit

Few tears will be shed over the sudden and inglorious exit of Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman from the centre of the Muslim League stage. His more than two years' association with this organisation, as Chief Organiser and later as President, has caused a decline in its fortunes that has few parallels in the

history of mass political parties. When the Chaudhry Sahib fled precipitately from India-after having sworn allegiance to the Indian flag and having pledged himself to serve his Muslim compatriots—and managed to get himself appointed to the highest office in the Pakistan Muslim League, there were not many persons to contest the claim of this party to speak authoritatively on behalf of the people of Pakistan. The period of his custodianship has seen the League organisation split into numerous factions, its largely bogus membership is now dominated by unprincipled cliques, its programme and policies are vague and amorphous and carry little authority with the Muslim League Government, and its functioning is motivated by the greed for power and position of individuals who are corroded by an overpowering personal ambition. Even if Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman had a clean personal record. he could not escape responsibility for having been unable to stem the rot. In actual fact, however, his role has been more positively harmful, for in every crisis Chaudhry Sahib's intervention has tended to intensify the factional wrangling. leading to an increased disregard of the organisation's principles and Constitution. In his explanatory statement. Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman claims that he still enjoys the confidence of the Provincial Muslim Leagues, although he does not return the compliment and condemns them for not giving him sufficient support in his manifold onerous duties. Presumably, by this somewhat contradictory stand, the League President means to affirm that there has been no breach of his alliance for mutual assistance with the Khuhros and Daultanas, the Isas and Qaiyums, which has been an important factor in helping to complete the process of the League leadership's divorce from the people and even the party's rank and file.

Apart from his views about the Muslim League and Muslim Leaguers, Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman considers that the bulk of the country's Press has, for ulterior motives, been grossly unfair to him, and that the refugees are utterly misguided and simply do not know what is good for them. Whatever the truth of the League President's long list of complaints against all and sundry, his general dissatisfaction with the people's feelings towards him is heartily reciprocated by the people—and with ample cause. Therefore, while he is constitutionally correct in stating that the refugees and the people of Karachi by themselves had no right to compel him to resign, under the pressure of their non-stop demonstrations. there will be widespread approval of his decision to vacate the League President's chair for 'someone who may serve it better'. As a matter of fact, if Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman had been gifted with a little more self-respect, he would have taken this commendable step many months ago. It is no great secret that the League President has enjoyed little support and respect from the people. He created a poor impression by deserting the Indian Muslims and he has, since his arrival in Pakistan, become more and more unpopular with every successive low-level political manoeuvre to control the Muslim League organisations, as an end in itself, without giving them a programme that would answer the people's needs, and without making any effort to reflect the nation's feelings and opinions on matters of public policy.

It is, perhaps, not without significance that Chaudhry Sahib's ire is reserved entirely for the people and certain public organisations, and that, by implication, he expresses his wholehearted approval of Government policies, deliberately overlooking all their inadequacies and shortcomings. This, along with his recent panegyrics on the Central Government, raises the suspicion that the aging politician from the UP may be nurturing Ministerial ambitions. One would like to hope that this is not true, for the qualities that have brought the Pakistan Muslim League to its present unenviable position are hardly likely to benefit the Central Cabinet or the department honoured by Chaudhry Sahib's direct attentions. It is also possible that, faced with the 'revolt' of the refugees and the people of Karachi, the League President has dramatically resigned from his office only so that he can be persuaded by the Muslim League

Council to withdraw his resignation. Such a request would be treated, at least by the President and his friends, as a vote of confidence, and, thereafter, the present galaxy of discredited leaders who form a majority of the Central Working Committee could, with greater confidence, carry out their plans for retaining their stranglehold on the organisation by manipulating the forthcoming party elections. Such a stunt would be a rather stale and undignified manoeuvre-Maulvi Bari is already trying to work it in the Punjab: nevertheless. it cannot be regarded as something that the present League President would not try if it suited his purpose. Whatever Chaudhry Khaliguzzaman's real motives may be, there can be little doubt that the overwhelming majority of Pakistan's people will fervently hope that he is genuinely desirous of retiring from the political field and that nothing will make him change his mind.

22 August 1950 New Masters

The Punjab Muslim League now has a new President, the third during the current term, and a new boss. Mr Daultana's narrow victory in the previous round of the factional struggle had paved the way for the present decisive defeat of his opponents for, with the Assembly elections in the offing, the urge to be on the winning side affected many waverers and the more unabashed opportunists. For similar reasons, a further realignment of forces may be expected in the next few days and weeks. Reconciliations will be arranged, past 'deviations' will be forsworn, and pledges of unswerving lovalty to the new masters of the Punjab Muslim League will eagerly be given. It cannot, at present, be said to what extent the Mamdot-Bari group will retain its existence as such after these defections: nor is it known what plans, if any, the leaders of this faction have for the future. In view of the Muslim League's weak position in the Province, it is likely that the faction in power will not discourage the adherence of

influential elements from among its former enemies. Whatever the future course of developments, the dominant picture is now quite clear. Mr Daultana has at long last succeeded in capturing the Provincial Council and will, therefore, be able to control the Muslim League elections-if they are held—and, in any case, dominate the Parliamentary Board and the future Muslim League Assembly Party. With both the Central and the Provincial Leagues working for him. there is little chance of a major upset in the near future. It is also highly probable that, in the absence of a strong and wellorganised Opposition party, the Muslim League will manage to obtain a comfortable majority in the next Assembly. The people of the Punjab cannot, therefore, attach any great hopes to the return of Constitutional rule in the Punjab, for, whereas there can be no doubt about the urgency of ending the Section 92-A regime, the main object for which the Assembly was dismissed remains unfulfilled, as the Province is likely to be served with old wine from old bottles.

If the recent period of turmoil had thrown up a new leadership gifted with a greater regard for public opinion and less devoted to personal and factional ambitions, many people would have allowed themselves to hope that the future Muslim League Ministry may turn its back on the undesirable traditions established by the previous League administrations. But even the most simple-minded can see that Muslim League politics are following the familiar and hated 1947 pattern. The scramble for political power has, as before, been dominated by personalities, neither side has sought to deny that their clash is unconnected with political aims or principles of any sort, while the methods adopted to win votes in the Council easily outshine the tactics once labelled contemptuously as Unionist...

Despite Mr Daultana's brazen reiteration of his high opinion of himself, the return of this gentleman to power in the Muslim League will not be greeted with jubilation except by those who seek to attain the heights of glory and gain by riding on the Daultana bandwagon. Mr Daultana should

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realise that he is no stranger to the people of the Punjab, and that his past actions speak much louder than his present words of self-praise. His tactical moves may be sufficient to dispose of a Maulvi Bari, but this should not create the illusion in anyone's mind that the high esteem in which Mr Daultana holds himself is shared by any wide section of our people. As a Minister he did little to endear himself to the public; and now one of his few proud achievements-the Transport Nationalisation Bill—is being opposed by his group, without eliciting any protest from him, presumably because lorryowners can prove useful allies in an election. Since Mr Daultana forsook the Khan of Mamdot, most of his political activity has been confined to drawing-room planning and scheming. His rare public actions and utterances have invariably found him ranged against popular opinion, and if ever he has allowed himself to take a stand in conformity with some public demand, it has never been for very long. With no past achievements to boast of, with no concrete promises for the future, and with Mr Mumtaz Daultana as its unquestioned leader, the Muslim League can hardly expect any enthusiastic support from the masses. The fact that, despite such grave handicaps, it is expected to emerge as the largest party in the Legislature merely proves that the Governor-General's advice to the Punjab people, asking them to reject the corrupt and inept old Muslim League leadership and find honest persons to head the Government, has not been heeded. The future holds out little promise of our Province stepping firmly on the road to progress. This depressing outlook can be brightened only by the people's revolt against the set of leaders responsible for bringing the Puniab to such a miserable pass...

10 October 1950 Muslim League Developments

Two constitutional amendments of considerable importance to the organisation have been adopted by the All-Pakistan

Council of the Muslim League. By the first, the ban on the holding of any party office by Ministers has been revoked. while the second amendment lays down that members of the Central Parliamentary Board will, henceforth, be permitted to take part in legislative elections. The amendments were accepted without much of a discussion, and the brief debate on the first amendment, initiated by Maulvi Bari after he had been manhandled by volunteers for raising his voice against official policies, was allowed only when the Council had already signified its full-throated approval of the constitutional changes. The main reasons given in favour of their acceptance by the Bengal Premier, who moved the amendments, were: that these restrictions were considered unnecessary now because there was 'no difference between the Government and the people', and because 'the Government was set up by the Muslim League organisation'. Subsequent supporters of the move, mostly leaders of the successful Muslim League factions in the Provinces, did not improve upon the mover's strange, and wholly unexplained, logic, and merely expressed their wholehearted approval of the new arrangement. The satisfaction of present or would-be Muslim League Premiers is easy to understand for, with the party organisation safe in the pocket of the Ministry, there will be no one to raise awkward questions, nor will it be necessary to hunt for Presidential or Parliamentary Board candidates who could be persuaded to remain obedient and also forget the temptations of Ministerial office-at least temporarily. The Khuhros and Daultanas will now be able to control, with far greater ease, the Assembly Party and the League organisation as twin agencies serving their personal and factional ambitions. For the League organisation, however, the concentration of all power in still fewer hands is not a healthy event, and the few Muslim Leaguers who still regard their organisation as a democratic political party, with the service of the masses as its cardinal aim, will regret that one more step has been taken to strengthen the innerparty dictatorship.

As far as the people are concerned, the assumption of party offices by those who anyhow were the real masters of the Muslim League is a matter of no great significance. The new circumstances can bring no vital change in the organisation's policies, while its day-to-day functioning is likely to become even more remote from the people and their problems. Whereas before now, albeit on rare occasions, the League organisation made some effort to take up popular issues and voice public demands, it will now be completely tied to the administration, and will be in no position even to promise redress of the people's grievances unless the Ministry's previous approval has been obtained. Theoretically, of course, it will still be possible for the organisation to be free of Ministerial influence, but in view of the present constitutional standstill and the peculiar working of the Muslim League, it is quite obvious that in most places the Ministries will wholly dominate the League organisation. It is known that the changes introduced in the League Constitution are intended, apart from facilitating the maintenance in power of certain political groups, to bolster up the Muslim League by bringing to its aid the power and prestige of the Government. The new League President, at any rate for some time, will certainly be able to muster bigger audiences and will be heard with greater attention than his predecessor, but it should be realised that, by removing the facade of an independent and separate Party organisation, the Prime Minister will now be held wholly responsible for all that goes on in the name of the Muslim League. Insofar as this will reduce all chances of confusing the people, it is welcome that those who actually mould the organisation's policies should directly receive the resultant blame or praise for their actions. But whether the serious departure made from the practice of most parliamentary democracies will save the organisation, as its leaders hope, or bring down the prestige of the Government to the low level to which the former's reputation has sunk, cannot be said with certainty. It is quite obvious anyhow that democracy within the party, by

which its contact with the people is determined, will be further reduced, and in the Provinces the factions and groups now in power will find their hands strengthened to maintain or establish their undemocratic regimes with greater impunity and by even more unscrupulous methods.

The decisions of the Muslim League Council with regard to its Constitution are open to more than one opinion and will continue to be debated in terms of their effect on the country's politics. But the Council's unanimous acceptance of Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman's resignation will meet with widespread approval. The fact that Chaudhry Sahib failed to secure sufficient supporters to persuade him to withdraw his resignation, and that no mention of his 'services to the *millat*' was made when his resignation was eagerly accepted, raises the hope that this gentleman will now retire from the political scene and bring his ignominious public career to an end.

15 October 1950 Further Retrogression

In keeping with the Muslim League leadership's recantation of the most elementary principles of democracy, the Central Parliamentary Board has taken upon itself the responsibility of selecting Party candidates for the forthcoming legislative election in the Punjab. This retrogressive step was considered necessary, it is said, because the Punjab Muslim League had failed to elect a Provincial Parliamentary Board within the time-limit laid down for it by the Central body. The Centre's decision to deprive the Provincial League of its right to choose, and thereby control, the future Muslim League Assembly Party will cause little surprise to those who are aware of the growing trend in the Muslim League to tolerate democratic methods only so long as they yield the results desired by the High Command. It has not, however, been disclosed so far why the Punjab League failed to elect a Parliamentary Board even after having received an ultimatum from the Central Board. Muslim Leaguers in the Punjab will also want to know why the Central Board could not be persuaded to give the new management of the Punjab League a little more time to perform this essential task. No date has as yet been fixed for the Assembly election, and, even if the oft-postponed League elections cannot be completed in a hurry, the existing Punjab League Council could easily have been asked to fill the vacuum in the Provincial organisation's set-up. The mere fact that the present Council was elected nearly two years ago is no serious impediment, for the All-Pakistan League Council and other League agencies have also outlived their normal span of life. And, in any case, the latter alternative would have done less harm to the party's claim in the coming elections to represent the people of the Punjab, and would have been far more acceptable to the organisation's rank and file.

There can be little doubt that, had the League leaders been genuinely interested in giving the Punjab League its due powers and rights, necessary steps could have been taken in good time before the legislative election. It is also fairly certain that the decision to bypass the Punjab League was taken with the full agreement, if not at the instance, of the faction now in power in the Provincial organisation. In willingly surrendering an important prerogative of the Provincial Muslim League, Mr Daultana and his friends have, presumably, sought to make the Punjab safe for their ascent to power. The possibility of not being able to secure a safe majority in the new Council must have given the recently-installed Punjab League boss many sleepless nights before the floods came and provided an excuse for ordering an indefinite postponement of the long-overdue League elections. With regard to the existing Council, it was quite possible that the majority mustered to get rid of the Advisers may not have stood the strain of the unprincipled jockeving for office by the strange assortment of individuals and groups who got together only for a limited purpose. And even if no upsets had occurred, there was always the danger of disintegration following the distribution of party tickets. By handing over all authority to the Central Parliamentary Board

and its broad-shouldered Chairman, Mr Daultana presumably hopes to be able to select his own band of heroes to represent the Punjab League without going through the risky business of facing Party elections, and also to escape the vendetta of those who are unable to secure their nomination as official candidates. Whatever other support he may lack, Mr Daultana seems to possess the Centre's fullest confidence, and his friends on the Central Board will certainly ensure that, notwithstanding any fact-finding committees, his 'valuable advice' on the choice of official candidates is given due deference. It seems fairly obvious that the latest Muslim League charade has been enacted for the special benefit of Mr Mumtaz Daultana, whose estimation of himself as the fittest person to lead the Province has been accepted by the Centre, and it is not considered necessary even to allow the Provincial League to give an opinion on the matter.

Those in the Muslim League who always owe their loyalty to the winning faction now know where their future lies, while those who are still troubled by such encumbrances as ideals and principles must either be able to adjust themselves to Mr Daultana's peculiar methods or be prepared to take a back seat. For the electorate also, the issue has been reduced to fairly simple terms. Whatever the truth abut the 'mass and democratic' nature of the Muslim League organisation in other Provinces, in the Punjab all possible doubt has been eliminated. The masses will now merely be asked to vote for a list of men and women nominated by a Board over whom the people have no control and whose decisions they will not be able to influence. It has also been decreed that, henceforth, an application for candidature on behalf of the Muslim League must be accompanied by a deposit of Rs.1,000. This automatically eliminates all those political workers who are not at least moderately wealthy and have no rich friends. And if the people do not like this dictatorial arrangement, the only alternative left to them is to leave the Muslim League and seek a new political party to represent their views and voice their demands.

14 February 1951 Punjab Elections

The Pakistan Muslim League's choice of candidates for the Punjab elections, the manner in which the selection was made, and the ensuing disruption within the organisation, have destroyed completely what little reality there was left in the claim that a vote for the Muslim League is, ipso facto, a vote for national solidarity. After the virtual suspension of the Punjab Muslim League, the Central Parliamentary Board assumed direct responsibility for nominating the future Muslim League Assembly Party. It is known, however, that except in a few cases the Board willingly accepted the advice tendered by Mr Mumtaz Daultana, who has been detailed by the Centre to head the Punjab Ministry. Apart from the general purblindness of the Muslim League's present custodians, the special position given to Mr Daultana explains why the Muslim League list contains such a rare assortment of opportunists, sycophants, and ignoramuses—most of them belonging to the class of big landlords. Mr Daultana is obviously trying to make sure of an Assembly party that would automatically elect him its leader and one that would not split over the distribution of offices. The number of possible aspirants to Ministership or Parliamentary Secretaryship has been restricted by including a considerable number of illiterates and semi-literates, while loyalty to the person of the Premier-designate-has-been given high priority as a criterion for judging a person's suitability for the League ticket. Further, the Muslim League, with its fortunes at a low ebb and without a dynamic programme, has banked heavily on the feudal influence that its nominees can muster. Throwing overboard the normal principle of naming the best person available for a constituency, the Central Parliamentary Board has favoured many whose membership even of a smalltown committee would be considered a disgrace to the township.

With most of its pre-Partition leadership already out of the organisation, the latest round of resignations reduces the

Punjab Muslim League to a clique—a faction of self-seekers and office-hunters. A coterie of individuals, whose lust for power is uninhibited by respect for principles of any sort, and whose allegiance to a leader or a cause is determined by the personal gain it brings, cannot be regarded as a genuine political party. Soon after the establishment of Pakistan, the Muslim League leadership assiduously severed the roots that linked it to the people and gave it strength, by ignoring past pledges and devoting themselves to the pursuit of selfish ends. The first phase of this political debauch was rounded off by the promulgation of Section 92-A. That during this period the Muslim League has failed to cure itself is manifest. Factional squabbles and an unprincipled jockeying for position continued and no serious effort was made to cleanse the organisation or forge anew its bonds with the people. Engrossed in inter-group disputes and intrigues, the masses were forgotten by their former leaders—an attitude that is now fully reciprocated by the bulk of our people. With no conscious mass support, with no positive promise that the new League Ministry will be better than the last, with no binding programme, and with the non-political influence of its adherents as its main source of strength, the depleted Muslim League rump has eschewed its political role and is seeking to gain office by fighting the election on a pattern made familiar—and odious—by the Unionist Party. In these circumstances, the Muslim League's appeal for support in the name of national unity is extremely presumptuous and utterly fatuous.

utterly fatuous. This situation has led to increased public frustration and scepticism, and a revival of tribal alignments and other retrograde influences...

17 January 1953 Deadlock Within a Crisis

The Central Cabinet's mission, which has brought most of its members to Lahore, has failed. The resolution adopted by the Punjab Muslim League Council clearly shows that the parleys between the party's Provincial and Central leadership have not helped to evolve a formula acceptable to both sides. The demand for postponement of the Constituent Assembly session scheduled for 21 January will probably have to be met, and the various groups and factions in the Muslim League will continue their search for a compromise solution behind well-guarded doors. There could hardly be a better example of a party's political bankruptcy or its complete isolation from public opinion than that provided by the Muslim League's handling of its responsibilities with regard to the framing of a new Constitution. Apart from other important aspects of the matter, we see that, after long months of intensive cogitation, this party has not been able to reach an agreement even on the basic structure of our future Constitution. As soon as the BPC Report was removed from the list of top-secret documents, and the common people allowed to see what the ruling party had in store for them, it naturally raised a storm of protest. This public outery prodded the Punjab's Muslim League leaders to confess their doubts about the BPC Report and claim authorship of minutes of dissent which, along with others, seem to have been confiscated by the powers that be. It is amazing that these gentlemen gave their blind approval to a plan which ignored the most elementary principles of democracy and could not possibly have been accepted by our people. A modicum of serious thought would have saved the Muslim League leaders from enacting the undignified spectacle which Lahore has just witnessed. Be that as it may, it is gratifying that, even if they are unwilling to consult the people and appear to be incapable of anticipating public opinion, at least some of them seem determined not to commit political hara-kiri and,

The Word-Eaters

therefore, are not prepared to give their assent to any constitutional plan without being assured of some measure of support from their constituents.

Whether or not the intra-party deadlock will be resolved, and in what manner, it is difficult to surmise. Muslim League leaders have a peculiar way of 'settling' political problems which may temporarily smother their own differences but, as far as the country is concerned, not unoften creates more difficulties than it solves. The give-and-take method may in some matters prove useful for pacifying the different cliques inside the Muslim League, but for obvious reasons it cannot be applied with any advantage to the constitutional issue. It needs to be realised that the Muslim League's intra-party deadlock lies within, and is a direct result of, a country-wide crisis. Therefore, any attempt to close the party's riven ranks by minor adjustments in the BPC Report, accompanied by an appeal to personal or party considerations, will not help to improve the situation; for even if the Muslim League can overcome its internal differences, no constitutional plan can be implemented unless it has the approval of a large majority of the people in every part of Pakistan. Judging from the manner in which the issues involved are being discussed inside the Muslim League, there is little chance of the party deadlock being broken in the near future, while the possibility of their being able to present a logical constitutional plan which would gain country-wide support is even more remote. If the Muslim League leaders cannot rise above the level of their party, if they cannot get out of the constitutional grooves of their own making, they will either be responsible for creating a chronic crisis or-and this is equally likely and equally dangerous-having won a small measure of backing for their elaborate show of opposition to the BPC Report, with some minor face-saving changes the recommendations will be accepted by the Punjab dissidents. Whatever course of action the Muslim League leaders may choose to follow, it is becoming increasingly clear that they are incapable of evolving a constitutional pattern that would be based on the

logical demands arising from the incontrovertible facts which govern Pakistan's social, political and economic life. And since this party—we repeat, for purely historical reasons controls the present Constituent Assembly, its continued failure to resolve the Constitutional crisis leaves the country with no choice except to demand that the old Constituent Assembly should be disbanded and a new body elected directly and on the basis of adult suffrage—to undertake the task of framing Pakistan's Constitution.

⁷ October 1953 The New Formula

The new constitutional formula devised by the Muslim League leadership, reportedly with the unanimous approval of the Muslim League Assembly Party, is being presented by the party's spokesmen and supporters as a veritable stroke of genius that will resolve all the existing differences between the two zones of Pakistan. The Muslim League leaders' elation is understandable because, if none of their factions stages the customary volte-face, the strange phenomenon of a political organisation riven by differences on a fundamental political question will now be eliminated. This does not, however, by itself provide any cause for general satisfaction... Anyhow, the important point is not whether the unity or stability of the Muslim League will be restored by the minor changes made in the BPC Report, but whether these modifications can give the country a constitutional structure that suits its peculiar conditions and will guarantee its future progress along the path of unrestricted democracy. The Karachi agreement has obviously been secured under the pressure of the forthcoming East Bengal elections, which Mr Nur-ul-Amin is reported to have used as a threat, declaring that anything less than parity would seal the fate of the Muslim League in that Province. Further, the prolonged constitutional deadlock, the growing impatience of the people, and the Muslim League leadership's inability to offer a

rational solution to the problems facing the country, had strengthened the demand for dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the election of a new body on the basis of adult franchise. The fear of early elections, which would certainly deprive many of the Muslim League leaders of their present positions, is said to have put the gentlemen who now represent West Pakistan in a mood to accept any compromise...

10 November 1953 The Muslim League

There can be little honest disagreement with Mr H.S. Suhrawardy's indictment of the Muslim League as 'a ruthless oligarchy in which the interests of the country, the views of the people and canons of justice and fair play, are being brushed aside in the struggle for power'. Today, more than ever before, it is true to say that the Muslim League, bereft of what little was left of its integrity and idealism after the post-Partition scramble for power and pelf, is not in office because it is a healthy, living organisation, deriving its strength from genuine public backing; but that it is able to delay the inevitable process of its decay and muster a measure of support-mostly among those whose loyalty is not to the party but to the position it occupies—only because it retains a monopoly of power. A complete lack of democracy characterises the Muslim League's internal functioning; selfish intrigue and unscrupulous chicanery guide the actions of its numerous factions, while questions of policy or principle are relegated to the distant backgrounds; and the bulk of the party is ever ready to support anyone whose hands hold the sceptre, whether he has achieved this position of dominance through an election-which is now rather rare—by self-appointment, or by selection. On the other hand, the Muslim League manages to remain in power mainly because its lust for office has overcome its allegiance to democratic principles and its respect for the rights of the

people. During the last three or four years, thousands of political workers have been sent to gaol without trial; elections have been gerrymandered with an utter lack of conscience; and opposition to the group in power, whether on a political basis or for purely personal ends, has been ruthlessly suppressed. With factional manoeuvrings as the party's main activity, its sparse ranks divided into cliques created by personal rivalries, and cheap slogan-mongering the basis of its approach to the people, the Muslim League may be expected to fade away soon after the people of Pakistan have regained their inalienable right to govern their own destiny and to decide who should rule the country.

In these circumstances, when the Muslim League has reached its nadir, it appears illogical that certain persons should consider it worthwhile to re-enter the fold of the ruling party. This phenomenon will not, however, surprise many discerning observers: for when the Muslim League ceased to be a national front and forsook its political conscience for petty gains, among those who left the organisation on some point of principle there was a fair sprinkling of Muslim Leaguers whose only difference with the party was its refusal to satisfy their ambitions. Outmanoeuvred in the factional struggle, this type of politician sought refuge in the Opposition, hoping thereby to down his opponents and to rehabilitate himself with the people by echoing their demands. Some of them even continued to take a keen interest in the League's factional war and to cement alliances with the enemies of their enemies. If these facts are kept in mind, it becomes quite clear why--despite, or perhaps because of the fact that the Muslim League is in a much worse plight than it was three years ago-Sardar Shaukat Havat Khan should suddenly see 'a ray of hope' in the person of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, and the Khan of Mamdot should decide to re-join the ruling party without offering a word of explanation to the public or to the members of the Opposition party he had formed when Mr Daultana gained control of the Provincial League organisation with Mr Liaguat Ali Khan's

blessings. Following the example set by these two leaders, whose recent speeches and statements mock their present conduct, some more defections from the ranks of the Opposition parties may well take place, adding to the confusion prevalent in all branches of the Muslim League by swelling the number of those who must be kept satisfied. It is quite obvious, however, that the somersault performed by a few individuals does not change the character of the Muslim League, nor can it thereby ward off for long the nemesis that its own misdeeds have invited; and, lastly, it does not in any way reduce the importance of the task of building up a strong Opposition that can lead the people in their struggle against the corruption, inefficiency and oppression which are the chief characteristics of the Muslim League's misrule.

29 November 1953 The Cesspool

Once again the turbid, stagnant waters of the political cesspool known as the Punjab Muslim League have been stirred by the agitational storm which is created seasonally by the inveterate factionalism that holds in its vice every section of the ruling party's leadership. Revelling in the slime, plastering each other with mud, and spewing venom, these denizens of the Muslim League underworld have unleashed another campaign of intrigue and chicanery, of vilification and blackmail, in which support is openly purchased by the highest bidder and loyalties are transferred with an abandon that is the privilege of persons unopposed by a conscience or by allegiance to principles of any sort. The contenders for the prize of office and power may occasionally refer to public issues and—particularly when the sceptre is not in their own hands-even pay hypocritical homage to the canons of democracy; but the truth is that the defenders of the citadel have nothing to defend except their gratified ambition, and the attackers' only goal is the capture of power for its own sake. This disgraceful scramble for monopoly control of the

Muslim League and the Ministry began soon after Partition. and it has continued for more than five years with unabated frenzy. The vicissitudes of the struggle have provided each of its heroes with the opportunity to rule the Province and serve the people, to prove that his own claim to altruism had more worth than his enemies' charges; but every such opportunity was frittered away, and in the intoxication of victory the only promise honoured was that of pursuing a ruthless vendetta against fallen opponents. Even when defeat compelled a particular faction to withdraw from the Muslim League camp, interest in the intra-party tussle was not abandoned, the game of low-level intrigue was not forsaken. and at the first opportune moment the self-proclaimed standards-bearers of the Opposition have returned to the fray with their appetite for power sharpened by the brief interregnum of tactical self-abnegation.

Like incurable addicts, incapable of extricating themselves from the morass they have created, these Muslim League leaders are blind to the enormity of their own misdeeds, deaf to the growing clamour of the masses, and completely unmoved by the fact that the Province, whose destiny was placed in their unworthy hands, has been drifting steadily towards the precipice. Its economic health shattered by years of wanton neglect, its administration the victim of a creeping paralysis, its true voice drowned in the noise of unending factional battles, the Punjab lies prostrate and stricken. Its people, betrayed again and again by political confidence-tricksters, feel frustrated and helpless. As their difficulties accumulate and the dismal political scene presented by the Punjab remains unchanged, their hope of redemption languishes and their former self-assurance and faith tend to be replaced by pessimism and cynicism. This unhealthy spirit of resignation is an extremely dangerous phenomenon, and the actual damage that the Muslim League leadership has done to the Province is insignificant when compared with the havoc they may cause if the people are not persuaded to resist the poison that is being injected into

their bloodstream. It is, therefore, gratifying to note that, as a direct consequence of the Muslim Leaguers' undignified antics, the people have been allowed to see the ruling party in all its ugly nakedness. It is increasingly realised that the long-drawn-out Mamdot-Daultana tussle-which has set the pattern for Muslim League politics on all levels-involves no political principle, no public issue of any importance is at stake, and the outcome of each skirmish can influence the lives of only the leaders and their close adherents. Not unnaturally, therefore, public interest in the annual mudslinging match between rival Muslim League factions is declining, and while many people will give credence to what a Muslim League leader may say about his opponents, only a very few attach any significance to the claims he makes for himself or his faction. It is also realised that the Muslim Leaguers' chronic bickerings betray not only a complete disregard for public interest but also their utter contempt for the people, who are expected to accept every unprincipled Ministerial change as being for the best...

Having lost all faith in the Muslim League leaders' ability to undergo a change of heart, we believe that the Province will be able to emerge from the bog only when its people have succeeded in burying the main source of the putrefaction-the Muslim League cesspool. The Mamdots, Daultanas, and Noons have strutted about on our political stage for long enough; they and the type of MLA they patronise must now be swept out of the Province's political life. The task is not easy and requires a great deal of hard work. But if the people are organised politically, the richly deserved nemesis that awaits the Muslim League politicians will not be long in coming. And if all honest political workers concentrate on the task of directing the people's acute dissatisfaction into political channels, new cadres of political workers, pledged to democratic ideals, will be thrown up during the course of the movement to make our politics conform to the real needs and demands of the people, and to root out the Unionist tradition of trying to build the political

pyramid by starting at the apex. This path alone offers the early possibility of saving the Province from further depredation at the hands of the Muslim Leaguers, and of beginning to realise the fond dreams that warmed so many hearts at the dawn of freedom. We fervently hope, therefore, that the people of the Punjab will follow it and turn their backs on the guilty men who have brought the Province nothing but misery, want, and degradation.

8 April 1954 Mr Noon's Antics

The Muslim League's unprincipled struggle for powerwhich has been the most distinctive feature of its post-Partition history—continues to be waged with unbated fury. In fact, it would seem that, after the East Bengal debacle, with the sands of time fast running out, with the prospects of the League being ousted in the provinces of West Pakistan brighter than ever before, the party's leaders have become more determined and ruthless in their efforts to satisfy their insatiable lust for office. In the political jungle of the Muslim League, where principles are regarded not as a guide to action but as something to be used for cloaking one's misdeeds. where talk of ideals is treated with cynical contempt except during public speeches or at press conferences, it is virtually impossible to make any confident forecast about future developments. It is accepted, however, that the dominant Muslim League cliques in West Pakistan, with their everchanging permutations and combinations, are only interested in somehow being accepted as the custodians of governmental power in this part of the country: and to achieve this end no antic is too undignified, no volte-face too sudden...

The latest tactic in the last-ditch battle to save their political *jagirs* in West Pakistan is the call for holding a convention to 'revitalise' the paralysed body of the Muslim League. There is talk of introducing new blood into the organisation, of cleansing it of undesirable elements, of

mobilising its progressive sections, or inviting the dissidents to return to the fold; but all these slogans indicate nothing beyond a bid to create a united front of office-hunters, to forge a measure of intra-party solidarity on the basis of a new re-division of the spoils. The two conventions held in Lahore on Sunday at the private residences of the two factional chiefs, in preparation for the bigger convention scheduled for next month, expose the Muslim League's total bankruptcy and its complete isolation from the people. Mr Daultana and his clique are presumably keeping their powder dry for the bigger all-Pakistan gathering. Therefore, they contented themselves with an 'informal' show of strength. It seems that Mr Daultana will make a final assault on the League's inner sanctum at the all-Pakistan convention, and if this attempt fails he and his supporters may well follow the policy adopted earlier by the Khan of Mamdot and leave the Muslim League. Mr Noon, on the other hand, in trying to strengthen his defences, called his clan together to swear fealty to the Centre by endorsing Mr Mohammed Ali's patently undemocratic stand on the question of dissolving the Constituent Assembly. The Noon group's resolution on the subject repeats the irrelevant arguments furnished by the Central Government's legal hacks, and goes on to raise the bogey of West Pakistan's 'serfdom to East Bengal'. This is arrant and harmful nonsense. If West Pakistan's Provinces had democratically elected Legislatures, and their representatives at the Centre could speak with a confidence that can come only with public backing, there could be no danger of this zone's rights being neglected or trampled upon...

Although Mr Noon has sought to consolidate his position in the Punjab by aligning himself with the present Central Government, playing for greater safety he has evolved the (for him) clever line of keeping the door open for negotiations with the United Front by fulsomely praising Messrs Suhrawardy and Fazlul Huq. At the same time, however, partly to pacify the Centre, he has maliciously impugned

their loyalty to their allies and accused the United Front leaders of encouraging anti-national elements. The effort to rouse artificial animosity in West Pakistan against the East Bengal United Front leadership, by making cheap and palpably false charges, can only widen the rift between the two wings—a process which no true friend of Pakistan can consciously encourage. If this line of approach has no great appeal for Mr Noon and his advisers, he should at least remember that, of all people, he is in no position to talk of anti-national elements being anyone's allies and supporters. Mr Noon should have been inhibited from his outburst by the brief history of his own conversion to nationalism. He should also consider the past record of his own chief allies, both in the Punjab and at the Centre. Can he deny the fact that among the most inveterate enemies of Pakistan and the most faithful stooges of the British were those who are Mr Noon's best supporters? Does he not remember the role played by his Minister for Revenue during the Pakistan movement? All this, however, is not surprising, for with a political background such as Mr Noon's, and with his past history of building a career on the favours of a foreign regime, it is difficult to abandon the habit of lackevism before Western imperialism and its agents. With such British-trained political geniuses as Mr Noon among the party's top leadership, it is easy to understand why the Muslim League has reached the end of its days. It is today not only a house divided against itself, but, what is a weightier factor, it is a house built on sand. Lacking the essential foundation of public support, the whole structure has begun to crumble, and a large part of it has already collapsed. It is clearly in the interests of the people to demolish the ruins and sweep away the debris, so that a new political edifice can be constructed in a design suited to the needs of our people and worthy of their aspirations. In this regard, it is of interest that, in all the balderdash which Mr Noon has recently been spouting, he somehow managed to put forward one reasonable proposal. Talking of his party's future, he expressed the view that the

best way to save the Muslim League was to dissolve it. Although in a sense and with a purpose which Mr Noon will not endorse, this brilliant idea is likely to gain a great deal of public support. And if Mr Noon undertakes deliberately to bury the Muslim League—a task he is accomplishing anyhow—the future historian may well write it down as the one redeeming feature of his long political career.

13 April 1954 Another Convention

Following the two party conventions held recently under the patronage of Mr Firoz Khan Noon and Mr Mumtaz Daultana, it was only natural that the third largest faction in the Punjab Muslim League should try to create evidence in proof of its existence as a separate entity. As we have pointed out earlier in these columns, the call for an all-Pakistan convention to unify and revitalise' the Muslim League has had the effect of intensifying the perennial scramble for power among the mutually hostile groups constituting what was once a national organisation. This phenomenon is really not surprising. The proposed convention, which has already been subjected to its first postponement, has no real significance as far as the party's programme or line of action are concerned. Its main purpose is to convince the various Muslim League leaders that they must learn to hang together if they want to avoid-the sorry fate of their counterparts in East Bengal. Whether or not such a manoeuvre, even in the unlikely event of its success, can halt or delay a historical process is a separate question. It has anyhow provided the various groups inside the Muslim League with another opportunity for a trial of factional strength to determine the pattern of the next re-division of Ministerial offices at the Centre and in the Provinces of West Pakistan. By holding a separate convention, the Khan of Mamdot presumably wanted to stake his claim to being treated as a 'leader' in his own right and to show that his faction could not be regarded as a mere adjunct of the Noon group.

The tactics resorted to by the Khan of Mamdot to prepare the ground for an attempt to recapture the Provincial Muslim League or the Chief Ministerial gaddi will not add to his political stature, nor are they in any way original. Like all other Muslim League leaders, the Khan of Mamdot concentrated his fire on his rivals, holding them responsible for the party's virtual extinction, and claimed for himself a monopoly of political rectitude and altruistic devotion to duty. Every step taken by his opponents was based on self-interest. while each of his own actions—the decision to quit the League when Mr Daultana captured the organisation and to rejoin it when he had been ousted-was guided solely by considerations of public weal untainted by motives of personal gain. While what the Khan of Mamdot says about his rivals will be given a considerable measure of credence. his appraisal of his own political manoeuvres is not likely to be accepted by many people. The Khan also repeated certain wild allegations made against the East Bengal United Front after its victory by the more irresponsible section of the Muslim League's supporters—transparently malicious allegations which are not substantiated by an iota of evidence and which have been categorically denied by the United Front leaders. In attacking Mr Suhrawardy, the Khan of Mamdot probably wanted to justify his own defection from the ranks of the Opposition and his return to the fold of the party which he had been condemning outright for many months; but the nature and manner of his attack link him to the shortsighted group who are playing the dangerous game of trying to save the Muslim League in West Pakistan by raising the bogey of East Bengal domination, thereby widening the gulf between the two zones of the country-strangely enough. in the name of national solidarity...

The muddied waters of Punjab politics can be cleansed only when political principles gain precedence over personal rivalries, and the people, instead of being regaled with seasonal mud-slinging contests, are encouraged to choose their political representatives on the basis of concrete issues of direct public interest. Since the heroes of the marathon factional battle in the Punjab, Messrs Mamdot, Daultana, and others of their ilk, are not likely to give up their intrigue and chicanery, or their unprincipled manoeuvring and jockeying for position, it is for the people to write off these quaint political figures and make a concerted effort to politicise the Province's public life.

14 July 1954 League Convention

The proposed Muslim League Convention, which was professedly intended to galvanize and unify the ruling party, seems to have become a point of contention which may well lead to further disruption and disunity. The idea was originally mooted by the unemployed section of the Muslim League leadership and, quite obviously, one of its main aims was to bring about a redistribution of the loaves and fishes of office to the satisfaction of the plan's authors. Realising that such a gathering of Muslim League malcontents could develop into a serious danger, particularly when in most Provinces the party organisation existed in name only, with the local leaders divided into two or more warring factions, and when the present Provincial Ministries were not only installed by the Centre but, in some cases, needed direct Central support to remain in office, it was decided by the group in power that a head-on clash with the dissidents should be avoided. As the result of a tentative compromise, the party's official leadership accepted the demand that the incumbents of Ministerial posts should be debarred from holding important offices in the party organisation; and it was also agreed that a Convention would be called to give the Party a new look and a new life. While invitations were being issued for a conference that was supposed to resuscitate the organisation, revive its demoralised workers, and bring back into its fold the thousands who had left the party in recent years, the inevitable tussle for power between the different claimants

continued without abatement. Leaders of rival factions busied themselves, as unobtrusively as possible, with the task of consolidating their respective groups for the impending trial of strength. On the other hand, the Ministerialists drew up a scheme for constitutional reforms which would reduce the authority of the organisation and prevent ambitious have-nots from using their position in the party as a stepping-stone to Ministerial offices. At the same time, efforts were being made, by those who feel that the Muslim Leaguers must at all costs hang together, to evolve an arrangement that would satisfy all the leading participants in the current scramble for power. It seems now that these efforts have failed, presumably for the simple arithmetical reason that the number of unemployed Muslim League leaders is far greater than the number of coveted posts available, and that while their ambitions seem to have no limits, a number of factors bar the large increase in political jobs required to give the Muslim League the desired equilibrium. With Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar's resignation from the Central Working Committee, following the President's decision to further postpone the Convention, the clash has once again come into the open. Whether or not the League leaders can find a way out of the latest mess they have got themselves into, the manner in which they are preparing for the much-boosted Convention is likely to have destroyed any illusion left in the public mind regarding the Muslim League's ability to pull out of the morass it has so diligently created for itself. To the discerning it is perfectly obvious that, as long as the capture or retention of power as an end in itself remains the Muslim League's principal aim, any number of national conventions or similar stunts cannot save the party from being overtaken by a welldeserved nemesis.

2 February 1956 The Revivalists

A motley crowd of Ministers, ex-Ministers, and would-be Ministers, divided into hostile factions on the basis of irreconcilable personal differences—with each office-hungry group supported by a few political retainers—gathered together in Karachi the other day, under the tattered and much-blotted banner of the Muslim League, to make preparations for future battles for political power. The Pakistan Muslim League Council, which met after a long period of inactivity, is today a derelict body without any genuine party organisations at its back to give it a status of some sort. It has in recent years been summoned only on very rare occasions, merely to endorse the manocuvres of the dominant group of Muslim League leaders; its membership rests largely on bogus elections or nominations: and, apart from periodic command performances of the sort witnessed at Karachi, and some evidence of behind-the-scenes agitation when elections are in the offing, it has hardly any connection with the country's political life. That this appraisal of the Muslim League is by no means harsh or unfair is proved by the admissions made during the Council meetings by prominent Muslim League leaders, who were either in a confessional mood or, what is more likely, wanted to absolve themselves of their share of the blame for the party's decline. It was accepted, either directly or by clear implication, that the Muslim League had degenerated; that it existed in a state of stagnation; that its membership was largely bogus; that its leaders, driven by an eager lust for power, intrigued and fought against each other: that the Party had achieved little during the time it was in power; and that it had ignored its programme and lost all contact with the people.

With this tediously long list of confessed sins, and a host of others which are equally well-proven, the gentlemen of the Muslim League want to be treated as a group of earnest revivalists who seek an opportunity to lead the people to the

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land of hope and glory. They talk of establishing mass contacts, of evolving a new programme based on social justice, of humbly serving the people; they pledge themselves to serve democratic ends, to eschew selfishness, and to work for national unity; and, finally, they present a few refurbished slogans and endless promises. As far as the people are concerned, all this has a far too familiar ring, and they can only regard it as a meaningless mimicry of real political activity. Each one of the dignitaries who now dominate the Muslim League stage has had at least one opportunity to act on the principles that are being reiterated with such glibness. and without exception they have failed to live up to their wordy promises. Further, the prolonged crisis through which Pakistan has recently emerged was a crucial test. How many of these stalwarts came out then to give the people a lead? Did any of them try to resist the danger of authoritarianism? Did not most of them remain engaged in their fay ourite pursuit of protecting the jobs they possess or manoeuvring for the jobs they want? And, even today, how many of them are motivated by anything but a hankering for office or are capable of political functioning except on the level of drawing-room intrigue? In fact, the proceedings of the Council itself betray the fact that nothing has really changed. and that the old spirit of factional manoeuvring for power remains the guiding force in the Muslim League.

We are told that, with incumbents of Ministerial offices debarred from holding any office in the Party organisation, the regeneration of the Muslim League is ensured. The faithful scribes who advance the theory of an impending miraculous rebirth forget that the combination of the offices of Prime Minister and Party President in one person was merely a symptom of the disease which has destroyed the Muslim League as a political party; and even if one particular symptom has been overcome—or at least cloaked—the disease has not been conquered. It is also said that the emergence of Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar from virtual retirement, and his acceptance of the Presidential crown, will somehow revive the Muslim League. The discreet silence of a politician over a period of acute political crisis may well have qualified him for the Muslim League's Presidentship, because the different factions tend to accept him as a lesser evil than any known rival; but, quite obviously, such political hibernation cannot have improved his standing with the people. When Sardar Nishtar was in the Muslim League's political arena, he showed no great promise of ever becoming a saviour; by remaining a spectator of the people's travail for some time he has not increased his chances of being hailed as the person who would lead the people to redemption. The other office-holders nominated by the new President, with a prematurely-retired diplomat as Secretary, are certainly not likely to evoke any popular enthusiasm, because they are all known entities. A tree which has over the years yielded only bitter fruit, a tree which is now dried up and shrunken, and, above all else, which has no roots—no real links with the masses—has been given a new set of custodians, and the people are asked to cluster around it for shade and protection. The appeal is utterly fatuous and can only arouse public derision. The task before the people is to remove this parasitic, gaunt wreck, clear the ground of its debris, and raise in its place a plant that will grow rapidly with their support and provide for them the shelter and sustenance they require.

16 August 1957 11 Hayalim League Antics

Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar's recent declaration that the people of Pakistan (presumably under the leadership of the Muslim League, or at least as a result of its instigation) would resort to 'other than peaceful means' if the Government did not hold elections by March 1958, is probably meant not so much to frighten the Government as to impress the people with the novel idea that the Muslim League is irrevocably wedded to democratic ideals. The gallant chief of this band of neo-

democrats was not satisfied with the threat of civil disobedience: he went a step further to promise a violent upheaval. It is possible that the Sardar Sahib was not serious about his threat, that while addressing the public meeting he became intoxicated with his own sound and fury, and that on cooler second thoughts he will try to explain away his statement or declare that he was misreported. However, even if he does so, it is pertinent to point out that the Muslim League's strategy of trying to rehabilitate itself by underlining the failings and failures of the present ruling parties can succeed only with those who have forgotten this party's unsavoury past; because, for those who are not afflicted with political amnesia, it is obvious that the policies for which the Awami League and Republican Party most deserve censure are those which were fashioned and pursued by the Muslim League during its long years of misrule. When Muslim League leaders talk of the people's fundamental rights having been taken away under the Awami League-Republican Governments, they want us to ignore the fact that the Muslim League Governments withheld these rights from the people for eight years; that they were the first to tamper with the Constitution in order to perpetuate their regime; that the Muslim League initiated or connived at moves to foist on the country a regime based on brute force: and that, even today, a very large number of its well-trained masters of intrigue remain in loyal service of the organisation which nurtured and fostered them. In the circumstances, however strongly the people may feel about the Suhrawardy Government's inability to fulfil its main pledge to the country, and whatever they may decide to do about it. the Muslim League President can hardly expect to be chosen to lead the crusade against anti-democratic forces. And while we fully endorse the demand for early general elections, we cannot refrain from pointing out to the Muslim League that these are dangerous antics which can do the country no good and will not even succeed in their primary aim, namely, that of winning for the Muslim League and its leaders a certain amount of cheap popularity.

I April 1958 Muslim League's Choice

The Muslim League's choice of a new President is clearly indicative of the very low level to which the party has sunk. It would, perhaps, be unfair to everyone concerned to recall that the chair which is now occupied by Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan was once graced by the Quaid-i-Azam. But it is certainly pertinent to point out that, apart from the period during which the Quaid directed and controlled the affairs of the Muslim League, the party's decline has been unchecked and fairly rapid, and that this process of deterioration has now reached a point of culmination.

Neither Qaiyum Khan nor the Muslim League can be congratulated on the new development. The party is afflicted with chronic Ministerialists and plagued by factionalism, its destiny in the hands of a band of men whose greed for office makes it difficult for them to distinguish between political right and wrong or to remember the party's pledges and manifestos. No one, particularly anybody with any selfrespect, can feel proud of holding the reins of such an organisation.

And this weak, attenuated party will now be guided by Abdul Qaiyum Khan, who has done more harm to its name and reputation than any other single person in the organisation. It was he who initiated the process of victimising political opponents by perversion of the law, of misusing the administrative machinery for partisan purposes, of gerrymandering on such a scale as to completely vitiate the democratic process. The only possible justification for his election is that, since Qaiyum Khan has been prominent among the Muslim League's grave-diggers, the duty of burying the party should also devolve on him.

Apart from the damage that Qaiyum Khan did when he was in office, it will be remembered that when—after first being kicked up to the Centre—he was squeezed out of office. it did not take him very long to desert the party and revile it

and pronounce it dead. The charges may well be true, but this performance only shows his lack of political stamina. After vain attempts to form a party of his own. Qaiyum Khan drifted aimlessly until he felt compelled to jump on the Muslim League bandwagon in lieu of support for his election to the West Pakistan Assembly.

Even after he had returned to the fold (incidentally, it is not known if he has completed three years of membership), he was listed among the unstable elements and, according to Muslim Leaguers, was involved in negotiations with other political parties for his own advancement.

Qaiyum Khan is reputed, among his admirers, to be a man gifted with an iron hand. Be that as it may, he must also be equipped with a wooden head if he imagines that by raising a few slogans in his loud voice in Khaliqdina Hall or elsewhere he will be able to rehabilitate himself or his Party.

For Qaiyum Khan to talk of clean administrative policies, of a foreign policy dictated by national interests, of respect for law and the Constitution, is to make these phrases shed their original meaning.

12 November 1950 Azad Pakistan Party

The emergence of another political party in Pakistan should cause no surprise either to the general public or to seriousminded students of current political trends. The stagnation that gripped the Muslim League soon after Partition, and the growing feeling that this organisation had come to a dead end, had made it inevitable that the people should seek other paths to reach the destination of a strong and prosperous Pakistan, progressively liquidating the British legacy of poverty, illiteracy, social inequality, economic backwardness and political dependence. The people's faith in the Muslim League's willingness and ability to accomplish these tasks was gradually torn to shreds and practically all the blame or praise for this rests on the shoulders of the Muslim League leadership...

Among the political parties, both old and new, that have come forward to replace the Muslim League and carry forward the people's struggle against the economic, political and social status quo, we now have the Azad Pakistan Party. Its sponsors are all ex-Muslim Leaguers who were either driven out of the organisation for unpalatable criticism of retrogressive official policies or have resigned in disgust. The formation of an Opposition Party on clear-cut political lines should be welcomed by all honest democrats, including those who still choose to remain in the Muslim League. It is of special significance that the Azad Pakistan Party stresses principles rather than personalities. The brief manifesto published by the five-man Convening Committee offers a searching analysis of post-Partition political events and goes on to present a clear-cut programme for the solution of various ills that have plagued our people for many decades. Supporters of the Muslim League, sighting a new danger to their monopoly of power and office, will undoubtedly seek to divert public attention from the concrete programme before the country and will try to confuse the issues, either by raising the dust of personal controversies or by slanderous accusations. Apart from those blinded by prejudice or constrained by overriding Party affiliations, it will generally be agreed that the Azad Pakistan Party's manifesto presents an honest attempt to diagnose present-day maladies, and that it suggests satisfactory and practical remedies for their early removal. As the document itself admits, a number of its proposals are neither new nor original. Some of them, however, are new-for instance. the plan for evacuee property. In any case, the party's plans deserve attention because the sponsors pledge themselves to pursue their objectives through mass action, by building up a constructive revolutionary movement' to complete the task of political and economic emancipation that was begun and left unfinished by the Muslim League.

In what measure will the Azad Pakistan Party succeed in attaining its objectives? This question cannot be answered

with any certainty, for the success or failure of any political party is governed by a multitude of unpredictable factors. In the last analysis, of course, it depends on the organisation's ability to reach and serve the people and their response to its work and programme. If the Azad Party's manifesto is any indication of its future functioning, it has made an auspicious beginning. And, in any case, it has already performed a public service by the promise implied in its programme that public life in Pakistan will be elevated to a political level and. henceforth, the musty smell of personal or factional intrigue will be dispelled by a contest on principles. Since the decision on the life or death of political parties lies with the people. one can safely hope that whatever the future has in store for those who are entering the lists under different political banners, the widening of the people's political choice will be in the best interests of the country...

II. AZAD PAKISTAN PARTY

21 Oc<mark>tober</mark> 1953 Unto Caesar

The mystery created by the apparently sudden resignation of Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan and Sardar Asadullah Jan from the Azad Pakistan Party, which they had helped to found about three years ago, has been solved by their decision to rejoin the Muslim League. Earlier rumours, spread by those who welcomed their break with the Azad Party, explained their action in a manner that gave the two gentlemen very little credit for being capable of taking an important political decision primarily on political grounds. It was reported that the former had severed his connection with the party as a result of personal differences with one of his colleagues, while the Frontier MCA was said to have followed in his footsteps in a state of somnambulance. Events have belied this analysis, and now the actions of the two MCAs fit into some sort of a logical sequence. The same cannot, however, be said of the arguments they have mustered in defence of their stand. Whether the decision of the two Sardars to re-enter the fold of the ruling party was prompted, as they naively claim, by the Prime Minister's come-back call to all ex-Muslim Leaguers-which the two astute politicians seem to have anticipated—or, as appears more likely, Mr Mohammed Ali's formal appeal was a result of their enthusiastic response to earlier informal invitations, their hyperbolic statement is not likely to be taken very seriously by a public that has become inured to the self-laudatory euphemisms used by our politicians to justify every action, however inconsistent it may be with their past professions or policies. In the present case, we see no change of political circumstances which could provide a rational explanation of the somersault performed by these two MCAs. We do not wish to be uncharitable, but it is obvious that if they mean what they are now saying, their speeches and statements of the last three years lacked the seriousness and sincerity attributed to them, or, contrariwise, their present decision has been influenced by factors which find no mention in their recent statement.

The main arguments given by Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan and Sardar Asadullah Jan are that democracy in Pakistan is in dire peril and must be saved, that Mr Mohammed Ali symbolises the one solitary ray of hope and, therefore, his faction in the Muslim League must be supported against the forces of darkness, that the grave problems confronting the country require national unity, and that by joining the Muslim League they can guide the nation along a newly discovered short-cut to the path of freedom, democracy and progress. In brief, their novel concept of the functioning of political organisations leads these gentlemen to conclude that the Prime Minister's 'love for democracy and progress'-of which proof has yet to come in the convincing form of concrete action—can by some miracle transform the Muslim League from a clique of power-hungry politicians, with little genuine mass support, into an organisation able and willing to lead the nation to the promised El Dorado. Such complete

trust in one person's ability to reverse the policies of an organisation—in which he enjoys little support except that brought by his high office—may be a touching human phenomenon, but it has little to do with the facts of political life in Pakistan. To give another example of their strange reasoning, the two Sardars rightly aver that democracy is a prerequisite to national progress, but they seem to forget that, in order to save democracy, they are joining hands with those who are directly responsible for denying our people their elementary democratic rights, for the suppression of civil liberties, for preventing free elections, and for adding considerably to the oppressive body of laws they inherited from the British. As for the broad unity required to tackle Pakistan's major problems, is it not the Muslim League again which is responsible for thwarting all efforts in this direction? Since the Muslim League's policies remain the same, its decay continues unchecked, and its internal functioning is dominated more than ever before by the unscrupulous squabbles of warring factions, one is driven to conclude that the only new factor in the situation is the changed outlook of the two returning prodigals.

Whether or not a fatted calf of some kind is placed before either Sardar Shaukat Hayat or Sardar Asadullah Jan or any of the other Opposition Party leaders who are known to be contemplating an early return to the place where 'programmes can be implemented', and however fine the words they use to justify their volte-face, they will rightly be criticised by our people for having abandoned the essential task of building up a strong Opposition—to which they had voluntarily pledged themselves. The task is by no means easy, but its achievement is absolutely necessary if the country is to be saved from the misery of one-party misrule...

III. AWAMI LEAGUE

June 16, 1957 Awami League Conflict

The recent Dacca session of the East Pakistan Awami League Council has allowed the simmering intra-party conflict to come to the surface. Meeting behind barred doors, with not even Pressmen present to witness its first volte-face on a major policy issue, the Council abandoned one of the most important points of its election programme by approving the foreign policy which is being acted upon by Mr H.S. Suhrawardy and was evolved during the Bogra period. It will be recalled that criticism of this policy had served as an effective weapon during the last East Pakistan elections, and it was most skilfully employed by the United Frontespecially the Awami League—to discredit the Muslim League as a party incapable of fully safeguarding Pakistan's independence and sovereignty. The people were then given a firm pledge that, with the Awami League in office, Pakistan would chart an independent course in international politics, and that the alliances made by the Muslim League would be either revised or scrapped. More recently, in May 1956, the East Pakistan Awami League unanimously opposed and condemned the same policies which have now been approved. The present majority opinion has, therefore, gone back on more than one pledge and flouted more than one mandate.

If the Awami League's opponents gloat over the split in its ranks, their sense of satisfaction is understandable. But for any group of Awami Leaguers to crow over Mr Suhrawardy's 'victory' would be not only be premature but extremely shortsighted. Unless admiration for the technique used to subdue and control the party organisation blinds him to its dangerous consequences, no sane Awami Leaguer can view with equanimity the disrupting of the organisation and the isolation or withdrawal from the leadership of those who provide the party with its democratic leaven, who are responsible for forging and maintaining its links with the people, and without whom the organisation might well lose a great deal of its coherence and popular appeal.

The group now dominant in the party should have learnt some lessons from the Awami League debacle in West Pakistan. In this wing, Mr Suhrawardy found the ad hoc organisation unwilling to scrap the party's programme. He therefore suspended its different branches and cancelled the Convention that was intended to set up the Awami League in West Pakistan on a proper, democratic basis. This drastic step may be regarded as a victory for Mr Suhrawardy, but its result, namely, the virtual disappearance of the Awami League as an organisation from West Pakistan, was hardly a victory for the Awami League, Those who value the party more than the person chosen to act as its convener can only regard it as a defeat. The situation in East Pakistan is totally different, and the Ministerial group was aided by what would appear to be Maulana Bhashani's contempt for their efforts to oust him. Nevertheless, the results can ultimately be as disastrous for the party in that wing as they have been in West Pakistan

It is also instructive to remember the history of the Muslim League. This party was once much more powerful and popular than the Awami League, but the strong-arm methods of the Muslim League's Ministers-who began to rule the country in the name of the party and soon wanted to dictate both to the party and the country-reduced it to an attenuated rump. It completely forfeited the people's confidence, and not long thereafter was deprived of authority. The danger of Mr Suhrawardy's party going the way of the Muslim League is now almost visible, and it is by no means a pleasant prospect. If this trend cannot be resisted, it will tend to subvert political and parliamentary life in East Pakistan, undermine the stability of the Provincial and Central Governments, and obstruct the solution of urgent domestic problems. All this helps nobody, not even Mr Suhrawardy and his foreign policy, for no policy can be effective unless it is backed by organised mass support. The

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danger also exists that when the Awami League Ministers begin to feel unsafe, they may lose their present keenness for holding the country's first General Election before the end of March 1958. The developments that have taken place at Dacca certainly do not provide any cause for rejoicing; they do, on the other hand, call for greater vigilance to ensure that democratic channels are not blocked and faith is not lost in democratic action.

IV. NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY

13 July 1957 Dacca Convention

Although it is far too early yet to make a confident assessment of the impact that the forthcoming Dacca Convention will have on the country's political life, no realist can underestimate the significance of the move initiated recently by Maulana Bhashani. The most important aspect of the Convention is that it is intended to bring political workers from the two wings of Pakistan together on one platform, so that they can evolve a common political programme and thus establish a direct link between the two sections of our people that are geographically separated from each other. Hitherto, this link has been extremely tenuous; and, as a logical result, misunderstandings have often arisen between the Provinces-which selfish politicians have hastened to exploit to their own advantage, thereby making a bad situation worse. But no serious attempt has so far been made to grapple with the problem and find a sensible solution. Once upon a time, when the Muslim League was still a live political organisation, it could have served to maintain close ties between the people of East and West Pakistan. However, this essential function, like so many of its other duties, was completely neglected, mainly because the Muslim League leaders were too busy safeguarding their own interests to be able to protect those of the country, and because each provincial group of Muslim Leaguers found it expedient

to raise chauvinistic slogans in order to strengthen their factional position within the party—even though it was fairly obvious that such tactics would harm the country and ultimately destroy the party. Anyhow, with the Muslim League's steady decay, hope of its ever being able to help improve relations between the two Wings began to dwindle: and now, after its complete collapse in East Pakistan, even if the party's leaders genuinely wanted to serve the cause of East-West understanding, there is little they could do about it.

Later on, when the Awami League's star was in the ascendant, it was widely expected that Mr Suhrawardy would be able to tackle effectively the task of establishing a rational basis for close political ties between the two parts of Pakistan. This hope has been belied. The Awami League—after it became the ruling Party—and its allies in the western wing seem to be imitating the Muslim League tactics. And, as past experience has shown, alliances of Ministerial groups which are not cemented by a common political programme are brittle arrangements which begin to crumble at the slightest strain. An opportunistic pact is not only useless as a substitute for a genuine political alliance—established through common allegiance to a single political party or at least to a common political programme—but is capable of doing a great deal of harm to the cause of national unity. Further, whatever little possibility there ever was of the Awami League emerging as an all-Pakistan party, enjoying the support of large sections of opinion in both wings, has begun to disappear. As far as West Pakistan is concerned, the manner in which Mr Subrawardy cancelled last year's Party Convention at the eleventh hour, because he found that a majority of the persons whom he himself had invited were likely to oppose his foreign policy, has made it very difficult for the Awami League to establish itself here in the near future. In East Pakistan, the recent split in the party has considerably weakened the Awami League's Ministerial group, for there can be little doubt that the majority of the party's active workers will side with Maulana Bhashani. This will not only reduce the Suhrawardy

group's following, but also make it necessary for them to depend for survival in office on the support of the more reactionary groups in the East Pakistan Legislature, and adjust their policies accordingly. In the circumstances, it seems clear that none of the political parties which either had an all-Pakistan basis, or were potentially capable of developing into country-wide organisations, can today shoulder the important task of bringing greater cohesion in Pakistani politics by dismantling the artificial barriers that tend to separate the people of one wing from those of the other. If the Dacca Convention can make a start towards uniting in one stream the parallel political currents that now follow almost identical but separate courses, it will not only foster the emergence of a formidable political force but also strengthen the foundations of national unity.

Dacca Decision

The decision of the Dacca Convention to form a new political organisation should help greatly to raise the level of political activity in Pakistan, by bringing it nearer to the plane where political slogans are not treated as mere catchwords, and the capture of power is not regarded as an end in itself. The two most significant features of the National Awami Party are, first, that its leadership is indissolubly wedded to a democratic programme, and, secondly, that it can be certain of enlisting considerable mass support in both wings of the country. Hitherto, the parties dominating the political scene in Pakistan have used their manifestos as a smoke screen that allows them to wage a single-minded struggle for power. To achieve and retain Ministerial office, they often have, without the slightest hesitation, jettisoned political principles when expediency so demanded, and have even been willing to follow policies diametrically opposed to those which brought them public support at the polls. With the formation of a political party that shows rich promise of remaining steadfast

to its principles, and which will give battle to its opponents only on the basis of political differences, the people may reasonably hope for a generally healthier atmosphere in national politics.

The fact that the new party will have a strong base in both wings of Pakistan makes its emergence doubly welcome. Since the advent of freedom no political party has functioned—the Muslim League can be ignored because soon after 1947 it ceased to function—in both parts of the country, with the result that the policies and actions of most groups and parties have not been guided by an integrated national outlook. Even with the best of intentions, the leaders of parties which, in effect, are only Provincial parties have been unable to appreciate fully the problems of the country as a whole, and their policy decisions have naturally been vitiated by a certain narrowness of vision. At the same time, the opportunistic political groups have based their programmes on Provincial chauvinism, seeking to make political capital even at the cost of fostering fissiparous tendencies. The only remedy for this unhappy situation was the creation of a political party that would secure the support of the people of both East and West Pakistan. The coalescence of important political elements in the two wings of the country is. therefore, a happy development: and even if today some of them are not wholly free of parochialism, it may be assumed that as they work together with the representatives of other parts of the country and begin to view Pakistan's problems on a wider national canvas, they will succeed in evolving a party pledged to the service of the whole people, a force that will bring about greater national unity and cohesion,

Whether the expectations aroused by the National Awami Party can be fully realised will depend on a number of factors, particularly on the devotion and energy with which the party leaders and workers take its message to the masses. However, if the reactions of its opponents are any guide, the new party's success may be forecast with a large measure of certainty. Since the idea of forming such a party was first mooted. hysterical cries of alarm have been raised by the ruling party's supporters. They have clamoured for an alliance of all reactionary elements to meet the danger, not realising that it is difficult to achieve such an alliance and impossible to make it last. The simple reason for this is that a unity of like-minded politicians is possible, but a number of equally power-hungry politicians cannot hold hands for very long. If this had been possible, the Muslim League would not have crumbled, the United Front would not have collapsed, and the Republican Party would not be a tottering hulk.

Having failed to ensure stability for their patrons they have unleashed a campaign of abuse and slander. It is, however, rather surprising that the Awami League, which not long ago was itself the victim of such a campaign of vilification, has given full-throated support to the peddlers of lies and calumnies. This is not all. Supporters of the Awami League have fallen back upon the ugly cult of the knife and lathi in their desperate efforts to save their own party by sabotaging the Dacca Convention. This shows, firstly, that the supporters of Mr Suhrawardy and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in East Pakistan have no other reply to Maulana Bhashani's charges against the official leadership of the Awami League, and that they foolishly hope to drown his call for a new era in Pakistan's politics in noisy vituperation, or to prevent the mobilisation of the people by breaking up meetings or assaulting leaders and workers. We earnestly hope that the Awami League leaders will have second thoughts on the subject, because they have started playing a dangerous game which, like any other disease, is likely to spread. The Awami League leaders should know that goondaism, which may for a short time serve the purpose of its authors, is not something with which the allegiance of the people can be secured. As all petty Hitlers have realised, goondaism is bound to boomerang and, by rousing the people's ire, hasten the downfall of those who seek to rule through fear.

1 October 1957 The Word-Eaters

Having failed finally, on the eve of the Provincial Assembly's last session, to renew their agreement with the National Awami Party for dismantling One Unit-mainly because a majority of the NAP Committee had little faith in their pledged word—the Muslim League leaders sat back to recoup their strength after weeks of hectic vote-catching; and, as the days passed, they showed less and less interest in the work of the Legislature and the behaviour of the more unstable MPAs. The Prime Minister's statement on the One-Unit issue has, however, roused these gentlemen from their apathetic despondency. They are now trying very hard to set right their record on the One-Unit question—not an easy task for those who helped an authoritarian regime to merge the Provinces of West Pakistan, and later, when driven out of office, repudiated the principle of integration and sought the NAP's support to overthrow the Republicans. On the basis of their alliance they succeeded in frightening the Republicans away from the Legislature in March; as a consequence, the Constitution was suspended and President's Rule proclaimed in the Province. During this period intensive talks continued between the two parties for further cementing, and even broadening, the agreement. There can, thus, be no doubt that if the Republican Party had not made a similar offer to the NAP, the Muslim League leaders-would-gladly have accepted a firm alliance with the NAP with the break-up of One Unit as its main condition. To meet the demands of a changed situation, the Muslim

To meet the demands of a changed situation, the Muslim League luminaries are giving a performance in word-eating which beats even their own past records. Some of the them, with colossal effrontery, deny that the party ever entered into an agreement with the NAP. Others, incapable for some reason of telling so direct a lie, are employing cheap quibbles to retreat from their commitments. It is said, for example, that the leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party and the Secretary-General of the All-Pakistan Muslim League had no authority to speak on behalf of the party organisations. The fact is that for six months the existence of these documents has been known to all; yet no one of any consequence in the party thought it necessary to question these two gentlemen or repudiate their actions. The argument that the Working Committee's 'conclusion' cannot serve in place of a formal resolution is equally puerile. A more plausible explanation offered is that these two senior office-holders of the Muslim League were trying to 'befool the NAP'. In other words, that they had sought its support on the strength of promises they had no intention of keeping, that they were engaged in lowlevel trickery, and that for six months the whole party connived at this attempt to gain office through deceit. It is for the people to decide whether the Muslim League and its leaders were being thoroughly dishonest for the last six months, or they are all being utterly dishonest now. In either case, hereafter the party cannot easily claim the right to ask for public support for any of its declared policies.

19 March 1958 ML-NAP Alliance

The lure of office has persuaded the Muslim League Assembly Party and a majority of the NAP Assembly Party to suspend their mutual name-calling and sign yet another agreement for a Coalition Government in West Pakistan. Irrespective of whether or not they can jointly buy enough votes to topple the new Republican Ministry, the latest ML-NAP pact will generally be viewed as one of the many unprincipled alliances which have helped to destroy political stability in Pakistan and thus hindered the country's progress towards real democracy. It is, of course, quite obvious that neither the Republican Party's policies nor its tactics evoke much admiration or respect. In today's circumstances, however, the important thing is not to decide whether the group of contenders for office is slightly better or slightly worse than the defenders of the citadel of power; the important thing is to ensure that the game of Ministry-breaking and Minis-

try-making is given up—or at least suspended—in order to keep the country free of crises until the General Election. The people must be allowed to give their attention to the serious problems that face Pakistan; they should now be spared the disgusting spectacle of a Ministerial merry-go-round where nothing changes except the faces of those who occupy the seats of power. And it seems quite plain that, if these gentlemen continue to pursue their selfish ends, there is real danger of the General Election being delayed beyond November 1958. Nothing could be more disastrous for the country. A further postponement of Pakistan's first elections would not only delay the full implementation of the Constitution and prolong the present unhappy state of affairs, but it would also tend to destroy what little faith the people have left in the promise of Pakistan's rulers that they are determined to build up a democratic polity. If this happens, most people will think, not without justification, that the question before them is not when and in what manner elections will be held, but whether the people will ever be given the opportunity to choose their representatives in a free poll. Particularly if the events of the last twelve months are kept in mind, the terms of the agreement signed between the Muslim League leaders and a section of the NAP have no real significance. In March 1957, the Muslim League gave a written undertaking to the NAP that it would support the break-up of One Unit; but when this manoeuvre led to the imposition of President's Rule in West Pakistan, the Muslim League repudiated its agreement and its leaders started a campaign of vilification against the NAP. Later, in September last year, the Muslim League once again offered to form a Coalition Government with the NAP, but the offer was rejected; subsequently, each one of its provisions was denied by the Muslim League leaders. Between then and now the Muslim League has gone on record in favour of retaining the integrated Province of West Pakistan, and has pledged itself to support the separate electorates system. But the smallest chance of their entering the portals of the Secretariat has made the Muslim League leaders perform yet another double somersault. In the circumstances, only the most credulous of human beings could believe that the Muslim League intends to remain loyal to its latest alliance, or that it will honestly implement the terms of the agreement. In fact, this is clearly an impossibility even on other grounds. If the Muslim League is earnest about its promise to facilitate the holding of elections by November, it cannot possibly fulfil its other pledges. How can the Muslim League achieve in six months what it could not do in ten years? How can anyone believe that these stalwarts 'will try to help the *Hari*', or root out corruption, or put down lawlessness, or honour any of the attractive promises that are meant to cloak their uninhibited desire to secure power at any cost?

As far as the NAP is concerned, the group which have come to terms with the Muslim League, in utter disregard of their party's policies and principles, have brought discredit to the organisation by sinking to the level of politicians who acquired special fame during the era of the Muslim League's gang warfare. Their defection from the path of political rectitude is all the more regrettable because they belong to a party which was formed on the basis of certain clear-cut objectives. The leaders who have presumed to accept an unprincipled bargain will undoubtedly be called upon by the party's rank and file to explain their conduct, for it is plain that the NAP can condone such actions only at the risk of blighting it future. Whatever the party may do, Mr G.M. Syed and his friends have no rational explanation for their volte-face. Since no political reason has been given for their decision to transfer their support from the Republicans to the Muslim Leaguers, one can only assume that their reasons are non-political or personal, particularly when such matters as the Government's treatment of a particular bank has been written down in the pact. That these gentlemen should use their position to seek petty personal gains for themselves is bad enough: that they should do so in today's conditions shows that they are either completely blind or completely indifferent to the dangerous consequences of their actions. In either case, they forfeit the right to speak in terms of political principles or to claim that they are unselfishly devoted to public interest.

30 March 1958 ML-NAP Pact

Not unexpectedly, the gentlemen responsible for the abortive ML-NAP pact have fallen out. The marriage of convenience arranged by them recently in a bid to capture power could not anyhow have lasted for very long; but once it had been proved barren, its early repudiation was a perfectly natural phenomenon. This is precisely what happened to earlier pacts of this sort, and the same thing is likely to happen again and again as long as political parties remain in the hands of persons who tend to confuse political activity with intrigue and political aims with the pursuit of personal or factional gains. Within a fortnight of the ML-NAP pact having been signed and sealed, its authors are giving it varying interpretations or disputing the very existence of its more important provisions: and the Muslim League leaders are trying, as has become their habit, to wriggle out of even those commitments which they had joyously made public. To take only one example of such contradictory statements, a representative of the Frontier group in the NAP has declared that 'an understanding' had been reached with the Muslim League leaders in respect of One Unit, but 'the details of that agreement' had not been released to the Press, "Nevertheless", he said. 'I can assure that the NAP members from minor (smaller) Provinces are satisfied with that agreement'. On the other hand, the Leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party declared two days ago: 'I state categorically that the agreement is limited in scope to parliamentary activity, and on the two controversial issues (One Unit and the electorate question) the coalescing groups are quite at liberty to stick to their stand'. It is not for us to say, at this stage, whether the Muslim League leaders are now backing out of the agreement or the NAP group who sought to join hands with the Muslim League are, in order to escape censure, giving it an interpretation that they hope will be more acceptable to their party's rank and file. In either case, the controversy raging between the parties to Pakistan's latest strange political pact makes it perfectly plain that the political frills devised by its

authors never had any real significance, and that its only object was to enable them to capture power at the cost of any principle and irrespective of all consequences.

27 March 1958 NAP's Decision

By refusing to oust the Awami League Ministry in East Pakistan, the NAP Assembly Party has provided evidence of its growing maturity and set for the country a healthy example of a political issue being decided in accordance with a straightforward political stand. The question of replacing the Awami League Government has been agitating certain political parties for a long time, but it came to the fore as a practical proposition only a few weeks ago. On the one hand, the Awami League, already weakened by last year's split, is now riven by factionalism and personal disputes that are said to centre largely on differences over future control of the party and the distribution of the fruits of office: already some MPAs have left the party. On the other hand, the KSP, Nizame-Islam and Muslim League groups in the Legislature have come together in an effort to capture power at any cost. Before the beginning of the current Assembly session, these parties worked out the terms of their own alliance and also decided to offer generous terms to the NAP whose help was essential for the success of their mission. In fact, partly in order to make sure of the NAP's support, and partly because they could not make an agreed choice among themselves, the leaders of the coalescing parties agreed that the Chief Ministership should go to the Leader of the NAP Assembly Party.

As far as the NAP is concerned, the main factor responsible for its reconsideration of the earlier decision to help the Awami League Ministry to remain in power was the party's bitter experience in recent by-elections. It is no great secret that the Awami League has been guilty of using the same dirty election methods against which it launched a mighty crusade when the

Muslim League tried to perpetuate its regime by misuse of the administrative machinery, and by denying the Opposition parties full liberty to approach the electorate. In addition to this, organised *goondas* were used at various places to break up NAP meetings and, taking advantage of the disturbances provoked by supporters of the Awami League. NAP workers were arrested or meetings and processions were banned in their strongholds. Apart from the feeling that free elections could not be expected as long as the Awami League remained in power, a certain measure of understandable personal bitterness had also crept in to strengthen the demand for withdrawal of support from the Awami League Ministry. However, after giving due thought to all the factors involved, the party has wisely decided that, in today's circumstances, every feasible alternative to an Awami League Ministry would be far worse than the existing set-up. It was also realised that a successful attempt to defeat the Awami League Government would have led either to the imposition of Article 193 or to the Constitution of a Government composed of elements that are interested neither in early elections nor in a rational programme of work. Therefore, overcoming its members' natural resentment against the Awami League's misdeeds, and casting aside the temptation of heading the new Coalition Government, the NAP Assembly Party has decided to give the Ata Cabinet a new lease of life—without asking for a share of power or for any other favour.

The East Pakistan NAP's decision acquires more than usual significance when it is compared to the actions and motives of a number of other political parties and groups in the country including the majority group of the NAP Assembly Party in West Pakistan. It also needs to be underlined that the elevenpoint programme it has drawn up, and which the NAP wants the Awami League Government to accept, consists only of important public issues; eschewing the path of blackmail and bribery, no attempt has been made to secure personal or partisan gains. One would like to hope, therefore, that the Awami League will realise that—if only because they are just and fair—the NAP's demands must be accepted, and not only accepted but fully honoured. The NAP has rendered an important service to the nation by trying to stave off another crisis which could reduce the chances of the elections being held this year. It has at the same time ensured the party's future success; because, even if some in high places may not think so, a time will undoubtedly come when the people will pay back those who have betrayed their trust, who have used public office for personal gain, who have made promises only to break them at the first offer of Ministerial office or equivalent advantage; and when that day of reckoning comes, all political parties or political leaders that are now engaged in the entertaining pastime of performing frequent somersaults, in utter disregard of both principles and pledges, will certainly be driven out of public life.

14 September 1958 NAP Rift

The rift in the National Awami Party has now come to the surface; and, whether or not Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his group intend to leave the organisation, the split in the party's West Pakistan branch is likely to become final unless matters can be mended by the Central Organising Committee. Although the differences dividing the party relate to a number of major issues, the current crisis has been precipitated over the comparatively unimportant question of the NAP helping the Awami League Ministry in East Pakistan to stay in office until the General Election. The dissident group of NAP leaders, led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mr G.M. Syed, hold that the East Pakistan Assembly Party has flouted party discipline by lending its support to the Ataur Rehman Ministry without first obtaining a firm agreement on the fivepoint programme prepared by a special NAP sub-committee. The East Wing leaders feel, on the other hand, that the fivepoint programme has virtually been agreed upon by the Awami League Government, and, further, that it would anyhow be wrong for the party to create another crisis in the Province and, thereby, either invite a return of President's rule or pave the way for a KSP-NI-ML Coalition—a combination that would not only jeopardize the General Election but open the door to greater administrative chaos, corruption and suppression of civil liberties.

On the question of party discipline, about which a great deal is being said, it is of interest to note that only recently Mr G. M. Syed has, without the approval of the party, entered into an alliance with Sind's feudal leaders in the name of forging a united front against One Unit. Nor is this the first example of such initiative on his part. Earlier this year Mr G. M. Syed, with the approval of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, sought to cement an unprincipled alliance with the Muslim League: and it is no secret that some points of his dissatisfaction with the Republican Party had nothing to do with any political issue. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, on the other hand, has been dissatisfied with the party since the NAP Convention at Peshawar refused to sanction a *satyagraha* campaign in order to break up One Unit. It was rightly pointed out by other NAP leaders that a campaign of civil disobedience could create conditions that would allow a reign of terror to be introduced in the affected areas; that the slogans used by certain NAP leaders would create inter-provincial bitterness; and that it might create sufficient chaos to give certain elements in the country the opportunity they have been looking for to postpone the General Election once again. This viewpoint prevailed and the question of satvagraha was shelved. Now, after the failure of a certain scheme agreed upon between Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and some Republican leaders who met under President Iskander Mirza's auspices, the civil disobedience plan is again being pressed-in utter disregard of the fact that elections are due to be held in five months.

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his friends do not seem to realise, or do not care to admit, that many people in the Punjab area—and certainly all Punjabi NAP leaders—are as strongly opposed to the One-Unit scheme as politicians from

the smaller Provinces, that the integration has brought no benefits to the Punjabi people, and that the authors of the One-Unit plan received every co-operation from a large number of political leaders in the smaller Provinces, including the NWFP. Further, if the immediate break-up of One Unit could be accomplished without delaying the elections, there could be no serious objection to the attempt being made. However, in today's circumstances, this appears to be an impossible task; and for every genuine democrat, it is far more important to ensure that democracy can be safeguarded than to secure the liquidation—through means as dubious as those used to bring it about—of the present constitutional set-up in West Pakistan. It should be realised by these veteran leaders that, in politics as elsewhere, short cuts can often be extremely dangerous; for not only is it possible that one may lose one's path and direction, but one usually walks into new difficulties that make the journey longer and more strenuous.

These and other matters will presumably be discussed and decided at the forthcoming meeting of the NAP's Central Organising Committee. By then the intentions of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mr G.M. Syed should be less obscure, and the situation in East Pakistan will have become clearer, making it easier for the Organising Committee to take clearcut decisions on the issues put before it. It need hardly be said that one expects the NAP leaders to be guided by the political programme which brought them together and not to be swayed by the threats and shouts of those who seek to bend the organisation to their will and caprice. Obviously, unless principles can take precedence over personalities, whatever short-term gains certain groups in the party might secure through spectacular but faulty tactics, the party as a whole is likely to lose prestige and begin to be counted among political organisations whose only purpose is to capture power. The crisis facing the NAP is, therefore, primarily a crisis of political morals, and, unless the Organising Committee can overcome it without compromising the party's basic aims, it will not bring real strength to the party, for a small united party can be more effective than a conglomeration of groups that pull in different directions

V. SHIFTING LOYALTIES

24 August 1958 The Real Remedy

The proposal that a member of the Central or Provincial Assembly should be compelled by law to vacate his seat if he forsakes his party, seeks to deal with the evil of shifting loyalties, which has undoubtedly done great harm to the country by fostering political instability and encouraging blackmail. But, however well-intentioned its authors may be, it needs to be pointed out that such a measure is not likely to purify our political life, and it could well create a number of new complications. The first objection to the proposed law is that it will tend to destroy the principle that an elected member is primarily responsible to his constituents, and not to a party or legislative group. The fact that this principle has little application in today's conditions does not justify its being overridden for all time to come. Secondly, by making the party an all-powerful leviathan, we would destroy intraparty democracy and make party leaders even more irresponsible than they are today. Further, legal sanctions for enforcing a member's loyalty to his party-can make sense only if the party itself can be compelled to remain loyal to its programme. For if, as has so often happened, party bosses become disloyal to the manifesto which ensured their return to power, is it not the moral duty of every party member to defy his leaders and remain loyal to the party programme? And, when a party splits, who will decide which of the two parallel organisations is to be obeyed? Lastly, such a law would be futile unless it also barred other acts of disloyalty to the party. For example, a dissident or dissatisfied member can damage his party's cause as effectively by voting against it in the legislature without resigning from the organisation.

But, surely, it would be absolutely fantastic to lay down that the members of a party must vote in accordance with the party whip even when it conflicts with the dictates of their conscience. The fact that, today, defiance of the party whip is usually not dictated by a member's conscience, and mostly results from some petty manoeuvre, does not change the validity of the principle involved. Thus it seems quite obvious that instead of trying to discover legal remedies for problems of political ethics and responsibility, the National Assembly should devote itself to remedying the real disease by ensuring that the existing legal safeguards for democracy in Pakistan cannot be destroyed or weakened. If it can be ensured that the people are never again deprived of their civic rights, it is reasonable to hope that before long the people's vigilance will compel our political leaders to show greater regard for the decencies of democratic life, and that those who continue to play their present game will be driven out of the political field.



Section 6: Pakistan and the World Foreign Relations, US Aid, and Kashmir



I. DARKNESS AT HIGH NOON: THE ANGLO-US BLOC AND MIDDLE EAST POLICY

3 July 1948 American Aid

Mr G. Allana, Mayor of Karachi and the employers' delegate to the International Labour Organisation Conference at San Francisco, apart from pleading on behalf of his capitalist friends, has taken it upon himself to appeal for 'some sort of Marshall Aid' for Pakistan. We do not regard this gratuitous effort on the part of the Karachi Mayor as any service to the country. Since the war ended, the world has had ample time to ponder over the implications of American aid. To independent observers it has become abundantly clear that the receipt of dollars, whether as a gift or loan, not only involves complete economic subjugation of the aided country but also its political tutelage to America. Even in its most liberal aspect, as reflected in the various bilateral pacts recently concluded with the countries of Western Europe, the Marshall Plan amounts to direct economic control by Washington to suit the needs of America and its dependents. The misgivings with which the terms of these agreements have been accepted, even by America's closest political associates, indicate the extent to which these countries have had to mortgage themselves to the great dispenser of dollars. In other countries, American domination following dollar-aid has been far more brazen, and the price paid by the recipients far heavier. Turkey has virtually been deprived of its independence, as is proved by the fact that it is the only Muslim country in the world which has refused to raise its voice in support of Palestinian Arabs; Greece has had a monarchist regime foisted on an unwilling people at the point

of Anglo-American bayonets and is being devastated by a foreign-inspired civil war; and in China, American aid is delaying the liquidation of the tottering Kuomintang dictatorship, which seeks to place the country in more effective bondage than it ever was before. America is obviously attempting to buy her way to world domination; therefore, her dollar-aid programme is certainly not meant for countries which refuse to accept orders in both the economic and political spheres. To maintain its independence, and to avoid embroilment in the Third World War which Washington seems to be planning, whatever foreign aid Pakistan accepts must be on terms of its own choosing. If American dollars are not available on these terms our country must look elsewhere for help. Pakistan's needs, of which machinery and technical help are the most urgent, can largely be met by other countries (for instance Czechoslovakia) without any commitments of the type demanded by America. For funds, Pakistan must make the fullest possible use of its favourable balance of trade, its sterling balances, and increased internal savings. If foreign capital is to be invited at all, it should only be accepted on such terms and conditions as eliminate all possibility of the creation of foreign vested interests in our country. The Pakistan Government should draw up its future industrial plans without depending on the dangerous dollar-import policy, even though this may seem to be the easiest and the quickest way to obtain the wherewithal to begin the reconstruction of our country. The other road may be hard to travel, and our journey may be a little longer. but this is a small price to pay for maintaining the absolute sovereignty of Pakistan. Having achieved deliverance from British imperialism, it would be extremely shortsighted to allow our country to become enmeshed in the net of America's dollar imperialism in return for an illusory progress. Mr Allana, and other representatives of Pakistan's nascent capitalism, may see in accepting some sort of a Marshall Plan' an opportunity to get their slice of the profits which will accrue to Wall Street, but such a policy of

dependence on a foreign power would be contrary to the long-range interests of the country and can bring no real benefit to the mass of our people. The Central Government of Pakistan is showing commendable caution in this matter, and we hope that neither present day difficulties nor the eagerness of Pakistan's budding Tatas and Birlas will stampede it into an alliance with Western imperialism. We must obviously try to lay the economic foundations of Pakistan on the firm rock of our own efforts and have faith in our people that they will do their best to carry out the Government's industrial plans, however great the hardships and sacrifice involved. In any case, whatever policy the Pakistan Government evolves, it is highly desirable that nobody should presume to speak on behalf of Pakistan in matters of such great national importance except persons to whom the task is specially assigned by proper authority.

3 April 1949 Foreign Bases

The prompt contradiction of the serious allegations made recently in a Soviet journal that Great Britain was setting up military bases in Pakistan territory near the Afghan border will evoke widespread relief in this country. A news agency states that responsible circles in Karachi have characterised the Moscow report as 'complete nonsense'. The lease of war bases, however, is not a very rare phenomenon in the world of today; in the preparations being made for the next World War, there are many examples of foreign troops being stationed in countries regarded as sovereign and independent. In the global strategy of a future war, Pakistan occupies a position of great importance; it is probably true, therefore, that certain Great Powers would like to use Pakistan as a stepping-stone for attack or a buffer for defence. This, of course, must not be allowed to happen, for our country has no world aims which can be furthered by war and badly needs a long period of peace for its own development. We hope, therefore, that the refutation of Moscow's allegations will be made more authoritatively and the people of Pakistan will be ensured that not an inch of Pakistan territory will ever be leased to any foreign power for military or pseudo-military purposes.

1 September 1950 Pakistan and Korea

The Pakistan Government's decision not to send any troops to aid the US war effort in Korea will be greeted in this country with great relief and satisfaction. It is gratifying that the Government has respected the wishes of the people with regard to a major matter of foreign policy, although it is regrettable that—despite the recent full exposure of America's predatory intentions in the Far East and her desire for warno change has yet taken place in the Pakistan Government's general attitude of supporting Anglo-American policies even when such support is not merited. Press and public opinion in Pakistan has been severely critical of the Government's hasty declaration of support for the American cause in Korea. The two months that have elapsed since then have provided no evidence that America's interest in Korea is even remotely connected with altruism. On the other hand, the absence of a clear-cut declaration of UN policy for Korea, the reported murder of thousands of civilians by the South Korean authorities, the inhuman 'saturation bombing' by the US Air Force, and the admission by most Western observers that the North Korean Government and Army are supported by the bulk of the Korean people, have confirmed the doubts about the UN's impartiality and justified the charge that in its sudden spurt of activity over Korea, it was merely serving American ends. Nor did last month's sessions of the Security Council show up the Anglo-American statesmen as champions of peace and democracy. In view of all this, it can be said with certainty that there will be very few to share the regret expressed on behalf of the Pakistan Government for its inability to send soldiers and arms to South Korea...

15 June 1952 Middle East Defence

The official contradiction of persistent rumours circulated by foreign news agencies, that the Government of Pakistan were favourably considering a British proposal for this country's participation in what Western publicists euphemistically describe as the Middle East Defence Pact, will be received by the people of Pakistan and their friends abroad with tremendous relief. A spokesman of the Foreign Office has declared that he had no knowledge of negotiations with Western countries for this purpose, and that Pakistan's Defence Secretary, who was reported to have left for London and Washington in this connection, had in fact gone to Switzerland on leave. This timely refutation of these reports, which are either inspired feelers and based on wishful thinking, or are maliciously intended to injure Pakistan's prestige in the Middle East countries, is most welcome. However, the issue is of such great importance that a more positive declaration of the Pakistan Government's policy towards the so-called Middle East Defence Pact is both desirable and necessary.

It is no great secret that the defence plan for the Middle East drawn up by the Anglo-American Powers is not even remotely connected with the protection of this region from a hypothetical foreign aggressor. Its primary purpose is to consolidate and perpetuate the aggression that took place many decades ago, as a result of which most of the Arab States are held in varying degrees of bondage, their rich resources exploited by foreign powers, and their people compelled to live in company with ignorance, destitution and disease. And since the occupying powers are engaged in preparations for another global war, they are not satisfied with the complete economic subjugation of these countries; they also seek to use this strategically important region as a base for the further expansion of their imperialist network. Like other regional arrangements of this sort, the proposed Middle East Defence Pact is intended to serve as one link in the chain being forged by the NATO group of powers to encircle the globe.

It is also perfectly clear that, with the exception of those Arab potentates or politicians who owe their position entirely to foreign support, the nations of the Middle East are strongly opposed to any involvement with the Western countries' war plans. They rightly feel that what the Middle East needs is an organisation that would canalise the people's desire for freedom and help to liberate them from their Western oppressors, rather than an arrangement that is meant to safeguard the *status quo* in the name of saving these countries from a threat whose existence is, to say the least, extremely doubtful. And, finally, as far as Pakistan's own defence is concerned, the only danger to her security arises from the machinations of Anglo-American powers or the neoimperialism of their Asian allies—a danger against which a regional pact sponsored by the West would be of absolutely no help, and may well prove a hindrance. In the circumstances, with the British plan for the Middle East deserving of condemnation from every conceivable point of view, we hope the Government of Pakistan will state their unequivocal opposition to this or any similar defence scheme evolved by those whose interest lies in keeping the people of this vast area in permanent subjection.

15 January 1953 Envoy to Egypt

Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman's selection as Pakistan's new Ambassador to Egypt will not help to enhance the Central Government's reputation for choosing the right type of persons for ambassadorial appointments. Whatever other qualities the Chaudhry Sahib may claim, his past career, and the peculiar methods he is wont to adopt to achieve his ends, hardly equip him for a diplomatic post. His appointment as Pakistan's representative in the most important Middle East country is particularly unfortunate in view of Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman's close association with the attempt to create a so-called Muslim People's Organisation—a move which was widely reputed to have had the support of a certain Western Power. Whatever the Central Cabinet's reasons for making this odd choice, it will certainly strengthen the impression among the public that senior ambassadorial posts are as a rule reserved for unwanted Ministers and trouble-some Muslim League politicians.

28 January 1953 Fearful Portents

The arrival in Karachi of yet another senior American military expert, who is scheduled to follow what seems to have become a routine programme of holding parleys with our Service Chiefs and inspecting the country's defences, is in itself a matter of grave concern for the vast majority of our people, who are definitely opposed to Pakistan's involvement in the campaign of the Anglo-American bloc of imperialist Powers against rebellious colonies and the group of Socialist States. Such 'courtesy' visits by Western military leaders have of late become more and more frequent, and at the same time the foreign Press has begun to claim with disconcerting confidence that Pakistan is interested in joining the new 'defence' organisation being devised to make the Middle East safe for the Anglo-American bloc. The latest visitation of this series is likely to see public anxiety give way to serious alarm. For, apart from the cryptic remark made by the Commander-in-Chief of the US Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean forces that he 'will be here in case of emergency', Admiral Wright has revealed that the question of the Middle East Defence Organisation is being discussed between Pakistan and the United States on the diplomatic level. It was also reported recently that Pakistan's Charge d'Affaires at Cairo had been invited by the Egyptian Foreign Minister to explain his country's attitude towards the MEDO,

and that this official has now been summoned to Karachi for urgent consultations. These and similar reports of what appear to be preparations to induct Pakistan into the West's military organisation are fearful portents which the people of this country can ignore only at great peril.

Pakistan's association with a plan which aims at consolidating imperialism's hold on the Arab World-so that, along with economic exploitation of its vast economic resources; the region can be used as a war-base in the global conflict that threatens to emerge from an intensified East-West Cold War—is unthinkable, for it would involve total abandonment of our policy of sympathy and support for the liberation struggle of the Arab nations. Even apart from our international obligations and a variety of moral considerations, Pakistan cannot, judging the issue solely from the standpoint of national interest, allow herself to be persuaded into joining a war pact which is defensive only in name. Not only would it be suicidal for us to get embroiled in World War Three, if and when it comes, but, as the experience of Western Europe shows, the interim period of armed peace under Western aggis would entail, in return for a meagre dollar allowance, control of our economy by and in the interest of foreign powers, and various other limitations on our sovereignty which no self-respecting nation should accept. It also needs to be pointed out that the mere fact that certain Indian politicians and publicists are worried by Pakistan's rumoured agreement to join the MEDO provides no good reason whatever for our actually doing so.

Hitherto, the Pakistan Government have given no definite indication of their intentions. In Parliament and outside, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has deftly parried all direct questions about his Government's attitude towards the longprojected expansion of the Atlantic Pact network to the Middle East. The hope that the question of Pakistan's participation in the MEDO was being considered only by Western military planners has now been belied by Admiral Wright's disclosure that the Governments of Pakistan and America are formally discussing the issue. In the circumstances, it is absolutely essential that the Pakistan Government should take the country into their confidence and explain the nature and purpose of the talks that are said to be going on between US and Pakistani diplomats. The Government cannot be unaware of the fact that Pakistan's association with any military arrangement of this sort, which encroaches upon our independence and creates the danger of bringing to our country the horrors of atomic destruction, and which takes for granted our support for Western machinations in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia, would never be approved by our people. The Government must, therefore, take the earliest opportunity to clarify their position and dispel the serious misgivings that have been created by the declarations of foreign statesmen and military leaders.

9 November 1953 Pakistan: A Second Turkey?

The Government's stubborn refusal to discuss the vital question of Pakistan's possible association in a US-sponsored military pact is not only symptomatic of their lack of respect for the Parliament and the people, but to also bound to strengthen the suspicion that the Government spokesmen's evasive replies to direct questions are meant to conceal negotiations on an unpalatable deal which they probably want to present to the country as a *fait accompli*. Apart from other equally unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Prime Minister or the itinerant Foreign Minister to make a definite declaration on this crucial aspect of our foreign policy, Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din's recent adjournment motions which sought to discuss the subject were rejected on the flimsiest of technical grounds, while his request that a special day should be allotted for a debate on foreign policy remains unanswered. Even if it is accepted that the Punjab MCA's motions for adjournment of the House were ruled out of order merely because of the Muslim League Government's unswerving adherence to the

rules of business, one might ask what insuperable hindrance prevents them from allocating time for a full-dress debate on foreign policy? And even if we are to accept the alibi that the Muslim League leaders are too involved in their struggle for survival, or too busy planning the next move in the chronic intra-party factional strife, why cannot the Prime Minister make a statement of policy clarifying his Government's stand? Or, since even some Muslim Leaguers would concede that the issue is not less important than that of introducing decimal coinage, why should not Mr Mohammed Ali give his own opinion on the matter in one of his monthly broadcasts to the nation, and ask the people to express their views? It is utterly ridiculous to argue that serious consideration of the matter is as yet unnecessary because the Government have so far made no final commitments. Surely, the proper time for discussion and consultation with the people is now-before the Government have signed on the dotted line. The nation has a right to be told the truth about Government's plans before they are executed, for the people and the Parliament have rights and privileges that extend beyond carrying out a post-mortem examination of the Government's policy decisions.

The question of Pakistan's participation in either the British or the US version of a Middle East Defence Organisation has been on the anvil for more than a year... The original MEDO plan proved abortive, partly due to Anglo-American rivalry and, even more so, because the Anglo-Egyptian conflict remains unsolved, Israel is not acceptable as an associate defender by its Arab neighbours and, until a few months ago, Iran refused to toe the Anglo-American line. The latest among many alternative suggestions is that Pakistan should sign a bilateral military pact with the United States and thus act as a decoy duck for the other Middle East countries. Since Pakistan accepted the US wheat gift, American efforts to make it 'a second Turkey' have been intensified. A veritable host of American experts have landed on our shores during recent months; the latest of these unwelcome visitors are a group of US Congressmen who, ominously, are reported to be members of the Armed Services Appropriations Sub-Committee. The American Press now refers to Pakistan's willingness to accept the role assigned to it by Washington with a certainty that is galling to our national self-respect, and can only be attributed to the impression created in America by those who represent Pakistan at Washington and in the United Nations. The New York Times, in editorially supporting a US-Pakistan military pact, gloats over 'the courage and skill among the Pakistanis for a first class fighting force'. And, for the benefit of those who suffer from the illusion that US military aid would make Pakistan strong vis-a-vis India, the New York Times goes on to say, significantly, that the Indians 'could have an assurance from the United States that military assistance to Pakistan should not be construed as any sort of an anti-Indian gesture' The Republican Party's majority leader was reported to have said a few days ago that he 'very definitely' thinks that Pakistan could become a useful military ally, and he indicated that it could ultimately become another Turkey.

The latest foreign Press reports allege that the visits to Washington by Pakistan's Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, who stopped in Turkey en route to the US, are connected with negotiations for US military aid to Pakistan of over twenty-five million dollars. Official comment on these alarming reports is as unsatisfactory as it is scanty. If all these rumours, emanating mostly from the United States, are, as one Minister stated in Parliament, mere kite-flying, why does not the Prime Minister make a definite declaration contradicting the foreign Press report and assuring his people that the Government will not walk into the MEDO trap or any similar entanglement? The issue is obviously of sufficient importance to call for the Prime Minister's personal attention, even from his sick-bed. Is Pakistan to barter away her hardwon freedom for a few guns or dollars? Are we to act as agents of the United States in world affairs? Will the 'courage and skill' of our people be used to defend Western imperialism in the Middle East? These and other allied question are causing a great deal of concern in the country. We warn the Government not to be blinded by the glitter of dollars into accepting a pact that would damage our national prestige, restrict our sovereignty, and create the danger of our involvement in war. We demand that the issue should immediately be discussed by Parliament, so that the people of Pakistan can express their views on a matter that is likely to determine the country's future for many long years to come.

24 November 1953 Pakistan-US Military Pact

Whatever one might think of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's recent expression of 'intense concern' at the reports of negotiations for a Pakistan-US military pact, it has had one beneficial result, in that the Pakistan Government have broken their indiscreet silence on an issue of such vital importance to the country. Decrying the Indian Premier's comments on Pakistan's foreign policy, the Governor-General of Pakistan declared in a press statement issued from London that 'reports' that my Government is negotiating with the United States Government for military assistance in return for American bases in Pakistan are absolutely unfounded and baseless'. and further that 'Pakistan will never be a camp-follower of anyone'. Mr Ghulam Mohammed's emphatic statement will to some extent allay the fears created among our people by the foreign Press stories-based mostly on the utterances of US politicians and officials-about Pakistan's association with the network of aggressive military pacts established by the United States. The Governor-General's contradiction has been partially corroborated by President Eisenhower and the US Secretary of State...

If the Governor-General's contradiction is read in conjunction with other relevant statements and news items, the conclusion is irresistible that, although the Pakistan Government have not so far entered into any definite military commitment with the US Government, the danger that they may do so in the future has certainly not been dispelled. Apart from the fact that the declarations of President Eisenhower and Mr Dulles were primarily intended to pacify India, both of them dealt with the subject rather evasively; the President merely said that the question of military aid and bases was not discussed 'in detail', while the Secretary of State stressed that 'at present' no such negotiations were taking place...

The Government owe it to themselves and to the country to show where they stand. If Mr Ghulam Mohammed's statement that 'Pakistan will never be a camp-follower of anyone' is meant to be a firm declaration of policy, let the Prime Minister declare in unequivocal terms that his Government will not join any military bloc. Such a declaration would put an end to Western intrigues and machinations, which seek to embroil Pakistan in the West's war plans, and set at rest the fears and doubts of our own people. If, on the other hand, the Government are merely waiting for an opportune moment to join the ranks of the West's crusaders, they must be made to realise that the people of Pakistan will never endorse such a suicidal policy and that they will always oppose any attempt to whittle down Pakistan's sovereignty or use its manpower and territory for the consolidation or expansion of Western imperialism.

Gul Hayat US-Pakistan Pact

The recent visit to Pakistan of the US Vice-President has cast more lurid light on America's plans for involving Pakistan in a regional military organisation of some sort. Ignoring the declaration made some days ago by Pakistan's Governor-General and Prime Minister that they did not want any foreign advice on what Pakistan should or should not do in domestic or international matters, Mr Richard Nixon took the trouble to define in considerable detail the foreign policy Pakistan should follow. The US Vice-President made it abundantly clear that Washington confidently expects Pakistan to join the ranks of the dollar-receiving, anti-Soviet and anti-Communist crusaders, led by the NATO group of imperialist Powers. In return for our association with the West's Cold War offensive and its system of military alliances. Mr Nixon promises that more US assistance will be made available, and that Pakistan will be protected against those working for its destruction. The implications of this offer are perfectly plain, and no amount of ingenious rationalisation can make it acceptable to those whose vision remains unimpaired by the dazzle of dollars. For a little hard currency and, perhaps, a few guns, Pakistan is being asked to surrender her freedom of action and to enter the war-camp of the imperialist Powers. to allow her soil to be trampled upon once again by foreign soldiery, and to make available her brave soldiers to fight under foreign flags for foreign causes.

Why should Pakistan accept this one-sided bargain? It is said that Pakistan is threatened by forces working for her destruction. Who then are these enemies? With both India and Afghanistan, Pakistan is known to be involved in serious disputes. Afghanistan lays claim to a part of our territory, and has for six years been engaged in warlike propaganda and hostile activity. India and Pakistan have fought an unfinished war in Kashmir, their armies are arrayed against each other along the cease-fire line, and the former's refusal to allow a fair plebiscite to be held in Kashmir remains a festering canker. spreading ill-will and preventing Indo-Pakistan amity. India also has influential communal reactionaries who have not accepted Pakistan's existence and are eager to undo the sub-continent's Partition. But Mr Nixon thinks that the Pukhtoonistan question could and should be settled peacefully, he wants Pakistan and India to live in friendship, and his Government have already given India the solemn assurance that any US military aid given to Pakistan would never be used against India. America wants Pakistan

to adopt the list of its friends and enemies drawn up by the State Department. We are told to treat the Soviet Union and China as our enemies. Whatever one might think of the regimes established in the USSR and China, how in the name of sanity can they be regarded as the enemies of Pakistan, a threat to its existence, forces working for its destruction? Pakistan has normal friendly relations with these neighbouring States, our trade with them is on a basis of mutual advantage, neither of them has cast an eye on our territory or sought to use our manpower as cheap cannon-fodder, and there is not the slightest indication that they have any intention of doing so in the future. A little clear thinking makes it obvious that Pakistan must, in its own interests, reject such biased advice and spurn such barbed offers.

What the Pakistan Government intend to do in regard to the projected US-Pakistan military pact remains a mystery. The latest official comment on the question has only made the confused situation more thoroughly confounded. Before leaving New York for London, Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan is reported to have declared that 'there have been no negotiations, nor attempts at negotiations, for an American-Pakistan military alliance'. All that has happened, the Foreign Minister added, is that there have been conversations with respect to military equipment for the Pakistan Army'. If the Pakistan Government's approach to Washington is limited to inquiries for the purchase of arms, the American Press seems to be amazingly and unusually minisformed on this issue, and one wonders why the spate of US Press stories have not been contradicted by the Pakistan Government. Nor is it possible to understand the assurance, reported to have been given by Pakistan's Governor-General to General Neguib, that Pakistan 'would not conclude an agreement with the Western powers unless the Egyptian conflict is resolved first'. What agreement? Surely not just a business deal over the purchase of arms. On the other hand, if Pakistan is asking for, or being offered, a gift of US military equipment, then the dangers inherent in a military alliance with America are

revived, for the equipment may well be followed by 'technicians and advisers', who will not only show us how to handle the guns but also where to sight them. The confusion has further been augmented by the comments of certain newspapers, who, instead of dealing with the straight issues involved, have sought to divert the discussion by attacking India and the USSR for taking an interest in the possibility of Pakistan being used as an anti-Soviet war base. This aspect of the matter only has incidental importance. The real question is whether Pakistan is to become another Turkey, an Asian satellite of the NATO group of imperialist Powers, and a friend of Messrs Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, who have recently called upon the 'free' Asian countries to enter the service of their benefactors; whether Pakistan is to forget her pledges to the nations striving for freedom, and become an ally and partner of those whose hands are red with the blood of innocent peoples in Morocco and Tunisia, in Kenya and Malaya; whether Pakistan is to forfeit her independence and sovereignty, jeopardise her future progress for which peace is an essential prerequisite, and, without the slightest provocation from their side, declare herself the sworn enemy of the Socialist States...

19 December 1953 US Military Aid

The Prime Minister's statement on the negotiations for grant of US military aid to Pakistan, apart from its other grave implications. reveals that—without consultation of the Parliament or the country—a major shift has taken place in the Pakistan Government's foreign policy. Hitherto, it had always been maintained by Government spokesmen that Pakistan followed an independent policy. judging each international issue on its merits, that it was not a party to the East-West Cold War, and that it would avoid embroilment in the threatened global conflict. Mr Mohammed Ali's latest dissertation on international politics clearly indicates that this policy of neutrality has been abandoned, and that the Government are seeking to align Pakistan with the American bloc. As if to justify the policy change, the Prime Minister certified that America has no desire to dominate any country and that, 'actuated by good motives', it merely seeks to 'build the defences of countries with a view to preserving the peace of mankind'. It follows logically from this naive appraisal of US foreign policy that the vaguely defined 'ideological affinity' sought by him will be discovered only in Washington, and that when he talks of the possibility of Pakistan's participation in a World War, Mr Mohammed Ali is thinking in terms of our soldiers fighting shoulder to shoulder with the US-led NATO armies. That the Prime Minister's faith in American altruism can make him shut his eyes to the realities of the international situation is surprising; that on the basis of such blind trust he intends to drag Pakistan into the imperialist camp is a tragedy whose awesome magnitude must be realised by the people of Pakistan before it is too late. America's domination of the aided countries is a simple, incontrovertible fact, which is no longer denied even by American publicists and politicians but accepted by them as an attribute of a 'leadership' bought with guns or dollars. US trade embargoes, their Ambassadors' direct interference in national elections, and the sponsoring of *coups*, are also well-known facts. That America has underwritten the tottering empires of the Western Powers, that she is rearming the Fascist Axis, that thousands of US bases have been established all over the world, are all undeniable facts which are linked directly to the US policy of aggressive expansion. The change in Pakistan's foreign policy indicated by Mr Mohammed Ali is, therefore, bound to be received by the majority of our people with keen disapproval and genuine misgivings about the country's future.

The second major issue Mr Mohammed Ali dealt with at his recent press conference is the proposal for accepting US military assistance. The Prime Minister revealed that 'informal and general' discussions had already taken place

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between the representatives of the two Governments, but technical and other details had yet to be examined. While the assurances given by him may seem gratifying to some people, the fact that Pakistan may be persuaded to take what can rightly be regarded as a fairly big step towards joining the West's system of military alliances cannot be viewed with equanimity. Mr Mohammed Ali declared that there was no question of leasing military bases, that Pakistan was 'not committing itself to the defence of any area other than her own region', and that Pakistan had no aggressive designs against anyone. Nothwithstanding these guarantees, those who have studied the working of US aid programmes will realise that American influence and interference are inevitable concomitants of such aid. Apart from what has been said by the US Press about Pakistan's usefulness to America, the reference made by the American Ambassador in India to the 'advice' that his country will be able to give Pakistan is a significant pointer to the donors' interpretation of the rights they will acquire after making a gift of tanks and guns. Mr Mohammed Ali himself impliedly admitted the possibility of US military advisers coming to Pakistan. The Prime Minister did not reveal on whose initiative the arms deal was being discussed. nor why the possibility of obtaining military equipment in other countries had not been considered, particularly when the bulk of our present armaments conform to the British pattern and could most conveniently be supplemented from British sources. No one can deny that, in today's world. Pakistan must develop her military strength sufficiently to protect her integrity and independence. The right course for Government. however, would be to purchase all the military equipment we need, wherever it is available without political strings, and at the same time to develop indigenous manufacturing potential with greater speed. To ask for or accept US military assistance amounts to jeopardising the very freedom our Government professedly seek to protect. We earnestly hope, therefore, that the Pakistan Government will be persuaded to reconsider its decision to

accept US military aid, for any such deal is certain to limit our sovereignty, promote a change for the worse in Government policies, and create the danger of our land and people being involved in the ghastly global war for which America is making world-wide preparations.

13 January 1954 Bases in Pakistan

... Those who have argued in favour of accepting US military aid on the ground that it involves no commitments of any sort on Pakistan's part will have to change their opinion or their arguments after Mr Mohammed Ali's recent interview in an American news magazine. It had been said that the example of other countries having surrendered their sovereignty in return for US military aid could have no application to Pakistan, because America was willing to make an exception in the case of our country and give it aid without any strings attached. It was also said that there was no question of Pakistan's bases being used, or of our independent foreign policy being deflected from the objectives of avoiding embroilment in the East-West Cold War and supporting the liberation movements in the colonial countries. The Prime Minister has completely demolished the first part of this argument by stating in a special interview with the US News and World Report that, 'of course we will build bases to defend Pakistan-and in an emergency there should be nothing to prevent us from inviting a friendly power, including America, to use those bases to help defend this region'. The word 'emergency' has not been defined, but since America is to be allowed to defend the 'region'-and not just Pakistan-from our bases, it is logical to assume that the American connotation of what constitutes a 'regional emergency' will be accepted, and that whenever America desires to move its forces into bases prepared in this country, it will be allowed to do so. This creates an extremely dangerous situation, which can be ignored only at great peril...

^{21 May 1954} US-Pakistan Pact

... Despite the transparent efforts of the representatives of the two Governments to rationalise the terms of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, signed at Karachi on Wednesday by the US Charge d'Affaires and Pakistan's Foreign Minister, it is perfectly plain that the Pact amounts to nothing less than a close military, political, and economic alliance between the two States. It can no longer be denied that Pakistan has for all practical purposes become a member of the Western bloc, a friend of its allies and a potential enemy of those against whom it is arrayed. The Pakistan Government have agreed, without even securing the Parliament's prior approval, to join in developing the defensive strength of the 'free world', and the possibility of Pakistan's participation in what is called 'defence of the region' has been specifically accepted. Further, a number of special privileges—tantamount to extra-territorial rights—will be accorded to American personnel posted in Pakistan to 'discharge the responsibilities of the US Government' under the Agreement... If proper terms are substituted for all the euphemisms employed by the authors of the Agreement, the document clearly violates Pakistan's declared policies of avoiding embroilment in foreign wars, supporting the liberation movements of the subject peoples, and diversifying her trade with the country's economic interests as the sole determining factor: with equal force it impinges upon our national sovereignty, and some of it clauses are derogatory to our self-respect as an independent nation. We see that what was originally mooted as an arms deal has become an allembracing treaty governing many major aspects of our national life, and allying Pakistan to the 'free world'-which, in fact, means the leading imperialist States of the world and their empires.

Careful analysis of the Pact's main terms reveals certain grave implications and raises some alarming questions.

Paragraph 2 of Article One, for instance, defines the purposes for which US military aid may be used by Pakistan. The first contingency listed is that of internal security. Apart from the fact that US military aid is not necessary for this task, does it mean that the facilities promised to the US for the supervision of the progress of the Agreement will include a US probe into Pakistan's internal situation? Will US preferences guide the Government's internal policies and US methods be allowed to retard our progress towards full democracy? Further, in the matter of 'legitimate self-defence', who will determine the legitimacy of any action taken? And, by the grant of permission to use US arms in regional defence or in a UN collective security arrangement, is it meant that Pakistan is expected to join any US military venture of the type that is currently under consideration to save the French colonial regime in Indo-China? The ban on 'aggression against any nation' obviously is the counterpart of the assurances given by Washington to India that US military aid to Pakistan will never be used against that country. The fact that India is the only country with whom Pakistan has been at war-and the state of their relations has not improved very much since the cease-fire-makes this a risky stipulation. If an Indo-Pakistan clash were to take place, will America have to give a verdict that the aggression was launched by India before Pakistan can use the gifted arms? It is, finally, laid down that one full year's notice is necessary for termination of the Agreement, implying that even after the treaty is repudiated, for a full twelve months the Government of Pakistan will have to comply with all its unpalatable provisions. While the Pakistan Government have already accepted these varied commitments, the extent and type of the aid that is being given in return has yet to be determined. But even if experts consider these supplies adequate, both in quantity and quality, we strongly feel that the Pakistan Government have agreed to pay too heavy a price for such aid. We reiterate our considered view that it would be far better to mobilise indigenous resources to raise the strength of our armed forces, and that the equipment and arms required should be purchased by cutting down all inessential imports, and by introducing a rational austerity regime inside the country, instead of linking Pakistan to one of the two Power blocs which may soon be engaged in a large-scale atomic conflict. We hope national opinion will assert itself sufficiently to persuade the Government to retrace the step they have taken and, in the meantime, to ensure that none of the more serious operative clauses of the Agreement are allowed to fructify.

13 January 1955 Pattern of US Aid


The agreement, signed at Karachi the other day, for the grant of more US economic aid to Pakistan deserves careful examination. While the political consequences of US aid programmes are given a great deal of attention, their economic consequences are usually spared the thorough scrutiny they deserve, presumably as a result of the mistaken belief that in the furtherance of its political policies the United States is dispensing money and gifts without any expectation of economic returns. It needs to be realised that altruism is not the basis of such aid programmes, as is borne out by US Press comments and speeches made in the Congress on this subject. Only a few days ago, the Foreign Operations Administration declared in a review of its work that, both directly and indirectly, foreign aid programmes have a 'stimulating effect' on the US economy. Broadly speaking, this effect is created by the export of consumer goods, the disposal of unsaleable surpluses of different commodities. and the fuller employment of American shipping and allied services. Pakistan, on the other hand, primarily needs capital goods to develop her own industries, the maximum possible reduction in the import of all consumer goods which can be produced indigenously, and the opportunity to expand her own shipping services. From the long-term point of view. therefore, as long as this is the pattern of US aid programmes. a clash of interests between the dispenser of aid and its recipient would appear to be unavoidable.

The economic aid given to Pakistan for the current year amounts to 110 million dollars. Of this, a sum of only 20 million is earmarked for the import of equipment and supplies needed for our development projects, of which again only a fraction will be available for industrial development; and it is interesting to note that this amount is being offered as a loan. The main grant of 40 million dollars is to be spent on the import of America's surplus agricultural commodities, an equal sum will probably be spent on other consumer goods, and about 5 million dollars will be devoted to inviting US experts and to the training of Pakistanis in the United States. Although such aid may ease existing market shortages and create a measure of artificial prosperity, the danger exists that it will tend to make us more dependent on foreign help, dislocate certain sections of our internal economy, and retard the pace of the country's industrial progress. Further, the American authors of the aid programme make no secret of the fact that it is a weapon in the Cold War, and that it aims not only to help their friends, but also to isolate their enemies. Ceylon, for example, could not qualify for US aid because it refused to give up its lucrative rubber trade with China, Under the US Battle Act, Pakistan will probably be expected to accept the US ban on trade with the Socialist States. China has in recent years been one of the best customers for our cotton, in return for which Pakistan has obtained an essential item like coal at reasonable rates. If our trade with China is stopped, will it not have an adverse effect on our economy? These and other relevant factors must carefully be appraised if a true assessment is to be made of the advantages and disadvantages of Pakistan's acceptance of US aid, and as more details are made available, we hope a realistic analysis of the situation will be made by those who are in a position to guide public opinion. We would also like to hope that, in their relief over the temporary gains expected from the arrangement, our Government experts will not ignore the risks and dangers involved in joining the family of US-aided nations.

20 November 1955 Baghdad Meeting

The doubts and misgivings felt by many in this country about the practical utility and political wisdom of Pakistan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact will be strengthened by the disclosures made some days ago by a Foreign Office spokesman. The official is reported to have said that our representatives would tell the Baghdad Pact Council that Pakistan is willing to undertake 'further commitments beyond her own area', but on the condition that more military aid is provided, because at present Pakistan's military strength is sufficient only for her own defence needs. The Pakistan delegation will, it is understood, argue that, since the situation in the Middle East has been 'complicated' by arms purchases from certain Socialist States, the Baghdad Pact must be made a 'going concern' and other States persuaded to swell its membership. A joint approach may be made to Syria and the Lebanon, and the United States in particular will be asked to join the set-up, so that the Pact can be strengthened numerically and in terms of the required funds and equipment. Further, it is said that the question of Middle East unity will be considered only within the framework of the Pact'. No indication has been given regarding the possibility of a discussion on the threat of Israeli aggression, which is by any reckoning the Middle East's biggest problem, except for the Prime Minister's recent declaration that Pakistan would oppose Israel's membership of the Pact. Mr Mohammed Ali's remarks on the subject, made at a press conference shortly before his departure for Baghdad, generally confirm the policy statement made on behalf of the Foreign Office, although he did not deal with all the points brought up in this statement and, naturally, spoke with greater caution and discretion.

This outline of the policy that the Pakistan delegation is going to pursue at the Baghdad meeting provides cause for grave concern. It clearly represents a new shift in our foreign policy towards a closer association with the plans and policies





Mazhar Ali Khan with the Cripps Mission.






Mazhar Ali in Tashkent, 1965



With foreign journalists.



With Abdul Ghaffar Khan.



Mr Bhutto with journalists.



Chou En-lai's vist to Pakistan: Lunch at Mian Iftikharuddin's.



With Indira Gandhi in Delhi.

of the Western Powers. No effort has been made to explain this change, and indeed in many respects it appears to be utterly inexplicable. Firstly, what precisely is meant by the offer of undertaking 'defence commitments' beyond Pakistan's own area? Does it mean that, in return for more aid, our troops will be available for use in the Middle East under Anglo-American command or guidance? Will Pakistan be expected to help in defending the *status quo* in the region? Further, if, resiling from the position taken by the Foreign Minister a few days ago, Pakistan endorses the West's objections to the purchase of arms from the Socialist States by a growing number of Arab countries, shall we not damage our friendship with these neighbouring States and lay ourselves open to the charge of blindly espousing the West's cause? And, by taking the stand that Middle East unity can be established only on the basis of the Baghdad Pact, shall we not widen the gulf between the two groups of Arab States and make a *rapprochement* more difficult?

These and allied questions need to be carefully considered before the Pakistan Government is allowed to accept any more commitments either in the Middle East or in South-East Asia. Apart from considerations of political morality, the practical implications of these Pacts must be studied thoroughly before accepting any new responsibilities. The advantages of these regional military alliances to their Western sponsors are as obvious as the disadvantages to Pakistan; but hitherto this country's membership of the two Pacts seems to have brought it no benefit of any sort-even the much-trumpeted US military aid, anyhow of doubtful advantage, is said to be completely insignificant-nor has anyone bothered to explain what gains are expected to accrue. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that before any new step is taken by the Pakistan Government, the question should be placed on the anvil before the Parliament and the country, and, after a thorough debate, a clear-cut policy devised. Without following such a course, the Government can claim no backing for its foreign policy decisions and no real

authority for making far-reaching commitments which may, at any stage, be disavowed by the Parliament or the people.

16 February 1956 Pakistan and the West

The blunt declaration made by the British Foreign Office that the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and Kabul's Pukhtoonistan stunt will not be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the SEATO Council, or at any future meeting of this body, and that the South-East Asia Treaty Organisationlike its Middle East counterpart, the Baghdad Pact—is not concerned at all with disputes of this nature, should help to awaken Pakistan's foreign affairs experts from their somnambulism. These gentlemen have in recent weeks been trying very hard to convince themselves that the SEATO Council would somehow be persuaded to seriously take up these two issues, which are known to be of vital concern to Pakistan, and that, even if no other steps were devised immediately, the senior partners of the SEATO set-up would at least openly support Pakistan's stand in the disputes with its neighbours. The correctness of Pakistan's position and its Government's lovalty to the Western alliance had probably made our policy-makers certain that their minimum demands would not be rejected. The rejection has taken place in very definite terms and without much ceremony. It clearly indicates that the Pakistan Government's Western friends do not allow either justice or friendship to influence their policies. It also shows that, once again, Pakistan's Foreign Office has failed to make a correct assessment of the situation, and, what is far more important than the exposure of official incompetence, that Pakistan's present foreign policy is based on a totally false premise.

When Mr Mohammed Ali of Bogra led Pakistan into the maze of military pacts and treaties which seek to buttress the NATO alliance of imperialist Powers, he and his colleagues made many rich promises to our people of the great advantages that alignment with the West would bring to this country. The most important of their promises was that Pakistan's adherence to US-sponsored military pacts would strengthen its position in the world, attract a great deal of support for its just cause, and thus help to expedite the settlement of the two international disputes in which Pakistan is directly involved. This promise has been completely belied. In fact, not only has Pakistan forfeited a great deal of its international prestige and lost a number of old friends by being listed as a camp-follower of the Western bloc, but the attitude of the leading Western powers seems to have become even more unfriendly and unsympathetic since they realised that it did not need much persuasion to make our rulers surrender their independence of judgement and allow Pakistan to become a devoted junior partner in the network of treaties which seek to preserve the status quo in the West's spheres of influence... We would like to make it plain, however, that we do not regard the lack of Anglo-American support for Pakistan in its disputes with India and Afghanistan, the unhelpful nature of US economic aid, or the miserable trickle of military aid that has come to Pakistan, to be the decisive factors in making a final appraisal of Anglo-American policies. While these facts certainly help to expose the real aims of the Western bloc, it should be realised that, even if these symptoms could be made to disappear, the situation would remain unchanged. The malady lies deeper, and it has world-wide ramifications. In any case, as far as Pakistan is concerned, it is clear that our foreign policy should be subjected to the searchlight of careful scrutiny. The Foreign Minister has promised recently that all Pakistan's pacts and treaties will be laid before the Parliament. This belated concession to democratic procedure will not, however, allow a remedy to be found for the existing unhappy state of affairs. We would suggest that an All-Parties Committee of the House should be set up to examine the foreign policy pursued by the Pakistan Government during the last three or four years and to study the various pacts that have been entered into in

Pakistan's name. In the light of this Committee's recommendations, the Pakistan Government should revise its foreign policy, base its future policy decisions on a clear understanding of the motives of the Powers which have inveigled us into association with a host of dangerous military pacts, and boldly repudiate all commitments which are contrary to our national interests and which impinge on the country's independence and sovereignty.

28 July 1956 Pakistan and the Aswan Dam

In an attempt to analyse the economic and political factors responsible for the sudden withdrawal of the US offer of aid for Egypt's projected high dam on the Nile at Aswan, the *New York Times* has alleged that Pakistan, along with Turkey and Iran, had opposed the grant of US aid for the dam. The newspaper's Washington correspondent is stated to have written in a special report that Pakistan and the other Asian Baghdad Pact countries had objected to 'the biggest single US aid project' being undertaken in a country which was 'not only neutral but occasionally actively anti-Western', and that it was generally felt by them that they had better claims to any funds allocated for such plans.

Although in recent years the Pakistan Foreign Office has developed a capacity for striking the most fantastic attitudes, and some of its pronouncements could without much difficulty be compiled into a manual on 'how to lose friends and fail to influence people'. the conduct ascribed to Pakistan's foreignpolicy-makers in the present case cannot easily be accepted as the whole truth. It is quite possible that the American journal has sought to defend the US Administration, and to justify its policy in regard to Egypt, by showing that a number of Asian countries not only support the State Department but were actually responsible for the decision to let down Egypt in the matter of financing a project of great importance to the country's national economy. Thereby it is probably intended to prove that US aid is really not loaded with major economic and political conditions which, in the present instance, Egypt had refused to accept. The world is asked to believe that Washington's second thoughts on the subject were not a result of right-wing Republican or Jewish pressure, but were instigated by a group of Asian States, loyal to the Western cause, whose advice could not be ignored. Whatever the truth of the matter, it is perfectly obvious that, as far as the US decision is concerned, no extenuation of any sort is provided by the advice that any other country might have given to the State Department on the subject. That the US action was based on the principle that aid must be paid for by the recipient States with economic and political concessions finds confirmation in the latest decision of the US Congress to suspend military aid to Yugoslavia.

Be that as it may, we are here concerned primarily with Pakistan's reported stand on the issue and its likely consequences in the Middle East. If the New York Times report is not true, the Foreign Office should immediately inform Egypt and other countries concerned, and also clear its position before the people of Pakistan, for if Egypt and other Middle East countries continue to believe that Pakistan had a hand in sabotaging the plan for foreign aid to build the Aswan Dam, it is bound to damage our country's reputation among nations whose friendship and opinions we greatly value. If, on the other hand, someone in the Foreign Office has blundered once again, one can only suggest that the Cabinet should give its attention to the question, and take effective steps to ensure that a *demarche* likely to be interpreted in the Arab States as an unfriendly act is not allowed to take place again. In any event, the issue is of sufficient importance and interest to rule out a policy of remaining discreetly silent.

4 November 1956 The Real Test

While the people of Pakistan have unequivocally condemned the treacherous Anglo-French attack on Suez and are demanding resolute action to help Egypt and to thwart the aggressors, the country's official representatives have either spoken with timorous. uncertain voices or sought to bypass the real issues. The Prime Minister, immediately on his return from China, categorically declared that Israel was the aggressor in Egypt, but it is surprising that, after the later developments. Israel's partners in aggression and the real authors of the scheme to recapture the Suez Canal have not been so branded in clear terms. Why cannot Mr H.S. Suhrawardy tell his people what he thinks of the perfidious Anglo-French assault on Egypt? Why does he not condemn the indiscriminate bombing of peaceful Egyptian cities? Why does he not criticise the Hitlerian British ultimatum to Egypt, the confession made by the British Premier that their real war aim is control of Suez, and Britain's refusal to abide by the UN General Assembly's resolution? And why does not the Pakistan Government draw up plans to succour Egypt and its allies and to hinder in every possible way the war efforts of the Western aggressors? It is of interest to note that the criticism of the Tories by Britain's Labour and Liberal spokesmen is far stronger than the terms in which Pakistan's Prime Minister has referred to one of the most shameful acts in the history of a country whose record is anyhow far from clean.

We feel strongly that, instead of the Prime Minister making a representation to the envoys of the three Western Powers expressing Pakistan's grave concern over the situation. Pakistan's first step should have been to register a strong protest with the British Government against its act of brigandage. Mr Suhrawardy has spoken in somewhat stronger terms while addressing a group of demonstrators in Karachi. The change in tone is welcome, but it is certainly not enough. So far neither the Prime Minister nor any other official spokesman has given any indication of what steps the Pakistan Government intends to take in pursuance of its declared aim of helping to restore peace in the area. It is obviously not enough to make a formal gesture: the circumstances of the case demand that we should do something concrete and tangible to influence the situation. Pakistan should make it known that failure on the part of Britain and France to accept the UN's demand for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egyptian soil will lead inevitably to certain consequences. And the most obvious step in this respect would be the severance of our ties with the Commonwealth and immediate repudiation of the Baghdad Pact.

The course of action indicated here is precisely what the people of this country want and what the ruling party is pledged to follow. Doubts about Mr Suhrawardy's willingness or ability to carry out this policy arise from certain speeches made by him after his assumption of office and his present strange reticence in regard to the Anglo-French aggression; and they will be strengthened by some of the Pakistan President's speeches on his current tour of Iraq and Iran. With British bombs raining on Cairo and other Egyptian cities, President Iskander Mirza considered it opportune to declare that the Baghdad Pact 'springs from our fundamental desire to protect and promote the welfare of the Muslim world, in particular, which stretches from Morocco to Indonesia'. From Morocco to the east the link easiest to see these days is that of the river of innocent blood spilt by those who are the sponsors and senior partners of the Baghdad Pact. How are we going to promote and protect its welfare in alliance with the biggest enemies of the Muslim world? In view of the Iranian Prime Minister's declaration that the situation in Egypt did not call for the intervention of the Baghdad Pact countries, the President of Pakistan and the Foreign Minister, who has not said a single word on Egypt so far, should cancel their tour and return to Karachi. Instead of this, we hear the fantastic report that the Prime Minister is soon to go to Teheran. The rulers of Pakistan should realise that the present state of affairs is far from satisfactory, and unless they can take early remedial action, the gulf between the people and the Government is likely to grow, and may well become unbridgeable as far as foreign policy issues are concerned.

Now that the Anglo-French clique has refused to comply with the General Assembly's directive, the Asian-African Powers must be prepared for a period of virtual UN inaction. It should also be realised that the American attitude is not likely to prove helpful to Egypt. The President's prepared statement on the subject leaves no doubt that the United States intends to continue to give Britain and France all possible help. The stoppage of military aid to Egypt along with Israel, and its continuation to Britain and France, fully exposes US policy: this is, indeed, a strange way of honouring the 1950 Declaration to stop aggression in the Middle East. Further, President Eisenhower has merely said that the Anglo-French action had been taken in error. He does not utter one word of direct criticism or disapproval of the British action: there is no moral condemnation, no mention of justice, democracy, and peace. One might almost say that he is only criticising their bad tactics, for he does not even disagree with the objectives of the Anglo-French intervention, and talks glibly of the 'defence of vital British interests'. Particularly in view of America's policy, the chances of the General Assembly being persuaded to go further than the resolution it has already adopted are exceedingly small. This places a heavy responsibility on the Asian-African States who, if they act in unison, can acquire sufficient strength to save Egypt from rape and destruction. The action that any State takes in dealing with the Suez crisis will be the real test of its position in international affairs: mere words—particularly when used in vague generalisations-are not enough. We would like to hope that the Pakistan Government will not fail this test.

14 November 1956 Darkness at High Noon

It appears certain that Mr Firoz Khan Noon's conduct of Pakistan's foreign relations will gain special distinction only

for an obstinate deafness to national demands, a deep attachment to the Western viewpoint, and a lack of understanding of the trend of current events. Within a few weeks of his being installed at the Foreign Office, this erstwhile gallant Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India has revived his well-earned reputation for being meaningfully silent or saying the exact opposite to what is expected of a public representative, and for betraying an ignorance so abysmal, an ineptness so shocking, that even a barely literate member of some small-town committee would appear more knowledgeable and capable in comparison. Admittedly, the responsibility for any action of the Foreign Minister, or his studied inaction, is shared by every member of the Cabinet and, in particular, by the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the policy devised at Teheran has evoked Mr Noon's wholehearted support even if he is not its author: therefore, his acts and utterances deserve attention.

It is amazing but true that, since the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, Pakistan's Foreign Minister has not said one single word in sympathy for the victim of aggression or in condemnation of the aggressors. His first public comment on the Suez War was made recently in London, when he went out of his way to declare that 'Egypt had been humiliated and defeated by Israel-of course, with the help of Britain and France'. He also had the temerity to declare that Israel had 'come to stay'. This is not all. Pakistan's Foreign Minister went on to suggest that the Israeli State should now be recognised by the world. For any representative of Pakistan to appear exultant at, or even unconcerned about, Egypt's defeat, or to suggest at this juncture that the nation of Zionist bandits should be recognised, is an act of sheer madness. The fact that Pakistan and many other countries have refused to recognise this illbegotten State expresses a desire for its extinction; at any rate, it means that, as long as Israel does not surrender the illegal gains it has made with Anglo-American help, it does not merit, and will not get, the treatment reserved for civilised States. Since then Israel, acting as an instrument of Anglo-French imperialism, has waged an aggressive war against Egypt. This action has, in fact, resuscitated the question of its very existence even in the minds of non-Muslim countries. But the Foreign Minister of Pakistan has an original bent of mind; he seems to feel that Israel should be rewarded for its service to the West by full-fledged recognition. By such queer utterances the Foreign Minister has humiliated the people of Pakistan, and his activities tend to defeat the very purpose which inspired our struggle for freedom. For his London performance alone, although it is by no means the only example of his shining genius. Mr Noon should be compelled to resign the high office he now holds.

Further, judging by Press reports from London, the Foreign Minister seems to have been blissfully unaware of the fact that the West's Big Three Powers had issued a joint declaration in 1950, pledging themselves to safeguard the frontiers between Israel and the Arab States and to assist any State which was attacked—a declaration which each one of them has dishonoured. Apparently, Mr Noon also did not know that France was a member of SEATO, And, then, it is strange that Mr Noon should find time to visit London and meet Sir Anthony Eden and other planners of the criminal Suez War, but he had no time to attend the Colombo Powers Conference. Of course, in the first place, Mr Suhrawardy himself should have gone to consult with the Prime Ministers of the Colombo Powers to devise a joint policy on behalf of the Bandung Powers to aid and succour Egypt. In any case, for Pakistan's Foreign Minister to be entertained ostentatiously by the British Government at a time when the havoc they have wrought in a brother country has not been repaired, and their invading hordes have not been expelled from Egypt. is. to say the least. highly improper.

It would appear from Mr Noon's strange words and deeds that he is still living in the dim past—the days when service to the British was accepted by men of his class as the high road to advancement, and when it was proudly said by the British and their lackeys that the sun never set on the British Empire. Since then the Empire has shrunk considerably, and it continues to shrink; and, as in the Middle East, the process of its liquidation is being hastened by the desperate crimes of those who guide Imperial policy. In many lands the struggle has already yielded results, and the people are able to bask in the sunshine of freedom. In others, the long night of slavery has been overtaken, but the dawn of freedom appears to have been thwarted. But this can only mean temporary delay, for the whole firmament is now aflame. It seems, however, that Mr Firoz Khan Noon and other veteran supporters of the British cause either have been dazzled by its brightness, or they have deliberately shut their eyes: their confined, narrow minds seem to be cloaked in complete darkness at high noon.

24 January 1957 Provocative Tactlessness

Mr H.S. Suhrawardy's recent effusion on the subject of Egypt's determination to guard its sovereignty will generally be viewed as an example of provocative tactlessness. Apart from the fact that his novel political theory appears to be an exercise in sophistry, it is difficult to understand why he considered it necessary and proper to enunciate it at this particular time. It is, firstly, most unusual for the Prime Minister of a country to make a direct attack on the policies of another State unless there is a major clash of interests between the two. Secondly, statements of this nature are bound to have the effect of widening the unfortunate cleavage that has split the Muslim States of the Middle East region into two groups-on the one hand, the pro-Western group of Baghdad Pact powers, and on the other, the majority of Arab States who follow a policy of non-alignment with Power blocs. Lastly, and this for us is a most important consideration, it seems strange that, at a time when Pakistan needs the support and vote of every country represented at

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the United Nations. Mr Suhrawardy should go out of his way to make a declaration that is certain to annoy Egypt and her Arab allies and thereby reduce the possibility of their supporting Pakistan's just stand on the Kashmir question.

The Prime Minister is reported to have said that 'the people sitting in Cairo have not understood the meaning of sovereignty'. He went on to say that 'sovereignty does not mean the exercise of power for annoving other people. If it is used for arriving at agreements with other Powers, they (the Egyptians) think it is curtailment of sovereignty. In fact, it is not'. That the tone and purport of this rigmarole seek to chastise the Egyptian regime is clear enough, but what exactly it means in the context of Egypt's recent history remains a matter of conjecture. It would, perhaps, be unfair to suggest that Mr Suhrawardy implies that the only proper exercise of sovereignty by a small country is to whittle down its sovereignty. What, then, is Egypt's fault? Is it guilty of some offence because it refused to bow before Anglo-French blackmail, because it fought back against the invaders? Surely, in the crisis over Suez, and the subsequent war of aggression by the three allied Powers, Egypt adopted the only course of action that could be taken by any selfrespecting nation. Further, Egypt has always been willing to negotiate a settlement of the Suez Canal question, but it justifiably asserts the right to exercise full sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Egypt has never sought to stop the ships of any peaceful nation from plying between Suez and Port Said-except in the case of Israel, with which Egypt and other Arab States are still in a state of war. Would not Pakistan do the same in similar circumstances? Can Egypt be blamed for this, or for 'annoying' Britain and France by defending its sovereignty against their attacks, for insisting that the aggressor powers should withdraw from its territory before the Canal is opened to traffic?...

The point we wish to stress here is that, even if Pakistan's political differences with Egypt and its Arab allies cannot for the present be either eliminated or reduced, there is no reason why Pakistan's representatives should make hostile statements that are likely to exacerbate our relations with these countries and, by echoing the opinions or prejudices of the imperialist Powers, tend to lower our prestige among the Arab nations. We earnestly hope that the Prime Minister, and other dignitaries whose comments on international affairs receive special notice throughout the world, will henceforth observe normal diplomatic propriety and caution in the matter of issuing press statements, and will also resist the temptation of making declarations which—while they may bring them kudos in the eyes of the West—are likely to damage Pakistan's position among the Asian-African Powers.

27 February 1957 Diplomatic Impropriety

In complete—and, perhaps, deliberate—disregard of the protest voiced in Parliament against the implied criticism of Government's policies by another US diplomat, the American Ambassador in Pakistan has made a statement which will generally be viewed as a serious breach of the code governing the public utterances of diplomats. Speaking at the Dacca Press Club, Mr Horace Hildreth is reported to have declared that 'criticism of Pakistan's foreign policy generally came from people who were uninformed and unaware of the facts of life'. While the Ambassador of a foreign country is free to shower praise on the Government to which he is accredited, it is universally accepted that he must not permit himself to say anything that savours of intervention in local politics. In condemning all the critics of the Pakistan Government's foreign policy as ignoramuses, the US Ambassador has not only violated the rules of diplomatic conduct but insulted a large number of parties-including the political party to which the Prime Minister owes allegiance-and the wide sections of our people who support them. Further, Mr Hildreth's remark that the problem of agricultural yields cannot be solved 'by talking' could also be read as criticism of the Government and people of this country, the implication being that this is about all that Pakistan is doing to deal with the problem.

Whatever the Pakistan Government's relationship with the Government of the United States, every self-respecting Pakistani will resent the US Ambassador's brazen attempt to dabble in local politics. The Foreign Office must take immediate notice of a performance that goes beyond mere indiscretion and can only be regarded as a case of gross diplomatic impropriety. In other countries Ambassadors have been declared *persona non grata* for saying a great deal less. Even if the Pakistan Government is not prepared to take any drastic step, the very least it can do is to warn the US Ambassador and his Government that Pakistan will not tolerate critical comments made in public about any Government policy or about the people's attitude on a subject, nor will it allow Ambassadors to attack political parties or otherwise take sides in local political tussles.

14 March 1957 Mr Hildreth Again

Within three weeks of his impertinent Dacca statement... the US Ambassador in Pakistan has, once again, transgressed against one of the most elementary rules of diplomatic conduct. Inaugurating the USIS Centre at Quetta, Mr Horace A. Hildreth is reported to have criticised the speech made by an Opposition MP during the recent National Assembly debate on foreign policy, arguing that the Member was wrong in his analysis of the motives which guided America's aid programmes. If it is true that the US Ambassador specifically mentioned the MP's speech and tried to answer it publicly and, considering the fact his Dacca utterance remains uncontradicted and unexplained, the Quetta report may be presumed to be correct—Mr Hildreth appears to have committed, for the third or fourth time, the grave sin of openly interfering in Pakistan's domestic affairs... It is, obviously, not for us to advise the United States State Department with regard to the desirability of instructing all US Ambassadors to conduct themselves in accordance with international custom and usage, but we would like to reiterate that the Pakistan Government, and particularly the Foreign Office, must ensure that the representatives of no foreign Power are allowed to abuse Pakistan's hospitality by dabbling in local politics. And if, for some reason, the Foreign Office does not consider it necessary to exact observance of the restrictions on the speeches of foreign diplomats that are universally respected, Pakistan's citizens should be informed accordingly, so that they can either resign themselves to an unhappy, undignified situation, or protest so loudly that the habitual deafness of our foreign-policy-makers can be overcome.

Pakistan and the West

If Mr Firoz Khan Noon's denunciation of the West's doublefaced policies had raised any hope of a rational reappraisal of Pakistan's relations with the NATO powers, it will not survive the speeches made more recently by Mr Muzaffar Ali Oizilbash in endorsement of SEATO's aims and decisions. A week ago, the Prime Minister voiced, in reasonably strong terms. Pakistan's acute dissatisfaction with the one-sided pacts that it has joined on Western beckoning. Admitting that these pacts do not help to advance any of Pakistan's vital national interests, that they have brought us no effective political support, that the arms sent to this country are mostly obsolete, and that the military and economic aid is not only inadequate but so tied up with conditions that it does not really help to strengthen Pakistan's position, Mr Noon promised the country that Pakistan would repudiate its alliances with the Western Powers if they continued to follow their policy of malevolent neutrality in regard to the Kashmir dispute. The Prime Minister's stand, which was supported by the main Opposition party and welcomed by many for its frank description of the predicament in which Pakistan finds itself, has been vitiated by the Industries Minister's intemperate utterances at Manila. What value can anyone, in this country or abroad, place on the Prime Minister's word when a senior member of his Cabinet virtually contradicts a major policy statement, and then nothing more is said on the subject? Are the people to assume that Mr Noon's speech was merely a beggar's rude protest against the inadequacy of the alms given, and that his reference to principles and policies was mere eyewash?

Even apart from this aspect of the matter, Mr Qizilbash's performance at the SEATO Conference can bring him and his Government no credit. He spent a great deal of his time tilting vigorously at the windmills of Communist subversion, and ignored no opportunity to exhibit his complete allegiance to the American cause and his blind hostility to the Soviet Union: his criticism of the Soviet peace proposal for Asia, for instance, was couched in offensive, almost abusive, terms. This attitude has already made a large number of countries suspicious of, or unfriendly to, Pakistan, without winning for it any real friends among the Western Powers. To persist in trying to prove that Pakistan wants to be the West's best ally in Asia is, to say the least, not likely to enhance our prestige in the world. Nor is the Industries Minister's strong plea for the diversion of all Western aid to the Asian members of Western 'defence' pacts likely to yield any tangible results. Mr Qizilbash's statement clearly implies that, since Western aid is meant to serve as a reward for loyal and obedient friends or camp-followers, it should not be wasted on countries which pursue a neutral or independent policy. This humiliating request for more aid is not likely to be accepted. for the simple reason that no one understands the aims of the West's aid programme better than the donors themselves. There is no possibility of Western aid to India or Afghanistan or Burma or Cevlon being stopped; the West will certainly not abandon these and other neutralist States to what it calls Soviet economic penetration: nor will it run the risk of weakening its economic relations with such vast and rich markets; and it undoubtedly wants to continue to exercise some influence over the policies of their Governments. The complaint that these States make the best of both worlds will also not take us anywhere, for Pakistan's own policies are to blame for the fact that it is wholly dependent on the NATO groups of States and has progressively weakened its bargaining position...

11 March 1959 US-Pakistan Pact

The Pakistan Foreign Secretary's efforts to convince himself and the country that the new US-Pakistan Pact represents a departure from the unequal agreements that form the basis of Pakistan's association with the Western alliance have not been very successful—and we have waited in vain for Washington to vindicate his position. In the first place, the document itself provides evidence of America's continued adherence to the strange principle outlined in various US declarations, that American help is available only against 'Communist aggression' or aggression by a State 'under the control of international Communism'. This position has been reiterated by clear implication in the Treaty signed at Ankara on 5 March, because it is said that the United States is acting 'in accordance with the Mutual Security Pact of 1954 and related laws'. Any lingering doubt on the point has been banished by the assurances given to India by Mr Bunker, the US Ambassador at New Delhi, and the statement of Mr Lincoln White, who, speaking on behalf of the State Department, has declared in clear, unambiguous terms that the Pact does not go beyond already existing authority as approved by the Congress, and that it is based on the Eisenhower Doctrine. Further, he has said even more bluntly that the agreement 'did not provide for US aid to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack'. Hitherto, it was always said that the US-Pakistan military agreement was defensive in character, and that US arms, being available only for defence, could not be used against India. But now Mr White was asked pointedly whether the Pact would apply 'if India committed aggression against Pakistan'. And his answer was that it would not. After this unequivocal definition, it appears to be somewhat futile to go on pretending that US policy has undergone a drastic change on this subject, and that henceforth Pakistan can depend on US help in matters other than those that directly concern US interests.

Apart from any question of the Pact's interpretation, we feel that Pakistan's policy of military alignment with the Western bloc is one of the legacies of past regimes which does not seem to have been subjected to a proper appraisal. We have always held that such association for an underdeveloped country like Pakistan is, in the balance, harmful, With the passage of time the misgivings that we expressed in 1954, when Mr Ghulam Mohammad and Mr Mohammed Ali of Bogra switched the country's foreign policy, have proved to be correct. For example, it was said in justification of these pacts that, as a result of US military aid, Pakistan would be able to divert a large part of its own defence expenditure to other tasks of national reconstruction, and, thus, its economic development would receive an unprecedented fillip. In actual fact, however, this has not happened. Not only has Pakistan's military expenditure continued to increase, but it appears now that at least a part of this increase has been a direct result of US military aid. Mr David Bell, a US economist who was, until recently, Deputy Director of the US advisory group in Pakistan, said recently that 'Pakistan has spent too much for military purposes, and has been encouraged by the US military aid programme to spend even more than it should, and that, as a result, this Baghdad and SEATO military ally of the United States is barely holding its own economically'. The present Government, fortunately, has realised the necessity of pruning all non-developmental expenditure, including that on defence; and, therefore, a special committee has been appointed to examine the possibility of cutting down expenditure on the armed forces.

Another common argument in favour of joining the Western alliance was that huge amounts of foreign aid would be made available to Pakistan, and that this would speed up its economic progress. It is, of course, true that a substantial amount of aid has been received in recent years. But, firstly, how much has it contributed to the country's permanent development? What part of it has been wasted or spent on providing well-paid jobs to experts and contractors from the donor countries? To what extent has the improper use of foreign aid been a result of local inefficiency or political instability, and how much has it been due to the conditions attached to Western aid? Different people may have different answers to these questions, but it is plain enough that, while figures of the total aid received over the last five years are most imposing on paper, its impact on the country's economy is not very impressive. And whereas Pakistan has apparently accepted the West's friends and enemies as its own friends and enemies, a large number of other Asian and African countries are receiving larger chunks of Western-sponsored aid and loans without committing themselves to support of the West-<u>and</u>, therefore, without shutting the door to help from other countries. It is, therefore, unreasonable to hold that aid to Pakistan would have been cut down to negligible proportions if it had not joined the military pacts.

The supporters of this policy also believed that, because of its membership of these pacts, Pakistan could depend on the senior partners of the Western alliance for political support. Let it be remembered that Pakistan then had no quarrel with the Soviet Union or China. Its serious disputes were and still are with its nearest neighbours. India and Afghanistan. In both cases—whereas Pakistan has made a gift of strong Soviet support to India and Afghanistan by siding with the West in the Cold War—-it has not been able to enlist the help of its Western friends for itself. On the question of Kashmir, not a single American or British statesman has ever publicly supported Pakistan's stand: and the United Nations has never been asked to condemn India for its refusal to carry out the tripartite agreement on Kashmir. On the question of river waters, their stand has been equally neutral. And, in regard to Afghanistan, American diplomats are reported to have advocated various plans for placating Kabul, without, in any way, helping Pakistan to persuade the Afghan rulers to abandon their irredentist claims to a part of our territory. Thus we see that, in our disputes with India, where that country seeks to freeze the status quo and our interests demand a change in the situation, the Anglo-American group seem unprepared to lift their little fingers to bring about the desired change. On the other hand, in relation to Afghanistan, where without any real justification Kabul desires a change in the status quo, our friends are easily persuaded to suggest schemes for special concessions to appease Afghanistan, On the other hand, Pakistan has, by standing on the side of the colonial Powers, forfeited some of the prestige that it enjoyed among the Afro-Asian countries and particularly the Middle East.

II. FANTASTIC CHOICE: GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS

12 June 1949 Pakistan and the World

The announcement of the Pakistan Premier's forthcoming visit to Moscow at the special invitation of the Soviet Government has been widely welcomed in this country. The Soviet invitation is generally interpreted as recognition of Pakistan's growing importance in world affairs, and its acceptance as proof that Pakistan's present membership of the British Commonwealth does not involve the subordination of her foreign policy to the interests of the Anglo-American bloc. The Soviet move has considerable significance and due recognition of the place Pakistan occupies in the world by a great power is extremely gratifying: but it should not be forgotten that any country's greatness and importance depends primarily on her own strength.

irrespective of whether one country, however powerful, gives it formal recognition by a special gesture like the one made by the Soviet Government. This strength, in its turn, is dependent on internal economic and social stability and, in external affairs, on the justness and firmness of her foreign policy; as increasingly Pakistan perfects her position with regard to both, her international status will automatically be enhanced. The second general reaction can be regarded as a healthy manifestation of our people's spirit of independence, their hatred of imperialism in any form, and their keen desire to remain out of other peoples' wars. However, in itself the Moscow visit does not mean much more than that the Governments of the two neighbouring countries seek to establish normal diplomatic relations on a friendly basis. The people of Pakistan, as their spontaneous approval of the Moscow visit has shown, would be extremely happy if it is proved that the move signifies a break with the doubtful foreign policy pursued by the Pakistan Government and Karachi's determination to follow henceforth an independent course of action in world affairs. Our Government's future policy should set at rest the serious fears and doubts aroused by Pakistan's wholehearted effort in the recent past to make the Commonwealth cause her own... The demand for diplomatic relations with the USSR, China and other countries has repeatedly been made in Pakistan; we hope this will now be done without further delay. The Foreign Minister, during his press conference, mentioned a practical difficulty, namely, the paucity of trained 'personnel'. As far as Ambassadors are concerned, Government would certainly be able to get the right persons if they did not limit their choice to ex-Ministers of the Central Government and Muslim businessmen from India: while on the secretarial level, if we could not find suitable persons, they should have been specially trained by now. We hope all further delay will be avoided in making Pakistan known directly to every important country in the world. The growth and development of nations is governed by no fixed rule. In the year and a half of its existence Pakistan has created a certain place for herself in the world. The time has come to discard all vestiges of our nonage in the field of diplomacy and stake our claim as a mature, full-grown and independent nation. Let the world know that a new force has entered the arena, and let Pakistan's message of freedom and social justice resound in the chancellories of the world. To rise to our full height and achieve the world position to which we aspire, much hard work needs to be done in every sphere of national activity; the problems facing Pakistan today call for zeal and devotion and, given the right leadership, we have no doubt that our people are capable of overcoming these difficulties and building the solid structure of a great Pakistan...

3 April 1953 Foreign Aid

The Pakistan Finance Minister's recent declaration in Parliament that this nation would rather starve than accept (foreign) assistance for food with strings attached to it expresses a sentiment that will be echoed by every patriotic Pakistani who is fully conscious of the serious consequences of succumbing to the conquest-through-aid policy of today's neo-imperialists. It would obviously be absurd to interpret this statement as referring only to foreign assistance given for food, for if we are prepared to starve rather than accept food gifts or loans with strings attached, the question of our making political, economic, or military concessions in return for a few out-dated planes or machines, and some foreign scholarships or lecture-tours by socalled experts, simply does not arise. The Finance Minister's statement on the subject must, therefore, be interpreted and discussed in its broadest sense. Those who are aware of the sorry fate of the Asian and European countries which have surrendered their independence in return for foreign aid will earnestly hope that this statement is intended to be a firm policy declaration, and that the Pakistan Government's future actions in the field of foreign affairs will be guided by the sound principle enunciated by Mr Mohammed Ali.

If the Pakistan Government are determined to refrain from giving economic concessions and accepting political or

military commitments in return for foreign aid, not only must they disillusion Western statesmen and military leaders who make no secret of the fact that they regard Pakistan as a part of their sphere of influence, but they must also break off certain existing agreements with the Western powers which clearly impinge upon our freedom of action...

The foreign policy pursued by Pakistan plainly indicates the Government's leanings towards the Western bloc. Notwithstanding the lawyer's quibbles resorted to by the Foreign Minister, it is clear that Pakistan has not yet evolved a strong foreign policy—based on complete neutrality in the Cold War—which judges every issue on its merits, and makes no compromise with those who hold millions of our Asian and African brethren in bondage and seek to expand and consolidate their empires—by persuasion where possible, through bloodshed where necessary. Apart from other examples of the Foreign Ministry's predilection for avoiding opposition to the policies of the Anglo-American bloc, the spate of cringing speeches made recently by our envoys in America and Great Britain cannot be ignored in appraising the present Government's attitude. Therefore, while we wholeheartedly approve Mr Mohammed Ali's statement, it is necessary to state in unequivocal terms that, if his brave words are to serve any purpose beyond staving off Parliamentary criticism, the Government of Pakistan must not only decide and declare that they will not under any circumstances bind themselves to any Power bloc, but they must also extricate the country from existing American aid agreements and similar Commonwealth programmes and, finally, withdraw from the British Commonwealth

24 October 1953 Islam's 'Patrons'

It is a strange irony of twentieth century history that during this period more than one potential aggressor has mounted the world stage as a patron of Islam and protector of the

Muslim world, whose extent and importance, on the one hand, and its present political weakness, on the other, makes it an attractive hunting ground for the neo-imperialists. Armed with guns and gold, these gentlemen seek to exploit the Muslims' love for their religion for purposes that have nothing to do with Islam and are, in fact, harmful to the freedom cause of the Muslim nations groaning under the tyrannous rule of foreign imperialists or their agents. It is stranger still that the West's bid to dominate the Muslim world has invariably found support among a certain number of Muslims who, for reasons on which we need not dilate, promptly take up the slogan coined by these spurious well-wishers of Islam and Muslims. In the post-war world, the mantle of the late Signor Benito Mussolini—who had himself photographed on a white charger being 'acclaimed' by North African Muslims as the protector of Islam'-seems to have been inherited, among certain other parts of the Axis programme, by the US President. And, in keeping with tradition, we find that Washington's programme of 'protecting' the world of Islam is enthusiastically being endorsed by a number of Muslims, including some from Pakistan.

The latest example of the needs of Islam and Muslims being viewed through Washington-made spectacles is provided by no less a person than Dr Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi. Pakistan's Minister for Education, who is currently on his second trip to the United States within the last two months. Speaking at the new Islamic Centre in Washington, Dr Qureshi devoted most of his speech to proving the 'utter incompatibility of Islam and Communism' and to assuring his American friends that the Muslims of every country would side with 'democracy'. Although, in the context of today's Cold War politics, Dr Qureshi's words could hardly be misunderstood, in order to leave absolutely no doubt in the minds of his listeners—who might easily have resented his talking of all men being equal—he went on to declare that the peoples of the USSR's Asian Republics were 'not happy and we know it'. We need not discuss here whether or not the Uzbeks and Kazakhs are happy with the tremendous progress they have made since their release from Czarist oppression, or what information the Education Minister has on the subject that is not gathered from American magazines or comics. Nor is it necessary to ask why Dr Qureshi did not consider it appropriate to mention the sufferings inflicted on the Muslims of North Africa and the Middle East by the NATO powers as a part of what the French Foreign Minister has called the war of the Cross against the Crescent. Dr Qureshi's acceptance of Washington's distorted view of world affairs has no great significance, but since he is still a Minister in the Central Cabinet, the people have a right to know whether his utterances truly express the Pakistan Government's foreign policy...

8 October 1954 Foreign Policy

The recent statements and speeches made by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister clearly indicate that the change in our foreign policy—which became noticeable soon after Mr Mohammed Ali was nominated to succeed Khwaja Nazimuddin—has now been pushed to completion. The policy enunciated by the first two Prime Ministers of Pakistan was one of non-alignment with Power blocs, and of seeking and maintaining friendly relations with all States which were prepared to live in friendship with us. Pakistan had pledged herself to judge each international issue on its merits, and to support the cause of world peace. She promised, and in large measure gave, her full support to the cause of selfdetermination of all peoples, and invariably sided with the anti-colonial powers in an effort to serve the liberation movement of subject nations. Although there could be, and often was, some disagreement with the manner in which the Pakistan Government handled particular international issues, there was wide agreement inside the country on the theoretical basis of Pakistan's foreign policy. It was generally accepted

that such a policy was guided by enlightened self-interest, and that for a country like Pakistan, facing grave international difficulties and internal problems, it promised the best chance of peace and the opportunity to tackle her vast tasks of reconstruction. One expected that, as time passed, and Pakistan's rulers gained in experience and maturity, such a foreign policy would gradually be rid of some of its weaknesses and vacillations, and eventually become a guarantee of the country's steady and uninhibited progress.

Regrettably, these expectations have been belied. The Mohammed Ali Government seem to have abandoned the path outlined by their predecessors, and have undertaken a voyage into waters that are both deep and dangerous. Instead of avoiding involvement in the East-West Cold War, Pakistan has for all practical purposes become a full member of the expanding American 'grand alliance', which seeks to weld a large part of the world into a closely-knit system of interlocking military treaties. The independent position hitherto assumed by Pakistan has been forsaken, and the Prime Minister says, with extraordinary bluntness, that every country must line up with either of the two world camps, implying thereby that in today's world independence of judgement in international affairs must be surrendered by all except the leaders of the two Power blocs. Proceeding from this false premise, it is said that Pakistan's interests lie with the West and, irrespective of all other considerations, she must inevitably accept the position of a close ally of the Western Powers.

The results of the drastic change of policy initiated by Mr Mohammed Ali are clearly perceptible. Whereas some time ago it was taken for granted that Pakistan would soon leave the British Commonwealth, and in any case it was agreed that the decision on the subject would be made by the Constituent Assembly, the Prime Minister has now declared with amazing confidence—which can be due either to complete certainty of, or utter disregard for, popular sanction—that Pakistan will, even after becoming a Republic, remain a member of the Commonwealth. The policy of seeking directly the friendship of Asian and Muslim Sates has been replaced by one of trying to persuade them to join a common treaty organisation with the US and Great Britain. The policy of seeking friendly relations with every country in the world is given up and, instead, all Socialist countries are viewed with an unreasoning hostility borrowed from Washington. Strange as it may seem, Pakistan Ministers are found apologising to American Press correspondents for having taken the sane decision of according recognition to the People's Republic of China. It is considered necessary to reiterate their disapproval of the Chinese regime; of course, no such necessity arises in the case of Fascist Spain or of an imperialist State like France, which is engaged in a campaign of ruthless terror that includes the bombing of innocent men, women, and children in a vicious attempt to drown in blood the North African people's determination to be free. The stand in support of the perfectly just demand for China's admission to the United Nations has virtually been given up, and the brilliant argument cited by Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan is that postponement of this question for a year is essential because it has become a controversial issue. Pakistan had so far conducted a laudable campaign on behalf of the peoples of the Maghreb, and thereby earned the respect of the Arab nations and everyone else genuinely devoted to the democratic cause. But Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan's latest general policy speech in the United Nations Assembly is strangely silent on the North African issue. Two years ago, in the Paris General Assembly, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, bowed with deep respect and gratitude' to the delegates from the Socialist States for their consistent support of the cause of freedom and democracy. Today, without any change in the circumstances which then inspired the Foreign Minister to point out the facts of international life, Chaudhri Zafrulla Khan delivered a speech which could have done credit to a McCarthy.

These few examples show the great shift that has taken place in Pakistan's foreign policy over the last eighteen months. This orientation has been brought about without taking note of public opinion and without consulting the country's Parliament. It has no democratic sanction whatsoever. Nor has there been any definite indication of what returns are expected by the architects of the new foreign policy. Even those who do not see any great disadvantage in closely aligning ourselves with the Western bloc of imperialist Powers are deeply perturbed by the fact that this alliance has been an altogether one-sided affair. The financial help and aid given to Pakistan by the US is generally appreciated, but it is pointed out that other countries have obtained the same or a greater quantum of aid without changing their whole foreign policy, and thus without any loss of prestige or position. The Government's promise that US military aid would provide tangible support to the country's economy, and release a large part of our own resources for peaceful tasks, is viewed with growing scepticism. It is also felt that the grant of such aid will not make any vital difference to Pakistan's armed strength. But even if these calculations are somewhat pessimistic, it is necessary for the politically conscious sections of our people to take serious note of the current developments and decide whether the political price Pakistan is being asked to pay in advance is too high for any promised benefits. Although Pakistan is faced with a number of serious and, some might say, more intimate problems, the foreign policy that is being implemented by the Pakistan Government cannot be ignored or neglected, for the simple reason that it is not just a question of whether Pakistan has voted correctly on an issue involving distant, far-off lands and alien peoples. As the report about the negotiations for a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States has revealed, our foreign policy will determine and affect almost every facet of national life. We would earnestly request every thinking Pakistani to demand that no further commitments should be made, and no pacts ratified by the Pakistan Government, unless the grave issues involved have been discussed and considered by the people and their genuine representatives...

25 October 1956 Foreign Relations

The fulfilment—after many postponements—of the Pakistan Prime Minister's engagement to visit China, his discussion with the leaders of that country, and the promise of an early return trip to Pakistan by Mr Chou En-Lai, provide a welcome augury for friendlier and more fruitful relations between these two neighbouring States. In retrospect, the lag between acceptance of the invitation from Peking and the Prime Minister's visit to China does not seem to have been unpropitious because, in comparison with his two predecessors, Mr H.S. Suhrawardy can speak on behalf of this country with greater authority and is, therefore, entitled to be heard with greater respect. Primarily, the Prime Minister's strength lies in the fact—unique in the recent history of Ministerial politics in Pakistan—that he has at his back a living political party, which—at least in the country's eastern wing—has deep roots among the people and enjoys their support. This fact, above all else, gives Mr Suhrawardy's position a measure of the dignity and authority that were lacking so conspicuously in others—and, particularly, in the gentleman from Bogra. It also encourages the hope that the new, healthier political trends that are beginning to be born may lead to a rational reorientation of Pakistan's foreign relations. Whether this hope can be sustained, and the people's expectations in this regard are allowed to materialise. remains to be seen... In his first broadcast as Prime Minister Mr H.S.

In his first broadcast as Prime Minister Mr H.S. Suhrawardy had declared: 'Let it be understood that we mean what we say, that our word is our bond'. Certain Western publicists interpreted this to mean that the new Government was pledging itself to stand by all the old military pacts; on the other hand, the people will expect Mr Suhrawardy to honour fully the word he and his Party have given to the people, even if it has to abandon the pledges made to their foreign friends by the Muslim League leaders. When the two pledges conflict, as they are bound to, the choice that the Suhrawardy Cabinet makes will determine the future pattern of events for the country and, to a large extent, also decide the Government's own future.

26 December 1956 Sino-Pakistan Friendship

The joint statement issued by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and China at the end of their recent talks-resembling closely in both tone and content the declaration made by them at Peking two months ago—may be said to mark the end of the first phase in the development of friendly ties between these two neighbouring States. It is, of course, true that, from the very beginning, relations between Pakistan and China have never been unfriendly, that during recent years cultural contacts and commercial exchanges between them have improved considerably, that no untoward incident has ever marred the steady maturing of Sino-Pakistan friendship, and that, as the Prime Ministers' statement underlines, there is no conflict of interests. Nevertheless, despite such propitious circumstances, contacts between the two countries have been slow to develop, and full advantage has not been taken of all the vast opportunities that exist for mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields. The meetings that have taken place in recent months between the leaders of the two countries should enable them to overcome any hurdles that they may encounter in carrying out their oft-repeated common desire for cementing Sino-Pakistan friendship. Apart from the high-level discussions that have taken place on problems of mutual interest, the visit of Mr Chou En-Lai to Pakistanon the pattern of Mr Suhrawardy's trip to China--will allow the Chinese leader to make a deeper study and gain a better appreciation of Pakistan's problems. He has also had the opportunity to feel the pulse of our people; to witness their affection for China and respect for the achievements it has made under the leadership of the People's Government, to see their love for peace and a genuine desire to live in friendship with all other countries, and to ensure a settlement of international disputes through amicable means on the basis of democratic justice.

The Prime Ministers have reiterated the desire of their Governments to facilitate the solution of the two countries' respective problems on the basis of peace and justice. The manner in which this resolve is implemented is anyhow important for the two countries, and it is likely to greatly influence the course of their relations. For China, the most important question is that of its admission into the United Nations. This matter clearly constitutes the biggest political scandal of the present era. A nation of 500 million people is denied representation in the United Nations, and a Government which is more firmly established in the hearts and minds of the Chinese people than any other Government in that country's long and chequered history, is prevented from sending its nominees to speak on China's behalf in UN councils; instead of China's real voice, what the world hears Sat UN forums is the undignified raving of the personal nominees of a dilapidated exdictator. While the non-recognition of China by the United States, and thus by the United Nations majority, harms China's prestige, it also damages the prestige of the United Nations and the cause of world peace. This is an issue on which China deserves full support from every country interested in justice and peace. It is regrettable that, although Pakistan was among the first few countries of the world to recognise People's China, it has not always followed a correct and consistent policy in this regard. We would like to hope that the Pakistan Government will revise its policy on this question, particularly because the restitution to China of her rightful place in the United Nations should enable her to play a more effective role in the cause of Asian-African freedom and world peace. And we earnestly desire and hope that, in regard to other problems of concern to Pakistan and China, the two countries will work in close co-operation to seek their early solution on a basis of international morality, justice, and acceptance of the peoples' right to self-determination. It should be realised that the settlement of local disputes is urgently necessary, not only in the interests of peace and concord, but also to prevent imperialist powers from taking advantage of such disputes to further their own interests in the region.

Finally, the Karachi statement has laid great stress on the pursuit of peace. Particularly in the context of the disturbances caused in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe, and the danger that exists of such a small conflagration bursting into the flames of World War Three, it is necessary that all possible efforts should be made to prevent a further outbreak of hostilities in any part of the world, and thus save mankind from the total destruction of an atomic war. One may also expect that, when both these countries work honestly and determinedly to achieve this common objective, their paths will begin to converge. Further, it will be widely hoped that the high-level contacts that have been established between Pakistan and China will be strengthened, and that the exchange of visits by State dignitaries will be repeated whenever opportunity presents itself. Further, it is essential for both countries that their commercial ties should be strengthened and the present volume of trade increased. It is equally necessary that the exchange of goodwill and cultural delegations that has developed over the last year or two should be continued and improved upon. Pakistan and China have everything to gain from a close and intimate friendship; while a lack of friendship or estrangement between them can only weaken the cause they stand for. We hope that the first handclasp between Pakistan and China that we have witnessed now will help them to cherish each other's friendship, to learn from each other, and to march together towards a bright future-marching in the same direction, even if they do not consider it convenient to march in step.

28 April 1957 Pakistan and Algeria

A few days ago, on the suggestion of an Opposition MP, the Pakistan Parliament, including the Speaker, stood up in a

body to observe a two-minute silence in honour of the Algerian martyrs and to pray for the success of their cause. This splendid gesture undoubtedly reflects the feelings of the people of Pakistan, and it will certainly be highly appreciated by all the Arab peoples. It was also a timely gesture, for it followed reports showing that in one week alone more than 800 Algerian nationalists had been massacred by the French armies, and that this was the beginning of a new campaign of indiscriminate blood-letting in yet another attempt to set the seal of finality on Algeria's integration with France.

It seems perfectly obvious that the French rulers have decided to make a desperate bid to smash the Algerian people's determination to continue their struggle against a ruthless imperialism. Another reason for the mood of desperation that has seized the Quai d'Orsay is probably the mounting indignation with which the people of the world not excluding France—are protesting against the brutal methods employed by the French armies against Algerian patriots...

It will be agreed that, in these grim circumstances, the fraternal gesture of support to Algeria made by the Pakistan Parliament is not enough. It must be followed by more concrete action to succour Algeria's stricken people. And, further, when the Parliament unanimously honours the Algerian martyrs and prays for their success, the Pakistan Government is logically expected to do something tangible about helping Algeria and thwarting its torturers. The present position is most anomalous. The anomaly is well illustrated by the fact that on the day our Parliament registered its support for Algeria, a Lahore cinema showed a Pakistan Government newsreel which proudly listed France as a friend and ally of Pakistan, one of the countries that would stand by us in the defence of freedom and democracy. This strange divergence must be ended if Parliament's actions are to attract the respect they merit; and only when it has been ended will it be possible for Pakistan's representatives at the UN to perform their duty of compelling the Asian-African bloc and other countries to take a firm stand and mobilise sufficient strength to compel France to hold her bloody hand in Algeria.

February 1958 Fantastic Choice

Pakistan's diplomatic representation in foreign lands has never been very satisfactory. Now and then, as if by mere chance, the right man is picked for a suitable post and he is able to serve the country with distinction. Generally speaking, however, those who control these appointments do not seem to realise that our Ambassadors, Consuls and UN delegates play an exceedingly important role in moulding Pakistan's relations with the rest of the world. Far too often diplomatic assignments have been regarded as sinecures that could, without any great disadvantage, be distributed among favoured officials, friends and relations, or politicians whose presence at home is considered inconvenient or undesirable. As a result, during the last ten years, many misfits have been allowed to occupy responsible positions in the diplomatic service: they have invariably done no real good—and sometimes a great deal of harm—to Pakistan's interests. Even so, it will not be easy to think of anything more fantastic than the Government's latest decision to appoint Prince Alv Khan as Pakistan's Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

If Prince Aly Khan had been known to have more in common with his late father than love for horses, if he had inherited some of the third Aga Khan's other qualities instead of just his stables—the proposition might have been considered less unreasonable by our people. What is more, the Prince is not even a citizen of Pakistan. He has no roots in this country, no links with the people, and can, therefore, have no understanding of their sentiments and aspirations. Prince Aly Khan undoubtedly possesses other qualities which endear him to high society in many a land and make him one of the best-known international playboys. But it is obvious that his known accomplishments do not qualify him for what is generally accepted to be an extremely tough diplomatic assignment. And neither the Prince's distinguished lineage, nor the fact of his friendship with men who matter in Pakistan today, provides sufficient cause for overriding these weighty considerations against his appointment to a senior diplomatic post. We would, therefore, most strongly urge the Central Government to reconsider its decision to name the Princeerrant as Pakistan's chief spokesman before the United Nations.

While on this subject, it is necessary to reiterate that the greatest care must be exercised in the selection of our UN delegation. A perusal of past records shows that less than half of the delegates chosen in any year could ever be expected to make any intelligent contribution to UN discussions; the rest were sent out in the pursuit of purposes that had nothing to do with the United Nations or safeguarding Pakistan's interests in the world organisation. It is also necessary that Pakistan's UN delegation should have a greater measure of continuity than it has had in the past. In the first place, Pakistan's Permanent Representative should be a person of outstanding ability, capable of hard work, and willing to devote himself to this job for more than one season. The delegation should consist of the best men available in the country, and the selection should not be confined to any particular walk of life nor restricted to members or sympathisers of the ruling parties. If certain persons prove their worth in UN debates and discussions, they should be sent out year after year so that advantage can be taken of their experience. Unfortunately, in Karachi, membership of the UN delegations is apparently regarded as a good holiday at public expense, with the result that not only has the general selection been poor, but if a capable person is chosen, by accident, he appears at the UN for a few months and is never heard of again. The old policy and old methods must be revised, so that Pakistan should always be represented by a strong and capable team of delegates who can, by their conduct and ability, win friends and votes at the United Nations

III. GROSS IMPERTINENCE: PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

⁵ August 1950 Afghanistan

The Shah of Iran's reported proposal for a 'cease-fire' in the cold war between Pakistan and Afghanistan is not likely to take these two countries very far towards the establishment of friendly relations. Pakistan, in further proof of her good will, has already agreed to accept a propaganda truce provided, of course, that our truculent northern neighbour can be persuaded to follow suit. It is feared, however, that even if the authorities at Kabul formally accept the plan for a temporary peace on the propaganda front, which is anyhow problematical, it will make little or no difference to the existing tension between the two States. The Afghan Government's hostility cannot be treated as a minor matter, based as it is on the ridiculous irredentist claim to a large and strategically important part of Pakistan's territory. Kabul has sought to use Indo-Pakistan conflicts to its own advantage, and there is no doubt that certain elements in India have encouraged and, probably, financed Afghanistan's against Pakistan. However meaningless campaign Afghanistan's claims may be, they do possess a nuisance value. Nor are there any indications to show that Afghanistan's ruling circles intend giving up their hostile attitude. On the contrary, as internal discontent with the misrule of an authoritarian regime is heightened, the Kabul Government is likely further to intensify its propaganda in an effort to divert the people's attention from their real problems. In these circumstances, it is widely felt that the Pakistan Government should give up its policy of appeasement, and take a more positive stand towards our neighbour. Economically, Pakistan can bottle up Afghanistan without any great effort and with hardly any effect on its own economy. A dose of the medicine that Kabul's rulers are used to will probably cure them of their medieval dreams

21 October 1950 Afghanistan

The Afghanistan Ambassador in India, who passed through Lahore recently on his way to Kabul, is reported to have said that his Government would make all efforts to achieve 'a compromise with Pakistan over the question of the creation of Pukhtoonistan'. The purpose of Sardar Najibullah Khan's present journey to Kabul, after a rather short stay at Delhi, is not known; nor can it be said if the presence in Kabul of the British High Commissioner in India has any special significance. But if these journeys between Delhi and Kabul are in any way connected with the Afghan Government's reported intention to trying to negotiate a 'compromise' with Pakistan, the diplomats concerned should realise that they are just wasting their time. The Government and people of Pakistan have made it abundantly clear to all concerned that the territorial integrity of Pakistan cannot become the subject of any compromise negotiations and, further, that Pakistan regards the Durand Line to be the irrevocable international frontier between this country and Afghanistan. Any other complaints that the Kabul Government may have against the Government of Pakistan can be discussed and settled amicably, but their preposterous claim—with neither legal nor moral backing-to territories lying within our borders is something that no one in Pakistan is prepared to consider on any terms.

The Pakistan Government's policy towards Afghanistan has, of course, been criticised by the country's Press and certain sections of public opinion, but only because Afghanistan's intrigues and fulminations have been treated with a tolerance that seems to have been misunderstood across the border as weakness. Despite the sustained and malicious propaganda campaigns from Kabul and the periodical incursions into Pakistan territory, our Government has not taken effective retaliatory measures, and has even continued most of the pre-1947 economic concessions and favours. While the desire to have friendly relations with Pakistan's northern neighbour is readily understood and appreciated, it is widely felt that the Government must now stiffen its attitude to scotch this nuisance of a miniature cold war. The last three years have provided ample evidence of Afghanistan's irresponsiveness to Pakistan's gestures of friendship. Therefore, whether Kabul's present policy is dictated by insane adventurism, or by the interests of a third power, the Pakistan Government should seriously consider the desirability of discarding the velvet glove to show our truculent neighbour that a policy of hostility towards Pakistan can only yield bitter results.

20 April 1954 Pak-Afghan relations

The strange and unexpected shift that is reported to have taken place recently in Pak-Afghan relations remains a curious mystery. Since Partition, at Kabul's initiative, a miniature cold war has been raging between the two States; and, despite Pakistan's assiduous efforts to cultivate friendly ties with her Muslim neighbour on the west, the Afghan Government has persisted in its attitude of blind hostility which first shocked opinion in Pakistan then surprised the world when the Afghan delegate at the UN raised his solitary voice against Pakistan's membership of the world organisation. In recent weeks, following the US Vice-President's visits to Kabul and Karachi, the pendulum of Pak-Afghan relations seems to have swung to the other extreme, and it is said that, at America's suggestion, the two Governments are currently negotiating an agreement which envisages a virtual merger of the two States. Although an anonymous spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Affairs Ministry has described foreign and local Press reports, which speak of secret talks for a federation of the two countries, as being 'without foundation, and pure speculation', there can be little doubt that some novel plan is under active consideration at both Karachi and Kabul. The comments in the American Press, and the unexplained comings and goings of senior diplomats between the two capitals, clearly indicate that important developments are in the offing, even if formal negotiations on the subject have not so far been initiated. While the desirability of ending the cold war between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and of basing their relations on friendly co-operation and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, is manifest, the proposal which is now being bandied about, as a part of the Dulles plan for Asia, needs to be considered with circumspection. America's stake in the proposal is perfectly obvious. Washington already regards Pakistan as a safe member of the American bloc, one of the Asian States willing to join the network of military pacts sponsored by the United States. If Afghanistan could somehow be linked with Pakistan, US strategists probably visualise the possibility of being able to establish bases along the extensive Afghan-Soviet border. Kabul may well be persuaded to appreciate the economic advantages of such a scheme sufficiently to accept it. However, none of the conditions that are said to comprise the draft agreement on the subject seems to offer any advantage to Pakistan. By underwriting Afghanistan's backward economy, and by forging close links with a feudal autocracy on a basis satisfactory to Kabul's rulers, it seems that Pakistan would gratuitously be undertaking new burdens-which it will not be easy to sustain-and inviting new political complications.

It is, of course, not possible to discuss with any degree of definitiveness the pros and cons of the matter to undertake its proper appraisal before the plan is made known in greater detail. In any case, the Pakistan Government must proceed with the utmost caution with regard to a proposal which seemingly expects this country to play the role of pulling chestnuts out of the fire for the benefit of others. Every effort to normalise Pak-Afghan relations, to foster mutually advantageous economic co-operation, and to persuade Kabul to abandon its ridiculous irredentist claims to Pakistan territory, must be continued; and any progress made in this direction will widely be welcomed in this country. But the new-fangled scheme which is being—or is likely to be discussed can, for good and sound reasons, only be viewed with suspicion, particularly in view of its alien authorship. We hope, therefore, that the Pakistan Government will not be hustled into making any awkward commitments, and that a definite policy on this important issue will be formulated only after carefully considering its various implications and, it is necessary to stress, after consulting public opinion.

⁷ April 1955 Afghan barbarism

As more detailed—and more horrifying—information about the recent outburst of Afghan barbarism is made available. the need for urgent action to deal effectively with the grim situation in that benighted land becomes more imperative. At Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar, official representatives of the Pakistan Government have been assaulted and insulted. their property has been systematically looted or destroyed, and even their women and children have not escaped the terror let loose by Afghanistan's ruling clique. Despite the formal expression of regret by the Afghan representative at Karachi, the violent anti-Pakistan campaign has not abated, and the professional hooligans, who seem to be the chosen instruments of the Kabul regime's insane policies, have not been leashed. While little or nothing is known about the present position in Jalalabad and Kandahar, the situation in the country's capital has shown no signs of improvement. The staff of the Pakistan Embassy and other Pakistani citizens are reported to be living in a state of siege, with no contact with the world outside, harassed by Afghan brigands, and unable even to obtain a regular supply of their daily requirements. This disgraceful state of affairs cannot be tolerated: it must immediately by remedied.

More than a week has passed since the Afghans, in utter disregard of international law and morality, began their vicious attacks on Pakistan's Embassy and Consulates. But all that the Pakistan authorities have done so far is to despatch two formal Notes of Protest to the Afghan Government; these communications remain unanswered and, judging from the impertinent utterances of certain Afghan politicians who are these days in India, no satisfactory reply can be expected. The Pakistan Government must, therefore, act now, without any further delay, on the basis of a policy which recognises that we are dealing with a kingdom of gangsters and not a civilised State. The first task is that immediate arrangements must be made to evacuate all Pakistani women and children living in Afghanistan, preferably by air. Private Pakistani citizens should be advised to leave that country at once, and all the Pakistan Consulates should be closed. In the meantime, Kabul should be given a firm ultimatum, demanding that suitable amends be made for the gratuitous insults offered to Pakistan's flag and her diplomatic representatives, and the damage done to Pakistani property. If the Afghan Government fails to accept these demands within the stipulated time-limit. Pakistan must break off diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and apply the most stringent economic sanctions, withdrawing the various concessions in regard to Afghanistan's trade, and barring the entry into Pakistan of the thousands of Afghans who come in every year to seek employment. The policy of turning the other cheek has been tried for long enough; we must now act on the principle of a tooth for a tooth, speaking to the Afghans in a language which they can be made to understand.

18 October 1955 Gross Impertinence

Kabul's latest venture in the field of diplomatic impropriety further confirms the doubts that many in this country have felt about the manner in which the Pakistan Government has

dealt with the Afghan nuisance. Commenting on the recent Pak-Afghan agreement over the rehoisting of flags at Kabul and Peshawar, we had stressed that the formula ultimately agreed upon gave Afghanistan the best of the bargain; not only did the double flag-hoisting ceremonies create the harmful impression that the amends were being made on a basis of reciprocity, but Pakistan also agreed to the resumption of normal diplomatic and trade relations without obtaining any clear guarantee from the Afghan junta that they would abandon their irredentist claim to Pakistan's territory and call off their campaign of hostility. So unrealistic is Karachi's appreciation of the situation that, at first, the Afghan Prime Minister's request for a meeting with the Prime Minister of Pakistan seems to have been interpreted by our experts as a move to establish friendly relations between the two States. It soon became clear, however, that it was merely another attempt to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs. The Afghan Prime Minister has had the gross impertinence to suggest that Pakistan's representatives should sit down with him and debate the West Pakistan integration plan; and when it was found that a meeting could not be arranged before 14 October, he had the temerity to demand that implementation of the One-Unit scheme should be postponed. When these inane requests were rejected, the Afghan dignitary demonstratively withdrew his earlier proposal for a high-level meeting. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the One-Unit plan has got absolutely nothing to do with Afghanistan or any other foreign Power. It is a question which concerns only the people of this country, and they are capable of so managing their affairs that the ultimate result accords fully with their aspirations and wishes. Apart from this, it is the height of stupidity that a semi-fascist feudal monarchy, which rules over a discontented and poverty-stricken people with the liberal help of the bullet and the knout, and which has a long tradition of oppression, particularly with regard to its minorities, should presume to advise the people of Pakistan on their affairs

It is learnt further that the Afghan Government has instructed its Charge d'Affaires at Karachi to lodge a protest with the Pakistan Government against the integration of the States and Provinces of West Pakistan, and thereafter to return to Kabul. If this report is true and the Afghan representative intends to carry out these instructions, we strongly recommend that his Note of Protest should not be received, and that on this subject not even a peon of the Foreign Office should grant him an interview. The Afghan Government must be made to realise that it will no longer be allowed to take advantage of what can only be characterised as Pakistan's extreme docility in dealing with its frequent exhibitions of ill-mannered hostility. The latest violation of diplomatic etiquette by the Afghans should prod the Pakistan Government into realising that our weak-kneed policy has proved a conspicuous failure, and that it must be abandoned in favour of one that Kabul will understand and respect. The Pakistan Government must also make it absolutely clear to its Western friends that this country is no longer prepared to tolerate the insults hurled at it from across the Durand Line, and that it intends to take all steps necessary to compel Afghanistan to observe the normal decencies of diplomatic relations. We have, on more than one previous occasion, outlined the measures which the Pakistan Government must adopt in order to restore the Kabul junta's mental balance. As a first step, Pakistan should withdraw the various one-sided economic concessions that it has accorded to Afghanistan since Partition. Further, if the Afghans want to stage a demonstration of protest by withdrawing their Charge d'Affaires from Karachi, Pakistan should compel them to follow this line of action to its logical conclusion by closing down its Embassy and trade offices in Afghanistan, and asking the Afghan Government to do the same in this country. Pakistan has tried over eight long years to establish friendly relations with its neighbour on the north-west. Every such effort has been rudely spurned, and every display of friendliness on our part has been interpreted as unmanly weakness. This ridiculous game must be brought to an end. The question of Pak-Afghan relations must be settled one way or the other; the present position of

persistent friendliness by Pakistan and equally persistent hostility by Kabul can no longer be tolerated. If even now the Pakistan Government is not persuaded to take appropriate action, the people should consider the desirability of taking direct steps to vindicate the honour of their country.

19 December 1955 Hostile Intervention

The Soviet Prime Minister's speech at a recent Kabul banquet constitutes an example of unwarranted intervention in Pakistan's internal affairs, a flagrant breach of the generally accepted principle that the territorial integrity of recognised States should respected, and the first instance of support by a foreign power for the preposterous Afghan demand that Pakistan should cede certain parts of its territory for no better reason than to satisfy the Kabul rulers' appetite for the expansion of their domain. This hostile Soviet manoeuvre will certainly have the effect of worsening Pak-Afghan relations by strengthening Afghan obduracy, However, Marshal Bulganin's utterances do not detract one jot from the correctness of Pakistan's stand vis-a-vis Afghanistan. Nor do they enhance the Soviet leaders' reputation for consistency or logic. It will be recalled that, at Srinagar, Mr Khrushchev, in referring to Pakistan and India, had declared pontifically that the frontiers of States which 'exist and develop' should not be redrawn because, he explained, 'it is a fact that a change in frontiers is always painful and does not take place without bloodshed'. If the status quo is to be maintained on the admittedly temporary Kashmir segment of the Indo-Pakistan frontier in order to avoid bloodshed-although both India and Pakistan are pledged to accept peacefully the final boundary line as determined by an impartial plebiscite in Kashmir-it is indeed extraordinary that the Soviet leaders should endorse the demand for changing an international border drawn up as long ago as 1893. If, according to them, peaceful co-existence can be maintained between India and Pakistan only by denying the people of Kashmir their right to self-determination-a right which every responsible Indian leader recognises in theory even to this day—it is a curious quirk of logic to ask for the grant of a similar right to a racial minority which accepted Pakistan willingly and has never voiced the demand for separating its homeland from Pakistan. Quite obviously, the Soviet leaders' sudden interest in this eight-year-old dispute, and their decision to support Kabul, have little to do with the facts of the case. Their *demarche* is seemingly guided by a blind hostility towards Pakistan which, Mr Khrushchev said, stems from Pakistan's adherence to the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact. Whatever one might think of the general Soviet reaction to this Pact, it provides no justification whatsoever for pursuing a policy which violates the basic rules governing the conduct of international relations, and which is likely to intensify existing tensions and encourage one State to provocative actions that may well threaten the peace of this region. Nor does this policy accord with the desire expressed by Mr Khrushchev for improving relations with Pakistan; in fact, it makes the prospect for friendly Pak-Soviet relations darker than ever before. Considered from every conceivable viewpoint, the initiative taken by the Soviet Prime Minister at Kabul is a positive disservice to the cause of peace and democracy in this area, and may well be regarded as a major deviation from the principles that have hitherto been advocated by the Soviet Government.

The Pukhtoonistan racket has so far been treated in this country with a measure of contempt. But since the Afghans have secured the support of a Big Power for their ridiculous stand, and the Pak-Afghan dispute may be put on the list of major cold war issues. Pakistan must take serious cognisance of the matter and devise an effective policy to deal with it...

9 June 1957 Journey to Kabul

It is expected in Karachi that the Prime Minister's current 'peace' mission to Kabul will not only help to restore normal diplomatic and commercial relations between the two estranged neighbours,

but also that the continued exchange of visits by the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan will ultimately lead to the development of intimate economic and political ties between them. Confident of big results being achieved through such high-level parleys, the Pakistan Government have shown unusual efficiency in working out a number of schemes that are expected to provide the basis for Pak-Afghan co-operation. For example, special transit facilities are being offered for Afghan goods on Pakistan's railways and at Karachi; PIA is ready to start a regular air service between the two capitals: blueprints are in hand for better telephone, road and rail links between the two countries; and it has been suggested that the Warsak Project should provide electricity to Afghanistan as well, and that the Warsak Lake should be used as a waterway for trade between the two States.

These plans certainly raise interesting possibilities, but most of them seem to offer special benefits to Afghanistan without any reciprocal advantage to Pakistan. This feature of the schemes under consideration appears all the more strange if we keep in mind the history of the Pak-Afghan quarrel...

We fully support the view that every possible effort should be made to establish friendly relations with our north-western neighbour, and we earnestly hope that Pakistan's present rulers will succeed where the best efforts of their predecessors have failed. It needs to be realised, however, that the main cause of this failure has been Afghanistan's refusal to renounce its claim to determine the future status of a part of Pakistan's territory, accompanied by a demand for unilateral economic concessions on Pakistan's part-as if we were expected to offer Kabul a tribute of some sort before our representatives could be accepted as personae gratae at the Afghan Court. Past experience clearly shows that, unless the Afghan rulers are willing to change their attitude, the possibility of a firm and lasting agreement remains remote. In today's world the only basis for friendly international relations is mutual respect and benefit, and recognition by the countries concerned of each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan cannot possibly accept any terms which do not conform to our national interests, or fail to exact due respect

for Pakistan's sovereignty over its territories. The people of this country would welcome friendly ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they know that this will be possible only if Kabul renounces its ridiculous claims to speak on behalf of a section of our people, and abandons its attempt to create trouble in the region that it covets: and so far there is no indication to show that such a renunciation is planned by the Afghan Government. The people will not, and cannot be expected to, tolerate any settlement that smacks of surrender or fosters the impression that Pakistan's representatives have accepted a one-sided agreement in order to serve their senior allies' strategic aims even at the cost of sacrificing Pakistan's national interest and self-respect.

11 December 1957 Pak-Afghan Relations

The Afghan King's visit to Pakistan on a mission of good will will complete the series of such visits by the dignitaries of the two States which began with the Pakistan President's journey to Kabul in August last year. Since then, it is gratifying to note, Pak-Afghan relations have shown steady progress. The subsequent exchange of visits by the Prime Ministers of the two countries, accompanied by high-level conferences on matters of common interest, has allowed their Governments to come to grips with the various points of dispute that have for years marred good-neighbourly relations between them-to the great chagrin of their peoples. Most of these issues pertain to minor matters and, given good will on both sides, there was never any reason why they should not have been speedily settled. However, even apart from the one major dispute arising from Afghanistan's inexplicable stand on what it is pleased to call the Pukhtoonistan question, the accumulated effect of a large number of small disputes was to create an atmosphere of bitterness and hostility which stood in the way of any attempt to end the pointless cold war and establish close and friendly ties between these two neighbouring States, which have a common historical and cultural background. The move towards a Pak-Afghan *rapprochement* has led to certain happy results. During the last eighteen months, hostility and suspicion have to a considerable extent been replaced by a desire for understanding and friendship. Diplomatic relations between the two States have returned to normal. Trade has improved, and a number of agreements are in the offing that will revolutionise communications between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and enable the latter to improve and speed up its trade relations with the rest of the world via Pakistan.

It would be unwise to forget or ignore the fact that the Kabul Government has not so far given up its support of the Pukhtoonistan stunt. However, a change for the better is clearly discernible in the Afghan Government's attitude on this question, and there are grounds for hoping that they will go further and accept the position that Pakistan's status as a sovereign State demands that no country should seek to interfere in any matter that is wholly within its domestic jurisdiction. We trust that Pakistan will, without abandoning any of its inalienable rights, continue patiently to follow a policy of seeking Afghanistan's friendship, and we earnestly hope that the welcome visit of King Zahir Shah will enable Pak-Afghan relations to improve still further, and that, on a basis of mutual benefit and recognition of each other's sovereign rights, the two countries will be able to leave the past behind and look forward to an era of friendly cooperation and mutual respect. itute

IV. REASON OR FORCE: THE KASHMIR TANGLE

10 August 1947 The Trump-Card

The future of Kashmir is in the melting pot. With only a week to go before the lapse of British paramountcy, the present rulers of

this Muslim State continue to maintain a discreet silence regarding their intentions. The Congress, who are busy in the game of trying to bring Kashmir into India, have already played their trump-card-Mr Gandhi. We do not know what Mr Gandhi said or heard in his private conversations with the Kashmir ruler, nor what offers and promises were made on either side. We are, however, largely in agreement with what Mr Gandhi has said publicly with regard to Kashmir. In a speech at Delhi, he expressed the view that the States should definitely join one of the two Dominions, and that their choice must be governed by the 'compulsion of their geographical position'. On his return from Kashmir he has declared that the will of the Kashmiri people should decide the future of their homeland, and has suggested that a referendum be held, the details of which should be jointly decided by the Congress, the Muslim League, the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir. The honour of agreeing with what Mr Gandhi says is so rare that we sincerely hope he means to stand by what he has said. If he does, ordinary human logic should make him openly advocate the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, and also make him insist on Sardar Patel's crying a halt to his intrigues with the present rulers of Kashmir through various individuals with dubious political antecedents. Judging, however, from the role of the Congress in the NWFP, where it accepted the referendum only if a Congress victory was assured, and as soon as the possibility vanished, repudiated it, there seems to be little hope of the Congress attitude being determined by mere common sense and fairness to Muslim India Kashmir with its strategic importance, its vast resources, and immeasurable future possibilities, seems too big a prize for the Congress money-bags to give up just for the sake of a principle or two. The Kashmir government must realise, however, that in taking a decision on this issue their first duty lies with the Kashmiri people, who cannot be expected to accept a decision that is taken without the consultation of their genuine representatives and is contrary to their desires and interests. Any attempt to force them into the Indian Union, especially since that would mean the present oppressive regime being granted a new

lease of life under Patel's latest alliance with his 'personal friends', the Princes of India, will not be tolerated by the Kashmiris. In Kashmir today, the leaders of the two biggest political parties, the Muslim and National Conferences, are in jail. If the present ruler is in the slightest way interested in the happiness and welfare of the people and the future prosperity of the State, he must give up the present policy of intrigue and oppression. The leaders of the people should be released immediately and the future of Kashmir decided in the open by the representatives of the people. The present atmosphere of palace intrigues, of threats and promises, cannot bring forth a solution which will satisfy the aspirations of the Kashmiri people and last for very long.

⁷ September 1947 Kashmir Events

Reports from Kashmir filtering through the heavy blanket of censorship indicate that a serious situation has arisen in the State. Peaceful demonstrations in Poonch, by the people demanding self-government and the right to decide for themselves whether Kashmir is to link up with the Indian Union or Pakistan, have been a signal for the State authorities to let loose a reign of terror. The Dogra soldiery has been unleashed and has started a brutal and ruthless campaign of repression which has provoked the people to take to arms. Martial law has been declared in Poonch. and pitched battles between the Dogra army and the people are reported. The people of Kashmir demand, and they have the right to demand, that they should be consulted on the decision regarding the future of their homeland. So far the Maharaja has maintained an indiscreet silence, and the political atmosphere is rife with secret parleys and intrigues.

For the last hundred years the people of this rich and beautiful land have lived in abject poverty, slaves of a feudal clique to whom they and their homeland were sold for a few pieces of silver. The time has come for this 40 lakhs of mankind to claim their heritage, and no amount of Dogra bullets and bayonets can keep them away from it. The people have no intention now of allowing themselves to become pawns in another game of power politics. The population of Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, the people have a cultural and linguistic affinity with the neighbouring Provinces of Pakistan, the country is geographically contiguous and economically linked up with the Punjab; its accession, therefore, to the Indian Dominion would be an unnatural and forced alliance. The statement of Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, a Hindu leader of Kashmir, points out the wisdom of its accession to Pakistan. We hope he would be supported in this by the minority community in Kashmir, who must realise that their best interests lie with the rest of the Kashmiri people and not in the maintenance of a feudal autocracy which is trying by underhand means to obtain a new lease of life. If the Congress is honest in its profession of sympathy for the States' peoples, and if Mr Gandhi meant what he said when he spoke of geographical contiguity being the determining factor for the accession of a State to either Dominion, then Patel's States Department should desist from carrying on secret negotiations with the Maharaja or his hirelings. But whatever happens in the high-level talks, the people of Kashmir are determined not to have their future freedom bartered away. The land is theirs. It must be governed by their consent

Gul Hayat Reason or Force

The high-level conference of Dominion Governors-General and Prime Ministers to discuss the Kashmir situation, which was to be held in Lahore on Saturday, was called off at the last minute. At the invitation of the Quaid-i-Azam and the Pakistan Premier, the conference had been originally scheduled for Thursday but was abandoned on account of Pandit Nehru's indisposition. It was then fixed for Saturday,

to be held along with the meeting of the Joint Defence Council. The latter has been held but the Kashmir talks, for some unknown reasons, have not. We hope this is not from a lack of desire on the part of either party to settle all outstanding disputes by the force of reason rather than the opposite. The leaders owe it to themselves as professed democrats, and to the people of the States, to get together and arrive at a solution acceptable to all parties concerned. If they do not do so the responsibility for prolonging strife, and helping the spread of further strife, as well as for creating illwill and distrust between the two Dominions, will rest squarely on the shoulders of those who stand away from attempting to achieve an amicable settlement. When the Junagadh question was raised, the Indian Government sponsored the idea of a plebiscite and invited the Pakistan Government for discussions. The latter accepted the invitation but no meeting ever took place. Kashmir is providing a repetition of history. The people of both Dominions have a right to know what prevents these meetings from materialising when both sides are ostensibly willing to hold joint discussions. We still hope that this oft-announced meeting will take place and the issue discussed and finally settled. The problem of Kashmir is a part of the general problem of the Indian States arising out of the 3 June Plan; hence principles must be evolved which not only solve the tangle in the North-West but also settle the problems of Junagadh and Hyderabad. The solution itself is obvious enough and has been put forward lucidly in a Press Note of the Indian Government issued on 5 October. It said that 'a dispute involving the fate of any territory should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite by the people concerned. This is a method at once democratic, peaceful and just. Such a referendum or plebiscite should be held under impartial auspices to be determined by the parties concerned. With this we are in full agreement and sincerely hope, in the interest of the people of this sub-continent, that the Indian Government do not mean to deviate from the letter and spirit

of this enunciation. Their latest communique, however, has laid great stress on the strategic importance of Kashmir as being vital to the security of India; which State, the communique says, has a common boundary in the north with the southern frontier of Kashmir. It has also stressed that the presence in Kashmir of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab imposed a duty on the Indian Government which influenced them in their decision to accept Kashmir's accession. The Indian Government cannot be so ignorant of geography as not to realise that the common frontier between Kashmir and Pakistan is definitely many times longer than that between Kashmir and India, and whatever strategic importance Kashmir might have for the Indian Dominion, as far as Pakistan is concerned the defence of Kashmir and this country is one and indivisible. Their reference to the presence of Hindus and Sikhs may be said to have some importance, but surely many times more important is the presence of the forty lakh Muslims in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, whose life under Hari Singh's rule has been one prolonged torture. And can the Indian Government say what business these large numbers of non-Kashmiri Hindus and Sikhs had to be in Kashmir? The argument of saving non-Muslims has also been used to justify the despatch of Indian troops to Mangrol and Babariawad, two States whose accession was in dispute in connection with the Junagadh issue. The argument of certain territories being strategically important and that of safeguarding the lives of its citizens abroad savours too much of what the Fascist dictators used to say to fit in with a desire for 'methods' which are 'at once democratic, peaceful and just'. All this goes to confirm the prevalent opinion in Pakistan that Delhi's acceptance of Kashmir's accession was far from being as spontaneous and innocent as the Indian Government would have the world believe. The onus of disproving these allegations is on the Indian Government; and it can do so by adhering strictly to the democratic principles it has so often proclaimed.

19 November 1947 Kashmir

We wholeheartedly approve the declaration by the Pakistan Premier that his firm and undeviating objective, as well as that of his Government, is 'to eliminate by peaceful and honourable means all existing causes of friction between the two Dominions and to establish conditions which would enable ourselves and our Indian neighbours to live in friendliness and amity'. This clear and unequivocal statement of Pakistan's policy vis-a-vis India will, we trust, discourage the stupid and senseless warmongering on both sides of the border. The declaration is accompanied by an invitation to India to settle by joint agreement the question of the accession of certain States, particularly that of Kashmir, which today is the most important issue between the two Dominions. Pakistan, in the last few days, has put forward two concrete proposals. The first was to seek a solution of the Kashmir question at an inter-Dominion level, and suggested an immediate 'cease-fire' between the Indian troops and the Azad Kashmir Forces: the evacuation of all outside forces from the State, the ejection of the tribesmen to be the joint task of both Dominion Armies should they ignore their joint appeal for withdrawal; and finally, after the establishment of peace and the restoration of law and order, a plebiscite to be held under the joint auspices of the two Dominion Governments. The second proposal, since the first has been rejected, is for the United Nations Organisation to arrange to stop the present war and hold a plebiscite under impartial administration. Pakistan is prepared to accept a similar procedure for Junagadh and Manavadar. Both proposals should have commended themselves to the Indian Government, for they satisfy the basic principle, enunciated not long ago by the Indian Government itself, that in the case of a dispute arising over the accession of the States, the decision should be taken only after a plebiscite, which 'should be held under impartial auspices to be determined by the

parties concerned'. We do not know, nor is it easy to imagine, why Pakistan's efforts towards arriving at an agreed solution of the State's tangle have received so little response from Delhi. If the Indian Government has objections to the details of either scheme, the best way to resolve such differences is at a joint inter-Dominion conference, which has been proposed twice by Pakistan. We sincerely hope the Indian Government does not stand to prove that superior physical force is the last word in deciding the future of a country or a people. They must realise that a decision to 'fight it out' in Kashmir will mean a protracted struggle, bringing endless suffering to the Kashmiri people, whose interests the Indian Government professes to have so much at heart and whose consent to the intervention of the Indian Army they always presume. The only way to prove the will of Kashmir's people lies through a free and unfettered choice being given them to decide the future of their country. And to be 'free and unfettered' this must be done today, and not after the Maharaja has been reinstated by Indian bayonets and the people of Kashmir either driven out of their homes or reduced by repression to a state of apathy and helplessness.

4 December 1947 The Kashmir Scene

Hari Singh of Kashmir, speaking over the newly-installed Jammu Radio, was in a mood of thanksgiving. He expressed his indebtedness to the Indian Government through whose kindness, he said, he could talk to the public since direct means of communication denied were him bν circumstances-the circumstances, he did not mention, of a people in revolt against the century-old tyranny of the Dogra House. He wished, therefore, to express his thanks, and that of his Government and the people (sic), for the help rendered in this great hour of need. Hari Singh's whining and grovelling, his obsequious expression of undying gratitude to the Indian leaders, shows what exactly the Indian intervention

has meant in Kashmir. Hari Singh went on with meaningless platitudes about a 'responsible Government in a short time'. and told the people that for their own good they must give full loyalty to the throne. The most revealing part of his speech, however, was a reference to Mr Mahajan as his Prime Minister. Sheikh Abdullah and the Indian Press would have the world believe that this seat of authority was now occupied by the 'Lion of Kashmir', and that Mahajan had been relegated to the position of a mere Diwan. Hari Singh states most definitely that Mahajan, whose advice has been 'most valuable', is the Prime Minister and as such will set up the new interim Government. Abdullah is referred to with royal pleasure as a 'leader of courage', and is asked to collaborate with Mr Mahajan and work for peace. Who really is the Prime Minister of Kashmir, and which of the two claimants is an impostor? Even if Abdullah is now given the name and office of Prime Minister, it is quite clear who will wield real power as long as Hari Singh continues to sit on his bloodstained throne. The handful of Kashmiri people who possess radio sets will have heard Hari Singh's utterances with great interest and understood their full implications. The thanksgiving and vague talk of responsible Government were dictated by the fact that, not many miles from Jammu, the Azad forces were fighting grimly against heavy odds to end his regime of tyranny. Hari Singh has realised, even if some of India's leaders choose not to, that the fighting now going on in Kashmir is not really over the question of accession either to Hindustan or to Pakistan. The fighting is to decide whether Hari Singh will continue to misrule the beautiful land of Kashmir or not. The question of accession is one which can finally be decided only by the people themselves. The two Dominion Governments have said so, the Provisional Azad Government has made this its basic demand, and now even Sheikh Abdullah. after much talk of a referendum being totally unnecessary, realises that it is inevitable. If the Liaquat-Nehru talks are being resumed on the clear understanding that the people will have the authority to decide their country's future, then an agreed solution is possible. We hope the Indian Government will not allow its attitude to be influenced by legal factors or by the economic and strategic importance of Kashmir. The only honest and just solution of the Kashmir problem, the only solution which can be guaranteed to last, must rest on the freely-expressed will of the people. In the interest of the forty lakh Kashmiri people, we sincerely hope that such a solution will be found.

30 January 1948 Clarification

After two weeks of speeches, discussions and conferences, the time has come for the UNO to take a decision on the Kashmir question. The three draft resolutions now before the Security Council make the issues perfectly clear. The resolution introduced by the President does not seek to describe the exact terms in which the settlement is to be carried out, but merely registers the fact that both Pakistan and Hindustan have agreed on three basic principles, namely, that the future of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided by a plebiscite, that the plebiscite should be impartial, and that it should be held under the aegis of the United Nations. The Security Council has now to decide what is meant by 'impartial' and the term 'under UNO aegis'; on this will depend the success of the UNO's efforts for peace. The suggestions put forward by India and Pakistan are more comprehensive, and describe in detail what they respectively understand by these terms. India's proposals are that hostilities should be ended, and after that has happened, all Kashmiris should be invited to return and all political prisoners released. The Indian Army is to remain in Kashmir to maintain law and order: after order has been restored, the Maharaja will transform the present administration into a 'Council of Ministers' with Sheikh Abdullah as Premier. Further, when conditions are normal this Government will convoke a National Assembly and will elect the new

Government under which the plebiscite is to be held. The UN Kashmir Commission will proceed to Kashmir in an advisory and supervisory capacity.

To say the least. India has very original ideas on impartiality. It desires Pakistan to use its influence to prevent help reaching the Azad Kashmir Forces, and after the Indian Army has restored order, that is after the peoples' revolt has been completely smashed, the Maharaja will perform a transformation ceremony and instal Sheikh Abdullah as the Head of the Government. The Maharaja, the Sheikh and the Indian authorities will then issue an invitation to all Kashmiris to return to their country and then, as soon as conditions are normal, this Government with the Maharaja and Abdullah will call a 'National Assembly'. The whole procedure is simply preposterous. The Maharaja remains in power, helped by Sheikh Abdullah; the State Forces will continue to terrorise the people with the Indian Army in the name of restoring order. Order having been restored, the conditions must get to 'normal'—and by normalcy we presume that the Indian Delegation means the conditions which prevailed before the Poonch rebellion, because for a hundred years a state of ruthless repression and police terror has been the only normal situation in this part of the world. While the Maharaja and Abdullah are carrying out this wonderful democratic procedure, the UN Commission will be sitting in Srinagar advising and supervising. If these are India's final proposals, the whole business is a farce, a complete travesty of democracy and justice. Pakistan's draft resolutions, on the other hand, suggest a straightforward and simple solution. The UN Commission is asked to arrange for an impartial interim administration in the State, foreign elements including the Indian Army and tribesmen are to withdraw from Kashmir, the return of all Kashmir citizens is to be guaranteed, and then a plebiscite is to be held to ascertain the will of the people. It is obvious that Pakistan's proposals are the only basis on which a just and peaceful solution can be arrived at. India's refusal to accept them can only be

understood as an attempt to hold the territory by force against the will of the people. The UNO has before it only one choice if its decision is to be made on democratic principles, uninfluenced by power politics and group alliances.

24 August 1948 Raid on Murree

The explanation offered by the Indian Defence Ministry regarding the recent bombing of Murree by Indian planes is as weak as the flying ability of their pilots or their knowledge of geography. They say that an Indian aircraft, allegedly assigned the task of bombing Azad Kashmir transport in the Domel-Uri and Bagh area, was deflected off its course by a change in the weather and increased clouds; it mistook its position and dropped two bombs on motor vehicle lights ten miles across the border, within Pakistan territory. The Indian Government have tried to score a point by implying that convoys, with full head-lights on, are sent across from Pakistan to Kashmir; hence they feel that the error of a mere ten miles can be regarded as slight, so slight that India's admission of having violated Pakistan territory is not accompanied by even a formal expression of regret. In the first place, not one but two planes took part in the Murree raid, which disproves the Indian version of the incident as being a mistake. Further, as Sardar Baldev Singh's Defence Ministry should be able to verify from better-informed sources, Murree is not ten miles but over forty miles from the border; and elementary common sense would help them to realise the obvious fact that the lights of Murree could not possibly be mistaken for motor-vehicle lights by any person with two eyes, leave alone a pilot with sufficient training to be entrusted with a bomber-aircraft at night. The Indian explanation explains nothing, and makes no amends for a blatant act of unprovoked aggression. We hope the Pakistan Government, apart from taking up the matter with the Indian Government and the UN Commission for India and Pakistan.

will take precautionary steps to prevent the recurrence of any such 'mistakes' by the Indian Air Force in the future.

2 November 1950 Pandit Nehru's Heart

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's latest declaration on the future of Kashmir merits the most careful attention, for it amounts to a virtual repudiation of all the past pledges made by the Indian Government for a just and amicable settlement of this Indo-Pakistan dispute. Speaking in Srinagar, to a session of Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference the Indian Premier is reported to have expressed his approval of the plan to hold elections in the Indian-held part of Kashmir to form a Constituent Assembly, which would be asked to ratify the accession of the State to India. This plan is obviously a brainwave of the gentlemen who now hold a vested interest in Kashmir's continued subordination to India, and who are afraid that a free verdict of the people would upset their apple-cart. Pandit Nehru does not seem to realise that the decisions taken by a Constituent Assembly of the sort visualised by the Hari Singh-Abdullah regime would not have any moral or legal sanction whatsoever. In fact, such a farce of an election, organised by the present Srinagar Government and supervised by the Indian Army, could be confused with the exercise of their right to self-determination by the Kashmir people only by congenital nitwits or cynical politicians in desperate need of a new argument, however weak, to vindicate their refusal to accept a democratic solution of the problem.

Pandit Nehru also reiterated, at length, his great perplexity at the UN's delay over Kashmir: but he did not bother to inform his 'fellow-Kashmiris' that he and his Government were not prepared to allow them to cast their votes except under the forced protection of Indian bayonets, and that the present wretched condition of the country was mainly due to this intransigence. Pandit Nehru provided further confirmation of the fact that, with regard to Kashmir, his emotions overpower his logic when he declared that Kashmir was 'a part of his heart'. It is the Pakistan Government's duty to draw the UN's urgent attention to India's intention of treating the Kashmir affair as a *fait accompli*, and to call upon the Security Council for prompt and effective action against Indian obstruction. Since Pandit Nehru persists in 'thinking' with his heart rather than with his mind, the chances of a private settlement between Pakistan and India can be ruled out completely; while a policy of drift is not only unworthy of the UN, but is also a grave danger to the peace of this subcontinent.

15 February 1951 Kashmir

With the Kashmir question once again on the Security Council's agenda, Indian leaders are faced with the far from easy task of finding cogent arguments to justify their Government's policy of holding Kashmir by force of arms. In his recent statement before the Indian Parliament, Pandit Nehru had a great deal to say about Kashmir's beauty, his own notions of reaction and progress, and his subjective interpretation of Kashmir's history. But with regard to the main question of allowing an impartial plebiscite to decide the State's future, the Indian Premier had nothing new to say. While reiterating that the Indian Government was pledged, before the people of Kashmir and the UN, to allow Kashmir the right of self-determination. Pandit Nehru expressed his firm resolve to maintain the Indian Army in the State during the plebiscite. The Indian leader simply refuses to see the truth of the obvious principle that there can be no free plebiscite without the withdrawal of all partisan forces from outside. The Indian Premier's distorted logic may be accepted within his country, particularly when it is larded with diatribes against Pakistan, but no independent observer can be convinced by such displays of poor reasoning and obstinacy.

Further proof of Indian intransigence is provided by the Minister for States, who said in reply to a parliamentary question that 'nothing could prevent the proposed Constituent Assembly of Kashmir from pronouncing itself on the question of accession or non-accession to India'. Mr Ayyangar further stated that this so-called Constituent Assembly would 'frame a Constitution for the whole of Kashmir', and that representatives from Azad Kashmir would be welcomed.

India clearly intends to thwart a fair settlement of the Kashmir dispute and, judging from past experience, the chances of positive UN action are fairly dim. In these circumstances, the Pakistan Government must review its whole Kashmir policy in order to ensure that deliberate UN inaction does not perpetuate the present artificial division of Kashmir, with the bulk of her population and territory dominated by India under no better sanction than that of military strength. Hitherto, the Anglo-American powers have used the Kashmir problem to keep both India and Pakistan on their leash, and have made no serious effort to use the UN machinery to secure a proper settlement. If they cannot be dissuaded from playing with the lives of 40 lakh human beings in an effort to further their own interests, the Pakistan Government must expose their machinations before the world and give up further negotiations under American or British auspices. Further comment on the situation must be withheld until the results of the Security Council's renewed discussion of the problem are known, but it can be said that, if the UN offers no hope of an amicable and just solution, the Pakistan Government has little right to ask the people of Kashmir to refrain from exercising their inherent right to struggle for the freedom of their homeland. The prolonged and fruitless conferences on the future of their country have sorely tried the patience of the Kashmiri people on both sides of the cease-fire line. Apart from the frustration and uncertainty that the present situation has fostered. Kashmir's common people who are cut off from Kashmir's natural supply routes, have suffered grave economic hardships. They have waited

in the hope that the promised plebiscite would soon solve their difficulties. If the Pakistan Government cannot guarantee such a desirable solution within a certain period, it should make its helplessness in this regard known to them, so that the people of Kashmir may be able to decide for themselves whatever course of action they consider best to secure their country's liberation.

15 March 1951 Nehru on Kashmir

Following India's rejection of the Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has made another futile effort to justify his Government's policy of obstructing every attempt to achieve an amicable settlement of this long-standing Indo-Pakistan dispute. The latest proposals before the Security Council certainly do not present an ideal scheme for securing the Kashmiri people's verdict on their country's future, and opinion in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir has reacted strongly to certain provisions that can be made to serve as an escape-clause for avoiding a State-wide plebiscite. India's objections, however, do not pertain to the Anglo-US plan's undemocratic or dubious features. That country's opposition is obviously aimed at preserving the status quo, namely, the Hari Singh-Abdullah regime. That is why every conceivable proposal which seeks to dissipate the shadow of Indian bayonets and eliminate-or even restrict-the pressure of the undemocratic, Indian-sponsored Srinagar government is summarily rejected by New Delhi's bosses. And every such refusal to accept a peaceful way out of the existing deadlock is invariably accompanied by a welter of sentimental piffle, intended to confuse the issue and deflect world opinion from the main question. The Indian Prime Minister's recent effusions on Kashmir, at a Delhi press conference, constitute just such a performance. The fact that Pandit Nehru's arguments were not coherent and that his pique not only overcame logic, but allowed him to make ill-mannered and reckless remarks, can safely be attributed to the perceptible shift

in world opinion from neutrality towards support of Pakistan's demand for the unfettered exercise of their right to self-determination by the people of Kashmir.

The Indian Prime Minister devoted a great deal of attention to past happenings and presented his own interpretation of events in India. Pakistan and Kashmir. He had nothing new to say, and his distortion of history has repeatedly been exposed in the Press, not only in Pakistan, but also in India itself...

The Indian Premier declared that it was the business of Indian troops to occupy the whole of Kashmir if there was any danger to the Indian-held Kashmir'. The use of the term 'Indian-held' is an apt description of the position on that side of the cease-fire line, and we hope the significance of this inadvertent confession will not be missed in the proper quarters. One can only hope that Pandit Nehru does not take his own heroics seriously, for it can only lead him and his country to disaster. There cannot be the slightest doubt that any threat of aggression against Pakistan will be resisted unitedly by all Pakistanis, and that every citizen of Pakistan will rally round the Government to maintain Pakistan's integrity and independence. Nor can India deceive international opinion by cloaking her threats of aggression in a 'defensive' garb—a stratagem made familiar by such war alliances as the Atlantic Pact. We ask the Pakistan Government to take due notice of the Indian Prime Minister's declaration, and to raise the matter before the Security Council, which must also be urged to give a mandatory decision on the Kashmir question, and compel India to abide by the agreed decision to settle the State's future through a free plebiscite.

28 April 1952 Srinagar Trends

If Sheikh Abdullah's recent speeches are not merely part of a political manoeuvre to strengthen his position against his

opponents in Kashmir and India and to convince the Kashmiri people that their interests are safe in his hands, the seemingly changed attitude of the National Conference leader should help to dispel some of the confusion created by his blind obedience to Indian dictates since the day he was rushed from his crude bedstead in a prison cell to the Prime Ministerial chair. Sheikh Abdullah cannot be unaware of the fact that when high office comes as a gift from outside, made possible only by foreign invasion and the continued presence of a huge army of occupation, the beneficiary's bondage for being willingly accepted—is more rigorous than that of a prisoner whose body is in chains but whose spirit is free. If, as some of his statements indicate, he is now prepared to discard the blinkers presented to him by India and make an honest endeavour to carefully analyse the post-Partition events that have led up to the present unhappy situation in Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah cannot fail to see that the Indian Government's stand on Kashmir has been completely undemocratic and guided solely by the ill-concealed intention to annex the beautiful and rich valley—irrespective of the real wishes of its inhabitants. Although the Indian Government would probably have pursued their predatory policy of annexation even without Sheikh Abdullah's support. he has facilitated their task by aiding and abetting their plans, and has allowed them to cloak their aggression in democratic verbiage.

In recent weeks, the comments of Indian leaders and the Congress Press on Sheikh Abdullah's speeches have torn down what little was left of the facade of India's professed altruism in regard to Kashmir. Whatever the motives which originally prompted the leaders of the National Conference to abandon the struggle for Kashmir's freedom and become partners in the conspiracy hatched by the Maharaja and Sardar Patel, it is apparent that India looks upon them as paid agents of New Delhi, and is not prepared to tolerate anything more than a formal show of autonomy. The demand for the separation of Jammu and Ladakh, supported by powerful elements in India, shows that secularism in that countrylike a number of its other principles—is a one-sided weapon. It is also fairly obvious that Kashmir has so far been shown 'special consideration' because of the dispute about its accession, and that if the State ever becomes fully integrated with India, every possible effort would be made to subject the Kashmiri people to the far from benevolent Congress dictatorship. Further, it is neither wise nor statesmanlike on the part of Sheikh Abdullah and his party to depend entirely on Pandit Nehru to save them from the consequences of an unnatural alliance with India. Apart from the fact that the Indian Premier has always in the last analysis submitted to the pressure of the Congress Right-wing, pacifying his conscience by trying to rationalise their reactionary policies, surely the future of four million people cannot be linked to the fate of one person, however, important he may be today and however certain some may feel of his subjective desire to do the right thing.

The leaders of the National Conference, placed as they are, can make a vital contribution to the achievement of a just solution of the Kashmir dispute—whose worst victims naturally are the Kashmiri people. But to do so, Sheikh Abdullah and his friends must be able to adopt a realistic approach to the Kashmir problem. Hitherto they have unthinkingly echoed every demand put forward by India's rulers, and have made themselves a party to the cold war waged by India against Pakistan. Now that their attitude towards India has become tinged with realism, they should go a step further and open their eves to the fact that, however keenly the Government and people of Pakistan desire that Kashmir should join their country, Pakistan has always supported the view that the question can only be decided by the people of Kashmir, and that they should be allowed to do so through an impartial plebiscite. Pakistan's stand should logically be supported even by those Kashmiris who favour Kashmir's accession to India, for ordinary self-respect demands that the people of the State should be treated not as

chattels, but as human beings capable of deciding their own future. Clearly, those Kashmiris who endorse India's undemocratic demand for a plebiscite held under the shadow of Indian bayonets lay themselves open to the charges of lacking confidence in their own cause and of being stooges of Indian interests. If the National Conference can reorientate its policy on this and allied questions, it could certainly help to hasten the dawn of Kashmir's freedom; and its leaders should realise that the alternative promises only prolonged subjection, conflict and chaos.

27 October 1953 Srinagar Antics

Having usurped power in a despicable intrigue with Hari Singh's son, and having suppressed the people's revolt with the help of Indian bayonets, the Bakhshi clique have sought to consolidate their position by eliminating all dissenting elements from the National Conference leadership. Matching the ruthlessness and disregard of democratic propriety employed in the earlier *coup*. Srinagar's rulers have adopted the expedient of gaoling without trial or summarily expelling from the party everyone who refused to accept the new regime. With a majority of their former colleagues on the Executive Committee of the National Conference having been arrested or 'purged', Messrs Bakhshi and Sadiq are now trying desperately to assuage the people's anger and hostility by holding a series of party Conventions where these gentlemen parade themselves as true well-wishers of the Kashmiri people, promising to redress every possible public grievance in return for popular support. Reform of the 'land reforms', free schools, cheap food, rehabilitation of trade, and elimination of corruption and maladministration, are some of the items on the Srinagar Government's campaign of extravagant pledges. The latest of such conventions was held at Anantnag, where Mr Bakhshi's supporters, apart from their usual propaganda, have come out in support of a 'democratic. just, and peaceful solution of the Kashmir question'. But, while supporting the Nehru-Ali agreement, the resolution adopted by the Convention went on to say that the two main impediments to its implementation were the activities of 'certain interested foreign imperialist powers' and some 'influential ruling circles in Pakistan'. This is an amazing distortion of history even for such expert defiers of truth as are found in the National Conference rump. Whatever might be said of Pakistan's ruling circles, and we often find it necessary to criticise their policies and utterances, the Pakistan Government certainly cannot be accused of delaying or obstructing a plebiscite in Kashmir. It is, equally, a wellestablished fact that from the very start India's attitude has been, to say the very least, extremely unhelpful. As for the intrigues of foreign imperialists, whatever their nature or extent, they cannot be used as an excuse for denving the Kashmiri people their democratic rights, or for foisting on them a puppet dictatorship.

We see that, not only are the Bakhshi clique indulging in a falsification of irrefutable facts, but their support for a democratic solution of the Kashmir question is as valueless as their other antics, whose purpose is to pacify a hostile people. For. on the same day that the Anantnag Convention spoke in favour of democracy, Mr Sadig declared in a rabidly anti-Pakistani speech at Gwalior that 'Kashmir will live with India and die with India'. Those who have gained power through the Sadar-i-Riyasat's fiat, and are maintaining it with a regime of terror. can hardly be expected to favour any steps towards democracy in Kashmir. In sharp contrast with the ravings of Messrs Bakhshi and Sadiq, the voice of occupied Kashmir found a true echo in the resolution adopted by the Working Committee of the Kashmir Democratic Union. meeting at Delhi under the Presidentship of Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, which condemned the recent killing of Kashmiri patriots and called for an early plebiscite-a demand that no honest person, whatever his views about Kashmir's future, can refuse to regard as the only solution to the problem.

3 March 1954 The Blind Spot

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's latest speech on the subject of Indo-Pakistan relations marks another stage in the reversal of the recent happy trend, which had held out reasonable hopes of a just settlement of the Kashmir dispute followed by the establishment of friendly relations between these two neighbouring States, for whose future progress and prosperity mutual co-operation is very nearly an essential prerequisite. The Indian Prime Minister has spoken at considerable length, dealing with a number of important issues; his speech, therefore, deserves full attention and careful analysis. For a proper appraisal of Pandit Nehru's statements it is necessary to remember that the burdens of office have developed in him a strain of schizophrenia, and that his high idealism as a historian or political theoretician does not always mould the polices he formulates or the decisions he makes in what he considers to be the interests of his country or of his party. Nor do the symptoms of this malady find expression only in the case of Indo-Pakistan issues. To give a recent example, Pandit Nehru justified the politico-religious directives of the Catholic Bishops in the Tranvacore-Cochin elections because the Church is supporting the Congress, but in PEPSU, where the Akalis are opposing the ruling party, he waxed eloquent about the importance of keeping religion out of politics. Similarly, the Congress leadership often co-operates with the rabid leaders of Hindu communalist parties, but even mild Muslim communalists are considered a danger to Indian secularism and are jailed without charge or trial. These and other instances are significant; but it is the Kashmir case which is Pandit Nehru's blind spot. The glaring contrast between what the Nehru Government have said and done in the case of Junagadh, and their stand in regard to Kashmir, provides the classic example of their adherence to the principle of 'heads I win, tails you lose'. As far as India's internal problems are concerned, it is primarily for the people of that country to decide how they should deal with the contradictions of Congress policies, but, for obvious reasons, when Pandit Nehru tries to apply the same principle to Indo-Pakistan disputes, the attempt must be resisted and exposed.

The Indian Prime Minister has demanded that the American members of the UN team of observers in Kashmir should be withdrawn because, in view of US military aid to Pakistan, 'they can no longer be treated as neutrals'. Pandit Nehru's new-found realisation that America is not neutral is interesting. As far as we are concerned, we have never considered America to be neutral in any international dispute: and in the Kashmir case, she has consistently aided and abetted India's policy of avoiding implementation of the plebiscite agreement. The Indian *demarche* on the question of American observers has no real significance; for in the context of present conditions, the nationality of the group of observers does not make the slightest difference to anyoneand India knows this. In fact, if the presence of the Americans among the UN observers had been a genuine point of conflict. and their withdrawal would bind India to allow a free plebiscite to be held, one would without the slightest hesitation advise the Pakistan Government and the United Nations to raise no objections to the Indian demand. But, as the rest of Pandit Nehru's speech proves beyond doubt, the new problem has been created purely for the sake of creating a new problem and finding yet another excuse to avoid the feared plebiscite. Apart from this latest_stunt, which is seemingly intended to queer the pitch for further Indo-Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir. and to pressure Washington and the United Nations. Pandit Nehru has virtually backed out of the commitments made by him last summer at the Delhi Conference. He says that 'the question of the quantum of forces in Kashmir has assumed a new character, and that the whole issue must be reconsidered when on the other side of the cease-fire line large additional forces are being thrust in and put at the disposal of Pakistan'. The first claim is devoid of all logic and the latter assertion is a complete misstatement. The question of the quantum of forces to be kept in Kashmir during the plebiscite depends solely on conditions inside the State, and the requirements of maintaining law and order and of ensuring that neither side interferes with the people's freedom to vote as they choose. It has absolutely nothing to do with the strength, numerical or otherwise, of the Pakistan or Indian armies outside Kashmir. If Pandit Nehru's strange line of thought were accepted, Pakistan could claim the right to determine for India the number of divisions and the type of equipment her army should have, and vice versa; it needs no argument to prove that this position is completely ridiculous. It is equally wrong to allege that 'large additional forces are being (or will be) thrust in' on this side of the cease-fire line. Pakistan has scrupulously observed the various Indo-Pakistan agreements in regard to Kashmir and she intends to do so in the future; this fact is proved by Pakistan's stand during all past negotiations, and the unequivocal declarations of various Government spokesmen that Pakistan's only demand regarding Kashmir is that the people should exercise without any duress their right to self-determination.

Pandit Nehru, however, remains unsatisfied, and professes a serious fear of sudden aggression from Pakistan. Neither Pakistan's assurances, nor the strength of India's large army, seems acceptable to him as a sufficient guarantee against attack. The Indian Prime Minister says that without a joint no-war declaration, fear and suspicion can never be allayed. In the first place, as Pandit Nehru should know, mere declarations are of little value in today's world; without going far, one can take the example of India's oft-repeated declaration that the Kashmir people will decide their own future. Secondly, a no-war declaration by India and Pakistan is meaningless when the cease-fire in Kashmir has not even led to a proper truce and, technically, the war in Kashmir has not ended. Surely, first things must come first; the proper thing to do is to close the unhappy chapter of the conflict in Kashmir by accepting a democratic solution of the problem, and then propose a no-war declaration or pact of peace. In the existing circumstances, no one can accept the Indian proposal as a genuine step towards friendship; it can only be read as an effort to 'freeze' the present unjust division of Kashmir. Pandit Nehru's objections to foreign intervention, his dissatisfaction with the working of the UN. his opposition to domination of Asia by the West, are all worthy sentiments—which have even greater bearing on the situation in countries like Korea and Indo-China, Malaya and Kenya, Tunisia and Morocco. But India has in the recent past often connived at, and even co-operated with, the West's aggressive policies in relation to some of these countries. That Pandit Nehru's anti-imperialism is being refurbished to serve as an additional argument to retain control of Kashmir is certainly no service to the causes he professes to hold dear. While our views on American military aid are well known—and we cannot allow ourselves to approve something that we consider harmful to Pakistan's interests merely because India is trying to take advantage of the development for unworthy purposes—it is perfectly obvious that Pandit Nehru's latest policy statement is a deliberate attempt to wreck the negotiations on Kashmir, and that this is certain to harm Indo-Pakistan relations and provide greater opportunities for the spread of imperialist influence in this part of the world. And, lastly, if the Indian Prime Minister is determined to break off direct Indo-Pakistan negotiations and intends to take some point of dispute to the international forum. Pakistan will, inevitably, have to consider the advisability of reopening the whole Kashmir question before the United IISHUUU Nations.

25 August 1955 India and Kashmir

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's latest reference to Kashmir provides further evidence of the Indian Government's desire to wriggle out of their commitments with regard to the future of the disputed State and to persuade the world to treat India's conquest of a large part of Kashmir as a fait accompli. Giving his version of the history of the dispute, the Indian Prime Minister stated that his Government's pledge to allow the Kashmiri people to decide their own future was merely a unilateral declaration and that it contained no mention of a plebiscite. Pandit Nehru is good enough to admit that India did accept the UNCIP resolution, which called for a plebiscite to determine Kashmir's future, but he goes on to say that the conditions governing the plebiscite, as defined in the UN resolution, had not so far been fulfilled, and that in the meanwhile certain other developments had taken place which have to be duly considered. Pandit Nehru did not go any further, but the implications of his statement are quite clear, namely that Pakistan has nothing to do with the question of Kashmir's accession, which is a matter between India and the Kashmiri people, and that certain developments have made it virtually impossible for India to honour its pledge to hold a plebiscite in the State. That this interpretation of Pandit Nehru's statement is by no means unfair is proved by the utterances of other spokesmen of the Indian Government. In this connection one might recall the speech made by Pandit Pant not long ago, the repeated ravings of the puppet Premier of occupied Kashmir (who loses no opportunity of trying to browbeat the Kashmiri people by assuring them that their fate is finally sealed), and the more recent statement of Mr Krishna Menon, Pandit Nehru's chief adviser on foreign affairs, declaring that he was unaware of the existence of the Kashmir problem and that, as far as he knew, Kashmir was a part of India.

The facts of the case, however, fully expose the weakness of the Indian Government's present position. As long ago as 2 November 1947, Pandit Nehru made the unequivocal declaration that Delhi's acceptance of Hari Singh's request for Kashmir's accession to India was conditional. He said: 'We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it. We are prepared, when peace and

law and order have been established, to have a referendum under international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people and we shall accept their verdict'. This policy statement of the Indian Prime Minister was subsequently endorsed by his Deputy, Sardar Patel, who stated with equal emphasis that 'it would be for the people of Kashmir to decide their own fate'. Further, when it was decided to take the dispute to the UN. Indian spokesmen declared that India desired to hold a referendum under impartial auspices and that, although Pakistan had been informed of this intention, it apparently did not accept such a solution but sought a decision by the force of arms. The subsequent discussions in the United Nations, and the negotiations under the UN Commission. were clearly held on the basis of India's willingness to accept Kashmir's right to self-determination. This was the main ground which made the cease-fire acceptable to the Kashmiri people. India's pledge was further confirmed by the UNCIP resolution, which. Mr Nehru proudly points out, India accepted before Pakistan did. But once peace had been restored and a measure of stability acquired by the Srinagar Government, sponsored by India and installed with the help of Indian bayonets, Pandit Nehru and his Government began to back out of their solemn pledges. Every attempt—either directly by the Pakistan Government or under UN auspices to resolve the deadlock has been wrecked by Indian intransigence. Today, ignoring the clear declaration by the Indian representative at the UN that the Srinagar 'Constituent Assembly' had no right to decide the accession issue, the Government of India are trying assiduously to foster the impression that the Kashmir problem is no longer a live issue. In the matter of negotiations, their latest piece of chicanery has been to bring up a wholly extraneous issue in an effort to evade the implementation of the agreement to hold a plebiscite. While the real point at issue is the quantum of forces that are to remain inside Kashmir territory during the plebiscite, or the administrative arrangements for the poll, Pandit Nehru irrelevantly talks of the equipment which the Pakistan Army is supposed to receive from America or of Pakistan's internal political situation—matters which have nothing to do with Kashmir and are none of his business.

Pakistan's stand on the Kashmir issue has been based on clear-cut democratic principles, and it has consistently demanded that the people of Kashmir should be allowed to give their verdict on the future of their homeland without duress of any sort. This objective has been pursued both at the UN and in direct negotiations with India. During recent months, the direct talks between the two Prime Ministers have on occasions shown some promise of yielding results, but ultimately, whenever the two sides have come to grips with practical questions, India has successfully taken evasive action. Pakistan can be criticised, primarily for failing to give more attention to this question and for allowing India to dillydally for so long. We hope that in the future the Pakistan Government will exhibit greater resoluteness and doggedness in its handling of the Kashmir dispute. The Indian Prime Minister should be invited to a final conference on the issue, and if, after such talks, it is felt that no useful purpose can be served through direct negotiations, the matter should be raised at the UN, with the clear-cut demand that India must be compelled to submit the question of Kashmir's accession to its people. The people of Kashmir and Pakistan have already waited long enough for a solution. There are signs of increasing impatience and restiveness on both sides of the cease-fire line. The movement for freedom in occupied Kashmir has now acquired greater cohesion and strength, and if no settlement is found, the people's discontentment is likely to erupt. In Pakistan, taking a leaf out of India's book, suggestions are being made that a satyagraha movement should be launched with a view to compelling India to abide by its commitments. These developments foreshadow serious complications, not only in occupied Kashmir, but in the whole field of Indo-Pakistan relations. The Indian Government must. therefore, be persuaded to give up their recalcitrance and

agree to implement the agreement with Pakistan for a free and impartial vote by the Kashmiri people on the future of their State.

19 April 1956 Nehru's Basic Facts

Mr Jawaharlal Nehru's latest speech in his carefully-planned propaganda campaign to smother and bury the Kashmir issue shows that his amnesia in regard to the Kashmir case has become a permanent disability. Despite pointed reminders from all parts of the sub-continent, including Kashmir, the list of basic facts presented by the Indian Premier for the edification of the outside world still contains no mention of the Kashmiri people's right to self-determination, or the fact that this right was accepted by both India and Pakistan, that the method of its expression was agreed upon by them under UN auspices, and that responsibility for the continuing deadlock regarding implementation of the agreement rests solely with the Indian Government. Instead of facing reality, Mr Nehru seeks to distort history and misinterpret facts in an effort to justify India's changing—but persistently undemocratic-stand on Kashmir. In fact, except for Pakistan's weather conditions, almost every development in this country is quoted by Mr Nehru as proof of the correctness of his Government's Kashmir policy.

It is said, for example, that the plebiscite plan failed because Pakistan refused to withdraw its troops from Kashmir—forgetting that India had a simultaneous obligation to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State and that its refusal to do so caused the deadlock. To bypass such inconvenient facts. Mr Nehru declares that even if Pakistan agreed to withdraw its troops unilaterally. no plebiscite could now be held because of other factors. Among these new factors he lists Kashmir's prosperity. Pakistan's political instability, the receipt of US military aid by Pakistan, and its membership of Western military alliances. Mr Nehru does not stop to explain how any of these factors can justify denial

of the Kashmiri people's right to decide their future for themselves, nor why his Government had refused to come to terms during the five years that Kashmir was not prosperous. when Ministries had not started changing rapidly in this country, and Pakistan had not accepted US aid. And, surely, a man of Mr Nehru's intelligence cannot fail to realise that his continued refusal to deal fairly with Pakistan has been largely responsible for inviting Western pressure on Pakistan and inducing the Pakistan Government to make the shift to its present pro-Western policy. All the old hackneved arguments have been served up again by Mr Nehru, but, since they have all been answered effectively, some new piece of sophistry had to be devised. The Indian Premier's latest thesis links the Kashmir question to the exodus of non-Muslims from East Bengal; and on the basis of this imaginary link he declares that he is not prepared to discuss the matter with Pakistan's leaders unless they accept division of the State along the ceasefire line. All that Mr Nehru can say in favour of this plan is that he does not want conditions on the sub-continent to become unsettled once again. He knows, of course, that there can be no justification for seeking the partition of Kashmir along the cease-fire line; it has no democratic sanction, and the only law that can be quoted in its support is the law of force. The argument that unsettled conditions must be avoided overlooks the fact that the Kashmir dispute is the greatest single unsettling factor in this part of Asia and no satisfactory relationship between India and Pakistan is possible until it is settled.

While Mr Nehru's policy statements have fully exposed his Government's undemocratic bias, it has become a little more difficult for the Government and people of this country to decide on the course they should follow now that the door has been closed to direct negotiations. The Pakistan Government has already decided to raise the issue again before the UN Security Council. This move, even though unavoidable, hardly warrants over-optimism. There are no good reasons to believe that the majority group in the Council, or any other of

the Big Powers, will advocate a policy guided solely by the desire to ensure that justice is done. Similarly, experience has proved that by raising the Kashmir issue at meetings of the member nations of Western-sponsored military pacts, Pakistan can achieve nothing at all except to demonstrate the apathy of those who are listed in Karachi's books as Pakistan's allies. What then are we to do? Since war must be ruled out as a means of achieving what is undoubtedly a just objective. are we to treat the Kashmir cause as lost? The answer is no--primarily because, whatever Mr Nehru and his friends might say, the people of Kashmir will never learn to accept outside dictation, and because a people determined to be free cannot be denied their right for very long. It is Pakistan's main duty not only to mobilise world opinion through the United Nations and other forums, but also to seek the sympathy of democratic opinion by following correct policies in the domestic and international spheres, and to give every possible support to the cause of Kashmir's liberation. We would also like to hope that the end of the Kashmiri people's travail will be brought nearer by the assertion of rational opinion in India in favour of a democratic settlement of the Kashmir question. Thinking Indians must realise that the unsolved Kashmir dispute harms both India and Pakistan, and that no real progress is possible on the sub-continent unless an agreed solution to the dispute is found and honestly implemented. Shri Vinoba Bhave's recent condemnation of the arms race between India and Pakistan raises the hope that Mahatma Gandhi's most prominent disciple may focus his attention on Indo-Pakistan problems, and bring his great prestige to the assistance of democratic elements who are already trying to persuade Mr Nehru to see the path of reason. Be that as it may, it is quite plain that the end to these conflicts can come only with the realisation that the only just settlement in Kashmir is also the only settlement possible. namely, the exercise by the people of their right to determine their homeland's future, and that the basic facts of Mr Nehru's choice or invention hold the promise only of prolonged Indo-Pakistan conflict and endless complications.

26 January 1957 India in the Dock

After a great deal of unnecessary delay, caused mainly by a studied evasion of the issue by those who wield great influence in UN councils, the Kashmir case has, once again, been taken up by the Security Council-and, once again, India stands in the dock before the tribunal of world opinion. Overriding Mr Krishna Menon's frantic pleas, and frustrating his attempt at delay through filibuster, the Council has passed a resolution by ten votes to nil (with the USSR abstaining), reminding the Governments concerned of the accepted principle that 'the final disposition' of Kashmir 'will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations', and re-affirming its clear stand that the antics of the Srinagar Assembly cannot in any way change this position. As a first step towards securing a just settlement of the dispute, the Security Council's resolution may be viewed with a measure of satisfaction—but only as the first step. If the Council does not—as it has resolved to do—'continue its consideration of the dispute', its present mild and indirect criticism of India's move to absorb Kashmir will serve no useful purpose. The UN must squarely face the fact that India is guilty of deliberately obstructing implementation of a solemn tripartite pact, of violating UN injunctions, and, now, of repudiating the very basis of the agreement which led to the cease-fire in Kashmir, and that it must speedily devise effective means to persuade the Indian Government to honour its pledged word. The Security Council's duty in the matter will not end until India has been made to see and perform its clear duty of giving the Kashmiri people their promised freedom. It should be realised that the UN's failure to achieve a just settlement can only provoke further turmoil in occupied Kashmir, embitter Indo-Pakistan relations, and keep alive tension in this region. making it a sub-arena in the Cold War and a target of foreign intrigues.

India's defence against Pakistan's straightforward charge that, in violation of the international agreements on the subject. India was trying to integrate the disputed State with the territory of India, was a laboured effort to confuse the basic issues. Mr V. K. Krishna Menon argued along the new Indian line, in defiance of both logic and truth, that the accession of Kashmir to India is complete and that there can be no secession. His contention that, from the geographical, ethnic and social points of view, Kashmir forms part of India rather than Pakistan makes nonsense of history and geography; while the assertion that Kashmir's accession to Pakistan would set off bloody religious feuds in the sub-continent is merely an attempt at blackmail. And the argument that there is no crisis in Kashmir, that there is no real dispute, that the Security Council is discussing a mere 'situation', is not only contrary to the facts, but an open invitation to the people of Kashmir to convert the 'situation' into a deeper crisis. to create circumstances that would compel the Security Council to sit up and take notice of India's attempt to suppress the freedom urge of the Kashmiri people. What is more, the fiction of Kashmir's accession gives India a pseudo-legal claim to Azad Kashmir and Gilgit, creating a dangerous situation in which one wrong move may cause an explosion.

All this, however, is an old story, and India gains nothing by its repetition. The important fact is that, irrespective of what happened in 1947 and 1948. India has so far held the view that Kashmir's accession was conditional, and that, as soon as peace was restored, a plebiscite would be held to determine the State's future status. Pandit Nehru has repeatedly declared that India would honour its pledge to allow the Kashmiri people to decide for themselves whether they wanted to accede to Pakistan or India. If what Mr Menon now says is not palpably false, why did Indian representatives assure the Security Council that the Srinagar Assembly could not take any decision in the matter of the State's accession? Why did the Indian Government agree, in August 1953, to devise ways and means of implementing the international agreement for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir? Why did they promise that a Plebiscite Administrator would be appointed by April 1954? All this clearly shows that India, having failed completely, despite its policy of generous aid to the puppet administration in Occupied Kashmir, to win over the Kashmiri people, has decided to abandon both law and morality in an attempt to retain its hold over the State.

The most ridiculous part of Mr Menon's speech in the Security Council is his declaration that the UN resolutions on the subject and India's acceptance of them, and the relevant joint Indo-Pakistan communiques, have no real value because 'they amount to the expression of a wish and not an international obligation'. Mr Menon, however, does not seem to have convinced himself of the validity of this quaint theory; therefore, he goes on to argue that the commitment to allow a plebiscite was made subject to the signing of a truce, and that this truce was not signed because Pakistan's forces were not withdrawn from Kashmir. This is another of Mr Menon's many half-truths. The withdrawal of troops from the Pakistani side was directly linked with the question of the withdrawal of the bulk of India's army from Occupied Kashmir. To this withdrawal India has never agreed.

In any case, Pakistan is perfectly willing today, as it always has been, to sign a truce agreement in accordance with the UN resolution on the subject. If India were also willing to do so, the road to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute would be cleared of all stumbling blocks. But Mr Menon makes another twist and adduces a new argument to avoid a suggestion on these lines. He says that the resolutions which constitute the Indo-Pakistan agreement on Kashmir are not the Security Council's resolutions, implying thereby that, because the resolutions were originally adopted by the UN Commission, they do not have full binding force. This is a preposterous argument, because the Security Council in due course took cognizance of all the Commission's resolutions and urged India and Pakistan to act in accordance with them. It has done so once again. India's rejection of its latest resolution, apart from reducing Mr Menon's argument to a cheap quibble, creates a situation which must be dealt

with firmly—to end the bondage of the Kashmiri people and bring real peace to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

9 October 1957 The Kashmir Case

With the Kashmir case once again before the Security Council. India's leaders have apparently given up all attempts at logical discussion of the issues involved: instead, they are depending almost wholly on abusive and provocative language to save their position. The latest illustration of this new policy is provided by Mr Jawaharlal Nehru. who has accused Pakistan of 'gangsterism' in Kashmir, and declared that Pakistan should 'get out' of Kashmir because the plebiscite question was something that concerned only India and no one else. This ranting and raving seems to be a part of the touch-me-not strategy devised by India during the last year or so in an effort to make the world accept the *status quo* in Kashmir's disputed territory.

Having failed to persuade, browbeat, or bribe the Kashmiri people into surrendering their right to freedom during ten years of military occupation—India faced a grave predicament: she had to choose between respecting her treaty obligations—with the strong likelihood that Kashmir would be lost to India in a free plebiscite—and retracting her promises. India's leaders seem to have chosen the latter course. Now, in order to divert the world's attention from the basic facts of the case, they have started a campaign of slander against Pakistan which not only violates the accepted rules of international conduct, but seeks to raise issues that are completely irrelevant to the Kashmir dispute. For example, Mr Nehru and Pandit Pant have asserted recently that the demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir has no force because Pakistan has not yet been able to hold its first General Election. No one is more conscious of this failing than the people of Pakistan. but how does Pakistan's inability to arrange a General Election justify India's enslavement of

Kashmir. or her attempt to back out of the promise that the people of the State would be allowed to decide their future in an impartial poll? To take another example, since India's cry of danger from Pakistan was met by the proposal for a UN force to be stationed on this side of the cease-fire line, talk of future aggression has subsided; Indian leaders have again started harping on the aggression that was supposed to have taken place in 1947—long before the cease-fire and the various other international agreements which are meant to govern the decision on the future of Kashmir.

Obviously, a great deal of what is being said by Indian leaders on the subject of Kashmir is sheer nonsense; but it is dangerous nonsense. None except the purblind can fail to see that a settlement of the Kashmir dispute cannot be long delayed except at great cost to the peoples of the subcontinent, or imagine that, by following the present policy of dangerous drift, India will be able to make Pakistan and the world forget the dispute. India may not easily realise the futility of her present policy, and the chances of her early return to the path of sanity may appear to be small; but it is plain that this is the only way to end the present deadlock. which can, if neglected, lead to disaster. It is, therefore, essential that world opinion should, through the United Nations, assert itself sufficiently to make India realise that her stand on Kashmir is wrong and immoral, and that it can have the most serious consequences. The next few days will show whether the world powers are prepared to take the decisive action required to settle a dispute which vitally concerns the 400 million people of this sub-continent, or whether India's tactics will again succeed in obtaining a further lease of life for her misrule in Kashmir.

25 November 1957 Soviet Veto

The Soviet Government's decision to veto the Five-Power resolution on Kashmir will neither help to improve the

prospects of peace returning to that disturbed land nor enhance the USSR's reputation for adherence to democratic principles. The Anglo-American move in the Security Council does not represent anything more than a half-hearted attempt to pacify Pakistan—without seriously annoving India—for if Dr Graham were to visit this sub-continent in accordance with the terms of reference laid down in the draft resolution. his mediation would follow the pattern of similar efforts in the past, and end with vet another report describing in vague terms the factors responsible for his failure to secure implementation of the relevant UN resolutions. India has in the past accepted such evasive UN action without much resistance, for then her main aim, apparently, was to gain as much time as possible in order to consolidate her hold over the disputed State. However, with every passing year, India's position in Kashmir has become more and more precarious; and it now seems to be realised in New Delhi that neither generous subsidies nor Bakhshi's gangsterism can make the people of Kashmir forget the promise of freedom given them jointly by India, Pakistan, and the United Nations, or compel them to abandon the struggle to achieve their birthright. Therefore, India's rulers are now unwilling to join another session of harmless tripartite negotiations on Kashmir, and would like somehow to smother and bury the issue. Having secured the co-operation of both the Power blocs, they seem to hope that, if their spokesmen shout_at_Pakistan a little louder and refuse more firmly than before to respect their treaty obligations, the majority group at the United Nations might be persuaded to suspend further action in the Kashmir case; and if the West's attitude is not wholly satisfactory, the Soviet Union can be urged to use her veto power to paralyse the Security Council completely.

The fact that the Soviet leaders have allowed the exigencies of the East-West Cold War to override all other considerations in determining their Kashmir policy is made quite obvious by the strange arguments given by Mr Arkady Sobolev in justification of his Government's decision to use

the veto against the Five-Power proposal. For example, he said that the resolution was unacceptable because it ignores every other factor and 'only serves the interests of Pakistan'. This is sheer nonsense, for if Pakistan had her way, the Security Council would demand in clear terms that India should carry out, within a reasonable time-limit, the provisions of the agreed UN plan for determining Kashmir's future, without any more quibbling and hair-splitting. The Soviet delegate's second reason for rejecting the resolution is even more ridiculous, namely, that it 'attempts to impose a solution on India that is unacceptable to her'. If this principle were to be accepted generally, the UN Security Council would cease to exist as an effective body. Even Mr Sobolev cannot believe in its general application, for it will be recalled that the USSR forcefully pressed the resolution calling for a ceasefire in Egypt despite the refusal of Britain and France to accept the directive. The Soviet delegate is on still weaker ground when he declares, without even attempting an explanation, that the call for mediation with the purpose of creating conditions for the exercise by the people of Kashmir of their right to self-determination is somehow contrary to the provisions of the UN Charter.

Mr Sobolev goes on to argue that the adoption of the proposed resolution would serve no useful purpose, because Dr Graham and other UN mediators had tried again and again to bring about an Indo-Pakistan agreement on these lines, but had been unable to achieve any results. This objection could have been accepted as genuine if the Soviet representative had put forward an alternative proposal suggesting a better way out of the present impasse; but he had no suggestion to offer. His aim clearly appears to be, not to help a settlement of the dispute, but to embarrass the Anglo-American bloc and to bolster India's position. There is considerable truth in Mr Sobolev's criticism of the Western Powers' policies and methods, and his objections to Pakistan's membership of Western military pacts are understandable. But the Soviet delegate did not explain how these issues could justify the Soviet somersault on the Kashmir dispute. How do the Western machinations deprive the Kashmiris of their right to decide their own future? How does any feature of Pakistan's foreign policy justify the denial of democracy to Kashmir's 40 lakh people? And how can the fact that the USSR approves of India's neutralism be treated as the deciding factor in determining whether the Kashmiri people should or should not be given their freedom?

The Soviet Union's partisan intervention in the Kashmir debate has made the situation a great deal more confused. Pakistan will have to tread even more warily now to ensure that India does not succeed in her manoeuvres to get the issue shelved for a long time to come. It seems equally plain that, in order to counter India's policies, it would be most inadvisable for Pakistan to continue to depend entirely on the leaders of the Western bloc. It is necessary that Pakistan should take the initiative herself, and evolve a policy that will thwart India's aims and help to create conditions for appropriate UN action to enable the Kashmir dispute to be settled on a basis of peace and justice.

19 January 1958 Confusion over Kashmir

Most impartial observers of the Indo-Pakistan scene now realise that the demand for a plebiscite to decide the future of Kashmir conforms to the dictates of democratic justice. The release of Sheikh Abdullah, and his courageous advocacy of the people's right to self-determination, should further convince the world that the Kashmiri people will never accept India's conquest of their homeland, and that the only fair solution of the problem, the only solution that will last, lies in honestly implementing the relevant UN resolutions. At the same time, Dr Graham's visit to the sub-continent in yet another attempt to serve that end makes it imperative that every country interested in peace and justice should use its influence to assist him in his task.

Unfortunately, world statesmen continue to view the problem from the standpoint of political expediency rather than political principles. The spokesmen of three Governments have commented on the Kashmir dispute during the last few days-each one of them in a manner that is unhelpful, and even harmful. The Czech Prime Minister endorsed the fatuous Soviet stand when he declared that in his opinion, 'the question had been solved by the will of the Kashmiri people', and that Kashmir now 'forms an integral part of India'. Mr Harold Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, has made it perfectly plain that his Government would maintain its attitude of strict impartiality in regard to the dispute, which means, in effect, that it will not risk annoying India by urging appropriate UN action to deal with New Delhi's refusal to abide by the UN resolutions on the subject. These two declarations, unfortunate as they are, will cause no great surprise, because they say nothing that has not been said before. But a more recent statement, made by the US Ambassador in Pakistan, cannot be lightly dismissed. The important part of his press interview reads: 'Frankly, short of war, settlement of the Kashmir issue would seem to be a matter of negotiation between the two countries involved, and, to be successful, the results of such negotiations would mean some compromise by both sides. Because the disputed region lies within the Indus watershed, the related dispute as to these waters would also be included in any such negotiations'. This approach certainly raises new dangers for Pakistan.

In the first place, Mr James M. Langley's statement implies that the UN cannot be expected—or that it will not be asked—to take any action to end the Kashmir dispute, which must be left to bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. Those who make this suggestion, which includes the USA and the USSR, seem to forget that direct negotiations have been tried again and again, and that such parleys would be absolutely futile in today's circumstances, when India has repudiated every promise it ever made with

regard to allowing the Kashmiri people to determine their own future. The US Ambassador's view that the success of these negotiations would depend on 'some compromise by both sides' is a sinister suggestion that seeks to substitute some dirty bargain for the Indo-Pakistan agreement on the subject, and completely ignores the wishes of the people of Kashmir. The most mischievous part of Mr Langley's statement tries to link the dispute over river waters with the Kashmir question. In actual fact, the two disputes are not related, and each case should be dealt with in accordance. with the relevant principles of international law and justice. Confusion-mongering of this sort must be resisted. We would, therefore, urge the Foreign Office to reject the American suggestion in unambiguous terms, for obviously the US Ambassador's opinions, whatever his motives, tend to harm Pakistan's position and to defeat Dr Graham's mission.

⁵ June 1958 Conspiracy for Freedom

Divested of its extravagant irrelevancies. India's reply to Pakistan's recent letter to the UN Security Council protesting against the re-arrest of Sheikh Abdullah—is virtually a confession of guilt. The essence of Pakistan's complaint was that, in order to stifle the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. India and her agents had launched a campaign of terror and repression: that the validity for the strange accusations made against Sheikh Abdullah would never be tested before a court of law, because he was again being kept in gaol under the Preventive Detention Law; and that these actions of the Indian Government, in violation of the various UN resolutions on the subject of Kashmir, prove that India is holding Kashmir by the force of arms, against the will of the Kashmir people.

India's UN spokesman has alleged that Sheikh Abdullah was involved in a deep conspiracy, and that he had been working since 1953 to bring about 'the overthrow of the

Government of the State established by law, and to that end to enlist the support, and join hands with Pakistan's agents and officials'. Further, he said that some time between 9 August 1953 and 29 August 1958, 'they among themselves and with other persons, known and unknown, at Srinagar and divers other places, both in and outside the State, conspired to overawe by means of criminal force the government of the State'. Sheikh Abdullah is also alleged to have 'collected large funds and organised the nucleus of a private army', and to have been guilty of incitement to murder by exhorting a public gathering 'to kill the traitors if there are any among you'. The only documentary evidence that India's Permanent Representative at the United Nations could quote in support of these charges was a Letter to the Editor published in a Karachi newspaper, and the unproved charge-sheet prepared by the prosecution in the conspiracy case being tried at Kud by a Special Magistrate.

If Sheikh Abdullah was really engaged in such a plot since 1953, why was he released by the Indian Government? If the Indian authorities were aware of his conspiratorial activities, why was the Sheikh offered the Srinagar gaddi only a few months ago, on the condition that he should stop talking of freedom? And is it logical to suppose that he would have started a strong propaganda campaign if he was, at the same time, engaged in drawing up plans for an armed revolt against the regime imposed on the people of Kashmir by India? Further, why has Sheikh Abdullah, allegedly the fountainhead of the conspiracy, been called as a mere witness in the conspiracy case? Why is he not listed among the accused? Are the Srinagar authorities so mortally afraid of him that they dare not arraign him in an open court of law?

No one acquainted with the basic facts of life in Kashmir will find it difficult to answer these questions correctly. And whether India's official spokesmen now remain silent, or try to weave a web of lies, they have already confessed that the person whom they themselves named the final arbiter of Kashmir's destiny is today determined to end India's rule over the State. They have also been forced to admit that he has the support of wide sections of the people, and is capable of launching a movement that would bring about the speedy end of the present regime. Of course, it seems fairly obvious that if the specific charges levelled against Sheikh Abdullah were true, if he had actually defied any of the arbitrary laws now in force in Kashmir, he would have been put before the same obedient magistrate and sentenced to a conveniently long term of imprisonment. But precisely because Sheikh Abdullah had refused to be trapped by Bakhshi's lawless laws, he has been incarcerated without being able to defend himself or to publicly accuse his persecutors of the crimes they are committing against his people.

Whether or not the Security Council takes any action on the matter, and whatever the result of the farcical trial at Kud, the world knows that Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues are guilty of only one conspiracy—to work for the freedom of their homeland: that they are inspired by their love of liberty, and incite others to feed its flame, even if this is now a crime in the eyes of the Delhi rulers. And the leaders of India must know that the people's conspiracy for freedom can never be defeated: that, even though the lives of the conspirators are harsh and uneasy, and many are bound to die by the roadside, many more keep joining their ranks: and that this noble conspiracy can end only in its complete success.

V. PLAYING WITH FIRE: RELATIONS WITH INDIA

30 November 1950 ay al Indo-Pakistan Peace

A whole year spent in laborious correspondence between the two Prime Ministers, the exchange of official Notes and *aides-memoire*, and numerous high-level meetings on the question of a joint no-war declaration by Pakistan and India, has yielded no tangible results. It is gratifying, however, that

this failure is not due to the desire on the part of either Government to wage war against its neighbour, and that the effort to reach an all-embracing agreement has not been abandoned. The Governments of India and Pakistan are agreed that war between the two countries would be an 'unmitigated disaster', leading them to 'utter ruin'. Disavowing warlike intentions, both are prepared to pledge themselves to the universally-recognised pacific means of settling international disputes, namely, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. Even if a firm and final agreement has so far eluded the two Prime Ministers, the reiteration of their Governments' adherence to this principle should be reckoned as a positive gain. Equally, it is to be welcomed that the twelve months of fruitless endeavour have not exhausted their patience, and that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's invitation to Pandit Nehru to visit Karachi in order to continue the discussions has readily been accepted.

The credit that redounds to India for taking the initiative in suggesting the desirability of signing a no-war declaration cannot be denied, but it is quite obvious that the discredit for the failure of the protracted discussions also has to be laid at India's door. An objective perusal of the lengthy correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan leaves no doubt that, whereas Pandit Nehru's stand seems to be based on abstract idealism, Mr Liaguat Ali Khan has sought to take a practical view of the problem and suggest practical means for its solution. The Indian Premier has insisted that a platitudinous no-war declaration should be made by the two countries, in complete isolation from what is being done to reach or avoid settlement of any disputed issue, and without any precise agreement on how and when these differences-which, admittedly, are the root cause of Indo-Pakistan tension and hostility-are to be resolved. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, on the other hand, has taken the position that such a declaration should, at least, be accompanied by the acceptance by both sides of definite and binding procedure for the amicable and speedy settlement of all pending disputes. The method and timetable put forward by Mr Liaguat Ali Khan can, of course, be amended or varied to suit particular issues, but the Indian contention, that no agreed procedure and programme for tackling existing disputes are necessary, cannot be accepted as either realistic or logical. Pandit Nehru's plea for an unconditional no-war declaration would be commendable if it were made for countries in normal relationship who desire to pledge themselves to preserve the *status quo*, except through mutual agreement. In the case of India and Pakistan, however, when the truce in Kashmir has not been allowed to proceed further than the cease-fire stage, and the armies of the two States face each other along a line determined only by the position of their troops on a given date, a mere declaration of pacific intentions, however earnestly and solemnly made, would be rather meaningless. Those who argue that precisely these conditions make a no-war declaration absolutely imperative should realise that, unless more foolproof machinery has been agreed upon for the peaceful disposal of the territories claimed by both States, there would be good grounds for the suspicion that the declaration is either hypocritical, or intended to strengthen the position of the party that is now in possession. And even if these suspicions are ill-founded, they would deprive the unconditional no-war declaration of the sole advantage that is claimed for it-the healthy psychological effect it is to have on the public.

On the other issues in dispute between the two countries. India's attitude is by no means wholly reasonable, but it seems possible that the obvious advantages of economic cooperation will eventually persuade both sides to come to a settlement on a give-and-take basis, or to accept outside arbitration.

The goal of permanent peace between Pakistan and India is eminently desirable, but it should be realised that it can be reached only through the principles of justice and democracy. India's refusal to respect UN decisions on Kashmir, her use of two totally different sets of arguments for Junagadh and Kashmir, the pressure she seeks to put on Pakistan through the 'defensive deployment' of her troops on our borders, the refusal to allot Pakistan her due share of water from common rivers, or the withholding of Pakistan's assets. cannot take the two countries any nearer the professed aim of their Governments. Professions of good will, to be effective, must be accompanied by actions that need no advance declarations to prove their purpose. It is sincerely hoped that the renewed Nehru-Liaquat talks will yield better results, for it is generally realised that the progress and prosperity of both countries demand that the existing state of armed peace should give way to mutually beneficial co-operation.

17 July 1951 Threat of War

For the second time within a period of sixteen months. Indian troops stand massed on the borders of Pakistan. On the last occasion, the tense communal situation in the two Bengals was used by the Indian Government as an excuse for threatening Pakistan with war, although it is known that happenings in India were mainly responsible for the renewed large-scale transfer of minority populations towards the beginning of 1950. Last year's crisis was happily overcome by the Liaquat-Nehru conference and the resultant Delhi Pact. India has now made a similar, but far more provocative, move; and even a comparatively soberminded Indian leader like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru seems to consider-judging from his Bangalore speech-that minor breaches of the Kashmir cease-fire agreement, and the alleged war propaganda in Pakistan, seen through the magnifying powers of the Indian Press, provide sufficient justification for concentrating practically the whole of the Indian Army along the Indo-Pakistan frontier. With regard to cease-fire violations, since the fighting in Kashmir was stopped, there has hardly been a single month without a border foray or incident of some sort; however regrettable these clashes may be, India, as is conclusively proved by the figures released recently, shares

equal, if not greater, responsibility for their occurrence. It is, further, quite obvious that when two armies face each other along a lengthy—and more or less undefined—front, and when the intransigence of one side has not allowed even a proper truce agreement to succeed the original cease-fire, it is extremely difficult to maintain complete peace year after year. India's stand that war propaganda in Pakistan has forced her into warlike actions is equally baseless: here again the boot is on the other foot, for a large section of the Indian Press, leaders of the powerful right wing in the Congress, and a host of reactionary organisations have persistently campaigned in India for a reversal of Partition by every means possible. On the other hand, anti-Indian moves in Pakistan have been discouraged and repressed, and stronger action has been prevented only by India's refusal to abide by her pledges and follow suit.

A close study of recent developments in the Indian Union leaves little doubt that the Indian Government consider it expedient to mount another anti-Pakistan propaganda offensive, backed up by their armed might. The recrudescence of communal rioting in India, the rabid pre-election speeches of Congress leaders-including the country's 'liberal-minded' Prime Minister—the stock-piling of foodgrains, and the efforts to establish closer ties with America, seem to be part of a carefullyconsidered plan to browbeat Pakistan into abandoning the cause of the Kashmiri people. Other, less drastic, means having failed to produce the desired results. India has turned to the last resort of every aggressive power-the threat of armed invasion. This policy has been adopted to coincide with the presence of Dr Graham on the sub-continent, presumably in order to impress the UN with India's determination to avoid compliance with the demand put forward by Pakistan-and, in a sense, by the whole world-for an early plebiscite in Kashmir to decide the State's future on a just and democratic basis. It is not yet known what effect India's latest action in defiance of international morality and law will have on the powers dominating the United Nations: but if all fairness is not dead, and if the maintenance of international peace is still its avowed aim, the Security Council

must immediately order the withdrawal of Indian troops from their present positions. No matter what ingenious arguments Indian diplomats may concoct to confuse the issue, in view of India's patent act of hostility against Pakistan—which is also a violation of the Security Council's directives to both countries the least that can be demanded of this body is prompt action to defeat India's move, which presents a clear threat to international peace.

In dealing with the present crisis, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan has acted wisely in taking the country into his confidence. While it is known that Pakistan seeks peace and would like the present threat of war to be dissipated by UN action, the fact remains that we have no cause to rely on either the common sense of India's rulers or the UN's sense of duty to avoid an attack on Pakistan. It is likely, of course, that India's show of force is mere bluff, for the Congress leadership cannot possibly be blind to the disastrous consequences of an Indo-Pakistan war, Nevertheless, whether the Indian Government hope to bully this country into submission, or seek to solve their own country's vexing economic and political problems by resort to war, the Government and people of Pakistan must be fully prepared to face every eventuality. There cannot be the slightest doubt that every single Pakistani will whole-heartedly endorse the Pakistan Prime Minister's determination 'to resist every unjust demand and to defend every just right', and that, irrespective of any political differences, all sections of our people will make every sacrifice necessary to defend the integrity and freedom of Pakistan. If India's military experts imagine that the numerical superiority of their forces can guarantee them victory, or if they have been told that differences of political opinion may simplify their task, these armchair strategists are certain to be disillusioned. In the Pakistan Army-one of the world's best-our country has an excellent first bastion of defence; and along with it a whole nation stands ready and unyielding, determined to repel the invaders and to fight for every inch of Pakistan's sacred soil. The Indian forces

attempting to enter Pakistan will find no Sheikh Abdullahs eager to spread out the red carpet for them: if they dare to try they will meet a people roused to arms by a flagrant act of aggression and unflinchingly resolved, in the words of a Spanish patriot, 'to die on their feet rather than live on their knees'.

20 July 1951 Playing with Fire

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's formal reply to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's telegraphic protest will not go very far towards relieving the acute tension between Pakistan and India. Although the Indian Prime Minister's communication, is compared to his earlier utterances, couched in moderate words, the repetition of baseless charges against Pakistan, and his blunt rejection of the perfectly justified demand that the threat to peace created by the Indian Army's concentration on Pakistan's borders should immediately be removed, cannot engender much confidence in his assertion that India has no aggressive designs against this country. Pandit Nehru naively argues that the reduction carried out in the Indian Army last year provides positive proof of India's peaceful intentions; he seems to have forgotten that, according to his own Defence Minister, this was more in the nature of a re-organisation which in no way affected the Army's fighting capacity. After reiterating the inane declaration that India seeks a peaceful settlement in Kashmir, and repeating his proposal for an unconditional 'no-war' declaration, the Indian Prime Minister demands that 'talk of and preparations for war' in Pakistan should be stopped, as this would be the best way of improving relations between the two countries. With regard to hostile propaganda. Pandit Nehru's refusal to see the beam in his own eve does him no credit. It is a well-established fact that, apart from Pakistan's determination to prevent the forcible annexation of Kashmir, our people have no territorial quarrels with India: in that country, however, a vociferous group has

persistently demanded war on Pakistan, and on many occasions even Government leaders have blatantly held out the threat of undoing Partition.

Pandit Nehru's admission that Indian troops have been massed along the Indo-Pakistan frontier, and his refusal to order their withdrawal, is a serious matter which merits the Security Council's immediate attention. New Delhi's plea that aggression is not intended, and that the current warlike measures are purely defensive in nature, will not impress a world that has seen many examples of 'defensive' aggression. Whatever their real purpose, Indian leaders cannot possibly ignore the fact that preparation for war on such a scale is in itself a danger to peace. Apart from other considerations, the fact that the bulk of the armed forces of India and Pakistan will now stand face to face—ready for battle—creates an explosive situation which could easily deteriorate into fullscale war at the slightest provocation. Any border incident, of which there have been hundreds since the cease-fire agreement, could be magnified into-or be misunderstood as—an attack from the other side, and thus serve as an excuse for unleashing a war that—whatever its outcome—would inflict terrible misery on the peoples of both countries. Presumably, the Congress leadership is taking these grave risks in order to appear before the Indian people at the forthcoming elections as a band of brave heroes capable of threatening and starting wars. It is probably hoped that the artificially-created war-psychosis would ward off the threatened strike in the Indian Railways and other Government Services, and also provide the Congress administration with an excuse to further suppress adverse criticism and curb all anti-Congress activity in the name of national emergency. War preparations-and even wars-are not a particularly original device for unpopular regimes incapable of retaining power by other means. The ultimate fate of history's most famous war-mongers should, however, warn India's policy-makers of what the future has in store for them

26 July 1951 Nehru's Reply

In his reply to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's second telegram, urging the immediate withdrawal of Indian troops from the menacing position they occupy along Pakistan's frontiers, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has once again sought to evade Pakistan's perfectly straightforward demand by reiterating certain proposals which are obviously, and for very good reasons, unacceptable to Pakistan. The Indian Prime Minister has put forward two main conditions which he considers essential for easing the present tension and preparing the way for a discussion of Indo-Pakistan disputes and their peaceful settlement. These are, firstly, that the 'war propaganda' in Pakistan should be called off, and secondly, that the Pakistan Government should sign an unconditional no-war declaration. Apart from the significant fact that Pandit Nehru has not explicitly promised to remove the threat created by the Indian Army's recent hostile move even if Pakistan were to accept his impossible conditions, it is clear that no self-respecting country could ever enter into an agreement of the sort advocated by the Indian Prime Minister, particularly when the other party has in the past shown such scant respect for its international commitments. It is manifest that when Pandit Nehru talks of war propaganda, he refers to the expression of Pakistan's determination to ensure that the ultimate fate of Kashmir will be decided, not by Indian bayonets, but by the freely-expressed will of the Kashmiri people: and it is equally clear that the Indian Government's eagerness to make Pakistan abjure the path of war—without even a truce in Kashmir, and without prior agreement on how the various Indo-Pakistan disputes are to be dealt with—arises from their desire to immobilise Pakistan in the event of further police actions in any part of Kashmir-including the liberated areas. In actual fact, Pandit Nehru's demands have little bearing on the real situation in India and Pakistan, and they are intended solely to impress the world with India's pacific intentions.

There can hardly be any doubt that India's talk of unconditional peace merely seeks to cloak her policy of holding Kashmir by force, and the recent concentration of troops is an attempt to brow-beat Pakistan into recognising India's conquest of at least a part of Kashmir as a *fait accompli*.

The Indian Prime Minister's stand seems to be based on a peculiar admixture of wishful and wilful thinking. Pandit Nehru deliberately turns a blind eye to the whole Indian network of anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim activities, sponsored by some of his closest colleagues in collaboration with the most fanatical of Indian reactionaries; and, on the other hand, he distorts and exaggerates everything that is done or said in Pakistan. Such intellectual gymnastics may salve what remains of Pandit Nehru's democratic conscience, but they cannot convince the world of India's bona fides with regard to either Kashmir or Pakistan, However, be that as it may, it is quite plain that if war between Pakistan and India can be avoided only on the basis of Pandit Nehru's demand for a completely free hand in Kashmir, then the chances of peace on this sub-continent are indeed small. In any case, the present situation leaves Pakistan with no alternative except to remain fully prepared against the threat of Indian aggression. The Government of Pakistan must also force the Security Council to take serious cognizance of the explosive situation. It should be pointed out that the excuses put forward by Indian leaders to justify their threat of invasion are utterly meaningless, for what Pandit Nehru calls Pakistan's 'war propaganda' has always been a definite article of political faith with every Pakistani, and it has been publicised from every possible platform, including the UN, for the last threeand-a-half years. The question of a joint no-war declaration is also an old issue, and it is many months since India and Pakistan last addressed each other on the subject. What then was the sudden provocation for India's recent act of hostility? Since Pakistan has done nothing, one can only conclude that the renewed discussions on Kashmir by a UN representative have caused Indian leaders to publicise their blatant

intransigence, presumably in order to frighten the UN and Pakistan into submission. What the UN has to say on the matter is not yet known: but Pakistan's answer has already been given. Our country seeks peace, and to this end India has been asked to retrace the hostile step of mounting her guns against Pakistan. But if India refuses to listen to reason, we are ready to defend every bit of our soil, whatever the cost: and, finally, we are not prepared under any circumstances to trade the Kashmiri people's right to freedom for our immediate security—for we know that such security would be humiliating as well as transitory.

¹ August 1951 Indo-Pakistan Crisis

With India seemingly uninterested in the early solution of her latest dispute with Pakistan, the exchange of telegraphic messages between the Prime Ministers of the two countries has sunk to the level of a cold-war debate. The trend of this longdistance debate, prevented from dealing realistically with the problem by India's peculiar attitude of ignoring all unpalatable facts, offers no hope of agreement on any reasonable plan to dispel the grave danger of war inherent in the present tense situation. It should be quite obvious even to the most myopic intelligence that the current threat to peace on this sub-continent has been created solely by the offensive disposition of India's armed forces along the borders of Pakistan. Pandit Nehru's attempt to justify this act of unprovoked hostility by raising the bogey of Pakistan's aggressive designs against India is a deliberate distortion of the truth.

It is even more ridiculous for the Indian Prime Minister to cite the defensive counter-measures that Pakistan has been compelled to take in view of India's aggressive moves as additional reasons for his refusal to withdraw the Indian Army. India sees black for white and expects Pakistan to do the same: this attitude cannot, to say the least. conduce to an amicable agreement. It would, perhaps, help the situation if the rulers of New Delhi were to realise that they are not dealing with Nepal or Hyderabad, and that while the Government and people of Pakistan fervently desire peace, they are confident of their ability to defend their country and will not, under any circumstances, be cowed down by India's threat of force.

12 August 1951 Unresolved Crisis

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's latest telegram to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan leaves the grave Indo-Pakistan crisis unresolved; and if, as the Indian Prime Minister has hinted, this unhelpful document is his last word on the subject, the future of the sub-continent remains threatened with the dire possibility of war. An impartial perusal of the letters exchanged between the two Prime Ministers during the last three weeks leaves no doubt that India is wholly in the wrong, and that her brazen show of force is intended to browbeat Pakistan into accepting the conquest of a large part of Kashmir as a fait accompli. It is by now well established that the first unprovoked move in the recent cold war manoeuvres was made by India. In his first three replies to Pakistan's protests against the massing of practically the whole effective strength of the Indian Army against our borders, Mr Nehru sought to justify his action by claiming that the incessant 'war propaganda' in Pakistan had necessitated the decision to prepare his country for defence. When this bubble was pricked by world-wide condemnation of India's untenable plea for her warlike move, the Indian propaganda experts decided to shift ground; and in his last two letters the Indian Prime Minister has, rather belatedly, tried to throw all the blame on Pakistan by alleging that this country was on the verge of launching an invasion of India, because one solitary brigade had been moved back into the line after a brief rest. This preposterous line of argument can convince no one and, naturally, increases Pakistan's suspicions of India's intentions. But even if for a moment we accept Pandit Nehru's premise as being based on truth, he still has no good reason for

refusing to agree with Pakistan's five-point peace plan, which clearly stipulates that the withdrawal of troops would affect both sides equally. The Indian prerequisite for the dispersal of their troop concentrations is, in plain words, that Pakistan should stop agitating for a free plebiscite in Kashmir and should acquiesce in India's plan to determine the future of the whole State by a Hitlerian farce. In putting this forward as a pre-condition for peaceful relations between Pakistan and India, Pandit Nehru is asking for the moon.

On the Kashmir issue, which is the crux of the situation. Pandit Nehru seems to allow his imagination to do the work of his intellect...

Although Pandit Nehru misses no opportunity of stressing his Government's pacific intentions, and in recent speeches he has boldly condemned India's communalists and warmongers, Pakistan cannot afford to relax her vigilance as long as Indian troops remain poised on her borders. The Indian Government's policies are not always based on Pandit Nehru's speeches, and his bugbear of 'Congress unity' has often led him to support and justify—of course, after due rationalisation—the most reactionary decisions of his party. It is a fact, which Pandit Nehru may ignore but Pakistan cannot, that the Congress is dominated by communal irredentists and that the Hindu Mahasabhites whom he occasionally scolds, have close ties with the dominant Congress group which has compelled_the_Indian Prime Minister and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to resign from the Congress Working Committee. Therefore, even if Pandit Nehru's protestations of friendliness for Pakistan were accepted at their face value, there is no guarantee that in a crisis he would be able to control the Munshis and Tandons who really rule the country. But even this doubtful assurance is denied to Pakistan, because on the Kashmir issue Pandit Nehru is as blind to reason as any of his Mahasabhite colleagues. In these circumstances, Pakistan is left with no choice except to remain fully prepared to resist any Indian action which threatens the security and integrity of this land.

27 December 1953 Pandit Nehru's Latest

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches in the Indian Parliament during the recent foreign policy debate mark an intensification of the cold-war offensive against Pakistan. The issue singled out by him was that of US military aid to Pakistan, and, referring to the pacts on various disputes between India and Pakistan, the Indian Prime Minister went to the extent of saying that such aid would 'change the whole context in which these (Indo-Pakistan) agreements were made'. Pandit Nehru specifically mentioned the agreement for a democratic solution of the Kashmir dispute, and sought to make out that India was eager and willing to hold an impartial plebiscite to decide the State's future, but now that a final solution of the problem was within sight, Pakistan had started talks for military aid with the United States and, thereby, compelled India to consider the necessity of repudiating the agreement. Whatever one may think of the question of US military aid to Pakistan—and for a host of excellent reasons we believe that Pakistan should not under any circumstances enter into an arrangement that will restrict its sovereignty and make it a partner in America's network of military alliances—Pandit Nehru's analysis of the situation, particularly in relation to Kashmir, is wholly incorrect. For six long years Pakistan has persisted in the demand that the people of Kashmir should be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. In direct negotiations, before various UN Commissions and the Security Council, and at the bar of world opinion, Pakistan has sought to persuade India to implement her pledge and allow an impartial plebiscite to be held. India has, with equal persistence, resisted this just demand. During these six years, when there was no question of US military aid being given to Pakistan, India had ample opportunity to settle her differences with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, but every plan for a fair and reasonable settlement was deliberately thwarted by Indian representatives whose professed willingness to allow a

plebiscite-on terms that would make it a Hitlerian farcewas completely vitiated by the claim that Kashmir's accession to India is complete and final. In the context of this schizophrenic attitude. in which there has been no apparent change. Pandit Nehru's discovery of a brand-new explanation for his Government's intransigence over Kashmir will not impress anyone who is acquainted with the genesis and history of the dispute. In any case, apart from this aspect of what may well be regarded as a peculiar manifestation of Pandit Nehru's guilt-complex, how can any aspect of Pakistan's foreign policy be used as an argument to deprive the Kashmiri people of their accepted right to decide their own future? The main party to the dispute are the Kashmiri people, and no thesis about Asia's balance of power, or the sub-continent's political equilibrium, can affect their inherent. inalienable right to self-determination; and, irrespective of other factors, every attempt to deny them this right is a disservice to democracy and to the cause of world peace.

With what Pandit Nehru had to say on the subject of imperialist expansion, and the efforts being made by the Western Powers to consolidate or resurrect colonialism, there can be no disagreement. We also agree with his general remarks about the dangers of accepting foreign aid. the need to avoid involvement in war, and the desirability of strengthening co-operation among Asian and African countries. These platitudes have a certain value, but when Pandit Nehru applies general principles to the Indo-Pakistan situation, he does so in a manner that lacks all objectivity and, therefore, leads to conclusions that are, to say the least, completely one-sided. On the question of free foreign aid, for instance, Pandit Nehru said that 'we (the Indian Government) welcome aid on honourable terms', but that US military aid to Pakistan would be a different matter because 'one does not receive free military aid without particular consequences'. Does one receive free economic aid without any consequences? As Acharva Kripalani said during the debate, and as world events clearly show, 'military aid is as dangerous

as economic aid'. In the last analysis, all foreign aid has certain consequences, and the difference between payment in cash or kind is one of degree only. To refer to only one example, can it be denied that the latest Indo-American operational agreement to rehabilitate India's railways has a certain military significance? It will be remember that, about two years ago, when large chunks of US aid were sent to India, Pakistan protested against an arrangement that would allow India to divert a larger part of her national budget to expanding or re-equipping the Indian Army. How has India's protest any greater validity? The fact that it is accompanied by threats certainly reduces its effectiveness and makes the Indian Government's bona fides impugnable. Further, as for building up an area of peace in Asia, avoiding embroilment in the Cold War, and opposing the advance of imperalism, Pandit Nehru should try to examine his own policies with greater clarity of vision. The acceptance of foreign aid by India, the grant of special concessions to US capital, the export of monazite sand to America, the despatch of a medical unit to help the American Army in Korea, and facilities for the British to recruit Gurkhas, are all factors which vitiate India's neutrality, sustain the Cold War, and endanger the freedom and security of Asia.

We earnestly hope that both Pakistan and India will be able to remould their foreign policies so that the gap between their leaders' professions and actions is completely bridged, and the two States can boldly use their influence to stem the tide of neo-imperialism and to halt the world's drift towards war. It must be realised, however, that the biggest single factor hindering this consummation is the inability of these two States to settle the disputes which for six years have compelled them to maintain large armies, to make compromises with the West, which is eager to take advantage of the rift, and prevented them from playing their historic role in world affairs. A statesman of Pandit Nehru's stature should be able to see things in their historical perspective, and to realise that Pakistan and India can form a bulwark of peace and democracy only if they can settle their own disputes on the basis of democratic principles. Towards the achievement of this essential precondition to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent's progress. Pandit Nehru and his Government can make a great contribution by honouring their pledges in regard to a plebiscite in Kashmir. The Indian Prime Minister's latest stand can only make more distant the day when India and Pakistan will stand together in friendship and co-operation—which is the only guarantee of their ability to resist imperialism's demands—and work whole-heartedly to bring to their peoples the long-delayed fruits of freedom.

² February 1955 Indo-Pakistan Relations

The tremendous upsurge of Indo-Pakistan good will witnessed in recent weeks has brought joy and hope to millions of hearts on both sides of the border. The lowering of the barriers—both physical and mental—raised by a decade of mutual hostility and suspicion has allowed the two peoples' keen desire for friendly and co-operative coexistence to express itself with unmistakable forcefulness. The friendly atmosphere created by the Pakistan Governor-General's official visit to Delhi on the occasion of India's Republic Day, and his informal discussions with Indian leaders, augur well for the Prime Ministers' talks scheduled for next month. In a sense, even more important has been the visit to Lahore, during the third cricket Test, of thousands of Indian citizens, and the warm welcome they have received from the people of this city. The opportunity thus provided for personal contacts is, of course, of great significance on the purely human level, but it also helps greatly to smooth the path of political peace-makers, and to frustrate the designs of those whose myopia or prejudice prevents them from realising the importance to the peoples of both countries of an early settlement of the disputes which have bedevilled their relations for so long. We are confident that the reunion of hearts (to use the words of some of our Indian guests) witnessed at Lahore will undoubtedly assist in the achievement of the task for which the Heads of the two neighbouring States have wisely taken the initiative at the highest possible level, and we earnestly hope that everything possible will henceforth be done to make such contacts more frequent, and to ease general travel conditions between India and Pakistan. In these auspicious circumstances, it would be far easier, and certainly more pleasant, to ignore any note of discord; but it would be unrealistic to do so. Following the recent Indo-Pakistan talks at Delhi, certain statements have been made which blatantly seek to disrupt future negotiations between the leaders of the two countries. We deliberately overlooked the remarks made by Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed some days ago on the subject of Kashmir's future, because this gentleman seems to have acquired a vested interest in the unhappy status quo, and therefore he opposes the idea of an Indo-Pakistan accord which would guarantee the Kashmiri people the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination. But now it is learnt that the Governor of East Punjab, Mr C. P. N. Singh, issued a message on Republic Day in which he said that 'Kashmir no longer presents a problem', and much more in this strain. Apart from the strange fact that Mr Singh, who is merely the constitutional Head of a Province, has made a policy statement on a matter completely outside his sphere, his declaration runs counter to what the President and Prime Minister of India have been saving on the same subject during the same week. It is, of course, for the Indian Government to decide whether or not it is proper for Provincial Governors to make statements of this sort on highly controversial subjects; nor do we want to attach an exaggerated importance to Mr Singh's opinions; but we do consider it necessary to point out that such inane remarks about a major Indo-Pakistan dispute can only make the quest for a just settlement more difficult, and should therefore be avoided, particularly when the leaders of India and Pakistan are engaged in earnest negotiations to solve the Kashmir tangle and end all other Indo-Pakistan disputes.

20 February 1955 Arrant Nonsense

The protest lodged with the Government of India by Pakistan's High Commissioner against the latest anti-Pakistan ravings of the East Punjab Governor is fully justified, and we would like to hope that Mr C. P. N. Singh will be given the rebuff he so richly deserves for his mischievous remarks about the reception given to Indian visitors in Lahore during the third cricket Test. Addressing a public meeting near Jullundur, the East Puniab Governor is reported in the Indian Press to have warned Pakistan against creating a wedge between the Hindus and the Sikhs', and declared that such a policy would not be tolerated; he went on to insinuate - in a voice trembling with anger^{*}—that, by treating the Sikhs better than the Hindus, Pakistan wanted to suggest to the Sikhs that they were not Indians. In different circumstances, it would be unnecessary to take serious notice of such arrant nonsense, except perhaps to suggest that the gentleman who is haunted by such wild nightmares would be well advised to consult an efficient psychiatrist; but in the context of the history of Indo-Pakistan relations, every factor, however insignificant, and every argument, however stupid, which tends or seeks to hinder the establishment of friendship and co-operation between Pakistan and India must be carefully considered and effectively countered. The reply to Mr-C.P.N. Singh's imaginary charges against Pakistan should be--and, we trust, will be-given by the Indians who were in Lahore for the third Test: but we would like to point out a few simple facts for the East Punjab Governor's edification. In the first place, the reception given to Indian visitors at Lahore was not official nor was it planned by any organisation. All that the Pakistan Government did was to relax the passport formalities, and the relaxation applied to all Indians—Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims. The warm welcome accorded by Lahore's citizens to their Indian guests was spontaneous and on the purely personal level: it was not even remotely

connected with politics of any sort; and, as far as we are aware. no invidious or deliberate distinction was made between the Sikh and the Hindu visitors. The main factors favouring the Sikhs was that they could be recognised immediately, and that very few of them had visited Lahore in recent years. To conclude, from this perfectly natural and understandable phenomenon, that a diabolical conspiracy was afoot in Pakistan to increase Hindu-Sikh tension in the East Punjab is utterly wrong-and can only be ascribed to either extreme ignorance or vicious malice. As far as the East Punjab Governor is concerned, he seems to be afflicted with both these maladies. It is for the Government and people of India to take the necessary steps to ensure that he is not allowed to harm Indo-Pakistan relations by his thoughtless campaign against Pakistan and against the very idea of Indo-Pakistan accord

² December 1956 Pakistan and India

According to a Press report from New Delhi, the Prime Minister of India has asked the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr Chou En-lai, who is now visiting that country and will soon be coming to Pakistan, to carry a message from him (Mr Jawaharlal Nehru) for the people of Pakistan. This novel mode of conveying a message to a neighbouring country has presumably been adopted as a means of obtaining wide publicity for the quaint view that India ardently desires to establish friendly relations with Pakistan, but for some unknown reason this country continually spurns India's offers of friendship and good will. In his message to Pakistan, the Indian Prime Minister is said to have expressed a desire for good relations with Pakistan, and his disappointment at the 'strange murmurings' that he hears from this country; he also wants to convey the assurance that 'India does not harbour any ill will and animosity' towards us, and that they 'do not want to have any fight and want to establish most cordial and friendly relations'. While referring to the unhappy state of Indo-Pakistan relations. Mr Nehru is further reported to have declared: 'I do not know how we can assure our neighbour of our good intentions towards her'.

The feelings expressed by Mr Nehru in general terms will be reciprocated by every sensible Pakistani. Time and again the people of this country have declared with all sincerity that they desire the most friendly ties with India-with whom we have unbreakable historical and geographic links-and both face a number of common problems which can best be solved by common effort. This earnest desire for friendship has, however, been continuously frustrated; and short periods of a hopeful trend towards accord and amity between the two Governments have been interspersed with much longer periods of suspicion and antipathy. The Indian Prime Minister naively asks how this can be remedied, how he can assure Pakistan of India's good intentions. Whether or not Mr Nehru's foreign guests, for whose benefit the reference to Indo-Pakistan problems was apparently made, are sure of the answer to Pandit Nehru's question, the Indian Prime Minister himself, and every student of Indo-Pakistan affairs, knows full well that India can assure Pakistan of its honest intentions by implementing the solemn pledge that it first gave in 1947-and which it has been reiterating again and again for a number of years-to allow the people of Kashmir to exercise their right to selfdetermination. It is an indisputable fact that only the non-fulfilment of India's promises in regard to Kashmir stands in the way of Indo-Pakistan friendship. There are some other questions also, but the basic issue, the main source of the suspicion and ill will which hold up the solution of other Indo-Pakistan problems, is the Kashmir dispute. And, however much Mr Nehru and his colleagues may try to divert world attention from this fact, the Kashmir problem cannot be made to disappear by shutting one's eyes to it, nor is there any lasting solution for it except the one India suggested nine long years ago, and from which it is now trying to escape. In the interests of the future of the peoples of this sub-continent, we would

like to hope that India will revise its present unprincipled stand on the Kashmir issue and agree to a plebiscite, and thus allow Mr Nehru to find the obvious answer to his question.

24 May 1958 Indo-Pakistan Scene

If the Governments of Pakistan and India have really decided to close down their diplomatic missions in all except three places in each country, the decision not only betrays a lamentable lack of mutual good will, but also seems to show that the two neighbouring States are allowing childish petulance rather than common sense to guide their affairs. It is true, of course, that Indo-Pakistan relations have worsened steadily in recent years, and that this deterioration has been caused largely by India's refusal even to consider a reasonable agreement to end the stalemate over Kashmir, by Sheikh Abdullah's re-arrest and the latest campaign of repression in his unhappy land, and, more lately, by the meaningless exchange of fire across the Surma River by the armed forces of the two States. However, none of these or other related developments can explain or justify the reported decision by the two Governments to cut down drastically the number of diplomatic missions they maintain in either country on a reciprocal basis. In fact, it could be argued far more effectively that the serious differences that exist between the two States require special efforts to maintain, and even improve, their relations-and not the curtailment of contacts between their peoples. To give an example of other States at loggerheads with each other realising the advantages of such a policy, we see that, after a long period of futile boycotts, deliberate attempts are being made by both sides to restore normal relations between America and the Soviet Union. The two Cold War giants, despite their failure to eliminate any of the numerous major causes of conflict, have been persuaded to resume friendlier contacts, particularly in the field of sports and culture, because they have realised that a policy of cutting oneself off from an unfriendly power offers no real gains. It is possible that India, because of a guilty conscience over Kashmir. wishes to adopt a pose of injured innocence before the outside world or seeks to impress Pakistan with its ability to get tough. But whatever India's motives may be, Pakistan has no reason to follow a policy which will cause great inconvenience to thousands of our citizens, and can bring comfort and encouragement only to those elements who seem determined to keep the fires of Indo-Pakistan tension burning.

With regard to the beginning of the latest exhibition of unfriendliness between the States—which is leading them to what may well be described as a policy of spiteful nosecutting-it appears most likely that Pakistan genuinely felt that its mission at Agartala, and India's at Comilla, could be withdrawn without any loss or inconvenience to the people of either side. If India considered that the closure of these two diplomatic offices would be unwise, it should have said so to the Pakistan Government and tried to dissuade it from pressing the proposal. Instead, India has retaliated with the demand that Pakistan should close down its missions at Bombay and Chandigarh, with the natural consequence that the Indian Deputy and Assistant High Commissioners at Lahore and Hyderabad, respectively, would also have to close down their offices. Apart from the other factors involved. since these four missions look after the vast majority of those who travel between Pakistan and India, their closure would greatly inconvenience large numbers of people on both sides of the border. For this reason alone the unwise move to restrict diplomatic relations between Pakistan and India should be abandoned and the status quo maintained. But it needs to be realised that, apart from the question of the grant of visas and other facilities to travellers, the decision to limit diplomatic intercourse will take India and Pakistan vet another step away from each other, make more difficult their cooperation to tackle common problems, and thus adversely affect the long-term interests of the two States and their peoples.

1 March 1959 Indo-Pakistan Talks

The failure of the latest round of Indo-Pakistan talks will cause keen disappointment among those who are conscious of the importance to both countries of finding just and reasonable solutions for their main disputes, and thus ending the harmful cold war that has raged—with only temporary abatements-for more than a decade. The secretariat-level conference held in Karachi was expected to deal with the question of final demarcation of the western boundary between the two States in the vicinity of the Sulemanki and Hussainiwala canal headworks, but it seems that both sides refused to alter their respective interpretations of the Radcliffe Award, and, therefore, no progress could be made towards eliminating a potential source of bitterness and conflict. Although the joint communique issued at the end of the conference does not admit failure, it seems quite plain that the talks ended without having achieved anything all.

Nor is this the only recent setback in Indo-Pakistan relations. Desultory firing continues on the border between East Pakistan and India, and, what is by far more serious, the Noon-Nehru agreement seems to have been placed in jeopardy as a result of opposition in West Bengal to the proposed transfer of the Berubari area to Pakistan. The gloom is not relieved by evidence of any improvement in regard to other Indo-Pakistan problems. India's rejection of the revised Pakistan proposal has created a deadlock in the canal waters dispute, and now the World Bank's representatives will draw up a plan of their own. If the World Bank's scheme, which will probably represent a compromise between the plans submitted by India and Pakistan, is accepted by both countries, and if satisfactory arrangements can be made for its implementation, a difficult problem will have been taken care of; but it is too early yet to say if we can confidently look forward to the early end of this dangerous dispute. However, while there is some hope that the World Bank's good offices will lead to an agreement on the sharing of the river waters of the Indus Basin, there is a complete stalemate on the Kashmir issue, and the UN Secretary-General's latest comment on the subject confirms the opinion that those who control UN policies are not really interested in doing anything about securing the implementation of the UN's resolutions on Kashmir. There are also a host of other, somewhat less important, issues concerning the two countries that still remain to be dealt with.

It is perfectly obvious that the present state of Indo-Pakistan relations is harmful to both countries and their peoples, and that its continuation can only further damage their interests. It is, clearly, the responsibility of the two governments to make every possible effort to seek peaceful agreements on all outstanding problems, and to try to bury the legacy of distrust and hostility which has brought only distress and misery to the peoples of this sub-continent.

The greater responsibility obviously rests with India, because in regard to the disputes over Kashmir and canal waters—the root cause of the trouble—its attitude has been unhelpful and unfriendly and in violation of the accepted rules of international law. In pondering the situation, it is also necessary to realise that, because of various factors extraneous to the disputes, there is for the present little or no possibility of effective and honest foreign mediation. It seems necessary, therefore, that the Governments of Pakistan and India should themselves take the initiative and make a serious effort to resolve their differences. Perhaps it would be best if, after due preparations, the Heads of Government of the two States could meet in a conference. And, if they could be persuaded to view the Indo-Pakistan situation realistically, keeping in mind the long-term interests of the two nations. it is not unreasonable to expect that they would be able to settle some of the outstanding problems and pave the way for future agreement on the others.

Section 7: Bread and Stones Agrarian Reforms and Economic Maladies

Gul Hayat Institute



Gul Hayat Institute

I. LAND AND THE TILLER

29 January 1948 Land Reforms

We have been unpleasantly surprised to hear that a large number of MLAs in the West Punjab Assembly are opposing the proposals of the Land Reform sub-committee which has recently submitted its report. The proposals accepted by the majority of this sub-committee are by no means revolutionary, and even fall short of the promises made to the people in the Provincial League's election manifesto. The only concrete measure recommended is the fixation of the landlords' share in the produce of land at one third of the crop. The other recommendations, like the abolition of begar and all the landlords' illegal exactions, the provision of cheap credit, and a stop to the ejecting of tenants 'without sufficient cause', are all pious hopes, almost impossible to realise by legislation as long as the present set-up in the villages continues. If the Government are serious about liberating the tenants from feudal tyranny, they must change the-whole-system and arrange that the Government should receive all dues from the tenant, including the landlord's share. This is the only way of ensuring for the tenant freedom from the exactions of his master, who has on his side the local officials, the force of tradition, and the resources to fight down any move on the part of the tenants to resist his despotism. As regards the question of the crop-shares, while the proposed measure would be a definite improvement on the fifty-fifty basis which generally prevails, the well-known fact that many landlords already take only a one-third share of the crop, shows how moderate it is. Since the tenant has to pay for the implements

and the cattle and also his proportional share of the land revenue and water-rate, this reform merely trifles with the problem of widespread poverty in which the vast majority of our people live. Those 'representatives of the people' who are opposing even this mild reform, presumably on the ground that the land is theirs to do with as they please, might be reminded of the fact that their so-called right to possess the land without working on it is not as old as they imagine. Before the arrival of the British, who created the landlord system as a matter of deliberate policy, the land in theory belonged to the State and in practice to the man who tilled it. The only tax on land was the State tax, which was sometimes diverted wholly to *jagirdars* or partly to rent-collectors. Corruption may have existed, and unscrupulous officials made illegal exactions, or tyrannous *jagirdars* taken more than their dues. This happened usually when chaos prevailed, or a weak Central Government was unable to exercise sufficient control over its distance Provinces. The fact remains, however, that, on the whole, the tiller of the soil was left alone and paid nothing more than one consolidated tax, which varied from one-tenth of his produce to one-fourth. With the arrival of the British this was changed, and the present system of a double tax on the man behind the plough was introduced: one, tax to the State, and two, the landlord's share. The study of an interesting book called The Punjab Chiefs will show how recent the holdings of the big landlord families are, and how all of them were either created or confirmed by the British Raj in return for services rendered. The history of landlordism being what it is in the Province, the protestation of moral or legal grounds put forward by certain MLAs is hardly tenable. The Government need hardly be reminded that, in the matter of improving the lot of the poorest section of our people, it will be supported by 99.9 per cent of the people, and it would be criminal on its part to allow itself to be browbeaten by a group of individuals who were elected to the Assembly on the basis of the League election manifesto. If even such diluted reforms are to be stultified or shelved.

the best course would be to dissolve the present Assembly and give the people another chance to choose more selfless representatives.

^{3 May 1949} Landlords United

The formation of a Chamber of Agriculture in the West Punjab would have been welcomed if it were a genuine move towards investigating and overcoming the serious shortcomings of our agricultural system. But the organisation recently formed under this name, with Malik Firoz Khan Noon as its Founder-President, seems to be nothing more than an association of big landlords organised to fight for the maintenance of their vested interests. The Lahore gathering of Knights, Nawabzadas, Khan Bahadurs, and ex-zaildars was a fairly representative assembly of the class of British-created landlords and jagirdars. These former pillars of the British Raj have now come before the public as well-meaning individuals, seriously interested in agricultural development and agrarian uplift. The mere fact that in Urdu this association for the protection of landlords has been called the 'Anjumani-Kashtkaran' makes it suspect. Some might wonder why these gentlemen have been forced to take time off from shikar and other pleasant diversions to get together and try to think of their future. Were they disturbed by some signs of life among their tenants, or roused by the fear that either the Provincial Government or the Muslim League was about to make a serious effort towards putting our rural economy in order? Judging from the recent actions of the Government and the party, no such revolution appears to be on the cards. Nevertheless, from their narrow point of view, the landlords' move is opportune, because the people of Pakistan are really beginning to realise that the feudal conditions of today are a negation of both democracy and freedom, and that as long as the present set-up remains intact, there can be no real progress—political, social or economic. The widespread

realisation of the urgent need for a change seems to have thrown these gentlemen into a panic, so much so that, discarding the cloak of the Muslim League, they have formed an independent front to preserve their 'professional rights'. The proceedings of the inaugural meeting should convince every honest Pakistani that this latest move on the West Punjab chessboard promises nothing good, and can be regarded as one more attempt to confuse and mislead the people. In his opening address, Mr Noon developed his pet thesis that landlordism hardly existed in the West Punjab and that, in any case, the tenants needed no protection of rights because he was convinced that 'no truly Muslim landlord could possibly cause annoyance to anyone'. The amount of trouble being taken by the Malik Sahib and his friends to preserve and save something that 'hardly exists' is certainly an illuminating contradiction. To dismiss the tenant-landlord question with the conveniently vague remark that efforts should be made for 'promoting a harmonious relationship' shows that the Chamber of Agriculture is living in a world far removed from reality. The fact that the problem of refugee rehabilitation was dismissed with the demand for resuscitating the landlord-holdings of the East Punjab, without giving even a single thought to the fate of the lakhs of poor refugees. provides yet another example to show the real character of this organisation and the predilections of its supporters. The hymn of praise sung to Sir Francis Mudie is also typical of these gentlemen; it is interesting to note that the demand for early Provincial elections was added to the main resolution, supporting the gubernatorial regime, by way of a last-minute amendment. Without the slightest malice, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Mr Noon's Chamber of Agriculture bears a family likeness to the late Chaudhri Sir Chhotu Ram's defunct Zamindara League. It should, however, help to draw public attention to the immediate necessity of reforming our land system and ensuring that West Punjab's biggest industry is organised on a just and scientific basis. It is quite obvious that, unless this is done, the millions of our brethren in the

villages will continue to starve; and progress in our agriculture will proceed, if at all, at a pace that will retard the country's general development and prolong the poverty and backwardness of our people.

7 May 1949 Hari Committee Report

Interesting developments are reported from Karachi in the strange affair of the Sind Hari Committee Report, a part of which has been deliberately suppressed by three successive Muslim League Ministries of that Province. The author of the offending Minority Report, Mr Mohammad Masud, has served a notice on the Sind Government demanding an unqualified apology for its 'premature release' of the Report, and 'disclosure of the names of those Ministers or officials responsible for the leakage'. Mr Masud's demands, accompanied by a threat to sue the Provincial Government for damages amounting to five lakh rupees, are based on the charge that the Government was responsible for the 'wilful premature release' of the Report, which had led to 'one-sided adverse propaganda that has been carried on by a clique of "mullas" and other hirelings'. Whatever the legal implications of the case, and whether the officer concerned succeeds in obtaining satisfaction from a court of law for the alleged harm done to his reputation, we sincerely hope that these novel proceedings will at least compel the Haroon Cabinet to honour its pledge regarding the publication of the Minority Report. Nothing is known by the public of the recommendations made by Mr Masud in his Minute of Dissent, but the fact that the 'big leaders' are all unanimous about keeping it a close secret has whetted public curiosity, and its criticism by a section of 'maulvis' has further encouraged the presumption that it suggests drastic changes in the present land system, and that these findings may be based on the equalitarian economic structure favoured by Islam.

22 June 1949 The Obvious Remedy

The Minute of Dissent to the Hari Committee's Report has at last been published. more than a year after it was first submitted to the Government of Sind. The deliberate suppression by successive League Ministries of an important part of a public document does not redound to the credit of the gentlemen concerned. The present Ministry has done the right thing, but only under strong public pressure and the threat of legal action from the author of the Minority Report. If Mr Yusuf Haroon would like people to believe that this decision was willingly taken, or that the agrarian policies of his Cabinet should be judged by his own speeches and not the actions of Mir Bunde Ali Talpur, the Premier should immediately withdraw the Sind Tenancy Bill, based on the Majority Report of the Hari Inquiry Committee, and bring forward a measure on the lines suggested by Mr M. Masud, The determination with which the Sind Government had sought to conceal this document suggested that the officer concerned had submitted some highly inflammatory material, likely to cause a small revolution if not a full-fledged war. Judging from Press reports, however, Mr Masud's Minute of Dissent is a closely-reasoned document, which gives a factual description of the conditions under which the producers of Sind's wealth are compelled to live; stressing the injustice of the *zamindari* system, it shows that this harsh and immoral dispensation is contrary to the laws and traditions of Islam; and, having made out an unanswerable case for the abolition of landlordism, the author gives a brief outline of the steps which the Government should take in order to guarantee the Haris a life as free human beings. No 'dangerous' slogans have been raised and no 'foreign' doctrines have been advocated: the author has merely made an honest investigation and suggested the obvious remedy. A solution on similar lines has consistently been advocated in these columns and by a large section of the country's Press; it also forms the ostensible basis of the East Bengal Abolition of Zamindari Bill. It is, further, quite certain that the overwhelming majority of Pakistan's people desire a radical change in the present agrarian set-up. The panic which presumably seized the Sind 'leaders' on reading the Minority Report only emphasises the wide gulf that exists between the rulers and those in whose name they profess to rule. Mr Masud's Minute of Dissent, after a detailed discussion of the issues involved, recommends that peasant-proprietorship should replace *zamindari*, that the State should be regarded as the supreme owner of all land, that holdings above a certain limit should be appropriated, and that lease of land for cultivation should be prohibited. It has also been suggested that compensation, to be assessed by a committee of experts, should be given to the present land owners. There will be general agreement with the author's main proposal, namely that interest in the land should be restricted to the actual tiller of the soil and the State: but he has not dealt with a number of points, which must be settled to ensure that any such scheme benefits the cultivator and also helps to improve the standard of agricultural production. The question of compensation is extremely important, for it has been seen that many proposals for the abolition of *zamindari*, like the East Bengal Bill, suggest such a heavy rate of compensation that no direct benefit is likely to accrue from such schemes to the cultivator, while Government will burden itself with a huge debt in an inflationary period. The problem should not be seen from the landlord's point of view, for he has lived on the toil of others for long enough; Government's primary concern should be to benefit the tenant, and also to take the necessary steps to raise production by replacing the present archaic method with modern scientific farming. This calls for big-scale planning, but the first step on the road towards greater national wealth, with happy and prosperous villages, is the abolition of the antiquated feudal regime of today.

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27 June 1951 Land and the Tiller

Reform of the existing land system is quite obviously the most important national task facing the rulers of Pakistan. It is generally accepted now that the present dispensation of the country's agricultural wealth is not only grossly unjust to the tiller, but it also tends to perpetuate antediluvian methods of production. Under a system which has no economic, moral or historical justification, millions of our fellow citizens are condemned to a life of indescribable poverty. Further, the cultivators' limited means discourage all but the most rudimentary efforts to combat ignorance and disease, their low purchasing power acts as a brake on the country's development, and the utter dependence of most of them on the landowners is extremely degrading and helps to corrupt rural society and the country's politics. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that for this section of our countrymen, the establishment of Pakistan will have real meaning only when they are freed from feudal tyranny and are no longer deprived of the fruits of their toil by a system which was installed in this sub-continent by the British in a fairly successful attempt to create a class of soulless sycophants.

Notwithstanding its urgency, the agrarian problem has not yet received proper attention from those in authority in Pakistan's Provinces. So far, East Bengal has taken the biggest step forward, but the legislators' sympathy for the big landlords has persuaded them to evolve a scheme which will afford little or no relief to the oppressed tenant, and its compensation clause may well involve the Government in serious financial difficulties. In the NWFP and, even more so, in Sind, the Governments have merely tinkered with the problem, making no serious attempt even to implement the moderate report of the Agrarian Committee of the Central Muslim League. Political chaos in the Punjab has hitherto barred the way to any definite policy being pursued in this Province. Since the present Government came into power, its

leading spokesmen have repeatedly asserted-among their long list of other promises—that they are determined to carry out a policy of liberal land reforms. The Daultana Ministry is pledged to implement the Muslim League Agrarian Committee's report, but even the far from radical provisions of this document have been watered down to constitute the Government's programme for the first five years. No attempt has yet been made to define this short-term programme, as it has been called, and it seems that the Ministry's intentions will not be known for some time, particularly since the bulk of the Muslim League Assembly Party is known to consist of representatives of the land-owning class. Mr Mumtaz Daultana has, however, held out the promise that his Government's plans for agrarian reform would be ready during the summer, and that necessary legislation would be introduced in the Assembly by September.

The problem of land reforms in the Punjab has two main facets. There is, firstly, the urgent question of finding enough land to rehabilitate all the refugee agriculturists; and secondly, the present system of land tenure has to be replaced by a more humane and equitable arrangement. With regard to the refugees, it is essential that primary consideration should be given to human rather than to property rights. Unless the smaller land-owners and tenants among the refugees, and the non-refugee tenants working on evacuee property, are provided with enough land to give them a reasonable living, the question of resurrecting the big or small feudal estates of East Punjab landlords should not even be considered. It is equally important that the present unduly high rent on evacuee lands should be drastically reduced or abolished. Care should also be taken to avoid forcible ejection of any person working on such lands, and no scheme should be accepted which involves large-scale transfers. As a matter of fact, the thorny problem of finding land for the big refugee landlords would virtually cease to exist if the Government were not so determined to maintain intact the local feudal estates. However, even if no such basic reforms are to be enforced for the present, the absolute minimum demands of the working agriculturists must be accepted and necessary legislation adopted as soon as possible. Apart from stopping the ejection of tenants-orders for which have been issued but, seemingly, without results-all undue exactions must be banned by law, and the present exorbitant rates of *batai* and cash-rents must be immediately and substantially reduced. The rights of landless agricultural workers must be protected and village industries fostered. Bigger changes will also have to be introduced, but these are some of the long-overdue reforms about which there can really be no argument and whose enforcement can brook no delay. The people of the Punjab will look forward with interest to see what interpretation is put on the vaguely-worded points of principle on this subject enumerated in the Ministry's manifesto, for the future of the present Muslim League regime will largely be determined by its agrarian policies.

3 Oct<mark>ober 195</mark>1 Agrarian Reform

The latest decisions of the Muslim League Assembly Party on the question of agrarian reform have confirmed the fear. expressed in these columns three days ago, that the party's leadership might succumb to the sustained pressure exerted by the vociferous group of reactionary landlords who are determined to maintain intact the feudal structure of our rural economy. Precisely this seems to have taken place. On the two most important issues connected with the reform of the land system, the moderate draft proposals—presumably prepared by the Ministry-were abandoned and the antireform group's counter-suggestions accepted. Firstly, it was decided that instead of allowing the tenant to keep a twothird share of the crop he would be given no more than sixty per cent. It is well known that the *batai* system, in which a very slight improvement is envisaged, is grossly unfair to the tenant, who is thereby deprived of the bulk of his net income.

A small increase in the percentage of his share, with a corresponding increase in the usual taxes, will bring the tenant only a negligible amount of relief. That this concession is utterly inadequate is proved by the fact that, even today, in large areas of the Punjab the tenants are receiving as much as two-thirds of the crop. If the 40-60 ratio is made applicable by law, the danger exists that, despite a possible provision for exempting those areas where tenants are already getting more than this, their interests will be adversely affected. Further, no attempt has been made to devise a system for collecting rents which would guarantee that the landlord does not take more than his legal due; while the problem of limiting cash rents was completely ignored.

The second main issue on which the no-changers among the Muslim League landlords won a clear victory is the question of *khud-kasht*. Here, contrary to the earlier proposal, land used for a variety of special purposes-gardens, forests, stud and cattle farms, seed farms and so on-has been declared exempt. Thereafter, instead of the 25-50 acres stipulated in the original plan, it was agreed that 50-100 acres should be allowed to each landlord for what is euphemistically termed self-cultivation, but which in actual fact means that the landlord is free to rent out the land on any terms and conditions he can force upon the cultivators. Quite often, *khud-kasht* land is cultivated by forced labour; but even if begar can be abolished in actual practice, this land will either be rented out at exorbitant rates or landless labourers will be hired to work on it for a pittance. It is presumed, at least by the landlords, that this amount of land will be allowed as khud-kasht to each member of the landlord family. This, in effect, means that many lakhs of tenants, who are now in possession of tenancy rights, will be reduced to the status of landless labourers and—in fact if not in law—made completely dependent on the landlords for their living.

It seems quite obvious that, if the land reform scheme as it has emerged from the recent session of the Muslim League Assembly Party—is adopted by the Punjab Assembly,

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it will certainly not improve present rural conditions in any major aspect and, in some respects, will make things worse for the tenants. Those Muslim League Ministers or MLAs who genuinely believe in the need for reform, and who seriously want to implement their party's manifesto, should realise that the path taken by the party is taking them in the opposite direction. When Mr Mumtaz Daultana said, a few days ago, that such far-reaching changes were going to be introduced in our present agrarian set-up that, thereafter, the tenants' agitation would become 'unjustified'. did he have in mind nothing more than these provisions reluctantly endorsed by his party? The Premier and those of his colleagues who realise the importance of agrarian reform for the future of the country—and, incidentally, of the Muslim League—must realise that the unreal discussion in the Assembly Party, in which the voice of the peasant was heard only by proxy. cannot be regarded as the last word on the subject. If they expect their speeches and pledges to be respected, they must reorganise their strength inside the party to resist the antireform groups and, at least, insist on getting the party's approval for their original proposals. If Mr Daultana takes a determined stand he could easily silence the more selfish landlord elements in his party, for there can be no doubt that. on the question of bringing in some measure of genuine agrarian reform, he will receive the people's full support against those who, for the most mundane motives, want the country to stand still or go backwards.

22 November 1953 avat Institute Agricultural Income

The demand for replacement of the present antediluvian methods of land revenue assessment by a rational system of taxation for agricultural income has been reiterated, at a recent Press conference in Karachi. by Mr Hyder Bux Jatoi, Sind's well-known Hari leader. The proposal is by no means new it has frequently been mooted in the past and has been endorsed in these columns on more than one occasion-but the custodians of political power in this country, who seem blindly pledged to the maintenance of the socio-economic status quo in the countryside—and who depend on the support of the reactionary class of landlords even when they do not belong to it—have never given the matter the serious attention it undoubtedly deserves. The existing rough-and-ready system of land taxation was suited to the age for which it was evolved, and even today, if all the land was more or less equally divided among the cultivators, there would be some grounds for continuing to tax the land at a flat rate instead of taxing the income derived from it. But although, with the introduction of landlordism by the British, the whole basis of our rural economy was changed, the ancient system of taxation has been carefully preserved, except for the fact that it has steadily become more burdensome. It is manifestly unfair that the tenant who cultivates a few acres, or the owner of a small plot of land, should be made to pay the same rate of tax as the masters of the vast *latifundia*. For the former the land revenue may well amount to more than half of his hardearned net income, while in the case of big landlords the amount due to Government, even if the inadequate Agricultural Income Tax is included, constitutes an infinitesimal fraction of their huge unearned incomes. By linking the tax on land to the actual income of the tax-payer. the Government would, without any serious loss to the exchequer, eliminate one of the most glaring injustices of the existing economic set-up; and with agricultural income taxed in accordance with rates applicable to income derived from other sources, it should be possible-among its many other advantages-to encourage the diversion of a greater part of our national wealth to constructive channels and, at the same time, to give sorely-needed relief to the poorer agriculturists, whose economic well-being is an essential prerequisite to any plans for industrial expansion, or for improvement of the standards of health and education in the villages. While the real reason for opposition to any scheme for reforming

agricultural taxation is obvious, it is often said that any change in the simple arrangement now in force would completely upset rural life, and that conditions in the villages do not permit the introduction of a complicated system of tax assessment. This is a fallacious argument, firstly, because tyrannous taxation cannot be justified merely because it can be exacted with ease, and, secondly, because a fairly simple method can certainly be evolved to levy a graded agricultural tax on the basis of the assessee's income. Tax reform on the lines suggested here could become an important factor in improving the life of the bulk of our people, particularly if it is accompanied by an effective check on rack-renting. We hope, therefore, that those interested in transforming the country's agrarian economy will examine the question in all its aspects and work out detailed proposals, so that public opinion can be invoked to demand the introduction of a more rational and equitable system of land taxation.

11 January 1954 Land Reforms

The personnel and terms of reference of the Special Committee appointed by the Punjab Government to study the working of the half-hearted land reforms introduced by the Daultana Ministry, and to recommend necessary changes in the agrarian laws, are certain to be viewed with alarm and despondency by the people of the Punjab, except, of course, for those who have a vested interest in the maintenance of the unjust feudal system. It will be recalled that, since his assumption of power, the Chief Minister has made no secret of the fact that he strongly disapproves of the steps taken by his predecessor to change the land system; but, while much of Mr Noon's criticism was fully justified, instead of devising a plan to remedy the defects of the Daultana scheme, he has been agitating for the restoration of the status quo ante. The Committee chosen to review the question is eminently suited to the task of giving effect to the views held by Chief

Minister. A vast majority of the twenty-five legislators selected are either big landlords or well-known for their bitter opposition to tenancy reform, and at least two of them had the distinction of being driven out of the Muslim League for their refusal to accept the meagre concessions given to the tenants by the earlier regime. As for the officials who have been co-opted onto the Committee to tender expert advice, even if some of them hold contrary opinions-which is by no means certain-their voice will carry no weight with the majority group of MLAs who are determined to reassure their right to ruthless exploitation of the land and those who till it. To describe such a partisan Committee as being representative of 'all the important elements in the rural life of the country', as has been done by an anonymous Government spokesman, is to betray a complete disregard for the truth. It is fairly obvious that a Government which does not recognise the existence of those whose sweat and blood produces our agricultural wealth as an 'important element in the rural life of our country', and a Committee on which there is not a single representative of the tenants or the landless agricultural workers, can hardly be expected to safeguard the interests of those who are in fact the most important element in our rural life—the tillers of the soil.

Such a venture would under any circumstances merit our strongest disapproval, but to embark upon a retrograde undertaking of this sort when our rural economy is in the grip of an acute malaise makes it doubly dangerous. The real task before the Punjab and every other province in Pakistan is to eliminate every vestige of feudalism, to give the tenant full security and a fair return for his labour, to liberate the mass of our people from the shackles of an oppressive, restrictive system of land-tenure, so that they too can feel that the day of freedom has dawned. Not only are these demands endorsed by the elementary principles of social justice, to which so much lip-homage is paid in public speeches, but they constitute an essential prerequisite to the country's overall economic progress.

10 December 1954 Agrarian Reforms

...Since a good majority of its members are well known for their predilection for the landlords' cause, it is not surprising that the Committee's recommendations seek to take away from the tenants the meagre concessions granted to them two years ago. Judging from the Committee's suggestions with regard to the liquidation of occupancy tenancies, by allowing the tenants to acquire proprietary rights over their holdings under certain conditions, and the fact that their retrogressive proposals have received the Assembly Party's approval, it would appear that the party's large reactionary wing has succeeded in its object of stultifying the Daultana Reforms. The rate of compensation to be paid has been enhanced for certain categories of occupancy tenants, and even those landlords who were not entitled to any rent will now receive liberal compensation for giving up what may be called mere paper-ownership of the land. It can confidently be forecast that its other recommendations will also provide evidence of the Committee's strong anti-tenant bias, and that the Muslim League Assembly Party will in effect try to restore to the landlords all the feudal rights and privileges they have enjoyed since the British selected them as the best pillars of a foreign regime.

24 December 1954 Abolition of Jagirdari Institute

If. unlike the similar announcements made in the past, the Sind Government's decision to abolish *jagirdari* is seriously meant to be implemented, it may well be regarded as the best news in many decades for the people of this benighted Province. Today's Sind is the big landlord's paradise. He is the unquestioned master not only of the broad acres he has acquired, by fair means or foul, but also of the miserable human beings who till his land, of their women and children, of their hovels and chattels. The *wadera* is a law unto himself: he recognises no limits on his authority, for ethical considerations do not trouble his conscience, and his influence with the administration prevents the exercise by the hari of the meagre rights that the law of the land has bestowed on him. The feudal pattern of our land system cries out for drastic reform in all parts of the country; but in Sind the prevailing conditions are reminiscent of the worst days of slavery. Land reforms are urgently necessary to improve Pakistan's economy, to pave the way for its industrial progress; but in the land enriched by the lower reaches of the Indus, the human aspect of the problem overrides all other considerations. Here, the present system of land tenure provides the basis for a story of inhuman tyranny, loot, and brigandage, which can find a parallel only in the darkest chapters of man's social history. Not only is the tenant compelled to work for a mere pittance, to live in indescribable poverty, without the most elementary benefits of civilisation, while his parasitic overlord wallows in indecent luxury, but even at this low level of subsistence the *hari* cannot call his life his own. He has no security of tenure, necessity binds him to his tormentor as effectively as the law of villeinage, and neither his life nor the honour of his women is safe.

The harrowing, soul-searing stories of human misery and degradation which sometimes reach the outside world from Sind's interior can leave no doubt in any mind that this state of affairs must immediately be remedied. Yet seven long years have passed since the advent of freedom, and many a fine word has been said on this grim subject by many a Muslim League leader, but, so strong are the feudal elements, that not a single worthwhile step has been taken towards liberating the *hari* from his cruel bondage. With Mr Ayub Khuhro's return to power, a great deal has been heard again from Ministers and official spokesmen about the sorry plight of the tenant and the need of improve his status. It has now been announced that, in accordance with the recommendations of the Experts Committee, all *jagirs* will

be abolished and the land thus released will be distributed among landless peasants. It is estimated that about one million acres will thus be made available for satisfying the landhunger of people who hitherto could not derive much benefit from the vast lands of their rich Province because the landlords treated it as one big *jagir*. The Government's expected gain from land revenue alone is computed at Rs. 20,00,000. If this plan is faithfully implemented, it will undoubtedly improve the situation in Sind. Apart from the direct benefit to those peasants who will receive a piece of land to cultivate for themselves, it will probably also help to improve the tenant's position by increasing his bargaining power vis-a-vis the landlord. It should, however, be realised that this break in the *waderas*' monopoly control of land is only a first step, and that a great deal more must be done if the people of Sind are to be freed from the evils of a system evolved for the benefit of a handful of idle persons at the expense of the millions who work on the land and are the real producers of our national wealth. Among reforms that are immediately necessary to rationalise our agrarian system, a reasonable limit must be imposed on holdings of land, the tenant must be given full security of tenure and guaranteed a proper share of his produce, and the poorer sections of the rural population must be protected against the landlord's illegal exactions and other misdeeds. These measures constitute the very minimum which must be achieved without further delay if, for the vast majority of our people, freedom is to have any real content, and if Pakistan's progress is not to be stultified for the benefit of those who have acquired a vested interest in feudalism.

10 February 1955 Abolition of *Jagirdari*

The Sind Government's decision to abolish all *jagirs* without compensation will be widely welcomed as marking the end of an obnoxious system of political bribery and the first major step towards reforming the Province's antediluvian agrarian set-up.

The present Government of Sind deserves due credit for boldly following the example set a few years ago by the Punjab and the Frontier Province. Apart from its political aspect, the abolition of *jagirs* promises to bring some relief to at least a section of Sind's hard-pressed peasants. It is revealed that 124 *jagirdar* families had under their control one-tenth of Sind's total cultivable land; and of these 11 lakh acres, about 3 lakh acres had not even been brought under the plough. It is estimated that a substantial part of the land to be released from the *jagirdars*' tentacles will be available for distribution among the peasants. Further, the Provincial Exchequer will, with effect from *rabi* 1954-5, start receiving normal land revenue and water rates for the former jagirs instead of the token payment hitherto made by the jagirdars, and this is expected to bring in additional revenue to the tune of Rs. 18.00.000.

While the right to receive land revenue has been extinguished, the vague provisions made by the Sind Government for determining the right of proprietorship over the former *jagirs* provide cause for concern. There are reported to be certain *jagirs* in regard to which ownership is supposed to vest in some person other than the *jagirdar*. But in most cases the *jagirdars* are certain to claim proprietary rights over their former *jagirs*, and may even be able to produce documents of some sort in support of their claim. If the basis of such proprietorship is identical with that of the acquisition of *jagirdari* rights, it cannot, logically, be recognised as possessing any legal or moral sanction. Proprietorship should be accorded recognition only if the

claimant, whether he is the *jagirdar* or someone else, can prove to the satisfaction of a court of law that ownership was acquired through purchase or by other legitimate means. If this is not done and the rules now drafted are retained, the jagirdars will be gifted with vast tracts of land at the small price of paying normal land revenue dues, and the *hari* will receive hardly any relief. The provision for the grant of pensions to jagirdars also appears to be unnecessary andunless the Government is thinking in terms of giving unemployment relief to all classes of persons who have no jobs—completely unjustified. It should either be dropped altogether or be restricted to genuine cases of possible hardship among women. Even if the Government's scheme is implemented in the right spirit, it should be realised that the abolition of *jagirdari* will have made only a small dent in the oppressive feudal structure of Sind's land system, and that if a rational agrarian economy is to be established, in this and other Provinces of Pakistan, the present land-tenure system must be drastically changed to give the peasant a higher standard of living and a bigger stake in the land he tills.

6 July 1956 Bread and Stones

It is depressingly symptomatic of the strange pattern of political life in Pakistan that the call for urgent and farreaching agrarian reforms by the Chairman of the National Planning Board has coincided with reports of repressive measures by the local administration to disperse the ejected tenants who had gathered at Lahore from various Punjab districts with the purpose of beseeching the Provincial Government for justice. It seems necessary to remind those in power that the hundreds of evicted tenants who marched to the capital, and thousands of others like them, are human beings just as much as those who have persistently demanded—and those who have so light-heartedly ordered their ejection from the plots of land on which they lived until

a few days ago. Like everyone else, they, too, have stomachs that must be fed, bodies that must be clothed, families that require shelter and protection, and children whose premature death through malnutrition or unchallenged disease they cannot witness without deep anguish-anguish as deep as that which smites the hearts of the more fortunate when visited by grim personal tragedy. It also cannot be gainsaid although some unprincipled scribes have often advocated Constitutional changes to the contrary—that the landless tenants are equal citizens with the rest of our people, entitled equally to the protection of law, possessing an equal claim on the State for succour; and that their reasonable demands on society deserve serious attention, along with those of the big landlords, the budding business magnates, or the senior officials. The tenants have a right to walk on our roads without interference, even if they do so now only as hungermarchers; they have the right to sit in the capital's gardens, even if they come not to seek pleasure, but in quest of protection on wet nights under scraggly trees or inadequate tents; and, above all else, they have the right to demand that they should not be expelled from the lands they have tilled for many long years. This unkempt, inelegant crowd did not come to Lahore asking for shares in evacuee factories or cinemas; they did not want the allotment of palatial residences; they did not come begging for route permits or refugee doles; this they could not ask for, because they do not control any MLAs' votes and possess nothing else which they could barter for the Government's favour. They came only to ask that they should either be allowed to retain their meagre holdings, or that the Government should honour its oft-repeated, but oft-belied, promise and give them alternative lands. They came to ask for work and bread, and in reply they were given only stones.

The problem of agrarian reforms, of which the question of tenants' rights is a part, should not, however, be approached solely from the human angle—because, other reasons apart, such an approach is likely to leave Pakistan's ruling class completely unmoved. All its facets must be studied with great care. And it will be seen that the broader and more thorough the examination, the clearer and more obvious is the conclusion that the feudal system, with its antediluvian methods, its soul-crushing tyranny, and its unjust foundations, must go, not only because of the demands of human justice, but also because it weakens the democratic basis of our polity and constitutes an insuperable obstacle to Pakistan's economic development. Genuine democracy cannot easily find its roots in the country as long as millions of our people are dependent for their livelihood on the whims of their feudal lords. These gentlemen, after decades of patronage by the British, have got used to exploiting their economic hold over the countryside for political purposes. Not only do the landlords bribe or frighten a considerable section of the electorate into acquiescence, but, as another legacy of the British *raj*, they also exercise undue influence over the administration, and thus often succeed in thwarting the ends of justice. From the economic standpoint, Mr Zahid Hussain has presented a lucid and unanswerable case for immediate agrarian reforms. He has rightly stressed that agricultural production cannot be expected to increase until the tiller of the soil is given security of tenure, a larger share in the fruits of his toil, and the guarantee that his rights in the land are inviolable. The thesis propounded by the Chairman of the Planning Board and his proposals for reform are, however, not new. Similar plans have been put forward again and again by different persons and bodies. Even the Muslim League Working Committee once endorsed a fairly reasonable scheme of land reforms. But, as far as its practical effects are concerned, all this labour has been in vain, because when it comes to implementing the recommendations made by the various committees and commissions, the type of leadership that has been in office in Pakistan since the dawn of independence finds itself unable to move forward.

Not only are they blindly devoted to the big landlords' interests, but the gentlemen who head the administration and

their minions seem to be callous and indifferent to the sufferings of the common people. The problem of tenants, for example, has assumed such proportions because of past neglect, and it is now being allowed to lead to a crisis because those in office are in such a great hurry to befriend their landlord supporters that they have no time to think of the consequences of their actions. These consequences cannot be made to disappear under a shower of stones or threats of dire action; they will remain like a running sore in the socioeconomic set-up until the causes of the malady are removed. And, as for the aesthetes in the administration who have suddenly grown apprehensive about Lahore's sanitation, and betray such novel concern about recreation facilities for the women and children of Mochi Gate, one wonders if they could allow their sensitive souls to be disturbed by realisation of the harsh fact that a low, common instinct, the fear of hunger, has driven the unwashed and unfed tenants to Lahore. Faced with a deepening crisis, even Dr Khan Sahib has found it necessary to misuse the name of Islam in an effort to save the large unearned incomes of his *jagirdar* friends and fellow-Ministers. They should realise, however, that, without any basis in economic or social justice, feudalism is doomed. Today the tenants are weak; they lack organisation and have no proper leadership. But when they fully realise their inherent strength, are able to unite, and can replace their timid leaders, they will rise like an irresistible phalanx and storm the citadel of power to oust the tyrants and usurpers. The representatives of the big landlords may for some time more be able to delay the change, but they certainly cannot stop it. And the more foolishly the feudal elements behave today, the more rapid will be the inevitable advance of agrarian reforms, and the more fearful the retribution that will be imposed on those who used inhuman and unfair methods to delay the progress of Pakistan and hinder the liberation of the biggest section of its people.

22 September 1957 Agrarian Reforms

While scores of official reports and plans on the subject of agrarian reforms gather mildew in Government store-houses, another Commission is to be appointed to study West Pakistan's agricultural economy, and another scheme has been put forward for mitigating the evils of the existing system.

The people might well ask the Government to explain what facet of the agricultural system is still hidden so completely that it requires a new Commission to expose it. Why cannot action be taken on the basis of the various reports that adorn the State archives? What has happened to the plan which the Prime Minister, Mr H. S. Suhrawardy, promised to draw up many long months ago? Before making his announcement, did the Food Minister consult Mr Abdus Sattar Pirzada—who holds rather novel views on the question—and has the West Pakistan Cabinet decided in favour of implementing a genuine scheme of land reforms? If satisfactory answers to these questions are not made available, it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Republican Ministry is trying, in the accepted tradition, to smother the demand for early action in the matter of reforming the land system by calling for the creation of yet another Commission

⁸ November 1958 Agrarian Reforms Institute

Within a month of its assumption of power, the new regime has achieved notable success in uprooting the worst evils that had bedevilled the administration and were steadily driving the country towards economic chaos and bankruptcy. Bribery in all its hideous forms has been checked, inflationary price trends have been controlled, the hoarder and smuggler are on the run, and, generally speaking, the administrative machinery is working a great deal more efficiently. However, these are short-term tasks, presenting a process of clearing the decks for action to overcome Pakistan's more deep-rooted maladies. Nearly all economic experts are agreed that the most important among the bigger tasks of national reconstruction facing Pakistan is the re-organisation of agriculture, for which far-reaching agrarian reforms are considered to be an essential prerequisite. It is heartening, therefore, that the administration has given this matter high priority, and that a Commission is already grappling with the problem.

In dealing with what is a vast and many-sided problem, it appears necessary that the worst malpractices of the existing system should be dealt with before setting about the bigger task of reform. The administration should issue strict instructions to all Government functionaries calling upon them to faithfully implement the law and to show no favouras they have done in the past—to the rich and hitherto influential. In the matter of reforming the set-up, the first aim should be to guarantee security of tenure for the cultivators, and to establish fair land rents. The law governing the ejection of tenants should be made more strict in order to eliminate all possibility of its being misused to harass the cultivator. With regard to rents, a ceiling must be fixed on cash rents, depending on the value of the land, so that the rack-renting that now occurs on all lands not occupied by regular tenants can be stopped. The *batai* system should be carefully examined. The 40:60 crop-sharing ratio between the landlord and the tenant is by no means as fair to the tenant as it might appear. It should be remembered that the labour, seed, cattle, and all other requirements, are usually provided by the tenant, and that the landlord makes no investment whatsoever. If the cost of these services is calculated, it will be seen that the tenant's share of the profit is negligible, and, in some cases, he gets no profit at all. Apart from ensuring a better return to the cultivator for his labour, Authority should examine the question of introducing a system of rent payment that is efficient and leaves no scope either for a tenant cheating his landlord or a landlord oppressing his tenant, as, for example, by making rents payable with the land revenue—the revenue authorities being responsible for its collection from the tenants and payment to the landlords.

The question of rationalising land holdings requires, firstly, that the work of consolidating all present holdings must be speeded up. Next, land must be found for those who possess uneconomic holdings and a limit must be placed on the area of land that any one person can own. Hitherto, it has always been said that land reforms were an impossible task because no Government would dare annov the landlords--even if this was necessary to save the country from ruin—and that the rigid Constitutional provision regarding compensation presented an insurmountable hurdle. Now that neither of these considerations stands in the way, the new Government can be expected to fix a reasonable descending scale of compensation for the land acquired from the big landlords. In this connection, it is also pertinent to point out that the East Pakistan Land Acquisition Act should be revised. Incidentally, while these measures are being discussed, benami transfers of land should be stopped.

With these or similar measures of land reform Pakistan will move forward towards the creation of a rural society of peasantproprietors. And once the dark shadows of social oppression and economic stagnation have been removed, and the cultivator is in a position to think beyond his struggle for two square meals a day, a vast new market would open up for indigenous manufacture, and the various schemes for his uplift that have been devised from time to time but have never worked properly, can be given a real start. Plans for adult education, village aid, the introduction of scientific farming methods, the expansion of cottage industries, and co-operative farming, could be pushed forward with certainty of success. So important is this task for the future of Pakistan that, even if the present regime were unable to accomplish anything else, it would earn for itself a high place in Pakistan's history for reforming the agrarian setup and thus laying the foundation for a stable economy and a truly democratic polity.

26 January 1959 Historic Decision

Except for those among the big landlords and their friends who are blinded by cupidity or prejudice, the country will accept the Government's scheme of land reforms in West Pakistan as a historic decision and welcome it as the first big step towards the reorganisation and strengthening of Pakistan's economy. For many years now, every student of elementary economics, every expert invited to study Pakistan's economic crises, every committee appointed to survey the agrarian setup, and, in fact, every level-headed layman who gave serious thought to the matter, has believed that Pakistan's agriculture must be freed from feudal shackles if it is to develop into a modern State. Yet, in eleven years, despite generous promises and loud slogan-mongering—which merely provoked some of the bigger landlords to take evasive action to protect their vested interests—no worthwhile measures were undertaken to eliminate the worst features of an antediluvian land system foisted on this country by an alien regime about a century ago. The speed with which the new regime has come to grips with the problem shows that the Government is well aware of its significance and of the urgent need for a solution. President Mohammad Ayub Khan has pointed out, in his broadcast speech announcing the plan, that his Government's aim is to 'devise a rational land tenure policy which will satisfy the social need for greater equality of opportunity and social status, and...the economic need for increasing agricultural production and improving the standard of rural living through a more equitable distribution of income from land', and further that, 'the setting up of the Commission was a link in the chain of measures that we propose to take to create an economically viable, socially free and politically stable and progressive society'. These aims will be widely endorsed; and, in fact, the Government's policy decisions will invariably be judged by the people in the light of the principles of equity and social justice outlined by the President.

While detailed appraisal of the plan must await publication of the Commission's Report and the relevant Martial Law Regulation, its main features clearly represent a laudable effort towards fulfilling Government's policy aims. Among other measures, a limit has been placed on agricultural holdings; jagirdari has been abolished: small holdings will be consolidated and, wherever possible, supplemented to form workable units: land rents will be frozen: occupancy tenants will be given ownership rights in accordance with their shareinterest in the land; and compensation will be paid for all land acquired by the State. Each facet of the proposed land reform law will require close study. Our present comments will, therefore, be confined to some of its salient features particularly where revision seems necessary in order to make the law uniformly applicable to all categories of big landlords. In the first place, it is pertinent to point out that the ceiling of 36.000 produce index units is rather high, especially when compared to the recommendations of earlier committees and commissions. Even a conservative body like the Muslim League Land Reforms Committee recommended an upper limit of 150 acres of canal-irrigated land. However, since this figure forms the basis of Government's rehabilitation policy for refugee landlords, it will probably be regarded as a reasonable compromise between the demands of those who want the maximum holding to be much smaller and those whose formulae could be likened to the bogus land reforms introduced in the Punjab and NWFP some years ago.

In addition to the basic exemption of 36,000 produce index units, a landlord will be permitted to keep orchards extending to 150 acres, and to transfer land to his heirs, provided that the total area of additional exemptions does not exceed 18,000 produce index units. It is gratifying that any land gifted by a landlord after 14 August 1947 will be included in the area that is now being allowed for his heirs. Further, those who received their land as a gift cannot re-gift it, and will only be able to keep the basic 36,000 units for themselves. This, again, is a reasonable restriction. It is most

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surprising, however, that full cognizance has not been taken of all such land transfers since 1947. As the Commission must know, talk about land reform began soon after Partition. The publication of the Muslim League Land Reforms Committee's report gave an impetus to the popular demand for radical changes in the land system. The Agricultural Income Tax introduced in the Punjab and NWFP, and the Estate Duty, also made landlords conscious of the advantages of dividing up their estates among their heirs. Many did so with impunity. But there seems to be no good reason why those who gifted away their land in order to avoid paying taxes or to save themselves from future land reforms should now be allowed to cash in on their anti-social circumspection. while those landlords who were honest and refrained from such improper action will suffer by comparison. Why should a premium be placed on trickery? Why should honesty be penalised? It appears reasonable and just that all transfers made since August 1947 should be taken into consideration when computing the share of his land that a landlord and his family can now retain. And it would not be difficult to check on such transfers, because the investigation would be necessary only in the case of persons who own a great deal more than 500 acres of land and who have made big transfers to their heirs.

Similarly, it seems strange that no provision has been made with regard to *khud kasht* lands, except in so far as it is laid down that tenants will not be ejected on the plea of the land being required for *khud kasht*. This provision is in itself unexceptionable. But it needs to be remembered that, at least in the Punjab, as a result of the so-called land reforms introduced by the Daultana Ministry, the question is important and has to be dealt with. Although the relevant law was never fully implemented, a large number of landlords, through fair means or foul, have had their lands vacated and, in theory, brought under *khud kasht*. *Khud kasht* lands have become highly coveted property whose income and value are greater than those of lands under cultivation by tenants. Here, again, landlords who have acted unscrupulously will be at an advantage over those who respected the law and the rights of their tenants. It is clearly necessary that this question should also be examined by the Commission, in order to ensure that all landlords are treated on a uniform basis, making equal sacrifices and getting equal privileges. It would, perhaps, be best if a limit, say fifty acres, were fixed as the maximum allowed for *khud kasht*.

And, lastly, the Commission's attention is invited to the fact that the land reform law cannot logically be made applicable to lands that lie within a municipal or corporation area. For example, there will hardly be a town in which somebody owns land in excess of fifty acres: and in towns where housing schemes are gradually eating up the tilled area, land must be sold in small plots or not at all. Seemingly this aspect of the matter has been overlooked by the Commission. We hope that necessary emendations to deal with these and certain other issues will be incorporated in the Martial Law Regulation that will be issued to implement the land reform scheme evolved by the Government.

II. THE GUILTY MEN

13 April 1952 The Guilty Men

The living conditions of that section of our people who suffer the most from a state of economic instability, and benefit the least during periods of comparative prosperity, seldom receive the public attention they undoubtedly deserve. Although such persons constitute a considerable part of our population, their needs and longings, their feelings and desires, are rarely given any consideration, and their sorry state is noticed by those more fortunately placed in life only when a large-scale visitation of flood, famine or epidemic adds to the normal misery of their lives. For instance, it does not seem to have been fully realised that the prevailing food crisis in the Punjab has had a calamitous effect on the poorest class of our citizens—in both rural and urban areas. Government's belated and inadequate efforts to deal with the spiralling food prices have not gone very far towards improving the overall situation, except for the fact that in a few towns the food position would have become much worse if no action at all had been taken. Faced already with the grave difficulties created by widespread unemployment and a low wage-level, the black-market prices at which foodgrains were available during the last few months have served to inflict varying degrees of starvation on many lakhs of our people, and have brought some to the end of their tether.

In recent weeks a number of cases of suicide have been reported and, since news of such tragedies usually reaches the Press only when they occur in the bigger towns, it is likely that many more have been driven by the harsh circumstances of life to end their pitiable existence. But the most harrowing tale of human despair comes from a village in Murree tehsil. It is reported that a villager named Abdullah, obviously demented by hunger, arranged to sell his child for a sum of forty rupees—presumably so that the rest of the family could buy food for a few days. In this case, the unnatural sale of a child by his own father was thwarted by the other villagers, who raised a subscription to restore the child to the unfortunate parent; but such seemingly insane deeds are not always prevented by kind neighbours, and many otherwise perfectly normal persons are finding themselves driven to inhuman acts either against themselves or against those whom they love and cherish.

When anybody is placed in such difficult circumstances, when he finds that his best efforts cannot procure the means of sustenance for himself and his family, it is useless, nay callous, to point out to him that his mad action offends against the law; nor can he be expected to appreciate any reproach from the standpoint of morality. Abdullah and others like him cannot be unaware of the fact that they are committing a grave crime—one which must rend their own hearts and sear their very souls. But are they really the guilty party? He who would hastily condemn such victims of our present society, let him search his own mind and tell himself truthfully what path he would tread in similar circumstances. Surely, the guilt lies with those who are responsible for creating conditions where a fond father can be made to think in terms of temporarily satisfying his hunger by offering his own offspring as a saleable commodity. The guilty men are those whose lust for profit is uninhibited by any regard for the thousands they condemn to slow death by their hoarding and profiteering. The guilty men are those who serve as accomplices of these merchants of death for the sake of a share in their illegal gains. The guilty men are those whose sense of duty is overcome by selfishness or callousness, and those who cling to positions of authority but lack either the ability or the will to safeguard public interest. Let these guilty men tremble; for the day of reckoning must come, when their fine vestments of ill-gotten wealth or authority will be taken off and they will be arraigned by the people of Pakistan and made to answer for their crimes.

4 July 1952 Discovery of Dandot

The General Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League, after a brief visit to Dandot. in Jhelum district, has expressed his surprise at the fact that a full working day of hard manual labour in the local cement factory brings the workers no more than the miserable wage of ten or twelve annas, while those who work in the neighbouring coalmines under the most primitive conditions receive an average daily wage of one rupee eight annas. The surprised Muslim League leader admits that such low wages cannot guarantee the workers two square meals a day, and that they receive no other amenities, and even compensation for injury or death is rarely paid to the worker or his dependants. With his awareness and conscience thus aroused by first-hand experience, one might have expected the gentleman, who is also a member of the Pakistan Parliament, to pledge himself to a campaign in defence of the workers' rights. Only the other day, on his return from an ILO conference at Geneva, Pakistan's Labour Minister proudly revealed that his Government had ratified twenty-one progressive ILO Conventions, which is more than any other Asian or African country has done. Syed Khalil-ur-Rehman could easily devote some of his time to persuading the Minister and the Government to realise that ratification of such Conventions is somewhat meaningless unless it is accompanied by their implementation. The Muslim League leader could also use his influence in the Punjab and at the Centre to divest the administration of its bias against trade union activity, and to urge upon them the desirability of releasing all detained trade union leaders.

If any of these or similar courses of action, likely to benefit the workers, has suggested itself to Syed Khalil-ur-Rehman, he makes no mention of it in his Press statement. Instead, he arrives at a conclusion that will cause as much surprise to those who read about it as its author felt when he discovered at Dandot that the working class in Pakistan lives on the verge of starvation and labours under inhuman conditions. The Muslim League dignitary concludes that 'with such labour conditions, rapid industrialisation is out of time and tune'. He further reveals that 'we have no gold or silver mines', and he declares that the 'robust, honest, hard-working people working in the fields, offices, or in the mines, are our only capital, and we must preserve them and enhance their morale'. Unless the gentleman has been grossly misreported, his statement is not likely to add to his political stature. Can he or his party offer no practical solution for remedying the grave disabilities under which our semi-starved workers live? How exactly are we to 'preserve' our hard-working people and enhance their morale? And how long are we to wait before it will be the correct 'time and tune' to start talking about rapid industrialisation? While it is gratifying that the General Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League has bothered

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to interest himself in the wretched conditions of the country's poorest workers, it seems he was too overcome with surprise to be able to deal with the connected economic and social problems with any semblance of clarity and logic. One would like to hope that he and his colleagues will ponder over the issues involved and, realising that fine words butter no parsnips, evolve a positive, common-sense attitude towards the problem of improving the living standards of our working class.

22 July 1953 Pakistan's Crisis

Although in Pakistan, as in every other country with a backward and unplanned economy, cases of unbearable human suffering—which condemns its helpless victims to the torture of slow starvation or provokes them to break the bonds of normal human behaviour—have not been altogether unknown, during the last two years the number of such cases reported from our towns and villages has increased, and their character seems to have become more ghastly. Yesterday's local newspapers carried reports of two soul-searing incidents which cannot be ignored even by the most callous of human beings, and whose frequency must not be allowed to dull the edge of public reaction to what are the ugly symptoms of grave socio-economic maladies. The first report relates the tragic story of a jobless young man who, having failed in his quest for employment, sat down to rest in the garden outside Shahalami Gate and suddenly collapsed. He was brought to the Mayo Hospital where he died within twenty-four hours. His disease was reportedly diagnosed as prolonged malnutrition; in other words, he died of starvation. The second report, even more harrowing, describes how an unemployed worker in Jhelum's Machine Mohalla was driven to sell his only son for the paltry sum of twenty-two rupees in order to pay off a loan incurred to keep himself and his family alive. If we remember the not infrequent Press reports of suicides

or other inhuman crimes, committed by men and women made desperate by hunger, and also that only a small percentage of such cases is reported, a grim picture emerges of what the present state of Pakistan's economic affairs means for a large section of our people.

No further words are needed to underline the urgent need for remedial action, for no right-thinking person who is acquainted with the facts can fail to agree that the present position can no longer be tolerated, and that the Government must devote their wholehearted attention to the question of saving our people from the effects of the present crisis. It will be recalled that for many long months, despite warnings from various quarters, the steady deterioration in the country's economic position was ignored by those in power. And when finally the existence of the crisis could no longer be denied, the greater part of Authority's energy was devoted to disowning responsibility for what was happening. Government's failure to counter in good time the ill-effects of a one-sided recession in the Western world market was made more dismal by their inability to take the required action even at a later date, by their chronic dependence on foreign help, and by the general inefficiency and inter-departmental squabbling which created a virtual hiatus in policy-making, and frustrated the implementation of what half-hearted policies were written out on paper. If things are to improve, the bitter lessons of the recent past must goad our rulers into devising a clear-cut economic plan to tackle at least the basic economic questions facing the country-as, for instance, the agrarian problem, whose solution needs no foreign aid of any description. In fact, the main requirements of today's situation are plain common sense and the will to achieve the desired goal even if it calls for certain sacrifices from those who can well afford to make them. We hope the new Government at the Centre will prove capable of following this straight path, for the alternative is that the country's economic crisis will continue to worsen, with our people sinking deeper into the mire of physical misery and moral degradation. It should also be realised by the leaders of the party in power that they possess no perpetual right to misrule the country, and that their continued failure to safeguard the people's most elementary rights is certain to hasten the stage when the demand for their removal from the seat of power will become irresistible.

29 January 1957 Conspiracy of Silence

Miss Fatima Jinnah has, most aptly, drawn the country's attention to the current food crisis and its basic causes, and has underlined the fact that failure to apply the required remedies can only lead to further economic chaos and distress. Pointing out that the mere raising of food prices provided no solution at all, and that the benefit from the rise in prices would only add to the profits of the big landlords, the middlemen, and the black-marketeers, she stressed the obvious fact that a reorganisation of the agricultural system, providing proper incentives to the cultivator, was the only answer to the problem of food shortages. She concluded, rightly, that *sound agricultural consolidation can only rest on an equitable agrarian system which eliminates parasitism and exploitation. and that 'Pakistan's industrial progress can only be built up on strong agricultural foundations'. Miss Fatima Jinnah has also pointed out that every major reform, social or economic, must necessarily impinge upon some vested interests, and that 'when the interests of millions of common men are suffering because of the vested interests of a few, it is the former that must get precedence.

These are self-evident truths: but in the circumstances prevailing in this country, they need to be repeated, again and again, until they can be made to influence official policies.

20 February 1957 Economic Policies

The country-wide debate on the national Budget has helped to focus attention on a number of important factors governing Pakistan's economic life. Among other things, the lesson has been driven home that in certain respects Pakistan is living beyond its means, that it has accepted a dangerous measure of dependence on foreign aid, and that the most important sector of its economy, namely, agriculture, is also the most neglected. It is generally agreed that henceforth a larger share of the resources available to the Government should be devoted to the renovation and development of agriculture. While there can be no disagreement whatsoever with the demand for increased agricultural production, it is impossible to accept the novel thesis that greater attention can be given to agriculture only at the expense of our nascent industries. The talk one hears of 'a shift from industry to agriculture' is totally meaningless. Nor is it enough to suggest that existing industries should not be abandoned, or that industries depending on local raw materials should continue to be encouraged. This, of course, must be done. But it is equally necessary that Pakistan's plans for further industrial development should not be shelved. If financial stringency or other difficulties make it unavoidable, our new projects can be spread over a slightly longer period. But the theory that Pakistan's hope of prosperity lies in giving up its plans for industrialisation is palpably wrong; it must be resisted and exposed. 1113111111

Many of the Pakistan Government's foreign advisers are, of course, of the opinion that Pakistan should steer clear of large-scale industrialisation and concentrate on agriculture and subsidiary or minor industries. Pakistan can accept this opinion only at the risk of mortgaging its future. It is true that the country has paid a heavy price for the modest measure of industrialisation that has been achieved, but it should be obvious that if Government planning had been more efficient, and if a serious effort had been made to control arbitrary prices and high profits, there is no reason why such a heavy burden should have been imposed on the consumers. One result of the resultant chaos has been that, psychologically, some of our people have become receptive to the fallacious argument that Pakistan's redemption lies wholly in agriculture. The country's economists and those interested in its future welfare should take due notice of this dangerous drift in economic thinking, and disprove before our people the false doctrines that are being propagated on the subject of industrialisation.

Another subject of national importance which has recently been enshrouded in confusion is that of land reforms. It is now accepted by every intelligent student of Pakistan's crisis that radical reform of the land system is a prerequisite to the desired improvement in agricultural production. But certain advocates of land reforms have thought of a strange new condition which, they say, should be fulfilled before the feudal privileges of the landlords are restricted. In a recent speech. Mr Daultana declared that radical land reforms must be accompanied by similar reforms in the industrial field. For example, if it was considered necessary to introduce small proprietorship in agriculture, the same principle must apply to industry, and if the profits of the landlords were to be reduced, a similar policy should be applied to the owners of industry. The Muslim League leader's possible political motives for putting forward this line of argument are reasonably plain. And one can safely assume that the Finance Minister considered it appropriate to endorse Mr Daultana's views for more or less similar reasons. We refuse to believe, however, that Mr Daultana-or even Mr Amjad Ali-fails to understand the difference in the position of the feudal landlords and industrial magnates: that whereas the average landlord makes no investment in the land he owns, the industrialists make a direct investment, and the existence of the industry depends on their contribution; that whereas the introduction of peasant-proprietorship would help to boost

agricultural production and pave the way for co-operative farming, similar action in respect of industry, namely, its break-up into small units, would reduce its output. Further, while we are wholly in favour of strict control of industrial profits and the expansion of the public sector in industry, with industrialisation in its present stage, it is utterly ridiculous to talk of socialisation of private industries. To equate industry with agriculture in the matter of ownership and control is illogical, and the only result it can-and is probably meant to-have is to hold up agrarian reforms. We earnestly hope that the full implications of the thesis adumbrated by Mr Daultana, probably with his tongue in his cheek, and endorsed so glibly by the Finance Minister, will be viewed as representing a grave danger to the country's progress, and that the proposal it contains will be rejected as being wholly unrealistic and unreasonable.

22 June 1958 Lyallpur Killing

The early morning calm of Lyallpur [Faisalabad] was shattered on Friday, 20 June 1958, by a volley of cruel rifle fire, and in fifteen dreadful minutes the area of a local strikebound mill was bespattered with the blood of its workers. At least six workers were killed and twenty-one more seriously injured, two of whom are stated to be hovering between life and death. This gory display of force took place when a crowd of striking workers sought to enter the mill, following the arrest of the President of their hastily-formed union, and were prevented from doing so by a posse of the local police. According to available information, the police officer did not ask the workers to disperse before resorting to force; he did not order a lathi-charge, nor was tear-gas used, and he gave no warning to the workers that the police were going to shoot at them. In explanation of this gruesome event, it is said that the workers threw brickbats at the police, and that a revolver belonging to the ASI on duty was taken away from him by force. Some of this may be true, but the story is too stereotyped to gain credence without the support of substantial evidence. And if, as it is alleged, the attitude of the workers had throughout been threatening, and an outbreak of violence was apprehended by the authorities. why was no preventive action taken, and why was no senior official present when the President of the workers' union was arrested? Further, in view of the heavy casualties, the claim that only thirty rounds were fired, apart from illustrating the policemen's extraordinary marksmanship, tends to show that the purpose of the firing was not so much to disperse the workers as to hit them. At the same time, the injuries to the policemen are reported to be extremely slight. All these are significant facts, and will no doubt be thoroughly investigated by the officer deputed to hold a judicial inquiry into the Lyallpur killing.

With regard to the background of the tragedy. it is reported by independent observes that the strike did not start—or, at least, it was not conducted—as a straightforward clash between the workers and the management of the mill. The chief role was played, rather incongruously, by the factory's Security Officer. Later, the Jamaat-i-Islami, which was providing the strikers with political leadership, is said to have avoided a settlement by spurning the mediation offers of an all-parties' committee, allegedly with a view to making political capital out of the strike. It is also said that the President of the Union had gathered round him a band of desperadoes who had pledged themselves to fight for him against arrest or harassment. All this may well be true. It is also possible, as has been reported, that the attitude of the mill management was quite reasonable.

Nevertheless. the fact remains that these factors do not provide the slightest justification for the killing at the mill gate, and it is on this episode that we wish to focus attention. Far too many of our policemen seem to have far too little respect for the lives of our poorer citizens, be they millworkers or tenants or mere nobodies. Far too often these gun-wielding custodians of the law fail to act impartially between two sections of our citizens, particularly when they are called upon to protect the privileges of the rich and influential. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that this incident should be thoroughly and impartially probed, so that, on the basis of the inquiry officer's findings, the police can take effective steps to instil among its junior officers and men a better understanding of the fact that in Pakistan, as in every democratic State, the lives of the poor are as precious as those of the more fortunate citizens—and certainly a great deal more precious than any businessman's profits.

The West Pakistan Chief Minister has done well to rush to Lyallpur to survey the situation for himself, and to order a prompt inquiry into the grim affair. It is also gratifying that he has persuaded the management to grant immediate compensation to the families of those killed and to the injured workers. However, this will be looked upon as mere bloodmoney unless these gestures are followed by an impartial inquiry and, once the facts are fully established, condign punishment for everyone found guilty. Nothing less than this can satisfy either the workers of Lyallpur or the people of Pakistan. While the Provincial Government's move has deservedly been welcomed, the Prime Minister's statement on the subject will be received with consternation. Mr Firoz Khan Noon, if he has been correctly reported, seems to have taken no interest in the reported loss of life; he is concerned only about ensuring that 'industrial units, set up at great cost to the country, are not subverted or disturbed by undue strife', and has asked the West Pakistan Government to take 'firm measures' to protect and preserve this 'powerful national asset'. Few will contest the wisdom of all that he has said, but it seems necessary to remind the Prime Minister that human life, even on the low level of an industrial worker's existence, also deserves to be preserved and protected; that when, on the one hand, a number of lives have been lost and, on the other, a factory has merely been closed for a few days, one would expect Mr Noon to offer a word of condolence to the wives suddenly widowed or the children orphaned; and

that firm measures must be taken, in the first place, to guarantee the people's lives and liberties. Pakistan's industries are important to the country, but not more important than the lives of its people. Already, because of the factory-owners' inflated profits and, in some cases, black-market activities, the people have paid in sweat and bitter tears to build up and sustain these industries; they cannot be asked to pay a still heavier price. Pakistan's industries must surely be made into monuments to national progress and prosperity; they cannot be treated as sacrificial altars presided over by high priests whose rights are sacred and holy. Let this be clearly understood by those in office, and let their policies be guided by these simple truths, for otherwise they will neither be entitled to, nor will they obtain, the support of the people.



Gul Hayat Institute

Section 8: Of Morals and Men Civic Problems, Education, and Miscellaneous

Gul Hayat Institute



Gul Hayat Institute

18 October 1947 Black Market in Cigarettes

In the last few days many articles of daily use have exhibited a mysterious shyness towards presenting themselves for public sale at reasonable prices. The list of commodities which are thus denied to the public at normal prices is lengthy; but for the moment we will leave the unwashed citizens to complain of the steep rise in the price of the soap. the unshaven to lament the lack of razor blades; we will ignore the housewife standing before an unlit fire with an empty matchbox in her hand or the poor student trying to write with a pencil one inch in length. Our cry today is on behalf of that large mass of Lahore's loyal and law-abiding citizens who are devoted to Dame Nicotine. They have found, in the last week or so, tobacco goods dwindling and disappearing from most of the respectable shops. Cigarettes not available at licensed shops have been sold in shops which have never before sold any tobacco, or are hawked by streeturchins at abnormally high prices. A packet which costs 8 annas in the morning has doubled its price by the end of the day. This black-marketing is not being done under the counter. It is open and public. The sorely tried citizens would like to know why all this is allowed to happen when there are various laws to prevent it. The Tobacco Vend Fees Act should prevent unlicensed shops and hawkers from selling any cigarettes at all, leave alone cornering all the supplies as they seem to have done. The Price Control Act should prevent the exorbitant prices being charged. The crime we have pointed out may seem trivial to non-smokers, but it is a crime

nevertheless. The wholesale dealer who supplies his goods to unauthorised persons for a consideration is a criminal, the unlicensed shops and hawkers who sell these tobacco goods without a license and at swollen prices are doubly criminals; and the excise and police Inspectors whose job it is to prevent breaches of the law, by not doing so, are criminals at large. All these agencies are aiding or abetting various offences to defraud the State of its revenue and deprive a large number of citizens of an honest, peaceful smoke. The custodians of law, we hope, will act and save the jagged nerves of many Lahore citizens from further deterioration.

7 February 1948 Down the drain

The speech by the new Mayor of Lahore to a special meeting of the Councillors and the Corporation officials reads like a drain-inspector's report and the Mayor deserves public thanks from the citizens of Lahore for putting their case against the Corporation so effectively. The facts, however, are not new and were publicly known, at the cost of the health and welfare of Lahore's citizens. The importance and the original aspect of the speech is that it does not come from the President of the Rate-Payers' Association with a clamour for reduced taxes, but from the Mayor himself, and that also not before but after his election. The Mayor dealt with the state of affairs of the Corporation department by department. According to him the whole set-up is pervaded with indolence and corruption, nepotism and jobbery. The Education Department was held guilty of everything except the proper education of those in its charge, the Accounts Department did not keep proper accounts, the Town Planning Department did not plan any part of the town and instead allowed unplanned structures to be built by unauthorised persons. The PWD neglected its work and the Circular Gardens were being gradually 'degardened'. The Electricity Department, the Mayor complained, did not provide electricity where needed, and

when it did so, refused to collect payments for its supply of electric current. To the general charges against the Health Department he added an additional one of snobbery, in that not only were medicines misappropriated and bribes taken, but the doctors paid out of public funds refused to visit the houses of the poor. The Ministry, he said, did not co-operate or consult the Corporation, and the Councillors themselves more often than not reduced their meetings to the level of a fish-market, through an over-enthusiastic devotion to party bickerings and controversies. In short, he lamented that everything was wrong and nothing was right. There are few who will fundamentally disagree with the analysis presented by the First Citizen of Lahore, for there is today sufficient visual and olfactory evidence to justify Lahore's reputation of being the worst-administered city in Pakistan, and what is so obvious in the context of sanitation applies equally to the other realms of the Corporation's activities. There is, however, one aspect of the duties which go with local selfgovernment that the Mayor did not point out. The city of Lahore and other cities and towns in the Province and country have for a number of years had Municipalities and Corporations and, whatever the degree of their failings in the matter of social or sanitary services, they have all failed equally in their most important duty-the development of a civic sense among the people. In the past this failing may have been and was rightly attributed to the fact that local self-government was such only in name, and the Municipalities and Town Committees were dominated and controlled by the foreign bureaucrats, leaving little room for local leadership or initiative. This, however, no longer applies. We would, therefore, urge upon the Corporations and Municipalities of the country the importance of this aspect of their existence. It is this function which, in foreign countries, makes the Mayor of the capital city second in importance only to the country's Prime Minister. While we wish the new Mayor all success in the future, and we trust that soon our drains will be clean, our schools impart an healthy education, and our gardens bear fruit and flower, we also hope that the Mayor and the Councillors will undertake the even more important task of developing, by example and precept, a civic sense of duty and responsibility among the people.

20 August 1948 Lahore Telephones

The Lahore Telephone Exchange, like similar systems the world over, is intended to enable subscribers to converse with each other by use of their telephones. Lahore has an automatic exchange. The supposition on which the system works is that when a subscriber dials a required number, he will contact the other telephone, unless it happens to be previously engaged. Telephone numbers are given in a book called the Telephone Directory, and further enquiries can be made from number 9. Complaints of any nature are registered at number 8, presumably to be dealt with and the causes remedied. For all these services and other facilities, every telephone subscriber pays the Telephone Department about Rs. 20 per month, in addition to other charges. As far as we know, Lahore subscribers have been paying their dues diligently and regularly. But all the things which are supposed to happen in return for this payment have not followed. For some unknown reason, the service they are entitled to has been deteriorating with a consistency worthy of a more positive cause. Some dislocation was expected after 15 August 1947, with its accompaniment of loot, murder and arson; and the public has been exceedingly patient, hoping that a return to better days was round the corner, as was repeatedly promised by the officials concerned. It is now over twelve months since the Pakistan Post and Telegraph Department took over charge of the Lahore Exchange; but it has failed to restore even a semblance of efficiency and order, while certain aspects of its work are below even the level of three or six months ago. In a whole year it has not been able to produce a Telephone Directory, which normally consists

of about a hundred pages only. The volume now in the hands of subscribers was published in the days of yore, when Khizar and Glancy ruled this land. It may be of some interest to research students of modern history, but is of as much use to the present telephone subscribers as a book of Greek verse. Failing this first prerequisite, the Telephone Enquiries Branch exists to satisfy subscribers. For some unknown reason the gentlemen in charge here are either incapable of, or just not interested in, the dull business of giving right answers to queries. The supplicant may be given a number, but seldom the one he wants; and if he is too persistent, he is invariably told that the required person has no telephone. He may be regaled with a chat on current politics or the latest song hits, but only extreme good luck will elicit the right answer, and in any case it takes the operator anything from ten to twenty minutes to accomplish this simple task. Armed with the required number, the subscriber dials it on the instrument before him. Hereafter anything may happen. He may be forced to join a conversation of two other subscribers, and despite his best efforts find it impossible to disconnect himself; he may, and invariably will, get a wrong number; or for hours the required telephone will sound 'engaged', and after an exhausting tussle with his telephone and numbers 8 and 9, be will probably find that his own telephone is as dead as a door-nail. If a Lahore subscriber asks Telephone Enquiries for a number and then gets the connection he wants, let him rest assured that he is no ordinary mortal but specially favoured of the gods. Slackness and ineptitude are similarly responsible for the gross inefficiency and inordinate delays in other branches of the Telephone Department, as, for instance, in putting telephones in order, shifting or closing down connections, etc. Except perhaps for the trunk-calls branch, the Lahore Exchange has come to such a pass that it can no longer be regarded a public utility, but is a serious public nuisance. We appeal to the powers that be—linesmen, operators, engineers, officials and Ministers-to do all that is necessary to banish the present chaos.

27 April 1949 Women's Role

Miss Fatima Jinnah's two speeches on Monday should help Lahore's women to see 'social work' in its proper perspective. These well-intentioned ladies, who meet in expensivelydecorated drawing rooms to discuss small matters over sandwiches and tea, or, arrayed in their best, gather in public places to honour distinguished lady visitors, have been told by Miss Jinnah to develop a new outlook and a new zeal to meet the exigencies of the time'. She appealed to them 'not to do social work to make a name', and 'to heal the wounds of the afflicted, the poor and the destitute'. Earlier in the day, Miss Jinnah drew attention to the tragedy that there are 'thousands of women roaming about aimlessly in the streets in tattered rags, with their half-starved children in their laps; but nobody seems to make note of them'. The language that Miss Jinnah speaks contains no trace of the artificiality that seeps into a speech when the audience is regarded as a mob of potential voters and not as a gathering of fellow citizens and fellow workers in a common cause. If the affection and respect shown to Miss Jinnah during her present visit to Lahore has any real meaning, it should rouse our men, and particularly our women, leaders to talk a little less and work a little more. One has heard a lot about various women's bodies, associations and organisations that have been or are in the process of being formed, but one hears much less of what concrete results these bodies have achieved to improve the lot of their sex or the plans that they have in mind towards that end. One is inevitably forced to the conclusion that the leadership of our women. like the leadership of our men, also needs either drastic change or a drastic readjustment of outlook to suit the requirement of our times.

1 October 1949 On the Road

The report of a recent increase in the number of traffic accidents in Lahore should not cause any great surprise; given the present conditions, it is really a wonder that more arms, legs or heads are not broken every day on the streets of this ill-administered city. The roads of West Punjab's capital have for a long time been in a rotten state of disrepair; even the best of them cannot boast of being adequately lit, while sidepavements exist only in certain parts and, except on the Mall, are invariably used for purposes other than the one for which they were originally intended. The traffic constables are by no means reputed for diligence or efficiency, and have often been known to deliberately create difficulties for drivers of tongas and cars, either out of sheer officiousness or in order to augment their paltry salaries by extorting hush-money.

The lack of proper arrangements to reduce the hazards involved in using Lahore's crowded roads might not have proved to be so disastrous if a large percentage of our citizens did not show such utter disregard for traffic by-laws and elementary common sense. Jay-walking, bad driving, speeding and the general tendency to obey the law only when in obvious danger of being caught, are all as much of a menace to the safety of life and limb on Lahore's roads as the poor standard of traffic control or the rutted, narrow and ill-lit roads.

We welcome the authorities' reported decision to launch a campaign to inculcate road-sense among the people and hope that, unlike many previous official campaigns, this will be a sustained effort, outlasting the first few days of Press publicity. Further, to be really successful, it should be accompanied by a serious attempt to make traffic policemen more efficient and honest. One would also like to hope that the Corporation will do something about the proper maintenance of roads and pavements, and about preventing their misuse as sites for vendors' wares or as improvised tonga-stands.

8 November 1950 Proliferation of Adulteration

For the second time within a week, the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court has felt compelled to raise his voice against the widespread and virtually unrestricted operations of the food racketeers. The sale of adulterated food in the Punjab is by no means a recent phenomenon, but during the last few months it has become such a common feature of the trade in foodstuffs that it is rightly regarded as a serious menace to public health. The local Press has repeatedly drawn Government's attention to this deplorable state of affairs, but the authorities have remained unmoved, and no tangible effort seems to have been made to remedy the situation. Such passivity in a matter of immense concern to the people is absolutely inexcusable, particularly when the evil practice is motivated entirely by the desire of unscrupulous inviduals to amass ever bigger profits, and no extenuating circumstance of any sort exists. The commodities usually sold after a mixture of baser materials has been added are not in short supply, and the absence of price control allows a generous margin of profit to the traders. Yet so many of the trading community are overcome by the lust for quicker returns that today it is almost impossible to obtain the genuine article in a number of essential edible commodities

The urban population of the Punjab will fervently hope that where other agencies have failed, the High Court's laudable crusade may succeed in forcing the Government to discharge more worthily one of its elementary duties towards the people. The Chief Justice has not merely focused public attention on the enormity of the crime and its high incidence, but he has taken the trouble to probe the structure of the existing preventive machinery, which he finds extremely inadequate to deal with the present abnormal situation. The directive issued recently by the Chief Justice to the lower courts, and his latest judgment enhancing the penalties imposed for breaches of the Food Laws, are bound to cure the regrettable trend among a large number of junior judicial officers towards taking a lenient view of such cases. This, however, as Mr Justice Mohammad Munir himself pointed out, is not enough. He suggests, therefore, that the Punjab Pure Food Act should be amended so as to allow deterrent fines and imprisonment to be imposed on those who are not only guilty of defrauding the people, but also of undermining the nation's health. Secondly, the Chief Justice points out that at present only the smaller fry are being apprehended, and no serious effort is made to detect and punish the wholesale dealers and other big operators who are obviously the bigger criminals. This calls for a proper overhaul of the Food Inspectorate in order to ensure that a criminal's large bank balance or influence do not provide him protection against prosecution by the law.

While it is urgently necessary that prompt action should be taken on the lines suggested by the Chief Justice, it must be remembered that Government can do a great deal more to ensure the availability of pure and wholesome food at reasonable rates. The Central Government is reported to have drawn up a scheme to establish a Milk Depot, with the purpose of supplying standardised milk and allied dairy products to Karachi's population. The Punjab Co-operative Department could easily be mobilised to organise similar dairy establishments. It could also be prompted to enter certain other selected sections of the food market, if only in order to provide the private trader with healthy competition. It is also necessary that the export of articles of food should be carefully controlled to avoid a rise in price or a further deterioration in their quality. The despatch of hundreds of maunds of cream to India in recent months is a case in point. We hope the Provincial Government will be persuaded to exercise greater vigilance in this regard, and further that, apart from tightening up the administration of the Food Act and making it more effective, it will realise the importance of taking positive steps to make pure food available to the people of the Punjab.

30 January 1953 Diverse Tongues

The fact that the Oriental College at Lahore has suspended the teaching of Punjabi, although examinations are still held in this language at which a large number of students appear every year, brings no credit to those who control the policies of the Punjab University. Further evidence of the criminal neglect of what is the most widely-spoken language in West Pakistan is provided by the equally regrettable fact that this highly improper action of the Punjab University has caused no great stir among the people of the Punjab, Bahawalpur and large parts of the Frontier, where Punjabi is the mothertongue of the indigenous population. The adoption of Urdu as the second State language by the British sarkar discouraged the study of Punjabi; and since the Punjabi-speaking people did not find it very difficult to read and write Urdu, and education was anyhow confined to a small percentage of the people, the process of Urdu being regarded as the only written language of this area provoked no widespread protest or resistance. In later years, the political aspects of the Urdu-Hindi controversy linked the demand for recognition of Urdu as the State language with what ultimately became the demand of India's Muslims for a separate homeland, thus giving Urdu an aura of special sanctity. The existence of two distinct scripts for writing Punjabi was another hindrance to its growth and development. And after decades of baneful suppression, many among the upper classes, who succumbed to the snob-appeal acquired by Urdu, began to treat Punjabi as a language to be used only when talking to servants, and to exhibit their own ignorance by declaiming that it hardly had any literature worth preserving and did not, therefore, deserve to be treated as a proper language.

Whatever the causes of past neglect, we see no good reason why Punjabi should today continue to be ill-treated. As a language which is spoken by a large section of our people and enshrines a rich and noble cultural heritage, and

whose vigour and expressiveness suit the genius of the Punjabi-speaking people, it deserves to be rescued from its present unhappy position. It needs to be understood clearly that the desire to halt the decline of Punjabi and foster its revival is not motivated by any antipathy against Urdu. Whatever the ultimate decision of the Constituent Assembly on the question of choosing a State language—or languages for Pakistan, as far as West Pakistan is concerned Urdu will readily be accepted by all its units as the common inter-Provincial language. At the same time, the attachment to Urdu among the people of this region, particularly the Punjab, and the weighty contribution to its literature made by our best writers and poets, ensures for the language a permanent place of honour in this part of the country. This does not mean, however, that the regional languages should not be given due attention. Punjabi, Pushto and Sindi—each in its way a language worthy of being preserved and developed—do not have to be sacrificed in order to create a special place for Urdu. As living languages, they provide the ideal media for mass-education, their vast wealth of literature deserves study, and full advantage should be taken of their potential for further development to encourage a growth which will go hand in hand with the intellectual progress of the people.

Since it would both be futile and aimless to try and uproot any of these languages, we appeal to the Provincial Governments and the universities concerned to revise their present unfriendly attitude towards the vernaculars, and take appropriate steps to facilitate their revival. In this regard, a share of the responsibility lies with our men of letters, public men, teachers, and intellectuals, who must in a democratic age dismantle their ivory towers, go beyond the esoteric circle of their peers, and learn to speak to the common people without the aid of translators: to do so with any effectiveness they must sponsor a renaissance of the languages which the ordinary people speak, understand, and 'feel'. In Sind and the Frontier Province a beginning in this direction has already been made, but in the Punjab even the need for saving the language of the people does not seem fully to have been realised. We hope that those concerned will make up for past neglect and work with special devotion to raise Punjabi to its proper status.

^{12 May 1954} What's in a name?

With the country's political atmosphere polluted by bitter factional strife and low-level intrigues, and with personal aggrandisement as the primary aim of a vast majority of those who strut about on Pakistan's political stage, it is not surprising that issues of national importance are seldom discussed with the required measure of objectivity, and that few decisions are guided solely, or even mainly, by the merits of the case. This unhappy state of affairs is well illustrated by the manner in which the language question has been handled by the Central Muslim League Assembly Party, with the result that for all practical purposes the English language will retain its pride of place, to the detriment of all indigenous languages, for many decades to come.

Another instance of how political issues should not be tackled is provided by the controversy raging over the questions of renaming the North-West Frontier Province and re-forming Pakistan's Provinces on a linguistic basis. Here again, instead of debating the principles involved, calmly considering the various implications of the proposal, and weighing its advantages against the disadvantages, a vitriolic campaign has been unleashed against its sponsors, impugning their motives and damning them as disrupters and enemies of Pakistan. To say the least, such calumny and slander do not help the national cohesion and unity which are thus ostensibly sought to be strengthened: in fact, abuse and vituperation only serve to heighten tension and widen the gulf between different sections of our people. It needs to be realised that if all the charges of enmity or disloyalty to Pakistan-hurled by different schools of thought against their opponents-were accepted as the truth, the number of loyal friends left to Pakistan would be very small indeed. We hope, therefore, that publicists and politicians will make an earnest endeavour to eschew the dangerous policy of trying to smother every political issue in the heat and dust of slanderous statement and counter-statement, and encourage the method of dignified debate and serious discussion for finding solutions to problems of public interest.

The questions of giving the NWFP another name and revising inter-Provincial boundaries particularly deserve cool consideration. With regard to the former, it is obvious that, with Partition, the present name of this Province has become completely meaningless, for it is only in the context of the whole sub-continent that it can be regarded as the 'northwest frontier'. Pakistan's frontiers being totally different, its geographic connotation makes the name a complete misnomer. It also appears perfectly logical that, instead of being called the NWFP, the Province should, like other provinces of Pakistan, be known after the linguistic or racial group inhabiting the area. The main reason for opposition to this demand is that the alternative name suggested— Pukhtoonistan—has been used by Afghanistan to define its irredentist and utterly untenable claims to a part of Pakistan's territory. This, however, cannot be regarded as sufficient grounds for rejection of the proposal; in fact, it could be argued with greater force that its acceptance would take the wind out of Afghanistan's sails. It is further said that, in view of its proximity to Afghanistan, the NWFP should retain this odd name in order to maintain the present distinction and avoid any affinity with the neighbouring State. If this argument were allowed to guide the nomenclature of provinces, the Punjab should be called the South-East Frontier Province and Bengal the Far-East Frontier Province. It is also said that the demand for re-naming the NWFP is motivated by some sinister, anti-national design. Since no proof of any sort is available in support of this charge, it must be ignored, and the question considered on the basis of known facts. We

feel that the proposal for giving the NWFP a proper name is perfectly logical, and that whenever the Provincial Legislature goes on record in favour of such a change, the Constituent Assembly should adopt the necessary enactment.

The question of linguistic provinces has also, unnecessarily, been made the subject of heated controversy. Since, by and large, Pakistan's units are anyhow divided on a linguistic basis, the plea for readjusting boundaries, where it is necessary and convenient to do so, deserves support. It is obviously advantageous from the administrative point of view to evolve units whose people possess greater linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Nor should such a redistribution of administrative units adversely affect our broader national unity. In fact, by eliminating the grounds for possible conflict between the people of different provinces, we should be able to achieve greater cohesion. The issue is of sufficient importance to deserve thorough consideration. It would, therefore, probably be advisable to set up a Commission to study the broader question, as well as the suggested solution, in all their implications, invite people to express their preferences in detail, sift the facts, and make recommendations. These can be studied and examined by the parties concerned and can, with the approval of democratically elected Legislatures of the Provinces involved. form the basis for an agreed re-demarcation of the Provincial boundaries. In case the recommendations are found unacceptable by one of the parties, agreed methods and procedures can be adopted to arrive at a just and mutually satisfactory decision. Further, it is perfectly plain that, in the political circumstances prevailing in West Pakistan, this issue will be taken up only to be used for factional or party ends. No decision on this question is possible as long as the Provinces of this zone are under the sway of unrepresentative Assemblies dominated by a ruling party which has forfeited all right to speak in the name of the people. Therefore, the task which deserves priority is the restoration of democratic rights in the Provinces of West Pakistan. When the people of

this zone succeed in obtaining legislatures and governments of their own choice, it will not be difficult to deal with the matter to the satisfaction of all. Today, the people of Chhachh or Hazara have little to choose between the maladministration of the Punjab Muslim League and that of the Frontier Muslim League. It should also be borne in mind that those who are in office today in the provinces of Pakistan, with little public backing and no confidence in themselves, will probably try their best to bedevil the issue, and create inter-Provincial conflicts in order to appear as champions of the respective provinces they so want only to misrule. It is suggested, therefore, that first things should be tackled first, and the struggle for democracy in West Pakistan should not be allowed to be pushed into the background. Once full democracy has been established in West Pakistan, like many other problems, that of re-drawing Provincial boundaries will be easy of solution.

10 January 1955 Pedagogical Elitism

The Vice-Chancellor of the Punjab University has reiterated the view that, in order to raise the standards of education in the Province, higher education should drastically be restricted. Basing his conclusions on the low pass percentages of most University examinations and the poor intellectual attainments of a large majority of our graduates, and believing that the present system entails a great waste of time, money and energy, he suggests that at the end of the present 9th class a severe test should weed out 85 to 90 per cent of the students, and only about 10 to 15 per cent should be allowed to join the reformed secondary schools. At the end of the three-year secondary stage again, only about 15 per cent should be allowed to enter the portals of the University, while the rest must be diverted to vocational training and subordinate jobs. Mian Afzal Husain believes that this policy would enable our services to be manned by men of calibre-who could compare favourably with the old ICS men, products of Oxford or Cambridge—that the present tremendous wastage of resources would be stopped, and that there would be an overall improvement in our educational standards. He thinks further that educational reform should commence with the secondary schools, because any attempt to start with the primary schools would not begin to yield results before two decades, and because, in any case, the former are responsible for the most important stage in a student's training and education.

Mian Afzal Husain's keen interest in the problems of education, his vast experience in this and allied fields, and the office he now holds, entitle him to be heard on this subject with great respect. His criticism of the present educational system, supported by a wealth of carefully tabulated data, is certainly fully justified; but it is difficult to agree wholly with his appraisal of the factors responsible for the present unhappy state of affairs, and almost impossible to endorse his scheme for the strict rationing of educational facilities beyond the middle-school stage. In the first place, although over-crowding in our schools and colleges is a grave problem, it cannot be regarded as the only, or even as the main, cause of our low educational standards. If other conditions remain unchanged, a mere reduction in the number of boys and girls who are allowed to enter the new secondary schools, or the University and colleges, will not improve matters very much, and the small gain in pass percentages that may be achieved would be no compensation for depriving the vast majority of our youth of the opportunity to study beyond the middleschool stage. This objection is sustained by the fact that even those departments which today, for different reasons, cater to only a handful of students are no better than the ones where 'all and sundry' are allowed entrance. What Pakistan requires is a thorough overhaul of her educational system-from the kindergarten upwards-a radical improvement in teaching methods, and large-scale expansion of schools, colleges and universities. Of necessity, this process is somewhat slow, and it may not show spectacular results; but it is the only answer

to our needs. Short-cuts which seek to attain some statistical improvement at the top, by concentrating on a few bright boys and girls, may not even achieve this particular aim, and even if they did, it would be at the expense of an intolerable deprivation as far as the mass of our people are concerned. It is, of course, true that, after a general improvement has been achieved in our educational system, a university degree would lose some of its present attraction, and a large number of students would seek jobs or professions after passing the higher secondary stage. But in today's circumstances, to cut off 85 or 90 per cent of them from secondary education would amount to condemning them to virtual illiteracy. It is equally unrealistic for the present to talk of diverting 85 per cent of those who pass the secondary stage to vocational training and subordinate jobs. Jobs are not readily available and vocational schools cannot spring up or function in a vacuum-they will grow hand in hand with the country's industrial progress.

It also needs to be realised that in a country like Pakistan, with illiteracy standing at the appalling figure of 87 per cent, the stress should be on more and more education, and not on limiting and restricting it. A low standard of general education is a bad thing, but it is better than no such education; and, however poor the net result of the existing system, it is better to disseminate even a smattering of knowledge among a wide section of the people-which should be made to become wider, with greater public and official efforts—than to leave the masses in utter darkness and concentrate all our resources on trying to create a small band of would-be intellectual giants. In fact, the denial of education to the masses is not necessary in order to achieve the aim of improving education at the top, and it may well in the long run have the opposite effect. The State certainly has an interest in education and the right to influence it, but this right and interest must not be exercised to limit and control education in the manner suggested. If Pakistan is to develop into a democratic State, with equal rights and equal opportunities for all citizens, we cannot accept a system that would compel the average person to be satisfied with near-literacy, and confine higher education to a small minority. The concept of a semi-literate population being ruled over by a group of highly educated persons, the philosopher-bureaucrats, is alien to the democratic tradition and must, therefore, be rejected. Lastly, it needs to be pointed out that the people want education for themselves and their children, and that they themselves pay for it, mostly through direct contributions: in fairness and justice, they cannot be asked to accept a system which would keep its doors closed to about 85 per cent of them. If the Vice-Chancellor's views on Pakistan's future educational planning, which we have found it necessary to criticise, had been put forward by the class of gentlemen who hold that mass education is dangerous folly, or by a bureaucrat interested solely in producing, at any cost, men of the old ICS type, they would have merited little attention. But when they are presented by an educationist of Mian Afzal Husain's standing, and a person gifted with a broad outlook and vision, the proposals merit thorough discussion—in the hope that their author will either remove the doubts and misgivings they prompt or revise his own opinions.

11 January 1955 A Capital Idea

We had hitherto refrained from making any comment on the question of the location of West Pakistan's capital city, in the confident hope that the Administrative Council would of itself make the obvious, sensible choice and decide in favour of Lahore. It appears, however, that the issue is not being considered with the required objectivity, and that extraneous factors may be allowed to sway the Council's judgment. Although it is said to be fairly certain that Lahore will be used as the provisional capital, the Council has set up a Committee which has been exploring the remoter tracts of Hazara District in order to select an appropriate site for constructing a new town to serve as West Pakistan's permanent capital. Lahore's suitability for this purpose, from every conceivable point of view, simply cannot be disputed. It is the only town which can provide sufficient accommodation and meet the other physical requirements of the West Pakistan Government; and it possesses unlimited scope for further expansion. In eight or nine months out of the year, weather conditions here are absolutely ideal; there is an ample supply of water: and it has a rich and developed hinterland, which is necessary to feed and maintain a large town. Further, Lahore has always been an important centre of trade and is fully capable of coping with the commercial requirements of West Pakistan's future First City; in fact, in this regard Lahore has suffered greatly in recent years, as a result of the change in the pattern of the country's trade, and its selection as West Pakistan's capital may help towards the restoration of the position it has lost since Partition. Being situated in the central zone of West Pakistan. Lahore is the most approachable town for the various far-flung parts of the new Province; and among West Pakistan's bigger towns it happens to be the nearest to East Bengal. Further, Lahore is the focal point of West Pakistan's railway system, and is linked to the different regions of this zone with the best roads in the area. Lahore's historical importance, particularly the part that it played in the Pakistan movement, deserves due consideration; and it should be borne in mind that it is a centre of culture and a seat of learning. In view of all these weighty factors, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that those who advocate its rejection are doing so for purely parochial reasons, or because they have not yet been able to rid themselves of provincial feelings.

It is also quite obvious that Lahore is about the only town in West Pakistan which can be made the capital without entailing a great deal of new expenditure. On the other hand, the proposal to build a new capital in some virgin tract would cost the national exchequer anything up to Rs. 200 crores, apart from what the people would be forced to spend on moving to the area. This is something which the country simply cannot afford; and even if

such a large sum of money were available, it could be spent with greater advantage on the completion of the various development projects which are being delayed or are moving at a slow pace because of lack of sufficient funds. It is also possible that the experiment of trying to build a new town may not succeed, as has happened in our neighbouring Indian province. So far, about the only argument that has been used against Lahore is its proximity to the Indo-Pakistan border. This plea cannot, however, stand the test of sober analysis. In the first place, the possibility of a war with India is so remote that it would be puerile to allow it to persuade us to abandon a place like Lahore. Secondly, Lahore is anyhow an important strategic town, where some of our most important industries are located, and should its evacuation ever become necessary in the case of an emergency, the addition to that vast operation of a few Government offices will make no real difference. Further, in modern war distances of a few hundred miles do not lend much safety to a city; therefore, unless it is intended to locate West Pakistan's capital in some faraway mountain hide-out, the vulnerability of the new capital in any other place would be almost as great as that of Lahore. Nor can the fact be ignored that, in moving away from Lahore, we would be getting closer to other borders. It is, therefore, meaningless for our arm-chair experts to cloak their parochial interest or Provincial prejudices under the garb of socalled strategic necessity in building up an argument against the selection of the present Punjab capital as the capital of West Pakistan. We earnestly hope that the West Pakistan Administrative Council will not allow itself to be influenced by any such considerations, and that it will come to a reasonable and fair decision, based on an objective appraisal of the relevant factors which should determine its choice.

30 July 1955 Asking for the Moon!

Not altogether unexpectedly, the Ruet-i-Hilal Committees functioning in various parts of the country have, once again,

succeeded in creating a mess over the forthcoming 'Id-ul-Azha, Before Partition, and before this country was afflicted with the plague of regional Ruet-i-Hilal Committees, which have seemingly made no arrangements to work in cooperation with each other, the worst that ever happened was that, on rare occasions, some confusion was created over the 'Id-ul-Fitr. But since the creation of Pakistan, it would appear that the learned gentlemen nominated to these bodies are determined to ensure that these two great festivals are never celebrated on the same day throughout the country. With regard to the 'Id-ul-Fitr, it is somewhat understandable that, in view of the short time available to them, diverse decisions should be taken in different parts of the country. But for the 'Id-ul-Azha, even this excuse—which anyhow has little validity because of the existing means of rapid communication—cannot be put forward as an extenuating circumstance. As on at least one previous occasion, we are confronted this year with the peculiar situation that while Quetta and Dacca have decided in favour of 'Id being celebrated on Saturday, for the rest of the country the chosen day is Sunday. It is also relevant to point out that the Haj has been performed on Friday. With ten clear days available to the authorities concerned for arriving at a decision, there is no justification whatsoever for the contrary opinions given by the different Ruet-i-Hilal Committees. If these bodies are incapable of co-ordinating their investigations and coming to an agreed conclusion even in regard to the 'Id-ul-Azha, they should be disbanded immediately and a single Central organisation set up for this purpose, which could be asked to get the required information from various regions through nominated representatives. If for some reason this suggestion is considered unacceptable, there are a hundred and one other simple ways of ensuring that the appearance of the moon is properly established and the information conveyed to the whole country. The important thing is that the celebration of the two 'Ids must not be spoilt again by the seemingly silly squabbles of those who are appointed to the various Ruet-iHilal Committees and are given a responsibility which they have invariably discharged with extreme irresponsibility.

3 August 1956 Sheer Vandalism

Not for the first time, the finest public park in Lahore (and, perhaps, the best in Pakistan) has suffered grievous damage at the hands of the Government Department entrusted with its care and unkeep. The Agriculture Department has once again been guilty of sanctioning the destruction of extremely valuable trees in the Bagh-i-Jinnah on an utterly inane plea. If we remember right, on the first occasion the purpose ostensibly served by what can only be described as an act of sheer vandalism was the replenishment of a match factory's stocks of suitable timber. And now, five of the garden's best trees have been heartlessly uprooted on the ground that a request to that effect was received from the All-Pakistan Lawn Tennis Association, whose Secretary thought that these trees were responsible for the bad lighting on the tennis court in their vicinity. This would appear to be a completely untenable and wholly stupid excuse for doing irreparable harm to a part of the Bagh-i-Jinnah. In the first place, it seems strange that, whereas these trees had been in the same positions for many decades, and important tennis tournaments have often been held in more or less the same area which is now under use. no one ever considered that their shade made the courts unplayable. This novel discovery was suddenly made by the Association's present Secretary, who is reported to have demanded that the offending trees must be cut down without delay. Secondly, even if it is true that the light on the tennis courts was affected adversely, it is difficult to believe that this could not have been remedied by judicious pruning. Lastly, if the trees really did obstruct the light in a manner that made play on the courts difficult, the thing to do was to shift the courts to another place. Those who requested, ordered or connived at the despoilment of the Bagh-i-Jinnah

do not seem to have given any thought to the fact that these trees were highly valued by the people, that it had taken many decades and a great deal of labour to grow them, and, in the case of the pine trees, it may not be possible to achieve their replacement even in a hundred years. The Bagh-i-Jinnah is a glorious heritage of Lahore's citizens. They expect that, even if the Agriculture Department cannot improve upon its present richness, the gardens should at least not be ruined. We suggest that the Minister concerned or, better still, the Cabinet, should take immediate notice of this affair and issue strict orders that the Bagh-i-Jinnah and other public parks should not be subjected to the ravages of the official blindness that has been responsible for the reprehensible actions we have pointed out here. In fact, it seems necessary that a committee of persons interested in gardening and gardens, including both officials and non-officials, should be set up to supervise the maintenance and development of the Bagh-i-Jinnah

9 April 1957 Lawlessness in Lahore

Yet another crowded locality of Lahore has witnessed a battle in the continuing war between rival gangs of local goondas. The latest outbreak of armed gangsterism, on Nicholson Road, ended in grim tragedy; apart from wounding two rival gangsters, the attackers accidentally killed a young girl of ten who was playing on the roadside outside her home, deliberately shot at and injured a cyclist whom they suspected of trying to bar their escape, and in this attempted murder killed another cyclist. Sunday afternoon's bloody drama was enacted on one of our busiest thoroughfares, at a place which is not more than a stone's throw from the nearest police station and the District Police Lines. Although telephonically informed of the shooting almost immediately, the first police party did not arrive on the scene until forty minutes after the event. Further, the escaping gangsters are reported to have

passed the Oilla Gujar Singh Police Station—presumably after it had been informed of the incident or, in any case, after it should have heard the shooting and shouting-but no one seems to have taken any notice of them. This is not all. When, at last, the police got to the place, valuable time was lost in a wrangle between the representatives of neighbouring police stations in order to determine where the case should be registered, because in their killings the culprits had carelessly shown no regard for the lines demarcating the territories of different police stations. Does all this merely illustrate inefficiency, or does it amount to dereliction of duty? Is it sheer stupidity that, with an innocent girl lying in a pool of blood, her young life destroyed by brutal hands, and another citizen dying on the pavement, responsible police officers—instead of chasing the perpetrators of these ghastly crimes—should waste many valuable minutes in a jurisdictional debate? The senior police authorities must investigate the matter thoroughly, and tell the people whether the police officials concerned are not gifted with elementary common sense, or whether they lack courage or integrity.

Later in the evening, however, the higher authorities moved into action. A large number of suspects were rounded up; the Senior Superintendent of Police shifted his headquarters to the Mozang Police Station in order to deal more effectively with the goonda menace; and a special police detachment was set up to detect and recover unlicensed arms. If the Administration's determination does not fizzle out once the public outcry has subsided, it should not be difficult to stamp out the lawlessness that is disgracing both the Provincial capital and the guardians of its peace. In fact, we feel strongly that the commendable steps that are being taken now should have been adopted as soon as the gang warfare started, instead of waiting until it had taken a toll of innocent lives. We would also draw the attention of the appropriate authorities to the seeming unwisdom of allowing persons to be enlarged on bail when they are involved in cases of this nature. Further, it is necessary that those in charge of the

police operations against crime should take cognizance of the fact that many of the lower police officials are widely suspected of maintaining intimate relations with the gangsters, and it is generally felt that, without police connivance or tolerance, it would be impossible for the gangsters to continue to function as protectors of groups of smugglers, or patrons of gambling dens, or places where illicit liquor and drugs are manufactured and consumed. If this suspicion is not baseless—and whether it is a result of timidity or of corruption—it is a factor which must be investigated and ruthlessly dealt with, if Authority earnestly wants to put an immediate stop to the crime-wave in Lahore. Lastly, it has been noticed that, because of the panic created by frequent cases of daylight banditry, the average peace-loving, lawabiding citizen considers it unwise to give evidence against persons engaged in crime. The general reaction is that the police are incapable of giving protection to those who would, by id<mark>entifying criminals, earn the ire of the gangsters and run</mark> the risk of harm being done to themselves or their families. It is often said that if the policemen themselves are frequently reluctant to give battle to the goondas, how can the unarmed citizen run the risk of reprisals by desperate men? This is a most regrettable, but understandable, state of affairs. The people realise that their help is needed to stop such crimes, but before they can co-operate fully with the forces of law and order, they must be assured that the local police is really interested in doing its job, and also that they will not run any undue risk if they assist Authority in the task of ridding Lahore of the flourishing gangs of professional criminals.

19 April, 1957 Of Morals and Men

Condemnation in these columns of acts of hooliganism involving harassment or molestation of ladies—and in particular the incidents that marred the Republic Day celebrations in Lahore and elsewhere—has provoked the

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accusation that we have exhibited an anti-male bias and deliberately ignored instances of improper or provocative behaviour by women. It cannot be said with certainty whether this charge is meant to be taken seriously; but, anyhow, considering the context in which it has been made, it undoubtedly deserves serious treatment. We believe that, far from being unduly harsh in our strictures on the goondas who disgraced themselves and the community on Republic Day, our condemnation of their misdeeds was far too mild, mainly because at the time of writing we were not in possession of the full facts. Further, the argument that, because some women behave with a lack of dignity or transgress the bounds of decency, men who pester and assault other women should not be condemned or punished too harshly, is clearly based on a perversion of both logic and common sense. This strange attitude, nevertheless, deserves full attention, for it is certainly not confined to unbalanced adolescents. It found support, for example, from a senior judicial officer, namely, the Additional Sessions Judge of Sheikhupura, who, in dealing with the Hiran Minar case, came to similar conclusions in his judgement, which was, however, dismissed by the Supreme Court as conforming neither to law nor to logic. The Court very rightly pointed out that 'if the learned judge thought that the appearance of educated girls in public places furnishes excusable provocation to the young men who come to or happen to be in that place, then he was propounding a pernicious doctrine...

This pernicious idea seems to be the basis of the perverted opinions of those who object to condemnation of hooliganism against women on the plea of provocation by its victims or other members of their sex. If some women or a group of girl students make a public nuisance of themselves, they certainly deserve to the condemned. If any such case had been brought to our notice in the ordinary course of events, it would have evoked prompt criticism. But when such incidents are quoted in an attempt to explain, and even justify, acts of shameless, vulgar, and brutal *goondaism*, both the motives of the complainants and the facts adduced by them become suspect. We expect all women to behave in public with dignity, and we tend to frown upon the giggling and smirking in public by groups of girl students (who should anyhow behave and dress with modesty and, in their own interests, be accompanied by a teacher when they go out to crowded places on a national holiday), but at the same time we are fully convinced that no case of improper or immodest behaviour by a woman provides a licence for the orgy of *goondaism* that Lahore saw on Republic Day, Such brazen lawlessness must be unreservedly condemned. The tone of high morality adopted by those who criticise women for provoking goondaism appears to be utterly false, for it seeks thereby to condone the worst possible acts of immorality. And the fact that national festivals are the favourite occasion chosen by the goondas must make their evil deeds even more reprehensible in the eyes of every true Pakistani.

We earnestly appeal to the citizens of Lahore and other affected towns to give proper thought to combating the evil of *goondaism* and fighting those who seek—either directly or impliedly—to connive at or condone actions that violate the most sacred laws of God and man. We further suggest that, apart from long-term remedial measures, before the next national festival, a Citizens' Committee should be set up in every important town to organise, in co-operation with the Government, squads of volunteers who would man the thoroughfares of their cities, in order to smash the monster of *goondaism*; and we hope that the student community will come forward to play their proper role in ensuring that the sanctity of our national holidays can be protected from the onslaught of the tribe of morons and *goondas* who inhabit many of our towns.

9 December 1957 Students' Duty

Addressing a students' meeting in Lahore the other day, Miss Fatima Jinnah advised the student community to work earnestly for the strength, stability and prosperity of the country. She pointed out that the Pakistan movement had aimed at the establishment of a democratic State, but 'what we see before us today is anything but the right step towards realisation of the Quaid-e-Azam's vision of Pakistan'. Declaring that there was no reason why the students of Pakistan should allow themselves to be 'mute spectators of all that goes on before their eyes', she said that it was their duty to safeguard the democratic principles underlining the establishment of Pakistan, and to create public opinion to put an effective stop to all attempts to place selfish motives before national interests.

This is excellent and timely advice. For many years now political events in Pakistan have moved in a vicious circle: an unstable Ministry is installed in office through intrigue; soon thereafter, unable to satisfy all its office-hungry supporters, it is ousted from power by counter-intrigue; and then another equally unstable coalition is elevated to power through a new round of unprincipled intrigues and unsteady alliances. Political activity has largely been reduced to an everlasting match of high-sounding slogans and low cunning between rival factions. The people are far removed from the political scene, and their problems do not seem to enter into the reckoning of those who rule the country in their name. At the same time, over the misty horizon hovers the dark threat of authoritarianism. Clearly, if this vicious circle is to be broken, if the menace of dictatorship is to be banished, the people must be roused to cast off their apathy and frustration, they must be organised for the mass action required to save democratic values and to ensure that Pakistan does not deviate from the path that can guarantee its democratic progress. In bringing about this mass mobilisation, in spreading political education and consciousness among the people, every educated and honest citizen of Pakistan has a part to play, and as a group, the student community is best equipped to take upon itself a large part of the burden which must be borne by all honest men if the country is to emerge from the

bog into which it has been led by petty men fighting for petty ends.

Before the achievement of political freedom, no one ever dreamt of questioning the students' right and duty to take an active part in politics, but since the establishment of Pakistan, the leaders of the leading political parties-particularly when in power-have done everything possible to discourage the students from taking a serious interest in the country's political affairs. It has been noticed that when the students do or say something which does not suit a particular political party, its leaders come out in support of the thesis that students should confine themselves to their classrooms and playgrounds. But whenever they can make use of the students to further their own ends, they forget their past injunctions and gladly accept the students' political assistance. Along with other factors, such as the lack of civil liberty and the rise of fascist tendencies among the educational authorities, this state of affairs has succeeded in creating a great deal of confusion, and, at least in West Pakistan, the students have been prevented from setting up an organisation that would help them to safeguard their own interests and express their views effectively on the major political problems facing the country.

Further, it cannot be denied that, in today's unhappy circumstances, the rights and interests of the students as students are by no means safe. Our universities have been affected by the prevailing political chaos, and it seems plain that there must be a political clean-up before the mess in education can be cleared. Thus, if only to protect their right to a decent education, it is necessary for the students to organise themselves and compel those in power to pay more attention to their clamant needs. It is essential to reiterate here that the students should create their own platform, and ensure that their organisation does not become the appendage of any political party. While no restriction should be placed on students who are sufficiently interested in political work to join a political party of their own choice, students' organisations as such should avoid the field of inter-party strife.

It is often asked: what useful work can the students undertake? To give one concrete example, the students could organise a country-wide literacy campaign to help uproot an evil which stands in the way of the country's progress. With an efficient organisation they could set up hundreds of cent.es in the towns and villages and rid the country of illiteracy within a decade or two. Along with such a campaign they could explain to the people the working of the country's political system, the importance of their votes, and the general principles of political democracy. There can be no doubt about the great value of such work. It is also obvious that, by undertaking to help in such a task, the students will not only educate their fellow-citizens but also educate themselves. We earnestly hope, therefore, that the excellent advice given by Miss Fatima Jinnah will find a response among the students of Pakistan, and that a genuine effort will be made by them to perform a duty that they owe to themselves and to their countrymen. We are fully convinced that, if the thousands of young men are able to harness themselves to grapple with the tasks of national regeneration, their selfless patriotism and energy will help greatly to clear the path for Pakistan's steady march to greatness and prosperity.

7 September 1951 Consolidation of Corruption

In recent weeks, the Punjab Government have announced a number of decisions that are expected to expedite the eradication of corruption in the government services. The work of the Anti-Corruption Department is being speeded up, steps have been taken to keep a check on the income and expenditure of officials, restrictions have been placed on their entertainment by the public and on their collection of public funds, and generally a stricter watch will be kept on those who are suspected of being corrupt or dishonest in their work, These measures, if honestly implemented, are likely to have some good effect on the present deplorable state of affairs but, as past experience has shown, administrative vigilance by itself cannot root out this deep-seated evil. To achieve big results it will be necessary to wage an unrelenting struggle against every aspect of the administration which encourages the acceptance of various types of illegal gratification by government servants. Quite obviously, full public support is an essential prerequisite for the success of any scheme which seeks to eliminate the divers corrupt practices that are today accepted by the common people as an unavoidable burden. To secure such co-operation, however, it is necessary that the existing standards of efficiency and justice should be improved in all Government departments. For it will readily be conceded that, apart from the few who seek out corruptible officials to buy special favours, the large number of ordinary persons—who are known to resort to bribery merely in order to save time or to forestall a perverse decision—could easily be persuaded to desist from this evil habit if they were assured that red tape and favouritism will no longer be allowed to harm their interests.

The Government should, therefore, devote special efforts to the task of making the administration efficient and impartial. Complicated procedures, which allow files and papers to travel leisurely from office to office and to be kept 'pending' or 'under consideration' for days and weeks, should be changed as soon as possible. The question of administrative impartiality is even more important. Here, apart from plain nepotism or the privileges that are usually given to those who possess large bank balances, political patronage has always played a major role in undermining public confidence in the Government's bona fides. In this connection, the Government have recently taken the commendable decision to stop recruitment by nomination for a number of junior posts in certain departments, and to allow all future vacancies to be filled through a competitive test. The principle underlying this important change in policynamely, that merit alone should determine Government decisions—must be rigorously applied to every branch of the administrative machinery. Progress towards achieving this ideal would gradually help to destroy the rotten tradition of trading in chits of recommendation, family connections and political influence. There are, of course, various other factors which deserve proper attention and suitable remedial action; for instance, it is important that all government servants should be given security of employment and a decent living wage. But perhaps the biggest stumbling block, which forces otherwise honest and straightforward persons to stoop to corrupt means, is the feeling that influence counts for more than right with the authorities. If the Government are prepared to attack and demolish this obnoxious form of favouritism, and can thereby foster conditions where a few may still try to buy undue concessions but the many will not need to purchase fairness and justice, a big step forward will have been taken towards combating the corroding disease of corruption in the admin<mark>istrative services.</mark>

31 August 1955 Exterminating Corruption

It is a well-established fact that, since Partition, the problem of corruption in the services has assumed frightening proportions. The standards of administrative honesty and efficiency were by no means too high during the British regime, but, strange though it may seem, since the dawn of freedom they have steadily deteriorated. However painful it might be, the fact must be faced—if it is to be fought—that today the hydra-headed evil of corruption has our national life firmly in its vicious grip; no branch of the services, and no facet of public life, is free from its poisonous influence. It would appear that customary moral and legal restraints—the individual's ingrained probity, a sense of self-respect, or fear of retribution—have become utterly ineffective, and blinding lust for money, however tainted it may be, has overcome the people's sense of duty and decency.

Whether it is the politician demanding special favours for his supporters, the public servant exacting bribes for doing his duty or for neglecting it, or the merchant offering a share of his illegal profit in return for being allowed to defy the law, these purchasers and dispensers of special benefits have brought down the prestige and honour of Pakistan very nearly to the level of Kuomintang China or certain Middle East countries. It is often said today, with no shame and little fear of such a statement being contradicted, that dishonesty is the best possible policy, the only way to ensure that what one requires of any part of the administration is accomplished with reasonable promptness. It can be said that the circumstances accompanying Partition, the dislocation of vast populations, the losses suffered by the refugees, the mishandling of evacuee property, and the mess made of the country's politics by the squabbling factions in the ruling party, have helped to create conditions in which corrupt practices of all sorts have found a fertile soil. While the influence of these and other factors cannot be denied, their existence does not really provide any extenuating circumstance and no cause whatsoever for viewing the present rotten state of affairs with equanimity.

A great deal of time, money and energy have been expended on what is called the anti-corruption campaign, but the ultimate result in the way of discouraging corruption or punishing those guilty is extremely meagre; and, despite its deleterious effects on our economic and social life, this sorry state of affairs does not seem to have given any sleepless nights to those whose responsibility it is to stamp out this corroding evil. From time to time we do hear of the arrest and punishment of offenders who have, for example, charged a pie more than the scheduled price of a packet of cigarettes, or of a *patwari* who demanded a small fee for the mutation of land records, or of a clerk guilty of tampering with his office records. But there have hardly been any cases of the bigger sharks being prosecuted and convicted. It is impossible to believe that corruption is confined to the lower rungs of the administrative ladder, or to the poorer classes who generally figure in the statistics published so proudly by the anti-corruption departments. In fact, if the top of the administrative pyramid were cleansed, if the bigger merchants were guided by ordinary business ethics, and if the so-called upper strata of our society was satisfied with receiving no more than its due, corruption could easily be wiped out. Even though the smaller fry are often driven by poverty to supplement their income by illegal means, they are able to do so only because the hands of their 'superiors' are not clean.

The Government's inability to deal effectively with this evil apparently arises from some self-imposed inhibition which prevents it from attacking and destroying the roots of this malignant growth. It is not easy to catalogue with exactitude all the causes responsible for the present situation, but it can be said with certainty that political corruption is one of the most important causal factors. When political leaders depend on the officials to win elections, and cajole or threaten them into doing the ruling party's dirty work, when Ministers and MLAs ask officials for undue favours to satisfy their ever-hungry political supporters, or when politicians themselves misuse their office for personal gain, it can well be imagined why so many of them are half-hearted in the matter of proceeding with the prosecution of officials or others found guilty of corrupt practices. Be that as it may, we earnestly hope that a serious effort will be made by all concerned to rid the country of the curse of corruption, which not only makes life more difficult and expensive for the citizen, but also adds to the general frustration and disaffection. destroys the people's morale, and makes the administration more inefficient and inept. While the Government must be persuaded to launch a ruthless campaign against all corrupt elements, particularly the more influential and powerful, and, to this end, to free the anti-corruption departments from all political influence, the people must not only co-operate fully with the investigating authorities, but also mobilise the sanction of public opinion against those who, for personal gain, are eating into the vitals of our governmental structure.

Section 9: Dawn of Dictatorship The Journalistic Sphere

Gul Hayat Institute



Gul Hayat Institute

25 July 1948 Paid Publicity

Whatever anyone might think of Allama Mashriqi's Indo-Pakistan Islam League and its political programme, the latest decision of this organisation to offer payments to journals and journalists propagating its cause will be rightly condemned by all, particularly by journalists. The provisional executive committee of this organisation has drawn up an interesting schedule: newspaper correspondents are offered a minimum column rate of Rs. 3 for English-language papers and Rs. 2 for Urdu papers; editors of weeklies can expect Rs. 60 per month; while editors of dailies are open to claim Rs. 150 per month; and if some author publishes a book promoting the cause of the Islam League he is entitled to receive anything from Rs. 100 to Rs. 5,000. The formulation of this scheme betrays the disappointing reception which has met Allama Mashriqi's latest attempt to return to the political arena; it can only be regarded as an undisguised and blatant attempt to bribe and corrupt the Press and as such is unworthy of any political party or group.

Government Advertisements

Every honest newspaperman should wholeheartedly endorse the stand taken by the Pakistan Newspapers' Society on the subject of the distribution of Government advertisements among local journals. The Society demanded at its recent meeting in Lahore that there should be no discrimination against any newspaper on the basis of its policy, and that the Governments should allocate all their advertisements in accordance with the journal's circulation and influence. It is regrettable that it should be necessary to reiterate this principle three years after the attainment of freedom, when it is known that even the British Government of India had been forced during its last few years to abandon the policy of maintaining a blacklist and issuing advertisements only to approved newspapers.

Government advertisements are intended to publicise certain official decisions or policies, and this purpose cannot properly be served if their issue is largely confined to only one section of the Press. It should also be realised that the money used for Government advertisements comes from the public exchequer and not from the private funds of the political party in power. Apart from the fact that it is morally wrong to use public funds for furthering the interests of a political party, discrimination in favour of, or against, a journal on the grounds of its policy is tantamount to Government subsidisation of the Press, which is virtually no different from a policy of bribery and blackmail. We sincerely hope that all the Governments in Pakistan will ensure that, in the future, democratic propriety in this regard is fully safeguarded, and that the national Press is treated with fairness and impartiality.

17 June 1951 **Dawn of Dictatorship**

nstitute Recently a Karachi contemporary chose to give gratuitous advice to Lahore Pressmen on what they should and should not do or say about protecting the rights and interests of journalists. In a long-winded and obviously inspired editorial-the latter adjective certainly does not refer to the quality of the writing-the newspaper gave vent to its ireful surprise at the twenty-five editors and journalists who had unanimously passed a resolution expressing their concern at

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the unexplained arrest of four Lahore journalists, asking Government to establish in a court of law that the arrests were unconnected with the detenus' journalistic activities, and demanding that a maintenance allowance should be sanctioned by Government for the dependents of the detained persons. The meeting was called and presided over by the editor of the local Zamindar, who at the time was also Acting President of the PNEC. Further, the resolution adopted at the meeting was drafted and moved by Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan; and after considerable discussion and certain amendments, it was unanimously approved by a gathering representing a variety of political views and policies. In this innocuous effort to safeguard the rights of journalists, the Karachi newspaper has seen an attempt to flout the code of the PNEC, help those who seek to disrupt or subvert the State, and weaken the forces of law and order.

In the first place, it is palpably incorrect to describe—by the use of malicious hints and innuendoes—the Lahore journalists' meeting as the result of clever manoeuvring by a few 'designing' individuals. This assumption is not only false—as proved by facts and the clear, if mild, statement of the gentleman who convened the meeting—but it is also an extremely unkind reflection on a large number of leading members of the profession. We need hardly deal with the Karachi newspaper's projection of the PNEC into a discussion which equally concerns all newspapers and journalists, except to point out that what the PNEC says on a certain subject cannot be accepted as final and immutable. It is of interest, however, to examine some of the contradictions that arise from this side-debate. Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan states that the Government is bound to consult a Press Advisory Committee 'before depriving a journalist of his liberty,' while the stand taken by the PNEC's main pillar is that the socalled Gentlemen's Agreement refers only to the rights of journals and not to those of journalists. A little more stress on this point and the Karachi newspaper will be arming the Government with a brand new weapon for encroaching upon the freedom of the Press-with the PNEC's special blessings.

Further, the main argument of the Karachi newspaper is that newspapers and journalists can only enjoy rights and privileges which apply equally to Pakistan's most lowly citizens. With this we whole-heartedly agree, and hasten to point out that we have always supported the elementary principle of democracy: that no person should be deprived of his freedom without a proper charge and a fair judicial trial. But in the same paragraph, our Karachi contemporary goes on to relate that the PNEC has secured a special privilege for the Press in the Government's guarantee—which, incidentally, is quite often ignored-that action against a journal under the Safety Laws would be preceded by consultation with the local Press Advisory Committee. The PNEC has also demanded, it is said, that when such action is taken the case should be referred 'to a judicial authority not lower than that of a High Court Judge'. Is this Karachi daily or the PNEC prepared to demand a similar trial by peers, or review by a High Court Judge, in the case of every detenu? Lastly, with regard to the question of reposing faith in Government's possible announcement about the reasons for arresting journalists, the newspaper has no hesitation in saying that as long as the Parliament keeps the Government vested with emergency powers, and as long as a Government remains in office, the people have no other choice but to accept the Government's words in such cases.' That this is arrant balderdash has been convincingly proved in the reply given by the editor of the Zamindar. In fact, the comments made by the Karachi newspaper itself on the use of the Safety Laws in Sind and on the Provincial Government's routine explanations, show that this argument is, to say the least, specious. It is also an extremely dangerous theory for, taken to its logical conclusion, it would mean that no word of criticism should ever be uttered—expect, perhaps, at election time—and that every statement of Messrs Qaiyum, Daultana, and Khuhro should be treated as the gospel truth.

It is not possible for us to deal thoroughly with the newspaper's attempt to bring in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, for the matter is sub judice and comments on its nature or implications should be reserved until after the trial. But it is necessary to point out that when, even in such a serious case. Government has not chosen to imprison the accused summarily for an indefinite period, but has taken the right step of holding a judicial trial, we see little reason for denving this basic right to those whose alleged crimes cannot possibly be so grave. The editor of the Karachi newspaper should also be aware of the fact that the round-up of Communists and Leftists was-it is known on the Government's authority-in no way connected with the Conspiracy Case; and, further, no one in authority has yet said that the arrest of the Lahore journalists was a part of the general round-up, nor has any other explanation been given. Finally, we would like to reiterate our firm stand that arrest on mere suspicion is a blatant denial of justice, and that prolonged detention without charge or trial is an unmitigated evil; and we look forward hopefully to the day when the rulers of Pakistan will dismantle the existing structure of oppressive laws that disfigures our land. A little study of world history, and a little serious thought, should convince all democrats that the doctrines propagated by our Karachi contemporary cannot lead our country to the untrammelled democracy promised by the Founder of the State, for they clearly seem to aim at ushering in the dawn of dictatorship.

29 September 1951 Karachi Editors' Statement

The Press debate occasioned by Radio Pakistan's tampering with Miss Fatima Jinnah's speech on the Quaid-i-Azam's death anniversary has been given a new twist by the editors of eight Karachi newspapers. Taking it upon themselves to speak as representatives of the Press in the Federal Capital, these editors have issued a vaguely-worded statement which apparently seeks to create the false impression that those who endorsed Miss Jinnah's protest over the mutilation of her broadcast, and took up the demand that Radio Pakistan should make proper amends to the Khatoon-i-Pakistan, were in some way guilty of encouraging disruption of Pakistan's national unity. It is palpably wrong and unfair to allege—as has been done, presumably in an effort to cloud the issue—that any section of the Press in Pakistan has forgotten the grave dangers of the present national emergency. The joint statement goes on to stress two main points: firstly, that no issue should be allowed to come in the way of absolute national unity, and secondly, after declaring their determination to oppose 'any attempt to disrupt national unity in a manner which brings comfort and cheer to the enemy,' the eight editors bravely proclaim that they have an undeniable right to express their opinions freely no matter with what official or non-official opinion they may be in conflict, provided that such opinions are expressed with due respect and are subject to law, morality and security of the State *

The two principles enunciated are unexceptionable. Disruption of national unity should be opposed—whether or not it brings comfort and cheer to the enemy-and full freedom of expression maintained by the Press. But it should also be realised that these principles cannot be given onesided application, nor can the question of what amounts to disruption of national unity be left to the decision of a diehard bureaucrat or a group of editors. Similarly, breaches of law or actions dangerous to the security of the State can only be determined by a court of law. Self-appointed censors, and claimants to a monopoly of patriotism. can only do a great deal of harm and little good. Finally, to see its utter inaneness, the Karachi editors' joint statement must be read in the context of the local happenings that obviously prompted it. Seen in this light, it is clear that the right to speak freely claimed by the eight editors has not been used; instead, certain hints have been made which cannot be allowed to go uncontested. The statement, for instance, seems to imply that the protest against the partial blackout by Radio Pakistan of

Miss Jinnah's speech—if not the whole speech itself—was disruptive of national unity. Further, as far as we are aware, it has never been suggested by anyone that Miss Jinnah's speeches or actions are above criticism. If the newspapers concerned consider her activities objectionable in any way, they should have the courage to say so openly, instead of mouthing vague generalities and insinuations. They should, further, also grant everyone else the right to criticise with equal freedom the views of their journals or the shortcomings of Government servants and political leaders. We do not know if any special local factors have provoked the eight newspaper editors to issue this peculiar statement; but, in any case, one is constrained to remark that they seem to have, served no useful purpose whatsoever.

9 October 1951 PNEC Affairs

The Bahawalpur session of the Pakistan Newspaper Editors' Conference has split the organisation wide open. Following acute differences over the election of a new president, a large number of editors have resigned from the PNEC, leaving a small rump whose claim to speak on behalf of the national Press can hardly be taken seriously. Unlike the earlier rift, which came to a head about eighteen months ago over the question of the application of the Safety Act to Pakistani newspapers-and ultimately led to the formation of the A-PNEC-the present development does not seem to be connected in the remotest way with any matter of principle, or any question concerning the interests of our national Press. Detailed reports of the proceedings at Bahawalpur reveal that the recent PNEC session was conducted in an atmosphere heavy with intrigue and chicanery, where factions were formed on the basis of personal likes or dislikes, and where support for candidates was bartered for offices or promises of a place on delegations invited to foreign lands. No definite principles of any sort guided the deliberations of the

assembled editors. many of whom admittedly represented journals that are now defunct or can be classified as newspapers for technical reasons only, and many of the resolutions adopted were sponsored and accepted merely for purposes of propaganda. The Altaf-Rashdi correspondence, in which charges and counter-charges of the most serious nature have been bandied about with complete abandon, throws further unflattering light on the functioning of an organisation which sought to be regarded as the sole representative of Pakistan's newspaper editors and was treated as such by the Government. Resisting the temptation to dilate upon the exposure of the PNEC's misdeeds made by the war of words between two of its former pillars, we would like to draw the attention of all concerned to the grave consequences that can result from the present disgraceful situation.

Recent developments provide further proof of the correctness of the stand taken by those who seceded from the original organisation to form the A-PNEC. for as we said on that occasion, the PNEC had blindly begun 'to champion the policies of the Government in power in preference to the wishes of the public or the interests of the Press, and that as such it was bound 'to disintegrate, for all opportunism leads to factionalism.' It is not our intention, however, to gloat over the PNEC's unenviable predicament, but to stress the urgent need for restoring the organisational unity of our national Press. This, as experience has clearly shown, can be brought about and made to last only if it is based on a clear understanding of the principles which should govern a professional organisation of this sort. On our part we firmly believe that a newspaper organisation's prime duty should be to guarantee and preserve the freedom and integrity of the Press, for otherwise it cannot effectively perform its duty towards the people or the State. Particularly in view of what has happened in the past, it is essential that such an organisation should confine its membership to the editors of genuine newspapers. so that the buying and selling of votes, and the jockeying for positions, can be restricted even if they cannot altogether be eliminated. Any effort made to form an organisation on these lines will merit the support of all those who are interested in establishing and maintaining the dignity of our national Press— inside Pakistan as well as outside. Mr Altaf Husain's reference to the opinions expressed by the members of such a conservative body as the Commonwealth Press Union about the Press Advisory system shows where we stand today. It is the obvious duty of the Press and the Government of Pakistan to remedy this unhappy state of affairs.

17 November 1953 Karachi's Cold War

The prolonged cold war between two Karachi newspapers— Dawn and the Times of Karachi—both reflecting and taking advantage of the tussle for power of rival factions inside the Muslim League, has taken a serious turn with the Central Government's decision to withdraw all Government advertisements from *Dawn* and its adjunct the *Evening Star*, to stop purchasing copies of these newspapers, and to deny their representatives the facilities normally given by the Government to all journalists. This drastic action has been taken, the official Press Note states, because the writings of these two newspapers 'transgress the bounds of legitimate criticism-they tend directly to bring Government into hatred and contempt and set one section of the people in the country against the other.' It seems most likely that legal proceedings will also be instituted against the newspapers, for the offences outlined by Government are punishable under the Press Act as well as under the ordinary law. While in recent years we have seldom found it possible to agree with the policy of the Karachi Dawn, and we strongly disapprove of the manner in which it has conducted well-planned smear campaigns against certain politicians and newspapers, the three-pronged Government attack on *Dawn* and its associate is, in our opinion, both undemocratic and ill-advised. It is true, of

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course, that in the past other newspapers have suffered far more after being charged with crimes of lesser gravity; but the existence of similar or worse precedents does not provide any justification for the present Government's current action, nor can our differences with *Dawn*—which include that newspaper's hostile attitude towards the victims of executive action under an earlier regime-persuade us to condone what amounts to restriction of Press freedom by executive fiat. The ban on the purchase of *Dawn* for Government offices is a minor issue; but with regard to Government advertisements, we hold, in company with the vast majority of Pakistan's newspapers, that these should be issued on a commercial basis and should never be used to influence the policy of a newspaper. The denial to Dawn's representatives of access to Government offices and official Press conferences is an even more reprehensible act of discrimination, which can neither be justified nor explained. Since, as indicated by the official Press Note on the subject, it seems that the Government are going to prosecute the newspapers concerned, no other action was called for at this stage, and it would have been proper to wait for judicial confirmation of the charges before proceeding to punish the newspapers.

We have, hitherto, defrained from commenting on the controversies which two sections of the Karachi Press have sponsored in recent weeks, and the deplorable lack of decorum with which the debates have been conducted, in the hope that the storm would be allowed to die out before it had done any great damage. Every newspaper undoubtedly has the right to speak frankly on national issues, to criticise those with whom it does not agree, and to seek public support for its own opinions. But when vitriolic abuse and wild, defamatory allegations replace arguments and facts, when newspaper editors intrigue against one other on the lowest possible level, when public meetings are sponsored by them and copies of newspapers are ceremoniously burnt by rival factions, the newspapers concerned may be said to have abdicated their proper function. It is perfectly clear also that,

by such malicious campaigns, they serve neither the interests of the country nor of the Press. The fact that unscrupulous political factions, for their own ends, fan the flames of such controversies may explain some of the unhappy developments; but it provides no extenuation whatsoever for the newspaper editors, whose loyalty to the ethics of journalism and the principles to which they are pledged should always transcend the allegiance they may owe to a political group or party. We earnestly appeal to those of our Karachi contemporaries who are involved in the regrettable cold war to return to the path of sanity and—forgetting the ugly past—help thereby to restore the dignity of the national Press and rehabilitate its prestige. We would also urge the Central Government to withdraw its decision to take executive action against *Dawn* and to proceed against the newspaper if this is necessary and unavoidable—only in strict accordance with the normal law of the land.





Gul Hayat Institute

Section 10: Quest for Stabilisation Postwar International Affairs

Gul Hayat Institute



Gul Hayat Institute

I. THE MIDDLE EAST

10 December 1947 Arab Resolve

Decisions of the greatest importance not only to the future of Palestine and the Middle East, but that of the whole world, will be taken by the Political Council of the Arab League which began the most momentous session of its short life in Cairo on Monday. While the meetings are being held in strict secrecy, and no final decision is likely to emerge for a day or two, the leaders of the Arab States have not minced words in reiterating their stand regarding Palestine. In this they are whole-heartedly supported by the Arab people, who have never made any secret of their intention to resist by force any decision which was unjust and unfair to the Arabs of Palestine, both Christian and Muslim, The Arab resolve to fight for the freedom of Palestine, which is and has been for centuries a predominantly Arab country, has the support and the sympathy not only of the Muslim world but of many other democratic countries. The sudden activation of the Big Powers in the UNO over Palestine, when they were slumbering peacefully over the Indonesian issue and various other matters, betrays a disconcerting similarity to the ways of the Geneva League, which first provided suitable cover for British machinations in the Middle East. The decision, which was arrived at with the help of all the bribery and blackmail that certain Powers were capable of, neither has the moral sanction of world opinion behind it nor can be justified on the principles to uphold which the UNO was formed. The UNO has not yet taken any formal decision on how it intends enforcing its decision in Palestine. It is,

therefore, impossible to foretell the course of future events. But war seems inevitable unless the UNO can be moved to reconsider its position. Skirmishes between Jews and Arabs have already begun in Palestine and are finding an echo in places as far off as Germany and Persia. The Jewish Hagannah and the various illegal Jewish organisations are feverishly completing their preparations for war. They seek to consolidate the position which twenty-five years of aggression under British auspices has given them and which is now sanctified by a UNO vote; the Irgun has already declared its aim of liberating the whole of Palestine, and in their distorted notion of geography the 'whole of Palestine' includes Transjordan. The fact that Britain, despite its present neutrality, has been listed in the Jewish Roll of Honour of the thirty-three countries responsible for the UNO decision, shows where this country really stands. The British administration has expressed its determination to maintain law and order: its first step-significantly-has been the disarming of Arabs in the Palestine police. An agency report shows that the United States is busy sounding out countries like China regarding their ability to provide troops to form the 'international police force' which is probably meant to replace the British Army. The Arab League will decide what steps to take to fight the international conspiracy which seeks to perpetuate the artificially-fostered Jewish advantage in Palestine. Whatever measures it adopts will be supported by every single Arab throughout the world, and will also have the backing of many other countries. The pages of history that record Britain's, and now America's, role in the Middle East are smeared with oil and blood. If the Big Powers do not see the folly of their plans, if the UNO does not give up its policy of treating the Jews as its pet children, then for many a month more blood than oil will flow in the Middle East. And the flow of oil to the West may stop altogether. For, whatever the outcome of the Palestine tangle, even the most backward countries of Asia are beginning to realise that foreign penetration, whether it comes armed with guns and aeroplanes or in the shape of goodwill missions equipped with dollars, brings in its train economic exploitation and, if necessary, political subjugation. A reorientation of the relations of the Asiatic countries with those of the West will and must take place.

8 October 1950 Israeli Aggression

Israel's illegal and unauthorised occupation of a strategically and economically important part of Jordan's territory, significantly lying to the east of the River Jordan, is only the latest act of aggression on the part of the Jewish State. Founded on fraud and nurtured on Western imperialism's desire to possess a safe base in the Middle East, Israel, since her very inception, has acted on the imperialist principles of deceit and aggression. Adroitly supported by America and other Western nations, Israel has been allowed to annex large territories that had been regarded as Arab even under the unjust UN plan for the partition of Palestine. Since then, thousands of Arabs have been forcibly driven out of their homes in the Jewish-controlled parts of Palestine, while those who remain may suffer the same fate whenever their departure is considered expedient by the masters of Zionism. Even those Arabs who are recognised as full-fledged citizens are not, in actual practice, free from vicious racial discrimination and persecution in a State that was ostensibly set up as a refuge for the victims of similar racism. Having consolidated herself with the help of influential and moneyed friends, Israel has now begun to spread her tentacles even beyond the former borders of Palestine, presumably in accordance with Jewish plans to dominate the western seaboard of the Middle East. The Israeli contention that Jordan had agreed to the transfer of the territory involved during the Rhodes Talks has been proved utterly false by documentary evidence and the independent testimony of Mr Ralph Bunche, former UN Mediator in Palestine, who has described the Israeli claim as 'truthless and unfounded'.

Despite Jordan's past betrayals and the existing inter-State differences, the Arab world is expected to stand by the Arab Kingdom in all attempts made to regain the occupied territory. It is interesting to note, however, that Jordan's complaint to the UN has not been causing anyone sleepless nights at Lake Success, nor has her appeal to Britain, France and America produced a satisfactory response. Those who professed to support the so-called UN action in Korea in order to create a healthy precedent for prompt action against aggression have been provided one more example of a case of wanton aggression being deliberately ignored by the Western Powers merely because it suits their own ends. Instead of going to Jordan's help under the Anglo-Jordan Treaty. Britain has advised its protege to take no hasty steps and to refrain from military action. In the meantime, efforts are being made to keep the matter out of the Security Council and instead, to refer it to the UN Armistice Commission for Palestine, Jordan's subordination to Britain prevents the Amman Government from taking the resolute action that the situation calls for. If the Anglo-Americans so desire, this may cost the Arab world another slice of territory and lay the basis for further Israeli aggression. Whatever the outcome of this latest crisis in the Middle East, it provides one more instance to show that, as long as the Western Powers dominate this area, either directly or through local potentates, the Arab peoples will find neither peace nor progress nor real freedom.

²² July 1951 Middle East Assassination Stitute

The assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan is the latest and the second one within a week—of a long series of political murders that have taken place in the Middle East countries during recent years. Five days ago, Riad Bey el Solh, a former Premier of the Lebanon, was killed at Amman, allegedly by a group of Syrian Nationalists who held the ex-Premier responsible for the death of one of their leaders. It is ironic that, only a day before he himself fell a victim to political vendetta, King Abdullah—in what was probably his last public proclamation—had deplored Riad Bey's death and declared that he would not tolerate mischief-makers and terrorists. Murder as a political weapon merits the unreserved condemnation of every sane person, and no circumstances can be held to extenuate a dastardly crime which offends against both morality and political sense. It is not enough, however, to condemn such acts and dismiss them as the result of an individual's aberration; it is at least equally important to probe the factors that help to create an atmosphere in which otherwise normal human beings turn to terrorism.

In the Middle East today, genuine democracy hardly exists anywhere. The political scene is dominated by factions revolving round feudal potentates. Educationally and politically backward, and with no tradition of democratic political functioning, the people find themselves helplessly caught in a morass of intrigue and corruption, unable to change the existing conditions or even to make their voice heard. The existence of direct foreign control in many Arab countries, and the active presence of foreign agents and spies in nearly all, make the situation even more confused. In these circumstances, particularly when major upheavals take place, the absence of normal political channels leads to mass discontent and frustration, which in turn tend to promote the cult of the dagger and the bomb. The Arab world is involved in a tense struggle for freedom. This struggle is neither a straight nor a clean fight; but it is clear that, unless it is finally won, the confusion and chaos that today make the Middle East a breeding ground for political assassins will not be completely eliminated. Therefore, those who wish to see an end to political terrorism in the Middle East must devote themselves to the cause of liberating the Arab States from the shackles of imperialism and its agents.

If King Abdullah's murder was, as reported, a political act, the reasons which led to it are well known. The Ruler of Jordan was a 'loyal ally' of the British, who subsidised his

Government, equipped and controlled his army, used his country's military bases, and determined his State policies. King Abdullah's loyalty to Britain could not make him a popular figure among the Arabs, but he earned the hatred of many primarily for his role in the Palestinian war. The annexation of a large part of Palestine, the Arab Legion's refusal to co-operate with other Arab armies, and his reported secret deals with Israel incensed Arab opinion even more than King Abdullah's pet ambition to rule over 'Greater Syria'. Thus, if it is correct that the assassin was a Palestinian Arab who had fought in the war that was started to prevent his country's vivisection, but ended in its disappearance from the map of the world, his act of madness can be understood, even though it cannot be justified. This explanation cannot, however, be accepted as the truth unless it is confirmed by independent sources. It is of interest that the Crown Prince was also dissatisfied with his father's pro-British policies, and had quarrelled with both Glubb Pasha and the Premier during King Abdullah's absence from Jordan some months ago. It is now learnt that a younger son has been appointed Regent—by whom it is not known—and the Crown Prince is reported to be either ill or out of the country. Whatever else all this may mean only time will tell, but it is obvious that if future trouble is to be avoided, the question of succession to the throne must be decided by the people of Jordan and not by the former Ruler's British advisers.

Mossadeq's Exit/at Institute

The resignation of Dr Mossadeq, its acceptance by the Shah of Iran, and the hasty appointment of a new Prime Minister, will be regarded as grave news by all those who have watched Iran's struggle for liberation with genuine sympathy. Details are not yet available, but it is said that Dr Mossadeq was compelled to abandon the attempt to form a new Ministry because the Shah refused to allow him to function as both Prime Minister and Minister of War, insisting that the latter office should be held by a senior Army officer. Although this clash, which indicates the Shah's desire to have direct control over the Government through the Army, might have brought the crisis to a head, there are good grounds for believing that a number of other factors were working against Dr Mossadeq. It is well known, for instance, that since the failure of the Stikes and Harriman missions last year, the British have been working very hard to dislodge the author of the Oil Nationalisation Law from office and to secure the appointment of a successor who would be more amenable to British demands. And, although Dr Mossadeq had accepted US military aid and American orders about not selling oil to the Socialist countries, in recent weeks Washington seemed to be getting impatient with his continued refusal to allow the British to return to Iran and re-establish their control over the country's oil industry. There were also many local politicians who saw in Dr Mossadeg a rival more dangerous than others, because his fight for oil nationalisation had won him a popular support which few Iranian Premiers have enjoyed in recent years. While Dr Mossadeg, not unnaturally, had many enemies working for his downfall, he would probably have survived their intrigues and machinations if, in the postnationalisation period, he had resisted the British blockade and the American boycott with the boldness which characterised his earlier fight against British pressure and threats.

Be that as it may, while London and Washington will rejoice at Dr Mossadeq's exit, his departure at this stage can only be viewed by the people of Iran and their friends with concern. The fact that he has virtually been driven out of office, and that he is succeeded by a person whose pro-British proclivities are no secret, further strengthens the suspicion that Dr Mossadeq's removal from office is not a normal political development, and that it portends events which may put the clock back in Iran. Those who disapproved of Dr Mossadeq's policy, not because of its ineffectiveness in certain matters but because it sought to free Iran from foreign control, may argue that since Parliament's support of the Mossadeg group was half-hearted, the Shah's action in appointing a new Premier is unexceptionable. It needs to be realised that the Iranian Parliament, with its complicated election procedure and with many of its seats still vacant, does not fully represent the will of the people. Further, Dr Mossadeg, unlike his Parliamentary opponents, enjoys considerable mass support, which had declined to some extent only because of the feeling that he might tire of the burden and seek a compromise with the British oil interests. It can also be said with certainty that, even if the Shah's support allows Mr Ahmed Quavam Sultaneh to get the Parliamentary votes necessary to instal him in office, he will face a hostile nation, convinced by past experience that the new Prime Minister will go as far towards appeasing the British as he dare. Iran today finds herself in a dangerous situation. Not only is it likely that the British will start a renewed of fensive to regain their lost possessions, but the threat of serious internal cleavage now hangs over the country's future. Iran faces a crisis which can be saved only by the people's determination not to surrender the gains of last year and not to give up their struggle for full freedom.

4 February 1958 Arab Unity

The proclamation last Friday of the United Arab Republic, merging Egypt and Syria. takes the Arab peoples a big step nearer to the realisation of their dream of Arab unity. The hope of welding together the Arab lands, of restoring in some form the unity destroyed long centuries ago by successful alien invasions and internal dissensions, has always inspired Arab nationalists and found an echo in the hearts of the people of every Arab country. Hitherto, plans for the furtherance of this ideal have only excited academic interest, because most of the peoples concerned were living either under direct

foreign rule or under protected Kingdoms and Sheikhdoms. But in recent years, with the gradual withdrawal of imperialism from different parts of the Arab world, its unification has increasingly been looked upon as a practical proposition. Of course, many obstacles still remain-the most potent being the part that foreign governments can still play in moulding the policies of Arab States, and the existence of a large number of principalities whose rulers owe their rise to foreign help and are, therefore, inclined to depend for support and sustenance on their foreign friends rather than on their own people. In fact, till a few years ago certain foreign powers enjoyed such a position of influence in the Middle East that plans and proposals were put forward in the name of Arab unity with the purpose of creating a unity of bondage; but most of these plans ultimately foundered on the rock of the people's resistance to imperialism

Meanwhile, serious efforts to integrate the Arab world have continued; and now the first tangible move in this direction has been made by Egypt and Syria—significantly, at the instance of the smaller State. With the unanimous approval of the two Governments, the countries have been joined together to form a unified State which will have a single Government and Parliament, one army, a common currency, and a customs union; further details have not yet been revealed. The merger plan will be ratified by the Parliaments of the two countries within the next day or two, and will then be submitted to the people for their opinion in separate referendums. The favourable demonstrations witnessed in Cairo and Damascus ensure that it will be acclaimed with virtual unanimity by both the Egyptian and the Syrian electorates. It can, thus, be said that there is little or no possibility of internal political differences jeopardising the plan. The administrative aspect of the merger may cause some anxiety, but none of the likely difficulties are insurmountable. Since Syria and Egypt are not contiguous to each other, the new State will present a picture not unlike that of Pakistan. The constitutional problems that we have had to face as a result of the country being split in two separate parts will probably arise in the case of the new Arab State also. However, it will be more fruitful to discuss these issues when the exact nature of the constitutional scheme decided upon by the two Governments has been made public. Whatever the solution they may agree upon, every friend of Arab freedom will hope that it will be based on two fundamental principles—a recognition of the just rights of each region, and the grant of full democratic freedom to the people.

Although the reactions created by the United Arab Republic among neighbouring States and the rest of the world have not yet assumed final shape, certain definite signs are already available. The King of Jordan, for example, is reported to have invited the Kings of Saudi Arabia and Iraq to join in a counter-move by forming a confederation of their three States. On the other hand, Yemen is said to have expressed its willingness to join the UAR on a federal basis, while the people of Lebanon seem to favour its amalgamation with the new Arab State. With regard to the motives of the authors of the merger plan, world opinion is sharply divided. Some Western commentators interpret the decision as a pro-Communist measure which seeks to create a broad base for co-operation with the Soviet Union; others view it as an anti-Communist manoeuvre guided by President Nasser's desire to prevent Syria from becoming too friendly with the USSR. Comment in the Socialist countries is too guarded to allow any positive conclusions. Whatever the outside world may like to think, in reality it appears quite plain that the leaders of Egypt and Syria. frustrated in their design to bring together all the Arab States on the basis of a minimum agreement on foreign policies, decided to make a less ambitious-but more concrete-move towards Arab unity. And the immediate motive was provided by the campaign of hostility unleashed against Syria by the Western powers following their failure to change the Svrian Government or change its attitude towards the question of co-operation with Western 'defence'

plans. The experience of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Suez had already driven home the lesson that a united Arab world could withstand both military and political inroads, but otherwise, divided into small States, each of them presented an attractive target for foreign attack. And now, if the Syrio-Egyptian union leads to policies guided by the Arabs' broad national interests, it may be taken for granted that, despite the various obstacles, this nucleus will ultimately develop into a mighty confederation or regional alliance embracing nearly all the Arab lands, whose peoples, apart from common ties of race, language, culture and religion, are determined to keep their homelands free of alien influence and to use their vast resources of national wealth in their own service.

26 March 1958 Turmoil in Arabia

The grant of full powers by King Saud to Emir Feisal, Crown Prince and Prime Minister, in regard to such vital matters as foreign affairs, internal security and finance, increases the possibility of yet another shift in Saudi Arabia's oscillating policy. Although reliable news is not easily available from a monarchy where there are no representative institutions, no political parties, and no newspapers, it may be presumed that the conflict between the two brothers has been resolved for the time being-either by virtual surrender on the King's part or on the basis of a compromise. In either case, Emir Feisal should now be able to exercise the vast influence that his position gives him to neutralise King Saud's pro-American predilections. Over recent years, Saudi Arabian policy has zigzagged between the pro-Western camp and the group of Arab States pledged to non-alignment. On occasions King Saud has urged moderation upon the Arab governments and sought compromises between Western interests and the demands of Arab nationalism. At other times, however, as for example during the attack on Suez, or the projected attack on Syria, the Saudi King has taken a bolder stand and given full support to the Arab targets of Western aggression or pressure. Some Middle East experts believe that this chronic vacillation is largely the result of a polite tug-of-war between the two brothers that has been intensified since the death of their father. This interpretation gains support from the fact that, since King Saud last switched his policy and, after accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine, started working out a strongly anti-Egyptian line. Emir Feisal has ostentatiously dissociated himself from the Government. Be that as it may, if the present change at Riyadh means that Saudi Arabia will henceforth follow a more rational and more steady course, it should help to bring about greater stability in that country as well as in Arab politics.

Apart from any differences of opinion within the Royal family, Saudi Arabia's inevitable contacts with the outside world following the discovery of one of the world's richest deposits of oil under its barren sands and the congregation of workers in large numbers in new towns are reported to have led to an awakening among the people; and this is a development that the King cannot even try to stop except by shutting down his oil wells and sacrificing a personal income of millions of dollars per month. More than ever before, impartial observers reveal, the people of Saudi Arabia consider themselves to be a part of the Arab nation, and desire that their State should accept the basic programme of the Arab nationalists. Further, the fact that Saudi Arabia is one of the few absolute monarchies left in the world, that although it is a very rich country its people are among the poorest of poor nations, and that little or nothing is being done by the Government to overcome the country's economic and social backwardness, can only make the Saudi Arabians lend a more wiling ear to the tales from other Arab lands where national assets are harnessed to national welfare, where the law is supreme, and the will of no man can easily overrule the wishes of the people. Of late, particularly after reports that elements close to King Saud had tried to bribe Syrian army officers to murder President Nasser, and that one of his

fathers-in-law was seriously implicated in the affair, murmurs of popular discontent in Saudi Arabia have been getting louder. One does not know how far the recent rumours of arrests and shootings, of the malcontents being supported by a large body of Saudi princes, and of imminent danger of the Saudi throne being toppled, are correct. However, even if these reports are untrue or grossly exaggerated, it seems quite plain that the desire for political and social reforms, on the one hand, and the strong pull of Arab nationalism, on the other, will combine to present a grave threat to the present regime, unless the King and his advisers are prepared to bend before the rising storm by agreeing to evolve a polity that will conform more closely to the demands of the people and their welfare.

II. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND BEYOND

19 February 1948 Quest for Stabilisation

When, about a year ago, the US President announced his famous Truman Doctrine, we expressed the opinion that this policy, and the bellicose words which accompanied its declaration, could only be regarded as the harbingers of another war, and that the principle of giving armed help to certain Governments on certain conditions amounted to divesting them of their sovereignty and independence. Ample proof of this has been provided during the last twelve months: the world has gone many steps further towards a third World War, and it is obvious that the civil wars in Greece and China show no signs of ending except with the end of their present regimes. When, on 12 March 1947, President Truman assumed the role of the protector of world democracy, and exhorted the Congress to make huge loans to Greece and Turkey in order to stabilise their existing governments, he in actual fact inaugurated the most dangerous phase of current American diplomacy. In Turkey the existing Government has

been stabilised to such an extent that this country is the only Muslim neighbour of Palestine to withhold the hand of help and friendship from the Palestinian Arabs, facing the gravest crisis in their history. Greece provides an even more disgraceful story. Here the present Government came into existence by enforcing a regime of Fascist terror against the people and completely mortgaging the country to the bosses of Wall Street. After a year, despite the constant stream of dollars, direct military aid and numerous Anglo-American military missions, the Royalist Greek Government is as insecure today as when first installed under foreign patronage. The rebel Greek forces, representing the people who fought against the German occupation and were responsible for the country's liberation, have set up a provisional government of their own, and their Commander-in-Chief, General Makos, recently stated that the writ of the Royalist Government at Athens is now confined to the main cities and the coastal area. President Truman's latest statement lends corroboration to this claim, as does the increasing exodus from Greece of its big capitalists. President Truman has once again notified Congress that he would soon ask for funds for additional military assistance to Greece and Turkey; he said that the guerilla war was 'sapping the economic strength' of Greece and that the guerillas were driving the people to the already overburdened urban centres. He also revealed that out of the original 300.000.000 dollars given to Greece, 172.000,000 dollars have been spent on the military programme; he did not say so, but obviously further American aid is likely to be used for the same purpose. Along with intervention in Greece, America has been doing its best to prop up Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang rule in China. Many million dollars have been put into Chiang's war chest. but his Government has not been stabilised, nor has he succeeded in stemming the tide of popular revolt. The fact that in China today a sum of Rs 5 can buy 100,000 Chinese dollars shows how stable Kuomintang China is: this is accompanied by defeat after defeat on the military front. Independent observers foretell

that at least in Manchuria and North China, the Kuomintang Government is doomed. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine was followed by its logical conclusion, the Marshall Plan, in order to carry this process of stabilisation to Europe. Today, many months after its first announcement, the plan is still not through the discussion stages. Fears of recklessly increasing inflation at home have led the US Congress to slash its astronomical dollar figures; the World Trade Union Congress has rejected it outright, and even the nations which originally accepted it at British goading are beginning to regard its outcome with grave scepticism. But America's faithful ally, Britain, is undaunted, and to ensure success for this attempt at the domination of Europe, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Minister, has put forward Churchill's old idea of a Union of Western Europe. This union of beggars is to embrace not only the home countries, but also their colonial empires. This latest stabilisation scheme, within a few weeks of its publication, has had two big dents made in it, by the defection of Iraq from its treaty with Britain and by the statement by the representatives of Sweden and Denmark that they definitely stand opposed to dividing Europe into different blocs. The Palestine issue is providing another headache to the much-harassed President of America. Torn between a greed for oil and a desire to satisfy world Jewry, the latter particularly important in view of the impending Presidential election, a curious policy has been outlined, which promises only increased chaos. The game which, America, with British assistance, is trying to play is similar to that of the late Adolf Hitler; it is dangerous to peace and democracy and, in the last analysis, doomed to failure.

26 August 1948 Unwelcome Move

The US Government's refusal to allow the Dean of Canterbury to enter America is unlikely to evoke any protest from Messrs Attlee and Bevin, who seem to be convinced

that America can do no wrong. The 'Red' Dean, as Dr Hewlett Johnson is often called, is really no more 'Red' than, for instance. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani: if he were, he could hardly be appointed so high a dignitary in the Church of England. The Dean's only sin seems to be his political independence, his intellectual integrity, and a refusal to look at the Soviet Union through imperialism's coloured glasses. He has visited that country and written about it frankly, as one should write about any country-without propaganda. He has faith in mankind, and works for world peace, seeking to break down the barriers between different nationalities and different systems. Since he does not bring grist to imperialism's propaganda mill, he is *persona non* grata with the reactionaries in both Great Britain and America. His comments on America's refusal to admit him, just before he left for Poland to attend the Congress of Intellectuals in defence of peace, make interesting reading. The Dean 'regretted that, while Americans had been cordially welcomed to Canterbury Cathedral, its Dean was not to be welcome in America'. He further said, 'It appears that the Iron Curtain, for me at any rate, stretches across the Atlantic, but the cordial welcome comes from the East'. The incident reminds one of Charlie Chaplin's caustic jibe that in America these days it is impossible even to get off a tram car with the left foot forward without being dubbed a Communist.

18 May 1951 US Policies

Any lingering doubt among impartial observers about US aid programmes being wholly an instrument of US foreign policy should finally be dispelled by recent developments, which show not only that an American gift or loan is available only on the State Department's terms, but also that the receiving country is expected to abide by US dictates in various other matters—both domestic and international. Many long months ago. India approached Washington for two million tons of foodgrains, to be given either at reduced rates or as a loan. After considerable delay over preliminary negotiations, the US Government decided—professedly on purely humanitarian grounds-to provide the required food on a half-grant, halfloan basis, and legislation to this effect was introduced in the Congress. The prolonged legislative debates have revealed that America's rulers are willing to send out the foodgrains, which can easily be spared, in order to save India from going Communist-thus paying the socialist system of production an unintended tribute—but not without the guarantee that India would re-orientate her foreign and trade policies. Apart from resenting other humiliating conditions, India, it seems, politely refused to change her attitude towards China or remove the ban on the export of monazite sands, a raw material used for producing atomic energy. Although its precise terms will be decided in subsequent negotiations, it now seems certain that America's food-aid to India will be entirely on a loan basis. And, further, in giving its approval to the relevant Bill, the US Senate has added the significant provision that, if India seeks to repay part of the loan in raw materials, these must include monazite and manganese.

America's dealings with other countries, including her closest allies, follow a similar pattern. Recently, the US Senate passed a resolution declaring that financial and economic aid would not be given to any country which continues to supply war materials to the Soviet Union, China or any of the other Socialist States. Since this definition can be made to cover almost every commodity, it means that the US will assume still greater control over the external trade of all countries in the Western bloc. It is no great secret that Britain's recent ban on the export of rubber to China was due entirely to American pressure. In a large number of other matters also, it is known that the freedom of action of Governments allied to America is severely circumscribed by the wishes of the US Government. In recent months, on many occasions, the Governments of Great Britain, Canada and France have been compelled to make sudden changes of

policy on important international questions—obviously, at a hint from the US State Department. Pointed attention to this facet of America's relations with her allies was drawn by a British paper which cannot be accused of either progressive or anti-American leanings. In a typical understatement, the London *Times* said in a recent editorial: 'It is an unfortunate fact. for which the Americans themselves are partly responsible, that since the war no British statesman has found a way to reconcile unity of purpose with difference of opinion or to strengthen Anglo-American friendship without necessarily accepting American policies'. One country's domination of so many others is anyhow undesirable, but with America openly preparing for war, her hold on her long list of junior partners and, consequently, the UN, constitutes a serious threat to world peace.

22 January 1953 Inaugural Speech

While supporters of the Anglo-American bloc of imperialist powers and supplicants for dollar-aid will probably regard President Eisenhower's inaugural speech as an inspired performance, and a local contemporary has already certified that it has 'a distinct Islamic ring', cold-blooded analysis shows that the General's first Presidential pronouncement is nothing more than a reiteration of the United States' bipartisan foreign policy-clothed in well-prepared but empty rhetoric. Shorn of the euphemisms that US statesmen reserve for formal occasions, and the speech-writers' elegant flourishes, the new US President has said nothing in his address beyond pledging himself to continue the policy of Cold War and all that it stands for. To grasp the real meaning of President Eisenhower's pompous declarations, it is enough to study one example of how words like 'freedom' and 'defence' are misused and distorted by American neoimperialism. Devoting a large part of his speech to America's faith in 'the deathless dignity of man governed by eternal

moral and natural laws', in the equality of all men, in freedom, and so on, General Eisenhower concludes that this faith 'confers a common dignity upon the French soldier who dies in Indo-China, the British soldier killed in Malaya, the American life given in Korea'. He might easily have added to this list the French marauders killed in North Africa, the British soldiers who fell during the fighting in the Canal Zone, the Dutch troops killed in Indonesia and the Indians who died in Kashmir. They and other soldiers fighting in aggressive wars waged on foreign soil are all part of the legion battling in the US-sponsored crusade for the 'defence' of the Western way of life. When, after describing the imperialist armies in Malaya, Indo-China, and Korea as soldiers of this new faith, General Eisenhower goes on to declare that his country is not an imperialist power, and that it is only exercising 'the responsibility of the free world's leadership', it is plain that either he overestimates his own powers of persuasion and under-estimates the world's intelligence, or, like many other US politicians, he intends to pursue his own policies in utter disregard of democratic world opinion.

13 December 1957 Racial Discrimination

Although considerable progress has been made in recent years towards the grant of equal citizenship rights to American Negroes, the United States still stands second only to the Union of South Africa among countries that enforce—either by law or through lawlessness—a policy of racial discrimination. The fascist theory of white supremacy still has a strong enough hold among influential sections of opinion to provoke defiance of the law and the use of violence against those who seek to ensure that the relevant provisions of the US Constitution are treated with full respect. The school-opening season in America has witnessed the recurrence of mob action in a number of towns to prevent Negro students from attending schools which were hitherto closed to non-whites. In an Alabama town, a Negro clergyman attempting to enrol his daughter and other children was assaulted by a gang of white men. In Arkansas, the Governor has called out the National Guard to prevent the admission of Negroes to a State school after a riot provoked by a group of white men. In another southern town, a school building has been dynamited to prevent its use in common by Negro and white children. Incidents of lesser gravity have been more frequent—jeering at Negro children, boycott of schools, and threats of violence against Negroes who send their children to the newly integrated schools. In a number of places in the south, integration of schools is proceeding without serious trouble, albeit slowly. Nevertheless, the mob violence that is being witnessed in or near certain schools is sufficiently serious—and even more so the fact that few of the white gangsters are likely to be convicted for their crimes-to shame every decent American.

America's racists are active on other fronts also. The Ku Klux Klan has emerged once again to threaten, maim or murder Negroes who have in some way offended white prejudice. Negroes moving into what are considered white localities are still harassed and even assaulted. The hope that the passage of a reasonably effective Civil Rights Bill would, by giving Negroes the opportunity to exercise their political rights, help to improve their status in all fields of life, has to a large extent been belied by the Administration's acceptance of a compromise formula which reduces the chances of its provisions being fully and speedily implemented. This vitiation of the Civil Rights Bill is certainly not a minor question, for it is well known that today only a very small percentage of America's Negro population of about sixteen million is able to vote. Quite obviously, unless America's leading political parties are able to muster sufficient moral courage to launch a countrywide campaign in favour of allowing all American citizens-black, brown, or white-to exercise equal political and civic rights, progress towards eliminating colour prejudice will be both painful and slow. And, as Mr Dulles himself has hinted, it is also obvious that, as long as America cannot ensure full democracy to a large segment of its own population, its efforts to export the American way of life to other countries are bound to be treated by the world with a measure of natural cynicism.

III. INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

4 February 1951 Indian National Congress

The recent Ahmedabad session of the All-India Congress Committee was summoned primarily to enable the Congress leadership to study the causes of the organisation's growing unpopularity and to devise effective remedies to halt the decline. As far as diagnosis of the malady is concerned, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches may be accepted as a fairly efficient analysis of what is wrong with the Indian National Congress. He said, among other things, that a kind of a rot had set in, the Congress had become lifeless, and many of its members regarded it merely as a kind of election machinery. All this is no doubt true, but neither the Indian Premier, nor the rest of the Congress High Command, could come to any definite conclusions about how the situation could be saved or, at least, further deterioration stemmed. Apart from reviving paid membership for the organisation and urging Government to ban the use of banaspati ghee, the AICC satisfied itself with the adoption of a resolution on national unity. This cliche-ridden document appeals to Congressmen to sink their personal or factional differences in order to save the national organisation, and even hints at opening the doors of the Congress to outside political groups like the Indian Socialist Party. That a vague appeal of this sort to all and sundry will do little good was shown by the reaction of 'rebel' leaders like Acharya Kripalani, who pertinently said that organisational unity was an empty slogan without clear-cut

and agreed decisions on Congress objectives. This challenge was not taken up seriously and, in a flood of the usual oratory, the AICC session came to an end without having made any progress towards closing Congress ranks or winning new allies.

The oft-postponed General Election in India will show how far Congress fortunes have ebbed since it last swept the polls in the areas that now constitute India. Due to the absence of a sufficiently-organised Opposition, and the influence it has as the only party in power anywhere in India, the Congress may be able to retain its hold over the Central and most other Ministries. But the crisis in India is so acute that, unless prompt steps are taken to solve their major economic and political problems, the people are likely to by-pass the legislatures and resort to more direct methods. Apart from the corruption, jobbery, and nepotism that have disgraced Congress rule, the main reason for such widespread discontent is the refusal of those in power to implement their pledges. The Congress organisation as well as its Parliamentary parties are dominated by the reactionary right-wing leadership. Hence, official policy has always been guided by the interests of the capitalists and big landlords, while the radical promises of past Congress resolutions have been shelved as being 'impracticable under the present circumstances'. The Congress programme with regard to the nationalisation of major industries, abolition of landlordism, democratisation of the administration, severance of the Commonwealth connection, and complete democracy in the Indian States-in short, on every important item of national policy-has been either abandoned or watered down beyond recognition. By its reactionary policies. combined with military ventures and the trade war with Pakistan. the Congress regime has brought the mass of the people only misery and disappointment.

It is quite obvious that the Indian people will not tolerate their present wretched conditions for very long, and if the Congress cannot do anything about it, they will be compelled to remove the Congress from power by any available means. The Congress, however, cannot even start tackling these problems as long as it is dominated by the representatives of vested interests. Pandit Nehru is, perhaps, the only Congressman who has sufficient honesty and influence to undertake a purge in the Congress, but his craze for Congress unity prevents him from coming out openly against the elements that have brought the country to the verge of ruin, and frittered away much of the good will that the Congress enjoyed three years ago. If Pandit Nehru continues to trail behind the Congress right-wing, whose majority Sardar Patel assured by astute manoeuvring, periodical sermons and vague resolutions are not going to save the Congress from extinction, for the masses will increasingly seek the help of other parties to complete the tasks of India's liberation and their own salvation.

26 August 1951 Congress Crisis

The serious crisis created by the Indian Prime Minister's resignation from the Congress Working Committee and its Election Board is symptomatic of the cleavage that has existed for many decades in the ranks and—to some extent—the leadership of India's biggest political party. The dominant faction in the Congress has always been the extreme rightwing group, formerly headed by Sardar Patel. Closely allied to Indian big business, and often working hand in glove with the Hindu Mahasabha, this group has persistently sought to purge the Congress of all liberal elements and to run the party as a semi-fascist organisation. The Opposition, led at different times by the Communists, the Socialists and the Bosites, has often had Pandit Nehru's sympathy but seldom his support, and these different Leftist groups have gradually been driven out of the Congress. Pandit Nehru's unityfixation, combined with his deep regard for Mahatma Gandhi, forced him to accept many unpalatable compromises, which course of action he rationalised and defended in public as a Congressman's patriotic duty. In post-Partition India, the only opposition within the Congress to Sardar Patel's policies came from Pandit Nehru and his small band of adherents, As long as Mahatma Gandhi was alive, his powerful personality buttressed Pandit Nehru's position and, had he lived, there can be little doubt that he would have cleansed the Congress of the elements that have converted the organisation into a camp of communalism, conservatism and corruption. The manner of Mahatma Gandhi's tragic death, and the resultant country-wide revulsion it caused against the reactionary Rightist elements—inside the Congress and outside—forced Sardar Patel to promise full allegiance to Pandit Nehru. The Sardar's illness and death prevented the fruition of his plans for putting the Congress into a strait-jacket of his own design. However, the tussle between the Patel group and Pandit Nehru continued, and Mr Tandon has now emerged as the leader of the minority-baiting, communal chauvinists who seem to respect the swastika much more than Asoka's chakra.

For more than a year Pandit Nehru has been toying with the idea of asserting himself and making a bold attempt to push the Congress out of its present rut, which has not only led it to deviate from its basic principles and policies, but has also created an ever-widening gulf between the people and the party. That the Indian Prime Minister has applied his 'shock treatment' at a time when the Congress faces its first real test in the forthcoming General Election, shows that he is fully aware of the risk involved in appealing to the country without putting the Congress house in order. As recent byelections have shown, four years of Congress misrule have alienated the mass of the Indian people from the ruling party. Pandit Nehru's belated realisation that the Congress was becoming more and more isolated from the people, and he himself increasingly ineffective, has led him to abandon the path of sponsoring unity resolutions in favour of challenging the Tandon group to accept his policies in toto or to do without his support. Since Pandit Nehru is virtually the only Congress leader whose reputation for honesty is unsullied

and who still enjoys considerable mass support, his threat of non-co-operation throws the Congress High Command in a quandary. So far Mr Tandon has shown no signs of surrender, but, as the Central Parliamentary Party's unanimous vote of confidence in Pandit Nehru indicates, the Congress President is not likely to get a majority in the AICC against the Prime Minister, for the rank and file of Congressmen know too well that it would be suicidal for them to fight the elections without Pandit Nehru's whole-hearted backing. Efforts will probably be made to persuade Pandit Nehru to accept a compromise; but if, as of old, he agrees to a formula which pacifies his conscience but leaves everything else unchanged, the Indian Prime Minister will merely be helping to bury the Congress. There is some glimmer of hope that Pandit Nehru is acutely conscious of the organisation's grave predicament, and that he will fight to save the organisation from the men who are driving it to premature death. It may already be too late, but the only chance of the Congress retaining some of the popularity it once enjoyed lies in throwing out the Tandons and Munshis, democratising the party's functioning, and working on the principles of democracy and justice-in domestic matters as well as in the foreign field.

IV. COMMUNIST BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

5 May 1954 USSR and Civil Liberty

The recent inaugural session of the newly elected Supreme Soviet, the highest legislative body in the USSR, had provided a logical opportunity for the Soviet Government to reveal to their own people and the outside world full details of the crimes of which Lavrenti Beria and his collaborators were accused and convicted. The new national Parliament might also have been expected to discuss all aspects of the episode and consider the desirability of making necessary changes in the State's judicial machinery. It now seems obvious, however, that, for reasons best known to themselves, they have no intention of doing so; appraisal of the case and the conclusions to be drawn about the state of civil liberty in the USSR must, therefore, be based on the scanty and largely biased information that has been made available. The dismissal from office and arrest of Beria, and his subsequent summary trial and execution, have caused a variety of comment. These reactions fall into two broad categories. representing two attitudes: there are those who gloat over the event and those who gloss over it. The first category sees in Beria's defection a fissure in the Soviet system, proof that it cannot prosper or last, and justification for the anti-Soviet crusade which fosters the Hitlerite doctrine of so-called preventive war; and the second, believing that the Soviet Union stands for justice and peace, tries to ignore any sign of weakness in its leadership or what appears to be a flaw in its system of justice. Neither of these attitudes, born of the intense East-West Cold War, makes it easy for independent persons to reach an objective assessment of developments in the Soviet Union or to judge a particular event.

It appears likely that Beria was rightly accused of grave offences against the Soviet State, that after the death of Marshal Stalin he conspired to subvert the Government—of which he himself was a member—with a view to capturing power, and that he not only committed irregular and illegal actions, but also sought foreign support for his venture. While the catalogue issued by Moscow of Beria's past misdeeds going back to the first years after the revolution is, apart from being irrelevant, somewhat unconvincing, and can only be regarded as frills added for enhancing the enormity of his recent offences, the assumption that Beria had become disloyal to his Government and State is supported even by the testimony of non-Soviet sources. For instance, the report of Western commentators that, in the 'struggle for leadership between Malenkov and Beria', the latter was 'driven to seek the support of the West', provides a plausible explanation for Beria's actions. The right-wing French newspaper Aurore

said, soon after the event, that 'foreign observers in Moscow were convinced that Beria had tried to sabotage the policies laid down by M. Georgi Malenkov...' and that 'the truth of this assertion could not be doubted'. It is significant also that the US Ambassador in Moscow hurriedly left the Soviet capital a few days before Beria was arrested, and that the US State Department proudly claimed that Mr Bohlen had prior knowledge of the developments in Moscow and had gone to Paris in order to be able to offer advice to Washington. This statement was, even more significantly, subsequently withdrawn and dismissed as a 'foolish boast'. It seems far more likely that it was a foolish admission. Be that as it may, we strongly adhere to the view that, however grave the crimes of which Beria was guilty, his trial, like the pre-war Moscow Trials, should have been held in public, with full facilities for the foreign Press to witness and report the proceedings. Although the procedure adopted by the Soviet Government is in conformity with Soviet law, and there arc earlier precedents for trials in camera, the position that Beria occupied in the Soviet Union during the last thirty years, and the world-wide interest aroused by his case, demanded that there should be no doubt left in any mind of his guilt, nor the suspicion that the accused persons were not given an adequate opportunity to defend themselves. This was particularly necessary after the Moscow doctors' case, when it was revealed that innocent persons had been falsely accused by the police and forced to confess the commission of crimes of which they were not guilty.

guilty. Those who see in Beria's trial and execution a callous and unprovoked manoeuvre by Mr Malenkov to remove an inconvenient rival, ignore the fact that Mr Malenkov anyhow occupied the leading position in the State, and that he had been selected for this privilege long before Stalin's death, at the time of the 19th Party Congress. Further, Beria's dismissal and indictment were supported unanimously by the Soviet Government and, later on, by both Houses of the Supreme Soviet. These organs of Soviet power can hardly be expected to send up an important leader for trial on a capital charge without sufficient cause. The main argument given in support of Beria's innocence is that all political trials in the Soviet Union are staged, and that the courts merely serve as instruments of extermination in the hands of the ascendant faction. Positive proof is available to show that this is a piece of baseless slander. It will be recalled that the pre-war Moscow Trials were witnessed by a large number of foreign diplomats and Press representatives, and most of them came to the conclusion that the trials were perfectly fair and the guilt of the accused fully proved. The American Ambassador, Mr Joseph E. Davies, reported from Moscow in 1937 to the US Secretary of State as follows: 'It is my opinion, so far as the political defendants are concerned, that sufficient crimes under Soviet Law, among those charged in the indictment, were established by the proof, and beyond a reasonable doubt, to justify the verdict of guilty of treason and the adjudication of the arrangement provided by Soviet Criminal Statute'. Further, he says, the opinion of those diplomats who attended the trial most regularly was general, that the case had established the verdict that there was a formidable political opposition and an exceedingly serious plot'. The US Ambassador also reveals why the truth was not made known to the outside world. He records his conversation with another foreign diplomat: 'In discussing the trial, he said that the defendants were undoubtedly guilty, that all of us who attended the trial had practically agreed upon that; that the outside world, from the Press reports, however, seemed to think that the trial was a put-up job (facade, as he called it): that while he knew it was not, it was probably just as well that the outside world should think so'.

In reviewing the history of the anti-Soviet plots germinating inside the Soviet Union, it must be borne in mind that the State has, since its inception, been the target of every possible form of attack by the Western States. After the failure of the war of intervention in 1919, when the armies of fourteen capitalist countries invaded the infant Socialist

State, the Governments of the West have continued their efforts to destroy the Soviet Union. Sabotage, intrigue, bribery, economic boycott, political non-recognition, every weapon of foreign intervention has been brought into use. Even today, as is well known, special agencies have been established by the United States for such activities, and millions of dollars are being spent to weaken and, if possible, to destroy the Soviet State. The fact that foreign agents and spies have been able to enlist the help of Soviet citizens or to take advantage of the over-weening ambition of certain Soviet leaders is not a phenomenon which occurs only in the Soviet Union. In expressing horrified surprise at the defection of a Communist leader in the Soviet Union, those who thereby seek to run down the Soviet State are really complimenting the system by unconsciously implying that it can, or at least should, never breed traitors who put their personal interests above those of the State.

Notwithstanding these weighty historical factors, which are cited as justification for the special measures adopted by the Soviet Union to safeguard is integrity against subversion and sabotage, we believe that the Soviet leaders should initiate radical measures to change the Soviet laws in certain respects, in order to ensure that in political cases—where alone, incidentally, the drastic death penalty is still permissible—all possibility of a miscarriage of justice is eliminated, and to guarantee that not only is justice done in every case, but that it should also be seen to be done. The argument that mere observance of the formalities of justice is no guarantee of its essence being respected certainly has a great deal of weight; but there are certain customary forms and procedures evolved by Man in his quest for justice which need to be preserved or revived, even if today in some countries they are used as a cloak for the grossest forms of injustice. Further, what appears to be the Soviet Government's disregard of foreign opinion in relation to their internal policies needs to be reviewed, if only because everything that happens in the Soviet Union affects international opinion and, therefore, international events. We hold the view that the Soviet legal system should be improved on these lines. The civil liberties now granted to Soviet citizens should be expanded, and effective measures adopted to ensure that the rights guaranteed by law cannot under any circumstances be overridden. The possibility of human error should be eliminated as far as possible by a system of checks and balances, such as the right of appeal in every political case, full guarantee of the prisoner's safe custody, the grant of satisfactory facilities for defence, and the avoidance of an accused person being treated as guilty until his guilt is proved. Such reforms would be easier of achievement in a normal world, where the independence and sovereignty of each State are respected by the others; in a certain sense, however, the existence of the Cold War provides the Soviet Union with an additional reason for making these changes without further delay, so that the machinations of saboteurs and their war-mongering foreign allies can be exposed before the world, and hostile propagandists disarmed.

31 October 1956 Moscow to Budapest

Since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Socialist world has been in a state of active political ferment. The developments revealed for the first time in February this year, and subsequent events in the USSR and certain countries of Eastern Europe, clearly indicate that basic changes in the structure and polity of the Socialist State have been undertaken in order to rid the system of the dross that had been collected during the periods of civil war and foreign invasion, of internal conflict and acute economic difficulties. So vast is the scope of the change envisaged being based on a drastic revision of Marshal Stalin's policies and methods, the deliberate exposure of his regime's mistakes and misdeeds, and radical reform in the legal, economic and political fields—that a hasty appraisal of the situation would have no lasting value, and can be attempted only by those who are pledged either to condemn or to praise blindly everything that happens in the world of Socialism. Further, information regarding the proven facts is still too scanty, and much of it is too prejudiced, to deserve uncriticial credence. And, in any case, events of such great significance can best be judged in a historical perspective. While final assessment must, of necessity, be deferred, certain trends are becoming clearly discernible, and it is significant that, so far, each step taken—albeit not always without hesitation—has been in the direction of democratic progress.

Inside the USSR it would appear that, notwithstanding his earlier achievements in the defence of Socialism and the Soviet Union, Marshal Stalin took advantage of the unsettled conditions to arrogate to himself extraordinary powers, which were used not only to deal with the threat of foreign intervention—which was real enough at all times—but were also employed to consolidate his own leadership. The demands of security were indeed high in the world's first Socialist State, but it is now revealed that Stalin interpreted State security as also embracing the security of his own rule, and equated it with the suppression of civil liberties. Dissident politicians and their followers were often detained without trial, arbitrary arrest and prosecution on false charges became Beria's set policy in handling the regime's opponents, and on the strength of confessions-often extracted through nonjudicial methods-along with the guilty, many innocent persons were condemned to death or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. These harsh and rigid practices defied Socialist principles, and involved a violation of Soviet laws and the traditions established by Lenin. Incidentally, it should be noted that this criticism has nothing in common with the hostile propaganda of those who hate the Soviet Union for its sources of strength-the elimination of exploitation and opposition to imperialism-rather than criticise it for its weaknesses. Those inside the USSR who knew the truthand were thus in the best position to judge the

situation—were, apparently, silenced by fear or expediency; and at the same time certain Soviet institutions were perverted to serve the rulers' personal ends. It has been pertinently pointed out that, when a system of governance can be dominated by one man or a small group to such an extent and for so long, its structure needs to be carefully examined and set right to prevent a repetition of such perversions. A beginning has already been made towards reforming the Soviet system. The Penal Code is being amended, the legal system is being overhauled, and a system of collective leadership—in opposition to the cult of the individual—has been established. However, a great deal more needs to be done before the legacy of the past can be fully liquidated. The people must be guaranteed that collective leadership will never degenerate into collective authoritarianism; that the illegal methods condemned by the new leadership will not be used even against those who are considered guilty of grave crimes. These and other essential reforms must be implemented with all possible speed: but it should be realised that the new leadership will be able to avoid past mistakes and evolve correct policies if, particularly in their criticism of Stalin, they do not forget the peculiar factors governing their country's history or their own part in its making.

The mistaken Soviet policy of strict control from the top was reflected in international relations by a similar rigidity, which led to attempts to enforce complete conformity in thought and action among the East European countries. Not only was this impermissible on grounds of Socialist theory, but in practice it led to grievous blunders. In economic planning, for example, an exaggerated stress on heavy industry, and attempts to collectivise agriculture without full preparations, caused acute suffering and discontent. On the political side, this policy sought to impose an unhealthy uniformity, and thus drove Yugoslavia out of the Cominform. This body has now been dissolved, and Moscow's ideological pressure on the States in close treaty relationship with the USSR has been relaxed considerably. The latest events in Poland and Hungary show that the promised transition in this respect, and the expected changes in the national policies of these countries, are taking place at too slow a pace. An impatient people have begun to demonstrate in favour of democratic reforms and more rational economic policies. At places, peaceful demonstrations have ended in violence; at others, groups which had nothing to do with the demonstrators have suddenly emerged from hiding to start the shooting. It is reasonable to assume that men on whom millions of dollars have been lavished in recent years have found on opportune moment to do their job. But whatever the extent of Western intervention through their paid agents, the problems facing Poland and Hungary are primarily internal in character and must be dealt with as such—which means, among other things, that the Soviet troops stationed in Warsaw Pact bases must not be used for restoring order, and should be withdrawn from these States as soon as possible. The new Governments in these two countries will undoubtedly be able to deal with the situation—not only on the law-and-order level but also on the political plane. They must be allowed to do so without foreign interference from any side.

The clashes that have taken place in Poland and Hungary can have two effects on the situation. They can either, as seems to be happening, hasten the progress of reform in these and other neighbouring countries, or they can strengthen the hands of the diehards against the liberals and encourage a reversal of the process of democratisation. Although the chances of the latter development taking place are small, it needs to be stressed that retraction of the new policy would be a tragedy. The answer to the spurt of rioting is not less, but more, democracy. To achieve success in their aims, the new leaders of the Socialist States will have to revive their best traditions, abandon the evils which either had their roots in war-conditions or were a heritage of Tsarism, and evolve a new methodology which, in striving for full political and economic democracy, will seek to serve the people in accordance with their wishes. Mr Molotov's confession before the Party Congress that 'we (the leadership) are not

infrequently still prisoners of the habits and conventions formed in the past', should constantly be kept in mind by his colleagues and friends, in the USSR and outside, so that the break with the past, for which they cannot absolve themselves of their share of responsibility, can be made complete, and a new era of democratic Socialism can be launched with confidence.

6 November 1956 Intervention in Hungary

Although the situation in Hungary is still too confused to permit a definite appraisal of recent developments, because of the importance of the issues involved some of the latest happenings call for immediate comment. The facts as reported are that, while the reconstituted Nagy Government was negotiating with the Soviet commanders for the withdrawal of their troops from the country, a powerful section of the Cabinet led by Mr Janos Kadar—who now heads the new Government—staged a revolt against Mr Imre Nagy's policies and secured the help of the Soviet troops to remove his Government from office. This is clearly a case of foreign armed intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary. While criticising the presence of Soviet troops in the East European States a few days ago, we had in particular stressed that their employment to deal with any internal development in these countries was a wrong and harmful step. At that time Soviet help had been asked for by the Nagy Government. Later, however, the reconstituted Nagy Government demanded that the Soviet troops should be withdrawn immediately. Before the negotiations had led to any results, a Cabinet split occurred, and the Soviet forces took the side of the Ministers who opposed Mr Nagy. This hasty move by the Soviet troops, in opposition to the wishes of the established Government, provides a reprehensible example of foreign interference in Hungary's domestic affairs. However unpalatable the last Nagy Government's policy of repudiating the Warsaw Pact and adopting a neutralist position might have been to the USSR and to large sections of Hungarian opinion, the conflict should have been settled by the Hungarian people themselves, without foreign interference of any sort. It has been stated that Mr Nagy was acting in collusion with fascist elements, imported from abroad, who wanted to restore capitalism and feudalism. These charges may well be true; but even if they are substantially correct, the question, we repeat, was one to be settled by the Hungarians themselves, and only in the event of a serious threat of military intervention from the West could there be justification for obtaining the help of the Soviet Army.

Soviet spokesmen have sought to justify the use of their troops in Hungary by referring to the Warsaw Pact. Never before have its aims been interpreted as including common action against subversion. The Warsaw Pact, we feel, can only defeat its main aim of protecting the freedom of its member nations if it is moulded in such close imitation of NATO that it even includes the clause regarding 'internal aggression' or subversion—a clause that the Socialist States have rightly criticised for years as an instrument for foreign interference in the smaller NATO countries. It does not, of course, lie in the mouths of Western statesmen to condemn the use of Soviet troops in Hungary—with their own black record in this regard—but genuine democratic opinion throughout the world has the right to criticise this step as a violation of the sovereignty of the Hungarian people. Anyhow, even if the leading sponsors of the General Assembly's resolution are only cynical supporters of the move for withdrawing foreign troops from Hungary, the demand it voices is a correct and desirable end; we hope, therefore, that the USSR will accept it without delay.

The new Government's first aim, naturally, is to restore law and order, but the restoration of peace will not by itself solve the extremely important issues that have been raised. The question of foreign troops, the restitution of the people's political and civic rights of which they have been deprived by the Rakosi regime, and the establishment of a genuinely democratic system of government, will remain on the agenda for Hungary, and if these issues are to be decided with any hope of permanent settlement, they must be determined by the Hungarian people themselves-without foreign interference. Whether this interference comes in the shape of subsidies to secret groups or venal politicians, or consists of the use or threat of armed force, it violates political morality and creates conditions which cannot help to ensure peace and stability in Europe. It is indeed surprising that those among the Soviet leaders who criticise Stalin's actions and have sponsored a new democratic policy should have done in Hungary what Stalin did not even dream of doing in the case of Yugoslavia, They should realise that, if their liberal policy had been acted upon with greater speed and vigour, the eruption in Hungary would probably have been avoided. They should also realise that military intervention in another State amounts to a reversal of their new policy, that it is contrary to the principles of Socialism, and that its consequences and repercussions will in the long run do a great deal of harm to the cause of Socialism.

While a final opinion on the subject must await the availability of more definite news, we cannot resist the conclusion that the Soviet Union's policy in relation to the recent events in Hungary has been wrong, and that the military interference lacks all legal, moral, and political justification: further, it tends to weaken the cause of democracy, and increases the danger of the Cold War being intensified. The USSR must, therefore, retrace its steps in Hungary. We would also suggest that the Warsaw Pact should be revised so that no Soviet troops should be stationed in any Eastern European country, and their entry should be possible only to deal with an actual threat of military invasion from the West.

19 June 1958 Hungarian Tragedy

The execution of Mr Imre Nagy, a former Prime Minister of Hungary, and three of his closest associates, is a horrifying echo of the grim tragedy that engulfed Hungary in 1956.

Whatever one may think of the genesis of the Hungarian uprising or of the manner in which it was suppressed, there seems to be no justification for inflicting the death sentence on Mr Nagy eighteen months after the end of the fighting and the foreign intervention from both East and West, and when the world was beginning to hope that Hungary had returned to normalcy and that its problems would henceforth be dealt with and solved without resort to violence. In conditions of civil war or soon thereafter, harsh sentences against those proved guilty in open trials of serious violations of the law are at least understandable. But in the present case, Mr Imre Nagy was not accused of loot or murder; he has been penalised only for his political actions. And whether one condemns or approves the policies he pursued after his appointment as Prime Minister in October 1956, it appears wrong and unjust that he should be made to pay with his life for any mistake that he is supposed to have made at that time. In fact capital punishment for political crimes must be abolished altogether, if the nations of the world are to evolve a higher pattern of polity.

It is also relevant to recall that, for a part of the period during which he is now alleged to have been preparing for the uprising in collusion with Western agents, many of his present accusers were his colleagues. Anyhow, the charges against Mr Nagy lose all significance in the eyes of the outside world when it is revealed that he was tried in complete secrecy, without the evidence against him being subjected to public appraisal-which is one of the best ways to ensure that the courts of a country remain an instrument of justice, and do not become the vehicle of their own whims or of the executive's arbitrary orders. What is more, it will be remembered that when his Government fell in the first week of November 1956, Mr Nagy sought political asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest; and he did not emerge from his refuge until he had been assured by the Kadar Government that his life and person would be safe, and that he would be allowed to return to his home as a free man. Instead, he was arrested soon after he left

the Embassy and was spirited away to Romania, and it was said then that this was considered necessary for his own safety. At that time no grave charges were levelled against him. In fact, it was said that Mr Nagy had been a prisoner in the hands of the reactionary elements in his all-parties' Cabinet, or that he panicked and gave way under pressure from right-wing elements who were helping the insurgents. Now, the world is suddenly told that the ex-Premier has been tried, found guilty and put to death for grave crimes against the State.

What the West's cold warriors will have to say on the subject of Imre Nagy's death, for their own propaganda purposes, can have no great significance. For those who ignore, or even justify, the daily slaughter of hundreds of Algerians have no right to be shocked at the execution of a few individuals; those who applaud de Gaulle, approve of Franco, and finance a whole tribe of dictators in South America and Asia, cannot preach with much effect about the virtues of freedom; and those who attacked Egypt not long ago, and are now prepared to save Lebanon from the Lebanese, can hardly expect to be taken seriously when they shout about nonintervention or quote international law. Be that as it may, those who endeavour to view world events with a substantial measure of objectivity, and who genuinely believe in Man's right to democratic liberty, cannot resist the conclusion that Imre Nagy's death is a disservice to the cause of human justice, that it cannot strengthen the cause of Socialism, and that it will probably help to fan the flames of the East-West Cold War and, thus, weaken the cause of world peace and freedom.

IV. INDO-CHINA LESSONS

^{10 May 1954} The Last Betrayal

The fall of a small Indo-Chinese village. whose existence was unknown to the outside world a few months ago, may determine the course of mankind's future history. Carefully chosen by French and American strategists, and widely publicised as their point-of-no-retreat, Dien Bien Phu was converted into a strong fortress as a deliberate challenge to the Vietnam People's Army—a 'trap' that would invite the guerilla armies to fight a pitched battle and thus suffer annihilation. The challenge was accepted; but it was the French who found themselves entrapped. And after fiftyseven days of intense fighting, the well-supplied and heavily-armed French garrison, comprising the best troops that France could muster, has been forced to raise the white flag before an ill-equipped force led by an ex-law student. Although the French Military Command has now tried to soften the grievous blow by claiming that Dien Bien Phu had successfully 'fulfilled its mission,' the military significance of the French debacle cannot be underestimated. Reports from Paris correctly assess the event as the biggest French defeat since World War Two, and one might add that it is equally a defeat for the alliance of Western imperialism. This accords with the appraisal made about a fortnight ago by the Vietnam Commander-in-Chief, General Giap, who described the clash at Dien Bien Phu as 'the greatest battle for our war of liberation'. The realists among the French, of course, realise that they have not merely lost a battle; they have lost a war. The French C-in-C in Indo-China, General Navarre, admits this fact when he says that, if the Vietnam armies continue their present tactics, 'it would be impossible for the French forces alone to face such an eventuality,' and that 'foreign intervention would become necessary'. The Generalforgetting that his own uninvited presence in Vietnam and that of his troops is the worst form of foreign interventionmeans by 'foreign intervention' that America must not only give more gold and guns, but also arrange to provide soldiers for the war to re-enslave Indo-China.

In a sane world, the appeal for help for a tottering imperialism—facing a richly earned nemesis—would be dismissed with contempt. Our world, however, is far removed from sanity. A great deal of help has already been given to

save the hated French regime in Indo-China. In fact. America has effectively prevented the French from making a serious effort to end the war through a negotiated settlement, and US diplomats are doing their best to sabotage the Geneva peace talks. In Washington's peculiar terminology, the Vietnamese patriots' struggle for freedom is 'aggression', and the bloody French effort to re-establish their empire is a just war 'in defence of the free world'. The cloak for this predatory policy is America's self-allotted mission to save the world from the 'evil of Communism'. whose spread 'by any means'including normal political methods—is a danger which must be met with preventive war and, if necessary, atomic weapons. These perverse policies lead only in one direction-World War Three. The ghastly catastrophe has been avoided so far because the American people do not want war; therefore, Washington's crusaders have been working hard to persuade other countries to provide the ground forces to spearhead the US plan for 'massive retaliation'. These efforts have not been very successful. The Dulles proposal for immediate Anglo-American intervention in Indo-China was rejected by the British. The plan for a South-East Asian alliance on the NATO pattern, which would satisfy the US ambition of making 'Asians fight Asians', has also been stalled, partly by British obstruction and partly by the united stand taken at Colombo by the Prime Ministers of five leading Asian countries. With the fall of Dien Bien Phu, however. renewed attempts are certain to be made to turn away from the path of peace and to prepare for all-out war. Since America is neither willing nor able to 'go it alone,' the countries of Western Europe-particularly Great Britainand Asia are in a position to halt the mad drift towards war by refusing to support the US plan for intervention. An Indo-Chinese war-as desired by Washington-would create the imminent threat of World War Three and the danger of mankind's total annihilation. Those who hold in their hands the fate of the human race, and have been entrusted by their peoples with the task of saving world peace, cannot afford

to—and they must not be allowed to—fail, for if they do, it will probably be their last failure, their last betrayal of their fellow men.

23 July 1954 Geneva Victory

The Geneva agreement marks a great victory for the forces of freedom and peace. After seven years of bitter fighting, initiated by France in a foolish attempt to resurrect her Far East empire, the valiant struggle of the Indo-Chinese peoples has been vindicated and their right to full freedom recognised. The cease-fire pact, which serves the best interests not only of the States of Indo-China but also of France and the rest of the world, constitutes a decisive defeat for those who sought to prolong the bloodshed and destruction in the hope of acquiring the right to use Indo-China as a base for future wars. In order to dispel the confusion that certain quarters are trying to create, it is perhaps necessary to recall that the war in Indo-China began long before the Communist bogey was conjured up and used as a cover for cold-blooded aggression in the West's post-war drive to stabilise old empires and found new colonies. When Japan's 'co-prosperity sphere' collapsed, the British invaded Indo-China, professedly to disarm the Japanese—who had already been disarmed—but, in reality, to hold the fort for their weakened sister in imperialism until the French were able to muster sufficient forces to re-enter the country. The British deceit was matched by the treachery of the French who, after having recognised the Coalition Government of Ho Chi Minh, launched a fullscale attack in an effort to drown in their blood the people's demand for freedom. For seven years the country has been ravaged by a heterogeneous French Army, which included local puppets, German Fascists, colonial and other mercenaries, in what was rightly described throughout France as 'the dirty war'. During this period, France has suffered immensely; but, despite the terrible drain of blood and treasure. it was many years before the growing public demand that Ho Chi Minh's repeated peace offers should be accepted began to be given serious attention by the ruling circles. By this time, however, America had become interested in the matter, and US aid to France was used as a lever to prevent negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Indo-China. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Geneva Pact, which is being welcomed with joy and relief all over the world, is being interpreted by many American publicists as a defeat for US policies and a cause for mourning in Washington.

France was faced with two alternatives: she could either virtually surrender her empire to America and continue the war with greater American aid and under US direction, or come to honourable terms with the Vietnamese People's Government. In choosing the latter course, the French Government ignored the advice of some of its own fire-eating Generals, whose appetite for war seems to have been whetted with every defeat of French arms, and has taken a decision which will be supported by the vast majority of the French people. The British Government's firm refusal to get involved in the Indo-China war—where, despite the West's immense technical superiority, the chances of success were meagrewas another important contributory factor in persuading France to make the correct choice. More important, however, than all these considerations is the fact, which must have greatly influenced all the negotiators at Geneva, that failure to achieve peace in Geneva would bring nearer the threat of World War Three. The American representatives seem to have used all the pressure they were capable of to prevent an East-West rapprochement at Geneva. When the assumption of office by M. Mendes-France destroyed the hope M. Bidault had raised of the talks being sabotaged. US attention was turned to Indo-Chinese gentlemen of the Bao Dai type, but the peoples' desire for peace was so strong that these tactics produced no result beyond one or two meaningless statements from persons who owe their positions entirely to the French Foreign Office. Frustrated, annoved, and completely isolated,

the Americans have had to acquiesce in the arrangement for peace in Indo-China. They have even been persuaded to give a guarantee that the United States will 'refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the peace settlement'. That even her allies considered such a pledge of future good behaviour necessary constitutes a complete exposure of America's prowar proclivities.

Although a detailed appraisal of the Geneva Pact will be possible only when the full texts of the various agreements and declarations are made available, and it is known how the different parties are going to interpret the more crucial clauses, there can be no doubt that the accord represents a big step forward towards international peace. It is, of course, obvious that much will depend on how the agreement is implemented, but we feel confident that, if the spirit of Geneva is maintained, it should not be difficult to eliminate the danger of a recrudescence of the hostilities in Indo-China, and to thwart the efforts of the saboteurs-French, Vietnamese, or American—who seem to have developed a vested interest in the Indo-Chinese war. While the Geneva agreement is undoubtedly a major achievement, and those responsible for it deserve all praise, it is necessary to point out that it is only a first step towards creating stability in the world. While welcoming the pact, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr Mohammed Ali, has pertinently pointed out the need of tackling other international problems, like Tunisia and Morocco, in the 'same admirable spirit'. If the happy result of the Geneva parleys can encourage world statesmen to deal speedily with other disputes that constitute a threat to international peace or, in any case, illustrate the denial of a nation's just rights-which, inter alia, include China's admission to the UN, the war in Malaya, British occupation of the Canal Zone, Palestine, and Pakistan's disputes with India over Kashmir and canal waters-mankind may soon be able to banish the fear of self-annihilation and look forward confidently to an era of peace and unprecedented progress.

V. CHANGE IN BRITAIN

11 January 1957 Inglorious Exit

Bowing before the unabating storm raised by his Government's rash and foolish venture in Egypt. Sir Anthany Eden has brought to an end the briefest and one of the most inglorious terms of any British Prime Minister. The bulletin prepared for him by a high-level medical board, certifying that Sir Anthony is no longer physically fit for the heavy burdens of the high office he has occupied with such little credit, may well be a genuine document; but the fact remains that his resignation is primarily a political decision, and that even if he were not in poor health, his exit from the centre of Britain's political stage had become inevitable. The Prime Minister's fond hope that his temporary retirement to Jamaica—during which his colleagues announced the decision to withdraw from Egypt, and sought to repair some of the damage done to Britain's position in the world---would induce people to forget or condone his crime, and thus allow him to remain in Downing Street at least for the rest of his normal tenure, could not materialise, primarily because, apart from the disastrous economic and political consequences of the Suez War, Sir Anthony Eden had by that one mad act forfeited the trust of his own people, of Britain's allies, and of the rest of the world.

The Suez War has destroyed completely the carefullyfostered illusion that Eden was a man of peace and moderation, that his perpetual dithering was really a form of high diplomacy, and that he stood firmly pledged to abide by UN principles. The British people, having voted the Conservatives into power on the 'peace ticket.' found themselves suddenly thrown into a cruel war of aggression, which followed a dirty conspiracy with France and Israel: and it must be said to their honour that, despite the jingoism of Tory right-wingers, a sufficiently large section of public

opinion condemned Eden's war policy strongly enough to assist in its reversal. Eden's war has cost Britain what little prestige it had left in the Middle East, making it extremely difficult for its few Asian friends to continue their support of British policies, and earned for it world-wide obloguy. Further, the Anglo-American axis has been weakened considerably as a result of the British Government's attempt to win a war without US help, because America probably feels that Eden's act of bad faith gives it the freedom to act on its own initiative—without waiting for British approval and without making concessions to British interests—in the Middle East and other parts of the world. The Eisenhower Doctrine is, apparently, the first major step in this direction; for, despite its anti-Communist verbiage, the new US policy can either impinge upon the sovereignty of the Arab States or gradually begin to take over the concessions that Britain still enjoys in this part of the world. It was also made quite obvious by Washington that Eden was not the right man to start repairing the Anglo-American alliance. These and various other related factors combined to create a burden that Sir Anthony Eden could not carry for very much longer. He might, of course, have been allowed to stay on for another few weeks, but the need for a revision of British policies, under a new Prime Minister, had become too urgent to allow for a more graceful departure to be arranged. It was clear that the Prime Minister's position could not be saved, and that any attempt to do so, or even to preserve it until a safe successor could be chosen at greater leisure, might completely wreck the divided Government. To prevent an open split in the Conservative Party, and to rescue the Anglo-American alliance, it had become absolutely necessary that he should go without further delay.

Irrespective of the merits and capacities of his successor, the main issue that arises from the circumstances of Eden's resignation is that Parliament should be dissolved and a General Election held at once. Notwithstanding the new medical bulletin, Sir Antony Eden has had to quit office

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because he was guilty of the grave sin of starting an aggressive war. The bulk of his party has formally supported his war policies, in violation of its election pledges; it has, therefore, forfeited its right to rule the country. It is also known that the country is bitterly divided over the Suez War issue and allied questions. The Labour Party's demand for an immediate General Election is, therefore, fully justified, because only thus can the British people guide their Government's policies in the crisis created by the Suez War.



Gul Hayat Institute

Section 11: Personalia Achievements... and Departures

Gul Hayat Institute



Gul Hayat Institute

31 January 1948 Glorious Dust

Mahatma Gandhi is dead. The world has been deprived of the sight and sound of his frail body and aged voice—the body and voice that had in the last few months almost lost, for a large section of mankind, their personal and ephemeral character and become timeless symbols of compassionate love and fearless rectitude. As the man who first ploughed the arid wastes of Indian politics in the pre-nationalist period, the man who husbanded the seeds and saplings, only recently come to fruit and flower, of the freedom of Indian peoples, Gandhi's name had passed into history long before the present and the greatest chapter in his life commenced. It was he who lighted the path, for Muslim and Hindus alike, during our earlier travels towards the goal of national liberation. In later days our ways parted for reasons unnecessary to recount, but the nature of our national objectives remained identicalthe attainment of full and unfettered freedom for all the great peoples of the Indian sub-continent. During this period Gandhiji's politics were not our politics. We have differed often and sometimes violently with what he said and did. We have occasionally spoken in bitterness and written in anger. And now the wheel had come full circle and our paths converged again. For in these last momentous days Gandhi, the politician, gave place to the infinitely greater Gandhi, the man. He saw, as few of us can fail to see, that spread out underneath the present political contours of India and Pakistan is one vast immensity of unhappiness and fear and suffering, and he strove as few of us have had the courage to strive to

press back the dimensions of this suffering into circumscription and confine. He saw, as few of us can fail to see, that the present bloodshed and savagery are the beginnings of an unholy assault, not only on our freedom newly-won, but also on our culture and civilisation inherited from our remote ancestors, and he fought as few of us have had the courage to fight against this frenzied onslaught. And now he is gone. There have been great heroes in history who lived and fought and died to preserve their own people from dangers that threatened and from enemies lying in wait. It would be hard to name any who has fallen fighting his own people to preserve the honour of a people not his own. No greater sacrifice could be rendered by a member of one people to another and no greater tribute could be paid to the supremacy of fundamental human values as opposed to passing factional squabbles. And there could be no rebuttal more convincing to the popular prejudice that brands large sections of humanity as completely good or evil, as wholly moral or immoral. There is little hope for the world, however, if it has no other use for the noblest of deaths except to make it serve as proof of so obvious a thesis. The greatest living Indian has fallen to the bullet of an unknown assassin. The most effective rational voice in the vast Indian Dominion has been brutally silenced. The best-loved and most venerated political leader and moral evangelist of a near sub-continent. the idol of millions, has been publicly murdered. In India and Pakistan today every heart and every conscience should be searched to assess how far every heart and every conscience is answerable for this most fearful of tragedies. The poor idiot or maniac who committed the crime was certainly not the only man responsible. Who had fed his mind with such fell hate for the weary old man seeking to purge men's hearts with love? What nefarious potion made him flex his muscles to lay violent hands on the apostle of non-violence? The answer is obvious. Every man who has thought and felt and spoke and acted as Gandhiji's assassin did, was his accomplice. Every violent word, deed, and thought went into

the composition of the mind that conceived and the arm that executed the terrible deed. Will this crime be the last? We do not know. Who can compute the amount of misery brought into the world since the day when heads began to roll and blood began to flow in the laughing countryside of the Punjab and on the time-hallowed pavements of Delhi and Ajmer? One should have thought that the people of this sub-continent had reached by now the surfeit of sorrow and the limit of pain. One should have thought that, however great the grip of fanatics and reactionaries on the mainsprings of popular thought and action, the common people would have, on account of the immeasurable losses and privations they have undergone, managed to disengage themselves by now from this deadly grip and be their normal selves. It has not been so. The people of India, and indirectly the people of Pakistan, for he was trying to befriend both, have added to their other losses the most grievous loss of all-the loss of Gandhi. Let us hope that this most precious sacrifice to the demons of hate will placate them at last, and the death of one will yet save the lives of millions for whom this life was given. Once, the Hindus and Muslims of undivided India mingled their blood, to fight for freedom under Gandhi's banner during the Khilafat days; let us hope they will now mingle their tears over his glorious dust, to retain their peaceful freedom under the independent flags of India and Pakistan.

9 August 1950 Paul Robeson

The US State Department's decision to cancel Paul Robeson's passport should cause little surprise, for it is known that ever since he declared many years ago that, henceforth, his voice would be dedicated solely to the cause of liberating mankind from slavery of every type and establishing peace in the world, efforts have been made by the political leaders of America and their Wall Street patrons to harass and victimise this world-famous Negro singer. As long as Paul Robeson was content to sing for his livelihood on the terms laid down by the philistines who control America's commercialised art, depicting contented Negro slaves or 'loyal' African Chiefs, they kept falling over each other to contract his services for films and concerts. But when Robeson showed signs of possessing a social conscience, and refused to play roles which he considered humiliating to the Negro people, the reactionary financiers and racketeers started an organised boycott movement against him, which failed only because Robeson's voice was so well known and liked by the world and because he was determined not to submit any longer to the dictates of Wall Street.

Increasingly, Paul Robeson associated himself with the fight against political and social injustice, using his rich, resonant voice to speak on behalf of the oppressed sections of mankind and particularly his own Negro people-in Africa as well as the United States. Since the Second World War. Robeson has whole-heartedly thrown himself into the world struggle for peace and freedom, with the result that the US State Department has, seemingly, begun to regard him as a sworn enemy. The American Government have now taken the drastic step of cancelling Paul Robeson's passport because, it is said, his activities are not in the interest of the United States. This act of the Truman Administration shows. the world how far removed the present American Government is from real democracy, while the fact that Washington regards Robeson's anti-war and anti-imperialist activities to be against the interests of America makes its bosses selfconfessed warmongers and imperialists.

10 March 1953 Stalin

The death of Joseph Stalin has in many ways left the world a great deal poorer. A brilliant soldier whose powerful armies seek no conquests in foreign lands but will tolerate no incursion into their own. A wise leader of men whose

leadership rested on his people's love and respect. A farsighted statesman who successfully out-manoeuvred those who planned to destroy his country for the sin of not tolerating feudal oppression and capitalist loot, or for not accepting foreign 'aid and advice'. A distinguished internationalist who has on more than one occasion spearheaded mankind's resistance against fascism in all its forms. An erudite scholar who enriched the world's treasury of political thought, basing his political and social philosophy on the right of all nations, both big and small, to maintain their freedom and sovereignty. A forceful writer who is widely acknowledged as one of the masters of modern prose. A great teacher who always remained a student, never disdaining criticism and always stressing the importance of learning about life from the common people. And, what may be regarded as a special characteristic, Stalin was a man whose greatness in amazingly wide fields of human endeavour—which makes him a veritable giant among men-did not affect one jot his innate simplicity and humility, nor cloud his consciousness of the fact that the task is always more important than the instrument that accomplishes it.

Joseph Stalin's demise brings to a close an eventful chapter in the history of the world, marking the end of the first phase in an era which future historians would be justified in describing as the Stalin Era. No other man has had greater influence on the course of human affairs during the first half of the present century; nor is there any other political leader whose policies and precepts will give greater guidance to his own country's future destiny and mould that of the world for at least the next few decades. Stalin stands in the first rank of that group of purposeful men who, at the turn of the twentieth century, undertook the task of transforming socialism from a dream of idealists and philosophers into a practical plan for liberating mankind from the oppressive system of Western capitalism and-its inevitable concomitant-imperialism. Even during the lifetime of Lenin, who led Russia's victorious struggle against Tsarism and the imperialist axis which sought

to re-enslave the Soviet peoples. Stalin was in the forefront of every important battle: but since the death of its founder, Stalin had been the chief leader of the young Soviet State. Lenin secured for his people the right to build a new life—free from indigenous parasites and foreign exploiters. It was Stalin who gave life to his leader's blueprints and reality to his plans. For three decades, Stalin has worked with extraordinary success to develop his country, to safeguard the welfare of its people, and to protect the socialist State from outside attack. At the same time, he has endeavoured unfalteringly to create a world that would abjure the path of war and recognise the right of every nation to determine its own way of life.

For the people of the Soviet Union. Stalin's death is an irreparable loss; and, with the rare exception of a few mean souls, the world will extend its sincere sympathy to the nation deprived of so great a leader. Having given nearly sixty years of his life to the service of his people, for them Stalin was not merely a devoted and selfless government functionary; he was a beloved leader, a trusted friend, a wise mentor. From the age of fifteen, when he began serious political work, until the day of his death, Stalin gave all his time and energy to the cause of his people's regeneration. From an underdeveloped, semicolonial country with a backward, disunited people, the Soviet Union has become a powerful State with an ever-expanding economy which directly serves to raise the living standards of its many nationalities, now knit together in a unity based on equality of rights. This glorious transformation is not the result of a miracle, but of careful planning and hard work; and in bringing about this vast change within so short a time, Stalin has closely supervised every facet of the Soviet Union's remarkable progress. The country's industrial development, the revolutionising of its agriculture, the spread of education and learning, the vast reconstructional projects which have literally changed its geography, all bear the stamp of Stain's genius, his courageous planning and bold execution. Similarly, in two major wars against international coalitions, it was Stalin who led and inspired his people's victories. For most citizens of the

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Soviet Union, Stalin's death is a personal loss, made more poignant by the fact that the blow has come when, once again, the forces of international reaction are scheming to destroy the Soviet State. The sorrow and anguish of the USSR's 200 million people will be shared in many parts of the world. The Soviet Union's allies. China and the new democracies, looked upon Stalin as a faithful friend and guide. The working-class of the world has lost in Stalin a sincere comrade who was regarded as the foremost champion of the world-wide struggle for the emancipation of all toilers. The people of every subject country will feel the absence of an honest friend who had always supported the cause nearest to their hearts. And millions of others will mourn the loss of a great statesman who had worked unceasingly to create a system of international cooperation that would outlaw war and safeguard the right of every nation to self-determination and freedom from foreign intervention. Stalin has bequeathed to his people and to all friends of peace and freedom a noble heritage—a well-defined path to peace and endless human progress which must be followed if mankind is to save itself from self-annihilation.

Prime Minister's Marriage

It is most unusual for us to comment on the private life of any citizen, for we believe that, unless someone's personal life impinges upon an important aspect of the country's social or political affairs, it should not be made the subject of public debate. But the high position occupied by Mr Mohammed Ali, and the manner in which his recent wedding with his Canadian-Lebanese Social Secretary has been celebrated, makes it something more than an ordinary case of bigamy. In the first place, the Prime Minister's second marital venture will cause considerable damage to Pakistan's prestige abroad; and it has even been suggested, with a great deal of justification, that if this consideration could not persuade Mr Mohammed Ali to sacrifice his personal inclination, he should

have abdicated his public office before entering upon his second marriage. Secondly, even among those who do not view uncontrolled polygamy with disapproval, it is customary to refrain from ostentatious ceremonial and lavish celebrations on the occasion of a second marriage. Mr Mohammed Ali, contrary to this general practice, thought fit to celebrate his wedding with special ceremonies; a huge marriage portion and expensive gifts were bestowed on the bride, and, what is perhaps the most regrettable aspect of the whole affair, on the honeymooning couple's return to Pakistan, the Governor-General was persuaded to give a banquet in their honour. To say the least, it seems most improper to hold what amounts to a State function in celebration of such an event. Further, the people of a country which has about the lowest standard of living in the world, where starvation is not unknown and enforced nakedness is a common phenomenon, naturally view with strong disfavour the fact that the Prime Minister should have made a gift of \$25.000 in cash and a like amount in gold and diamonds to his bride. Apart from other questions that are being asked in this connection, the people want to know how and why Mr Mohammed Ali was given special permission for the export of large quantities of gold and precious stones and for the expenditure of the considerable amount of foreign exchange involved. This criticism is perfectly pertinent, and the Prime Minister has certainly not enhanced his prestige by his marital alliance and the display of wealth with which it was accompanied, particularly at a time when the country faces a grave economic slump and is involved in the worst political crisis of its history. We endorse these protests, and also the stand taken by the women's associations in Karachi and Lahore. Finally, it is necessary to condemn with all possible emphasis the attempt made by a local contemporary-addicted to defending every action of those in authority—to find support for the Prime Minister by making undignified insinuations against his first wife, Begum Hamida Mohammed Ali. In attempting to perform a sycophant's duty to the Prime Minister, this newspaper has

been guilty of a low, mean and ungentlemanly attack on the reputation of a woman who deserves the sympathy of every decent human being, and who is unable to save herself from the mud gratuitously flung at her. We would earnestly appeal to this tribe of yes-men not to allow their eagerness to support the Prime Minister to override considerations of respect for women and ordinary common decency.

23 February 1958 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad

The death of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad bereaves the world of one of the truly great men of his era; the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent has lost a statesman of stature who worked earnestly and unostentatiously for the establishment of good will and friendship between the two neighbouring States; and the Muslims of India have been deprived of a leader whose vast influence was harnessed to the service of their interests. Maulana Sahib had few rivals and hardly any superiors among his contemporaries in any of the diverse fields in which he exercised his prodigious talents for more than half a century; his name figures with equal prominence in the annals of the Indian freedom movement, Urdu literature and journalism, and Islamic religious thought.

History will recall how, during the earlier decades of this century, the fiery eloquence of his written and spoken word helped to rouse the Muslims from their political stupor. It will also record that, having chosen the path of his life's journey in his early youth, he remained steadfast and loyal for more than half a century to the cause he had first espoused when still no more than a boy. Fear of persecution never made him waver; the lure of office did not make him falter; and even when he saw that his stand on the communal question was frowned upon by a large majority of his own community, he continued to do and say what he thought was best—irrespective of the political consequences. His part in Indian politics during the decade preceding independence became more and more controversial,

and often earned for him the disapproval of his co-religionists. But, as the hostility and bitterness bred by the fierce political controversy of those years began to subside, a more objective reassessment of his political role followed. It has increasingly been realised among his critics that. although Maulana Azad's political judgement on certain important matters had isolated him from the bulk of the politically conscious Muslims of India, his heart had always remained sound and his motives pure, that he was as deeply concerned about the welfare and happiness of the Muslims as any other leader of the community. And it is recalled with admiration how philosophically calm and unembittered he had remained amid the heat and passion of that controversy, how keenly he desired that both India and Pakistan should grow and prosper, how clearly he realised that this was possible only on the basis of a firm understanding between the two countries.

While the political facet of Maulana Azad's life may still provide points of dispute for people of different political hues, there can be little difference of opinion about his great contribution to Islamic thought and his status as a writer. Apart from his other works, his commentary on the Holy Koran is generally accepted, despite the fact that some do not agree with all his views, as a towering monument to its author's erudition and originality of thought, and it undoubtedly stands among the foremost interpretations of Islamic philosophy. As a journalist and master of Urdu prose, Maulana Azad raised that language to heights that had before then been considered unassailable, and he was able to influence a whole generation with his powerful diction, beautiful imagery and forceful ideas. So great has been Maulana Azad's contribution to literature and philosophy that, even if he had never entered the political field, his name would live for ever in the memory of those who realise how much he has illumined and enriched our cultural heritage.

In Abul Kalam Azad the world has seen the rare phenomenon of a child prodigy flowering into a genius. of an intellectual with a philosophic bent of mind battling bravely

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in the political arena, and, lastly, of a tired and ailing politician unstintingly devoting the last days of his life to public service. His passing away from this world will be mourned not only in India and Pakistan, but in all countries where freedom-fighters are honoured, or Urdu is known, or Islamic thought is studied and respected. But India has, specially, been made a poorer place by his loss, and for the Muslims of India his departure from this world creates a vacuum that it will not be easy to fill adequately.

21 October 1958 Kardar's Retirement

Abdul Hafiz Kardar's forced retirement from first-class cricket will bring him widespread sympathy, and there will be general regret among all lovers of the game at the premature loss of a great captain, a cricketer of unusual merit, and one who has played such an important role in preparing the ground for Pakistan's victories on the field of cricket.

Kardar—who, incidentally, belongs to a region which has bred a host of great cricketers-started playing the game at an early age. In school and college, at the University in Lahore and later in England, whatever else he might have done or tried to do, his love for cricket took first place—and he has played it with exceptional devotion and courage, always determined not merely to do well, but to do his best, to do better than anyone else. His keenness to accomplish great things, and to work hard to make the accomplishment certain, is worthy of emulation by those who wish to shine in the field of sport—or for that matter in any other field. And, as a captain, Kardar was never in a position to become smug for lack of critics, but, in the main, any weakness of which he was considered guilty as a leader arose from an overpowering desire to push his team forward and not in order to boost his own position.

However difficult it may be to think of a Pakistan cricket team taking the field without Kardar, if the verdict of his doctors about his disability is final. nothing much can be done about it. All cricketers and cricket fans will hope that the Board of Cricket Control will choose the best available cricketer to step into Kardar's shoes, and that he himself will continue to be associated closely with the game, so that he can carry on the good work that he has done in popularising cricket. In fact, Kardar's withdrawal from the centre of the stage should enable him to give more time to promoting sport, and since, God willing, he has many long years of active life before him, his contribution as a sports organiser may well earn him a bigger niche than his prowess with bat and ball has already done.

7 December 1958 Prof. A.S. Bokhari

The memory of Professor Ahmad Shah Bokhari, who passed away at New York on Friday morning, will live for a long time in many hearts, in different parts of the world. At the United Nations his name will recall a charming and persuasive diplomat and a really brilliant debater, who always marshalled his facts with care, presented his case with clarity, and drove home his points with a ready wit that cut through the pompous verbiage used by professional diplomats—often to conceal their Governments' real intentions. Selected as UN Under-Secretary for Public Information, Professor Bokhari shouldered his duties as an international public servant with his usual zeal and efficiency; but this, his last assignment in a rich and varied career, he was unable to fulfil as well as he would have liked to, because he was handicapped by constant ill-health and harassed by the petty-minded vendetta started by some of India's representatives. In this country, it will long be remembered that Professor Bokhari was probably the ablest representative sent out by Pakistan to speak in her name in UN councils. Some of his UN speeches deserve to be read as literature; and it should be noted that he was equally brilliant and effective as a conversationalist, and won many friends for Pakistan through personal contacts with people in different fields of life.

However, notwithstanding the fact that he was a successful diplomat and made a special mark at the United Nations, Professor Bokhari will probably best be remembered in the land of his birth as a man of letters. Undoubtedly a master of the spoken and written word, he employed both English and Urdu with equal facility, and appreciated the best that Persian, Pushto and Punjabi had to offer. After an outstanding career as a student, both at Lahore and Cambridge, Professor Bokhari took to teaching as a profession or way of life that offered sufficient time and opportunity for him to feed his love for art and literature, to encourage others to appreciate good writing and drama, and to read and write at leisure. While he wrote exceedingly well in English, and also wrote Urdu verse, Professor Bokhari will probably win eternal fame for his contribution to Urdu prose, where he introduced a purity of style that few others have attained; and his humorous essays in Urdu broke new ground and won for him a large army of admirers, who wanted him to devote his whole life to writing. His versatile mind, however, always seemed to be seeking new pastures, and soon he was to leave the cloisters of the Government College at Lahore for New Delhi, where he remained for many years as the guiding spirit of the newly established All India Radio. Soon after Partition he returned to his old college as Principal, but he was not left there for long, and was chosen by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to serve as Pakistan's UN Representative. While it can be said that a man of his great ability could have made better use of his talents—and a more tangible contribution to his country's life and literature—it will generally be conceded that whatever he set his heart on he usually accomplished. The world of letters is poorer with his departure; an able educationist has been lost; and Pakistan has been deprived of the services of a diplomat who shone in any company and was always able to bring credit to his country.

12 December 1958 Prof. Abdus Salam

The grant of the 1954-7 Hopkins Prize by the Cambridge Philosophical Society to Professor Abdus Salam will be acknowledged in the world of science as befitting recognition of this Pakistani scientist's contributions in the field of theoretical mathematics and physics; and every citizen of Pakistan will justifiably feel proud of a compatriot who has distinguished himself at a comparatively young age among the leading mathematicians of the world. At the same time, however, it will be widely regretted in this country that a man of such outstanding merit should have found it necessary to seek employment abroad. It will be recalled that when Professor Abdus Salam was working in the Punjab University, no special attention was paid to his work, and it may be presumed that he felt frustrated and oppressed in an unacademic and uncongenial atmosphere: therefore, he was easily persuaded to leave his post at Lahore. Professor Salam is now Chairman of the Department of Mathematics at Imperial College, London, and is looked upon as one of the biggest assets of this foremost scientific institution in Great Britain. Perhaps, in a way, the Professor's stay in England has been a blessing in disguise, because, apart from opening the eyes of our educational authorities to his stature as a scholar, it has given him the opportunity to collaborate with the best brains in the field of mathematics and physics, and, thus, widen the avenues of his research work. Be that as it may, we hope that earnest efforts will be made at the end of his present tenure with Imperial College to persuade Professor Abdus Salam to return to Pakistan-where he should not only be provided with all the facilities he requires to continue his work in theoretical mathematics. but also enabled to give Pakistani teachers and students the chance to benefit from his learning.

Section 12: Premature Epilogue



Mazhar Ali Khan's association with **The Pakistan Times** ended on 18 April 1959—the day Ayub Khan's Martial Law regime took over Progressive Papers Limited. For over ten years his prolific pen remained motionless, stilled by a dictatorial government's paranoid unwillingness to countenance criticism.

When Mazhar Ali Khan finally broke his silence in 1970 by contributing to Forum, a political weekly published from Dacca, his first article recounted the events of that fateful day in April 1959 when the Press in Pakistan suffered its most grievous blow.

Forum introduced Mazhar Ali Khan in the following words:

'It is a unique privilege for FORUM to serve as the vehicle for Mazhar Ali Khan's return to journalism after a decade in the wilderness. He became one of the first martyrs to the cause of Press freedom in the Ayub years when he refused to continue as editor of *The Pakistan Times* following its illegal seizure by the regime in 1959. Prior to that date, during his tenure as editor, *The Pakistan Times* became the most outstanding paper that this country has seen. Mazhar Ali Khan is the first and most distinguished of a long list of outstanding journalists driven out of the profession by Ayub. He will be a regular contributor to the columns of FORUM. In returning this outstanding talent to the readers of Pakistan we feel that we have contributed to justifying our existence.'

7 February 1970 Ayub's Attack on Progressive Papers

When the people of our land attain full freedom and genuine democracy, and Pakistan's history is written by honest scholars searching for the truth, and not as a panegyric on, or apologia for, the Ruler of the Day, the Ayub regime will be found guilty of a long and varied list of heinous acts, of defying the most elementary principles of law and justice, of destroying institutions wedded to the public weal, and of victimising individuals who could not easily be browbeaten or purchased.

It will not be easy for our future historians to determine which single action of the self-appointed President and his Government of courtiers did the greatest harm to the national interest, for they will have a wide field to survey. Many will probably conclude that the dictatorship's gravest crime was its deliberate destruction of Press freedom, because so many other evils flowed from this act of denying to the people of Pakistan one of their fundamental rights. It is, therefore, pertinent to recall the Ayub regime's first step towards this fascist aim, namely, its attack on Progressive Papers, an institution created under the patronage of the Quaid-i-Azam.

The dastardly attack was made at dawn on Saturday, 18 April 1959. Two Ministers, one a General, masterminded the operations, with their main headquarters at the residence of the Martial Law Administrator of Zone B, and a tactical headquarters at Lahore's Gymkhana Club.

By midnight the offices of the Progressive Papers—*The Pakistan Times, Imroze,* and the weekly *Lail-o-Nahar*—were

surrounded by an array of armed police and CID men, and they were captured as the night shift left the premises.

At the same time, similar detachments besieged the residences of Mian Iftikharuddin, the Company's Chairman, who also owned a majority of its shares, and its Managing Director, Syed Amir Hussain Shah. The police carried search warrants and were authorised to use 'reasonable force' to take possession of all documents connected with Progressive Papers Ltd., and 'any material or documents reasonably believed to relate to receipt of funds from foreign sources, or to news, reports, or information likely to endanger the security of Pakistan'.

For some weeks before the event, we had heard rumours that the Government was unhappy with *The Pakistan Times* because it was not giving the regime full support, and, more recently, sympathetic individuals connected with the Government had discreetly whispered the warning that 'something terrible' would happen to our papers.

We were naive enough to believe that any action contemplated would be legal action of some sort, and we did not see how our papers came within the mischief of any existing laws, not excluding the Security Act and the various Martial Law Regulations applicable to the Press.

Since 8 October 1958, our journals had been published under censorship, and when the censorship order was formally withdrawn and the euphemism Press advice substituted for it, we chose to be 'advised' daily, unlike some other newspapers more confident of being able to interpret the Government's mind in respect of the draconian laws to which the Press was subject. In the circumstances, we felt there could be no palpable cause for action, and even if action were taken out of pique it could not be sustained.

Our naivety was rudely shattered, and we learnt the lesson that a usurper's regime, guided by unprincipled and lying toadies, was capable of illegal and unscrupulous action to gain its own ends.

The last warning received by me before the event was at

AND ALL AND ALL

1.30 a.m., when a friend woke me up to say that he had heard from a Minister at the Gymkhana Club that he would be coming to see me at 5 a.m. to discuss 'the future of The Pakistan Times'. At about 5.30 a.m., the threatened Ministerial visitation-which by morning I had begun to discount-materialised. He told me in plain terms that the Government had taken over The Pakistan Times. In reply to the protest that this could not be done as there was no law which allowed such action, he said that it had already been done' and that the Security Act had been amended two days ago to make it possible. Cutting short the discussion on law and ethics, he said he had come to explain that the Government's only purpose was to oust Mian Iftikharuddin and to change the management. No other change was intended, and, in fact, 'better facilities' for work would be made available to the editorial staff. The confused and confusing discussion ended when I said that I would give my decision by the afternoon.

I went immediately to see Mian Iftikharuddin, who was then seriously ill. and whose house by then was surrounded by the police, who wanted to search the premises. On his behalf, Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri tried to stall the police, but his efforts to contest the legality of the police action were fruitless. At Syed Amir Hussain Shah's residence a similar scene was being enacted.

From Mian Iftikharuddin's residence the police took away all his cheque books, bank statements, a sheaf of letters, and newspaper files. From Amir Hussain Shah's residence they took away a reasonable quantity of Progressive Papers' letterhead.

About noon I reached the office, and saw that the takeover was indeed complete. Armed police, with handcuffs dangling from their belts, stood at the gates, and CID men were all over the place. When I tried to open the door to my room, I was stopped by a policeman guarding the sanctum. The Managing Director's office was occupied by Mr Mohammad Sarfaraz, the newly-appointed Administrator, and only at his intervention was I allowed to enter my room.

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Sarfaraz gave me the details of the Government's monstrous action, and I saw the relevant orders and notifications which had been issued, clearly showing that the *coup* was a well-planned conspiracy. I also saw a copy of 'The New Leaf', the editorial which appeared in the next day's issues of *The Pakistan Times* and *Imroze*. Reputedly the work of Qudrutullah Shahab, the then Information Secretary, it is the stupidest piece of bad writing that has ever disgraced the columns of these journals.

A CID officer conducted a thorough search of my room and took away certain papers and books. The papers included Mr Daultana's thesis on One Unit and two letters, one for publication, from Mridula Sarabhai. The books he took away were mostly Soviet and Chinese publications. I pointed out a big pile of American publications on my table, and told him that these too were of foreign origin, but he said, looking rather sheepish, that his Government was not interested in them.

I called an informal meeting of the other editors and senior colleagues, and told them that I had decided to resign immediately.

Later in the afternoon, after informing Mian Iftikharuddin, I went to General Rana's residence. There I was confronted by a Minister and a group of senior officials, including Shahab and Sarfaraz. On being told that I had decided to leave The Pakistan Times, they sought to persuade me to change my mind. A rambling debate ensued, in which the various issues were discussed. My suggestion that, if Progressive Papers were really considered guilty as charged, the charges should be proved in a court of law, only evoked inane smiles. My objection to the editorial called 'The New Leaf' was met with the reply that if I remained, it would be scrapped; and my objection to the Company being handed over to a Government official, with the offer that I should take his place. My contention that no cause for action arose as the papers had been published under censorship was used to suggest that I should carry on, as no new restrictions were being imposed on The Pakistan Times.

When it was realised that my refusal was final, an official pointed out that the Essential Services Ordinance had been invoked, and that I could not resign. I said it would be a novel experiment to compel an editor to continue to work against his will, and if they so desired they could try it. At this the Minister said that the Ordinance would not be applied to me, and that if I insisted, my resignation would be accepted. Requesting that my name should be removed from the print line, I left the gathering.

As far as Progressive Papers Ltd. are concerned, this is almost the end of the story, bar the shouting.

The next day, Syed Amir Hussain Shah and Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri met the two Ministers at their main headquarters, and protested against the action taken by the Government, demanding that the charges should either be substantiated in a court of law or withdrawn. The General's only reply was that Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri could well have been arrested for obstructing police officers in the discharge of their duty. The other Minister tried to justify Government's action, but the only concrete instance of 'subversion' he mentioned was a brief editorial note published in *The Pakistan Times* regarding the Sino-India border dispute, in which it had been suggested that India's attitude was unreasonable.

A few days later, Mian Iftikharuddin, his son Arif, and Syed Amir Hussain Shah were served with notices stating that, in the Government's opinion, they had purchased shares in Progressive Papers Ltd. with the help of foreign funds, and that their shares would be confiscated under the Security Act—which, incidentally, was repeatedly amended to cater for each shift in the situation.

Mian Iftikharuddin demanded that he should have access to the papers and cheque books taken away by the CID so that he could show how he had paid for Progressive Papers shares. This permission was not granted. When Syed Amir Hussain Shah appeared before the Tribunal to explain his purchase of shares in 1946, he told that body that Mian Iftikharuddin should

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be given the opportunity to present his explanation. No notice was taken of this plea. While Amir Hussain's shares were restored to him, Mian Iftikharuddin and his son were dispossessed of all their shares. It is obvious that Government had no intention of listening to reason, and that the Tribunal was enacting a farce, because long before it had met, notices for the auction of these shares had been advertised.

The Directors also received letters stating that the Board had been dissolved because Progressive Papers Ltd. were receiving 'policy guidance and financial assistance' from foreign sources; that 'there was an objectionable innuendo in their writings which, even if it was not discernible in any single article, was, in the accumulative influence on the minds of its readers, meant to engender subversion'. Replies in refutation of these and other charges were submitted, but the Tribunal set up under the Security Act took no notice of these explanations; the demand that the Directors concerned should be heard by the Tribunal was ignored; and even their telegrams and registered letters were not acknowledged.

Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri then sent to the Government a 'notice of demand for justice' in which he pointed out the various illegalities and improprieties committed by Government and demanded that these grievances should be redressed, failing which he would be compelled to resort to a court of law.

No reply being received, a Writ Petition was filed before the Supreme Court, but before it could be heard the Government passed a Martial Law Regulation removing the matter from the Court's purview.

During this period, the real story behind the take-over began to unfold. It was learnt that, soon after the Ayub regime had established itself, it felt the need for the services of newspapers that would be completely subservient to its interests. Proposals were initially made for starting one or two newspapers under the Government's direct control. When the matter was examined in detail, it was realised that the venture was not likely to succeed. A proposal for nationalising the whole Press was also considered, but rejected because of the fear of adverse publicity abroad. It was then decided that some well-established newspapers should somehow be acquired. Progressive Papers were a good target because, in addition to *The Pakistan Times*. the country's largest English daily, there was also an Urdu daily and a weekly.

A Cabinet committee had been set up to deal with the matter. Once the decision had been taken to take over Progressive Papers, the case against them began to be built up. The so-called political charges are reported to have been prepared by the Director of the Intelligence Bureau, assisted by a Brigadier who at that time was grooming himself to become the Goebbels of the regime. Other Government departments were instructed to dig up anything they could find against the company and its newspapers. This process reportedly went on for many months.

That the charges were utterly false is proved by the fact that, although the Company's files were scrutinised by a team of sleuths for nearly three years, not a single iota of evidence was discovered to substantiate any charge or even to pinpoint a serious irregularity.

One by one the inquiries instituted in respect of the charges were dropped, and the criminal case filed against Mian Iftikharuddin in respect of newsprint import and sale was withdrawn; thereafter Government had to find other means of harassing him, and the persecution continued until his demise.

Since it is plain that the charges against Progressive Papers Ltd. were fabricated, and would have been thrown out of court even by a third-class magistrate gifted with a modicum of honesty and elementary knowledge of legal procedures, the Ayub Government's action. and the kangaroo court which authenticated it. can only be viewed as a medieval *auto-da-fe*. because the only complaint which had validity was that those who owned, managed, and guided *The Pakistan Times* and its sister papers did not share the regime's faith in its dictatorship, and for this lack of faith they were punished.

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A Who's Who of Pakistani Politics

Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad (1906-82): Principal figure in Kashmir politics from 1931 till his death and a close friend of Jawaharlal Nehru. A founder of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, he launched a Quit Kashmir movement against Maharaja Hari Singh in 1938. Was Prime Minister of the state 1948-53, then spent the better part of a decade in jail. Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir 1975-82.

Ali, Chaudhry Mohammad (1905-80): Bureaucrat who rose to the position of Finance Minister in 1951 and served as Prime Minister 1955-6. Remained active in politics till 1970.

Amin, Nurul (1897-1974): Active in pre-partition Bengal politics; Muslim League Chief Minister of East Bengal 1948-54. Played a role in opposition groupings under Ayub Khan; opposed the creation of Bangladesh and was made Vice-President of Pakistan in December 1971.

Bakhsh, Pir Illahi (b.1897): Larkana lawyer who served in pre-partition Sindh cabinets; Chief Minister of Sindh 1948-9; member of provincial and West Pakistan legislatures; joined National Awami Party, and in 1970 Pakistan People's Party.

Bhashani, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan (1885-1976): Peasant leader active in Bengal politics since the 1920s. Joined Awami League after Partition, and was imprisoned 1949-52. Founder-leader of the National Awami Party; remained involved in politics through the Ayub period.

Bogra, Mohammad Ali (1901-63): Minor Bengal politician who served as a diplomat after Partition till he was asked to take over as Pakistan's Prime Minister in 1953. He returned to the US as ambassador 1955-8, and served Ayub Khan as Foreign Minister 1962-3. Caroe, Sir Olaf (d.1981): NWFP Governor 1946-7.

Chundrigar, Ismail Ibrahim (1897-1960): Migrant from Ahmedabad assigned to ministerial, gubernatorial and diplomatic posts after partition. Prime Minister of Pakistan from October to December 1957.

Cunningham, Sir George (1888-1964): Governor of NWFP 1937-46 and 1947-8.

Daultana, Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Khan (1916-95): Ex-Unionist who joined the Muslim League in 1943. Chief Minister of Punjab 1951-3, strong advocate of one-unit plan; member of Dr Khan Sahib's West Pakistan government, and Minister of Defence under I.I. Chundrigar. Became president of the Council Muslim League in 1967. Elected to the National Assembly in 1970: later served as ambassador to Britain.

Fazlul Haq, A.K. (1873-1962): President All-India Muslim League 1916-21, but founded Krishok Praja Party in 1927. Prime Minister of Bengal 1937-43. After partition, Advocate-General of East Bengal till 1954, then briefly Chief Minister, and later (1956-8) Governor of the province.

Gurmani, Mushtaq Ahmad (1905-81): Politician of Unionist leanings who served as Prime Minister of Bahawalpur State 1947-8, federal minister 1949-54, Governor of Punjab 1954-5, and Governor of West Pakistan 1955-7.

Haroon, Yusuf (1917-): Minister in successive federal and West Pakistan cabinets during the 1950s, before being banned under Ayub Khan's EBDO. Served as Governor of West Pakistan for three days in March 1969. Has lived in New York since 1971: briefly an active supporter of Nawaz Sharif's Islami Jamhoori Mahaz in recent years.

Hayat, Sardar Shaukat (1915-): Became active in Punjab politics shortly before Partition and subsequently served as a provincial minister. Expelled from Muslim League in 1950; joined Azad Pakistan Party but later returned to the League. Briefly leader of the parliamentary opposition in the Bhutto era, before joining the Pakistan People's Party.

Iftikharuddin, Mian (1907-62): Associated with the leftwing of the Congress till he left to join the Muslim League in 1945. Elected president of Punjab League in 1947, but expelled from the party in 1951. Founder member of Azad Pakistan Party and later National Awami Party (1957); a legislator of note till political activities were banned in 1958. Owner of Progressive Papers Limited (including *The Pakistan Times*) from 1947 till they were taken over by military regime in 1959.

Jinnah, Fatima (1894-1967): Youngest sister and constant companion of Mohammed Ali Jinnah; after his death she fell out with Liaquat Ali Khan. Later opposed Ayub's Martial Law and lost narrowly to him in a limited franchise presidential poll.

Jinnah, Mohammed Ali (1876-1948): Founder of Pakistan and its first Governor-General. Popularly known as Quaid-i-Azam.

Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhry (1889-1973): United Provinces Muslim Leaguer; appointed Governor of East Bengal in 1953. Welcomed Ayub's 1962 Constitution.

Khan, Abdul Ghaffar (1890-1988): Popularly known as Frontier Gandhi and Bacha Khan; played a conspicuous role in the Indian freedom movement by organising the Khudai Khidmatgars. Vehemently opposed Partition; after 1947, devoted his energies to the Pashtun cause and was branded a traitor. Imprisoned 1945-5; in exile 1965-70, and again left for Afghanistan in 1978.

Khan, Ayub (1907-74): Appointed first Pakistani Commanderin-Chief of the country's armed forces in 1951; also served as Defence Minister under Ghulam Mohammad. Became Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1958, and President after Iskander Mirza's ouster, an office he held till 1969.

Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar (1904-): Became ruler of Kalat in 1933; the state declared independence in 1947, but Khan declared merger with Pakistan the following year. Served as Governor of Balochistan under Z. A. Bhutto.

Khan, Khan Abdul Qayyum (1901-81): Frontier politician; resigned from Congress and joined Muslim League in 1945. Chief Minister of NWFP 1946-53, later member of Bogra cabinet. Out of the League between 1955 and 1958. Formed Qayyum Muslim League in 1970, served as Interior Minister under Z. A. Bhutto.

Khan, Liaquat Ali (1895-1951): Pursued a political career in the United Provinces before Partition, and rose to eminence in Muslim League, Became Pakistan's first Prime Minister; assassinated at a public meeting in Rawalpindi.

Khan, Maulvi Tamizuddin (1889-1963): Active in prepartition Bengal politics. President of the Constituent Assembly 1948-54; fought back unsuccessfully when Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed dissolved the Assembly.

Khan Sahib, Dr (1882-1958): Elder brother of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, joined Khudai Khidmatgar movement and was jailed 1930-4. Served as Frontier Premier 1937-9 and 1945-7; federal minister 1954-5; founded Republican Party, became Chief Minister of West Pakistan 1955-7. Stabbed to death in May 1958.

Khuhro, Ayub (1901-80): Involved in the successful preindependence campaign to separate Sind from Bombay Presidency: later a staunch advocate of the one-unit scheme for West Pakistan. Served intermittently as Chief Minister of Sindh between 1947 and 1954: subsequently a minister in Dr Khan Sahib's cabinet. Lost to Z. A. Bhutto in the 1970 elections.

Mamdot, Iftikhar Hussain (1906-69): Joined politics after father Sir Shah Nawaz Khan's death in 1942; first Chief Minister of Punjab after Partition; left Muslim League in 1950 and founded Jinnah Muslim League, but returned to the parent organization in 1953 and was appointed Governor of Sind. Joined Republican Party and held West Pakistan cabinet post; later reorganized Ayub's Convention Muslim League and served as its vice-president. **Masservy, General Sir Frank** (1893-1974): British army officer, appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army in 1947.

Mirza, Iskander (1899-1969): Bureaucrat with a military background (he rose to be a Major-General) who opted for Pakistan in 1947 and was appointed Defence Secretary. Served as Governor of East Bengal and a federal minister before becoming Governor-General in 1955. Under the 1956 Constitution, he became Pakistan's first President. Imposed Martial Law in 1958 to pre-empt scheduled elections, but was deposed by Ayub Khan shortly afterwards. Spent the rest of his life in exile.

Mohammad, Malik Ghulam (1895-1956): A civil servant who was appointed Finance Minister in Pakistan's first cabinet, he took over as Governor-General after Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination in 1951, dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin's government in 1953 and dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 1954. Resigned for health as well as political reasons in 1955.

Mountbatten, Lord Louis (1900-79): Britain's last Viceroy to India, and independent India's first Governor-General.

Mudie, Sir Francis (1890-1976): British civil servant; Governor of Sind 1946-7 and (West) Punjab 1947-9.

Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh (1920-75): Joined Awami League in 1949, and became its president after Suhrawardy's death in 1963 after brief stints in the East Bengal and federal cabinets in the 1950s. Imprisoned by Ayub, but Awami League under his leadership swept 1970 polls in East Pakistan. Became the first Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 1972; assassinated three years later.

Nazimuddin, Khwaja (1894-1964): Served in Bengal cabinet during the 1920s and 1930s, and became Premier of the state (1943-5). After Partition, he was Chief Minister of East Bengal 1947-8; succeeded Jinnah as Governor-General of Pakistan (1948-51), and then served as Prime Minister 1951-53.

Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889-1964): The first Prime Minister of independent India (1947-64) and one of the progenitors of the international Non-Aligned Movement.

Nishtar, Sardar Abdur Rab (1899-1958): Frontier politician, member of first post-independence federal cabinet; Governor of Punjab 1949-51: federal minister 1951-3; president of Muslim League 1956-8.

Noon, Malik Sir Firoz Khan (1893-1970): Prominent in Punjab politics since 1920, and India's High Commissioner in London 1936-41. Prime Minister of Pakistan 1957-8.

Pirzada, Abdus Sattar (1907-74): Involved in pre-partition Sindh politics; served in federal cabinet 1947-53 and as Chief Minister of Sindh 1953-4. Resigned from Muslim League and joined Republican Party in 1956. Contested 1970 polls without success.

Rashid, Sardar Abdur (d. 1993): IG Police NWFP: replaced Abdul Qayyum Khan as NWFP Chief Minister in 1953; opposed one-unit scheme: replaced Dr Khan Sahib as Chief Minister of West Pakistan in 1956.

Suhrawardy, Hussain Shaheed (1893-1963): Premier of United Bengal until Partition: broke away from Muslim League in 1949 and founded Awami League. Served as Pakistan's Law minister (1954-5) and then Prime Minister (1956-7). Formed National Democratic Front in opposition to Ayub Khan's martial law in 1962.

Tiwana, Lt-Col Nawab Malik Sir Khizar Hayat (1900-75): Faithfully served the British Raj, joined the Unionist Party and became Premier of united Punjab in 1942. Flirted with Muslim League in the 1950s but was not directly active in politics after partition.

Zafrulla, Chaudhri Sir Muhammad (b.1893): Lawyer who became Pakistan's first Foreign Minister: later served as judge at the International Court of Justice in the Hague (1954-72), and was President of the UN General Assembly 1962-3.





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Pakistan: The First Twelve Years *The Pakistan Times* Editorials of Mazhar Ali Khan

During his lifetime, Mazhar Ali Khan selfeffacingly turned down suggestions that his journalistic endeavours be anthologised. This posthumous selection of his writings is based almost entirely on editorials contributed to The Pakistan Times in the 1947-59 period. The idea behind this volume is not just to preserve a distinguished body of work, but also to give historians, scholars and students access to a lucid and fearlessly critical contemporary perspective on Pakistani politics in the nation's formative years. The majority of the editorials contained herein deal with the misadventures and intrigues that distinguished politics in Pakistan's first twelve years, offering a host of clues about what went wrong in that crucial phase of national development. Reflections on issues such as the Kashmir dispute and the burgeoning American role in Pakistan provide a fascinating insight into the mood of the times. A handful of comments on international affairs have been included as a window to concurrent developments elsewhere in the world.

Gul Hayat



About the author

Mazhar Ali Khan was born in Lahore in 1917. He attended St Anthony's High School and later Government College in that city. A skilled debater and swimmer, his active involvement in radical politics while still a student earned him jail terms under the Raj. Commissioned as a Captain in the British Indian Army in 1942, Mazhar Ali Khan saw action in north Africa, the Middle East and Italy during World War II. He obtained release from the army in 1945, and joined *The Pakistan Times* as News Editor in June 1947. He was Editor of the paper from 1951 till it was taken over by the Ayub regime in

April 1959. A period of enforced silence was broken when he began contributing to the Dhaka-based weekly Forum in 1970. He served as Acting-Editor-in-Chief of the Karachi daily Dawn in 1972. Three years later he set up his own weekly, Viewpoint, in Lahore on 14 August 1975, which subsequently became a focus for prodemocratic dissent during the dark years of General Ziaul Haq's Martial Law. Mazhar Ali Khan was imprisoned twice, in 1977 and 1981. He succumbed to a second heart attack in January 1993, just nine months after financial constraints forced the closure of Viewpoint.

Mazhar Ali Khan

Mazhar Ali's personal integrity, both as an editor and as a human being, will always be a shining example for all in the profession. **Majid Nizami**,

Chief Editor, Nawa-e-Waqt and Nation

The key to his success lay in a rare ability to blend the effective authority of an editor with the openness of a debater.

I.A. Rehman, Columnist and Director Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

Mazhar's warm personality, his commitment to principles, his alert journalist's mind, will always be remembered.

Perin Romesh Chandra Vice Chairperson, Afro-Asian Solidarity Committée, India

Mazhar has legated a horde of friends in India and Pakistan with an abiding faith in values acquired during the great freedom struggle.

Inder Gujral, former Foreign Minister of India

If we in the profession of journalism are able to do one hundredth of what he accomplished, and if we can acquire even a modicum of his integrity, fearlessness, sense of right and wrong and adherence to principles, we would become better men and journalists. In my book there can be no greater tribute.

Khalid Hasan, Columnist



Oxford University Press



PAKISTAN The First Twelve Years

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