

OUTLINE OF THE OPERATIONS

OF THE

BRITISH TROOPS

IN

SCINDE AND AFGHANISTAN,

BETWIXT NOV. 1838 AND NOV. 1841;

WITH REMARKS ON THE POLICY OF THE WAR.

By GEO. BUIST, L.L.D.,

EDITOR OF THE BOMBAY TIMES; SECRETARY TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND
AGRI-HORTICULTURAL SOCIETIES; AND IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT OBSERVATORY, BOMBAY.

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· The Action of the Nereorsk Pass, August 31st, 1840.



The Action of the Sierrita Pass, 16th May, 1840.



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H. Morse Stephens

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THE following memoir was drawn up for the *Bombay Times* and *Monthly Times* newspapers: the former a bi-weekly print, chiefly read in India; the latter, for which it was principally intended, being published on the morning of the dispatch of the Overland Mail, and having much the greater part of its circulation in Europe. Various valuable narratives, giving accounts of the campaign of 1839, were published in the year 1840, the titles of which have been quoted as their pages have been referred to and drawn upon for the substance of the Second Chapter of the present volume. The writers of these treat, after their own fashion, of the events of which they were witnesses or sharers: Dr KENNEDY confines himself to an account of the march of the Bombay column, which at first, for three months, pursued a different route from the Bengal portion of the army; until, reaching the mouth of the Bolan Pass, it afterwards followed the track of the leading column, although ten marches in its rear, until the whole assembled at Candahar on the 4th May, where the elements of the grand army were, for the first time, united. The march between this and Cabool furnishes common ground, which has been traversed by all the writers who describe the operations of Sir JOHN KEANE. Dr KENNEDY retires with the Bombay force by the new route over the Toba mountains, to the southward of that which had been previously traversed, and brings the reader back through Sukkur with the last fragment of the force. Major OUTRAM's "Rough Notes" are entirely confined to what he himself did or saw: he gives us his adventures at starting in Cutch in quest of camels—the gallant,

engaged in one or more of the several campaigns under review, and nearly all of them at the heads of departments in the detachments to which they belonged, and each of whom most frankly and willingly complied with his request for their advice and assistance. The introductory and concluding chapters are the only ones which have not been subjected to this species of ordeal. To these gentlemen the Author's most grateful acknowledgments are due; and he only regrets that, in consequence of the etiquette of the Service, forbidding them to be formally known as contributors to a newspaper, he cannot thank them by name for the labour and pains bestowed by them in correcting casual errors, which fortunately were less numerous than might have been apprehended,—as well as for the complimentary manner in which they have been pleased to express themselves as to the accuracy of the narrative. For the opinions maintained as to the policy and management of the war, the gentlemen alluded to are, of course, in no way to be held responsible.

The sale of books of the present description is in Western India in the last degree limited: the want of curiosity so constantly manifested in England in reference to the concerns of the East, left no reason to suppose that a work of greater magnitude on this subject, if published separately, would have covered the heavy charges incurred in printing at Bombay,—the difficulty at once and necessity of having the proofs carefully corrected and revised, put home publication out of the question,—and the style of the writing pretended to none of the graces which might have attracted the attention of the reader where the subject by itself was to him of little interest. On these grounds, a very small edition (200) of the volume has been thrown off: this being not, strictly speaking, a reprint from the *Bombay Times*, but an impression from the types as re-adjusted and placed in pages. Several errors have been corrected, and some few changes in arrangement, and a slight enlargement made, while the whole has been subjected to repeated and very careful revisals: and this is all that has been done in the way

of alteration. These explanations are required to account for the numberless imperfections with which the volume is chargeable,—for the defects in style, and occasional want of method which, though inexcusable in a formal historical work, may be pardoned in a newspaper memoir, written occasionally amidst attacks of sickness, at all times in haste and under the pressure of numerous, complicated, laborious, and varied avocations. The duties of a newspaper editor at home give no sort of idea of the labours and perplexities of a journalist in India:—without reports of public meetings or parliamentary debates,—where political discussions, in the English sense of the term, which at all times furnish food for unlimited speculation to a ready or fluent writer, are disrelished,—with a hot and relaxing climate to contend against, and many of the duties which in Europe are discharged by correspondents, reporters, sub-editors, or other assistants, thrown entirely into his hands.

In drawing up the present narrative, each month demanded its chapter complete, however numerous might be the documents required to be consulted, or perplexing and inaccessible the authorities to be referred to,—whatever might be the amount of interruptions, or the pressure of extraneous avocations; and the several sheets were generally taken away by the compositor as written—the first proofs not being ready for revision till the last pages were out of the writer's hands. The dispatch of the mail required that the printing machine should be at work by a given hour, without regard to the fatigues of the party who prepared for it its supplies of food. This will account for, if not excuse, much repetition and not a little confusion, which will be observed especially in the first and second chapters, and of which no one of those which follow is wholly free. To have got rid of these, which even an author's partiality for his own writings leaves sufficiently apparent to himself, would have required an amount of alteration, incurring an expenditure of money and of labour which there was no reason to suppose the return of sales would compensate, and which no prudent person would have recommended a poor

man to undertake without hope of requital, for the benefit of those who might not, after all, have appreciated the outlay that had been incurred in their behalf.

No exertion has been spared to complete the work to the best of the writer's ability under the disadvantages which hurried periodical publication always impose; he is conscious of no selfish motive, or personal bias towards any one; and has neither been influenced by fear or favour of any party; he has warmly and fearlessly assailed the dishonest and aggressive foreign policy alike of Lord ELLENBOROUGH as of Lord AUCKLAND, aware that, in so doing, he should incur the displeasure of the men of both parties who might happen to favour his speculations with perusal: he undertook the task in his capacity of newspaper editor, in the hope of supplying something not quite familiar nor wholly unacceptable to the reader, but under no delusion as to his pre-eminent qualifications for its discharge,—and now passes the result of his labours from his hands, not as a volume worthy of the name of history, or capable, as a literary production, of withstanding the censures of the critic, but as a mere reprint of an ephemeral memoir, which may help to assist the recollection of those into whose hands it shall chance to fall,—and who prefer a book to a series of chapters spread over seven months of a newspaper file,—of the connection betwixt the victories of Lord KEANE and the terrific disasters of the army of General ELPHINSTONE. The excessively limited amount of its circulation precludes it from being considered so much even as a memoir to serve in the place of history till history be written. It was originally intended that the chronicle of events should have been brought down through the calamities of winter and spring 1841–42 to the triumphant return of our armies to India: and this is a work of much interest and importance which yet remains to be performed by some one,—the narratives of the prisoners being confined to the affairs at Cabool. But the parliamentary papers and numerous journals published in the course of the past six months, furnish a mass of material which would, after the utmost

compression, occupy as large a space as that devoted to the events of the three preceding years; and it seemed doubtful whether public interest might not flag had this been attempted to be issued in chapters,—more than doubtful whether it would have been cared for as a separate volume. The narrative, therefore, was broken off at the period supplied by the Ghilzie insurrection—when a new roll rather than a new chapter in our history may be said to have been opened up.

The woodcuts of Nufoosk and Surtof were engraved for a work of a different nature from the present: that having fallen aside they are now taken advantage of. This, it is hoped, will be accepted as an explanation why, if any illustrations were thought of, more were not given. These are presented to the reader because they were at hand, at any rate; they were not purposely prepared: more could not have been afforded.



ERRATA.

At page 2, line 7 from the top, for 1837 read 1839.

- .. 17, ... 2 from bottom, for *fall* of Herat read *safety* of Herat.
- ... 49, ... 4 from the bottom (note 41,) for *expected* read *expressed*.
- ... 63, ... 10 from top, for *presents* to Lahore read *presents* to Runjeet Sing.
- ... 92, ... 11 from the top, for 6th April read 26th April.
- ... 124.—Omit from line 5 to line 10 from the top of the page. The change of plan adopted in the course of publication excludes the account of the destruction of the Cabool army and advance of General Pollock's troops, proposed to have been given in the concluding chapters.
- .. 127, line 15 from the bottom, for Lieut. McKenzie read Lieut. Nicholson.
- ... 148.—A note, copied from the *Agra Ukhbar*, states, that the chiefs who fell into the hands of Lieut. Nicholson were executed contrary to agreement. Sir W. Macnaghton in his letter, printed at p. 287-89, states, that the chiefs were perfectly aware that they were to be capitally punished, and that there was no stipulation whatever to the contrary.
- ... 203.—Line 15 from the bottom, for judgment of a court of inquiry read decision of a court, &c.
- .. 233, ... 16 from top, for Kojuck read Kujjuck.
- .. 243.—Mr Boll's demise is said to have taken place on the 1st August: it occurred late on the evening of the 31st July.
- ... 249.—Line 7 from top It is stated that Lieut. Outram was specially mentioned by Colonel Deacon in his account of the capture of Kittoor. This was not Lieut. James (afterwards the distinguished Major) Outram, as stated by mistake in the text; but his brother; both were present and did good service, but Lieut. Outram of the engineers is the party stated to have been named in the Dispatch.

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P R E F A C E.

AFGHANISTAN is walled in on the north by the Hindoo Koosh and the Paropamisian range of mountains,* many of which reach the elevation of 20,000 feet—the summit level of the passes through which the intercourse betwixt the countries to the north and south of these is maintained, varies from 10 to 13,000 feet.† On the south and east it is bounded by the river Indus from Attock in longitude 73° east, latitude 34° north, to as far south as latitude $32^{\circ} 20'$. On the east it is divided by stupendous mountain ranges from Chinese Tartary—on the west it borders with Bokhara, Koondooz, and Persia; on the south-west with Beloochistan and Scinde, from both of which it was wont to claim allegiance, military service, and tribute. The kingdom of Cabool, which more immediately concerns us at present, arose out of the dismemberment of the empire of Nadir Shah. When that monarch was murdered in 1747 he was succeeded by Ahmed Shah, the founder of the Dooranee monarchy;—a skilful, brave and enterprising soldier, whose whole reign, to the period of his death in 1773, was spent in war. He bequeathed an empire which reached from Khorassan to Sirhind, and from the Oxus to the sea, to his son Timor, a weak and indolent monarch, unable to rule the extensive realms and turbulent subjects the more vigorous hand of his father had with difficulty controlled. Timor Shah transferred the seat of government from Candahar to Cabool, and was, in 1793, succeeded by Zemaun Shah, one of the youngest of his sons.‡ On the elevation of this prince to the throne, which had been effected by a faction of

* Hamilton's Gazetteer.

† Rough Notes on the Campaign in Scinde and Affghanistan, &c. By Captain James Outram, p. 110.

‡ Asiatic Journal from September to December, 1838. The whole of the papers in this periodical on our Affghan policy are able and excellent, and would form valuable subjects of study to those who have the ignorance or impudence to assert that the mischiefs of the Affghan war were only first discovered after it began to appear unfortunate.

the nobles, his elder brothers broke out in open insurrection: one had himself proclaimed king of Candahar, but was afterwards defeated and blinded by Mahmoud Shah, another brother, who seized Herat, which he was permitted to retain. The elevation of the Shah Zemaun to the throne, had given rise to much popular discontent: and Futteh Khan, head of the Barukzyes, having formed an alliance with the ruler of Herat, advanced to the eastward, where, near Candahar, he defeated Zemaun, who was afterwards betrayed into the hands of the conqueror, by whom he was blinded and sent prisoner to Cabool. Shah Soojah, a still younger son of Timor, and brother of Zemaun, now, for the first time, appears in the field. In 1801, on learning the mishap of his brother, he advanced on Cabool from Peshawur, but was defeated, and his army dispersed by Futteh Khan and his Barukzyes. An attempt in 1803 was more successful. When Futteh Khan, acknowledged on all hands to have been a man of talent and courage, was absent from his capital engaged in quelling an insurrection, advantage was taken of some religious quarrels betwixt the leading Mahommedan sects: and the Shah Soojah, who had shortly before been a second time defeated, from a fugitive living on the bounty of the tribes was raised to the throne. After six years of almost uninterrupted turbulence and discord, during which he, on more than one occasion, nearly lost his crown, he was, in 1810, totally defeated by Futteh Khan, and driven from his kingdom. In 1811 he made an unsuccessful attempt to regain the sovereignty. He subsequently resided in the Punjaub till stripped of the crown jewels and all his other property by Runjeet Singh. This is a brief but exact outline of the early career of the Shah Soojah. His grandfather obtained the kingdom by conquest. His brother, to whom he temporarily succeeded, was one of the younger sons of Timor, the son of Ahmed Shah, and was raised to the sovereignty by force over the heads of his elder brothers; to whom, if seniority and hereditary right were to be considered grounds of claim, it properly belonged. Kamran Shah of Herat, son of Mahmoud, the eldest of these, has throughout, since his father's death, been the representative of the lineal branch, and is so still. The Shah Soojah maintained a weak and troubled reign for the space of seven years, during which he never exercised authority over one half the territory or subjects, or claimed one tithe of the rights of which we afterwards for a time put him in possession. It is well to recollect these things, because the general impression amongst

the public at large appears throughout to have been, that in placing the late Doorannee ruler on the throne, we were restoring a once powerful and popular monarch to rights which he had formerly enjoyed:—to a kingdom and subjects so ruled by him through a long period of time, as that, from them with him as their sovereign, we might look for a strong and imperishable barrier against all invasion from Persia and Russia. Instead of this, we associated ourselves with an ally who was only able to maintain a precarious rule, because of the dissensions of the other chiefs:—who never possessed the confidence of the Affghans to an extent that would have enabled him to ward off foreign aggression, from whatever quarter it might have been threatened.

Futteh Khan, though actually holding the power and destinies of the kingdom in his hands, had never claimed the title of Sovereign, which was enjoyed by Shah Mahmoud, the hereditary Grand Vizier. The former chief was shortly afterwards deprived of sight at Candahar by a son of the latter, in revenge for the contemptuous manner in which he had spoken of the ruler of Cabool. This barbarous act of vengeance immediately converted the brothers of Futteh Khan into the most active enemies of Mahmoud Shah and his family.* After a considerable period of turbulence and strife, the Doorannee empire was dismembered. In 1826, Dost Mahomed made himself entire master of Cabool.† He deprived his brother Jubbar Khan of the Ghilzee country, of which he had just before obtained possession, and made him his vizier; seizing also on Jellalabad, which had belonged to Mahomed Zemaun Khan. Candahar fell under the rule of three of Dost Mahomed's brothers. In 1833, the Shah Soojah made a last attempt to recover the sovereignty; he defeated the Scindians and possessed himself of Shikarpore. Having advanced by the Bolan Pass and Quetta, he was, on the 2d of July 1834, defeated by Dost Mahomed near Candahar, and sought refuge from the Khan of Kelat. From this date he lived a pensioner on the Indian Government within the Company's territory. He had, indeed, resided at Loodianah since 1818: we allowed him a pension of £4500 a-year, but avoided meddling with his quarrels.‡ Sixty winters had cooled his ambition, and he seemed content to spend his days in affluent and luxurious

* The above is chiefly an abridgement from the Asiatic Journal, as already quoted.

† Major Hough's March and Operations of the Army of the Indus, p. 414.

‡ Ibid, p. 404, note.

exile, when in 1838 it pleased the British Government to treat with him as a sovereign about to be placed once more in power!

Having given thus much of a cursory glance at the state of politics in Afghanistan when we first embroiled ourselves with its affairs,—its revenue, and the character of its people fall next to be noticed before enlarging on the political questions whose discussion immediately preceded preparations for war, and which will not, for some time to come, have ceased to occupy public attention.

The entire population of the Dooranee empire is estimated by Mr Elphinstone at about a million of souls; of these, from 80,000 to 100,000 are inhabitants of Cabool,* and about a similar number of the city of Candahar.† The town of Istaliff, but little known to us till attacked and destroyed by Gen. McCaskill on the 29th Sept. 1842, contains about 15,000 inhabitants; Charekar about 3000; Ghuznie about 3000; and Quettah about 6000. The last-named town was at this time a portion of the Khanate of Kelat, to which it has since been re-annexed; from 1839 to 1842, we held it as belonging to the Shah Soojah. There are no other towns of note in the kingdom, save Jellalabad, which is within the first line of passes. Cabool, the capital, is situated in Lat. 34 deg. 30 min. N., and Long. 68 deg. 31 min. E. It is more than three miles in circumference. It is surrounded by rocky hills; and the beautiful but narrow valley in which it stands is no less than 6396 feet above the level of the sea.‡ It is remarkable for the excellency and abundance of its fruits. The Bala Hissar, or citadel, is placed on an eminence, half a mile long and half as much broad, overlooking and commanding the town, which is difficult of access either to friend or foe. It is, or rather it was, chiefly remarkable for the magnificence of its bazaars. These buildings, formed by a continuation of streets roofed in and crossing each other at right angles, were, until our troops blew them up in 1842, the admiration of every traveller, and the architectural pride of Central Asia. The revenues of Cabool with all its territories, amounted in Dost Mahomed's time to from £250,000 to £300,000 a year;§ during the period of our occupation they seldom exceeded £220,000;¶ while,

* Burnes. Major Hough.

† Major Hough states that there are 40,000 houses, and 100,000 inhabitants in Candahar (p. 135.) We are disposed to take a lower estimate.

‡ Major Hough, pp. 284 and 430.

§ See Burnes's Travels.

¶ Letter of Sir Alex. Burnes, published in the *Bombay Times*.

in addition to this, Candahar yielded £80,000 ; and the whole revenues of the Shah Soojah betwixt 1839 and 1841, never probably amounted to any thing like £400,000 a year. The charges we incurred on his account annually, were about eight times this. The winter throughout Affghanistan is exceedingly severe, the thermometer at Cabool often sinking below zero, and remaining 8 or 10 deg. under freezing for three or four months together.

Recent occurrences have occasioned so much wrathful discussion as to the character of the Affghan population, that instead of attempting an analysis or delineation of it for ourselves, we shall borrow what appears to us an exceedingly fair one from the *Asiatic Journal*; the article we are about to quote being an abstract of the views of Elphinstone, Conolly, Burnes, and Moorcroft :—

“ These tribes differ so much in their internal government, manners, and customs, that they may be almost regarded as distinct nations ; the only feature which is most marked amongst the Affghan tribes, as common to all, is a wild independence, which, in some approaches to a republican sentiment of equality. They are all, likewise, remarkable for a lofty martial spirit, simplicity of manners, and hospitality. The original number of their tribes, or family divisions, is four ; but these have been subdivided into several branches, each ruled by its own independant khan, or chief, though retaining an idea of a community of blood and interests. Each tribe, or *ooloos*, has a distinct form of government, of the patriarchal character, constituting a complete commonwealth in itself. The Affghan nation is composed of an assemblage of these commonwealths, which form one state by obedience to the authority of a common sovereign, though the submission of some of the tribes has ever been but nominal. The Affghans exult in the free spirit of their institutions ; they cherish the notion that ‘ all Affghans are equal.’ When Mr. Elphinstone urged, on an intelligent old man of the Meeankhail tribe, the superiority of a secure life, under a powerful monarch, to the discord and bloodshed which prevailed under their present system, he replied proudly, ‘ We are content with discord, we are content with bloodshed, but we will never be content with a master.’ ”

“ The condition of the Affghan women, who are described as large, and very fair and handsome, varies with their rank ; those of the upper classes are entirely concealed, those of the poor do the work of the house. The former are not uneducated. In the country, they go unveiled, and exercise hospitality when their husbands are from home. ‘ I am not sure,’ says Mr. Elphinstone, ‘ that there is any people in the East, except the Affghans, where I have seen any trace of the sentiment of love, according to our ideas of the passion.’ ”

“ The Affghans exhibit a remarkable contrast to other Mahommedan nations in their treatment of Christians, to whom they have not the smallest aversion. M. Durie, an Indo-Briton, who travelled through Affghanistan as far west as

Candahar, mixing with all classes as a Mahomedan, though suspected of being a Feringhee, represents the people as kind, free, liberal, and tolerant; their aversion towards the Sikhs arises from their regarding them as pagans.

"One of their most remarkable characteristics is their hospitality; the practice of this virtue is so much a national point of honour, that their reproach to an inhospitable man is to say that he is no Affghan. A man's bitterest enemy is safe while he is under his roof, and a stranger who has come into an Affghan's tent or house is under the protection of the master as long as he stays in the village. The protection, however, does not extend further; there are instances, in some of the predatory tribes, of travellers being entertained and dismissed with presents, and yet robbed by the same tribe, when met again without the bounds of their protection.

"The tribes most addicted to rapine in the west are about Candahar, in the desert country on the borders of Persia and Beloochistan, and the Ghilzees, who inhabit the Paropamisian mountains. All the tribes of the range of Soliman, especially the Khyberees and Vizceres, are notorious plunderers; many others in the east are disposed to plunder, and it is remarked that all the pastoral tribes in the west are more disposed to robbery than those who live by agriculture: robbery is, however, never aggravated by murder.

"The nomade population is diminishing, though the Dooranees extol the charms of a pastoral life. Those who live in tents are chiefly to be found in the west, where they amount to one-half the population. All over the east, the people live in houses. The commonest house is built of unburnt brick one story high, and roofed with a terrace or low cupola. There is little or no furniture within, except a coarse woollen carpet, and pieces of felt to sit on. The houses of the great are of two or three stories, and enclosed with high walls containing stables and offices, and several courts laid out in gardens with fountains. The halls are supported by pillars and Moorish arches, carved and painted. The walls are ornamented with paintings in distemper or oil, and pictures. The furniture consists chiefly of carpets and felts. The tents of the shepherds are of coarse black camlet; those of the common people are from twenty to twenty-five feet long, ten or twelve broad, and eight or nine high, supported by poles, and divided into two apartments by a curtain; those of the khans are larger and better—the Dooranees line their tents with felt.

"The Affghans are a social, sober, steady, cheerful people. Though merry, they do not laugh much, though they talk a great deal. They are fond of tales and songs, which are of love or war; but their favourite amusement is the chase or hawking.

"The men are all of a robust make, generally lean, though bony and muscular. They have high noses, high cheek-bones, and long faces. Their hair and beards are generally black; sometimes brown. They shave the middle part of the head, but wear the rest of their hair, which is coarse and strong. Their countenance has an expression of manliness and deliberation, united to an air of simplicity. The western Affghans are larger and stouter than those of the east, and some Dooranees and Ghilzees are of surprising

strength and stature; but, generally speaking, the Affghans are not so tall as the English. Their manners are frank and open, and though manly and independent, they are entirely free from military pride and *ferocity*. About towns, the Affghans are in some degree polished; but in many parts of the country they are plain and rustic, but never fierce or insolent. Their deportment is easy, yet it is not uncommon to find them bashful, a defect rarely seen in an Asiatic. Their conversation is rational, they are desirous of information, and the bulk of the people are remarkable for prudence, good sense, and observation. Capt. Burnes says they always interrogated him closely regarding Europe, and that 'it was delightful to see the curiosity of even the oldest men.' Though far behind Europeans in veracity, and though they would seldom scruple to deceive when their interest was at stake, they have not the habitual falsehood of the natives of India and Persia. They are all remarkably hardy and active, industrious, and laborious. From the nature of their country, they are exposed to endure cold and heat, and accustomed to climbing mountains and swimming torrents. They are impatient of heat, though much of the climate of Affghanistan is hot. They are attached to their clans and families, proud of their ancestry, and all take a lively interest in the honour of their country. They are kind to their immediate dependents, though the Affghan rule over conquered nations is severe and tyrannical. They are faithful in friendship, and mindful of favours. They are *neither irritable nor implacable*, but they retain a long remembrance of injuries not retaliated: revenge is esteemed a duty. Capt. Burnes taxes them with idleness and a passion for intrigue; yet he adds, 'I imbibed a very favourable impression of their national character. Mr. Elphinstone sums up their character in these words.—'Their vices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity, obstinacy; on the other hand, they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious, and prudent; and they are less disposed than the nations in their neighbourhood to falsehood, intrigue, and deceit.'"—*Asiatic Journal*, 1838, pp. 306—308.

There is, in one particular, a remarkable difference betwixt the Affghans and the tribes to the north and west of them in a matter which of itself is sufficient to mark the character of a people. The Heratees, Khivans, Uzbeks, and Tartars of every race deal freely and extensively in slaves.

"In the Khurm valley we overtook another slave party from the Hazara country. The owners, to the astonishment of our party, were men of Cabool. They appeared greatly mortified at being seen by us, hung down their heads, and wished, but in vain, to escape notice. The Khirakushes recognised them as inhabitants of Chardah, a plain in the vicinity of Cabool, and at once charged them with carrying on a traffic as degrading to an Affghan as it is accounted honourable in an Uzbek. They were asked how they could face their clansmen after such disreputable conduct. In extenuation of their conduct, they stated, that after trading to a considerable extent with the Hazaras,

and waiting twelve months for a settlement of their claims, they had been unable to obtain payment. The correctness of the demand was readily acknowledged, and slaves, valued at its full amount, offered in lieu of all claims. At first they refused this mode of payment, but were at length induced to comply. Unable after such a description of compromise to return direct to their own country, they were now proceeding to the Uzbek mart of the Khurm, or Tash Kurgan, there to realize by sale the proceeds of this discreditable barter.

"Nothing surprises one so much, nor is more difficult to be accounted for on rational principles, than the marked shades of difference which often, as in this case, are exhibited in the moral character of neighbouring nations. Here we have two races of men, professing the same belief, whose habits in many respects are alike, and whose location and pastoral pursuits offer many points in common, yet differing in almost every feeling that marks the man, and which in their combined influence constitute the peculiar genius of a people. Of the freedom enjoyed by the Affghans, the Uzbeks know nothing. The liberty of the slave they capture is not more at their disposal than their own life is in the hands of their chief or Beg. To love of country, a feeling dominant in the breast of an Affghan, and which glows with more or less intensity in the soul of every other people from the Zahara to the Esquimaux, the Uzbek is almost a stranger. The custom of man stealing appears to have smothered every better feeling; and the practice of trafficking in human beings extends even into their domestic arrangements; for their wives are as much articles of property as their slaves, and are bought and sold with the same callous indifference."—*Wood's Journey to the Oxus*, pp. 210 & 211.

The following extract, from Mr Masson's late work, gives an idea of Affghan liberality and toleration, for which we should in vain seek a parallel in the wide limits of Asia:—

"**AFFGHAN TOLERATION.**—It is matter of agreeable surpriso to any one acquainted with the Mahomedans of India, Persia, and Turkey, and with their religious prejudices and antipathies, to find that the people of Cabool are entirely free from them. In most countries few Mahomedans will eat with a Christian; to salute him even in error, is deemed unfortunate, and he is looked upon as unclean. Here none of those difficulties or feelings exist. The Christian is respectfully called a 'kitabî,' or 'one of the book.' The dissolute Vazir Futi Khan, when occasionally an Armenian Christian presented himself desiring to become a convert to Islam, was wont to inquire what he had found deficient in his own religion that he wished to change it? and would remark, that those persons who possessed a book and would adopt a new faith, were scoundrels, actuated by love of gain, or other interested motive. To the Hindu anxious to enter the pale of the Mahomedan Church, he made no objection; on the contrary, he applauded him who, having no religion, embraced one. I at first imputed the indifference of the Cabool people to their own laxity, for I soon observed that there was very little religion among them. Those called Shiâs were very generally of the Sun-mazzabz, which, whatever its mystical pretensions, I fear implies no religion at

all. The same system largely prevails among the Suni professors: but when the same liberality was found to extend over the country and among all races whether Affghans, Tajiks, or others, who could not be chargeable with Sufi doctrines, I was sensible that there must be some other reason. * *

“Living with the Armenians of the city, I witnessed every day the terms of equality on which they dwelt among their Mahomedan neighbours. The Armenian followed the Mahomedan corpse to its place of burial;—the Mahomedan showed the same mark of respect to the remains of the Armenian community. They mutually attended each other’s weddings, and participated in the little matters which spring up in society. The Armenian presented gifts on Id Noh Roz, or the Mahomedan New-year’s Day; he received them on his own Christmas Day. If it had happened that a Mahomedan had married an Armenian female who was lost to the Church of the Cross, I found that the Armenians had retaliated, and brought Mahomedan females into their families and inducted them into their faith. An Armenian, in conversation with the present head of the Wais family, said, that some person had called him a *Kafir*, or Infidel. The reply was, ‘He that calls a *kafir* is a *kafir* himself.’ It is something for a Christian to reside with Mahomedans so tolerant and unprejudiced. Wine prohibited to be made or sold in the city, is permitted to be made and used by Armenians, who are simply restricted to indulge in their own houses. They have not unadroitly induced the Mahomedans to believe that to drink wine is part of their religion, and to interfere on that head is impossible. There are a few families of Jews at Cabool; but, while perfectly tolerated as to matters of faith, they by no means command the respect which is shown to Armenians. Like them, they are permitted to make vinous and spirituous liquors; and they depend chiefly for their livelihood upon the clandestine sale of them. Some years since, a Jew was heard to speak disrespectfully of Jesus Christ: he was arraigned, and convicted before the Mahomedan tribunals on a charge of blasphemy; the sentence was *sangsar*, or to be stoned to death. The unhappy culprit was brought to the Armenians. that they, as particularly interested, might carry into effect the punishment of the law. They declined; when the Mahomedans led the poor wretch without the city, and his life became the forfeit of his indiscretion. It was singular that an attack upon the divinity of our Saviour should have been held cognizable in a Mahomedan ecclesiastical court, and that it should have been resented by those who, in their theological disputes with Christians, never fail to cavil on that very point.”

These matters are given with the greater minuteness and detail, because it has been the habit ever since our armies entered Affghanistan, to speak of the people as treacherous and deceitful savages, characterized by scarcely a good or estimable quality, and hardly, amidst the severest sufferings inflicted on them, or the most intolerable exasperations to which they were exposed, entitled to the sympathies of civilized men! It appears of late to have been forgotten that Affghan-

istan and its people were well known to us before our soldiers entered it; that it had, betwixt 1808, when Mr Elphinstone went on embassy, till 1832, when Conolly and Burnes traversed it from the love of travel and desire to extend our knowledge of geography and statistics, been described by travellers surpassed by none in modern times in unimpeachable veracity, in careful and minute research, and in powers of graphic description.* The testimony of these and of those who followed after them in 1837 and 1838, on the eve of the outbreak of the war, of whom Lieut. Wood was one, is perfectly unanimous,—the passage already quoted from the Asiatic Journal giving a full and faithful abstract of their opinions. No man knew more of the Afghan character than the late Sir Alexander Burnes: he had lived with them in peace, and traversed their country before our discords began with them; he had negotiated with them, and striven to avert collision, and examined every turn and winding, every nook and crevice of their policy: he had watched them in open war, and purchased their forbearance when it could not otherwise be procured. On the 23d October 1841, within a week of his death, he writes thus: "I have often wondered at the hatred of the officers towards the Affghans. They surpass their western neighbours, the supple lying Persians; their northern ones, the enslaved Uzbegs; their

* The books of travels referred to are the following:—

Travels into Bokhara, containing the Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus from the sea to Lahore, &c.; and an Account of a Journey from India to Cabool, &c., in 1820 and 1830. By Lieut. Burnes. 3 vols. 8vo. 1832.

Journey to the North of India, overland from England through Russia, Persia, and Affghanistan in 1830. By Lieut. Arthur Conolly.

Moorcroft's Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindostan and the Punjaub, in Ladakh and Kashmir, Peshawur, Cabool, Koondooz and Bokhara. Prepared for the press by H. H. Wilson, Sanskrit Professor, Oxford. [These volumes were not published till 1841, though referring to the period intervening betwixt 1819 and 1825. Moorcroft had corresponded very extensively with the Government as well as with his friends in India, and a large amount of the information, systematically arranged by Dr Wilson, had appeared before in fragments.]

Wood's Journey to the Sources of the Oxus in 1837-8. 1 vol. 8vo. 1841.

Cabool; being a personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in, that country in 1836-8. By Lieut.-Col. Sir Alex. Burnes. 1842. This journal, though prepared by Sir A. Burnes at the date just mentioned, was not passed from his hands till May 1841; so that he had abundance both of leisure and opportunity to correct any imperfections in his previous observations.

Narrative of a Journey in Beloochistan, Affghanistan, and the Punjaub, betwixt 1826 and 1833, by C. Masson, 3 vols. 1842. The best portion of these volumes appeared in the Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society for 1840.

Eastern, the timid Indian ; and their southern ones, the fierce savage Beloochees. Yet they are blamed because they fight at night, when in fact the poor wretches are unable at any other time to cope with disciplined armies. This course, after all, is I imagine, nothing else than is allowable ; it was the same as the Scotch Highlanders pursued a century since." * The Affghans throughout found themselves unable to withstand us in the field : our guns, with which they had nothing to cope, mowed them down in hundreds, and although certainly on numerous occasions they threw themselves upon us regardless of all danger, charging home to the points of our bayonets, as often as they could they took advantage of the darkness of night, or the defiles and ravines which their country supplied, and which did something to equalize the condition of the disciplined soldier with that of the untrained warrior of the mountains. This was provoking for us, but it was the only wise course they could have pursued : the vexation and annoyance, the frequent mischiefs and continual irritation occasioned by it, made our officers as indifferent judges of the people against whom they were employed, and of whose character they wrote, as honourable-minded men could well become. They were placed in a false position : they saw everything through a tinted medium ; and they naturally described as they observed : being at the same time in the worst possible position for philosophical observation.

* This is copied nearly verbatim from an entry, dated 23d October, in a private journal of Sir Alexander Burnes's, which extends to the 1st November, the day before his murder, and which, singularly enough, amidst the wreck of all other things has been preserved entire. It is now in the hands of his friends.

OPERATIONS IN SCINDE AND AFFGHANISTAN, FROM 1837 TO 1842.

CHAPTER I.

Opinions of the British in India little affected by consideration of Home party politics. Perplexity in the Narrative from the diversity of authorities, the imperfections of the published papers, and the incessant alternations betwixt peace and war amongst the rulers of Central Asia—Feeling of all the Affghans against Persia in 1832. **AFFAIRS OF PESHAWUR**—Hostile movements of Runjeet Singh against the Doorannee States in 1818—Seizes on Attock and Mooltan—On Cashmere—Captures Peshawur—Resigns it in favour of Kamran Shah and Dost Mahomed—Hurry Singh gets possession of, by treachery, in 1834—Defeat of the Shah Soofah near Candahar—Dost Mahomed attempts to recover Peshawur in 1835—Retreats before the Seikhs—Successful attack on Nao Nehal Singh in 1836—The Prince seizes Deera Ishmael Khan—Preparations for another descent of troops from Cabool—Battle of Jumrood in May, 1837—Death of Hurry Singh—Prostration of the Seikhs—Our tender of mediation. **AFFAIRS OF HERAT**—Size of the Principality—Character of Kamran Shah, and his Vizier—Death of the King of Persia in 1834—Warlike preparations of the new King—Lord Palmerston's remonstrances—Preparations to march on Herat in 1836—Mr Ellice's alarm—Mr McNeil and Mr Ellice agreed upon his right—Advance of the Persian army in July, 1837—Occupation of Karrack—Our complete command of Persia throughout the Gulf—Money wasted on the embassy—Gratitude of Kamran Shah. **RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA**—Harmony of the Courts of St Petersburg and London in 1834 and 1835—Suspensions of Mr Ellice—Bugbear of Russian influence—Count Simonich joins the Persian Camp before Herat—Gives Directions—Negotiations with the Candahar Sirdars—Mission of Lieutenant Vicovich to Cabool—Withdrawal of Count Simonich and Captain Vicovich—English Cabinet express themselves entirely satisfied—Sir J. Hobhouse's Speech in 1842—Remarks on—Assumptions of falsehood and folly of Russia unsupported. **CAPTAIN BURNES'S NEGOTIATIONS AT CABOOL**—Mission at first Commercial—Became Political in June 1837—Letter to Mr McNeil—Dost Mahomed and Lord Auckland's Correspondence in 1836—Burnes arrives at Cabool—Cordial Reception—Opinion of the reasonableness of Dost Mahomed's Demands—Russian and Persian influence—Candahar Affairs—Mission of Lieutenant Leech—Arrival of Kohun Dill Khan at Cabool in April—Arrival of Vicovich—Unwise importance attached to His Character—Burnes's Despatch of 22d January in reference to Sooltan Khan—Insolent papers of the Government of India—Despatch of 5th March with Suppressed Passages—Further Misunderstandings—Farewell Letter of Lord Auckland—Retirement of the Mission—Determination to have a War—Negotiations at Lahore—Vacillation of Lord Auckland—Influence employed with.

THIS chapter has, with a view to explicitness and perspicuity, been broken up into four subdivisions—on the affairs of Peshawur and those of Herat—on the alleged intrigue of Persia and Russia, and negotiations of Sir Alexander Burnes at Cabool, betwixt September 1837 and May 1838; though it must be allowed that the danger of occasional

repetition has thereby been incurred. As the statements put forward may appear strange and new to the English reader—at variance, as they are, with most of what has been set forth in and out of Parliament by the defenders of Lord Auckland's policy,—it is proper to explain that very nearly the whole of the facts are taken from the official papers of the Government of India, or Foreign Office, selections from which were, in 1837, published by order of Parliament. The sources of all the information have been carefully and copiously indicated, that the reader, who may chance to suspect prejudice or partiality, may have an opportunity of satisfying himself as to whether the extracts have been fairly dealt with. The works whence these are taken are perfectly open and accessible; and we have every wish that the suspicious should resort to them to see whether their doubts are capable of verification.

The writer has no hesitation in admitting that he is, and has always been, conservative in his views,—opposed to the late Governor-General in his English politics, but not, therefore, opposed to him in his Indian administration. In India, these considerations have little weight in the discussion of general questions. The keenest and most consistent advocate of Lord Auckland's policy, is the *Englishman* newspaper—a conservative in its politics: one of its ablest opponents is the somewhat more than Whig *Bengal Hurkaru*. Divided as the newspapers of India have been in their ideas of the wisdom of the Simla policy of 1838, they have borne unanimous and willing testimony to the good intentions of Lord Auckland, and the amiable and benevolent character of his domestic administration. They have been still more heartily cordial and united in ridiculing and exposing the alternate bursts of madness and imbecility, the fickleness, vacillation, and caprice which have throughout characterised the rule of Lord Ellenborough. These considerations may perhaps be permitted to have some weight in exempting us from the charge of that undeviating partizanship which manifests itself in England, where, amongst one class of disputants, nothing is wrong—nothing censurable or dubious in the conduct of the late Gov.-General—nothing in that of the present one which is not more or less liable to one, or all, the three imputations—and where, amongst their opponents, these predicaments are maintained—the individuals placed in them being shifted. With all the opprobrium of the Affghan war on its head, the administration of Lord Auckland will, in India, be regarded henceforward with far more respect than that of Lord Ellenborough with undisputed claims to the popularity and wisdom of the abandonment of the unimaginably wicked and disastrous scheme of his predecessor. To the European reader much confusion of ideas must necessarily arise from the constant references to parties at war the one day and peace the next, incessantly making arrangements for attack or for defence; terrifying the Calcutta cabinet with the ideas that the flames of war were to be lit up in the very

regions where we were endeavouring to extend our commerce—the next with alarms for intrigue and coalition, threatening danger on the threshold of our Indian possessions, and filling the rulers thereof with alarm and dismay. These constant alternations are in the last degree perplexing in the study of the Parliamentary papers ; from which the advocates of either side, who chose to restrict their selections to isolated passages, may draw weapons enough to defend themselves against their opponents.

The documents themselves have been furnished by a variety of individuals, very differently situated from each other, in respect, alike, of their opportunities, as of their aptitude for observation, and deducing their conclusions from appearances in the last degree varying from each other.

The papers themselves besides, have been garbled and sent forth to serve the purposes of the late Cabinet in supporting their Affghan policy, rather than to supply correct information : they are in some cases, as in that of the share supplied by the late Sir Alexander Burnes, so made up as to support positions as much as possible opposed to those they were intended to sustain, which they now establish when set forward entire. It is evident besides, from the allusions in many of the unmutilated despatches, that much of the information which it would be desirable to possess remains to this hour concealed in the archives of the Board of Control.

No pains have been spared to clear up the obscurity flowing from these channels in so far as this could be accomplished by a careful study and comparison of all the papers which appeared with or without consent of parliament. There are other sources of perplexity which can only be surmounted by a careful consideration of a few leading particulars about to be explained.

It must, in the first place, be kept in view amongst the constant allusions to the alternations of hostile and of friendly intercourse amongst the chiefs themselves, that they in fact had no settled or consistent system of policy : that their alliances were transient and uncertain : that the incursion of one month was followed by the embassy of the next. Take the case of Persia and Herat as an illustration : we find the former threatening the latter early in 1834, and before the end of the year they were on terms of friendship ; and in 1836, 1837, and 1838, Herat was besieged—and Persia agreeing with Russia to have Kamran, the Suddozye prince, set aside, and Kohun Dil Khan, the Barukzye Sirdar, put on the throne in his stead. In Nov. 1838, Persia foregoes all these schemes, and once more makes peace : in 1840 the tables are turned, and the king of kings is induced by England to strengthen the hand, and increase the territory, of the Suddozye. Scarcely is this arrangement completed, when the latter turns his back on England, makes spontaneous submission to Persia, and restores what we had procured for him. Turn next to Candahar: the Sirdars there had, from the time their brother Dost Mahomed acquired supremacy in Cabool, been almost incessantly at feud with him.

They were throughout in league with another brother to destroy his power, Sooltan Mahomed Khan, on whom the Ameer had conferred Peshawur; and seemed ready to accept the assistance of Herat and Persia in turn to accomplish their objects as these presented themselves. On one point only were all the Mahomedan princes just named thoroughly agreed,—in their hatred to the Seikhs, and their determination to recover Peshawur from heathen dominion. In this great object they were united, but in nothing beyond it. Dost Mahomed had given it to his brother, from whom it had been fraudulently wrested in 1834, and he desired to re-annex it to Cabool. His brother, himself in league with the Candahar Sirdars, coveted it for their own use alone, being in the last degree jealous of the Cabool chief, and eager to subvert his authority. Kamran Shah apparently lent himself to this confederacy without hope of immediate gain, unless indeed the dream might have crossed his mind that in the midst of the confusion he might have some chance of recovering a further portion of the territories ruled over by his grandfather; his chief object being to avenge himself on the Barukzye chief, who had successfully driven and excluded the last hope of the Suddozyes from kingly power. The king of Persia obviously desired to increase the Dooranee empire as much as possible, in the hope of making it all his own. It must besides, be recollected, that war in these countries, so far from being regarded, as in civilized Europe, the worst of evils, is looked upon as a heroic and exciting occupation,—as the only means by which power and glory are really to be won. The rapture of the strife is reason enough for the leaders—the hope of plunder for the followers—rushing into battle.

In 1832, when Captain Burnes first visited Affghanistan, Persia threatened Candahar; and the Sirdars, alarmed at the danger from the west, and aware of how little they merited kindness at their brother's hands, knew not where to look for assistance. Dost Mahomed was too large-minded a politician to permit personal feeling to betray him into the folly of suffering his country to be endangered. He knew that if Persia advanced on Candahar, she would come farther, and that Ghuznie or Cabool itself might suffer. He wrote to his brother—"When the Persians come, let me know, and as I am now your enemy will I then be your friend." (1) The threat of invading Affghanistan seems indeed to have been a peculiarly favourite one with Persia; made use of from time to time from the period of the final dissolution of the Dooranee monarchy. Dost Mahomed appears to have been the only prince in those parts who had seriously set himself about extending the interests of commerce, and maintaining the vigorous administration of justice amongst his subjects. As nothing could more seriously have impeded the tranquil advancement of these than the continual alarm to which the threats allud-

1. *Travels in Bokharæ*, vol. iii. p. 272, 12mo edition.

ed to from time to time gave rise, the wisest course he could have pursued was to have endeavoured to obtain a secure and permanent alliance with the sovereign who uttered them. His anxiety to establish relations with distant foreign powers was equally an evidence of his desire for peace, and ought, so far from exciting our jealousy, to have elicited our warmest approbation, —the more especially when it appeared that an alliance with ourselves was that which he preferred above all others, and for whose sake he was willing to sacrifice them all. One thing alone he refused to concede to us—the abandonment of his claims to Peshawur,—a measure which, if yielded, would have disgraced him for ever in the eyes of his subjects, as well as of surrounding nations. For this refusal we expelled him from his throne!

No stronger evidence can be had of the solicitude of all the Affghan chiefs as far west as Seistan, for an alliance with England, than the promptitude with which all their own individual schemes were abandoned so soon as the appearance of the mission in 1837 held out a prospect of this being acceded to. It must be kept in view that we offered our interposition betwixt them and their enemies at a time when they asked not our assistance; that they were under no treaty or obligation to us whatever; and that if they had something to hope from our friendship, they had no reason to suppose that they had any grounds of fear from our enmity. They were perfectly independent of us, and entitled to accept or decline the friendly offers so superfluously and officiously proffered them, without our having the slightest grounds of anger, further than may be considered justifiable when felt by one who, meddling with the affairs of his neighbour, receives, as he deserves, the meddler's requital.

When we tendered Kamran Shah, the Suddoyze, help against *our allies* of Persia, he frankly told us, he did not want us. "With regard to the coming of the Persian army," says he, as stated in the official despatches, "I am not, and never shall be, in any way willing to give you trouble or annoyance. Should the Russian government evince any great desire to come to Herat, do not prevent the advance of the army, or take any trouble about the matter. It is an affair of no consequence. Let them come, in order that they may be able to prove what they can do. May it please God, the most Merciful! the steed of their wishes shall not accomplish the journey of their design."

AFFAIRS OF PESHAWUR.

"With a view to invite the aid of the *DE FACTO* Rulers of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties, Captain Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mahommed Khan, the Chief of Cabool. The original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Captain Burnes, however, was on his journey to Cabool, information was received by the Governor General, that the troops of Dost Mahommed Khan had made a sudden and un-

provoked attack on those of our ancient ally, Maha Raja Runjeet Singh. It was naturally to be apprehended that His Highness the Maha Raja, would not beslow to avenge this aggression; and it was to be feared that the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Government would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a result so calamitous, the Governor General resolved on authorizing Capt. Burnes to intimate to Dost Mahomed Khan that, if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maha Raja, His Lordship would exert his good offices with His Highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maha Raja, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Governor General to the effect, that in the meantime hostilities on his part should be suspended."—*Simla Proclamation, 1st October, 1838.*

THE troubles of Afghanistan, and strife of its Chiefs, had, from an early period, been watched with intense interest by Runjeet Singh; eager to profit by every opportunity of extending his dominions to or beyond the Indus. In May 1818, the Afghan forces having been withdrawn from Peshawur to meet the exigencies of civil broils at home, the ruler of Lahore—who had some time before possessed himself of the Fort of Attock—dispatched a select body of troops with a heavy battering train to lay siege to Mooltan. The expedition was successful: after a gallant but unsuccessful defence, in which 1000 of the garrison fell, the town was captured and sacked, the mosques destroyed, the muzzin forbidden, and the cow declared sacred. The following year he attacked the Capital of Cashmere, and after a severe engagement, where the Affghans fought with all the rage and zeal of religious enthusiasm, he made good his conquest. Driving the enemy before him, he next entered Peshawur, and received the submission of the inhabitants. (1) These aggressions were commenced without the claim of right, or pretence of quarrel, and on no colourable grounds but lust of conquest. The territories on his north-western frontier were valuable and desirable: the disagreements of their rulers rendered them weak and ill-defended: and accordingly they were seized upon and annexed to the Seikh dominions. The countries beyond the Indus were at this time so torn by internal dissensions that the rebel Sirdars feared to leave Cabool,—apprehensive that the heir of Timour might return from Herat and claim the sovereignty. Tranquillized on this point by three years delay, in 1823 Azeem Khan, learning that the Seikhs were about once more to cross the Indus, advanced to Peshawur to meet them: another engagement, more severe and bloody than any which had hitherto occurred, again ensued: the Seikhs were victorious, and the Affghans retired upon Cabool.

So excited was the state of public feeling, that Runjeet found himself unable to retain Peshawur as a Seikh province, and accordingly he divided it betwixt Kamran Shah of Herat, grandson of the emperor Nadir,—and Dost Mahomed Khan, the bitter rival of the Suddoyze race of kings, and most active of the Barukzye chiefs, as yet only struggling for the supremacy soon after—

wards attained by him at Cabool. (2) Five months afterwards, Cashmere was lost to the Doorannees. Dost Mahomed having possessed himself of supreme authority at Cabool, in 1826 made over his share of Peshawur to his elder brother, who had been the last of his competitors for power, on his abandoning further pretences to the capital. (3) In 1834 the Shah Soojah, as already mentioned in the preface, made one more attempt to regain his throne. It fell in with the views of Runjeet Singh, on the present occasion to offer him assistance, on the condition that Peshawur, together with the whole of the Affghan territory betwixt the Hills and the Five Rivers, should be formally ceded to him, and annexed to the Punjaub. The treaty was agreed to,—the only portions demurred at being the surrender of the gates of Somnath, then at Gbuznie, and the giving of Shahzadah as a hostage. (4) The presence of Dost Mahomed and his chiefs was in July required to the westward to repel the advances of the Shah Soojah, now approaching Candahar with a numerous army. The Chiefs of Peshawur took advantage of these events to arrange a series of plans against the authority of the Cabool Chief: and fearing, from the rapidity with which he had just before overrun Jellalabad, that he might, so soon as his hands were free, inflict on them summary chastisement, they solicited aid from Lahore. Hurry Singh, the most fortunate and talented of the Seikh commanders, was at this time encamped with a powerful force near Attock; watching, as is supposed, the opportunity of seizing on Peshawur, lest perchance the Shah Soojah, on recovering his throne, should be supported by us in making it, if found more convenient, tributary to Cabool: his master wished to be beforehand with us in securing this new acquisition, that we, on giving assistance to the Shah, should have no pretext for claiming it as compensation for our services, should this other untoward alternative present itself. (5) He appeared within six miles of the city of Peshawur, on pretence of receiving the usual tribute of horses, rice, swords, &c., which the Sirdars had bound themselves to pay; sneaking to gain time, which was of the utmost importance to him, he delayed his departure on pretence that the horses were not of such quality as had been agreed upon. Finally, it was proposed that Nao Nebal Singh, the prince royal, should be permitted to make a friendly visit to the capital. Under cover of this conciliatory concession, the whole Seikh army advanced, and at once sat down in hostile attitude opposite the walls. The Affghan Sirdars, wholly

2. Masson's Journeys in Beloochistan, Affghanistan, and the Punjaub, vol. iii., p. 60.

3. Ibid. 4. Parliamentary Papers 1839, p. 143.

5. This is the explanation given by an apparently well-informed writer in the *Delhi Gazette*, June 1835, and it seems a probable one. Strange that two years afterwards we should make the claim of Runjeet Singh on this province, which he had snatched to keep it from us, the chief pretence for the deposition of Dost Mahomed. See Asiatic Journal, 1835.

unprepared for this, had no means of resistance: they fled at once with their wives and treasure—yielding to an army of 9000 men a territory which a few years before the Sikh sovereign himself had been unable to retain with a force of 25,000. (6) This digression is essential for the full understanding of the events just about to be related, which formed the chief ostensible cause of our resolution to dethrone Dost Mahomed. (7) The Shah Soojah having been defeated near Candahar, as narrated at the close of the preface, retired once more to the previous asylum the British Government had provided for him within their territories at Loodianah. It was not to be supposed that Dost Mahomed would submit with patience to an act of such fraudulent and barefaced spoliation without an attempt to recover the portion of his kingdom which had been ravished by trickery. He was stated by Captain Wade (25th September, 1834), to have roused the whole Mahomedan population for an attack on the Sikhs. Runjeet Singh, who had then 25,000 men at or near the scene of action, was determined (writes the Loodianah Resident) not to let go his hold on Peshawur, while Dost Mahomed Khan, and the other Affghan rulers, were equally resolved to stake their political existence on the capture of the place. Little could be done before the setting in of winter, and the earlier operations appear to have been of inconsiderable importance. Some severe skirmishing ensued with small parties of troops detached from the main army, assembling at Jellalabad under Ukhbar Khan,—in which Hurry Singh had the worst of it,—having on one occasion been repelled with the loss of 150 men. (8) The Maharajah himself made every preparation to meet the approaching contest on a larger scale than had hitherto occurred. He reinforced his army; and advancing from Lahore remained encamped for some time at Rotas, and then proceeded to Peshwar, around which a very large force was assembled by the end of April. (9) Dost Mahomed having joined the army, which for some time had been collecting under his favourite son, prepared to descend through the Khyber Pass. Runjeet Singh advanced to meet him, and drew up his Sikhs in battle array across the line of the advancing Affghans,

6. Masson, vol. iii, pp. 225—228.

7. Sir Alexander Burnes thinks that the Maharajah was urged to this against his better judgment, by Hurry Singh. "It has proved [says he] a source of annoyance, and latterly of serious disaster. Its revenue, under the Dooranees, used to be £80,000 a year: under the Sikhs it is £100,000; but of this £60,000 is allocated amongst the Chiefs holding Jaghires—Mahomed Khan Barukzye and his tribes enjoy £40,000 of this, and the bulk of the remainder is devoted to religious purposes." "It is [concludes Burnes] a drain on the finances of Lahore, with the additional disadvantage of being so situated as to lead the Sikhs into constant collision with fierce and desperate tribes, who, were it not for their poverty, would be dangerous antagonists."—Cabool, by Sir A. Burnes, vol. i., 1842.

8. *Calcutta Courier*, June 3, 1835; and *Delhi Gazette*, April, same year.

9. *Delhi Gazette*, June 3, 1835.

and within two miles of their front. The Ameer, who seemed at no time to have been sanguine of success, on seeing himself outnumbered by the powerful and disciplined army of the Maharajah, considering affairs hopeless, returned towards Jumrood, and was followed for some distance up the Khyber Pass by the enemy (11th May, 1835.) Proposals were sent to him, that if he would abandon all claims to the conquered territory, and give one of his sons as an hostage for the maintenance of peace, he would receive a Jagheer (estate) worth £30,000 a-year. (10) This proposition was at first favourably received, but afterwards declined. Meantime the Affghan Sirdars had tendered unconditional allegiance to the new ruler; and it was agreed that they should receive a territory of equal value with that rejected by Dost Mahomed,—they doing homage, and acknowledging the Seikh sovereignty. This reward for their hostility and treachery to the Ameer was accepted of, and they became thereafter the dependents of the infidel.

General Avitabile, one of the Corsican officers who had, many years before, joined the service of the Maharajah, was made Governor of Peshawur, —the duties of which office he has now for seven years discharged with the utmost ability: 2000 cavalry and 5000 irregulars were left to protect the country. It was said that Dost Mahomed on retiring towards Cabool, pledged himself to retake Peshawur or die in the attempt. (11) He returned to his capital, leaving his sons to settle the affairs of Jellalabad; while his principal opponent retired to Lahore, withdrawing all his troops from beyond the Indus, save those already referred to. The Affghans of Peshawur, discontented with the new order of things, meanwhile repaired in vast numbers to Cabool to lay their grievances before their former ruler, and express their desire to be led against the Seikhs; and their eagerness to sacrifice their lives for the faith, and in the expulsion of the infidels. Influenced by these, and with the desire for the recovery of his territory unslacked and unabated, it was determined that his eldest son, Afzul Bey Khan, should proceed to

10. We are at a loss to understand the allusion of Mr. Masson, vol. iii., p. 416, where he says—"The proposal [made in 1837 or 38] to give Peshawur to the Ameer—Runjeet Singh receiving in return one of his sons, had never been made by the Maharajah;—Capt. Wade denouncing it—and I am sorry to say justly—as insidious." Why it was the very offer Runjeet Singh had himself made in 1835—only instead of the whole of Peshawur he was to receive a jagheer of £30,000 a-year. Dost Mahomed, as will be seen from the text, for a time entertained the proposal. Runjeet Singh had made a similar one to the Shah Soojah in 1833, when negotiating for his restoration.—Parliamentary Papers, 1838.

11. Asiatic Journal, December 1835. This passage is a quotation; but the source whence it is taken is not named. The officers referred to are Generals Avitabile, Allard, Court, and Ventura,—all men who have distinguished themselves for military skill and general literary acquirements, and for the wisdom and the friendly feeling towards our Government with which they have conducted the affairs of the Maharajah.

measured his sword with the unbeliever. An army of 20,000 men, mostly Kuzzilbashers, were, without delay, accordingly assembled at Jellalabad. Descending the Khyber Pass with about half of this number, he came up with the Seikh army only 5000 strong, under Nao Nehal Singh, at the Ghurri of DeCassah, in June 1836. The fight was obstinate, and the slaughter on both sides severe, when victory determined in favour of the Affghans: their enemies completely defeated, dispersed and fled. Just before, a bloody encounter had taken place near the city betwixt the troops of Shero Singh, father of the prince already named, and immediate heir to the Seikh throne, and the Chief of Lalpoora: both suffered severely, and each claimed the victory; but the Affghans appear to have had the best of it. A few months after this, Nao Nehal Singh descended by the line of the Indus towards Dejerat, and obtained Deera Ishmael Khan by stratagem—imprisoning the Chief, Shah Newaz Khan; the alleged ground of offence being, that the Sacred Cow had been openly killed within his territories. This fresh appropriation of Affghan territory, effected almost without bloodshed, was an evidence that the Lion of the Punjaub had given all consideration of right and justice to the winds, when an opportunity presented itself of aggrandizing himself at the expense of his Mahommedan neighbours beyond the Indus; and the rumour now ran, that as he had taken possession of nearly the whole of the Dooranee territory on the hither side the mountains, he might be expected to prepare himself without delay for an advance upon the capital; an idle boast, probably encouraged by the Court to cover the mischances which had just been experienced at Peshawur, and brazen out the appropriations he seemed determined to make, so far as his power permitted.

Preparations were meanwhile made by the Seikhs for the seizure of Shikarpore, a wealthy and populous town belonging to the Ameers of Scinde, who appear to have given not the slightest cause for quarrel or displeasure. From the beginning of autumn 1836, till the approach of spring in the following year, though we read of no encounters of note betwixt the Seikhs and Affghans, the hostility betwixt them appears not for a moment to have been modified or interrupted. Great preparations having, in the course of the winter and early in spring, been made by Dost Mahomed for a further attempt upon Peshawur, an army, said to have consisted of about fifteen thousand men, descended the Khyber Pass, and came up with the enemy at the Fort of Jumrood, just beyond the mountains, on the 1st May 1837. The strength of the Seikh army is not mentioned; they were commanded by the celebrated leader Hurry Singh. The Affghans commenced by cannonading the Fort; and, finding themselves for a time unresisted, considered that the day was their own. (12) Hurry Singh having

suddenly burst upon them with a compact body of disciplined warriors, while their irregular troops were divided from each other by separate ravines, for a time carried every thing before him. Victory appeared for a while to lean first to one side, then to the other, as the parties were alternately successful. The Seikhs had captured fourteen of the guns of their enemies, who managed in the course of the day to recover eleven of them, and make up their original number by the seizure of three pieces of Hurry Singh's artillery. The Seikhs, who had committed themselves in pursuit of a body of retreating Affghans, were unexpectedly met by a fresh and powerful force, and compelled to retire. Their gallant and able leader had fallen, and the troops were everywhere compelled to quit the field. The Affghans claimed the victory : but hearing that heavy and highly-disciplined reinforcements would immediately be sent to join the beaten army, considered it hopeless to proceed further, and retired accordingly on Jellalabad, elated with the pride of success. It has generally been asserted, that the incursion terminating in the battle of Jumrood was designed in the knowledge that at this time the bulk of the Seikh forces were absent at Amritsur in celebration of the marriage of Nao Nehal Singh, and it is to this that the term "*sudden*," in the Simla Proclamation, is assumed to apply. Mr Masson publishes a letter from Captain Wade under date the 7th April, blaming the Ameer for having overlooked the opportunity then gone by. The festivities were over in March, and the Maharajah immediately afterwards hurried off his forces to Peshawur in the full knowledge of what had been for several months impending.

It appears (says Masson, vol. iii., p. 424) that the Maharajah was so confounded at the death of Hurry Singh, that he informed Captain Wade he should be glad to give up Peshawur, preserving his pardab or his honour. Nothing could be clearer (continues the same writer) than that he was willing, at the request of the British Government, to have abandoned this unjust conquest—such request would have saved him the appearance of a forced surrender. Capt. Wade, on the 15th Sept. 1837, wrote to Mr Masson that the Seikhs are ready to bring their quarrels to an amicable adjustment on any reasonable terms, in accordance to our wishes for mutual peace. (13) With this in view, it is important to observe, that there was nothing, save in the death of a man of such note as Hurry Singh, at all different in the circumstances or concomitants more than in the half dozen other encounters which had taken place betwixt the conquerors of Peshawur and its former possessors throughout the four preceding years. It will be seen, also, that Runjeet Singh had all along acted on a system of most unprincipled aggression towards all his neighbours on every side of him : that Dost Ma-

homed only strove to recover the territory of which he had been robbed. In the Simla proclamation, issued on the 1st October following, the Ameer was reported as the disturber of the peace on our N.W. frontier, (14) whereas Runjeet Singh had maintained the whole line of the Indus from Sukkur to Attock,—a scene of incessant strife. We tendered our mediation, to the effect that we would guarantee the robber the permanent possession of his plunder, and he very naturally accepted so generous an offer:—the party robbed declined it on these terms, and we dethroned him for his pains!

AFFAIRS OF HERAT.

“It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor General, that a Persian Army was besieging Herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan, for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the Officers of Her Majesty’s Mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.” * * *

“The Governor General deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian Army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause, and the Governor General would yet indulge the hope, that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence until succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Government, have been, by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Governor General has recently ascertained by an official despatch from Mr. McNeill, Her Majesty’s Envoy, that His Excellency has been compelled, by the refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian Government, to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Governments. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed, of regarding the present advance of the Persian Arms into Afghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah, under the express order of Her Majesty’s Government.”—*Simla Proclamation, October 1, 1838.*

HERAT, a principality on the borders of Persia, was one of the provinces of the Doorannee empire, as constituted under Nadhir Shah, and his two

14. With those facts in view—given as they are on admittedly unquestionable authorities—how are we to regard such passages as the following?—

“Whilst Captain Burnes was on his journey to Cabool, information was received by the Governor-General that the troops of Dost Mahomed had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient ally Runjeet Singh!!”
—*Simla Proclamation*, para. 4.

“It was naturally apprehended that his Highness would not be slow to avenge this aggression; and it was to be feared, that the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Government would be altogether frustrated.”—*Ibid.* Runjeet Singh, from the time he took Moulton and Attock, and invaded Cashmere and Peshawar, had, for ten years, kept the flames of war blazing along the Indus, and we never interposed! It was him who fed them now, when we blamed Dost Mahomed! Capt. Burnes mentions that we had no objection to his seizing on Jellalabad in June 1838, or doing what he liked with Dost Mahomed; so that we had no dislike to the flames of war in the abstract,—it depended entirely on the party who kindled them whether we should fan or quench them. Dost Mahomed’s preparations were incessantly commented on by the newspapers from March onwards.

successors, Ahmed and Timor, whose joint reigns occupied the greater portion of last century. It was ruled over, under the crown, by one of the principal chiefs or princes of the empire. Its revenue amounts to about £90,000; the population of the city to about 50,000 souls. When the Suddozyes were driven into exile, Shah Mahomed, the lineal heir and elder brother of the late Shah Soojah, was, in 1818, expelled from power; he found refuge in Herat, and was permitted by the Barukzyes to retain a hold on the principality after the authority of the other members of his family had become extinguished throughout the rest of the Dooranee empire. He died in 1829, and was succeeded by the present ruler, Kamran Shah, nephew of our late royal protege, and, as descending from the elder branch, rightful representative of the Suddozye line. This prince, who seems a man of intellect without principle, has lived without a friend, and has often suffered from the treachery of those he trusted; and, having been driven to a corner of his dominions by rebel enemies, he has thought it expedient to fill his coffers by any means that could be resorted to, in order, perhaps, to be prepared for still greater reverses. (1) For ten or fifteen years he has apparently resigned the cares of government to the hands of his Vizier, Yar Mahomed, a man still more unprincipled and detested than his sovereign. With this short personal notice, attention must be turned to the affairs of Persia, which will speedily bring back our narrative to the more immediate consideration of the concerns of Herat.

In Oct. 1834, the death of Futti Ali Shah raised his grandson and adopted heir, Prince Mahomed Meerza, by the title of Mahomed Shah, to the throne the late sovereign had bequeathed to him. Fearing that the recollection of his father's successes in the field might tempt the youthful sovereign to endeavour to signalize the commencement of his reign by extended schemes of conquest to the eastward, Lord Palmerston, in July 1835 (letter dated 22nd) instructed our ambassador at Teheran that the Persian Government should be specially warned against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war with the Affghans. (2) The course apprehended was the very one which the King had resolved to pursue. (3) "It is unsatisfactory to know," writes Mr Ellice in November 1835, (4) "that the Shah has very extended schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan; and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that he has the right of sovereignty over Herat and Candahar. He proposed various expeditions for spring 1836—one against Herat—one against Candahar—and another against

1. Conolly, vol. ii., p. 416.

2. Lord Palmerston's Letter, 22nd July 1835. Parliamentary Papers 1839, No. 10.

3. Mr Ellice to Lord Palmerston, November 13, December 24, and December 30. Parliamentary Papers with Supplement.

4. Memo. to Lord Palmerston for 1835.

the Beloochies: (5) the minister stated that the dominions of Persia extended as far as Ghuznie." (6) Whether the young king really thought of this at the time, or merely spoke of it in empty bravado, does not appear. It might have been either, or partly both: but this is beyond dispute, that whatever were his purposes eastward of Herat, it required not the disastrous experience of a year spent in preparation for the attack of the fortress to no end, but that, after a nine months' siege, he should retire baffled from its walls, to prove that he was unable to carry them into effect, or to march an army a hundred miles beyond his own frontier, calculated to alarm any one but the peasantry on the line of march. In September 1832, when Captain A. Burnes visited the Persian camp at Koochan, he found the Prince Royal Abbas Meerza, whose exploits afterwards fired his son with martial ardour, at the very pinnacle of his triumph. Yet his success was ascribed by him entirely to the British officers who had trained his troops: he had no money to pay his army, and admitted that, without supplies from us, he despaired of success. (7)

In April 1836 Mr Ellice informed Lord Palmerston that the king had resolved to march upon Herat to chastise Kamran Shah for a gross breach of treaty, in having failed to fulfil the agreement made with Abbas Meerza for the restoration of Ghorman, and of certain Persian families detained by him from their native country; and the payment of £10,000 annually to the Shah. Mr Ellice considered that he had a perfect right to obtain redress on these points by force of arms. (8) Mr McNeil took exactly the same view of the question, expressing himself in still stronger terms:—"Putting aside the claims of Persia to the sovereignty of Herat," writes the Ambassador to Lord Palmerston, under date 24th February 1837; "and, regarding the question as one between two separate sovereigns, I am inclined to believe that the Government of Herat will be found to have been the aggressor." From the death of Abbas Meerza, when an agreement had been concluded for a suspension of hostilities between the parties, and the line of boundary agreed upon, Persia had committed no act of hostility against the Affghans (of Herat); but at the death of the late Shah (October 1834) the Government of Herat made a predatory incursion into

5. Parliamentary Papers with Supplement. Mr Ellice in his note, 8th January 1836, states to Lord Palmerston that he had explained to the Persian Minister that the Shah had the most absolute right to obtain redress from the Herat Prince but that the British Government would much rather prefer negotiation than force of arms:—the friends of Lord Auckland have, as yet, omitted to explain on what grounds this were called in the Simla proclamation—a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression.

6. Letter to Lord Palmerston, received 28th February, 1839. Parliamentary Papers 1839.

7. Ibid, December 24; received April 7.

8. Ibid, December 30; received ibid.

the Persian territories, in concert with the Turcomans and Hazarehs, and captured the subjects of Persia (to the extent of 11,000) for the purpose of selling them as slaves." At the very time the Shah was making preparations for an advance on Herat, with ulterior views on Candahar and Ghuznie if any faith could have been placed on the vapouring threats of his ministers, a source of alarm of a precisely opposite description, and from a different quarter, appears to have burst on Mr Ellice. In March 1836, an ambassador arrived from the most important of the destined victims of the purposed invasion of the countries to the east,—the Candahar Sirdars themselves—proposing that an alliance, offensive and defensive, should be entered into betwixt them, for the purpose of attacking Kamran Shah, betwixt whom, as the representative of the Suddozye dynasty, and the Barukzye chiefs, there was a blood-feud. The chiefs required an acknowledgment of their independent administration in the internal arrangements of the country, and submitted themselves to Persia in their foreign relations only. (9) The terms of the proposed alliance were immediately granted them. It was probably these successive threats of the Shah of advancing on Ghuznie, baseless as they might have been considered, which induced Dost Mahomed at the same time to send an ambassador with overtures of alliance. These were to the effect, that the Cabool Ameer would assist in attacking Herat, taking vengeance on the enemy of his house, on condition that the King of Persia should aid him against the Seikhs, who, taking advantage of the embarrassments the Shah Soojah had in 1834 occasioned him, were now stripping the Doorannee empire of the whole of its former dependencies west of the Indus. The proposition was a most natural one: a power threatening to undermine or overthrow him was about to be converted into an ally,—Persia, Candahar, and Cabool were jointly to attack first Herat, and then Peshawur, the joint powers severally benefiting by the result. It was scarcely to be expected that the Ameer was to regard England with much affection, when he knew that we protected, and were in closest alliance with, his most hated enemy—the Lion of Lahore, and that we supplied the Shah Soojah, his competitor for the crown, with a safe hiding-place whence to sally out and attack him, under cover of our wing, when he thought fit. "Pressed on one hand by the Seikhs," says Mr (now Sir John) M'Neil, (10) "and, on the other,

9 Bokhara Travels, 12mo edition, vol. iii. p. 79—Burnes's Address—"I did tell him (on his application for money) as I have ever felt, that I considered the payment of money to such a Cabinet derogatory to the name and honour of Britain; since it has tended more to lower our estimation in Asia than our most noble deeds have done in India to raise it,"—a sentiment which should be written on the girdle of every British ambassador at the Court of Persia.

10. So writes Mr Ellice on the 1st April 1836; on the 10th we find him once more stating, that His Majesty had been encouraged and promised pecuniary assistance from the Russians, who well knew that the conquest of Herat and Candahar by the Persians is in fact an advance for them towards India, if not

fearing that some member of the Suddozye family may incite the Dooran-nees against him, he had for some time been seeking to strengthen himself by a foreign connection." The Ameer had forwarded letters almost simultaneously to the Emperor of Russia, the Shah of Persia, and the newly appointed Governor-General of India—all sent ambassadors in return, and none at first wrote more cordially than Lord Auckland in reply. The anxiety of the Russian Minister for the chastisement of these man-stealers, was most satisfactorily explained by the extent to which they kidnapped the subjects of his country. It was not wonderful that parties having a common object of such importance in view, should have been drawn somewhat closely towards each other—the marvel was, that, considering the causes, they were not more so. We have, however, in these observations, permitted ourselves to wander from the subject of the eastward march of the Persian army, to which attention must now be directed.

The summer and autumn of 1836 were occupied in preparing an expedition meant to be of overwhelming magnitude,—but so unskillfully had arrangements been made, that, on the approach of winter, the head-quarters of the army, with all their supplies, were still 600 miles to the westward of the declared point of operation. Alarmed at these things, Kamran Shah now of himself proffered terms of treaty; he acknowledged his previous man-stealing practices, but pledged himself to abstain from this and every other species of aggression, if the Shah would bind himself to abandon the present advance. This he declined to do, and accordingly in July 1837 an army of 40,000 men, with 70 pieces of artillery, was on its march from Teheran to Herat. The utter worthlessness of any professions of submission on the part of Kamran Shah had, before this, become apparent. The British ambassadors had laboured incessantly to bring about an amicable arrangement, and had in part succeeded: when, on a check which had been sustained by the Persian army, the Herat ruler sent a message full of contumely and insult. On receipt of this, the councillors of Persia determined that a force should, next season, be marched to chastise the faithless and unprincipled chief. The fear of the approach of this, occasioned a second overture for negotiation. (11) New light on all these matters appears about this time to have beamed from Downing Street on the Government of India: and a communication from the Governor-General entirely altered the opinions of Sir John M'Neil. He now considered the war eminently unjust, and urged the utmost remonstrances against it. The Per-

for the purpose of actual invasion, certainly for that of intrigue and disorganization."!!! This within ten days of the time when he had given an account of a treaty, offensive and defensive, having been concluded betwixt Persia and Candahar! The name of Russia seems to turn the wits of British statesmen!

11. Letter to Mr Macnaghten, 22d January, 1837.

sian route lay wholly through their own country, yet they were unable to reach Herat before the end of November,—the sole obstructions arising from an empty treasury and defective commissariat, and an undisciplined and disorderly army, which frequently threatened to melt utterly away before they had seen the enemy; an excellent illustration of the futility of our fears of the danger of aggression on Afghanistan from the troops of *modern Persia*. The siege lasted nine months, the Persian army having retired from before it on the 30th of September. An expedition from Bombay, which had landed at Karrack, in the Persian Gulf, in the middle of June, showed them how completely Persia was within our grasp: that we could disembark any force we pleased at Bushire within a fortnight of its quitting Bombay, and possess ourselves of the chief towns of the empire before the people at large could be made aware that hostilities were intended. This, together with the urgency of our remonstrances, were assigned by the Shah as the reasons for his retreat. Yet it must be kept in mind that his attempts against Herat had throughout proved failures; that he in one unsuccessful assault lost 1800 men; that his casualties had exceeded 3000. He was, in September 1838, as remote from his object as in Nov. 1837. His army was short of provisions, and without clothing or pay; and rather than have continued before the fortress which had so repeatedly defeated them, for another winter, would, in all likelihood, have dispersed of themselves in spite of all remonstrances. It may here be remarked as one of numerous illustrations of the crooked and hollow policy in which we had now engaged ourselves, that though the occupation of Karrack was an able and most effective military movement, both this and the preparations against Afghanistan, in consideration of any movement Persia might have in view, were specific violations of treaty. It had, in 1814, been expressly stipulated by us, that if war should be declared between the Affghans and Persians, the English Government should not interfere with either party unless their mediation to effect a peace should be solicited by both parties; (12) and in a despatch from Lord Palmerston to Sir J. McNeil, dated 2d June 1836, the obligation to neutrality was emphatically recognised. Yet we took possession of Karrack, an island belonging to Persia in the centre of the Shah's dominions, which placed the whole sea coast of the country at our command, and we prepared to attack Afghanistan on suspicion of her desire to ally herself with Persia, or to resist her aggressions, the alternative apprehended by Government not being apparent! The intimation of the fall of Herat, one of the alleged causes of our invasion, reached the Government before a single regiment had marched; while Runjeet Singh,

12. Treaty of 1814, article ix. The previous article binds Persia to assist us with troops in case the Affghans should be at war with the British nation.—Parliamentary Papers, 18:9.

whose personal animosity, another cause of our movements, was on his death-bed, and Dost Mahomed had consented to postpone his claim to Peshawur, and to keep all Russian and Persian embassies out of his territories would we only afford him temporary protection. Every one of the pretexts of quarrel had thus vanished before conflict began! We had still the bugbear Russia before us as a pretended source of apprehension. Yet surely little weight, in reality, was attached to this, however much might have been pretended, when the Cabinet waited till Russia had offered an explanation of her conduct—declared to be frank, gratifying, and satisfactory—before either remonstrances or inquiries were thought of! What definite project we imagined the Court of St Petersburg to have had in view, has never been explained by any one. A foreign writer had the sagacity to point out, that should all the powers of the empire, with all the material the best appointed army could desire, reach the western borders of Beloochistan in safety, that a descent by us on Bushire would place us in possession of all their communications, compel Persia at her peril to act against them, and place the rear of their armies, and the line of their advance and relief, completely at our mercy. The descent on Karrack gives practical proof of the soundness of Count Bjornstjerna's speculations. (13) The uniform testimony of travellers had speculatively shown that which the expedition to Khiva practically demonstrated—that for Russia to send an army as far as the eastern border of Persia, was *impossible*. Our own experience is now sufficient to convince the most sceptical that were they there, the mountain tribes would cut off their supplies, destroy their cattle, and appropriate their baggage, before they reached the Indus, without our intervention. We could, any day, cut an expedition from the westward to pieces, by landing a force at Bushire, where the coast country, with our fleet and supplies, would furnish a base of operations from which Europe and Asia together could not drive us. A Russian army would take twice the time to march from her furthest to our nearest frontier that the armies of England would occupy in being transported from the banks of the Thames to those of the Indus. We take no account of how our fleets might meanwhile be employing themselves in the Baltic or Black Sea.

The manner in which Kamran Shah has manifested his gratitude towards us since 1837, might furnish a salutary lesson as to the nature of these treaties of amity; how hopeless it is to attempt to establish an alliance betwixt barbarous and civilized nations, which can be made agreeable or advantageous to either—and how worse than wasteful to fling a nation's wealth away on wretched chiefs who can never be satisfied or enriched—who cast us off the moment we stop our subsidies,—whose gratitude ex-

13. The British Empire in the East, by Count Bjornstjerna.—Translated by H. Evans Lloyd, 1840. J. Murray. 1 vol. 8vo.

tends not beyond the hour of their receiving our gifts into their treasury,—and who employ the bounty we bestow on them for the basest and worst of purposes. It has been seen how incessantly Messrs Ellice and McNeil laboured to dissuade the King of Persia from advancing on Herat, and how anxious they were to promote negotiation. When this failed, and an army of 40,000 men appeared under its walls, Herat was first defended by the prowess of an English officer, and then relieved by the descent of an English force on the shores of Karrack. Their requital was, that, within two months of the Persian retreat, Major Todd and Lieutenant Pottinger were ordered to quit. (14) The following year another deputation was sent from the army then at Candahar on its way to Cabool. They remained for nearly two years, and spent £300,000 in bribes, and in endeavouring to repair the fortress. The moment they began to shorten their expenditure they were dismissed with contumely. The British Ministers had laboured incessantly to obtain from Persia the cession of Ghorian, and its annexation to Herat, with a view of establishing it as an independent principedom. They had no sooner succeeded in this, than the object of our solicitude being now no longer in our pay, made his submission to the Shah spontaneously, and restored to him, under certain conditions as to which we never were consulted, the very possession we had just before procured for him! These things all stand on official record; the oldest of them have occurred since the year 1836: yet we go on wasting millions annually on embassies at the courts of wretches who only hold to us while we bribe them: when we could purchase them for any service they could perform, for one-tenth of the sum we pay them annually; and for whose hostility, aided by all the assistance all the nations of Europe could conveniently supply, we need not give ourselves the slightest disturbance!

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

So much for the Persian branch of the Russo-Persian question apart from the affairs of Cabool,—a part of which will shortly be considered under the head treating of the last-mentioned subject. In September 1834 so cordially were Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode at one on Persian affairs, that the English minister directed the ambassador at St Petersburg to intimate the gratification experienced by His Majesty's Government that the Governments of Great Britain and Russia were acting in the same spirit, and were equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity, of Persia. (1)

14 Despatch of Sir A. Burnes to Mr Torrens, dated Shikarpore, Oct. 31.

1. Lord Palmerston to Mr Bligh, 5th September, 1834.—Parliamentary Papers, 1834.

The letter (dated 5th Sept.) in which these expressions of amity and good-will are contained, had been crossed by one from Count Nesselrode (Aug. 22) couched in terms still more satisfactory—the Russian minister stating “that the Court of St. Petersburg continued to think that a conformity of language and conduct on the part of the representatives of Russia and Great Britain would, of all political combinations, be the one which would most effectually contribute to maintain tranquillity in Persia, and to prepare the country for a new reign without exposing the empire to the disorders inseparable from any contested succession.” (2) In 1834, the Shah of Persia, Futteh Ali, died, and was succeeded by his grandson, as already explained: the same harmonious feelings which up to this time had existed betwixt the Courts of London and St Petersburg appear to have continued without any interruption. In December, Mr Bligh writes Lord Palmerston—“I have just seen Count Nesselrode, who has given me some details respecting the death of the Shah of Persia. Count Nesselrode seems to anticipate that Persia will inevitably become the scene of civil commotion, and expresses his satisfaction that, under such circumstances, the British and Russian Governments should have come to a good understanding about this matter.” (3) Upon this hint our foreign minister writes to the ambassador at Teheran, warning the Persian Government against aggressive war. (4) It does not appear whether Mr Ellice had been duly kept informed in reference to the friendly terms of the correspondence betwixt Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode on Persian affairs—it is to be presumed he was: but a very different train of feelings had obtained hold of his mind in regard to the views of Count Simonich, his brother ambassador at Teheran. In January 1836 he writes “that the Shah had determined on attacking Herat; and that his success was anxiously looked for by Russia, whose minister did not fail to press its execution.” (5) “The motive,” continues the ambassador, “cannot be mistaken: Herat once annexed to Persia, may become, according to the

2. Ibid, Nov. 8.

3. Mr Bligh's note dated St Petersburg, December 5, 1834—received 5th January, 1835.—Ibid.

4. Ibid—Lord Palmerston's note to Mr Ellice, July 25, 1835, referred to under Herat affairs.

5. The Parliamentary Papers, from which the whole of the above facts are derived, are marked as extracts. After the mutilation of the Cabool papers, so justly characterised by Burnes as “sheer trickery”—we knew not well what to make of them; they form of course what ministers mean to be set up as a justification of their measures. They are full of confusion, which might probably vanish had we the documents complete. In speaking of Herat affairs, Mr Ellice constantly refers to the Persian claims on Ghuznie; yet there seems to have been no intention of advancing even to Candahar, as there were no preparations attempted, or capable of being made, for doing so. It is possible that the entire documents would show that there were two different expeditions in view, and that Count Simonich was favourable to that on Herat only.

Commercial Treaty, the residence of a consular agent; who may from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Affghanistan." "The extension of the Persian monarchy in the direction of Affghanistan, will at once bring Russian influence to the very threshold of our empire: and as Persia will not, or dare not, place herself in a condition of close alliance with Great Britain, our policy must be to consider her no longer an outwork for the defence of India, but as the first parallel from whence the attack may be commenced or threatened." This metaphor of Mr Ellice seems at once to have been accepted as a substantial and tangible fact: and from the hour this view of it began to be taken, the Board of Control seemed to think of nothing but a battery of Russian cannon playing on the walls of Delhi—1500 miles off! What there would have been either objectionable or inconvenient in the establishment of a Russian commercial agent on the frontiers of Persia—seeing that Russia carried on an extensive trade with these countries, and was the only European power which did so, is not explained to us;—nor does it appear what damage India could have sustained from any researches or communications, either secret or open, which he could have conducted. But this was the political mania of the Foreign Office for the time; and any one demanding an explanation of the words "Russian influence," or daring to doubt the potency and malignancy of its effects on his country, must have run the risk of having his sanity, sincerity, or patriotism called in question. This fantasy affected the sound understanding of Sir Alexander Burnes; and in all his communications—clear and sagacious as they are in every other respect, and full of statesman-like policy and prudence—whenever the visions of Russian intrigue, and Persian influence come across him, he becomes visionary, and all but unintelligible. From this time forward, we find that every look and word of Count Simonich is tortured into something threatening evil to the common weal, and portending mischief to India! The shake of Lord Burleigh's head conveyed not half so many meanings, when nodded most strongly, according to the directions of Mr Puff, as did the most meaningless civil speech of the Russian ambassador, interpreted by the lights of Mr Ellice and Mr McNeil! Yet Count Nesselrode assures Lord Palmerston that, if the Russian envoy comported himself as described by the members of the British mission, he was acting in direct contradiction of his instructions: and that so late as the 4th May 1837, he had received the most positive orders "to employ all his credit with the Shah [of Persia] to dispose him to a formal accommodation with Herat." (6) Count Simonich's own

letters to his government give evidence that these instructions were most heedfully attended to. On the 28th of May—before receiving the despatch of the 4th of the same month just noticed—he writes to his own Cabinet, “I have made the most pressing representations, in order to induce his majesty [of Persia] to content himself with the voluntary submission of the Prince of Herat, and not undertake that expedition at least before placing the affairs of his country in order.” (7) The Emperor of Russia called back the battalion in the Persian service, formed of Russian deserters, at the very time when he knew that this was the principal force in the Persian army, then before the walls of Herat. (8) Instead of accompanying the army with the view of urging on hostilities, Count Simonich attended the movements of the Shah with the same peaceful intent as Mr McNeil: and he did this by special permission, asked for and obtained, from the Court of St. Petersburg. On his arrival in camp, in the end of April, a fortnight after Mr McNeil, and in the seventh month of the siege, when danger to Herat was considered nearly over, the Ambassador, witnessing the distress from which the Persian army was suffering, did not think that he ought to refuse his assistance to the Shah when the sovereign earnestly entreated him to examine the works of the siege. (9) Any English officer placed in similar circumstances, would unquestionably have acted in the same manner, in order to render a friendly sovereign the assistance he might have applied for in so critical a situation. Count Nesselrode further declared, that if the King of Persia had succeeded, by the capture of Herat, in getting victoriously out of the dangerous situation in which he had placed himself, it was the determination of his cabinet to have refused sanctioning the extension of Persian power in that direction; and to have negotiated the cession of the city and territories to Kohun Dil Khan, chief of Candahar, on an arrangement having expressly for its basis the very thing we pretended most to desire—a formal obligation being imposed on Persia in no other way to assail the integrity of the country of which the Sirdars were in possession, or the tranquillity of the tribes of which they were the chiefs. (10) The explanation in reference to the appearance of Captain Vicovich at Cabool was still

7. Count Simonich to H. E. Count Nesselrode, 28th May 1837.—Ibid. This was forwarded to Lord Palmerston 15, and received July 24, 1837.

8. Count Nesselrode's note to Lord Palmerston, Nov. 1838, *ut supra*.

9. We have taken the above nearly verbatim from Count Nesselrode's note;—a fine, bold, perspicuous document,—as given in the Parliamentary Papers selected for publication by the Foreign Office.

10. Count Nesselrode's note to Lord Palmerston, October 20, 1838.—We have, throughout, in a great measure copied the note verbatim. Also note of same, March 5, 1839.—Mr Lorch sent a copy of the treaty to Mr McNeil in March 1837.

more minute and satisfactory: he was sent there from Herat by Count Simonich, in consequence of the arrival of an agent from Dost Mahomed Khan, or rather, as it will by and bye be seen, from Mirza Sami Khan his minister, who had taken it upon himself to address the Emperor of Russia in name of his master. (11) The objects of his mission were purely commercial; in order to ascertain the advantages, and degree of security Russian merchants might expect in entering on commercial speculations with Cabool. (12) Surely we were the last parties in the world who had a right to find fault with such a measure as this,—our own countryman Burnes, having, six years before, approached the very gates of Orenberg on a similar expedition. On one point the Russian ambassador exceeded his instructions when before Herat, and he frankly confessed it, as did his cabinet before being called upon to do so: he not only lent his aid in negotiating a treaty betwixt the King of Persia and the Sirdar of Candahar, with a view to the cession of Herat to the latter, “securing thereby the tranquillity of the eastern frontiers of Persia, by putting an end to the acts of plunder by which they were incessantly disturbed,” (13) but he gave the guarantee of Russia for the maintenance and fulfilment of the agreement. The determination of the Emperor had ever been not to maintain with Affghanistan any other than purely commercial relations: he would take no part in the civil wars of the Chiefs, nor in the family feuds, which had no claim on his attention. Count Simonich’s guarantee was therefore at once disallowed, and he himself recalled. Not only so, but General Duhamel, by whom he was succeeded, so soon as he discovered that the objects of Capt. Vicovich’s mission had been misconstrued by us or by himself, or by both, without waiting for fresh directions from St. Petersburg, and in conformity alone with the spirit of his original instructions, immediately on his arrival at Teheran ordered the agent to return. With these assurances, given with the utmost

11. Masson, vol. iii. p. 465. Masson doubts if Vicovich really was accredited by the Russian minister at all; or whether he was not adopted after the sensation which his appearance at Cabool had made became known: he says—“Count Nesselrode, in acknowledging the mission of Vicovich, may be supposed to have adopted his letters, although he does not expressly say so: I still, however, believe it to have been a fabrication while admitting the Russian minister’s dexterity in relinquishing projects he never entertained.” The explanation in Count Nesselrode’s note quoted in the text, is such that we cannot for a moment concur in this view of the case. Sir J. C. Hobhouse calls him a Polish renegade (See Speech, June 23). He appears to have been murdered on his return from Cabool, and no more inquiries made after him. It might have been enough to know this much, to feel assured that Russia had no intention of attempting the revolution of empires when an agent such as this was resorted to.

12. Count Nesselrode, *ut supra*.

13. *Ibid*, March 5, 1839—*verbatim*.

apparent frankness and candour in two very able and elaborate papers, of dates 1st November 1838, and March 5, 1839, Lord Palmerston declared Her Majesty's government to be entirely satisfied (Dec. 20, 1838)—convinced that Russia harboured no hostile designs against the interests of Great Britain in India; and that the two powers would thereafter unite in earnestly dissuading the King of Persia from undertaking any similar expedition to that against Herat. In reply to the second note (that of 5th March, 1839,) the declarations of reconciliation were still more cordial,—expressing the satisfaction which the renewed assurances of friendship afforded H. M.'s government, and the gratification felt especially by the information, that the first act of General Duhamel on arriving at Teheran was the recall of the commercial agent already referred to. The same declaration on the part of our foreign minister was afterwards emphatically repeated in Parliament. It is impossible to peruse the official papers, even as prepared for publication—tricked out as a portion of them has since been proved to have been, to bolster up the policy of Lord Auekland—without coming to the conclusion, that a more baseless vision than that of hostile design on the part of Russia, conjured up by Mr. Ellice, and unhappily believed in by Lord Palmerston, never misled the rulers of a country. If it be affirmed, as it has often been, that the declarations of Russia, however plausible and specific in appearance, are wholly untrustworthy,—it must be replied, in the first place, that H. M.'s ministers declared that they implicitly confided in them: they may take the alternative of confessing, that in this they uttered a falsehood knowing it to be such; or that they then said what they believed to be true, but which has since been proved to them to be the opposite. If so, however, we are entitled to demand what new light has been thrown on the intentions of Russia in regard to the affairs of Central Asia, since March 1839? If the affirmations of the Court of St. Petersburg are at any time to be received with less confidence than those of other kingdoms, it will require to be shewn on what grounds? When, and how, it has deceived its allies? If it be established that its assertions are untrustworthy, then it is a mockery to receive, or respond, to them; or to maintain towards a country, thus affirmed to be self-outlawed from the society or privileges of civilized nations, the demeanour required where ordinary principles of political morality are adhered to: those who neglect or violate the laws of the European commonwealth have no right to require that these be observed towards them. With matters as they now appear before us, the accusations of duplicity and dishonesty brought against Count Nesselrode and his colleagues, in reference to their conduct towards Persia and Afghanistan, must be looked on as base and malignant slanders. Lord Palmerston asks, with a confident air of triumph, whether the intentions and the policy of

Russia were to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode, or from the acts of Count Simonich and Lieut. Vicovich? (14) The reply to this is simple—that the acts referred to are no where to be found but in the fancies of the members of the Persian and Cabool missions;—the grounds of suspicion set forth by Mr Ellice and Mr McNeil, as published in the Parliamentary Papers, would not have been admitted as circumstantial evidence to convict an English poacher! Captain Burnes gives us his suspicions only; we are wholly in the dark as to the grounds on which they were founded. The explanations of Count Nesselrode were declared to be so entirely satisfactory, that the accusations against Russia were thereby *de facto* admitted to have fallen to the ground. Under these circumstances, the following passage from the Speech of Sir John Hobhouse, delivered in Parliament on the 23d of June 1842, in opposition to the motion of Mr. Baillie for the production of the papers on which the justification of the Affghan War was grounded, is worthy of quotation:—

“ I am sorry to say (observes the Hon. Bart.) that that advice came from the Russian Minister at the Court of Persia. It came from the representative of that most powerful state, who had hitherto acted in the most friendly way with the British Minister, but who gave advice to the Schah totally contrary to the advice that was tendered by the British Minister, and carried his advice afterwards into effect by the intervention which I must more particularly allude to hereafter—an intervention on the part of the representative of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, which was totally incompatible—I say was totally incompatible with the very safety of India. Count Simonich advised the advance upon Herat. Hon. Gentlemen are now so familiar with the importance of that city and state, from its position in Central Asia, that it is unnecessary for me to dwell upon it. This, however, I must state, that the best authorities had laid it down as an indisputable fact, that that city and its immediate dependencies are the most important of all the cities and states of Central Asia, and that the master of Herat is in a position, both with reference to Persia and to the Affghan states, to hold the balance, if he has any considerable power, between the parties who might contend for empire much further and with much greater proximity to India. But Count Simonich did not confine himself to giving advice. At the very time that the English Minister, in consequence of instructions from Lord Palmerston, retired, after fruitless endeavours to prevail upon the Schah to relinquish his pretensions, Count Simonich remained in the neighbourhood, and actually, it might be said, superintended the siege, and an officer of distinction, who had been in the Russian service, assisted at the siege, and I think I recollect, was killed there.

“ But it did not stop there. The intervention of Russia did not stop with the

14. Draft of a note presented to Count Nesselrode, dated Foreign Office, 26th October, 1838. The Simla Proclamation was issued three weeks before Lord Palmerston thought of enquiring whether Russia had given any cause for our going to war with Dost Mahomed! It turned out she had given none: yet we went to war notwithstanding, when the last of our pretences for so doing had admittedly failed us!!

mere appearance of the Russian ambassador at the siege of Herat. Forsooth, a treaty was entered into—it will be found in the papers before the House—by which, in the most summary way, the lawful sovereign of Herat (the real representative of the ancient dynasty) was to be dethroned, and his dominions were given to one of the princes of Candahar, a brother of Dost Mahomed. By that treaty an entire change was to occur in the whole of that important part of Central Asia; and who does the House of Commons think was the guarantee of that treaty? No less a person than the Russian ambassador, and I hold a proof of it in my hand. Was the Governor-General of India, or the Minister at home charged with the Indian department, or my noble friend, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, or the Cabinet at large, to permit such a state of things for a moment? Was Lord Auckland to look on tamely when this transaction was taking place, I might say, at the very gates of India? But there was a person who has gained an unhappy notoriety by the publication of these papers, deputed also, I am sorry to say, by the Russian Ambassador—a renegade Pole he was said to have been—a Captain Vicovitch, whose exploits, no doubt, Hon. Members have read of in this history. That individual was deputed by Count Simonich to go—whither? To the ex-chief of Cabul—and he went there accordingly. But not contented with that, there was to be another mission, a sort of branch mission to the Akiers of Scinde, and another to the Court of Lahore; and was Lord Auckland to consider those things as nothing but a trumpety effort made by the Shah of Persia, which the very shadow of the British bayonet from beyond the Sutledge would at once put down? No! Lord Auckland considered, with the Cabinet at home, that the time was come for resistance. My noble friend (Lord Palmerston) directed a remonstrance to be made to Count Nesselrode, and an answer was given to it. The Hon. Gentleman said, that my noble Friend, in his reply, considered the answer satisfactory; that was not the word. My Noble Friend said he considered the assurances were satisfactory, and so they were, for they were carried into effect. For what occurred? Count Simonich was recalled; and, moreover, the unhappy man, Captain Vicovitch, who was a tool in these intrigues, was also recalled, and has been heard of no more. The rumour was, that he put an end to his own existence; but he has been heard of no more. An effect, however, a very serious and dangerous effect, had been produced by these intrigues. It did not signify to those barbarous states whether or not that ambassador, Count Simonich, or that envoy, Captain Vicovitch, had exceeded their orders or not, as Count Nesselrode said they had. What did Dost Mahomed know of that? How could he judge?"

Sir John Cam Hobhouse, who now adduces charges of the grossest duplicity and fraud against the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, was, by his own showing, in possession of the evidence supplied by Mr McNeil and Lord Auckland in 1838: this was embodied in a note to Count Nesselrode of date 26th October, but had been unofficially before him in a separate form; and the several points replied to specifically and seriatim by a note from the Russian minister of date 1st November—before the formal note of our foreign minister was received. Lord Palmerston states, that Count Nessel-

rode's communication had received all the attention that its importance so justly demanded, and that its general result had been highly satisfactory to H. M.'s government. "The proceedings of Russian agents in Asia [continues the noble viscount] had for some considerable time been so much at variance with the professed policy of the Russian government, and so inconsistent with the friendly relations subsisting between Great Britain and Russia, that the British Cabinet deemed it its duty to ascertain, by frank explanations with that of St. Petersburg, whether any change had taken place in the declared policy of the Imperial cabinet in regard to the affairs in question, or its friendly dispositions towards Great Britain? The despatch of Count Nesselrode contains upon these points, assurances the most full and complete, and H. M.'s government *accepts, as entirely satisfactory*, the declarations of the Imperial cabinet, that it does not harbour any designs hostile to the interest of Great Britain in India; and that its own policy, with respect to Persia, remains unchanged, and is the same which, in 1834, the two powers agreed to adopt."

Sir John Cam Hobhouse was, in 1833, President of the Board of Control, and one of the members of the Government who stated themselves satisfied with the explanations in reference to the conduct of the Persian and Afghan missions;—admitting by this declaration, that the impressions founded on their previous information were groundless, and that the statements now recapitulated, on which these were based, were utterly fallacious! The statement contained in the revised report of the speech,—that "Lord Palmerston and his colleagues considered the assurances of Count Nesselrode satisfactory, *because they were carried into effect*," Count Simonich and Lieutenant Vicovich having been recalled when the intimation of the pleasure of the Cabinet was conveyed to the Court of St Petersburg, is at variance with the evidence supplied by official documents! The announcement of the recall here referred to is contained in a note dated 5th March, 1839: this again called forth expressions of pleasure and satisfaction from Her Majesty's Government, who had "been much gratified by learning, that one of the first acts of General Duhamel, on entering upon his functions at Teheran, [in supercession of Count Simonich] was to recall Lieut. Vicovich from Afghanistan." (15) The paper of explanations referred to by Sir John Cam Hobhouse with which the Cabinet first expressed themselves so highly gratified, is dated the 1st November, and contains not one word of the second mentioned recall! Why should not

15. The very words of the official correspondence have, for the most part, been retained in the text,—which throughout this section is little else than an abridgement of the Parliamentary papers of 1839; in which the late ministry put what they *then* meant to be the defence of their policy. These are now abandoned, and old exploded or refuted statements once more dragged into the field.

Russia or Persia have sent missions to Cabool, or Lahore, or Scinde,—or China, or Burmah, or Japan if it so pleased them? We were then on terms of amity with them all,—though the first three enumerated were at deadly feud with each other,—so that no deputation could have any common hostile object in view. The explanation in reference to the transference of the sovereignty of Herat from the wretched effete Suddozye prince, to the more vigorous Barukzye Sirdar, was fully set down in Count Nesselrode's notes,—and this also was, in 1838 and 1839, considered entirely satisfactory: well it might, if our pretended wishes for peace in Central Asia contained one particle of sincerity: the wretch proposed to be set aside was the son of the elder brother of the father of the Shah Soojah, who had seized upon Herat on the general dismemberment of the kingdom, and was permitted to retain it. He was, according to the rules of legitimacy and primogeniture, the rightful sovereign of the Doorannee empire, to the exclusion of the Shah Soojah himself. He had no more claim on Herat than on the Punjab, Peshawur, Cashmere, Cabool, or Ghuznie,—save that given him by the sword. His character as a sovereign, and his value as an ally, may be gathered from the section referring to the affairs of Herat. Russia desired to have him removed and a better man put in his place, “to secure the tranquillity of the eastern frontiers of Persia, by putting an end to the acts of plunder by which they are incessantly disturbed.”(16) Kamran Shah, “the lawful sovereign—the real representative of the ancient dynasty”—derived his revenues from man-stealing,—from plundering merchants passing in his neighbourhood, and by making inroads into conterminous countries to carry off their inhabitants and sell them as slaves. The more peaceably-disposed states which suffered from his malpractices, were as much entitled to depose him as a common nuisance, or a robber in the highways of commerce, as were England and France in dealing with the far more dignified and honourable plunderers the Deys of Tunis or Algiers! The ex-president of the Board of Control states, that the guarantee for the fulfilment of the treaty by which these changes were to be effected, “was no less a person than the Russian ambassador.” He might, in candour, have added, that in doing so this ambassador acted in opposition to his instructions, and was recalled for having so acted before Lord Palmerston offered any remonstrance or complaint:(17)—as also, that thus much was admitted by the ambassador himself to the British embassy! How lightly Dost Mahomed held the Russian mission in comparison to the hope of the friendship of England, the members of the late Cabinet knew right well, though their hearers might not. The portion of the despatch referring to this was sup-

16. Count Nesselrode's note, 5th March 1837; also 1st November 1838.

17. See Count Nesselrode's Note of 1st November 1838.

pressed, when all the extracts injurious to the credit of Russian candour were given to the world. Sir Alex. Burnes, in one of these, of date 27th December 1837, writes to the Government of India :—" On the morning of the 19th, that is, yesterday, the Ameer came over from the Bala Hissar, with a letter from his son, the Governor of Ghuznie, reporting that a Russian Agent had arrived at that city on his way to Cabool. Dost Mahomed Khan said, that he had come for my counsel on the occasion ; that he wished to have nothing to do with any other power than the British ; that he did not wish to receive any agent from any other power whatever, so long as he had a hope of sympathy from us ; and that he would order the Russian agent to be turned out, detained on the road, or act in any other way that I desired him." In a further suppressed portion of another despatch, dated 26th January 1838, Sir John knew that the following statement was to be found :—" Since arriving here [at Cabool] I have seen an agent of Persia with alluring promises, after penetrating as far as Candahar, compelled to quit the country, because no one sent to invite him to Cabool. Following him, an agent from Russia, with letters highly complimentary, and promises more than substantial, has experienced no greater civility than was due by the laws of hospitality and nations. It may be urged by some, that the offers of one or both are fallacious ; but such a dictum is certainly premature. The Ameer of Cabool has sought no aid in arguments from such offers, but declared that his interests are bound up in an alliance with the British Government, which he will never desert so long as there is a hope of securing one. It is evident, therefore, that in this chief [Dost Mahomed] we have one who is ready to meet us ; and from what is passing in Central Asia at this moment, it is any thing but desirable to exhibit indifference to the solicitations of one whose position makes him courted ; and whose aid may render powerful for or against us." (18) Amongst the various anomalies apparent in these singular passages of our political history, it is not unworthy of remark, that the speech on which these observations have been offered, was delivered on the debate on a motion by Mr. Baillie for the production of papers alleged to have been on a previous occasion printed in a garbled form. Sir J. C. Hobhouse was opposed to this—the chief argument against granting the request of the mover turning on the misunderstandings this might generate betwixt

18. Burnes's suppressed Despatches. Lord Fitzgerald and Vescei, the present President of the Board of Control, took upon himself to affirm in his place in the upper house, that his predecessor in office was not liable to the charge of unfairly garbling Burnes's papers : we must in charity believe that the noble lord had not examined them when he made the affirmation : yet under such ignorance of what he assisted to defend, the assertion was something more than bold, in the face of the declaration of Sir Alexander himself—that the publication was sheer trickery, and that he had been made to support doctrines which he denounced. The noble lord may, by this time, have had the means of correcting his impression !

us and Russia! When the papers were posthumously published from the MSS. of Sir Alex. Burnes entire, without consent of Parliament, it turned out that the tenor of the cancelled portions was calculated to produce an effect the very opposite of animosity! In contrast to the English minister's perversion or concealment of the contents of state papers, Count Nesselrode had himself explained "that Lord Palmerston's having informed him that the affairs of Persia would probably form the subject of serious discussion in Parliament, and that the English cabinet will probably find itself obliged to give publicity to the communications which have been exchanged on this subject betwixt our cabinet and that of London,—the Emperor desires me to state to you, in his name, that he does not see any inconvenience in that publicity. The policy of our august master does not fear open day. On the contrary, His Majesty will be glad to see that explanations which he has spontaneously offered to England should be generally known." (19) "Strong in our rectitude, and in our conscience, we shall never have anything to conceal or to dissemble which we have designed or undertaken."

It seems throughout to have been assumed by the Melbourne administration, that such was the policy of Russia that no faith whatever was to be placed in her professions; this postulate has already been adverted to above:—we had no right to assume that Count Nesselrode and his colleagues were fools as well as scoundrels. Yet nothing short of fatuity could ever have induced the Cabinet of St Petersburg to believe that Russia could have possibly maintained herself in India, had Britain made her a gift of it: that she could ever have reached it, even had she attempted to do so: or that, if having succeeded in the inconceivable exploit of placing a hundred thousand men on our frontiers, she could have maintained them on British ground for a single campaign. To any nation in Europe less used to enlightened, liberal, and honest government—less blessed with commercial enterprise and perseverance than our own, India would prove a ruinous possession.

To those who have perused the contents of the previous pages, it will have become apparent, that so far from the attack of Persia on Herat being, as asserted by Lord Auckland, "cruel and unjustifiable," it was declared by two successive ambassadors the very opposite of both—that so far from being at variance with the principles and objects of our alliance, we were bound by a special clause contained in each of three successive treaties to give no assistance, except as mediator at the solicitation of both parties, to either Affghan or Persian, should war arise betwixt them.(20) So far from the attack of Dost Mahomed on Peshawur being either sudden or unprovoked, it had been long premeditated—was one of a series which had been going

19. Count Nesselrode's Notes of 5th March 1839, and 6th Nov. 1838.

20. Treaty of 1814—1826, repeatedly referred to by both parties as in force in 1837.

on without interruption for three years in succession—and was provoked by the perfidious conduct of the Seikh ruler seizing on a portion of the Doornanee territory, which the Ameer of Cabool was endeavouring to recover. It will be perceived from what immediately follows, that the Ameer of Cabool, who in 1838 had been declared by the Governor-General to be an usurper, had just two years before (22d Aug. 1836) been written to by Lord Auckland, the same Governor-General, in terms expressive of “regard and esteem”—the Dost having been designated Ameer, without question as to the validity of his title, and called by the name of “friend”;—that Runjeet Singh was desirous that the Governor-General should be the channel of submitting to his consideration the pretensions described as unreasonable;—and that the Cabool ruler himself, in case any difficulty should be made on this point, was willing that this should be left in abeyance throughout the lifetime of the Lahore chief. The negotiations at Cabool betwixt September 1837 and May 1838 require next to be examined. We cannot in this, as in two of the preceding sections, draw our materials from papers printed by Parliament; the portions which will most avail the purposes of the present enquiry were withheld from the public as long as the ministers could keep them back; they have been published from the private papers of the late Sir Alexander Burnes, being portions of his despatches forwarded to Government, but suppressed when the others were printed by order of the House of Commons.

CAPTAIN BURNES'S NEGOTIATIONS AT CABOOL.

“After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless negotiation at Cabool, it appeared that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor General could not, consistently with justice, and his regard for the friendship of Maha Raja Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of His Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the Frontiers of India; and that he openly threatened in furtherance of these schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs of Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British Power in India, he was well apprised, and by his utter disregard of the views and interest of the British Government, compelled Capt. Burnes to leave Cabool without having effected any of the objects of his Mission.”

“It was now evident, that no further interference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh Ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan, and the hostile policy of the latter Chief showed too plainly that so long as Cabool remained under his government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian Empire would be preserved inviolate.”—*Simla Proclamation, October 1, 1838.*

We have in this, as in the two preceding portions of this narrative, placed the paragraph of the Simla Proclamation to which the observations which follow next in order more particularly relate, as a text to which the reader may refer: should he succeed in reconciling it with the official documents on which it is professed to be based, and on the examination of which we are now about to enter, he will have been more fortunate than the writer of the narrative.

In 1832, treaties had been entered into with the Ameers of Scinde, the Nawab of Bahawalpore, and the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, which had for their object the extension of British commerce by means of the opening up of the navigation of the Indus. (1) The glowing descriptions of Burnes (2) appear to have given a very exaggerated idea of the value of the internal traffic of the countries beyond the Indus. It was forgotten that where there was no industry, no manufactures, or mineral wealth, no sea-coast or rivers to permit exportation, there could be little or nothing to give in exchange for imports;—and that the wants of a population, purely nomade, must at all times be simple and singularly few. The whole of our commerce with Persia has never exceeded two millions sterling a-year, rarely got above one; (3) the total of our trade with Afghanistan certainly never exceeded a million annually, and has very rarely amounted to much more than the half of one. (4) Besides this, the Indus in reality was never closed save by its own dangerous entrances and shallow depth of water. (5) Lord Ellenborough has opened the Indus as far as Mithen Kote, and the Sutlej in continuation of this to the Markunda, where it ceases to be navigable for the smallest craft. Yet the gross value of the British goods consumed by the countries adjoining does not at present amount to a quarter of a million sterling, and will not in all likelihood be doubled for ten years to come: the expense of maintaining troops between Kurrachee and Bukkur, both stations included, exceeding £600,000 a-year; with a less force, it would be unwise to think of keeping these stations at all. The great line of traffic was not along, but across, the Indus by the Delhi frontier, (6) or parallel to it, at a distance of 100 miles, by Sonmeanee and Kelat. The countries beyond the Indus, besides, have always been open to the free admission of every variety of foreign imports on paying a moderate fixed duty. The chief obstructions in reaching these, are irremediable by treaty: and arise from the attacks of the plundering tribes in the passes, which cannot be restrained save by the payment of a black mail or subsidy. This, in the time of the Dooranee monarchy, amounted to £8000, and during the short reign of the Shah

1. Masson, vol. iii. p. 432.

2. Simla Declaration, October 1, 1838—*ut supra*. Bokhara Travels, Book iii. The term exaggerated, is applied without censure on Burnes: his statements are apparently quite within the mark, but the idea of commerce with the interior at all appears to have induced all sorts of absurd conclusions. The inferences were exaggerated; the premises were glowing, but not too much so.

3. Sir J. McNeil, quoted in Hough's Preface.

4. See Mr Torrens's Tables, June 1841.

5. Burnes's Cabool, p. 126.

6. Masson's Returns supplied to the *Bombay Times*, and given in detail, July 1841. Torrens's Trade Tables by the Delhi Frontier—a set of papers of very dubious authority—the last;—from which it appears that £670,000 worth of goods crossed the Delhi frontier for Cabool in 1840-41.

Soojah from 1839 to 1841, to £12,000 a-year (7) for the use of the Khyber Pass alone.

In the month of October 1836, Captain (afterwards Lieut. Col. Sir Alex.) Burnes was directed by the Government of India to proceed from Bombay through Scinde, and thence to Cabool on a commercial mission, whose object was to bring, if possible, into operation, a line of policy some years before chalked out by Lord William Bentinck, for the extension of trade and promotion of our intercourse with the countries to the westward of the Indus. The traveller had, six years before, traversed the countries to which he was now sent on mission, and acquired the friendship of many of the chiefs, especially of Dost Mahomed of Cabool—one of the most able, vigorous, and enterprising rulers in central Asia; and he had, besides, distinguished himself beyond any man of his time in the Company's service, for the accuracy and copiousness of the Commercial statistics he had, from time to time, laid before the Government. With him in this embassy were associated, Lieut. Wood of the Indian Navy, Lieut. (now Major) Leech of the Bombay Engineers, and Dr Lord of the Company's Medical service.

A combination of events occasioned the speedy alteration of the objects and character of the mission. Before the end of June he had received instructions to proceed without delay to Cabool, and enter on a train of political arrangements,—destined, as it proved, to terminate in the dethronement of Dost Mahomed, and the restoration of the Shah Soojah;—in the murder of the latter, and eventual reinstatement of the former in power.

Urged forward by successive expresses with instructions from the Government of India, as the emergencies seemed to arise, he proceeded to Peshawur, where he arrived on the 12th and left on the 30th August; having delayed in hopes of the arrival of an escort, expected to have accompanied them through the Khyber Pass.(8) On 20th Sept., the mission entered Cabool with great pomp and splendour. Ukhbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mahomed, had been sent out to meet them, with a fine body of cavalry. The Sir-dar, a youth scarcely twenty years of age, but the largest man in the cortege, placed Sir Alex. Burnes on the same elephant with himself, and conducted them straight to the Bala Hissar to be introduced to his father's court, where his reception was most cordial. A spacious garden, close to the palace and under the Bala Hissar, was allocated as the residence of the mission. The following day they were admitted to a formal audience. The Ameer's view of the Governor-General's letter was all that could be desired. On being informed that some of the rarities of Europe had been brought to him as presents, he promptly replied, that Captain Burnes and his friends were the rarities the sight of which most pleased him. As they passed

7. Journey to the Oxus, p. 171.

8. Major Hough, p. 318.

through the city, some of the people cried out, "take care of Cabool;" "do not destroy Cabool,"—and wherever they went they were received with cordial welcome. "Power frequently spoils men (says Sir A. Burnes in his excellent work on Cabool); but with Dost Mahomed, neither the increase of it, nor his new title of Ameer seems to have done him any harm. He seemed even more alert and full of intelligence than when I last saw him." (9) The following account is given of the Dost by Lieut. Wood, a member of the mission. (10)

"Dost Mahomed Khan is about forty-five years of age, and looks worn out and aged before his time. His frame is large and bony, and all his features strongly marked. There is a sternness in the general expression of his features, which is increased by his flowing, jet-black beard, but his countenance is lighted up by eyes of peculiar brilliancy and intelligence: when he fixes them upon those by whom he is addressed, they actually seem to flash with approbation or dissent. From the ease with which he ran over the names of places visited by Captain Burnes in 1832-3, it is evident that his memory must be a good one; and the various subjects on which he spoke, the good sense of his remarks, and the readiness of his replies, proved that his conversational talents were of no mean order. When any one of us addressed him, he sat with his eyes rivetted upon the speaker, and his whole soul appeared absorbed by the subject: when he himself spoke, though he did not resort to Persian gesture, nor assume the solemnity of a Hindoo rajah, there was that in his manner and tone of voice which enforced attention.

"Our welcome had been cordial; and as we left the apartment I could not help contrasting the audience we had just quitted with the scene in a Haiderabad durbar on a like occasion, and the bearing of the blunt, homely Afghan with that of the vapouring Beluche. Dost Mahomed's reception of the mission was less warmly expressed than that of the Sind Amirs, but the ruler of Kabul felt what the others only feigned. He deemed himself honoured by the arrival of a British mission at his capital; while on the contrary the potentates of Sind, when they grant an interview to a British agent, affect to think that the condescension is on their part; they consider only the servant who is sent to them; but the more intelligent Affghans view in the servant the government which he represents."—*Wood's Journey to the Oxus*, pp. 171 and 172.

The following extract from a letter, addressed, after the march on Herat had begun, to Mr M'Neil, Ambassador at the Court of Persia, is important, as explaining the views of Captain Burnes on the claims of Dost Mahomed, just before the Government of India had determined that no concession whatever ought to be made to the Ameer, and that the claims

9. Burnes's Cabool, p. 149. It may be of interest to recollect, that this is the celebrated Ukhbar Khan who had, six months before this, distinguished himself against Hurry Singh at Jumrood. If Wood's statement be correct, he could be no more than 24 when he joined the Cabool insurgents. He is now about 25.

10. Wood's Journey to the Oxus, pp. 171 and 172.

which the best-informed of their own servants considered equitable and just, should be set aside, and he deposed, on the plea of putting forward aggressive pretensions calculated for his own aggrandisement, and injurious to British views :—

Extract : Letter from Captain A. Burnes to the British Ambassador in Persia, dated above Mooltan, on the Indus, 6th June 1837.

Assuming then, as I have done in my late communications to Calcutta, that a friendly commercial connexion with the states beyond the Indus, and between that river and Persia, would be highly beneficial to our interests, the advantage would be greater if we could render that connexion political. There is certainly now no alteration since 1809, and it was then desirable. The only objection to it at present is the offence which we shall give to our old ally at Lahore, but as his death cannot be very distant, I have urged upon notice the propriety of taking a middle course. Supposing it were found that Dost Mahomed Khan possessed all the influence, and all the ability, for which he universally receives credit, much embarrassment is not likely to accrue to us, by either promising to that chief, or entering into a secret treaty with him, that we should throw our influence into his hands, to establish himself on the right bank of the Indus, as far down as Shikarpoor, on the demise of Runjeet Sing. Till then, by a judicious friendly intercourse we might so guide the course of events, as to consolidate his power, and prepare the way for the closer future connexion, which we contemplated. A loan of money would of course be by far the most substantial way, but that I was afraid to suggest, not that I think it should be withheld, but from the utter hopelessness of getting it; nor would I urge its being given at all, if the cash were to be employed against Runjeet. To that I see strong objections. We should let him keep Peshawur while he lives, and meanwhile, turn Dost Mahomed Khan's attention to Candahar and Herat. He has annexed Jellalahad to his country since I was in Cabool in 1832, which gives him an addition of six lacs of rupees to his revenue.

Though the above be the outline of the policy which it appears to me we should follow, I should like first to see with my own eyes, the state of affairs in Cabool, the more so, after reading your letter of the 22nd of January.—As for Suddozye ascendancy in Cabool, I consider that hopeless, either from Kamran, or Shoojah ool Moolk; the former, by the way, is said to be dying of dropsy, and the latter has not the head to manage any thing.—The most powerful tribe of the Dooranees is assuredly the Barukzye. Your view of the influence of the Cabool Kuzzilbashes is new to me. At first sight it might appear anti-national, and the power of Dost Mahomed Khan in consequence to be anti-national; but still Ahmed Shah, Timor Shah, Zeman Shah, and even Shoojah, trusted greatly to these Kuzzilbashes, and the Ghoolam Khanee, as they are called, have at all times had great influence in Cabool. I look upon them as the main stay of Dost Mahomed Khan, and it is to them that he will owe the crown of Cabool if he ever gets it. His own clan the Barukzye, will not oppose their influence, as I think, with some few exceptions, they were glad of the supremacy which a Barukzye has secured. It is certain that the chief of Candahar acknowledges in some degree

the superiority of Dost Mahomed Khan, as you have been informed; and I hear that it was by the advice of the whole clan, that the chief of Cabool has taken the title of Ameer. In fact, there is a circumstance written to me by Mr. Masson quite corroborative. On receiving the Governor General's notification of my approach, Dost Mahomed Khan summoned Kohun Dil Khan to Cabool, and if he would not come himself, requested him to send one of his brothers and not reproach him hereafter, since every thing depended on this visit. I very much fear I shall find one of the Candahar Sirdars at Cabool. On all these points, however, I hope soon to be better informed, and before I get to Cabool to find myself invested with other authority than what I now hold. The part which the Candahar chief is acting requires particularly to be watched. Immediately I got your letter I sent off a messenger from Dera Ghazee Khan to Candahar, through the Lukkee Surwur pass, by which it has been reached in 8 days, to ascertain what was going on there, and I addressed Kohun Dil Khan for the first time as to the objects Government had in view in deputing me to the countries west of the Indus. I shall very soon hear what passes, for since I dispatched the messenger, which is but four days ago, I have had a letter from Candahar saying "that the Persian Eleehee is expected to reach in a day or two, and that the Sirdars have made pompous preparations to receive the Embassy," though my informant had no idea of presents from the Russian Envoy. I shall not fail to avail myself of the worthy Meer Mahomed Candaharee, and if things are not right in Candahar, when I get to Cabool, I shall wait there till I put them so. At all events, I shall leave nothing undone to try and put a stop to their intercourse with the Russian minister, and if matters go rightly we shall, I take it, be able to neutralize the power of the Candahar chiefs, or, at all events, place them in complete subjection to Dost Mahomed Khan, whose influence increases daily, and will be nought diminished by his late victory over the Sikhs. As to that indeed, a letter from Captain Wade, which has just reached me, says "that the Sikhs have never been so severely handled, and a near move at the present time "towards the Sutlej might secure the independence of Dost Mahomed Khan," so that the game at present is all in favor of Cabool.

Captain Burnes was entrusted with a letter of the most warm and cordial tenor from the Governor-General to the Ameer, written in the same kind and friendly strain as that of the preceding year. It was dated 15th May, 1837. It is needless to say how much gratified Dost Mahomed felt at what he assumed to be a fresh instance of our good wishes towards him. At this time, Lord Auckland was perfectly aware of the King of Persia's preparations for attacking Herat, (11) as also of the allegations in reference to the advice given to this effect by Count Simonich. (12) He knew, likewise, that messages of friendship, (13) and letters of amity and regard, (14) had been

11. Mr McNeil's Letter to Lord Palmerston, Nov. 3, 1836.

12. Ibid. As also Letter of Lord Palmerston to the Earl of Durham, 16th January, 1837.

13. Mr McNeil, &c., December 30, 1836.

14. Ibid, Feb. 20, 1837. The above is abridged from Extracts of Letters

exchanged betwixt the Ameer of Cabool, the Candahar Sirdars, and the King of Kings. The incessant attempts of Dost Mahomed Khan to recover Peshawur, were known to every one. There was, in fact, nothing which had occurred, so far as appears by anything on record, betwixt the 15th May, when the letter of friendly greeting which was to introduce Captain Burnes as a commercial agent was written, and the 1st of June, when it was determined to convert this into a threatening embassy, demanding explanations and denouncing vengeance, for the sole crime of defeating the Seikhs at Jumrood on the 1st of May. The preparations for attacking them were long before well known; the result of the action was the only thing which had transpired. (15) We have assigned the last fortnight of May as the period in which this wonderful alteration was wrought in the Calcutta Council Chamber. The letters of Captain Burnes, indicating this, are dated Indus 5th of July; it must have taken a month or nearly to transmit letters from Calcutta to the Indus. He says, "I came to look after commerce, and already I have required to abandon my ledger for treaties and politics. (16) I was ordered by express to pause; and, while hurrying on my accounts, another express cries pause,—which places a vast latitude in my hands. * * I have not as yet got replies to my recommendations on our line of policy in Cabool, consequent on a discovered intrigue of Russia, and on the Cabool chief throwing himself in despair into Perso-Russian arms." If these things were new to Burnes, the published papers show that Lord Auckland and Lord Palmerston had been for many months acquainted with them. It was the interpretation which was to be put upon them, and the line of policy to be pursued in consequence, which were the only things that were novel—and new these were with a vengeance. No papers relating to these have been published, and we are left to look to Downing Street, where a tottering Cabinet required some achievement in India, considered certain of success, to divert public attention from mismanagement at home, for a solution of the mystery which attends them.

Lord Auckland had, a year before, as will be seen by the subjoined communication, expressed himself in the warmest terms towards the Ameer, calling him his friend, and expressing his anxiety to know in what manner he could be of service to him in bringing about a reconciliation with the Seikhs!

Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabool, to Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India, 31st May, 1836.

After compliments.

As I have been long attached to the British Government by the ties of friendship

published in most of the London newspapers, from the posthumous papers of the late Sir Alex. Burnes, first printed in Bombay for private circulation.

15. *Delhi Gazette*, Feb. 15, 1837; and so on till May.

16. Cabool, p. 142. Letter to Mr Secretary M'Naghten, dated Sept. 24.

and affection, the late intelligence of your Lordship's arrival, enlightening with your presence the seat of Government, and diffusing over Hindoostan the brightness of your countenance, has afforded me extreme gratification; and the field of my hopes (which had before been chilled by the cold blast of the times) has, by the happy tidings of your Lordship's arrival, become the envy of the garden of Paradise.

It may be known to your Lordship, that, relying on the principles of benevolence and philanthropy which distinguish the British Government, I look upon myself and country as bound to it; and the letters I have received from that quarter have all been replete with friendly sentiments and attention, and to the effect that, in the time of need, the obligations of friendship should be fulfilled. The late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and misguided Sikhs, and their breach of treaty, are well known to your Lordship. Communicate to me whatever may now suggest itself to your wisdom, for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for my guidance.

I hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your own; and favour me often by the receipt of your friendly letters. Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased to issue for the administration of this country, I will act accordingly.

Lord Auckland to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, written 22d August, 1836.

After compliments.

I have had the pleasure to receive your friendly letter, which was transmitted to me through Captain Wade; and I am gratified at the opportunity which it affords me, so shortly after my assumption of the Indian Government, to convey to you the assurances of my unfeigned regard and esteem.

It is my wish that the Affghans should be a flourishing and united nation; and that, being at peace with all their neighbours, they should enjoy, by means of a more extended commerce, all the benefits and comforts possessed by other nations, which, through such means, have attained a high and advanced state of prosperity and wealth.

My predecessor, aware that nothing was so well calculated to promote this object as the opening of the navigation of the Indus, spared himself no pains in procuring this channel for the flow of industry and enterprise; and it shall be my study to second his philanthropic purpose, and to complete the scheme which he so successfully commenced. I feel assured that you cannot but take a lively interest in the success of this undertaking, so especially conducive as it must be, to the prosperity of the people over whom you rule.

It is probable that I may, ere long, depute some gentleman to your Court, to discuss with you certain commercial topics, with a view to our mutual advantage.

I have learned with deep regret that dissensions exist between yourself and Maharajah Runjeet Sing. My friend, you are aware that it is not the practice of the British Government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states; and indeed it does not immediately occur to me how the interference of my Government could be exercised for your benefit. I shall be happy, however, to learn from you by what means you think that I can be of any assistance; and, in the meantime, I have only to hope that you will be able to devise some mode of effecting a recon-

ciliation with the Sikhs; it being not only for your own advantage, but for the advantage of all the countries in the vicinity, that two nations so situated should ever preserve unimpaired the relations of amity and concord.

Begging that you will accept my renewed assurance of friendship and regard,

I am, &c. (Signed) AUCKLAND.

Sir A. Burnes's instructions, in reference to the mercantile portion of his mission, were sufficiently copious and explicit: when this was transmuted into an embassy of a widely different character, he appears to have been left almost wholly to the guidance of his own understanding. (17) If we consider the very imperfect condition of our information at this period, or rather the impenetrability of our ignorance, and the total want of justification for the measures afterwards adopted, that Burnes's reports did actually supply, the conclusion is almost forced on us, that the mission was sent to see and speak of matters on which a quarrel might be founded. When this failed, Captain Wade fell back on the reports supplied by Mr Masson in 1835. (18) Captain Burnes had learnt, on his way to Cabool, how easy would be the adjustment of the Peshawur question on the part of Runjeet Singh. (19) On arriving at Cabool, he found Dost Mahomed anxious to come into all the views of Government.

Persian influence was rapidly on the decline: and though a Persian Elchee was then known to be on his way to Cabool, it seemed doubtful if he would be received; if he had been so, there were no offers which he could have made which would have been placed for a moment in the balance against those of the British Government. (20) Our Envoy, ten days after his arri-

17. In a private letter, dated Cabool, 30th October, Burnes thus writes:—"I hardly know what the Government of India will think of my measures, for my line of conduct is only indicated by them, not marked out. I am in a very critical position, and they tell me so *totidem verbis*." Masson complains incessantly of this matter; he quotes a letter from Burnes, in which the writer says,—"My last accounts from Calcutta are, in plain language, as follows,—that Lord Auckland looks with great anxiety to hear from me in Cabool, after I have seen about me; the meaning of which is clear enough, that they are to act after I have reported. This looks like toasting our toes at Cabool for the winter."

18. Masson's Travels.

19. We have, in the text, given Burnes's own views of this matter. Masson's are almost word for word the same. In commenting on a letter received on that subject from Captain Burnes, he says, "While perfectly aware that the occupation of Peshawur was unprofitable, and the constant source of alarm and inquietude to Runjeet Singh, and satisfied that he would relinquish it if solicited to do so, I had not hoped that he would have voluntarily come forward and expressed a desire to be eased of it."—Masson, vol. ii., p. 447.

20. Burnes's Letter to Sir W. M'Naghten—Cabool, Oct. 4, 1837—Blue Book, 1839. We shall require to refer to these papers almost incessantly for some space to come. They form a continued series from the 25th September to the 1st May. Those quoted as "unpublished papers" are fragments of the original despatches as forwarded to Government. They were suppressed by the Board of Control when ordered by Parliament to be published in 1839. They give a totally altered complexion to the conduct of Dost Mahomed.

val, was closetted with the Ameer, and found him most frank and circumstantial in his explanations. He had been before, as already explained under a previous head, on treaty of alliance with Persia; he declared that he already bitterly repented ever having had anything to do with that country—the more especially since he had received the Governor-General's notification of Captain Burnes's intended mission. He stated that the Candahar negotiations with Mahomed Shah were entirely without his concurrence, and much against his inclination. If the affairs of Peshawur were ever adjusted, he said he would be expected to have no more occasion for aid from any one; but whether the British Government interested itself in this or not, he was resolved to do every thing he could to show his respect for its wishes; if he could not succeed in regaining our friendship, he was equally resolved to have nothing more to do with Persia. It was impossible that anything could have been more satisfactory than this, if we really were in earnest in our desire to treat with him as an independent sovereign. The same tone of friendship was maintained with the most perfect consistency to the end, when our offers of alliance became so absolutely insulting, considering the terms on which they were made, that he had no choice left but to decline them. The following extract from a private letter, dated Cabool, 30th October, gives Captain Burnes's opinions in a more concise and graphic form than do his communications with the Government of India, though the two are in substance identical:—

“Cabool, 30th October, 1837.—Here a hundred things are passing of the highest interest—I arrived here on the 24th of last month, and have had a very cordial reception—Dost Mahomed Khan has fallen into all our views, and in so doing has either thought for himself, or followed my counsel, but for doing the former I give him every credit, and things now stand so, that I think we are on the threshold of a negotiation with King Runjeet, the basis of which will be his withdrawal from Peshawar, and a Barukzye receiving it as a tributary of Lahore, the Chief of Cabool sending his son to ask pardon.—What say you to this after all that has been urged of Dost Mahomed Khan's putting forth extravagant pretensions? Runjeet will accede to the plan I am certain, but *** is a great little man, if you comprehend what I mean, and while he is looking to the horizon (to use his own words) of politics and considering, events crowd on, and spoil his speculations. I have, in behalf of Government, agreed to stand as mediator between the parties, and Dost Mahomed has cut asunder all his connexion with Russia and Persia, and refused to receive the Ambassador from the Shah now at Candahar.—His brothers at that city have however caressed the Persian Elchee all the more for this, and I have sent them such a Junius as I believe will astonish them. I had indeed reason to act promptly, for they have a son setting out for Tehran with presents to the Shah and the Russian Ambassador, and I hope I shall be in time to explain our hostility to such conduct.—Every thing here has indeed run well, and but for our deputation at the time it happened, the house we occupy would have been tenant-

ed by a Russian Agent and a Persian Elchee. I hardly know what the Government of India will think of my measures, for my line of conduct is only *indicated* by them, not marked out.—Yet I am inspired by their free use of laudatory adjectives regarding my proceedings hitherto—* * I am in a very critical position, and so they tell me—*tolidem verbis*,—but I like difficulties—they are my brandy.”

We have already had occasion to refer to the utter want of instructions from which the mission suffered on first reaching Cabool. So far from this having been remedied, it became aggravated each month of their stay. The pure no meaning of the terms “Persian aggression” and “Russian intrigue” puzzled them far more than the phantoms they apprehended would have done if converted into substantial realities. Mr M’Neil sounded the double alarm, that Persia was about to march on Herat, Candahar, and Ghuznie, and that Mahomed Shah and Dost Mahomed were about to form an alliance—out of which some fearful and indefinite mischief was to spring, whose form was too dreadful to be described, its power too terrific to be resisted. Dost Mahomed was forbidden to make terms for himself with Persia, on pain of our severest displeasure, and the Ameer at once declared that if this would please us, we should have no grounds of dissatisfaction: he had treated with Persia as he had done with other powers, with a view of strengthening his authority, and without any idea of annoying us. But then again, Persia threatened to advance towards Cabool with a view to invasion. This intention, which, whether real or pretended, we have every reason to believe incapable of being carried into effect, was fully believed in as practicable and imminent by the whole Persian mission, (21) by Dost Mahomed, and the members of the mission at Cabool; Captain Burnes having offered himself to serve with the troops of Candahar, and to assist the Sirdar with money in case it should be carried into effect. (22) It was implicitly relied on by Lord Auckland, and is yet held as an unquestionable article of creed by the then chairman of the Board of Control. (23) Yet Lord Auckland de-

21. See letters of Mr Ellice, Mr M’Neil, Major Tod, &c. from 1834 to 1838; they will be found more fully quoted and referred to under the Herat and Russian heads.

22. Burnes’s private letters, also despatches.—See Mr Macnaghten’s letter, dated Belleiry, 20th Jan., severely blaming Captain Burnes for having made an offer of assistance. Burnes himself says, “I entertain the belief that if we keep our footing in Cabool and Herat falls, the presence of Mr Leech alone will prevent the Shah of Persia from attacking Candahar.”—Suppressed Despatch, 22d February, 1838.

23. Sir J. C. Hobhouse’s speech, 23d June, 1842. The ex-chairman quotes Mr Ellice as an authority on the imminence of the dangers of invasion from Persia. This is *naïve* enough; he seems to have forgotten that the alleged cause of the war was, the desire of Dost Mahomed to screen himself from this danger, by an alliance with Persia. We would not help him in fighting with

clared in his minute (12th May, 1838), that he had before stated to the Secret Committee his determination not to oppose the hostile advance of Persia upon Candahar or Cabool, whether by arms or money. (24) He, in short, would not permit Dost Mahomed to enter into a treaty to save himself from Persian invasion, nor suffer him by alliance with her to protect himself. This was the state of matters in the beginning of the year 1838, but a change in our conduct towards the Cabool chief was at hand, to which, after noticing the affairs to the eastward, we shall speedily have occasion to advert. On the 25th December, two months after the arrival of the mission at Cabool, Lieutenant Leech was dispatched to Candahar to ascertain how matters stood in that quarter. The three brothers who ruled in Western Afghanistan, were Kehun Dil Khan, Rehem Dil Khan, and Meer Dil Khan: the first described by Captain Burnes as an honest good man and staunch Soonee; the second, as having some energy; and the third, as possessed of more talent than either of the other two. (25) These chiefs were at this time in treaty with Persia, with a view to their assisting in the attack on Herat. It does not appear whether or not any hint of the intentions of Russia as to the bestowment of the principedom on the eldest of the brother Sirdars, had transpired. The treaty was submitted to them and agreed to in January: (26) how long before this they were informed of the intentions of Persia and Russia in their favour we have not discovered. If, in the knowledge of this, they were still disposed to break off all arrangements with Persia and Russia in our favour, we surely could have desired no stronger evidence of their anxiety for our alliance:—nor could we assuredly blame them for endeavouring to complete an arrangement so favourable to themselves, if their exertions for this had only begun after they saw that there was no longer reason to hope for our friendship, much less for our assistance. Herat, and the territory dependent upon it, would have more than doubled in extent, and tripled in value, and infinitely increased in political weight their territorial possessions. (27) However these things may be, we find from the instruc-

her, and deposed him because he would not comply with our wishes in endeavouring to make friends with her!

24. We only became aware of the existence of this very important document by a reference to it in a paper of subsequent date. It bore upon the pacific view of the question apparently, and was therefore suppressed.

26. Lieut. Leech's despatch, 12th March, encloses Count Simonich's guarantee.

25. Burnes's Instructions to Lieutenant Leech. This very important despatch was omitted by Sir J. Hobhouse on the publication of the Parliamentary Papers. It was found amongst the posthumous papers of Sir A. Burnes:—we quote from a copy published in the *Caledonian Mercury* of 22d October 1842.

27. *Quarterly Review*, June 1839. The article referred to is a review of the mutilated Parliamentary Papers. It is believed to have been written by Sir

tions of Captain Burnes to Lieutenant Leech, as well as from his other letters, that by the beginning of December "they had listened to advice—declined sending one of their sons to Persia as previously agreed to—dismissed the Persian Elchee, and began to look with serious anxiety for counsel and assistance towards the British Government, and their brother Dost Mahomed." The King of Persia, in referring to this, sent back information that their assistance against Herat was no longer desired. (28) Serious and not unnatural apprehensions were however entertained by them, that, in case of the Shah succeeding at Herat, their proceedings on this head might so incense him as to furnish him with an excuse for resuming his often threatened measures for an eastward march, with a view to the subjection of the countries to which he never failed to prefer claims so often as opportunity occurred: claims which, when put forward, invariably filled our statesmen with alarm. In reply to a representation from the Sirdars, apparently to this effect, received on the 22d December, (29) Captain Burnes stated that, in the event of Persia attempting to subdue their chiefship, he would proceed in person along with the Ameer of Cabool to assist them; that he would do every thing in his power to aid them—even to the extent of paying their troops. The sum proposed to be advanced for this latter purpose was three lakhs of rupees—i. e. £30,000. The chiefs declined the pecuniary portion of the offer, writing, in return, that the original intent of their negotiations had been to keep off Persia,—to ruin Kamran, and make themselves masters of Herat. This was understood to mean that their apprehensions at this time were more from the aggressions of the latter than the former power. (30) It is difficult to reconcile this with the previous representations of the brother Sirdars. This proposition appeared calculated to meet all the exigencies of the case, assuming that our designs were honest,—that we wished to maintain the Barukzye chiefs in the position in which we found them; (31)

John McNeil, and at any rate is imbued with the darkest tints of Russophobia. The writer had only the minor half of Burnes's papers to resort to. He deals in the broadest assertions beyond the records he pretended to review. The article is full of talent, and has had more influence in favour of Lord Auckland's policy than all the other writings which have been published on the subject. Some admirable remarks will be found in the *Spectator* newspaper of July 25, 1839, relating to this subject.

28. Instructions to Lieutenant Leech, *ut supra*.—*Caledonian Mercury*.

29. Neither the letter nor the reply appears amongst the printed papers, though both must be in the hands of Government. We know of the existence of the former, and quote the substance of the latter from Burnes's instructions to Lieutenant Leech. The sum offered was stated by Masson, in a MSS. note to the present writer, at three lakhs—£30,000.

30. Letter of Captain Burnes to Dost Mahomed Khan, April 23, 1838. We confess we are unable to reconcile some of these very prominent contradictions in the Parliamentary Papers.

31. Mr Secretary Macnaghten, in his letter 20th January, just about to be examined in the text, stated, that "it was our object also to mark our wish for

but so far from this being the view of the matter taken by Lord Auckland, Burnes's conduct was severely censured, and only not repudiated to prevent exposure of the fact that he and his Government were at variance. A different view of it was taken by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, and when the Governor-General intimated that her Majesty had been pleased to confer the honours of Lieutenant-Colonel and Knighthood upon him, (December 1839) his Lordship was obliged to confess that this very policy which had incurred his severest displeasure, had been judged by the authorities at home as the wisest that could have been adopted. We learn little more than the above from the published papers of the intent of Lieutenant Leech's mission, or the motive of his residence at Candahar; and here, without regard to order of time, we may bring the narrative of the negotiations in this quarter to an end. The treaty with the King of Persia, by which Herat was to be made over to Kohun Dil Khan, some time before concluded, had been guaranteed by the Russian ambassador in March, and probably at this time only waited the sanction of the Cabinet of St Petersburg. This was not only not accorded to it, but Count Simonich was recalled immediately on its being known that he had so far exceeded his instructions as to give the authority of Russia as a voucher for its fulfilment. Of all these things it is to be presumed our minister at Cabool was fully aware, as we find by the printed papers, that Mr M'Neil, then in the camp before Herat, had been made acquainted with them by Mr Leech before the 11th of April. Under these circumstances, and with no further light before us on the subject than that which the Blue Book supplies, we are unable to explain how in the account given of the arrival on the first week of April of Kohun Dil Khan at Cabool in quest of pecuniary or military aid against Persia, they happen not to be referred to. There was at this time no doubt entertained in Western Afghanistan that the fall of Herat was at hand; (32) and apparently in anticipation of the speedy occurrence of this event, the Sirdar waited on Captain Burnes, with a view of obtaining a direct promise of protection from Persia, should she, in the event of succeeding in her present expedition, advance with hostile purpose to the westward. It is difficult to suppose, after what we know to have occurred, that the apprehension pretended could really have been experienced, or if it had been so, that the supplies ap-

the maintenance in their actual position of all the chiefs of Afghanistan, being the most just course of proceeding in itself, and as the existing division of power amongst them was felt to be on the whole decidedly most beneficial to British interests." By the middle of May Lord Auckland had come to conclusions exactly the opposite of these!

32. Burnes's Despatch, 25th April—Blue Book. It is curious that Mr M'Neil, writing at this same date from the camp before Herat, apprises Lord Palmerston that there is no apprehension of its fall.

plied for could have been expected to be received. Yet the enormous amount of treasure which we had lavished in Persia caused it to be believed throughout the whole of Central Asia, that whenever we interposed our authority, or proffered friendly offices, money would be scattered in almost boundless profusion. The expenses of the embassy at the Court of Teheran, including subsidy, amounted to about £128,000 annually betwixt 1809 and 1827, and betwixt this latter date and 1837 to about £30,000 a-year, or in all to about two and a half millions(83)—a sum justly deemed enormous by us, till taught by the Dooranee alliance that a similar one might annually be required to maintain a so-called wise and popular Suddozye sovereign on the throne of Cabool. The able writer in the *Quarterly Review* states, that “the hope of playing off England against Russia and Persia, and these powers against England, and the prospect of advantage to themselves, which they believed to be opened to them by a competition between states so powerful and wealthy, for their attachment—divested their communications of all sincerity, and enough transpired to destroy every feeling of confidence in their good faith. A comparison of dates will shew that they were at the same time holding out to England on the one side, and to Persia and Russia on the other, professions of the most cordial attachment and exclusive alliance.” Of the last mentioned fact there is no sort of doubt—the first two assertions are pure assumptions. Russia and Persia in agreeing to the cession of Herat, should it fall before the armies of Mahmood Shah, had guaranteed all that was desired of them already, and more perhaps than ever had been hoped for before. There was therefore no reason why England should be played off against them. From us, again, the aid they asked was purely conditional on two contingencies, neither of which ever arrived—the fall of Herat, and the hostile advance of Persia, with a view to the conquest of the Affghan states to the eastward. We can only suppose this danger to have been apprehended as the result of the alliance the Sirdars had entered on with us, and the indignation the King of Persia might have been expected to have felt at the slight put upon him and his offers of alliance, so soon as Captain Burnes promised them the friendship of England; or the alternative vengeance of Kamran Shah, should the siege prove unsuccessful. Captain Burnes had formerly been severely snubbed for offering aid of any sort: he of course—now on the eve of his departure from Cabool—had no choice left but to refuse it. He probably began to suspect, what proved to be the case, that the Government of India desired any thing rather than the conciliation of the

83. Pamphlet of Sir Hartford Jones Brydges, late ambassador at the Court of Persia; Lon., Oct. 1838. Lord Auckland considered the fall of Herat, and the consequent advance of Persia eastward, as the most probable event so late as the 12th May. (See Simla Minute of that date.)

Affghan chiefs. Had it been otherways, we could readily have afforded to promise them all that they desired from us, conditional as this was on two things never realized. If Herat had fallen, and Persia advanced, we should, if we had left her progress unopposed, have permitted her to take up a position, through sheer lust of conquest, which would have enabled her to assume a threatening attitude towards us, the idea of which Lord Auckland pretended to deplore.(34) The arrival and requisition of Kohun Dil Khan—an event of sufficient importance to warrant the present amount of remark, was, in all likelihood meant for no other end than to ascertain, by a specific proposition, what at any rate were *not* the intentions of the Government of India; that some sort of conclusion might from this be drawn, as to what they probably were. On this last point Capt. Burnes was unable to form anything like a conjecture; he was as much at a loss as the Ameer or Sirdar, what was meant to be the result of his mission, and long after his departure, when, as it appears from the minute of the 12th of May, Lord Auckland's mind was made up for something very warlike, he writes to Mr Macnaghten, under date 29th June, indicating how much he was at a loss to conjecture the ultimate intentions of Government,—not more so than they themselves appear at the time to have been.(35) Accounts being for the present closed at Candahar, the condition of the state of affairs at Cabool fails to be resumed, back as far as the arrival of Lieut. Vicovich on the 20th December. Subsequent events have brought many things to light in reference to the character and position of this adventurer, of which Mr M'Neil and Capt. Burnes were at the time necessarily ignorant; yet it does seem most unaccountable, that, taking into consideration the only objects which could by possibility be contemplated by Russia, supposing her likely to pursue the same principles of action which had in all other quarters throughout guided her policy during the past and present reign, and the questionable shape in which Vicovich at first and throughout appeared,—such consequence should have been attached to his approach, and such ill-supported inferences drawn from his detention. This man is reported by Captain Burnes as a Cossack Lieutenant; by Sir J. C. Hobhouse as a renegade Pole. His credentials appear to have consisted of a letter, professedly written by the Emperor himself, not by any secretary or minister—a circumstance sufficient to have excited suspicion.(36) He was

34. Lord Auckland's Minute, dated 12th May 1838.—We have copied his Lordship's observations almost verbatim. It was curious, that when so much alarm was experienced lest Persia should advance, we refused to permit any steps to be taken for driving or keeping her back.

35. See letter quoted in part, unfairly as usual, by Sir J. C. Hobhouse in his speech of 23d June. It is given entire in the *Bombay Times* of the 24th, and *Summary* of the 27th, August.

36. Masson's Journeys, &c. In quoting Mr Masson on this subject, we are bound to state, that whatever he writes in reference to Captain Burnes, bears an appearance in the last degree suspicious.

said to have been provided with money, which he promised liberally; but there is not the slightest reason to believe that ever it made its appearance. He bore with him a genuine letter, of a general and perfectly inoffensive character, from Count Simonich, which appears amongst the Parliamentary Papers, expressive of respect and promising presents; but the presents themselves, like the pecuniary assistance, appear never to have reached their destination. (37) He spread reports in all directions "that he was sent to intimate the arrival at Astrabad of a large Russian force destined to co-operate with the Shah's army against Herat." (38) This we now know to have been a falsehood so monstrous, that the man who could have had recourse to it was wholly untrustworthy. So much opposed to this was the fact, that every Russian soldier in the service of Persia was ordered, in the course of the siege, to return to his own country to prevent the possibility of suspicion. He was admitted by Count Nesselrode to have been sent by the Russian ambassador at Teheran as a commercial agent, and it is now demonstrated that even in this capacity his rank must have been of the humblest. Mr Mc'Naghten alludes to him as appearing in this character, and Captain Burnes himself, in one despatch, declares his disbelief that he could by possibility be acting on the instructions of the imperial court. He was ordered back by General Duhamel, and when he disappeared near Candahar, where he is supposed to have been murdered, (39) no notice of the event was taken by his Government. The mission of Lieutenant Vicovich, as already stated, was explained by the Russian minister to have been in return to a messenger from Dost Mahomed. The arrival of this man with his letter, says Charles Masson, "astonished the Ameer, particularly as he was unconscious of having written a letter to Russia. He did not at the time remember Hussein Ali [the messenger sent to St Petersburg, who was said to have fallen sick and been delayed at Moscow] and he required to be told that he was the son of Baji Nurwari. He then observed, I gave him no letters, and Mirza Samee Khan [the minister] explained that he had written one, and claimed for himself much credit for having procured the Ameer the honour of a reply from the Emperor. (40) Whether the Ameer believed his Mirza or not I cannot tell. It was known that Hussein Ali had accompanied Vicovich from Bokhara to Orenburg. His non-appearance with the Cossack officer was considered badly accounted for by the pretence stated that he was sick at

37. Masson, in a MS. note in the *Quarterly*, states that they never were received.

38. Mr Mc'Neil to Lord Palmerston.—Parliamentary Papers. The circulation of the report is deposed to by Masson, MS. note.

39. Masson's Travels. Sir J. C. Hobhouse's speech.

40. Masson's Travels, vol. iii. p. 464.

Moscow, and the general opinion was that Vicovich had murdered him; and this I state not wishing to belie Vicovich, but to shew the little respect in which his mission was held." "The reception of Vicovich was not such as he had reason to boast of, and in the house of Mirza Samee Khan he resided, in fact, under surveillance."

This agent remained some seven or eight months at Cabool. We cannot discover in any paper, public or private, a single overt act of intrigue laid to his charge. With all the means and appliances possessed by the various missions at Cabool, Candahar, Herat, and Teheran, which seem to have been resorted to so unsparingly, and with such success, that scarcely any communication of note escaped them, not one letter, either to or from Vicovich, from any party whatever, has ever been produced or referred to. His vocation seems to have been limited to "a system of enormous lying"—to the exhibition of his Cossack uniform, and certain mysterious closetings with the Chiefs, with a view, probably, on their part, to discover whether the man, to whose appearance we attached such mighty consequence, had really been intrusted with any commission at all from his Government, or had any function whatever, above those already described, assigned to him, with the wish on his side of appearing a greater man than till now he had dreamt of becoming. Political quacks of this sort have been found to emanate from other countries than Russia without being similarly successful in attracting attention. Yet, if Count Nesselrode, with half his Cabinet, had been at Cabool, with a Russian army half-way on its march to Delhi, greater consequence could hardly have been attached to them than that with which we find this miserable adventurer treated in the official papers of Lord Auckland and Lord Palmerston, and in half the other despatches! About the 20th of January, Captain Burnes received letters of dates 25th November and 2d Dec., from Mr M'Naghten, giving him, for the first time, apparently some definite instructions on one or two points as to how he was to proceed and what to require, for up to this period he seems on both questions to have been left to follow his own discretion. From this it appeared, that though Runjeet Singh was asserted to be unlikely to consent to the restoration of Peshawur to Dost Mahomed, he might probably be induced to make it over to its former ruler,—Sooltan Mahomed Khan, the Ameer's brother. It is singular, that up to the time of the publication of the Simla Proclamation, the Governor-General had never taken the very simple and obvious step of directly ascertaining from the Maharajah himself whether or not he would cede Peshawur without objection. Captain Burnes and Mr Masson, the only two authorities referred to on these matters, had both assured Government, as has already been stated, that the Seikhs would at this time have been most thankful to have got rid of it: and wanted but the pretext of our interposition with them to save their honour, to make it

over to any one we were disposed to have named. (41) It appears to have occasioned much mortification in the Simla cabinet, that the Affghan chiefs, one and all, had come so readily into our views, as to leave scarcely a single point on which to disagree with them. It looks as if serious apprehensions had been entertained that Runjeet Singh, if applied to, might have manifested so much of the same complying spirit, as to have left no room for a quarrel, the only thing which from the commencement appeared to have been determined on; and relieved us even from the impertinence of intruding the offer of our friendly offices on those who desired them not, and stood in no need of them. Sooltan Mahomed Khan, it will be recollected, was stripped of all authority when Dost Mahomed obtained power at Cabool, but had the half of Peshawur assigned to him in compensation for his loss. He had from this time forward been constantly engaged in plots against his brother: it was in the course of one of these while intriguing with the Seikhs, that Hurry Singh seized on his territories, as well as those of the Ameer on the Attock in 1834. At this very time the Ameer had just been made acquainted with an intrigue against him that had originated at Peshawur; Sooltan Mahomed Khan having sent an agent to the Shah Soojah at Loodianah with a view of obtaining his restoration. The position in which matters at this time stood will be most readily understood by the republication of one of the mutilated despatches of Captain Burnes, extracts from which are to be found in the Blue Book. The portions marked with single inverted commas were suppressed by the Board of Control on its original appearance, and have been extracted from his posthumous papers:—

*Capt. A. Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Vide Blue Book, No. V. p. 22.)*

Sir,

Cabool, 26th January, 1838.

“I have now the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 25th Nov. and 2nd of December last, which reached me about the same time,

41. “Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance on Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstandings with the Seikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor-General could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of his highness.”—Simla Proclamation. It was surely a pity that they should not at any rate have been submitted, when Lord Auckland had such strong assurances that had they been so, they would have been favourably considered. The passage about assistance from Persia contrasts curiously with the paragraph in the Simla minute of 12th May already referred to, where such serious apprehensions are expected by his Lordship, that Persia might, in sheer lust of conquest, occupy Afghanistan altogether. Was it Persian alliance or Persian invasion that was apprehended? They seem to have been put forward alternately just as suited. Sir J. C. Hobhouse feared the latter when he last expressed himself on the subject.

'and conveyed the views of the Right Hon. the Governor General' regarding the overtures made by Dost Mahomed Khan, for adjusting his differences with the Sikhs, and the apprehension that the Maharajah would not be disposed to surrender Peshawur on those terms, but be more likely to restore it to Sooltan Mahomed Khan, its former governor. I lost no time in making known these circumstances, 'as well as the sentiments of his Lordship on them,' and the policy which it would be advisable for the Ruler of Cabool to pursue.

2. After listening with considerable attention to what I impressed upon him, the Ameer proceeded to make his own comments on what was recommended. He said that he felt satisfied that the British Government was actuated by the most pure and upright motives in making known its sympathy with the sufferings of the Affghan nation, and that, in seeking to apply some remedy to them, it only followed the generous course for which it was celebrated throughout Asia; that there were, however, obstacles and objections to what had been recommended, 'which the Government of India might not know' which it behoved him to unfold, 'for its deliberation,' before any adjustment of differences on such terms was carried into effect.

3. "In offering to render tribute, horses, and apology, to Runjeet Sing, and to hold Peshawur under him," continued he, "I was actuated by no motive of hostility to Sooltan Mahomed Khan: he is my brother, and though we have diffored, the rancour is on his side, and not on mine. I stated that I would secure to him and his brothers the jagheers they enjoy; and this, with what would have to be paid, would not have rendered it a very profitable appendage to my power; for these were precautionary measures to secure myself in Cabool, and prevent injury befalling me. Of Runjeet Sing's power to invade me in Cabool, I have little fear; of his power to injure me, if he reinstates Sooltan Mahomed Khan in the government of that city, I have great apprehension, for in it I see a Mahomedan ruler instead of a Sikh; and had the Maharajah been more conversant with the politics of Affghanistan, and bent on my destruction, he might ere this have succeeded, had he not displaced Sooltan Mahomed Khan from Peshawur, and supplied him with funds to corrupt those about me, who are inimical, and envy the rise to my present elevation.

4. "At the present time, many of the chiefs who belonged to Peshawur and their retainers, are subsisted by me. They fled from their country on its invasion by the enemies of our religion, and on my brother becoming a servant to them. It cannot be supposed that with my limited revenues I can either give to these persons what they are entitled to, or what they received in their own country; but at this moment I expend about 90,000 Rupees annually in giving them bread. When Peshawur is restored, these individuals will of course leave me, and along with them will proceed every one who may take offence at his merits not being appreciated as he considers they deserve; and thus, instead of being freed from enemies, I shall be lowered among my countrymen far below my present situation; and, far from being free from danger, as at present, have that situation most certainly endangered. I think,

therefore, that I see in the contemplated plans for altering the arrangement for governing Peshawur, a rectification of the errors of the Ruler of Lahore ; and that his designs are sinister, and his object to draw the British Government unawares into them.

5. " In the friendly expression of the feeling entertained towards the Affghans by the British Government, I see clearly, that it would not permit itself to be made a party to my destruction. If you are not disposed to strengthen my hands, and raise me above the rank which I at present enjoy, it cannot be your intention, with offers of sympathy, to bring about my ruin. On that point I am at ease ; but in separating us all one from another ; in seeking to keep the chiefs from being dependent on one another ; you are certainly neutralizing the power of the Affghan nation, and sowing the seeds of future dissension. Your object is to prevent harm ; you will prevent good. You will secure to yourselves the gratitude of Peshawur, of the Eusufzyes, the Khutucks, and the tribes near the Indus ; but as for myself, you open a new door of intrigue against me ; and as you see injury likely to accrue from the Chief of Candahar entering on an alliance with Persia, I see injury to myself in Sooltan Mahomed Khan, when restored to his chiefship of Peshawur, being in alliance with Lahore : and, above all, what security am I to have that the chiefs of Peshawur and Candahar will not join to injure me, and be aided in their designs by Maharajah Runjeet Sing ? "

6. To these arguments I opposed the views of the British Government, and said that it would ill tally with its wishes to find new causes of quarrel arise consequent on an adjustment of the differences between the Sikhs and Affghans ; that as the Ameer had renounced his connexion with Persia, we had in return hoped to do him a good office by entering into a negociation with Runjeet Sing on the differences existing between them, but that if he was thoroughly sincere in his belief that the restoration of Peshawur to Sooltan Mahomed Khan was positively injurious to him, it was proper to state most decidedly that we had no such design, ' and would be a party to no measures ' of such a tendency. I then pointed out the various advantages which must ' arise from the Sikhs withdrawing themselves to the other side of the Indus, and I dwelt upon the increase of reputation which must follow to himself on his having contributed, by his determined opposition, to the release ' of his brothers, their wives and their children, from the hands of the Sikhs, ' to have once more in the possession of the family the burying place of its ' ancestors, and to hear again in a country inhabited by Mahomedans the ' Summons to prayer (eezan,) and secure the permission to follow the usages ' of Islam, and their Mosques from defilement and spoliation. "

' 7. Giving every weight to what had been urged, I proceeded to lay before him (the Ameer), the positive advantages derivable from an altered ' state of things in Peshawur.—' The number of troops entertained by you ' will become unnecessary, your increased exactions from the merchant and ' the cultivator will cease, because war with the Sikhs will no longer engage

‘ your attention, decrease of expence will be tantamount to increase of revenue, your resources will be improved, your power concentrated and strengthened, and as to the charge brought forward of our raising up many Chiefs in Affghanistan, he was to recollect that those Chiefs were his brothers, that Candahar, Cabool, and Peshawur, would thus be in possession of one family, the sons of one father, who had a common interest against the enemies of their house, and whose family differences whatever they were, might be made to disappear when they ceased to be threatened by a powerful Ruler like Maharajah Runjeet Sing ; that as to the neutralization of the Affghan nation which he complained of, it was certainly no part of the policy of the British Government to injure any of the present holders of power in this country more than himself, and that we looked to the general good of all parties ; that the Ameer no doubt understood better than we did what injured, and what availed him ; but it appeared to me that he had too exaggerated a view of Runjeet Sing’s designs, and that it would certainly be taken into the Governor General’s consideration, if this subject proceeded further, how far he should receive security against the plans of Lahore to be compassed by means of his brothers in Peshawur, and also the nature of the counteraction which would be used to prevent his brothers at Peshawur and Candahar combining to do him injury.’

8. To this Dost Mahomed Khan replied, that there were no doubt many advantages in prospect, and that the arguments adduced had both foundation and solidity, but that the advantages were chiefly on the side of others ; that he had hitherto been able to stand on the defensive against Runjeet Sing, and to do it with some effect ; that that Ruler’s withdrawal was more injurious to him on the terms proposed, than his continuance at Peshawur ; that he himself now received a degree of respect which he could then no longer command, and that it was better to leave things as they were, in the hopes of some future charge, than to shackle himself by being a party to an arrangement, which did him little good, and seemed fraught with danger ; and in return for which, things might be expected of him which he could not perform. Peshawur, said he, has been conquered by the Sikhs ; it belongs to them ; they may give it to whomsoever they please ; if to Sooltan Mahomed Khan, they place it in the hands of one who is bent on injuring me, and I cannot therefore acknowledge any degree of gratitude for your interference, or take upon myself to render services in return. ‘ I admit that it will be highly beneficial in many ways to see the Sikhs once more Eastward of the Indus, but I still can dispense with none of my troops, or relax in my precautionary measures, as equal if not greater anxieties will attach to me.—I have unbosomed myself to you, and laid bare, without any suppression, my difficulties. I shall bear in lively remembrance the intended good offices of the British Government, and I shall deplore that my interest did not permit me to accept that which was rendered in a spirit so friendly, but which to me and my advisers has only seemed hastening my ruin. To Runjeet Sing your interference is beneficial, as he finds himself involved in serious difficulties by the possession of Peshawur.’

'wur, and he is too glad of your good offices to escape from a place which is a burthen to his finances, but by that escape a debt of gratitude is exactible from him, and not from me : and if your Government will look into this matter, they will soon discover my opinions to be far from groundless, and my conclusions the only safe policy I can pursue.'

9. The Nawab Jubbar Khan followed his brother, and said, it was undoubtedly true that the Ameer had not mistaken the evils which might ensue to himself from the entire restoration of Peshawur to Sooltan Mahomed Khan, but that the Affghan nation could not afford to lose the sympathy which had been exhibited by the British Government; and an arrangement might be made on the basis of a treaty which Runjeet Sing had once entered into with the Ameer and his deceased brother Yar Mahomed Khan, which was to divide Peshawur between them and receive equally at their hands a fixed tribute. Such an arrangement might now be made, and the Ameer would be free from fear of injury, and Runjeet Sing receive from him and Sooltan Mahomed Khan conjointly, the amount on which he was disposed to surrender it. The Ameer added, that such an arrangement would remove his fears : and he should wish no other person placed there but the Nawab himself, and one or two of his own agents under him. ' These observations coming from the Nawab Jubbar Khan are the more remarkable, since he is devoted to his brother Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and would rejoice to see him restored to Peshawur — They consequently carried with me a conviction that the Ameer's fears are not groundless, and that they will deserve all due consideration before Government enters upon any measures for attaching this Chief to its interests.'

10. To the proposition of the Nawab, and the observations of the Ameer which followed upon it, I made no further remark than that the plan would also be taken into consideration ; but before proceeding further, it was incumbent on me to ask one categorical question : ' I had stated that the British Government considered itself conferring an everlasting favor on the Affghan nation by prevailing on the Sikhs to withdraw from this side of the Indus ; that I who had seen this country, considered this act as one of the greatest blessings which could happen to this people. I had however heard from the Ameer, that he did not appreciate this service as we did,' and ' was I' then ' to consider that he would rather have the Sikhs in Peshawur, with all their exercise of prejudice and all the disgrace that it entailed', in preference to Sooltan Mahomed Khan's being restored to his government in that city ?

11. The Ameer replied, that this was certainly placing the matter in an extreme light, and that he found a difficulty in answering the question : ' He admitted fully the advantages of getting rid of the Sikhs, and was far from depreciating the good offices of removing them if it could be done, but' he would candidly ask in return, if the mode of accomplishing an act generally beneficial were proved to be detrimental to himself, who had the most sub-

stantial share of power in the Afghan dominions at this time, it could be said to be applying a remedy to the difficulties under which the Affghans laboured ; and in return for it, the British Government could reckon on those acts which all powers naturally look to in return for benefits conferred. ' I ask you not to aid me in achieving a supremacy throughout this country ; but I do ask to be allowed to stand in the position in which you have found me : if I am to be protected from intrigues in Peshawur, I will then consider myself benefited, but without such a plan as that which the Nawab has stated, or some such other, that places a Barukzye there, which the Governor-General must devise, I foresee evils which cannot have entered into the minds of those who are my well-wishers.

“ 12. ‘ As an instance in point, at this moment I have been made acquainted with an intrigue that has originated in Peshawur, and as I believe with ‘ Ranjeet Sing, which will convey to your Government juster notions than any ‘ expressions of general apprehension. Sooltan Mahomed Khan has just sent ‘ an agent to the ex King at Loodianah to offer his services to combine against ‘ me, and to secure my brothers at Candahar in support of this coalition ; what ‘ security am I to receive against a recurrence of such practices ? As for the ‘ ex-King himself I fear him not, he has been too often worsted to make head ‘ here unless he has aid from the British Government, which I am now pretty ‘ certain he will never receive. If my brother at Peshawur however, under a ‘ promise of being made his minister, and assisted with Sikh Agents and money, appears in the field, I may find that in expressing my satisfaction at his ‘ restoration to Peshawur I have been placing a snake in my bosom—and I may ‘ then, when too late, lament that I did not let the Sikhs do their worst instead ‘ of replacing them by another description of enemies.’ ”

13. I have thus placed before the Right Honorable the Governor-General the opinions and views entertained by the Ruler of Cabool, and the nature of the arguments which I have opposed to them. ‘ It has appeared to me that ‘ they call for much deliberation. It will be seen that the Chief is not bent on ‘ possessing Peshawur, or on gratifying an enmity towards his brothers, but ‘ simply pursuing the worldly maxim of securing himself from injury ; the arguments which he has adduced seem deserving of every consideration, and the ‘ more so, when an avowed partizan of Sooltan Mahomed Khan does not deny ‘ the justice of the Ameer’s objections. It will be for His Lordship to judge ‘ how far the British Government will agree to an interference through its ‘ Agent that will prevent the Chief of Peshawur from caballing against his ‘ brother in Cabool, and if this could not be brought about by the plan suggested of placing the Nawab Jubbar Khan there on the part of the Ameer, and on ‘ the terms proposed. It would give Runjeet Sing tribute from both the Ameer ‘ and Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and thus gratify him, while the known good feeling of the Nawab towards the British Government would give confidence to ‘ Runjeet Sing in the arrangement, and secure to the British a great reputation ‘ in these countries. In the event of this arrangement being also rejected, it

'does certainly appear to me that we are bound in some way to protect the Ameer from the cabals of Peshawur and Candahar, without which this country will become a scene of strife, injurious alike to our commerce and our policy. Those Chiefs will acknowledge the Ruler of Cabool as the head of the family, and respect him accordingly, but they do not admit being dependent on him, nor is it desirable to make them so. If we stand aloof and do not encourage Runjeet Sing to recede, the Ameer of Cabool will hold his present ground, since he is the most powerful of his family.—If we interfere, we endanger his supremacy such as it is, and consequently it seems incumbent on us to prevent such interference being detrimental.'

'14. Under such circumstances it might be urged that all interference had better be avoided, but this, as it appears to me, would be, under the existing state of affairs, a very doubtful line of policy, unless it is intended to put forth the ex-King at Loodiana, secure through him a footing in these countries, and sweep the present rulers from their authority, which has happily never been contemplated. Besides the very questionable nature of such a proceeding, it would not gain the objects of Government, for we should then be unable to balance one Chief-ship against another, and though we might be sure of him whom we advance to the throne of his fathers, we may experience in his successor all the evils of a powerful Mahomedan neighbour. With the Barukzye family in the three Eastern divisions of Affghanistan, we have to deal as it were with but one house, and we have the certainty of their good will and services for these good offices, which will keep them stable, as they are, and prevent them injuring each other.—In time, when one Chief found he could not destroy another, the family differences will be allayed, and we shall thus force into one mass materials which are less incoherent than they appear, and have all that is wished on this important frontier of our Indian Empire.'

'15. I have not hesitated, while reporting on a question of this magnitude, to give expression to sentiments which have been adopted after much reflection on the scene of these distractions. Since arriving here I have seen an Agent of Persia with alluring promises, after penetrating as far as Candahar, compelled to quit the country, because no one was sent to invite him to Cabool. Following him, an Agent of Russia with letters highly complimentary, and promises more than substantial, has experienced no more civility than is due by the laws of hospitality and nations.—It may be urged by some, that the offers of one or both were fallacious, but such a dictum is certainly premature; the Ameer of Cabool has sought no aid in his arguments from such offers, but declared that his interests are bound up in an alliance with the British Government, which he never will desert as long as there is a hope of securing one. It is evident therefore that in this chief we have one who is ready to meet us, and from what is passing in Central Asia at this moment it is any thing but desirable to exhibit indifference to the solicitations of one whose posi-

‘tion makes him courted, and whom aid may render powerful for or against us.’

‘16. As this letter contains matter which may materially affect an adjustment of the differences between the Sikhs and Affghans, I have sent a copy of it specially to Captain Wade.—I am not in possession of his letter to you handing up the first overtures of the Ameer of Cabool, and I cannot in consequence give my sentiments thereon, which will be received as an apology for my not having touched upon them in this letter.—Captain Wade and myself have, I am sure, but one object, which is to gain the ends of Government by using our most strenuous endeavours respectively at Lahore and Cabool, but I must respectfully entreat that Dost Mahomed Khan’s views be subjected to strict scrutiny before they are pronounced to be a mere “gratification of his personal resentments.”—Did I think so, I would not transmit this letter, but this Chief is perfectly aware of the policy we have marked out for ourselves in this country, and his conduct has been already in some degree put to the test by Persia and Russia.—With regard to the latter, the importance of it has now become manifest by the arrival of an express from the Bombay Government, conveying to me the despatches of our Ambassador in Persia, which prove all previous conjectures to be well founded, and that Mr. Vickovitch is, what he has given himself out, an Agent from the Emperor of Russia.—The necessity for a good understanding with this Chief has thus become more than apparent, as the dangers from such an alliance are no longer imaginary, but fairly developed.’

‘17. I have just received a letter as I finish this, from the Ameer to the Governor General, which I enclose with its translation.’

I have, &c.

ALEXANDER BURNES.

Nothing, certainly, could be more conclusive or convincing than the reasoning of the Ameer: the accuracy of his facts we never disputed. But this was a mild specimen of the requirements of the Government of India. A letter from Mr Macnaghten, dated 20th January, was received by Capt. Burnes on the 22d of Feb., containing another from Lord Auckland himself. The latter of these was smooth in expression, but imperious in demand; the former was in the last degree insolent in both—such only as we were entitled to prefer to a ruler, who, having placed himself absolutely in our hands, was still urging the most unreasonable and absurd requests. The immediate object of this was to intimate Lord Auckland’s extreme disapprobation of the assistance proposed to have been given by Burnes to Candabar, in the event of an attack from the westward. The principles laid down on which Dost Mahomed was for the future to be treated with were,—first, the Dost being now essentially dependent upon our good

offices for the removal of his apprehensions from Seikh power, (42) his compliance in having thrown himself on our friendship, and cast aside the alliance of other states, was to be taken advantage of; and now that he had left himself without an ally save ourselves, we were to abuse, insult, and plunder him as the reward of his esteem and regard for us! Burnes was once more (43) instructed to tell him "that, in the precarious position in which he was placed, our good offices for the peace and security of his *remaining territory* should be thankfully accepted by him." This was the language the British envoy was to employ towards the most vigorous minded and enlightened ruler in Central Asia:—a ruler who, from the time our intercourse began with him, had, according to our own account of the matter, treated all the Europeans who ever visited him with the utmost kindness and consideration: who having lost one of the most valuable portions of his territory while engaged in defending himself against a wretched and unpopular imbecile, to whom we gave harbourage and assistance, had for four years striven without intermission to regain it—who had in the majority of cases been successful, and in no case, even when compelled to retire, quitting the field under such circumstances of disaster, as that he did not, within three months of any given retreat, return undismayed into the field,—and who, when we officiously interposed our uncalled for "good offices," had given the enemy so severe a handling, that had we kept away they were ready of themselves to have come in to his terms! (44) That Dost Mahomed could have endured a proposition so insulting, evinces an anxiety to avoid offence almost without a parallel in the annals of royal forbearance. Well might his brother reply—"that government must be ignorant of the true state of affairs in the country; that so far from the proffered protection from Runjeet Singh being of the nature stated, the Maharajah had never sought to attack Cabool, and that hitherto all the aggression had been on the part of the Ameer, and not the ruler of Lahore"—"of his attacks they were under little apprehension." (45) But we must

42. Letter of Mr Macnaghten, 9th paragraph. This paper does not appear in the Blue Book. There certainly was good reason why it should have been suppressed as a manifestation of the commencement of the most unjust and rigorous system of policy on record. The comparatively mild letter of Lord Auckland to the Ameer of the same date and superscription, is given at length in the Blue Book, so as to throw the odium of the impending misunderstandings on Dost Mahomed! The bullying and overbearing note of the Secretary told too much.

43. The same instructions appear to have been given in a letter of 27th December, not published.

44. See extract from Burnes's Cabool, under head Peshawur, note 7; also extract from Captain Wade's letter to Mr Masson, under the present head.

45. This it will be observed, is one of Burnes's longest despatches:—there are just 22 lines of it given in the Blue Book, and these are garbled; 250 lines are suppressed without intimation!

give the suppressed despatch entire, illustrating as it does the clear and vigorous intellect of the good Nawab, and how ill able the sophisms of the Indian Government—which Captain Burnes was directed to employ, to bolster up a dishonest course—could stand against the arguments of the untutored Affghan, with right upon his side:—

Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(*Vide Blue Book, No. V. p. 28.*)

Cabool, March 5, 1838.

Sir,—On the 23d ultimo, I had the honor to report to you the result of my intercourse with the Ameer of Cabool, on the subject of the extent to which he was to reckon on the good offices of the British Government, in an adjustment of his differences with the Sikhs, and the returns which would be expected from him in consequence.

2. From various quarters I have meanwhile heard, that the Ruler of Cabool is but ill disposed to meet Government in its wishes; and the advice given to him by one of the first individuals whose counsel he sought, ‘viz. Mahomed Khan Byat’ was that he should take the British Government at their word, and dismiss their agent, since there was nothing now to be expected from his presence in Cabool. From the receipt of the Governor General’s letter to the present time, nightly meetings have been held at the Bala Hissar, and the Ameer has, on more than one occasion, given vent to very strong expressions, both as to his future proceedings, and the disappointment at the slight degree of appreciation entertained by Government regarding him.

‘ 3. On the morning of the 2nd instant, I had a visit from the Nawab Jubbar Khan, who arrived at Cabool on the preceding day from his estate, having set out immediately he heard of the decision of the British Government. He had previously read His Lordship’s letter to the Ameer, and he had just come from visiting his brother,—I need not detain Government with a repetition of what I stated to the Nawab, since I made him fully acquainted with the views of Government, and the only terms which it seemed just in regard to Maharaja Runjeet Sing, that we could tender our good offices, which consisted in an endeavour to use our influence at Lahore to put a stop to future aggression on the part of the Ruler there on the Affghan dominions, and thus releasing them from the wrath of a powerful sovereign whom they had offended, against the danger of whom their applications in every quarter for succour afforded manifest proof of their fear and danger.—I further told the Nawab of the views of Government regarding Peshawur, of its restoration being in the hands of Runjeet Sing, but most certainly it would not be given to the Ameer.’

‘ 4. The Nawab replied, that the Government must be ignorant of the true state of affairs in this country, that it was well known he was an avowed and open partizan of the British, and that he might therefore give his opinions with a frankness that was not liable to be mistaken; that the good offices of the Government to remove the Sikhs and their future attacks, and to make some set-

‘ tlement in Peshawur were proofs of sympathy, but his Lordship might not have
 ‘ reflected that so far from the proffered protection from Runjeet Sing being of
 ‘ the value stated, that the Maharaja had never sought to attack Cabool, and
 ‘ that hitherto all the aggression had been on the part of the Ameer and not the
 ‘ Ruler of Lahore—That it appeared we valued our offers at a very high rate,
 ‘ since we expected in return that the Affghans would desist from all intercourse
 ‘ with Persia, Russia, Toorkistan, &c. &c. &c. Were the Affghans to make all
 ‘ these powers hostile, and to receive no protection against the enmity raised for
 ‘ their adhering to the British? As for Peshawur being withheld from the Ameer,
 ‘ it might be got over, and he believed he did not over-rate his influence with
 ‘ Sooltan Mahomed Khan when he stated that he might bring about a reconcilia-
 ‘ tion between him and the Ameer; but he must say that the value of the Aff-
 ‘ ghana had indeed been depreciated, and that he did not wonder at the Ameer’s
 ‘ disappointment.’

‘ 5. I replied to the Nawab that I really did not comprehend the motives
 ‘ which swayed him or his brother.—I had before found that it was not Candahar
 ‘ which he wished to subdue, and that the difficulties about Peshawur were not
 ‘ insurmountable, and that in consequence it could not be that Chiefship which the
 ‘ Ameer sought to conquer.—What then were his wishes or expectations? Digni-
 ‘ ty and respect (*izzat wa ikram*), was the reply, and to be looked upon in the light
 ‘ of being able to do something for the British Government, and for such service to
 ‘ receive its real friendship and not a proffer of its sympathy, which did not insure
 ‘ protection from the West, and which dwelt upon the good done on the Eastern
 ‘ frontier by withdrawing Runjeet Sing, of whose attacks they were under little
 ‘ apprehension.—The whole of the Affghan country, continued he, is now at your
 ‘ back, and no future opportunity may prove so favorable to gain any ends which
 ‘ you may have to establish your influence in Cabool, and if you lose this opportuni-
 ‘ ty you will have yourselves to blame.—Before leaving, the Nawab asked me to
 ‘ tell him confidentially if the real object of the Governor General’s letters was to
 ‘ withdraw from the Affghans, or to make friendship with them, for he hoped he
 ‘ would be told his exact meaning that he might use his influence to bring about
 ‘ a good understanding, or at once to save himself from disgrace, refrain from in-
 ‘ terfering. I gave him an assurance that we did most sincerely sympathize with
 ‘ his brother and all the Affghans, and that the use of his influence would be much
 ‘ appreciated, but that after the explicit letter of the Governor General, and the
 ‘ instructions which I had received, I would deceive him if he founded hopes of
 ‘ any thing farther being done for the Affghans than what had been stated.—He
 ‘ took his leave, telling me that he hoped for the best, but that he too was disap-
 ‘ pointed. He made also the singular declaration, that if you wish the good of this
 ‘ country, you must either put aside by force the Ameer, or find some means of
 ‘ obliging him.’

‘ 6. On the 3d instant I had a visit from Mirza Samee Khan, the principal
 ‘ Secretary, who made me acquainted, of course by desire of the Ameer, with what
 ‘ had passed since I last saw him; he stated that the Ameer was more depressed

' at what had occurred than he had ever been, that he had often written to the
 ' British Government about his affairs, and in return they replied to him about
 ' their own, and spoke of commerce : that the answer which he had however re-
 ' ceived from Lord Auckland on his assuming the Government, differed from all
 ' others, and had been most acceptable : that it now appeared if the Ameer took
 ' any means which he thought advisable to resist Runjeet Sing, it will be consider-
 ' ed a direct breach of friendship, so that by seeking the good offices of the British
 ' he had brought upon himself their enmity instead of their indifference. And for
 ' what did the Government claim the gratitude of the Ameer and from abstaining
 ' from all communication with powers to the West? that it would use its good
 ' offices with Runjeet Sing to prevent future aggression, and that the Ameer
 ' should be satisfied with this and his remaining territories. The Government
 ' could not as it appeared to the Ameer have known the true state of things when
 ' Runjeet Sing had never made aggression on Cabool, or taken a jureeb (acre) of
 ' the Ameer's territories, which are now larger than ever, and that he had hitherto
 ' successfully resisted. He had however no hope against the Sikhs if the British
 ' Government aided or encouraged their attacks, but he certainly would consider it
 ' unjust if he sought other aid to hinder Runjeet Sing, and the British Government
 ' interfered.—That the offers to adjust affairs at Peshawur did not suit the Ameer's
 ' views, that he waved all expectations of that place for himself since it was dis-
 ' pleasing to us, but that he regarded Sooltan Mahomed Khan and Runjeet Sing
 ' as identified, and that by such a settlement his character (purdeh) did not remain
 ' with the people who had attached themselves to him, whose injury would follow
 ' on Sooltan Mahomed's restoration, and whom he would then have the disgrace
 ' of having deserted.—In addition to all this, he was to get no protection from
 ' Persia, or any power whose anger he might have raised because of his adherence
 ' to the British, which in Mahomed Shah's approach to Herat seemed both an act
 ' of honesty and justice.'

' 7. These, continued the Mirza, are not only the views of the Ameer himself,
 ' and tho' as yet no general assemblage of his advisers had taken place he had
 ' had the opinion of others. The Nawab Mahomed Osman Khan had written in
 ' reply from Bala Bagh, that subjugation by Runjeet Sing could never disgrace
 ' him even if it did take place, but a desertion of those who had served him in his
 ' wars with the Sikhs would most certainly do so, and if he could not ma-
 ' nage to have some influence in Peshawur such must follow, but that he
 ' must know he had no hopes of resisting the British Government what-
 ' ever he might do to that of Lahore.—The Mirza made nearly the same obser-
 ' vation as the Nawab about the expectations which the Ameer had cherished of
 ' doing service for the British and devoting himself to it, that it was not the ad-
 ' justment of Peshawur affairs that dissipated his hopes, but the indifference to his
 ' sufferings and station which it was now clear we felt, and this was the more
 ' strange as he abandoned all his intercourse with Persia and every other power to
 ' please us, for he could not be charged with over civility to Captain Vickovitch,
 ' who had not been even received till he had consulted with me, and whose con-
 ' tinuance here depended upon the moon, and to whom letters which had been

‘ written, had not been given because they met my disapproval.—The Ameer, said he, has taken up an impression that your Government has misunderstood the nature of the correspondence with Russia, and attached to it a degree of blame which would only have been just, had it taken place after an exhibition of your friendly feelings.’

‘ 8. I replied to Mirza Samee Khan, that they knew as well as I did the views of the British; that I could not take upon myself the responsibility of doing more than reporting all they had to say, and that I really did not see how Government were to blame, since I did not know exactly at this time what the Ameer of Cabool expected of us.—That as far as the respect due to his situation, my presence here was proof enough of the friendly estimation in which we held him, and that there was no doubt some grounds for the claims made to protect him from the west, but my Government knew its own interests best, and the extent which the British agreed to go in its good offices had been explicitly stated, and that if they considered their own interests they would gladly accept what had been tendered in a spirit so friendly, for if we did not appreciate the services of the Affghans in the light which they themselves did, we wished to do them a substantial service, which it grieved me to see that they did not hold in that light. It was certainly true, I added, that Captain Vickovitch had been received as had been stated, and that the letters which were to be sent had been altered, but I begged him to remember the message about waiting till the vernal equinox (snowroz) for an answer, and if he thought a Government like the British would submit to be tied down by such a limit.’

‘ 9. The Mirza observed, that the Ameer had apologized for that message, which was decidedly wrong, but that I who was on the spot, should judge of the agitating circumstance.—I took this occasion to say, that if the Ameer thought we were in error about Russian letters, he had it in his power now to transmit the originals from Russia to the Governor General, but I observed that this was a suggestion far from agreeable, and the Mirza said that if I wished to see these letters again he would bring them to me, but he did not think the Ameer would ever permit their being sent to India, but we had received copies of them.—I treated the reply with indifference, and said that the remark on my part had arisen from his own observation.—Before Mirza Samee Khan left, I gathered that the result of all the conference up to this time (3d instant) went to claim from the British Government a means of protection from the West as the price of their adherence to us, and farther, that, however Peshawur might be settled by Runjeet Sing. no acknowledgment could be made for our good offices unless means were taken to prevent injury from such settlement to those who had befriended the Ameer—even with this latter arrangement it appeared we could not carry the Ameer’s heart along with us,—since he believed it in his power to do service from the position he held, and the anxiety to be allied to us above all others, to which we seemed to give little or no weight, but on the contrary had shewn in the Governor General’s letter that we looked with a degree of indifference (be purwae) to any connection with the Affghan nation.’

‘ 10. On the morning of the 4th, I had another visit from the Nawab. While conversing on the contents of the Governor General’s letter I observed that no communication could more clearly convey the sincerity and good feelings of the British Government than such a declaration, to which he assented, adding that there were hopes conveyed in it which appeared on a re-perusal to be satisfactory, but that I dimmed all these expectations by declining to give any promises about protection from Persia, or any proof of our friendly feelings towards the Affghans : we had weighed much on our good offices at Peshawur, and no one would be more rejoiced to see Sooltan Mahomed Khan once more established in his Government than himself, but we had really gone too far in fixing that as the limit of our good offices, and if we meant to purchase the Affghans by it we should not succeed, that our policy appeared to him the more strange since we had furnished cannon, muskets, &c. &c, and even officers and money, to Persia, when in Afghanistan the door of India (durwaza i Hind) we mean to do nothing, and what was more, to consider Dost Mahomed Khan our enemy if he entered into any description of political intercourse with others.—The singular attachment of this man to the British Government made its appearance however in a form different from what has been stated—he made a serious proposal to me to keep the Ameer in check if we were determined to go no farther, by drawing closely to Candahar ; establishing Sooltan Mahomed Khan in Peshawur, and then bidding defiance to the Ameer ; but to effect this, added he, you must substantially protect Candahar. I replied that Government had not contemplated any such measure, and it was its object to maintain all the Affghan Chiefs in their actual position.’

11. It seems very clear, from what has been above stated, although the final answer of Dost Mahomed Khan has not been received, that we have little hope of establishing a friendly connection with him on the terms wished for by Government ; even if it could be brought about before a vast change of opinion takes place, the friendship would be delusive, and no degree of dependence could be placed on this Chief.

‘ I am aware that the views of Government are decided, and it would be highly presumptuous in me to make any observations on the record of the different conversations which have been above reported.’ As Mr. Vickovitch still remains in Cabool (and his presence is the strongest test of the Ameer’s disposition to make use of him against us) ; and as Dost Mahomed Khan does not appreciate our good offices in Peshawur, I shall deem it my duty to retire when I receive the Ameer’s letter unless some very decided change of tone takes place at Cabool. The only feeling, and it is one of the highest importance, which will counteract this step is the expression of His Lordship’s opinion that the line of Policy marked out in respect to Dost Mahomed Khan ought to be readily successful, and the belief that this Chief will have judged better for his interests than to compel me to quit Cabool. I am well aware of the responsibility when I shall incur as a public servant by this act, if it be too precipitately taken, but as our unavoidable loss of character must equally follow my continuance here under expectations

' which appear deceptive, I shall not hesitate between such responsibility and the
' paramount consideration of what appears to me due to our national honor.'

I have, &c.

ALEX. BURNES.

Even this, however, was insufficient to obtain the quarrel which we had, it would appear, three times determined to provoke. We had a last resource yet left us: it was now clear that there was hardly any thing which we could demand of the Ameer which he was not prepared to concede to us, rather than forego the hope of our friendship: the master-stroke of our policy was to ask him for what he *could* not give. It was proposed that the Ameer should be requested to send presents to Lahore, in testimony of his gratitude for having been relieved of Peshawur—to make submission to him after having inflicted on him severer humiliation and chastisement than he had ever before endured at the hands of an enemy—and ask his pardon for having endeavoured to get back his own! The whole of the papers on this subject are suppressed, and we only discover the fact of this scheme having been in contemplation from Burnes's posthumous MSS. It would be important to possess the documents to which these are replies. This last act of tyranny was one to which our envoy refused to be a party. "He found that he could not propose to the Ameer of Cabool to send presents to Lahore as an opening to the establishment of future friendship: the difficulties had been great, without adding to them. Had Dost Mahomed Khan himself assented, the Mahomedan populace would have despised him, and probably have prevented him." (46) An untoward event at this time occurred, which, with parties less determined for hostilities than the war party in the secretariate,—for Lord Auckland unhappily was now removed from his council, in which, we have every reason to believe, he would have been out-voted,—would have deprived us of all excuse for the Afghan campaign. (47)

On 5th March, the Ameer called on Capt. Burnes. The usual explanations were gone over—it was no wonder that they were in so far unsatisfactory, when Burnes admits that, up to this time, he could not discover what were the intentions of the Governor-General. (48) The Envoy told him explicitly, that if he did not wish our good offices on the terms proposed, he should dismiss him. The Dost (49) professed himself shocked at this

46. Suppressed portion of despatch, 13th March.

47. He was on his way to Simla. A most unwise provision in the Charter Act permits the Governor to act alone, and on his own responsibility, when absent from Calcutta. The Commander-in-Chief is known to have been hostile to the war, and the Hon. Messrs. Prinsep and Bird were universally believed to be the same—Three out of five.

48. Suppressed portion of the despatch of the 5th March. The presentable fragments are given in the Blue Book, pp. 29, 30, and 31.

49. The above is given nearly verbatim. What the phrase, "our good

last proposition, from which he considered disgrace to him would flow:—
 “You have been welcomed,” said he, “by every Mahomedan State since you left Bombay, from the belief that you were the bearer of good news to an unhappy race of men, whose internal discord has made them the prey of a nation of another faith. I dare not, if I wished it, set myself up against the Affghan people: the belief has gone abroad that your presence is connected with their advantage, and, though I admit that I profit by it, still the objects of my heart are not fully accomplished.”

“There are Affghans in Tak fighting in thousands at this hour against the Sikhs; they have aided me, and they looked to me, but their sufferings will have no abatement; but I throw myself upon the generosity of the Governor-General of India, and I rely on the sympathy which his Lordship has expressed.

“I congratulated the Ameer on his having seen his own interest better than to permit of friendship being interrupted between him and a nation so well disposed towards him; but that it was now my duty to tell him clearly what we expected of him, and what we could do in return. You must never receive agents from other powers, or have aught to do with them, without our sanction; you must dismiss Captain Vickovitch with courtesy; you must surrender all claim to Peshawur on your own account, as that chiefship belongs to Maharajah Runjeet Sing; you must live on friendly terms with that potentate; you must also respect the independence of Candahar, and of Peshawur; and co-operate in arrangements to unite your family. In return for this, I promise to recommend to the Government that it use its good offices with its ancient ally Maharajah Runjeet Sing, to remove present and future causes of difference between the Sikhs and Affghans at Peshawur; but as that chiefship belongs to the Maharajah, he may confer it on Sooltan Manomed Khan or any other Affghan whom he chooses, on his own terms and tribute; it being understood that such arrangement is to preserve the credit and honour of all parties.

“‘To this I assent’ said the Ameer; ‘but as these arrangements are not set forth in full in his Lordship’s letter, it would be desirable for you to reduce the matter to writing, as far as your knowledge of the Governor-General’s views will permit you, that I may fairly see what is expected, and what is to be done in return. The differences of the Affghans and Sikhs can never be said to be adjusted so long as the Maharajah keeps his troops and Officers at Peshawur: and, consequently, though I place every faith in the friendly intervention of the British, and know that the Maharajah must be left to himself I am bound to state that fresh causes for disturbance must arise if his Highness does not place my brother, or an Affghan, in Peshawur, and leave him to govern it subject to his (the Maharajah’s) orders, but without the presence of Seikh

offices” meant, the Affghans appear never to have been able to discover,—nor will the reader be very likely to find it out from the Blue Book.

troops." I replied, that since the Ameer agreed himself to peace, it was better to leave these things to be settled hereafter, since the less that was now said about them the better."

18. ' Having thus, it appeared to me, gained the ends desired by Government, I proceeded to improve the dawn of good feeling towards his brothers, and sued for the Nuwab Jubbar Khan's co-operation in making up matters between the Ameer and Sooltan Mahomed Khan. This most amiable man declared to me that the matter was easy, and begged that I would write to the Governor General and say that he pledged himself to bring it about, and that there was but one difficulty which could prevent it, and this *would be the disapproval of the Maharaja Runjeet Sing*. If this was no obstacle, he would proceed at once to Peshawur and bring all his brothers to Jellalabad, where they would be met by the Ameer, and in my presence he would get them to exchange papers that the Peshawur family may come to Cabool in summer, and the Ameer go to Peshawur in winter, each with a few hundred horse; and that further, he pledged himself to bring together the whole family from Candahar, or at least one of the brothers, and to witness the much desired object of the restoration of harmony and unanimity in their house. On this he added that all the Ameer's fears for his Peshawur adherents, now with him, would end, if the affair could be adjusted.—I assured the Nuwab Jubbar Khan that his exertions would receive high applause and appreciation, and that if things went right and I happened to be present at the peace-making, I would consider it one of the most happy events that had occurred, and which would rescue a brave nation from inevitable destruction. I do not believe the Nuwab overrates his influence; he has great weight both at Peshawur and Candahar, through Sooltan Mahomed, Kohun and Rubun Dil Khans, and when war no longer disturbs the peace of the Eastern frontier of Afghanistan, these much wished for objects will certainly follow, as is amply proved by my previous correspondence. With Persia, we should have had Russian influence in her train, and had the Ameer been disposed to doubt the sincerity of the Shah, the presence of the Russian Agent, Captain Viekovitch, would have gone far to remove his suspicions.'

Here, then, so late as the month of March were the last of our difficulties surmounted, and everything gained from the Ameer which the British Government appeared to have desired. Nothing of any moment—save the arrival of Kohun Dil Khan from Candahar, formerly noticed at length, is recorded as having occurred for the next four weeks.

There were said to have been letters written to Candahar by the Doct, stating that he had now lost all hope from the British—no great marvel that there should,—and interviews discovered with Captain Vicovich, of which no one professed to know the purport; and with matters in this *alarming* state, Burnes felt that he could no longer remain at Cabool consistently with his instructions. He left on the 26th of April, being accompanied in all honour by three of the Ameer's sons and the prime minister two miles beyond the gates. Captain Burnes writes from Jellalabad (30th April,) that he

had heard reports of the Dost's having gone over to Persia, and sought the security of Russia,—that some of the Ameer's family, or of his brothers at Candahar, were to be sent with letters to the Shah; that Captain Vicovich had promised to get the guarantee of Russia to all their arrangements,—and that, when Herat fell, the King of Persia would either assist with troops or money for an attack upon Peshawur. Burnes at the time seems to have been very doubtful of the weight to be attached to this report, and on more mature consideration he manifestly held it of no account whatever. The light which subsequent disclosures has thrown upon the subject, now shews that Captain Vicovich had no political authority; but that he was one of the most wild and unscrupulous of romancers. Russia formally refused to give any guarantee whatever in the case of the cession of Herat to Candahar: the latter place never fell into the hands of Persia, so that this most mendacious of nations could never have been brought into the predicament of requiring to fulfil her promise, if she had made any: she had no money to pay her own troops, and was therefore sufficiently unlikely to afford subsidies to Dost Mahomed; and as she required a twelvemonth to march her army from her capital to the nearest frontier—from Teheran to Herat,—it is sufficiently unlikely that she could, even had she desired it, have succeeded in ever reaching Peshawur, a thousand miles beyond it! With this closes the narrative of our negotiations with Dost Mahomed: the reader may judge whether anything had arisen in the course of these to justify the infliction on him and his brothers of the last of ill rulers can endure. We took their country from them and gave it to the enemy of their race, leaving them the choice of the alternatives of becoming outcasts and wanderers from the land of their fathers, or prisoners of state within our territories. The majority of them preferred the former—the nobler selection. The subject of this chapter was introduced by a letter from Lord Auckland to Dost Mahomed, and with another at the interval of less than two years, it may be closed.

Lord Auckland to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan.

After compliments.

Simla, 27 April 1838.

I HAVE received your letter, and fully comprehend its contents.

It has been a source of much regret to me to find that your views of what is most for your advantage, have led you to decline the good offices which I have tendered, for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between you and Maharajah Runjeet Sing, on the only terms on which I could, consistently with what has appeared to me just, engage to exercise my mediation for the settlement of the unhappy differences existing between you.

With the explanation, however, of your sentiments which you have now afforded to me, my further interposition in this affair could not lead to beneficial results; and as, in so unsettled a condition of things, the continuance of Captain Burnes, and of the officers under his orders, in Affghanistan, would not

be conducive to the good ends which I had hoped to accomplish by their deputation, I have now issued orders to them to return to India ; and they will accordingly set out, on receiving from you their dismissal, for which their immediate application will be made to you.

I have to express to you my acknowledgments for your attention and kindness to these officers while residing in your dominions.

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

Dost Mahomed and Captain Burnes had parted in sorrow but not in anger, and surely, from aught that has yet appeared, there was nothing to lead to the belief, from any thing which had occurred, that the country would be invaded by our armies, and its chiefs—not one but all—rendered fugitives or captives. From what appears in the printed papers, there is no reason whatever to believe that the Ameer or his brothers were, from this date, guilty of one disloyal act towards us. The assertion that Dost Mahomed ever threatened to call in foreign aid to enable him to consummate schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India, is founded on no better grounds than the declaration that Persia was prosecuting throughout Afghanistan intrigues, “ having for their object the extension of her influence to the banks of, or even beyond, the Indus ; ” (50) and both, so far as the printed papers are concerned, are as thoroughly unsupported as any averments ever made by the most reckless statesman. Lord Auckland, in his Simla minute of the 12th of May states, “ that Dost Mahomed Khan had shown himself to be so disaffected and ambitious (51) that with him we could form no satisfactory connection ; although he might not, under such circumstances, furnish us with grounds of direct hostility against him.” This is most decidedly an admission that, up to this date, no grounds of direct hostility had been furnished by the Ameer. The probability is, that the secretaries, or the leaders under whose influence the Governor-General had placed himself, had, by this time, arranged the whole matter without his Lordship’s knowledge : the mission of Mr Macnaghten to Cabool, three days afterwards, proves that the thing was completed by the 15th May.

This mission, from which results so singular in many ways arose, was as strange as it was important. It has just been seen that on the 12th of May the Governor-General placed on record, opinions in many respects pacific—in no respect countenancing the idea that Dost Mahomed was to be dethroned. Three days afterwards the chief secretary set out on a mission

50. Simla proclamation.

51. Verbatim extract from the minute. His Lordship does not condescend to enlighten his readers in what way the Ameer had evinced either ambition or disaffection to us. The published papers exhibit none, but much of the contrary of both.

to Lahore with the draft of a treaty ready prepared, by which the Indian Government, the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and Shah Soojah-Ool-Moolk, bound themselves together so that the friends and enemies of any one of the parties were to be considered the friends and enemies of all the others. After this had been duly discussed and determined on, and was on the very eve of being subscribed, Mr Macnaghten continued to consult Sir Alexander Burnes and Mr Masson, as if every thing was to be regulated by their advice. The opinion of both these gentlemen on this point, almost exactly coincided. That of Sir Alexander Burnes, as expressed in his official letters not quoted in the Blue Book, is as follows:—

Extracts : Opinions as to the mode of restoring Shah Shoojah, submitted by Sir A. Burnes.

Lahore, 18th June, 1838.—But objections arise to sending Shooja-Ool-Moolk from the country of the Sikhs, of which Dost Mahomed Khan would not be slow to avail himself, agitating the country to war against the infidels who had come to invade him. These objections seem stronger than they really are, and indeed amount to little when we have gained the end of directing the Sikhs. Sikh troops should if possible not be used at all ; but I adhere to the opinion, which I have already expressed, that one if not two of our Regiments should be given to the Shah nominally as an escort to his person, and to show decidedly to the Affghans how much we are interested in his safety and welfare. The smallest number of our troops will be exaggerated in Cabool to an army, and we shall speak at once to men's eyes and senses. If Maharaja Runjeet Singh objects to the use of our troops when he has so many of his own, he might be told they were merely honorary, as their small number proved, and that the Shah required them as the nucleus on which he was to form his future forces. Besides this direct assistance, opportunity should be given to the troops of our army to volunteer, as they have lately done for the force in Oude, and instead of raw levies a good army might soon be collected ; but though it is doubtless necessary to have a force of sufficient strength to cope with the Chiefs of Cabool and Caudahar, for my part I have more faith in political agitation for the Shah's cause than in physical force.* * * *

Matters being thus arranged, I would recommend the following line of procedure. From Peshawur, Shah Shooja should issue a proclamation and send it in hundreds through the Affghan country, that he had arrived at Peshawur to recover the throne of his fore-fathers, to put an end to wars with the Sikhs, to unite the Affghan nation, and to repel the enemies of their creed, the Persians, who had dared to invade the kingdom ; that he was now able to chastise his enemies, both internal and external, since he and the British Government were one ; and that, from the affection he bore to his people, he could not think of declaring war till he had given all parties a fair opportunity of repairing to his camp and tendering their allegiance ; that the treatment all would experience would be according to their early presence, and that His Majesty's object was not to scrutinize particularly what had passed, but to

restore the glory of the Dooraneo Monarchy. This, with a distribution of money in Khyber, where Shooja has more friends than in any part of Affghanistan, and the Kohistan of Cabool, which could easily be managed, would in all human probability dissolve Dost Mahomed's power, and the Shah's advance on Cabool would be a triumph without bloodshed; for the Affghan nation never will submit to Persia but by fear, and Dost Mahomed Khan by going over to Mahomed Shah, has converted doubting friends into enemies, and materially contributed thereby to Shah Shooja's success. * * *

"The next, and probably the most delicate, of all questions which present themselves, is the disposal of Dost Mahomed Khan. His ambition makes it more than questionable if he ever would consent to act in a subordinate capacity, but he should have the offer, for he will be a dangerous antagonist if he flies to Persia, and we have the first authority for recording that one of Shah Shooja's most serious errors, when King, was in failing to conciliate Futeh Khan Barukzye, the brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, and in whose place he may now clearly be said to be. These are the words of Mr Elphinstone: 'Futeh Khan was soon after persuaded to make his submission to the new King (Soojah). An opportunity was now offered of securing the attachment of this powerful and active Chief, but it was allowed to escape, and hence arose the misfortunes which disturbed the rest of Shah Shoojah's reign, and which drove him at length from his throne.' This is high authority, and though it perhaps would be impolitic to offer the Viziership to such a Chief, some situation as a Dooranee Lord, such as existed in the old court of the Suddozyes, might be found for him, and a liberal provision in land. The presence of a British agent, and an active and decided influence in all that relates to the political affairs of Cabool, which I take for granted is to be our policy, if it did not break the factious spirit of Dost Mahomed Khan, would prevent his doing harm. I think also that it would be highly to the credit of the British Government to aid in such an offer of conciliation; for if the Ameer is disappointed, our hopes, the difficulties that beset him from the west are to be considered, and we escape the odium of being privy to his entire destruction by showing that our object is the restoration of the Dooranee monarchy, and not the punishment of the Chief of Cabool. It is to be observed, that Affghan differences are much easier healed than those of other nations; and, above all things, it should be Shah Shoojah's policy to forget the past, and the talents of Dost Mahomed Khan may yet avail him in subduing some of his rebellious subjects. Much is to be said on this subject, and it requires great reflection and consideration, which may and must be given to it when matters are more advanced.

Lahore, 19th June, 1838.—2. I attach importance to the presence of a small portion of our troops from the prestige it will exercise. There are as solid objections to the presence of our officers as our troops; a disaster in either case would be unfortunate, and going so far as to give money and officers, an honorary escort is not a step far beyond. It is not essential to success, but I think would contribute to it.

The reference by Mr. Macnaghten to Capt. Burnes, replied to on the 18th and 19th of June, was clearly nothing else than a pretext, with a view of extracting something from him capable of receiving a construction favourable to the views of the war party—now unhappily in the ascendant; so as to satisfy, if possible, the still wavering resolution of the Governor-General. The treaty, providing for war on the largest scale, and ratified on the 26th, betwixt the British Government, the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and the Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, must before this have been drawn up.

It has already been seen that Mr Macnaghten was, so late as the end of January, in favour of the maintenance of the arrangements among the Barukzye chiefs as they stood, considering their divisions well calculated to ward off the advances of a foreign foe. He had now abandoned this and taken an entirely opposite view of the case, and determined that nothing could save India but the re-integration of the Dooranee empire under the Shah Soojah, the proverbially *unfortunate*. The sole original objection to the maintenance of Dost Mahomed's claims upon Peshawur was, that it kindled up the flames of war in those regions where we were most anxious to promote the interests of commerce; but when it appeared that the equitable claims of the Ameer could readily be adjusted by peaceful negotiation,—our aversion to hostilities took another form, and it was now the aggrandizement of this man, who had, more than any Ruler in Asia, courted our friendship without selfishness—without hope of favour or fear of injury—until we meddled with his affairs, that alarmed us! A few months afterwards, when Runjeet Singh asked permission to advance with fire and sword on Jellalabad, and increase his territories by fresh appropriations from his neighbour, our fears, both of war and aggrandizement on his part, had vanished. If the historian were permitted to examine into the archives of the Colonial Office, with a view of ascertaining when certain unsatisfactory despatches from Calcutta first began to be received—and were then to turn to the Board of Control, and see whether the first warlike instructions sent out by Sir John Hobhouse had not considerably more to do with these than with any tidings sent by the Persian mission—the results might be curious.

The arrival in India of the news of the unfortunate issue of the general election of August 1837, would, if examined into, probably be found to coincide remarkably with some of the more pugnacious Simla minutes. These things will be matter of speculation for the annalist to inquire into, when the records of the public offices are transferred to the Tower or the British Museum.

Although it was obviously our intention, from the month of June 1837, to pick a quarrel, and have a war on some account, somewhere, with somebody—a source of recreation in which our statesmen were permitted to indulge with-

out enquiry, by virtue of an accumulated surplus of ten millions of hoarded treasure in the coffers of government,—the form and pressure this was to assume was left to be determined by the chapter of accidents. According to Mr Masson, it was the Punjaub that the Board of Control wished us to seize upon, and the mistake into which we fell was that of marching on Cabool, when Lahore was intended to have been the point of our destination—making a traverse of 1500 miles instead of 50. The gentleman referred to professes to have been shewn, by Captain Burnes, the letter to this effect from the Secret Committee. It passed through the hands of Lord Auckland and his secretaries, and might be worth while enquiring after. There was said to have been such difficulty in keeping Lord Auckland's courage at the sticking point, that the secretaries were terrified lest the whisper of the possibility of pacific arrangements should reach his ear. An amusing anecdote is mentioned on this subject by Masson. "I had previously learned," says this not over-trustworthy authority, "a strange account of the mode in which the *amiable* Lord Auckland had been driven into measures which his better judgment disapproved, and how he was obliged to yield to the assaults of certain female A. D. C.'s and Secretaries, and I now questioned Sir Alexander on the part he had taken, particularly as regarded this useless expedition. He replied that it was arranged before he reached Simla, and that when he arrived, Torrens and Colvin came running to him, and prayed him to say nothing to unsettle his Lordship; that they had taken all the trouble in the world to get him into the business, and that even now he would be glad on any pretence to return from it." The correspondent of a London daily paper is still more explicit as to the sources of the plan of the campaign on the great scale—how Mr Macnaghten was at once ambitious and unpopular, he wished to become an Envoy, and was wished out of the Secretariat to make room for Mr Torrens, whose wife, a fashionable and accomplished woman, was in great favour with the rulers of the ruler of India—the Hon. Misses Eden, sisters and managers of Lord Auckland!

From the subscription of the treaty at Lahore, on the 26th of June, the State Papers furnish no further light on the course of events till the middle of August, when a despatch of Lord Auckland's to the Secret Committee indicates that matters were finally arranged, much as set forth in the Simla proclamation of the 1st October—the bulk of which has been quoted in paragraphs at the heads of the sections of the present chapter. It was one amongst the singular anomalies with which the arrangements of the Afghan expedition abound, that we relied for our means of getting into the country on the Governments of Scinde and Kelat—both in former days dependencies of the Dooranee empire, but both for thirty years perfectly independent of all superiors. The inducement to assist us which we held out to them

was, that they should be once more replaced under their old oppressive masters, be annexed to the Doorannee empire, and merge their individual authority in the sovereignty of the Shah Soojah! The alternative offered for declining a request so modest and equitable was—deposition, or probably death!!

It must not, in conclusion, be forgotten, that we never gave Dost Mahomed the most distant hint that we intended to wage war with him. He had, on numerous occasions, expressed himself so awed by British power, and so apprehensive of its being employed against him in assisting the Seikhs, that had we made him aware that we purposed attacking him, it is probable he would have made any sacrifice that could have been required of him. We never gave him the alternative; we never made him a tender of the terms on which we were willing to have abstained from invading his country. We, on the 1st October, for the first time announced our intention of restoring the Shah Soojah, and deposing the Ameer and the Candahar Sirdars,—not pretending that with the last we ever negotiated or had any grounds of quarrel! We marched an army into the country without having asked whether, with the alternative of invasion before them, the chiefs would not concede the points which they knew we would compel them to yield to us in the long run at any rate. The Affghans knew our power too well,—as indeed they had often told us,—to imagine that they could keep the field against us. In this particular the campaign of 1839 was wholly without precedent; and it is beyond question, that according to the principles of civilized war, Lord Keane's army could not have complained had they been treated as marauders. The Colonial Society has drawn up a statement on the subject, shewing, that had the whole of our people who fell into the hands of the enemy during the period of our occupation of the country, been hanged, the Affghans would have acted under the sanction of the highest European authorities, and would have been countenanced by the conduct of all civilized nations, on whose territories similar aggressions had been attempted. It has of late become the custom to affirm, that the objections to the policy of Lord Auckland only began to make their appearance after the calamities of Nov. and Dec. 1841: a statement more unfounded cannot exist. It has already been seen that had Lord Auckland been at Calcutta when hostile measures were in agitation, he would in all likelihood have been outvoted at his own Council Board on the question of Affghan invasion. The whole of the military chiefs in India viewed the expedition as one of pure insanity. The aversion of the Government of Bombay, far more intimately acquainted than that of Calcutta with the countries we proposed to subdue, to the whole scheme of the Simla policy, has long been notorious. The press of India, though far from unanimous certainly, generally condemned the measure, and predicted with very great accuracy, as the

results afterwards exemplified, the mischiefs to which it must give rise. We have already seen with what aversion the matter was regarded at the India House, and how early Sir Henry Willock, and Mr St John Tucker, recorded their opinions against it. The press, in general, entered but slightly into the discussion: the journals which ventured on an examination of the question, with the exception of the *Quarterly Review*, gave their opinions decidedly against it. The *Asiatic Journal*, as the best informed of those on Oriental affairs, has been repeatedly referred to, and its articles on the subject in 1838 and 1839 are well worthy of perusal. We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of quoting, in conclusion, some extracts from a very excellent article in the *Spectator* newspaper, of 27th July 1839, on the *Review's* observations on the Parliamentary papers, pointing out not only the general danger incurred by the newly adopted policy of the Governor-General—for that of the Government of India it could in no sense be called—but the shape this danger was likely to assume, and the quarters whence it might be expected to approach us. The *Spectator's* views were given to the world in the midst of our triumphs; he boded evil while the shouts of victory still filled our ears. His anticipations have been realized:—

“ THE WAR IN INDIA.

“THE current number of the *Quarterly Review* has an elaborate paper on Russia, Persia, and India; distinguished by a tone of friendliness to the Government and its agents, and what is more, a substantial vindication of recent British policy and proceedings in Asia, which few would have expected at the hands of that stanch organ of the Opposition, even in charity. To us, indeed, it seems that the Reviewer is, for once, too charitable: for a pretty careful examination of the file of papers laid before Parliament in the passing session, leads us to conclusions considerably at variance with his; and at the same time it has confirmed some of our previous opinions and speculations, it enables us to correct or qualify others. In short, we rise from the perusal of the Eastern Correspondence with a persuasion, that our present war in India, or rather outside of India, is more questionable in its objects, and suspicious in its pretences, and likely to be more extensive and perilous, than any which the British Government of that country has ever yet waged with any Asiatic power.

“Let us begin by examining the pretext for the war. For thirty years and upwards, we have maintained, without interruption, an embassy at the Court of Persia, and paid in salaries, in subsidies and gifts, in arms and ammunition, between three and four millions sterling. The object of our Persian diplomacy was to secure India against French and Russian invasion. The upshot of our thirty years' expenditure of money, protocols, and despatches, is, that Persia, on our own admission, instead of being a bulwark against the aggression of an European power, has become a stepping-stone for Russia. In a word, by our own showing, all our Persian diplomacy has been worse than useless—it has been highly detrimental.

“With the Shah of Persia we have three respective treaties, every one of which

contains the following article—'If war should ensue between the Persian and Afghan Governments, the English Government shall take no part in it; nor shall it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator, at the solicitation of both parties, for the purpose of producing peace.' Well, a war arises between the Persian King and the Afghans—as just, upon the part of the former, as any ever waged by an European government, and far juster than most of them. The Prince of Herat, the most westerly state of the Afghans, taking advantage of a moment of anarchy, invades a Persian province, burns its towns and villages, and, carrying off twelve thousand of its inhabitants, sells them, man, woman, and child, as slaves. The King of Persia, naturally indignant at this outrage, marches an army to chastise the public robber, and invades Herat. According to the admission of the British Envoy, (a man of mark and talent,) twice repeated in the papers laid before Parliament, the King of Persia has right and justice on his side. Well, then, are the English Minister, the Envoy, and the Governor-General of India, neutral and quiescent, as in good faith became parties to the treaty we have just quoted? Quite the contrary. They are not only not asked to interfere as mediators *by both parties*, but one party expressly repudiates their interference; while the other does not solicit it, and only accepts it when it has been often obtruded: as we may see from the following curious passage of a letter from the Prime Minister of Herat to the British Envoy—'With regard to the coming of the Kajar (Persian) army to this country, I am not, and never shall be, in any way willing to give you trouble or annoyance. Should the Persian Government evince any great desire to come to Herat, do not prevent the advance of the army, or take any trouble in the matter. It is an affair of no consequence. Let them come, in order that they may prove what they are able to do. May it please God the merciful, by the grace and assistance of the Almighty, the stead of their wishes shall not accomplish the journey of their design.' This is the polite Oriental fashion of saying '*laissez nous faire*' to a meddler; and the recent obstinate refusal of the Prince of Herat to accept a British subsidiary force for his protection, shows that our interpretation is the right one. The English Government is not only not neutral, it directly interferes, and without being asked. It is far from stopping even at the point of impertinent negotiation. A roving agent of the Governor-General of India, a skillful engineer, throws himself into the fortress of Herat, and assists in its defence against the Persians; a squadron of men of war is sent and takes possession of a portion of *our allies'* territory on the Persian Gulf; and a great army is marched to dethrone an Afghan chief *suspected of preferring a Persian to an English alliance*, (some alliance or other being indispensable, and *we* having expressly refused him ours except on terms intolerable,) for his protection against a fourth party, the Seiks, who had wrested from him, by a series of aggressions, a large portion of his dominions. In reference to this conduct, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs has the following pertinent remarks—'We are ignorant by what evidence the British Government considers our interference in the affairs of Afghanistan as a mark of hostility against itself. Besides the auspicious treaty, the observation of the stipulations of which is the foundation of the friendship of the two states, are there any other treaties or engagements between Persia and England relative to

which any neglect or non-observance has proceeded from us? or did the plenipotentiaries of both states forget this point at the time of forming the treaty, that they omitted any allusion to it? or have new rules of friendship been instituted in this world, with which we are not acquainted? or does the party which considers itself strongest consider also that the observation or violation of treaties rests on its discretion?' Here is a *shocking* charge of Punic faith, made against the government of a civilized country by a people whom we have been accustomed to look upon as faithless barbarians; and the only reply we have made to it, virtually amounts to this, that our original intention in making the treaty was not accomplished,—that is, that Persia did not turn out to be the bulwark against Russian aggression which we mistakingly supposed it would. In short, we talk of the 'spirit' of the treaty, carefully avoiding to say one word about its plain and obvious letter.

"Against the faith of treaties, then, we set up necessity and expediency. Now let this plea be looked into. Herat is declared to be the key to the British dominions in India—the key which is to open the door to the Russians and their allies the Persians, to Hindoostan. The supposed key, in this case, is surely at a vast distance from the door. Our own army has been already five months on its march from the frontier, backed by all the resources of India, and without firing a single shot, unless at a few freebooters; and there is no trustworthy intelligence that it has yet reached the first spot where there is any probability of its meeting with resistance, viz. Candahar; in the neighbourhood of which, by the way, it is proposed that we should canton for the whole summer,—by which (for Cabool, the main point, and a month's march through snowy mountains and narrow defiles, remains untouched) it is plainly pronounced that the affair is to cost us two campaigns. From Candahar to Herat, allowing for halting-days, and supposing no interruption from an enemy, is at least a month's march. Thus, therefore, without meeting an enemy—and, supposing the barren country which it had in its rear and along its line of march could afford it the same supply of food which fertile, populous, and peaceful India affords us—it would take a Russian army five months to march from Herat to the nearest British frontier, with many a 'key' to get possession of, and many a door to unlock, between; and, after that, there is a march of at least fifteen hundred miles further to the chief seat of our power and resources, Lower Bengal and Calcutta; which would take at least four months more, supposing the climate, our armies, and our fortresses offered no resistance, and that John Bull (who in one half the whole time mentioned could send an army from the banks of the Thames) were to look on with his hands in his breeches-pocket doing nothing. But to reach India, is not to conquer India, (never so powerful and united as under our own administration,) as any one who will take the pains to read, may learn from the history of its invaders from ALEXANDER to AHMED SHAH. Most of them never penetrated much beyond the frontier, and the few who established themselves in the North-west, took not months or years, but from one to two centuries, to conquer the East and the South. The truth is, that a Russian invasion, and conquest of India, is but the dream of a troubled and uneasy conscience.

No man in his waking moments and sober senses imagines the possibility of the thing, or fancies it even probable that any nation whatever, without the command of the sea and of immense pecuniary resources, would be mad enough even to make the attempt. 'At the conclusion of your letter,' says the Persian Prime Minister to one of our agents, 'there are some remarks about alarm. I am in great astonishment at this declaration, considering the distance of four months' journey and the great friendship between the two states, which during this length of time, has never been interrupted by a hair's breadth on either side. What cause is there for alarm, or for these remote speculations, which have never entered into the mind of any one, nor ever will?' It is clear, from these remarks of the Persian Vizier, that his Excellency had no personal acquaintance with Lord AUCKLAND or Lord PALMERSTON, or he would not have expressed himself so rashly. What, after all, does the reader fancy has thrown the Indian Council Chamber and the foreign Office into a turmoil? The Russian Envoy at the Court of Persia is supposed, contrary to his instructions, to have advised the Shah to attack Herat: and a Russian Lieutenant of Infantry goes on a commercial mission to an Afghan state; and this has sufficed to frighten the Foreign Secretary and the Governor-General from their propriety. At the very moment we are making this charge against Russia and Persia, our English officer of Engineers, being the agent of the Governor-General, is fighting in the ranks of the Herattees; and there is a diplomatic agent at Cabool, and another at Candahar, endeavouring to force treaties on the chiefs of those two places, by which they are to break off all connexion with Persia and Russia. Where is our sense of political justice?

"There is not the least doubt but the very measures we are pursuing lead us into far greater difficulties than the actual invasion of the Persians and Russians themselves could produce. The war with the Burmese cost us fifteen millions. If we escape from the present more difficult contest with a penalty of double the amount, we may look upon ourselves as fortunate. This will add just one-half to the national debt of India, and an annual interest of a million and a half will add a tithe to the taxes of the already over-taxed Hindoos. Is it not better to stay at home, administer justly, tax lightly, and thus gain the support of the conquered millions, than squander their money in so dangerous, extravagant, and Quixotic an enterprise? The very undertaking itself proves that we are ill at ease at home, conscious of the instability of our power, and suspicious that we have misgoverned India, to the dissatisfaction of its inhabitants.

"If our diplomatists and politicians would only keep their hands out of mischief, it is astonishing how perfect a bulwark nature and fortune have opposed to the possibility of a successful invasion of British India from the westward. The country lying between Persia and British India is one either of rugged mountains or of uncultivated and almost impassable sandy deserts. On the side of Persia, all but on one narrow quarter, it is a sandy desert two hundred miles broad. On the side of India, there is a far more extensive one, generally of double that breadth, except at one point also. Even at this last point there is, according to Mr. ELPHINSTONE, one hundred and sixty miles of 'the strongest country' he had 'ever seen,'

The people that an invading army would have to encounter, if not alienated by our ambition, is as formidable as their country is strong. They are estimated at fourteen millions; a fourth part of whom, probably, are in that shepherd or nomade state in which men have little to lose and much to gain by war. The ruling people exceed four millions in number; and in their manners, habits, and customs, are rather Europeans of the middle ages than Asiatics. 'An European,' says Mr. ELPHINSTONE, 'coming among them, would scarce fail to admire their martial and lofty spirit, their hospitality, and their bold and simple manners. He would admire their strong and active forms, their fair complexions, and European features; their industry and enterprise; the hospitality, sobriety, and contempt of pleasure, which appear in all their habits; and, above all, the independence and energy of their character. The Afghans themselves (he adds) exult in the free spirit of their institutions. They endeavour to maintain that all Afghans are equal. I once strongly urged on a very intelligent old man, of the tribe of Meankhail, the superiority of a quiet and secure life, under a powerful monarch, to the discord, the alarms, and the blood which they owed to their present system. The old man replied with great warmth, and thus concluded an indignant harangue against arbitrary power—'We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood—but we will never be content with a master.''

"The plain truth is, that we are breaking down, by our aggression, the most formidable portion of the bulwark that lies between us and invasion to the West. We are making, in fact, the false movement of a general, who, finding a broad marsh between himself and his opponent, wantonly crosses it, with great loss and inconvenience, posts himself on the opposite margin, and, cutting himself off from his supplies, affords his opponent, at the first favourable moment, an opportunity of driving him into the swamp, or starving him to death, or compelling him to surrender at discretion. Such is a fair view of our present adventure; nor can we see any termination, utter discomfiture excepted, to the course into which it leads, until it bring us to the very thing we deprecate—contiguity and collision with the power of Russia in Persia."—*Spectator*, July 27, 1839.

CHAPTER II.

Runjeet Singh refuses to permit our troops to pass through the Punjaub—Route by the Bolan Pass—Augmentation of the army by 13,000 men besides the Contingent—Retirement of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir H. Fane—Sir J. Keane nominated Generalissimo of the Army of the Indus—Entrance into Afghanistan—Bengal column—Reserves—Bombay column lands at Vikkur—Hostile aspect of Scinde—Want of camels—Scarcity of Commissariat stores—Demonstrations on Hyderabad—Ameers agree to our terms—Bengal column reaches Koroë, and crosses the Indus to Sukkur—Misunderstandings betwixt the Bengal and Bombay columns about camels—Colonel Dennie's remonstrances on the inutility of the Shah's levies—Capture of Kurrachee—Reserve left there—Amount of force at Shikarpore in February—Bengal troops ascend the Bolan Pass—Apprehensions on reaching Quetta—Rumours of a retreat—Conduct of the Khan of Khelat—Sir A. Burnes's mission to—Breaks his agreements—We resolve to dethrone him—Extreme scarcity of provisions—Troops on half rations for six weeks—Arrive at Candahar and enter it unopposed—Progress of the Bombay column—The Lukkee Pass—Larkhana—The desert—Reach Dadur—Excessive heat—Enter the Bolan Pass—Reach Quetta—Arrive at Candahar—Adventures of Colonel Dennie betwixt Shikarpore and Candahar—Force at—Condition of—Remain six weeks at Candahar—March on Ghuznie—Description of fortress—Conflicting accounts of enemy's force—Open fire of artillery on the walls of—Move round from the Candahar to the Cabool side—Plan of attack of—Captain Outram's attack on the enemy's irregulars—Slaughter of the Ghazee prisoners—Preparation for the attack—Successful explosion of powder-bags at the gate—Storming of the gate—Capture of the fortress—Excellent conduct of our troops—Advance on Cabool—Dost Mahomed abandoned by his troops—Capture of his guns and baggage—Pursuit of, by Capt. Outram—Treachery of Hadji Khan Kakur—The Dost makes his escape into Toorkistan—Return of the pursuing party to Cabool—The Shah enters Cabool—State Durbar for the purpose of conferring the Dooranee Order, Dr. Kennedy's account of—Bengal column quits Cabool—Proceeds by Jellalabad and Khyber, through the Punjaub, to Ferozepore—Bombay column proceeds to Ghuznie—Captain Outram's operations against the Ghilzies—Column takes the left of Candahar—Reaches Quetta—One portion descends the Bolan Pass and reaches Scinde—Loss by Cholera—General Willshire advances on Khelat—Gallant capture of—Slaughter at—Captain Outram's adventures—General Willshire descends the Gundava Pass to Scinde—Lord Keane's return to Bombay, and reception—General reflections—Troops required to be left in Afghanistan—Opinions of the campaign entertained in England.

So soon as it became manifest that nothing but a war on the largest scale would fully meet the views of the Governor-General and his advisers, it was resolved that this should be commenced in form next spring, as early as the disappearance of the snow beyond the passes would permit. Runjeet Singh declining to suffer our troops to traverse the Punjaub, our principal rendezvous was appointed to be Shikarpore in Scinde; our line of advance, by the Bolan Pass, Quetta, and Candahar.

During the preliminary diplomatic arrangements, which had occupied

from December, 1837, till August, 1838, military preparations had been in rapid progress. The Army of India, which had, since 1823, been reduced from an effective force of 274,000, did not, in 1837, exceed the strength of 190,000, exclusive of contingent or subsidiary troops. (1) This was, before the month of October in the following year, raised to 203,000;—an augmentation of ten men to each company (2) ordered on the 30th June, and a second of similar amount on the 28th August, having given an increase of 13,000 men. (3) Besides this, a force raised amongst the camp-followers at the Company's various frontier posts, officered from the Indian army, and paid by the British treasury, under the name of the "Shah's Contingent," added, before next midsummer, nearly 8,000 men to the muster-roll of the army: these, if not very efficient, were as expensive as our best drilled veterans. The increase of our army, occasioned by the Afghan war, betwixt 1838 and 1842, amounted to 50,826 men.

Sir Henry Fane was at this time Commander-in-Chief of all India. He is said to have disapproved both of the principles of policy, and the arrangement of the details of the expedition; (4) and viewed with great apprehension the prospect of having our armies so far removed from their base of operations—our own frontier. The Commander-in-Chief was, besides, in indifferent health and about to proceed to Europe: he had, indeed, retired, and was succeeded by Sir Jasper Nicholls, before the expedition returned

1. *British Empire in the East*, by Count Bjornstjerna, 1838.—Translated by H. Evans Loyd. London, 1840. Vol. i., p. 185. The following is given by this illustrious foreigner as the strength of our armies in 1837:—

Staff, British.....	312	Brought over.....	17,576
Company's officers of British birth ..	2,416	Artillery train.....	1,392
Officers of Hindoo birth.....	3,416	Cavalry.....	14,529
Engineer corps.....	3,498	Infantry.....	124,381
Horse artillery.....	1,022	European troops.....	26,582
Foot ditto.....	5,892	Medical Staff, &c.....	5,006
	17,576	Total.....	189,360

2. See General Order, Simla, 30th June and 28th August,--republished in Bombay G. O. to the same effect, for the army of the Western Presidency, July 12th and September 3rd.

3. *Asiatic Journal*, new series, second part, p. 328, for Dec. 1838. The cost of the Company's military establishment was in 1830 set down in the Parliamentary papers at 9½ millions sterling. The ordinary annual charge of a sepoy regiment of 1000 men, every thing included, is reckoned at about £40,000;—that of a European regiment at about £80,000. Cavalry charges are double those of infantry.

4. Letter from his son, published in the *London Times* of 5th June 1842:—"I am prepared to prove, if called upon, [says Colonel Fane] that the military head in India and second member of council of that country, did oppose, or perhaps rather point out to the Governor-General, the extreme danger of this wild and unmeasured expedition."—"He ensured Lord Auckland of the success which did at first appear to attend us, but warned him, that to maintain large bodies of troops in countries so distant, and which scarce produced food sufficient for the scanty population, was next to impossible."

to India. (5) He resigned the command of the onward force at Ferozepore, and boats were provided for himself and staff to drop down the Sutledge and Indus, (keeping parallel with the marching column) with the intention of remaining at Bombay, (which he in fact did for several months afterwards) but retaining the post of Commander-in-Chief in India until his successor should be appointed from home. The Governor-General, immediately upon this resignation in December 1839, nominated Sir John Keane to the chief command and direction of the whole force; a brave and experienced officer, but head-strong, passionate, vindictive and domineering, though bold and determined in action. From this period he was instructed by the Governor-General to give his own orders to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who, as senior officer, succeeded to the command of the Bengal column as a temporary measure, until its junction with the Bombay troops. This also gave the temporary command of a division to Major General Nott, and of a brigade to Colonel Dennie. The head-quarters of the Bengal column had assembled at Ferozepore, an outstation on the banks of the Sutlej, about 50 miles from Lahore, the capital of the Punjaub. The nearest course for this body to have pursued would have been through the Seikh territory; by which route a march of 350 miles from their cantonments would have brought them to Peshawur; 200 more through the Khyber and Khoord Cabool passes and by Jellalabad, would have taken them at once to Cabool. The difficulties of this line have at all times been considered formidable: no army save our own ever appears to have forced them. Nadir Shah, in 1739, paid £100,000 for the use of the passes; (6) and the Khyberies and Ghilzies who inhabit the adjoining mountains, have always been in the habit of receiving from £4,000 to £8,000 a-year as black-mail, from the Dooranee rulers, for free passages to kafilas to and from Cabool. Yet the facility with which Colonel Wade made his way, the following August, from Peshawur to Cabool with 10,000 men, shows that when the natives are liberally treated, and prudently dealt with, and not previously excited to hostility, their country may be traversed with comparatively little trouble. The objections to this route, however, lay not in the physical difficulties which presented themselves to our progress,—these have grown upon us as we have become better acquainted with them. They were at the time surmounted by the Shahzada Timour's contingent, and were held comparatively lightly of by officers of experience. (7) The insurmountable objec-

5. Narrative of the War in Affghanistan, by Capt. H. Havelock, H. M. 13th L. I., Vol. ii., p. 173.

6. March and Operations of the Army of the Indus—1840. Major Hough, to whom we shall have many occasions of acknowledging our obligations, omits to quote his authority on this point.

7. Captain Havelock reasons this matter very ably: he gives the preference to an advance by Dera-Ismael Khan—a little-known path over the

tions of our ancient ally Runjeet Singh to the passage of so formidable a force through the centre of his country, compelled us to take the western or Bolan Pass route, towards which the Bengal column now prepared to march. By the beginning of December, the force on the Bengal side, just mentioned as destined to proceed without delay to Scinde, amounted to 9,500 men. A considerably larger number had originally been intended; but intelligence of the retirement of the Persian army from Herat in the end of September, diminished the exigencies of the service; and the intimation which notified this, stated that, under these altered circumstances, the command of the column would be assumed by Sir Willoughby Cotton, on the march downwards to Shikarpore. (8) Besides this, a reserve division of 4,250 men was stationed at Ferozepore under Major-General Duncan. A Sikh army of observation of 15,000 was agreed by Runjeet Singh to be maintained at Peshawur, while the levies of the Shahzada Timour, the eldest son of the Shah, amounted to 4,800 of the contingent, with 6,000 Sikh allies. This last was taken charge of by Lieut.-Colonel Wade, (9) and moved on Cabool by the eastern passes.

The Bombay column, under Sir J. Keane, landed at Vikkur, on the eastern bank of the Hujamry mouth of the river Indus, 50 miles to the right of the town and fort of Kurrachee, betwixt the 20th and 28th of November. (10) The Ameers of Scinde—feudatories of the Dooranee Empire, with whom, for the space of ten years, we had been on terms of alliance (11)—had faithfully promised to provide supplies and the means of conveyance for our armies. On our arrival at Kurrachee, so far from finding that either the one or the other had been attended to, it was discovered that they entertained the most jealous and hostile feelings towards us, and had done all that they could to obstruct and annoy us on our advance.

mountains from Dejerat direct upon Ghuznie; by which it was pretended General Nott's force were, on a recent occasion, ordered to return. Havelock wrote after returning to India by the Khyber route; and speaks disparagingly of the Khoord Cabool and Tezeen defiles, which at that time he had not seen. It is curious that this officer should have had three times to force his way through this series of passes—once on the march of Sir R. Sale's force in October 1841, and twice with that of General Pollock in September and October 1842.

8. General order quoted by Hough, p. 3, dated Secret Department, December 4.

9. Captain, now Lieut. Colonel Sir, C. M. Wade, then political agent in these parts.

10. Rough notes of the Campaign in Scinde and Affghanistan, by Captain James Outram.—Campaign of the Army of the Indus, by R. H. Kennedy, M. D., Superintending Surgeon to the Bombay column of the force. The port of Kurrachee, at which the British force has, since 1838, been stationed, is 500 miles by sea from Bombay. A Lighthouse, and new cantonments, have just been ordered to be constructed, with a view of maintaining it as a permanent possession.

11. Visit to the Court of Scinde, by James Burnes, M. D., K. H., F. R. S.

While they continued to profess the utmost friendship for us, they began to levy, *en masse*, their fighting men from seventeen to sixty years of age. From 16,000 to 17,000 Beloochees occupied the Hyderabad side of the river. So eager were these undisciplined hordes to attack us, that it was said the Ameer had to distribute from £50,000 to £60,000 amongst them to keep them at peace. (12) Captain Outram, (who acted as extra A. D. C. to Sir John Keane,) one of the most active, indefatigable, and adventurous soldiers in the army, was dispatched without loss of time to Cutch, a subsidiary state to the eastward, with letters from Sir John Keane and Colonel (now Sir Henry) Pottinger to the Rao. His Highness was the personal friend of both, as well as one of the most zealous and faithful supporters of the British government to be found among the princes of India, and his aid and influence on this occasion enabled Captain Outram to succeed in collecting a considerable supply of camels—a most seasonable help to Sir John Keane. The troops which had disembarked at Vikkur 5,500 strong, after various difficulties and delays, advanced towards Tatta on the 24th December. They crossed an arm of the Indus by a bridge of boats: the heavy baggage was transported in flat-bottomed vessels up the stream. The climate here was very trying for the native troops: the thermometer, which rose to about 90° during the day, descending as low as 35° over night,—a temperature, this latter, which nearly incapacitates the sepoy, as the former unfits the European, for duty. (13) It had originally been proposed that, for the sake of producing a moral effect, the army should proceed up the river by boat; but this unwise project was afterwards renounced. Its extreme inexpediency was subsequently proved by the difficulty experienced in providing boats for the transportation of the mere ordnance stores of the army,—whatever was transported by the river being afterwards found an impediment and vexation. (14)

The granaries had been plundered by the Beloochees, as was believed by the sanction of the Ameer. At length, seeing that we could make our way without their aid, and in spite of their resistance, they agreed to the terms of the treaty proposed by us; having further pledged themselves to supply us with whatever we required, on being duly paid for it. A tribute of £280,000 having been set down as due by them to the Shah Soojah, we, as his patrons, for the present compelled them to make payment to us of £100,000 as a first instalment of the long arrear. By the 1st February they had duly professed submission, their army having, with much difficulty,

12. Outram, p. 30.

13. Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Scinde and Affghanistan, in 1838-39—By R. H. Kennedy, M. D., Chief of the Medical Staff of the Bombay Division.

14. Kennedy, Vol. i., p. 145.

been disbanded by them. Their resolution on this point was probably stimulated by the fact, that while the Bombay column was encamped within two marches of their capital, the Shah's contingent, 6,000 strong—which was the first to approach the river at Shikarpore on their left, moved down parallel to the line of Sir John Keane's upward advance, and occupied Larkhana, while half the Bengal column moved upon their right, the other half standing fast at Sukkur; so that they had in their immediate neighbourhood three armies, amounting in all to above 20,000 men. After a considerable halt at Tatta, collecting camels and making other preparations, as well as carrying on negotiations with the Ameers, the force moved on to Jerruck, one of the strongest positions on the Indus, and within two marches of Hyderabad. Here it was that the Ameers were desired to communicate their final answer to the terms proposed. They at first resolutely refused their assent to these, and Sir John Keane adopted measures without loss of time to compel them to come in to our views. He dispatched messengers and additional guards down the river to hasten up and protect the heavy ordnance and ammunition, which would be required in the event of an attack upon Hyderabad becoming necessary; while the other demonstrations from the force above were directed as already detailed. The Ameers seeing themselves in this serious predicament—threatened with an attack upon their capital from all points, immediately gave in to all the terms proposed to them.

It did not come within the plan for the campaign that Hyderabad should be taken, or the Ameers deposed: the instructions of Lord Auckland were very strong and specific on this point, and nothing short of an actual attack on our troops, or positive refusal of the Ameers to come in to our terms, would have justified the Commander-in-Chief in using force and attacking their capital; it being thought that the consequences of such a measure might retard the ulterior operations of the campaign, and perhaps the season be so far advanced as to render hazardous the march of the troops through the Bolan Pass, and thereby delay the operations for a whole year. The resident, Colonel Pottinger, was most resolute in resisting all propositions involving the idea of actual aggression, to which abundant provocation had been given. The Governor-General was afterwards greatly pleased with Sir John Keane's management of the affair. (15) The brushwood adjoining the camp having taken fire, during the halt at Jerruck, three promising young officers, who had been out shooting, were burnt to death,

On the 24th Jan. the Bengal column reached Roree, on the Indus; and on

15. We state this on the authority subsequently referred to as unquestionable, although not named. An impression has hitherto very generally prevailed that Sir J. Keane was in fault in not having attacked Hyderabad: on no point were his instructions more explicit: they were to the effect notified in the text.

the 27th crossed to Sukkur, on the left bank, by a bridge of boats. Bukkur, a strong fort situated on a rocky island in the middle of the river, was, after some delay, ceded to us by authority of the Ameer of Khyrpoor. On the 28th, a detachment of 5,500 men was dispatched towards Hyderabad, under Sir W. Cotton, to act in concert with the army of Sir John Keane, whose movements have just been given, should the conduct of the Ameers have compelled active measures to be resorted to. The treaty had, however, meanwhile been subscribed; and, when seven marches on his way, Sir W. Cotton was, on the 6th February, ordered to retrace his steps. The Shah's contingent having marched in a line nearly parallel to that of Sir W. Cotton's detachment, but on the western side of the river and at some distance from its banks, had meanwhile occupied Larkhana some 25 miles lower down, but on the same side with Shikarpore. Intimation having been received that there was no further occasion for their services in the direction of Hyderabad, the two detachments retraced their steps, and returned to head-quarters; that on the right bank of the river having crossed the Indus from Roree to Sukkur by a bridge of boats betwixt the 13th and 15th. At Sehwan, Sir Henry Fane and Sir John Keane met by a preconceived plan, and the meeting was such as could not but gratify all who saw it. The two men embraced: they had always, it seems, been upon the most intimate and friendly terms, and meeting for the first time in the east on such an occasion, and in such a place, was full of interest.

On reaching Larkhana, Sir John Keane, in a general order, dated 10th March, announced to the troops of both presidencies the arrangements consequent upon his assuming the command, in obedience to the Governor-General's orders, by which amongst other things Sir Willoughby Cotton, as a matter of course, fell back to the command of his division, General Nott to his brigade, and Colonel Dennis to his regiment; Major-General Willshire to command the Bombay division, Major-General Thackwell the cavalry division, and Brigadier Stevenson, as senior officer, the artillery of both presidencies. The troops of Bengal and Bombay to be guided as much as possible by the regulations of their own particular presidency; and the orders of the Commander-in-Chief intended for both to be issued through, and signed by, Lieut.-Colonel Macdonald, the Deputy Adjutant-General of Queen's troops, Bombay, and senior officer in the department of the Adjutant-General with the force, officiating also as Military Secretary to his Excellency.

Sir John Keane quitted the Bombay column a few days afterwards for the advance, taking as his escort a wing of the 1st cavalry, and one of the 19th Native Infantry. On reaching Dadur, he had his first interview with his Majesty Shah Soojah and Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Macnaghten, whose camp had reached that place the day before, and all moved on

together through the Bolan Pass. The Shah's camp continued during all the after operations with the Commander-in-Chief.

The Governor-General employed Sir Alexander Burnes, Major Leech, and several other officers to collect camels, and was under the impression that when all should be concentrated at Shikarpore, they (including those with the Bengal column) would amount to 45,000; and this number, he informed Sir John Keane, should be distributed into fair proportions between the troops of the two presidencies and Shah Soojah's contingent, but not one half this amount was ever collected. The Bengal column, which had just arrived, took it for granted that all the camels were for them; and thought it extremely hard that the Commander-in-Chief should order any to be appropriated for the Bombay troops, or for the Shah: the Bengal Commissariat officers left at Shikarpore, in particular managed to evade every order sent to them to dispatch camels to Larkhana, until Captain Outram was sent there; and Colonel Dennie, who was then in charge, exercised his authority very properly on that point. At this time Colonel Dennie was still in command of two native regiments of General Nott's brigade, and thought it hard these troops should be left there, and the camels given up for raw levies of the Shah. On this point he addressed a letter to Colonel Macdonald for the information of the Commander-in-Chief; and out of this has arisen an erroneous impression, as now ascertained, that Colonel Dennie thereby incurred the displeasure of Sir John Keane. His Excellency was himself completely of the same opinion with Colonel Dennie, but the Governor-General's policy and his orders were, to send on the Shah's contingent entire if possible. It seems Sir John Keane at this period had a very high opinion of Colonel Dennie; that he thought equally well of him when he joined at Candahar; and up to the day after Ghuznie was taken, when, by a visit Colonel Dennie paid him in his tent, he greatly offended the Commander-in-Chief. (16) The reports, therefore, which have gained such extensive circulation, countenanced as they are by his own letters since published, that Sir John Keane bore enmity to Colonel Dennie before the capture of Ghuznie, are totally without foundation. Sir John Keane felt himself bound to disapprove of some arrangements made by Colonel Dennie, when he volunteered to take charge of a convoy from Dadur through the Bolan Pass, which included two troops of the Shah's artillery, a great part of the material belonging to them having been captured by bands of plunderers and robbers in the pass on that occasion; but this circumstance made no difference in the feelings of the Commander-

16. We give this view of the case on the highest authority: our own impressions have, we confess, been hitherto different: we are happy to have this opportunity of correcting them.

in-Chief towards Colonel Dennie, who was a guest at Sir John Keane's table, partaking of his hospitalities during the halt at Candahar.

A reserve force of 3,000 men had been ordered up from Bombay to be stationed at Kurrachee. They landed near the town on the 3d February, about 50 miles from the Hujamry mouth of the Indus, where the troops under Sir John Keane had disembarked on the 27th November.

The fishermen on the coast had informed them that the fort was one of the strongest in Lower Scinde, and that it was defended by one of the Ameer's in person, with an army of 3,000 men. Her Majesty's ships *Wellesley* and *Algerine*, under command of Admiral Sir F. Maitland, accompanied the transports. Her Majesty's 40th having landed under command of Colonel Valiant, with some artillery, the fort was levelled by the first broadside of the men-of-war, and was within the hour in our possession, without the troops having occasion to fire a shot. The garrison were captured in endeavouring to make their escape, and were found to consist of no more than 20 men! Cholera, which has since that period proved so fatal to the troops stationed at Kurrachee, broke out soon after the brigade was encamped, and carried off many men; together with Colonel Thomas Powell of the 40th regiment; an old and experienced Peninsular officer, much regretted. To return, however, to the armies now on their march towards the mountains. It had been agreed that the Bengal division, for the sake of convenience of carrying on baggage and supplies, should move at some distance ahead of the Bombay troops, which had not yet overtaken them, and by a line considerably to the right, and that the whole army should unite at Candahar. It was at one time proposed that Sir John Keane's force should ascend the Gundava Pass, and take a line of route for a time forming an acute angle with that the others pursued. This resolution was, however, departed from, from the apprehension of obstructions which proved to be unreal. The descent of Sir T. Willshire by this pass, after the fall of Kelat the following November, shewed its perfect practicability. (17) The whole of the principal division, which had been separated into three portions by the diversion on Hyderabad, having, as already stated, been once more reunited on the 17th February, proceeded towards Shikarpore, a large commercial town containing about 6,000 houses, and 30,000 inhabitants, on the edge of the desert, (18) which interposes itself betwixt Scinde and the fertile plains of Cutchee, skirting the foot of the mountains; the Bengal 35th Native Infantry had been ordered to stand fast at Sukkur till relieved, part of the treasure having been deposited in the adjoining fort of Bukkur. Sir Willoughby Cotton arrived at Shikarpore on the 20th February; the other portions of

17. Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 157.

18. Hough, p. 33—Sir Alexander Burnes's Travels to Bokhara.

the force having come in in the course of the five preceding days, orders were given to commence the march towards the Bolan Pass without delay. The force under his immediate command, including the Shah's contingent, amounted to about 15,000 fighting men, attended by about 80,000 camp-followers; so that there were nearly 100,000 people to feed from the commissariat. (19) This was altogether independent of the Bombay division, amounting to 5,500 fighting men, with probably not fewer than 30,000 camp-followers; so that the whole army betwixt Kurrachee—where the reserve of 8,000 was stationed—and Dadur, just before we entered the Bolan Pass, amounted to 27,000 soldiers, and probably 125,000 camp-followers,—or nearly 150,000 in all. The Bombay camp followers provided their own food, and were not rationed by the commissariat. The desert having been crossed in safety, Dadur, at the foot of the mountains 150 miles beyond Shikarpore, was attained by the 6th March, the Bombay troops being still nine marches, or nearly 100 miles, behind. Here supplies began to run short, so that it was thought prudent to put the non-combatants of the Bengal column on half rations before entering the mountain country. Yet they had scarcely left the territories of professing allies, and overcome no more than one-half of the road to Cabool; they had hitherto lost little or nothing by pillage, and never encountered an enemy. Dadur is, as already stated, the nearest town to the base of that enormous ridge which, buttress-like, supports the table land beyond. The latter is here attained by the defile known by the name of the Bolan Pass—a terrible chasm which, in the course of 70 miles, carries the traveller to a height of 5,637 feet above the level of the plains below, which are here about 750 feet in height above the sea. This portion of the country is inhabited by the poorest and wildest tribes, who live entirely by plunder—supporting existence on the plainest and scantiest fare. Fortunately, they offered no opposition to our troops till just about to quit the defile, when some skirmishing took place, by which a few of our people were wounded. The excessive barrenness and steepness of the line of march had caused the destruction of a vast number of horses and camels, and a considerable loss of private baggage. On the 26th March the troops arrived, in safety, at Quettah, where a very short halt was permitted. This is the capital of the fertile valleys of Shawl and Pesheen. It contains a population of about 6,000 souls. The territory was, in the reign of Ahmed Shah, made over to Kelat on condition of contributing a contingent of 12,000 men when the exigencies of the state

19. Hough, p. 34. We give the above on the authority of Major Hough. We are assured, however, by a member of Lord Keane's staff, that the camp-followers must be prodigiously over-rated—28,000 only having been mustered at Candahar.

required it: it afterwards became, along with Kelat, wholly independent of Candahar, whose chiefs desired to keep it in subjection. We have just seen how the expectations of the army had been disappointed in obtaining supplies from the Ameers of Hyderabad and Khyrpoor; a more severe source of mortification awaited them in the non-fulfilment of the promises of Mehrab Khan of Kelat, whose dominions had been traversed by us from a little beyond Shikarpore to Quettah. The chief just named governed the various rude tribes who inhabit the eastern portion of Beloochistan. He could boast a descent from seven princes; was a shrewd, brave, unscrupulous ruler, who had never sought our friendship, or received overtures of amity, till the march of our armies had begun. "While the Dooranee empire preserved the semblance of authority [says Masson], there was, agreeably to the original treaty concluded between Ahmed Shah and Nasser Khan, a Belooch force of one thousand men stationed in Cashmere; and the Khans of Kelat had ever been attentive to the observance of their engagements. On the dislocation of the empire, and after Cashmere had been lost (1809), there was, of course, an end to the treaty, and, virtually, of dependence." "So long as there was a nominal Shah in the country, as in the case of the Shah Ayub, they professed a certain allegiance; but when, by the final partition of the remnants of the Dooranee empire, it became parcelled into small and separate chiefships, they no longer felt the necessity of acknowledging the supremacy of either." (20) In 1834, when the Shah Soojah was defeated at Candahar, Mehrab Khan gave him shelter, and refused to deliver him up to his enemies. (21) In November, 1838, Sir Alexander Burnes (22) had been dispatched to Shikarpore to endeavour to obtain a treaty with him, binding himself to supply our army with carriage and provisions so far as our march lay through his country. For this, the Khan was to receive a subsidy of £15,000 a-year during the war, besides payment for the supplies; but was to be denuded of all his independence, and a moiety of his territory, so soon as the Shah was restored! He held out as long as he could, but at length gave a hesitating, reluctant, and apparently insincere assent. It was no wonder that he should have been concussed into this: an army of 20,000 men was then on its march, the whole of which was to pass through his territories—one-fourth of it by the Gundava route, subsequently abandoned, close to his

20. Journeys in Beloochistan, Affghanistan, and the Punjaub, by Charles Masson, 3 vols: Bentley, 1842, vol. ii., p. 101.

21. Ibid, p. 102. Mr. Masson was the chief, or rather the only, authority referred to by Sir C. M. Wade, in support of the views afterwards adopted by Lord Auckland in opposition to those of Sir Alex. Burnes.

22. Sir Alexander Burnes was appointed Envoy to Kelat and other states, under Mr. Macnaghten's direction—General Notification by the Governor-General, Simla, October 1.

capital. All the historians of the campaign agree that, had this last line of march been pursued by the Bombay column, Kelat would have been dealt with at once. Mehrab promised plentifully, as most oriental, and many European princes, under these circumstances, would have done; trusting that the chapter of accidents would enable him to evade, or release him from, a treaty which was acceded to under fear or constraint, and which we had no right whatever to impose upon him. Major Leech had been at Kelat some months before (August 1838), urging the chief to supply us on our march. The answer received at this time was such as to furnish but little hope that our wishes would be complied with. (23) It is important to keep these things in view: the affairs of Kelat furnish two singularly important episodes further on in our narrative; and nearly all the writers of the time, apparently without searching into the facts, or seriously considering the matter, concur in condemning the Khan as guilty of some grievous piece of ingratitude, or a gross breach of treaty,—well deserving the capital punishment afterwards inflicted on him! Before leaving Shikarpore the Kelat chief had desired us to send people to take charge of the stores he had provided for us, as he would not be responsible for their safety. On applying at Dadur for what we considered we had reason to expect from him, less than one-tenth of what we looked for was found to have been provided. On the 24th March, Sir Alex. Burnes, with Lieutenants Simpson and Paterson, went from Sir-i-ab on a further embassy to Kelat, to endeavour to reason the chief into terms. "He appears [says Atkinson] to have had a morbid dread of the Shah Soojah; and could not be brought to promise that he would see him, without the assurance that the British would stand his friends, and guarantee his safety." (24) He was informed that he needed be under no apprehension on that head,—that he should hold the territory dependent on Cabool, (25) on the same terms as in the reign of Ahmed Shah, grandfather of the Shah Soojah, in the middle of the preceding century. He was, as formerly intimated, proposed to receive a subsidy of £15,000 a-year during the continuance of our army

23. Hough, p. 45, note :—" I must say, [writes Hough,] he, *i. e.*, Major Leech, was never very sanguine as to his keeping his promise."

24. Hough, p. 73, note. The above are nearly the words said to have been used by the Khan.

25. The Expedition into Affghanistan—by Dr. J. Atkinson, Superintending Surgeon of the Bengal Division. The apprehensions here detailed were, in all likelihood, a feint to get rid of a peculiarly disagreeable arrangement. The whole of the Kelat episode has been excessively compressed. Our treatment of Mehrab Khan was, perhaps, the most tyrannous proceeding during the campaign. We send an army of 20,000 men into the country—ask one of the rulers to supply us with the means of carrying on the war, which, if successful, robs him of his power and independence—and then, when he endeavours to resist us, we attack and plunder his capital, and kill himself and his Chiefs!

in the direction of Khorassan, on condition of supplying provisions, carriage, and escorts, to the extent of his ability; all of which were to be separately paid for. After a good deal of shuffling and evasion, he at length subscribed the treaty. When it is considered that, during the Barukzye rule, Kelat and its acquisitions—Quettah and Shawl amongst the rest—had been perfectly independent, his reluctance to accede to a measure whose object was the restoration to the throne a man who had treated him with gross ingratitude, and who he hated and despised,—and that from this must follow the loss of the fairest half of his country, and all his independence,—his aversion to our advance, and reluctance to assist us, seems neither so marvellous nor reprehensible as the writers of the time appear to regard it. The provisions were at length promised, but were not forthcoming, and the payment never was required. (26) Burnes gives a very minute account of one of his discussions with this Chief, in a letter to Government, dated March 30, 1839. He said that “Dost Mahomed was a man of resource and ability; and though we could easily put him down through the Shah Soojah, even in our present mode of procedure, we could never win over the Affghau nation by it.” (27) “Wait,” said he, “till sickness overtakes your troops—till they are exhausted with fatigue from long and harassing marches, and from the total want of supplies; wait till they have drank of many waters; and wait, too, till they feel the sharpness of the Affghan swords.” (28) The Khan is said, on another occasion, to have used these ominous words:—“You have brought an army into the country, but how do you propose to take it out again?” (29)—the very expression which fell from the Duke of Wellington, on the same subject, on

26. These statements are given on the authority of Major Hough, who is generally correct, though he does not quote his informant. He states that Lieut. Simpson, one of the party, informed him that a plot had been laid by Mehrab Khan to murder them, which was only foiled by their sudden departure. This is not noticed in any of the letters, either public or private, of Sir Alexander Burnes,—who speaks of the Khan with great respect; neither is it so by Masson, to whom he was intimately known: and we hold it, therefore, groundless, as it certainly is eminently improbable.

27. This letter was first published in the *Bombay Times* of the 24th and 27th August, 1842—Subsequently at greater length in the *Caledonian Mercury*, (an Edinburgh paper) 22d Oct., 1842. Several other documents appear in this paper not previously printed, to which we shall have occasion to refer. Burnes concludes his letter to Government by stating, in reference to the counsel the Kelat Chief had offered as to the conduct of the Shah Soojah—“I agreed his advice was sound and good.”

28. Atkinson, p. 131. Dr. Atkinson's book contains far the fullest information of any of our printed authorities on the Kelat treaty. His facts and inferences, however, seem often singularly inconsequential. He gives the above as evidence of the connection of the Chief with Persia and Russia!

29. We take this from Hough: it is not mentioned by Burnes. The remarkable sagacity of the observations of the whole of the Affghan Chiefs, as given in the official papers, contrasts strikingly with the flimsy sophistry of Lord Auckland's politicals.

the intimation of our advance into the country having been made in parliament. (30) We never took the army out of the country—their bones rest in Afghanistan! Sir Alex. Burnes rejoined the force on the 7th April, without any satisfactory arrangement having been effected. "To return from this digression to the Bengal column, which we left at Quettah—the Bombay column not having as yet entered the Bolan Pass. On the 4th April, Sir John Keane having established his head-quarters at Quettah, issued an order in continuation of that promulgated at Larkhana, dated 10th March, by which Sir W. Cotton was directed to resume charge of the first division, and General Nott of the second brigade, from which they had been temporarily transferred on the 4th December. Colonel Dennie, who had been left in command of troops at Shikarpore, was ordered to join his regiment,—Brigadier Gordon, commanding in Upper Scinde, succeeding to his duties. The other details may be passed over for the present. So scarce and dear had grain already become, that the camp-followers greedily devoured the fried skins of sheep, coagulated blood, roots, or whatever else they could procure, to save themselves from starvation. (31) With a march of 150 miles before them to Candahar, they were obliged to push on as far as Pesheen (25 miles) with only ten days' half rations for the men, and none at all for the cattle. (32) All communication betwixt the front and rear divisions, now 100 miles apart from each other, was completely cut off by the tribes in the Pass. A very unlooked for spirit of discontent had begun to make its appearance amongst the Bengal troops just before Sir John Keane took command at Quettah: They had been on half rations for some time before his arrival, and had permitted themselves to believe that their situation was desperate. A political officer (Major Leech, we understand) tendered his advice, in writing, to Sir Willoughby Cotton, among other alterations, that a retreat towards Shikarpore would be prudent; this baneful counsel got circulation through the camp, and was in everybody's mouth, and many had made up their minds that it must end in a retreat. The first act of Sir John Keane was, to desire that no officer or soldier should permit themselves to indulge in such nonsensical and mischievous talk, and he issued an order for a march forward the next morning. This confidence on the part of the Commander-in-Chief seemed to inspire spirit in all. The adoption of some prompt and stringent measure for the subsistence of the troops now became indispensable; and as more than nine days' provisions for a fifteen days' march could not on any terms be procured, the fighting men were put on half, and the non-combatants, who had been reduced to this ten days before, were brought

30. Hansard's Debates, February, 1839.

31. Hough, p. 74.

32. Outram, p. 62.

down to quarter rations (33)—or, as Havelock calls it, famine allowance. (34) On the first march towards Candahar, sixty of the artillery horses were shot, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy, —no more food for them being procurable. In the course of seven days, 116 cavalry horses died from the effects of starvation; and of eating a poisonous weed often mixed with the grass which was gathered: and, betwixt the 6th April and middle of June, this arm of the service was nearly disabled for want of food! Nine hundred camels had died in the course of three months! (35) It is needless to follow, in detail, the footsteps of the troops on their march to Candahar—a distance of 150 miles, which occupied them till the 6th April. They found some supplies of forage, as well as live-stock, on the way—as welcome as unlooked-for,—which considerably relieved the pressure of their necessities. They were incessantly harassed by the predatory tribes, who, without venturing to attack them, omitted no opportunity of committing the most audacious acts of robbery on their baggage. These were, on most occasions, pursued, and on many overtaken; and, when captured, were hanged or shot—no quarter being on any occasion given them. On the 26th April the head-quarters of the army reached Candahar. (36) The Bengal column had traversed a distance of 1,000 miles since quitting Ferozepore; the non-combatants had been on half or on quarter rations for the preceding 48 days; the fighting men, with the cattle of all arms, on half rations; the cavalry and light artillery horses had had no grain for 26 days, and were at length found unfit for duty,—in which state they continued for some weeks after their halt. (37)

We must now return, however, and trace the progress of the Bombay column; which, when the Bengal troops entered the Bolan Pass, was nine marches in the rear, but had now so far gained on the advance as to be in the Kojjuck Pass, 60 miles behind, when the head-quarters of the grand army arrived under the walls of Candahar.

On the forward movement, just after the demonstration opposite Hyderabad, betwixt the 4th and 10th February, the Bombay column kept along the western bank of the Indus, continuing to approach the range which divides Lower from Upper Scinde at the Lukkes Pass. Here 1,000 men were, for four days, employed in cutting a road along the face of the precipice which overhangs the river, and in dragging up the guns and heavy baggage. Having experienced some inconvenience in consequence of an order which, having been misunderstood, caused the baggage to separate

33. Atkinson.

34. Havelock, vol. i., p. 255.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

36. Hough, p. 96. Havelock, p. 298.

37. Kennedy, vol. i., pp. 188 to 209, gives a very lively and graphic account of the march of the Bombay column till it fell, at Dadur, into the route of that which preceded it.

into several portions, and some alarm in crossing the Arul, a large artificial canal, where the pontoon bridge was threatened to be carried away by a premature inundation;—they, on the 3d March, reached Larkhana, the post already described as having been occupied by the Shah's troops on their descent from Bukkur to assist in hastening the resolves of the Ameers. In the plan of operations for the campaign, one brigade at least of the Bombay troops was ordered to be left on the banks of the Indus, to be distributed as might be found necessary, and such portions stationed at Sukkur and Shikarpore, and along the line to Dadur, as might be deemed proper to keep up the communication with the brigade of Bengal troops above the Bolan Pass, at Quetta, and the advance—three native regiments under Brigadier Gordon, were, therefore, selected for the purpose. Indeed, it would have been almost impossible to have taken them on for want of carriage. The remainder of the Bombay column, then reduced to 3600 men, two-thirds European and the other natives of India (1st Cavalry and 19th Bombay Native Infantry) moved on. They crossed the desert by a forced march of 30 miles on the 16th. A person sent to explore the Gundava Pass, returned and reported it impracticable. Had it been threaded as was intended, it would have carried the force close by Kelat, and out of the already impoverished track of the leading division. It does not appear how the reporter came to the conclusion just stated: that it was an erroneous one, appeared the following November, by the facility with which it was traversed in the opposite direction by our troops. On the 23d March, Sir John Keane, with his staff, escorted by a detachment of Bombay light cavalry, quitted the force, and after joining Shah Sojah at Dadur on the 28th March, arrived, as already stated, at his command at Quetta on the 4th April. He was succeeded in charge by Sir T. Willshire. (38) Mehrab Khan, whose actual hostility towards us had scarcely sought to conceal itself by so much of the semblance of friendship as to mislead any one, even when in the act of treating with us, appears to have urged the tribes along the line of our march to practise every species of annoyance against us; a system which needed little stimulant amongst the predatory hordes, who have, from time immemorial, subsisted almost entirely by plunder. In an intercepted letter addressed to a hill chief, of a date subsequent to that of the treaty of the beginning of April, he is reported to have written—"What is the use of your treaties and your arrangements? all child's play. There is no relief but in death: no cure but in the destruction of the English. Their heads, goods, and bodies must be sacrificed. Strengthen the Pass. Call on all the tribes to harass and destroy." (39) How nearly this system had proved successful,

38. Kennedy, *ut supra*.

39. Atkinson, p. 132.—Though both Major Hough and Dr Atkinson furnish

under the very imperfect shape it assumed, we have already seen: had it been carried out as just suggested, the campaign would probably have closed short of Candahar. Orders had been given to withhold all grain from us in Cutchee; and the most annoying system was that of rifling the letter-bags, so that, from the end of March till the troops reached Cabool in August, the safe arrival of not a single packet could ever be depended on. (40) Numberless executions occurred in consequence of this very vexatious species of molestation; but it does not appear to have, in any degree, decreased with the deaths of a few of the culprits. On the 8th April, the now diminished column, having suffered grievously from excessive heat—the thermometer often standing as high as 104° —reached Dadur, and found Major Griffiths in charge of the depot of the Bengal commissariat. Stores having been received from Shikarpore, the whole of the troops had entered the Bolan Pass by the 12th. The thermometer was 110° ; but could they have borne fire by thinking on the snowy Caucasus, the accounts they received of a snow storm which had been experienced just above the Pass a few weeks before would have relieved them. On the 20th they reached Quettah, having, on their progress through the Pass, escaped molestation from the enemy till near the conclusion; a rather sharp attack was made upon them in a very exposed position, but occasioned nothing more than the loss of some baggage and three or four men: the loss of forty-nine camel-loads of grain, with five horses killed, was the heaviest of our casualties. (41) During the march from Dadur they had been considerably annoyed by the stench of dead camels, and multitudes of unburied bodies of the enemy left behind along the line of the advance of the first division. General Nott, with the second brigade, and a considerable force of foot artillery, had been left behind at Quettah to keep open the communication with the rear. Here, a large amount of camel-men deserted.

facts sufficient to illustrate the character of the chief, as well as to prove the sagacity, if not the honesty, of the system proposed to be put in force, neither of them seem to comprehend the drift of their own statements! They speak of Mehrab Khan as a weak-minded traitor, well deserving the punishment inflicted on him, because he promised but did not fulfil that which he dared not refuse, but might well withhold! Major Havelock and Sir A. Burnes give him due credit for talent and sagacity.

40. Kennedy speaks of this as having been done in sheer wantonness of mischief. This is improbable: it is easily accounted for by the wish of interrupting communication—by retarding dispatches—a motive which has been held to legitimatise this species of annoyance in every war. Masson gives particulars of matters of this sort, when he and Loveday were prisoners in the hands of the Braboes in August 1840—see Masson's letter dated Quettah, Dec. 24, 1840,—published in the *Bombay Times*, March 13; and *Summary*, April 1. Dr Kennedy mentions that the Khan had been sent monies as bribes, and received all he got: we cannot discover any evidence whatever of this in any quarter. All the other writers agree that he was *promised* a subsidy,—but he never earned, nor, so far as we can perceive, *obtained* any.

41. Outram, p. 68.

The sudden change of climate which, in the course of ten days, had elevated their position by nearly 5,000 feet, and lowered the temperature from 96° or 104° to 80° and 58° produced a slight, but almost universal, though transient, attack of dysentery. Nothing of any note, further than what has just been mentioned, occurred till they reached Candahar, where they arrived, by rapid marches, on the 4th May, and found the Bengal troops, who had been there since the 26th April.

Before proceeding to examine the state of affairs at Candahar, we must record a notable adventure of an officer already well known to fame through forty years of distinguished military service; and whose name, from this date to the close of his honourable career leading the van at Jellalabad on the 7th April 1842, occupies a conspicuous place in the narrative of the conflicts which from this time, on to the memorable close of our connection with the country three years and a-half afterwards, continued almost without intermission. The party just referred to was Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, of H. M. 13th Light Infantry. He had been left in command of the second brigade, consisting of the 31st and 42d Bengal Native Infantry, ordered to remain at Shikarpore till means of conveyance should reach them from Mooltan and the Punjaub: this was a temporary arrangement, which ceased on the remodelling of the commands. The reserve stores and carriage were here put under his charge; while he was, at the same time, engaged in organizing a portion of the raw levies directed to form the Shah's contingent. (42) No sooner had Head Quarters got above the pass, than the whole of the camels, horses, and means of conveyance were withdrawn from Shikarpore. Colonel Dennie remonstrated; but in vain: he complained that he had neither been left hands or feet (43)—neither the means of defence or escape. Remonstrance, however, was useless, and in this helpless state he remained at Shikarpore till the end of March. Captain Stock-

42. Colonel Dennie's letters, 9th March 1839, and 24th Nov. 1840. As we shall have frequent occasion to refer to these papers, we may state that they consist of a series of letters to friends in Bombay, not immediately meant for publication, but of which the writer stated that any use might be made which was desired, provided he was not in his military capacity committed with his superior officers. A number of these were published either in substance, or in the shape of articles, during his life, without the author being referred to, and the proceeding was, we have every reason to believe, highly approved of. When his death removed all personal objections to their appearing in the form in which they were written, a selection made from them was published in the *Bombay Times* during the month of April. They form important historical documents on many points where our information was defective. A similar series of letters, rather of an earlier date, was published in the *Dublin University Magazine* for September and October 1842. A number of unpublished letters from the same quarter are in the present writer's hands: they also have occasionally been drawn upon, and are marked MSS. papers.

43. Letter dated Cabool, 13th April 1841. We have given nearly the whole of the letter.

ly of the Bombay commissariat, had, in the mean time, while on his way to Dadur with cattle, grain, and stores, been surrounded and shut up in the fort of Janneedera by the Beloochees; 250 of his camels had been captured, and numbers of his people had been cut up. (44) Securing a few treasure camels, the only cattle left him, with 200 sepoy he marched to the rescue; and, after a rapid march of 150 miles, one-third of it across the desert, he succeeded in saving the convoy, and delivering it safely over to the commissariat depot at Dadur. All intercourse betwixt the troops above and those below the pass had, as before explained, been cut off by the Beloochees. It was here, in the middle of May, that he first learned of the Quettah General Order of the 4th of April, already adverted to, ordering him to join his regiment, now on its way to Candahar. At Dadur, Captain Anderson, commanding two newly raised troops of the Shah's Horse Artillery, with tumbrils, ammunition waggons, &c., amounting to 50 carriages, claimed Colonel Dennie's protection through the Bolan Pass. Opposed in like manner by a numerous enemy the greater part of the way, with horses that could not draw, and boys that could not ride—compelled to halt every alternate day in this mountainous and rocky defile, they were destitute for several days of all powder, and their casualties in killed and wounded were necessarily increased by men dying of apoplexy or going mad from heat. With all these obstacles to be overcome, the detachment was brought in safety to Quettah with astonishingly little loss. From Quettah, Colonel Dennie, with this insignificant force, augmented at Dadur by the accession of five companies of the Bengal 37th N. I., took charge of treasure to Candahar, a distance of 150 miles, the Kojjuck Pass intervening. With this he arrived in safety, (45) and joined the headquarters of his regiment on the very day appointed.

Having thus brought our narrative to the point where the whole of the elements of the grand army were assembled at Candahar, we may be permitted shortly to review the general aspect of the military arrangements of Sir J. Keane at the opening of a campaign which, up to this date, could scarcely be considered as begun. The troops had marched to the battleground, but had hitherto met with no opposition: they were now about to engage in combat. The army which had assembled at Candahar, by the 6th of May amounted to 10,400 (46) fighting men, of which the Bengal

44. Letter to Major Henderson, Officiating Military Auditor General.—Cabool, 24th Nov. 1840.

45. Letter to Major Henderson, *ut sup.* He says in a published letter of the 13th April 1841, "I have always considered that duty the most arduous, if not the most meritorious, which fell to my lot in Affghanistan."

46. In all numerical matters we have taken Major Hough for our guide. He gives no account of the Contingent in his muster roll, dated Candahar, 1st June. This author is one of those whom every body copies, and no one commends. As a store-house of exact statistical facts, his work is invaluable; but

column supplied 6460, the Bombay division, last arrived, 3940; these were exclusive of the Shah's Contingent, of whose exact strength, at this date, we are not informed, but which probably brought the force up to 15,000. The followers at Candahar amounted in all to 28,653, of which more than half were on the muster-roll, and all depended on the commissariat. These were attended by about 4000 horses and bullocks, and above 10,000 camels. It was computed, that from Shikarpore about 500 Beloochees had been slain by us; our own loss amounting to about 40 or 50 men, with about 500 horses, besides 900 camels, and a large quantity of baggage.

The Shah's Contingent constituted a description of force to which we shall have such frequent occasion to refer, that we may here give a short notice of its origin, expense, and uses. It consisted of six regiments of regular infantry, two of cavalry, two troops of horse artillery, a corps of sappers and miners, and a mountain train, besides five local corps of irregulars. These amongst them mustered about 13,000 fighting men, paid and officered by the Government of India, (47) at an outlay of about half a million an-

it is so dry, and so severely statistical, that it forms rather uninteresting study by itself. In saying this much, we most readily acknowledge the extent to which, on the present and innumerable other occasions, we have been indebted to him. Hough states in his journal, p. 105—"The British force then present at Candahar (8th May) was about 9000 men, and there were about 3000 of the Shah's Contingent, besides some Afghan cavalry." We are unable exactly to reconcile the two statements, but have assumed 15,000 as the gross number.

47. The following abstract of the charges of the Shah's army was supplied us by a Cabool correspondent of 27th September, 1841, whose name is unknown to us, but who, we have reason to believe, held a high official appointment:—

<i>Paid by the Indian Government.</i>		<i>Rupees.</i>
6 Regiments of Infantry of the line, yearly		7,92,000
1 Kohistanee Corps		78,000
1 Khyber Corps		78,000
1 Jezailchee Corps		90,000
1 Bolan or Kalur Corps		48,000
2 Regular Cavalry Corps (50,000 monthly)		6,00,000
1 Atchukzie do.		36,000
2 Troops Horse Artillery		1,44,000
1 Company Mountain Train		54,000
1 Corps of Sappers and Miners,		1,20,000
General Staff:—(1 Brigadier, 1 Brigade Major, 1 Judge Advocate, 1 Superintendent of Cavalry, 3 Cavalry Officers, 1 Artillery Officer)— 9500 monthly.....		1,14,000
Medical Department—(1 Surgeon, 4 Assistant Surgeons).....		60,000
<i>Paid by the Shah.</i>		
4 Regiments of Jan Baz, 1 Battalion of Artillery Guards. Not paid by the Company, and therefore the real cost unknown, but estimated at	6,00,000	
Total, 28 lakhs—	28,14,000	
Add 4d for pension, half mountings, and contingencies	9,58,000	
Add Commissariat Department, at 60,000 monthly	7,20,000	
Grand Total	44,72,000	

I need not mention that the amount for pensions, half mountings, and contingencies, is very uncertain; I take it at 9,58,000, which, if not now, it will be at no distant day. Total, £447,200 sterling.

Major Hough gives their numerical strength as high as 13,000 men, including the Afghan and Kohistan levies of 4000, raised subsequent to our arrival at Cabool.

nally, their pay alone amounting to £280,000; the regular portion of them consisted entirely of men of Hindostan. (48) The reason why this body of raw levies should at the first juncture have been added to a couple of well appointed armies, already adequately strong for the performance of the task prescribed to them, is not explained. Our ideas of the then prospective objects of the campaign are still so imperfect and obscure, that it would be rash to pronounce an opinion on a piece of policy which seems eminently unwise and inexplicable, and in reference to the objects of which no one has ventured to offer any information:—it was disapproved of by Sir J. Keane, and censured by the highest military authorities. The only colourable pretext is that suggested by Colonel Dennie in his official letter to Col. Macdonald, that “it was in the vain hope of giving plausibility to the fiction that the Shah was entering his dominions surrounded by his own troops,—when, in fact, it was too notorious to escape exposure, that he had

Hough in his preface, gives the following as a recapitulation of the numerical strength of the force at the commencement of the campaign:—

By way of Candahar, Bengal and Bombay columns, 13,030; Shah's contingent, 6070; total, 19,100. At Bukkur, under Brigadier Gordon 2200; reserve at Kurrachee, 3050; reserve at Ferozepore, 5000. The Shahzada Timour's force and Seikh contingent, to act by way of the Khyber Pass, 10,886. The whole force amounting to 40,186. The difference betwixt this statement, and that already given from the same quarter, is not explained. The force left in Afghanistan and Scinde amounted to 20,000 men, with from 70 to 80 guns. This was gradually raised up to nearly 25,000 men before the insurrection broke out. It is well to keep this in view, because it has been urged innumerable times, that we stripped the country of troops before it was quieted!

The subjoined from Major Hough's preface, gives us the details of the Shahzada's force:—

Shahzada Timoor's force, under Lieut.-Colonel Wade. Lieut. J. D. Cunningham, Bengal Engineers, Mily. Secy. and Political Assistant.

Artillery.—Two 24-Prs. Howitzers and two 6-Prs. (and 20 Swivels) under Lieut. Maule, Bengal Artillery,

Golundauze,	40
British,—2 Co.'s 20th (Capt. Ferris) and 2 Co.'s 21st N.I. (Capt. Farmer),	320
Cavalry.—Mahomedans armed with swords, shields and matchlocks 400—irregulars 600,	1,000
Juzzailchees (rifles), 320. Infantry (matchlocks). Regulars 3 Bns. (683)—2,040. Irregulars 820 (under native commandants,)	3,180
Afghans,	100
Pioneers,	200
Total,	4,840

British officers with these troops and commanding parties, Lieut. F. Mackesson, 14th; Lieut. Rattray, 20th, Political Assistant; Lieut. J. G. Caulfield, 68th; Lieut. Hillersden, 63rd Bengal N. I., and Dr Lord, Political Assistant to Lieut.-Colonel Wade, Bombay establishment; Dr Alexander Reid, Bengal establishment, in medical charge.

48. See letter of Colonel Dennie to Colonel Macdonald, D. A. G., Shikarpore, March 9, 1839. We have as usual given nearly the words of the letter.

not a single subject or Affghan amongst them,—his army being composed of camp-followers from the Company's military stations." (49) We can hardly suppose but that it was intended to leave the contingent behind us as constituted—that is of Hindoo sepoys, commanded by British officers and paid by the Company; and yet if such was proposed at the time of the publication of the Simla proclamation, the writers who stated that so soon as the Shah Soojah was established on his throne, the British army would be withdrawn, were guilty of embodying as gross an equivocation in a Government proclamation as ever state paper contained! To return from these digressions, which have been considered necessary for the full elucidation of this portion of the narrative, the reader will recollect that we have now arrived at that period when an army of 15,000 British soldiers having encamped around Candahar, the Shah Soojah was prepared to enter the western capital of the Dooranee empire—a city containing a population of from 60,000 to 100,000 inhabitants.

On the approach of a force so perfectly overwhelming, the three brother Sirdars, who had for a period of 12 years maintained Candahar, fled with their families and about 200 followers to Ghirisk, a small fortress on the river Helmund, 80 miles distant, which formerly belonged to one of the other brothers, latterly to themselves. They left their capital on the 24th April. "Antecedently to the occupation of Candahar," says Major Havelock, "they might by timely submission have received at the hands of the British government a comfortable provision and honourable asylum in Hindustan; they have now no resource left but flight into Persia." Who doubts but they made the nobler choice? It would be humbling were it not ridiculous now to listen to the tone in which the contemporary narratives of the Affghan war are written. The most unjustifiable acts of the Indian government figure as worthy of all admiration; the bold freedom of thought and

49. Letter dated Shikarpore, 9th March, 1839, addressed to Lieut. Colonel Macdonald, Military Secretary to Lord Keane. We have so far given the words of the letter as they stand. The following are farther extracts:—"I cannot but lament, in common with the *whole force*, that two regular and disciplined armies, brought from so great a distance with so much difficulty and cost, should, at the very moment of united action, be thus maimed and dismembered merely for the sake of keeping together a mass of raw levies like the Shah's contingent, whose carriage and supplies would suffice for the Bengal and Bombay divisions, and who would again be much better employed in being left here for formation and instruction, whereas in their present state they must prove worse than worthless in advance. * * A necessary evil which has arisen out of this has been the effort to establish the efficiency of one part of the army at the expense of the other," &c. These observations were as sound as fairly put, and their justice was heartily concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief. But the Government of India on this occasion desired no advice on military matters from the officers in its service: Sir John Keane knew this, and he troubled them with none, but executed what he was ordered.

action manifested by the Afghans, whose analogies in our history are sources of our highest and purest national pride, are spoken of by English officers as pieces of fatuity wholly unaccountable! The Shah was anxious to have made his troops pursue the Sirdars, and bring them back to camp: the more considerate Envoy having, without success, endeavoured to make terms with them and secure their submission or friendship, and fearing that the treatment they might receive from any one under the immediate authority of the sovereign might not be altogether consistent with English justice or generosity, dispatched Brigadier Sale, on the 12th May, in pursuit of them; who, however, on approaching the Helmund, found that they had continued their flight without interruption to Meshid in Persia. (50) The chiefs had been driven to the alternative of seeking exile rather than attempting resistance, by the treachery of one of their number—Hadjee Khan Kakur, who had deserted them, and shortly afterwards displayed similar treachery to us. They proposed before this to have posted a body of cavalry to oppose us at the foot of the Kojuck pass, but had not carried their intention into effect. (51) This arrangement, if conducted with the most ordinary skill, might have been sufficiently inconvenient for us, considering the strength of the position and the crippled condition of the mounted portion of our troops.

On his approach to Candahar, the Shah appears to have been received in a very friendly spirit by the populace. It was with the chiefs he was unpopular; and they had quitted their country when they found their inability to defend it. Up to this period the King kept in the rear of the British Troops. "As we drew near to Candahar," says Sir William Macnaghten in a letter to Government of the 24th April, "at every hundred yards of our progress we were met by bands of well-mounted and well-armed men, all tendering their allegiance to his majesty; whilst the peaceable inhabitants of the city assembled in crowds and manifested their joy at the Shah's restoration, in the most unbounded terms." (52) "On the morning of the 24th April the king approached Candahar, but without any intention of entering the city. The scarcity of water compelled his majesty to proceed within three miles of the walls. This, at all events, was the excuse for passing to the front, and leaving the British army in the rear. The king was in advance of his own troops. The morning had scarcely dawned when parties of horse were descried; they were soon ascertained to be friends come to pay homage to their sovereign. They galloped up, dismounted, drew up in line, prayed to the king, who welcomed them, and then fell into the rear of the procession. One standard after another succeeded,

50. Atkinson, pp. 159, 160.

51. Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 248.

52. Dr Kennedy.

and ere his majesty entered the city he had been joined by 1500 well-mounted, dressed, and caparisoned horse. On his majesty's entering into the city, there could not have been less than between 60,000 and 70,000 persons present." (53) After they had visited the shrine containing the shirt of the prophet, and prayed at his grandfather's tomb, the party returned through the city amidst universal demonstrations of loyalty and respect. These emotions must either have been shallow, insincere, or of very transient duration. The Shah had not been six months seated on his throne, when discontent and insurrection made their appearance, which, in this quarter never was subdued while we remained in the country. On the 25th, the day following that on which so favourable a reception had been given to a chance visit, he took possession of his western capital in form. On the 8th of May the whole of the British army was drawn out in review order, by desire of the sovereign, to make a display of our strength in the eyes of his subjects, and celebrate his restoration to his throne. "The king was surrounded by his loving subjects, (says Lieutenant Fane,) and ragamuffin soldiers, but by very few men of rank or consequence." (54) Nothing could have appeared better than the whole array of people, but from fear or dislike of the Shah, few, if any, men of influence in the country were present. It is needless to give the details of the Shah's levee, with the other regal ceremonies, by whose means it was hoped to give the phantom the authority of a king. The modern city of Candahar is comprised within a fortification, three miles in circumference, forming an irregular oblong square, surrounded by a ditch 24 feet wide and 10 deep. The wall just within this is 27 feet in height, and from 14 to 20 feet thick. It has six gates, all at this time in bad repair. The gateways are defended by six double bastions, and there are 34 lesser bastions distributed along the face of the wall. There are four leading streets running from north to south and from east to west, and meeting in the centre in a large circular space 50 feet in diameter, and covered in by a dome. This forms the principal market place, where the chief merchants reside.

When we arrived at Candahar in April, the crops were in process of rapid vegetation. We still clung to the hope that Mehrab Khan would supply us with cattle and provisions; and as forage was becoming more plentiful as the season advanced, though the means of transport were rather falling off than improving, we hung on from week to week till the

† 53. Letter from an officer of the Bombay force, published in a Bombay paper, quoted in Capt. Outram's rough notes. This visit to the city was made at the suggestion of the Envoy, and gave the greatest offence to Sir J. Keane. It certainly was a singularly rash and imprudent adventure: wholly ignorant as we were of the temper of the populace, it might have been fatal.

54. Five years in India—by Lieut. Henry Fane, late aid-de-camp to H. E. the Commander-in-chief; now Captain in H. M. army, vol. ii., p. 131.

approach of harvest :—that season being later at Ghuznee and Cabool than at Candahar, in consequence of the great additional elevation and higher latitude of the latter two than the former, gave us reason to hope that we should find the produce of the soil ready for us as we advanced. It was a singular feature in the design of the campaign, that we should have sent an expedition of such magnitude to so great a distance, knowing that for its success we must in some measure be dependent on the aid of chiefs whom we might punish for broken promises, but could not coerce, and whose whole interests lay in retarding and resisting us. “ Had Mehrab Khan of Kela’ obstructed us in the Bolan Pass (says Dr. Kennedy) ; (55) had Candahar been properly defended ; had the 28 guns we found at Urgundah been bestowed for the defence of Candahar and Ghuznee ; and had the 1200 cavalry shut up in the latter fort been merely employed in riding round us, wasting all the forage, and watching all foraging parties from the Bolan Pass to Cabool : finally, had Russian agency been so far developed as it was supposed, and ought to have been, to have justified such a campaign ; had any one of these contingencies occurred,—and not only one but all were to be looked for,—the army could not have advanced ; not because we should not have been able to defeat the enemy if he would have given us the opportunity ; but because it was his wisdom to avoid a contest, and the distance to be travelled exceeded the means of any Commissariat to convey supplies in the face of hostile opposition. The wretchedness of the country denied pasture for our cattle, and they must have perished on the road had the necessary delay occurred, which must have resulted from a cool and calculating enemy, however feeble, availing himself of the natural advantages his position gave him, and of the length of way we had to travel.” At Candahar there was every appearance of a plentiful harvest. The Commander-in-Chief had a very heavy responsibility on his shoulders,—that of the future provisioning of the army ; and one of his first acts was to consult the king and the envoy in regard to the crops on the ground. It was considered, that if the owners consented to receive a high price for their grain, and a certain number of the largest mills were placed under the control of the commissariat, such an arrangement would be the best, and least annoying to all parties ; but unless the king could satisfactorily establish that he had power to guarantee this, and assurance of it was given by the principal men in the place, and by the owners of the crops, there was still left the power of *might* in the hands of Sir John Keane, to take possession of the crops on the ground, and pay the owners a fair valuation—but such a measure as this last was not to be resorted to except in an extreme case. The most satisfactory assurances were given that there would be no occasion for coercion on the point of collect-

ing grain, and this free system was carried out to the letter; but the cost was tremendous, and the treasury was in consequence most severely drawn upon. So extremely guarded was the Commander-in-Chief obliged to be, and so parsimonious in the disbursements from the treasury at that time, that not a rupee could be issued to any functionary, or establishment, whether to the Envoy for the service of the Shah, the expenses of the commissariat, or the pay of the troops, without a written order from Colonel Macdonald, his Excellency's military secretary. The grounds and necessity of the requisitions for money were required to be made manifest before the order was given. In this way it was managed to keep the chest in such a state that there was always something to go and come upon for exigencies. All attempts failed of raising money at Candahar, by giving bills upon India. Whether this proceeded from poverty in the place, or a want of confidence in us, has not been clearly ascertained, but in all probability from the former cause. Daily reports were sent to Sir John Keane of the progress made, and great exertions were used by the commissary-general to complete the quantity of provisions required for an onward move, and for which there was carriage. The four heavy guns of the battering train were left behind, for two reasons, first, because the carriage for their transport, together with the ammunition and all belonging to them, could ill be spared; and, secondly, but *the principal cause*, owing to the strong opinion given by the chief engineer, Capt. Thomson, that they would be wholly unnecessary, *as Ghuznie was not a place of that strength to require their being brought into use*. This opinion was not formed by Captain Thomson on light grounds. It was, strange to say, come to on the authority and report of an engineer and an artillery officer in our own service, who had seen the place, and who were actually then present with the force! How difficult then is the situation of a commander of an army in a country so little known as this was. Who could Sir John Keane look to for information with so much confidence as to the officers in our own service who had seen Ghuznie, and those, officers too of the scientific branch? Captain Thomson states in his official reports, that he was misled by this information. The Commander-in-Chief has been blamed in more than one publication for leaving the heavy guns behind. He did so, however, on the recommendation of those from whom he had the best right to expect good counsel on such a point, the heads of the engineer and artillery departments; and although the lamented Brigadier Stevenson is not alive to verify the fact of what is here stated, Colonel Pew and Majors Thomson and Peat are, and will readily subscribe to its accuracy. (56) At length the order was given

56. The above explanation is given on the authority not named but already

that we should advance on the 29th June, and by the 1st July the whole army had quitted. They met with no obstruction in their progress, and no event of any considerable note occurred to them till their approach to Ghuznee, when they were much annoyed by alarms of night attacks which never were made. The troops still continued on half, and the followers on quarter rations. (57) On the 21st of July, they arrived under the walls of Ghuznie; the distance from Candahar being 230 miles. The British force consisted of 8000 fighting men fit for duty, and the Shah's contingent, about 4,000 : making 12,000 in all, with 40 pieces of artillery. (58) Their baggage covered an area of 16 square miles. (59)

Ghuznie is situated on the northern extremity of a range of hills running due east and west. The west, south, and east sides of the town, are protected by a broad and deep ditch supplied with water from the river adjoining. (60) The citadel or Bala Hissar is an irregular square on an eminence overlooking all the city. The fortress was considered by the Afghans so strong that it was believed capable of being maintained against us for twelve months. Its garrison consisted of betwixt 3000 and 4000 men, half of which were cavalry; they were provisioned for three months. The population of the city was about equal in amount to the garrison. It was commanded by Goolam Hyder Khan, youngest son of Dost Mahomed. "The accounts of the fortress received," says Captain Thomson, (61) "from these who had seen it, were such as to induce his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to leave at Candahar the very small battering train then with the army, there being there a scarcity of transport cattle. The place was described as being very weak, completely commanded by a range of hills. When we came before it on the morning of the 21st July, we were very much surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about 35 feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a *fausse braye* and wet ditch. The irregular figure of the 'enceinte' gave a good flanking fire, whilst the right of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles had been enlarged, screen-walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river so as to command the bed of it. As we approached Ghuznie the most conflicting accounts reached us of the intentions of the

repeatedly referred to. It has been made more minute because of the misapprehension which has generally existed on the subject.

57. Major Hough, p. 156, note.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

59. Dr Kennedy.

60. Hough, p. 227.

61. Memoranda by Captains Thomson and Peat, engineers, July 1839. We have employed the words of the writers.

enemy: it was at first maintained that night attacks were intended; then that battle was to be given us in form; afterwards that the city and citadel were to be abandoned without resistance; and, finally, which proved the truth, that the garrison had been reinforced and received instructions to hold out to the last. General Willshire's brigade having pressed on by forced marches, the whole army were arranged by the Commander-in-Chief in three columns, ready to deploy into line, and give battle at a moment's warning, and thus they moved across the extensive plain by which Ghuznie is approached on the west, and after a march of twelve miles halted within a mile of the walls of the fort. (62) On the arrival of the infantry a party of skirmishers was thrown into a garden from which some matchlock fire had appeared to proceed, and cleared it without difficulty. It was desired by the Commander-in-Chief that it should be ascertained what amount of fire the enemy could direct against us. With this object, 18 horse artillery guns, together with the camel battery of 9-pounders, making 30 in all, were got into position 700 yards from the walls. (63) They opened a brisk fire of shot and shrapnell, which lasted for three quarters of an hour, the enemy appearing to suffer severely, especially from the explosion of the shells. The practice of the Affghans was good, and their guns were well supplied. Having ascertained all we wanted to know, our artillery were withdrawn. (64) The fort was now reconnoitred in form: it was found that all the gates, save that opening on the Cabool road on the opposite side from whence we halted, had been built up. It was impossible to breach the walls with guns of the calibre we had alone brought along with us, or in any reasonable time with the small battering train brought from Sukkur and left behind, even could this have been commanded. Mining and escalading were equally out of the question, from the height of the parapet and magnitude of the wet ditch; to sit down in formal siege was an operation much too tardy to be thought of, considering the advanced period of the year, and it was therefore determined, on the recommendation of the Engineers, that the Cabool gate should be blown in, and capture attempted by assault. On the evening of the day of their arrival, the

62. Outram, p. 91.

63. Major Hough, p. 166, and note.

64. The works were evidently much stronger than we had been led to expect, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner. We had no battering train, continues Captain Thomson: to besiege Ghuznie in form, a much larger one would have been required than the army ever possessed. The command of the parapets from 60 to 70 feet, with the wet ditch, were unsurmountable obstacles to an attack either by mining or escalading. * * * The result of this reconnoissance was a report to His Excellency the Commander-in-chief that, if he decided upon an immediate attack on Ghuznie, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one which held out a prospect of success, was to make a dash at the Cabool gateway, blowing the gate open by powder-bags.—*Report, ut supra.*

troops were directed to change their ground : they marched in two columns, right and left of the fortress, to take up their new position on the Cabool instead of the Candahar side; they were directed to make a considerable circuit, so as to keep without the range of the fire of the fort : they reached the new halting place in the course of the night. Besides being now in a position for the operations about to be carried 'into effect previous to the assault, the army was so placed as to prevent the escape of Hyder Khan and the garrison should they think of abandoning the fort, as well as to preclude the possibility of his receiving assistance or supplies from his father or brother, whose troops were still further to the eastward. The Commander-in-Chief having, at break of day, reconnoitred the new aspect the city now presented, laid down his plans and issued his orders for the proceedings of next night. (65) About noon the hills to the southward of our camp were crowded by masses of horse and foot, displaying several standards. The whole of the Shah's horse, supported by the Lancers and a Bengal regiment of cavalry, moved out with a couple of guns to meet them. So soon as the cavalry approached, the enemy, who had begun to descend into the plain, found it expedient to re-ascend the heights, leaving behind one of their standards in our possession, four or five of their horses having fallen. Captain Outram had at this time galloped out to ascertain what was astir : he reached the scene of action just before the occurrence of the incident already described, and finding no European officer on the spot, persuaded a body of the Shah's horse to follow him round the hills to the enemy's rear, where he stationed them so as to cut off their retreat. Intimidated by this movement, and repulsed by the gallant charge of Eosign Nicholson, the Affghans ascended the heights beyond the reach of our horse. Captain Outram now suggested to an English officer, whom, at this juncture, he met in charge of 150 infantry and matchlock-men, that they should make an attempt to drive the enemy from the heights in the direction in which the cavalry had been stationed. They scrambled over the rocks with great gallantry, Captain Outram at their head ; and after scaling the steep and rugged acclivity of the hill, sheltering themselves from the fire, which was hot and well-directed, by every stone and rocky promontory which came in their way, they at length step by step attained the highest summit. They now reached the head-quarters of the enemy, marked by a large green and white banner, which had been consecrated by the priests, and was supposed to confer invincibility. On arriving within fifty paces of this, the whole of our party rushed in with a general cheer—a fortunate shot brought down the standard-bearer, and the standard itself fell into our hands. The enemy were panic-struck, their charin had

failed them, and they fled on every side. The loss of the Affghans amounted to 30 or 40 in killed and wounded, and 50 were made prisoners by the cavalry—the greater part of which were afterwards executed, because one of them in the king's presence stabbed an attendant; his Majesty gave instant orders to behead him and the others. As may be supposed, this was done without the knowledge of the Commander-in-chief, who was astounded when Sir Alex. Burnes came to him soon after from Mr Macnaghten to report it. It was also perpetrated without the knowledge of either of them; but the deed was done, and it was too late to recall it. His Majesty was, however, distinctly informed by Sir John Keane's orders, that such butchering would never again be permitted within the limits of a British camp, *even on his Majesty's own subjects.* (66) By 3 o'clock of the morning of the 29d July, the va-

66. This version of the matter may be relied on, though very widely different from that usually given. Sir W. Macnaghten, though disapproving of the measure at the time, afterwards attempted to defend it. [We have retained this note, as well as the text to which it refers, exactly as it stood in the *Bombay Monthly Times*. A letter subscribed "OLD VERSION," gives Sir W. Macnaghten's own account of the matter, which is very greatly at variance with the above.]

On referring the matter to an Officer of rank now in Bombay, who held a confidential Staff situation with Sir John Keane at the time, he writes as follows:—

Sir,—As you have asked my impression as to the two versions regarding what immediately preceded the beheading of the Ghazee prisoners by order of Shah Shoojah, I can have no objections to give it, in so far as I had any means of forming an opinion,—it being a matter that did not in the most remote degree come within the sphere of my office or duty. The point upon which I believe you wish an opinion is, whether Sir John Keane was aware of the King's intention to behead the prisoners, and gave his concurrence to it, *before the fact*; or whether he was only made aware of it after the fact. The impression on my mind is, that he only knew it after, and for this reason: having gone into Sir John Keane's tent that afternoon, and finding Sir Alexander Burnes with him, Sir John Keane exclaimed "what do you think has happened?—the King has beheaded the prisoners taken this afternoon." Sir Alex. Burnes then related how, and why the King had done so—that when they were brought into His Majesty's presence and questioned regarding their rebellion and treason, they said they would glory in taking His Majesty's life; that he was an infidel, and had brought an army of infidels into the country, and that they would take his life whenever they could, or had an opportunity; and one of them, suiting the action to the word, plunged a dagger into the breast of one of the Shah's attendants in His Majesty's presence;—upon which the King gave orders that they should all be beheaded.

I cannot be mistaken in what Sir Alexander Burnes said, as I have above related it, nor do I think he could have come with a message from the Envoy asking concurrence, previous to that afternoon, without my knowing it, as I was seldom out of Sir John Keane's tent; it being a time of heavy work, as well as heavy responsibility and much anxiety to him, as the arrangements for the storming of Ghuznie were still in progress and not completed. My impression therefore, for the reason I have stated, is, that the account in the text is the nearest to the true version. There was no writing of any kind upon the subject that I was aware of, and I seldom or ever heard it afterwards talked of or condemned by the Officers in the Field: at the moment all seemed to think the treason of the Ghazee prisoners of a double and

rious detachments were at their posts, and all the guns in position at points which commanded the eastern face of the fortress, as well as the Cabool

most aggravated kind; and although at the time of Sir Alexander Burnes relating the tragic story to me, as I have stated it, I heard Sir John Keane condemn the Shah for his rash act, and that such a thing must not happen again, I at the same time heard him say, that "the murderers and treacherous rascals deserved it," or words to that effect. I therefore think, that if Sir William Macnaghten wrote a year afterwards, to the effect stated in the note, he must have jumbled two things together, and confounded the account Sir Alexander Burnes gave him of the Commander-in-Chief's conversation with concurrence in the Shah's act.

I had for Sir William Macnaghten personally a very great regard, and so thoroughly convinced am I of his good intentions, and his strict regard for truth, that if he did write to the effect stated, he had convinced himself of its correctness, however he may have mixed up two circumstances at a time of intense anxiety, and of no small danger, when my lamented friend Sir Alexander Burnes went back to him and related his conversation with the Commander-in-Chief.

It was not an unusual thing for Sir John Keane to offer advice to the Shah (the Envoy being of course cognizant of it). This he was not only authorized to do, but also to enforce the advice in any case of necessity. In that way, he caused the Shah to be informed on one occasion, when the ears of a man had been cut off by His Majesty's orders for a heinous crime, that mutilation, which was abhorrent to British feelings, however it might accord with Afghan law and usage, would not be permitted, so long as His Majesty and his followers formed part of a British Camp.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

AN OFFICER OF RANK NOW IN BOMBAE, WHO HELD A
CONFIDENTIAL STAFF SITUATION.

"The following extract is from an autograph-letter from Sir William Macnaghten to Sir Alexander Burnes, dated "Cabool, Nov. 27, 1840," now before me, and a Copy of which I have supplied by last Mail to Sir William's friends in London, to enable them to meet the new 'version of the matter' in your Summary with such denial as they may think proper.

"Extract from a letter from Sir William Macnaghten to Sir Alexander Burnes, on the subject of the destruction of the 36 prisoners who were put to death at Ghizni the presence of Major McSherry, on the evening of the 22d July 1839.

"The facts of the case, as contained in my official letter to Government, were simply these: to the truth of my statement you and many other persons can testify.

"On the morning of the 22d July, whilst we were before the Fort of Ghizni, a numerous body of armed people (I have recently heard their number estimated at nearly four thousand) were seen ascending the hills immediately to the left of His Majesty's camp. In the course of the day they several times threatened to come down upon our camp; but they were repulsed and kept in check chiefly by the Shah's own troops and Christie's horse, who were at different periods engaged with these fanatics. Towards evening, a report was brought to me, that the King's people had taken several prisoners, and that His Majesty had determined upon the execution of them all. On the impulse of the moment, I suggested that a selection should be made of the offenders for execution; and I immediately consulted Lieut.-General Sir John Keane, through Sir Alexander Burnes, who was in His Excellency's camp; and his opinion was, that 'the most summary example should be made of all such dastardly ruffians.' In the meanwhile, I had received several messages from His Majesty, expressing his determination to put the prisoners to death, as the only safe and proper course to be adopted in the exigency of our situation. I replied, that His Majesty was supreme, but that I would at least strongly recommend him, if he thought a severe example necessary, to liberate some of the

gate. The weather was peculiarly favourable for the concealment of our movements. The wind blew strongly and in gusts from the east, and occasionally with such violence over night and towards dawn, as to render inaudible to the devoted garrison the tramp of columns or rattle of artillery wheels.(67) Under these circumstances, so quietly and judiciously were all our arrangements effected, that not a shot was fired from the garrison until after the commencement of the false attack by Captain Hay, with three companies of the 35th N.I. from the opposite quarter to that from which real danger was preparing. As an attack for the relief of the garrison had been threatened, Col. Stalker with the Bombay 19th N. I., was ordered to guard the Cabool road, but no enemy appeared. At midnight, the first battery left camp, followed by four others at intervals of half an hour. Those to the right of the road were conducted to the right of their positions, by Lieutenant Sturt, those on the left by Lieutenant Anderson. The ground for the guns was prepared by the sappers and pioneers, taking advantage of the irregularities to the right, and some old garden walls on the left.(68) The artillery being all in readiness shortly after 3 o'clock, Captain Peat of the Bombay Engineers moved down to the gateway, accompanied by six men of H. M.'s 13th, without their belts, and supported by a detachment of the same Regiment, consisting of 18 officers, 28 sergeants, 17 buglers, and 276 rank and file, which entered to the right and left of the road, taking what cover they could find as they arrived at the ditch, and endeavouring to keep down the fire of the ramparts, which became very heavy on the approach of the party, though it had been sufficiently slack throughout on previous operations. Blue lights were shown by the besieged, which rendered surrounding objects distinctly visible; luckily they were burned on the top of the parapet instead of being thrown into the passage below.(69) The explosion party consisted of Captain Peat, Lieuts. Durand (70) and M'Leod,

prisoners, in order that the retribution which had overtaken their comrades might be made known to the whole of these fanatic offenders. My recommendation was not concurred in by His Majesty to the extent that I could have wished: of 38 prisoners 2 only were released,—the one on the ground of his being a Syud, and the other because he begged his life. The remainder, who obstinately persisted in exasperating His Majesty, were executed.' * * *

'On such an occasion it was my duty to seek the advice of the chief military authority on the spot, and I have shown that I did so.'

OLD VERSION."

67. Havelock, vol. ii. p. 71.

68. Captain Thomson's Report.

69. Report, *ut supra*. Copied verbatim.

70. This officer having been home on leave, returned to India with Lord Ellenborough, and was appointed his Lordship's Private Secretary. Long before the capture of Ghuznie, when very young in years, he had distinguished himself in scientific research: especially by his discoveries of some of the most famous sub-Himalayan fossils.

three serjeants, and eighteen men of the Sappers, in working dresses, carrying 300 lbs. of powder in 12 sand-bags, with a hose 72 feet long. These advanced steadily, silently, and rapidly, led by Lieut. Durand. The enemy were perfectly aware that we were in the gateway, but appeared to have no idea of the nature of the operations in progress. If they had been so, they might have rendered it impossible to place the powder-bags, by throwing over blue-lights, of which they had abundance in store. The powder pots, and other fire-works so much used by the natives of Hindostan, would easily have rendered the cramped space leading to the gate much too hot for such an operation, but the ignorance of the besieged was known and calculated on; the results show how justly. Lieutenant Durand, on first going up, saw, through the chinks of the gate, that there were lights, and a guard immediately behind it. The men on duty were smoking quietly thinking of no danger: three minutes after, they must have been destroyed by the explosion! The powder was placed, the hose laid, the train fired, and the carrying party had retired to tolerable cover, in less than two minutes. No man was hurt; Captain Peat was momentarily stunned by the concussion, but speedily recovered. The success was complete. There having been reason to apprehend that the enemy might have built up or strengthened the gate from within, more than double the quantity of gunpowder recommended by Colonel Pasley had been used. The charge was so heavy that it not only destroyed the gate, but brought down a considerable portion of the square building in which it was placed, the ruins obstructing the advance of the assaulting column. (71) A few moments elapsed before a bugler could be found to sound the advance. (72) The instant the trumpet blast was heard, the storming party, consisting of the grenadier companies of H. M.'s 2d and 17th, with those of the Bengal European Regiment, and a company of H. M.'s 13th, led on by the heroic Colonel Denie, rushed in and found themselves for a few moments in fierce hand-to-hand conflict with the Affghans amidst the ruins of the demolished gateway. "Nothing could be distinctly seen in the narrow passage; but the clash of sword-blade against bayonet was heard on every side." (73) The soldiers had to grope their way between the yet standing walls; there was neither room nor leisure for regular firing. Each section loaded in turn, and delivered its deadly volley at half pistol-shot distance on the enemy. The entrance-way just on passing the gate, took a sudden turn at right angles to the line of its previous path. This led at first to the erroneous impression that the passage was built up within, and that the explosion had not opened

71. Capt. Peat's Report, verbatim.

72. Capt. Thomson's Report.

73. Havelock, vol. ii., p. 76.

a thoroughfare. The illusion was only dispelled when the sky began to appear over head ; and the leading files immediately afterwards found themselves in the open square within the town. Meanwhile an erroneous report, that Col. Dennie had been unable to make good an entrance, reached the supporting column, consisting of H. M.'s 2d and 13th, with the remainder of the Europeans, under Brigadier Sale, (H. M.'s 17th being directed to follow the storming party into the fort.) They halted for a moment, and the retreat was sounded ; (74) fortunately it was imperfectly heard and unattended to during the tempest of the night and the excitement of the events in progress. A few minutes more elapsed, and the true version of the matter was communicated ; Brigadier Sale pressed on, but the loss of the few minutes his halt had occasioned, gave rise to mischief. (75) A considerable interval was left betwixt the forlorn hope, under Col. Dennie, and the column of Brigadier Sale. As the latter pressed into the gateway, the Queen's regiment taking the lead, a large body of Affghans, driven from the ramparts by the fire of the forlorn hope, rushed down upon them in hopes of escaping beyond the walls. The attack was made on the rear company of the Queen's and the leading files of the Bengal European regiment. (76) The fury of their assault for a moment drove back the troops opposed to them. Brigadier Sale was cut down, and his adversary rolled over him. Capt. Kershaw of H. M.'s 13th, during the struggle passed his sword through the body of the Affghan. This, however, was not enough ; and not till Sir Robert Sale managed to get uppermost and cleave his skull to the eyebrows, would his desperate enemy let go his hold. The reserve under Colonel Croker now speedily followed, and made its way into the city without resistance. On the evening of the 22nd a council of war had been held in the garrison of Ghuznie : it had been proposed by Hyder Khan the governor, that all the females should be sent into the fort as a place of protection ; this was opposed ; and just as the assembly, whose debates had occupied the live long night, were being dissolved, the gates were burst open, and the batteries opened their fire. (77) No one dreamt of what had happened, and the three leading companies under Col. Dennie were within the fort before the chiefs suspected the approach of danger. The Commdr.-in-chief, perceiving that the city had been won, desired that the whole force of the artillery should be directed against the citadel, from which a determined resistance was still expected. But the enemy were panic struck with the suddenness and magnitude of the misfortune which had fallen upon them, and though in their attempts to reach the gateway, the flying Affghans laid about them in all directions, there was no further resistance systematical-

74. Major Hough, p. 175.

75. Havelock, *ut supra*.

76. Major Havelock, vol. ii. p. 79.

77. Dr. Kennedy, vol. ii. p. 48.

ly attempted. By five o'clock A. M. the colours of H. M.'s 13th (78) and 17th waved from the battlements of the citadel of Ghuznie. There had been some sharp fighting in the streets: one lofty building offered a desperate resistance, and upwards of 50 Affghans perished in defending it. There were 514 dead bodies picked up within the walls: we took 1600 prisoners, and the number of the wounded was estimated about equal that of the captives. For weeks afterwards, however, bodies were found in the recesses of private buildings or narrow streets, mostly those of men who had died of their wounds, so that the total loss of the Affghans is estimated at about 1000 slain. (79) No city taken by assault ever suffered so little as Ghuznie, and no men ever conducted themselves under similar circumstances with temperateness and moderation equal to that of its captors. On this point all writers are unanimous. With the close of the fighting all violence ceased, and not one female was exposed to insult or injury. It may not be superfluous to add, that long before this the commissariat store of intoxicating liquor had been exhausted, and Sir J. Keane commanded a temperance army. To the want of liquor is ascribed by the medical men the unprecedented celerity with which the injuries of the wounded were healed. Our casualties in killed, wounded, and missing, officers and men together, amounted to 191, of whom 17 only were killed. Hyder Khan, the governor, surrendered himself in the course of the morning, and was placed under the surveillance of Sir Alexander Burnes; he subsequently accompanied the Commander-in-Chief with the part of the Bengal army which returned through the Khyber Pass, and in progress through the Punjaub he requested that, owing to the kind treatment he experienced, he might be allowed to accompany Sir J. Keane all the way to Bombay,—a request which was assented to by the Governor-General. He remained through the year 1840 a prisoner of state at Bombay, where he was left almost entirely at liberty. The fall of Ghuznie was known at Cabool, 80 miles off, at 5 o'clock the same day. (80) Meer Ufzul Khan, the eldest, and commonly known as "the fighting son" of Dost Mahomed, was afterwards found to have been close upon our camp early in the morning with 5000 cavalry. He heard the firing, and was

78. Major Hough, p. 6.—The colours of the 13th were placed on the battlements by Ensign Frere, an able, amiable, and gallant young officer, who, after having been present at all the remarkable actions which occurred in Affghanistan betwixt 1838 and 1842, including the siege of Jellalabad and return to Cabool, died on his way to India on the final abandonment of the country.

79. Dr Atkinson's *Affghanistan*, p. 236—"On our arrival at Cabool, information reached us, that in searching through every recess and corner, between 200 and 300 more dead bodies had been found and buried; so that, together with those cut down in their flight, the total amount of killed has been estimated at upwards of 1000."—*Ibid.*, *ut supra*. Major Hough estimates them at 1200.

80. Major Hough.

only waiting for daylight to discover the state of Ghuznia. Dawn showed him the British flag waving on the citadel, and indicated that it had already met its fate. He immediately fled towards Cabool, leaving his elephants and baggage behind him, within six miles of our camp. These were afterwards captured by us. (81)

Lieut.-Col. (now Sir Claude Martin) Wade, political agent at Loodiana, had, as mentioned at the commencement of our narrative, assembled near Peshawur an army of 4800 men of the Shah's levies, besides a Seikh contingent of 6000, (82) so early as the month of January. These were to move upon Cabool by Jellalabad, nominally under Shahzada Timour, eldest son of Shah Soojah; while a further Seikh contingent of 10,000 was to remain as an army of observation at Peshawur. Col. Wade having been duly informed of the progress and success of the grand army under Sir J. Keane, proceeded into the Khyber Pass on the 22d of June. On the 27th he obtained possession of Ali Musjid, a fort previously held by Dost Mahomed's troops, and considered the key of the pass: the enemy abandoned it without fighting on the approach of the advancing force. Mahomed Ukhbar Khan, second son of Dost Mahomed, and afterwards too famous amongst the insurgent chiefs in 1842, was then stationed at Jellalabad, of which he was the governor, with 2,500 men and 14 guns. On the fall of Ghuznia he was recalled to defend Cabool. This at once opened the way for the Shahzada's advance through the passes. He arrived at Cabool on the 2d Sept. Near Gundamuck, Ukhbar Khan abandoned his artillery and camp equipage, so that 12 guns, 7000 rounds of ball cartridges, with camp appointments, horses, and draught bullocks, fell into the Shahzada's hands. Gen. Ventura, who was to have taken command of the Seikh contingent, remained behind in consequence of the death of Runjeet Singh, and the entire command of this force, amounting to betwixt 10,000 and 11,000, devolved on Col. Wade, (83) who, for this well-directed movement, received the special thanks of the Governor-General: and appears well to have deserved them. A march through the passes, at all times a difficult operation, was at this juncture a very important one; and though little opposition was experienced, it seems to have been got rid of by skilful and judicious management,—by a series of difficult and intricate arrangements amongst a set of most untractable subjects.

So soon as all was tolerably quiet, H. M. Shah Soojah and the Envoy

81. Major Hough, p. 183.

82. Major Hough.

83. Dr Atkinson's expedition into Affghanistan. This work supplies us with a great many valuable facts, but it is impossible sufficiently to censure the tone of childish adulation towards Lord Auckland's administration, which characterizes it every where, or the perverted credulity with which all sorts of silly and incredible anecdotes against the Barukzyes are raked up.

and Minister were conducted round the citadel and a great part of the fortress, by the Commander-in-Chief. The King was astonished at our having made ourselves master of a place considered to be impregnable, in the space of two hours of assault, and within 48 hours of our having presented ourselves before it. (84) He was still more delighted than astonished at the result. On the recommendation of the medical officers of the force, it was determined that the sick and wounded should be left at Ghuznie under charge of field-surgeon Pinhey of the Bombay service. The garrison to be stationed there consisted of the 16th Bengal N. I., a detachment of 30 artillerymen, and 200 of the Shah's horse: to these were afterwards added a *ressalah* of the 4th Bengal local horse, with four of the Shah's guns. (85) On the 28th July, the Nawab Jubbar Khan, eldest brother of Dost Mahomed, arrived in camp on deputation from the Ameer. Sir Alex. Burnes and an escort of Lancers went out to meet him. This chief had been celebrated by all the travellers who ever visited Afghanistan, for his hospitality, his kindness to Europeans, and general liberality and benevolence of disposition. (86) His strength of intellect and shrewdness of remark have already been noticed by us in our introductory chapter, where the reasoning of the state papers of the Government of India is shown to have been completely demolished by him and his brother. "The conduct of Jubbar Khan (says Major Hough) was on this occasion noble: he had at one time been defrauded of his estates by his brother, but he said he wanted nothing for himself." The drift of his present proposition was, that Hyder Khan should be released, and that Dost Mahomed should cease to offer further resistance, and should resign all power and authority into the hands of Shah Soojah, provided we consented to his becoming Vizier or Prime Minister—a position which he claimed by right of heritage. After the steps we had already taken, this proposal was clearly inadmissible. He was informed that the only terms which Dost Mahomed could look for, were a safe asylum and liberal allowance within the British dominions. He declared that his brother would never consent to reside in India on any terms. He was offered for himself the continuance of his property, with honours from the hands of the Shah. These were declined, and the chief seems to have resorted to a boldness of speech not over grateful to royal ears. "On being

84. Lord Keane's dispatch.

85. Major Hough, p. 221.

86. Dr Atkinson's work is on this, as on most other points affecting the Barukzye character, at variance with all our books of travels. He does not state whence his lights are drawn—that they are tinted by the medium of the Shah Soojah court is sufficiently apparent. He speaks of Jubbar Khan with much disparagement.

introduced to the King," says Dr. Atkinson, "his deportment was not uncourteous, but he said, 'if you are to be king, what is the use of the British army here? If the English are to rule over the country, what use are you here?'" "The Shah," continues the courtly historian, "with unruffled temper, parried this observation by soothing his hurt mind, and, in a bland manner, promised him a confidential station near his person." If, instead of parrying, the Government of India had endeavoured to solve the difficulty here set forth, as also that pressed by Mehrab Khan of Kelat—"you have brought an army into the country, how do you propose to feed it while here, or get it back again?"—before entering on the war, Britain might have been spared the loss of much life, treasure, and fame. The Nawab having failed in effecting any of his objects, left us, declaring his determination to follow his brother's fortunes to the close.

On the 30th of July our troops marched from Ghuznie towards Cabool. Near the end of the first day's march they passed a defile of about 200 or 300 yards, behind which, a very inferior force with a few guns might have made good. The elevation here was the greatest attained by them, being 9000 feet above the level of the sea. Very rigid orders were issued for the protection of the villagers, and to prevent injury to the growing crops, now nearly ripe in the field. On the 1st of August a message from Peshawur brought accounts of the death of Runjeet Singh: this event, by which the triple alliance was so materially affected, had occurred on the 27th of June, the day before the troops left Candahar. On the 3d, intelligence was received of Dost Mahomed having been wholly deserted by his chiefs and army, the latter said to have shortly before amounted to 13,000 men. (87) Quarrels and jealousies had arisen amongst them: old feuds and grudges were, as usual, called up just at the time they should have been forgotten. The severities of Dost Mahomed's vigorous government were recent and minutely recollected: distance had mellowed the errors of the Shah Soojah, and caused his half remembered seven years' reign of 30 years since to be looked back upon as an era of happiness and prosperity. The force, besides, which was accompanying him to the throne, appeared capable of bearing down all opposition. The result was, that with perfidy, treachery, dissension, and disaffection every where, with enemies on every side, and no one to encounter them, Dost Mahomed, with 600 horsemen, fled to Bameean with a view of seeking refuge amongst the chiefs in Trans-Oxania till more auspicious days should come around. So soon as authentic accounts of this reached camp, it was resolved to send a detachment in pursuit of the Ameer, who, so long as he was left at liberty, must necessarily prove the hope of the disaffected, and a source of substantial annoyance to the new

87. Letter of Sir J. Keane, dated 8th August, to the Envoy and Minister.

ruler. Two thousand of the Shah's Affghans, under Hadjee Khan Kakur, were ordered for this service, accompanied by a hundred of our Cavalry, regular and irregular, for the purpose of stimulating their exertions, and checking hostilities in case of the fugitive chief or his family falling into their hands. (88) These were accompanied by the following British officers:—Captain Outram, Captain Wheeler, Captain Troup, Captain Lawrence, Captain Backhouse, Captain Taylor, Captain Christie, Captain Erskine, Lieut. Broadfoot, Lieut. Hogg, and Dr. Worrall—Capt. Outram to take command. The party assembled at 4 P.M., according to order, at the tent of the Envoy, where the Affghans were also to have been in readiness; but not more than 300 effective men had made their appearance when it became dark; the remainder, consisting of from 400 to 500 of a ragged rabble, mounted on yaboos or half starved ponies. It was promised that the rest should follow, and the details were made up by 100 of Captain Christie's horse. Hadjee Khan Kakur was extremely desirous that the high road should be pursued as far as Meidan, in order, as he pretended, to take up the track of their quarry; and it was not till Capt. Outram had repeatedly urged the impossibility of ever succeeding in this manner in the pursuit, seeing that Dost Mahomed was already 24 miles a-head of them, that the line of march was changed. It was with great difficulty that guides were ultimately procured to enable them to make a short cut across the hills, so as to intersect the path of the Ameer, about three miles from Meidan. The first night the party marched thirty miles, leaving Gada, a small village situated in a confined but fertile valley, about 7 A. M. Several halts had been made to admit of the Affghans closing up, but not more than 100 of the 1600 awaiting had made their appearance. Those who dropped in in the course of the day gave evidence, from the plunder with which they had encumbered themselves, of the cause of their delay. The March was renewed in the evening; the road was precipitous and bad; at the end of ten miles they bivouacked till one in the morning, when the moon having risen they proceeded on afresh till 7 A. M. Barely 50 of the Affghans kept up with them, the rest straggled in in the course of the day. Information was here received that Dost Mahomed was at the village of Yourt, one march a-head. Hadjee Khan Kakur, who had hitherto proceeded with the greatest reluctance, became urgent for a halt till reinforcements could be sent for. He declared that the Ameer had 2000 followers, and was much too strong for the present force to attack him with any hope of success. Capt. Outram having insisted on proceeding, the followers of the Hadjee were mus-

88. We have taken the whole narrative of the pursuit of Dost Mahomed from Major Outram's Rough Notes, which we have given a good deal abridged.

tered, and were found to amount to 700 in all,—less than one half of them being suitably mounted. Before they had advanced four miles on the evening's march the guides were reported to have deserted; in a dark night, amongst abrupt precipices and interminable ravines, it was in vain to attempt to move without conductors, so a halt was made till day-break, and Yourt was, in consequence, not attained till the morning of the following day, the 6th. Few of the Affghans were now forthcoming, and no inducement whatever could prevail on the Hadjee to advance sixteen miles further to Huzar, where there was positive intelligence of Dost Mahomed's presence; he promised most solemnly, however, to proceed in the evening, and this afforded some hope of their being able to beat up the Ameer's quarters during the night. Next evening he fell back on his old resolution: nothing would induce him to move that night, but he promised to make a forced march of double the distance next morning.

It was most singular that in arranging this most important expedition, the whole authority was intrusted to Hadjee Khan Kakur; the European officers were vested with no power save over their own men, and Capt. Outram's only instructions were, that he should act along with the Affghans, and second them if necessary! All accounts agreed that the Dost was accompanied by at least 2000 followers, but their progress was retarded by the sickness of one of the young princes: this greatly increased the chance of success in the pursuit, and Hadjee Khan was informed that, in the event of his hanging back on the morrow, the party would proceed without him or his assistance. It rained and hailed violently over night, and our people had for the two preceding days had nothing to eat but a little unripe parched corn. On the 7th they marched at daybreak, and, on arriving at Huzar, found traces of the Ameer's camp of yesterday; they learned that he had that morning encamped at Kalloo, without apparently being in any hurry to depart. They reached the place at three p. m., but found the Dost gone so many hours before that he must have surmounted the Kalloo Pass, the highest in the Hindoo Koosh. Every one of the Affghans had now fallen behind, and the little sepoy band had been nine hours in the saddle; their horses were knocked up; they were 12,000 feet above the level of the sea, and saw snow 1300 feet below them. In the evening they obtained a scanty meal of flour. On the morning of the 8th they were joined by Captains Trevor and Taylor with 30 troopers. In the course of the day they surmounted the Pass called the Camel's Back, 15,000 feet high, nearly the altitude of the summit of Mount Blanc. Hadjee Khan they now found to be totally untrustworthy: a council of war was held, when it was resolved that on the Ameer turning to oppose us in the event of his being next day overtaken, of which no doubt was enter-

tained, that the thirteen British officers should charge in the centre of the band, every one directing his individual efforts against the person of Dost Mahomed Khan, whose fall in this way must be next to certain. It was evident that all the Affghans on both sides would turn against them, unless they were immediately successful, and this plan appeared to afford the only chance of escape to those who might survive. It was an object of paramount importance to effect the destruction of the Ameer rather than permit his escape. (89)

On reaching Bameean, on the morning of the 9th, the intelligence of the Dost's escape, which had previously been received, was fully confirmed. He had pushed ahead by long forced marches, and was, by this time, on the extreme verge of the Shah's territory, and close upon the confines of that of the Wullee of Khooloom, who had always been a friend of the Barukzyes; it would, under these circumstances, and in the utterly exhausted state of their horses, have been madness to proceed, and it was resolved to halt until they were so far refreshed as to be able to return to Cabool. They arrived at the capital on the 19th. Hadjee Khan Kakur was immediately arrested,—abundant evidence of his treasonable intentions having now made their appearance. This wretch was originally a melon-vendor. He deserted Dost Mahomed Khan to join the Candahar Sirdars, and, having betrayed them and joined the Shah Soojah, forced them to quit their country without a blow. For this he was ennobled with the title of "Nusseer-ood-Dowlah,"—or Sword of the State,—and received territory valued at £30,000 a-year. It now appeared that he had leagued himself to fight against the King in the event of any change of fortune arriving. He has been since detained a state prisoner at Chunar,—as deeply dyed a traitor as ever betrayed an empire.

Returning to the movements of Sir John Keane's army: simultaneously with the despatch of the party towards Bameean, Major Cuerton, with 200 of H. M.'s 16th Lancers, was sent forward to take possession of the guns left at Arghundee. They were all of brass, and amounted to 28 in number, of various calibres, generally from 6 to 9 pounders. Many of them were double-shotted, and would, in all likelihood, have been as injurious, if fired, to the army to which they belonged, as to that against which they were directed. They were badly mounted, difficult to work, and their carriages liable to damage or destruction from comparatively trivial accidents. They were unskillfully placed, and an army situated where the guns had been planted could very easily have been attacked in flank from (90) the

89. Captain Outram's Rough Notes, *ut supra*.

90. Dr. Kennedy.

high grounds, within easy range of them. A deep ravine would have carried our light companies safely into the midst of them before they suspected danger. Yet there was much strong ground eminently favourable for military dispositions in the neighbourhood, where, had they known how to make use of it, a very formidable resistance, even with their troops, might have been maintained. (91) A large quantity of powder and shot, with tumbrils, ammunition-waggons, and gun-bullocks, were also captured. He was directed to push forward his reconnoissance as far as the walls of the city. The army continued its march without interruption, and on the evening of the 6th encamped under the walls of Cabool. On the evening of the 7th, His Majesty proposed to proceed in state from Nanuchee to the Bala Hissar.

At 4 in the afternoon, when the heat of the day had been succeeded by one of those mild and beautiful evenings which characterise the autumnal climate of the cooler latitudes or altitudes, the Shah Soojah, accompanied by the Envoy and Minister, the Commander-in-Chief, and the general officers of the army; Sir Alex. Burnes and other officers of the mission; the staff, and a vast number of other officers; left the camp to proceed, with much pomp, into the city of Cabool. (92) They had about three miles to march. The escort of His Majesty consisted of a squadron of the 4th Light Dragoons, and one of the 16th Lancers, with Captain Martin's Troop of Bombay Horse Artillery. They were paraded in review order in front of the lines, and on the road leading to the city. A royal salute was fired as the Shah approached the escort; and the cavalry having saluted him as he passed, fell into the rear of the procession.

The royal reception was respectful but cold; the people were orderly: curiosity brought them in thousands to witness the spectacle, and a feeling of decorum seems to have prompted them to pay distant respect to the king. The chiefs were absent; there was no enthusiasm, and not even that clamorous exultation which a crowded populace commonly display on the first fall of one who has kept them in order, or in the manifestation of any important change in the order of things. The king led the way into the palace: he wept as he witnessed the dilapidation the neglect of thirty years had occasioned. (93) The cavalcade returned at a late hour in the evening to camp, finding some difficulty in making their way past the baggage of the Shah, then passing through the narrow streets. For the next three weeks no event of any moment occurred to the army. Capt. Outram

91. Major Havelock.

92. Major Hough. Copied *verbatim*.

93. Major Hough, *ut sup.*, p. 252.

and his party returned on the 19th August from the fruitless pursuit of Dost Mahomed, and on the 3d September the Shahzada Timour and Colonel Wade, with betwixt ten and eleven thousand men under their command, arrived from Peshawur by the Khyber Pass, Jellalabad, and Khoord Cabool. These things have been already mentioned. Of the events which occurred on the march from Ghuznie we should have noticed the death of Lieut.-Colonel Herring: he was following the grand army in charge of treasure from Candahar, when he with two other officers had imprudently gone out some way from camp unattended, and been murdered by the robbers by whom the whole country seemed infested, who hung upon the skirts of our army. He was a gallant and experienced officer, and his death was deeply lamented. Lieutenant Inverarity had in like manner fallen a victim to a similar imprudence during the halt at Candahar in May.

On the 17th September a magnificent state durbar was held at the palace for the purpose of conferring the badges of the Douranee order on certain of the most distinguished officers of the army.

"In a court-yard of about a hundred yards square [says Dr. Kennedy (94)] a ruinous and neglected garden, and surrounded by ruinous buildings of the old palace in which a dozen or two of bricklayers and plasterers were at work repairing the dilapidation and neglect of the past thirty years, and who never stopped their work to look at us, sat the old King alone in his glory; his throne being one of our old camp-chairs, value, when new, some four or five rupees at the utmost; behind it stood two old fat eunuchs, each holding a dish in his hand: and up to this extraordinary dumb show we marched, and were all ranged behind and on the right of the camp-chair with the King in it.

"When all was ready,—and it took less time than I could have supposed,—Sir John Keane stepped before the said camp-chair with the King in it, and gravely dropped on his knees before the Douranee Emperor. One of the fat eunuchs waddled to the front, and uncovered his dish, in which was the decoration and ribbon of 'the order of the Douranee empire.' The Emperor with great difficulty stuck it on; and, Sir John's coat being rather too tight, it cost him some effort to wriggle into the ribbon: but the acorn in time becomes an oak, and Sir John was at last adorned, cap-a-pie, a Knight Grand Cross of the Douranee empire.

"The decoration required eloquence; and Sir John, standing before the Emperor, delivered himself of a speech, in which there was a great deal about 'hurling a usurper from the throne,'—at which my uncle Toby might perhaps have whistled his lillibullero.

" But as the Emperor of the Douranee empire did not understand English, the Chief's Persian interpreter, Major Powell, stepped to the front to interpret. Poor man ! he was 'not accustomed to speak in public,' and made but a bad job of it ; and the Emperor, who seemed to wish the whole affair over, broke into the midst of the interpretation with his own observations complimentary to the British General, the British Army, and the British Government. Burnes, for some reason best known to himself, wished the whole interpretation to be fairly and fully driven into and through the imperial ears, and whispered ' Desgurnat, ' ' There is more of it ; ' which silenced the Emperor, and Major Powell went on : but, making a pause to take breath, his Imperial Majesty began again and was again silenced : a third pause, and again his Imperial Majesty commenced ; and by that time Burnes seemed tired too, and the Emperor had it all his own way, and all the talk to himself for the rest of the ceremonial. Mr. McNaughten and Sir W. Cotton were next invested ; and Sir A. Burnes and Sir Martin Wade were told that they were created Knights Grand Crosses too, but that the goldsmith had not been able to make the decorations in time for them, but they might rely on receiving them in as short a time as he could compass it. Lord Auckland was declared a Knight Grand Cross also ; how Colonel Pottinger escaped can be only explained by the wonderful good fortune that has attended that gentleman through life.

" The Grand Crosses being created, the Knights Commanders and Companions were to be invested, but the decorations had not been made ; and it was clear that if there was to be a kneeling and a tow-tow for each, there would be no end of it : so an officer in a Bengal Cavalry uniform, holding a paper in his hand, shouted out the names of the ' men whom the King delighted to honour ; ' and we, the *ci polloi*, being all drawn up on the right of the King, the parties so named stepped forth in succession, and, crossing in front, bowed to the King, and ranged upon the left. The officer, who thus enacted the Grand Marschal of the palace, read with a clear good voice, and deserved to have been a Grand Cross himself, if his taste lay that way, for the fine feeling he showed when, in reading the original list, he paused on the names of Brigadier Arnold and Colonel Herring, and, reading them with a subdued tone, added ' deceased,' and passed on to the next in order. This honourable tribute to the dead was the only incident in the whole affair that seemed worth recording for anything but its extreme absurdity.

" The decoration of the order is a Maltose cross, a bad imitation of the Guelphic order of Hanover ; and it was the more absurd to give a Christian's most sacred religious badge as an honour supposed to be conferred by the most bigoted petty Mahomedan government in the world ; because the arabesque star of six points, which forms the ornament of the historic

gates of the tomb of Mahomed of Ghuznee, would have been so peculiar and appropriate an emblem of a Douranee institution. The ribbon, 'party per pale vert and gules,' is in good taste; and when manufactured in England, will no doubt be very ornamental.

"When the list was read out, and all was over, there rose the cry of the disappointed; and I saw Sir John Keane much excited, and apparently in a bewilderment and amaze at the storm that threatened. The rule for the selection had been, that the brigadiers and heads of departments were to be Knights Commanders; and all field officers, and sundry head-quarter favourites, Companions. The claimants who now started forth were the field-officers by brevet: there were only four or five; and these of course from the simple fact of their brevet, were the oldest officers of their class, and much senior to many who were preferred before them. One of them had served nearly forty years in India, and was old enough to have been the father of half the new-made knights: he is said to be writing a history of the campaign, and will no doubt make known his grievance. No satisfactory reason was assigned for their being omitted; had they been too numerous, it would have been otherwise, but they were not so."—*Kennedy*, vol. ii., pp. 113—118.

On the 14th of September, before the separation of the Forces of the two Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay, a General Order was issued, of which the following is an extract:—

"Sir John Keane cannot omit this opportunity of assuring the Troops of both Presidencies, that it will be a proud reflection to him throughout his after life, to have had the honour of commanding Troops of such high character and bearing, and who have surmounted difficulties of all kinds without a murmur, but on the contrary, a cheerfulness which does them honor, and which marks their high discipline and good feeling: these qualities, combined with gallantry, they gave the enemy a signal proof of, on the memorable day when their stronghold Ghuznee fell.

"The conduct of the Troops has been no less marked by their gallantry and high bearing on that occasion, than it has all along by the cordial good feeling which has subsisted between the combined forces of Bengal and Bombay throughout this service, and to which it will be the pleasing duty of Sir John Keane to call the attention of the Right Honorable Lord Auckland, the Governor-General; and he is convinced it will be equally gratifying to his Lordship to learn it, as it is to him to report it.

"His Majesty Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk has requested Sir John Keane to signify to the Troops that His Majesty has, in token of his gratitude, determined on conferring the decoration of the Order of the Douranee Empire on certain Officers, and to present every Officer and Soldier present at Ghuznee on the 23d July last, with a medal. That his Majesty has further addressed a letter through the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, to our most gracious Sovereign Queen

Victoria, requesting that Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to permit the Officers and Soldiers to wear these marks of distinction.”(95)

By order, &c.

(Signed) R. MACDONALD, Lieut. Colonel,
Mily. Secy. and Depy. Adjt. Genl. H. M.'s Forces, Bombay.

On the 18th September the Bombay column quitted Cabool; they retraced their steps by the route over which they had advanced as far as Ghuznie: thence crossing the Toba mountains, they made a short cut on Quetta, evading the detour by Candahar, and pursuing a line of march to Quettah entirely new to them. From Quettah part of the force proceeded to Kelat, which they captured. But this will form a part of our narrative to which we must return after tracing the progress of the Bengal troops to Ferozepore. Towards the beginning of October, the affairs to the northward of the Hindoo Koosh began to wear an aspect so alarming as to occasion serious apprehensions to the authorities at Cabool. Dost Mahomed appeared to have so firmly established himself in the favour of the Chief of Koondooz, and to have obtained such entire command of the resources of the country, that the Envoy and Minister, at the suggestion of Dr Lord, had at one time resolved to establish, even at that late season of the year, a brigade near Syghan. From this ill-considered measure he was dissuaded by Sir John Keane. The troops sent out could have had no time to construct for themselves sufficient cantonments before the setting in of winter; and would, even if they had, have been cut off from all communication with the army at Cabool, and exposed single-handed, and without ammunition, provisions, line of operations, or means of resistance, to the attacks of all the forces of independent Tartary, which, as subsequently shown, could easily muster to the extent of 12,000 men. (96) This was a bud of the fatal system which afterwards spread abroad, and proved fatal to us. The Bengal troops remained for nearly a month after the departure of the Bombay column—as late, in fact, as the season would permit. Head-quarters, under Lord Keane, marched on the 15th October, and the remainder followed with as little delay as possible,—and the whole of those who proposed returning for the present to India had left before the 20th. The cold was severe in the pass—ice was found upon the roads, and the bodies of dead camels and horses lay frozen all around, and the horsemen's cloaks which chanced in the morning to be splashed with water in crossing the stream, were immediately decorated with a border of ice. (97) Hyder

95. These Medals have since been presented to the Officers and Soldiers in the name of the Government of India.

96. Major Havelock, vol. ii., p. 171.

97. Major Havelock, vol. ii. p. 176.

Khan, governor of Ghuznie, and Hadjee Khan Kakur, accompanied the force. We shall not at present attempt a description of this tremendous chain of defiles, or the savage predatory tribes which inhabit them, which occupy nearly the whole space betwixt Cabool and Peshawur, a stretch of 200 miles. We shall, in the last chapters of our narrative—those which record the melancholy loss of 13,000 men in the pass in January 1842, and in that which describes the victorious advance of General Pollock on his mission of vengeance eight months afterwards,—require to go over every part of the ground which Lord Keane with his retiring force traversed without annoyance or impediment. It is enough at present to mention, that the army which left the capital on the 18th October reached Peshawur on the 8th November. They had not been attacked or molested in any way, except the rear division on the last day's march in the Khyber pass, when two officers were wounded, several men killed and wounded, and many camels with their loads taken by the tribes that afterwards gave so much trouble; nor experienced greater difficulty than might have been anticipated in traversing such wild and sterile regions. From Peshawur the route lay through the friendly territory of the Seikh ruler: the distance is 350 miles, which was traversed without inconvenience or obstruction, our troops reaching the frontier station of Ferozepore on the Sutlej on New-year's day 1840.

A deputation from the Maharajah Kurruck Sing met Sir John Keane at Attock, on crossing by the bridge of boats over the Indus after its junction with the Cabool River at that place, to invite His Excellency to visit the Court of Lahore. At the head of the deputation was Lena Sing, a young and handsome Sirdar of great wealth, with an escort of 2000 men well mounted and appointed, who continued with the Commander-in-Chief during his whole journey afterwards through the Punjab until he reached Ferozepore. Lena Sing is one of the very few men of high rank (or indeed of any rank) in his country given to literary and scientific pursuits. He is particularly fond of Astronomy, and not a day passed without his asking questions, and taking instructions from Major Thomson and the other Engineer officers. He was presented with a Sextant, which pleased him much, and a set of instruments and telescopes were ordered out for him from England.

Sir John Keane with all his personal Staff and the Staff of the Bengal force, made the detour to Lahore, while the Army continued to move by the direct route through the country, where he arrived on Christmas day, taking with him as his Escort—Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, a Troop of Bengal Horse Artillery, and his Infantry Escort of the Bombay 19th N. I. His reception was most cordial, and attended with a degree of splendour which cannot be rivalled by any other Eastern Court in the present day.

All the usual ceremonies were gone through, and a display made of Jewels, Cashmeers, Cloth of Gold, &c. &c., that surprised all who had seen it for the first time. Sir John Keane was unfortunately so unwell at times, as not to be able to attend all the ceremonies, and by the approval of the Maharajah he was on those occasions represented by Colonel Macdonald. The most imposing of all the ceremonies was a review of 45,000 men, with 152 pieces of cannon, drawn up in one continued line, under the command of the Heir apparent to the throne, Nao Nehal Sing, a high-spirited youth of about 20 years of age, who afterwards lost his life by the falling of a beam, at one of the gateways, on the day of his father's funeral, when he was to succeed as sovereign of the Punjab. The courtiers, Generals and others, as well as the whole of the Staff Officers of the British Force, were mounted on Elephants, and mostly seated in gold and silver Howdahs, (98) to afford them a better view of the troops from their elevated seats, than they could command on their chargers. The fine appearance of the troops, and their appointments, surprised the British Officers. The arms, cuirasses and clothing were all of French manufacture. The late Runjeet Sing had given a *carte blanche* to two of Napoleon's officers of distinction, Allard and Ventura, Generals in the Maharajah's service, to procure in France all that they considered requisite for the equipment and respectability of His Highness's Army. There were besides in his service, of the Napoleon school, Generals Court and Avitabile (the latter a most intelligent energetic man, who has since proved himself so useful and such a staunch friend to the British as Governor of the Province of Peshawar,) together with many other French, German and Italian officers of inferior grade; and the drill and discipline was entirely French. The Cuirassiers and Artillery were particularly well horsed and appointed, and all had the appearance of soldiers; it is believed that if it came to blows, they would make but a poor stand against a British Force.

On the 7th January Sir John Keane and his staff left them for Bombay, and the various regiments were dispersed amongst their respective cantonments. Since the 8th November 1838, the Bengal column had traversed a space of 2070 miles, the longest continuous march ever accomplished by an Indian army. (99)

We must now return to the movements of the Bombay column, and follow them through this important episode, detailing the operations against Kelat, out of which one of the most singular passages in the history of our policy in the East so speedily arose. "It was a strange feeling in retracing our steps," says Dr Kennedy (100), "to compare the numerous recollec-

98. A Howdah resembles the body of a Gig, or very large arm chair.

99. Major Hough, p. 362.

100. Vol. ii. p. 121. History of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus.

tions of our journey on the advance, with its doubts and uncertainties, and the thousand wild rumours which were every day afloat, in contrast to the solution of all difficulties and the termination of all danger, on the homeward march of the army."

Capt. Outram appears on most occasions to have been the officer in all the army sought out when any enterprize of especial hazard, or where unusual dispatch or daring was required, whose services were put in requisition. The Envoy having applied to have him placed in political employment,—on the 7th Sept., a week before the march of the Bombay column, he was sent out to depose, and, if possible, to arrest the refractory Ghilzie chiefs, Mehta Moossa Khan, Abdool Rehman Khan, Ghool Mahomed Khan, and the Mama, a Chief so named from his being the uncle of the Candahar Sirdars, (101) and to establish the newly appointed Ghilzie Governors, Meer Allum Khan, Zeman Khan, and Khulleel Khan;—to punish the inhabitants of Maroof, who, in May last, wantonly destroyed a caravan proceeding from Hindostan to Candahar;—and lastly, to reduce the forts of Hadjee Khan Kakur, should they still be held by his adherents. The murder of Colonel Herring was reported just as he was about to start; he was directed if possible to search out and punish the perpetrators of that atrocity. The force placed under his charge consisted of a wing of the Shah's 1st Cavalry and Goorkah Battalion, Capt. Abbot's Battery of 9 pounders from Cabool, a reinforcement from Capt. Macan's Regiment of Shah's Infantry at Candahar, half of the Shah's 2d Regiment of Cavalry, and a brigade of Horse Artillery. In consideration of the difficulty of obtaining forage and preventing plunder with so large a number, the regular force was, at the especial request of Capt. Outram, reduced to 500 men. A thousand Affghan cavalry, under Mahomed Oosman Khan, an uncle of the King, led in parties by 20 Affghan Chiefs, were to be added. After the experience of the trust to be reposed in the Affghans, which had been supplied from the time we reached Quettah, and especially after the conduct of Hadjee Khan Kakur and his people, it seems singular that the system of pressing them into a service in which they seemed determined only to impede or thwart our aims, should have been persisted in, when we had troops of our own in the country sufficient for the discharge of all the duty desired to be performed. It is impossible to conceive what good end could have been purposed to be served by it, unless to delude the people at a distance into the belief that the Shah was subduing and quieting the country by the help of his own subjects; a more thorough delusion, or one more zealously striven after, could not be imagined. The Affghan auxili-

101. Outram's Rough Notes, p. 123. We have copied the instructions *verbatim*.

aries could not be got ready, and Capt. Outram marched without them. His Majesty, though unable to make his faithful subjects accompany the expedition, promised to *drive* them after it, and, in three days after it was gone, he succeeded in driving a part of them from Cabool; they joined on the 7th day of the march. On the evening of the 14th, Meer Allum Khan succeeded in capturing some of the banditti connected with the murder of Colonel Herring. On the 20th, Buxee Khan was captured. The following day, Capt. Outram's party were reinforced by a wing of the 16th N. I. under Major M'Laren, and they arrived at daybreak at a deep dell occupied by the gang of which they were in quest. Our people managed completely to surround the marauders; they fought desperately, and maintained their position until their ammunition was exhausted, when they were induced to throw down their arms, after 16 of the most desperate of their body had been killed, and 71 wounded. We lost three sepoys, and had two European and two Native officers wounded. Not a soul escaped; 112 prisoners, with a similar number of camels, fell into our hands. The Company's mark on the head of the animals showed that they had been acquired by plunder. Forty-six of the most ferocious of the robbers were selected, and despatched to Cabool for execution. Capt. Outram's party were now moving on a line nearly parallel with that of the Bombay column, which had left Ghuznie on the 29th Sept., (102) under a temperature which at night sunk to 34 deg., and were now only three marches to their right. They were in constant intercourse with Sir T. Willshire, who supplied them with whatever reinforcements were necessary. On the 1st Oct., the detachment of the Shah's 1st Cavalry, under Lieut. M'Kenzie, was ordered to return to Cabool—three weeks of such severe marching as that required amongst the Ghilzie mountains, having knocked up all the horses. On the 3d the Poonah Auxiliary Horse, under Captain Keith Erskine, arrived in camp; the next night they made up with a couple of nine-pounders, escorted by a wing of the Bombay 19th N. I., sent out to meet them from Ghuznie by previous agreement. On the 5th, Capt. Outram marched his little band 42 miles in the course of 24 hours. The following day he surprised in his fort the principal Ghilzie chief Abdool Rehman Khan. The father of this man, when disputing the empire with Shah Zeman, besieged Cabool with 50,000 horse and foot. Abdool Rehman seemed to have had no intention to fly. He had, just before the arrival of our troops, sent off his women and property: he himself, with eighty chosen horsemen, remained within his hold. It was a well-constructed fort, with a wet ditch and lofty citadel, before which in former days the Shah Soojah had twice been foiled and forced to

return. Capt. Outram had resolved to defer the capture of the place till the following evening, that the cavalry might be sufficiently rested to be able immediately thereafter to make a dash upon the other chiefs, whose strongholds were only about a forced march off. Major M'Laren had the fort surrounded by 500 cavalry, besides two companies of the 16th Bengal N. I. stationed under cover within 200 yards of the gate. Near midnight, however, Abdool and his party suddenly rushed out on horseback through our piquets, and dispersing in all directions, managed to escape in the dark. He had remained to the last in his fort under the expectation of being joined by a neighbouring chief, who was to have attacked our rear with 1000 horse. This man had been brought over to our interests, and had come into our camp the previous evening before sunset, leaving no choice to Abdool Rehman but to attempt the flight thus boldly and successfully effected. The fort was completely destroyed, having been mined and blown up by us after its evacuation. On the evening of the 8th, Captain Outram rode into Gen. Willshire's camp, attended by no more than a couple of Ghilzie followers, though the distance was 20 miles. These operations against the Ghilzies were continued with the utmost enterprise and spirit, and with no inconsiderable success, till the troops reached Quettah on the 31st October. Captain Outram had latterly occasionally accompanied the Bombay column, sometimes moved parallel with it, and occasionally crossed its path in all directions. The season of extreme cold was now approaching; the country was to the last degree barren and inhospitable. On the 18th October, on reaching the summit of the Toba mountains, the thermometer at daybreak stood at 19 deg.—13 degrees below freezing. The engineer officer in charge (Captain Peat) stated that it only required the difficulties of the country to be a fraction of a fraction greater than they were, when the roads would have become impassable. On the 29th they regained the line of their original advance at Hyderzye, and found themselves plentifully supplied with provisions, sent out on purpose by Captain Bean from Quettah; the fort was attained in safety the second day after.

Before the Bombay column quitted Cabool it had been determined that Mehrab Khan should be deposed, and a remote relative, Nowaz Khan, a Cutcheo chief, placed in authority at Kelat. The conduct of the Beloochee chief has been pretty fully treated of in the preliminary chapter and earlier portion of the present narrative. Finding that all the obstructions which he had endeavoured to throw in our way, and the numberless annoyances he had occasioned us, had failed to retard us on the path of victory, or to prevent the restoration of the Shah Shoojah: he no sooner found the Suddozye power supreme, and the British army likely to maintain itself in Affghanistan, than he sent in all sorts of professions of loyalty and devotion towards the king, and friendship for his allies. On General Will.

shire's arrival at Quettah, he received a letter written in the same unblushing style as those addressed to the envoy and minister, in which he declared himself the faithful subject of the Shah Shoojah, and devoted ally of the British government, (103) and entreating that he would interfere to prevent the hostile measures which Captain Bean, the political agent for Shawl, had meditated, from being put in execution against him; concluding by stating, that if attacked he would defend himself to the last. The nature of our information as to the state of affairs at Kelat appears to have been almost inconceivably imperfect. The most fitting time for a movement against it would probably have been the month of August, when General Nott, left at Quettah to keep the Beloochees in check, had a force under his charge abundantly powerful for the purpose, especially as the intelligence of the fall of Ghuznie had at that time astonished and stunned the whole of Affghanistan. It was afterwards said that Captain Bean had requested General Nott to undertake the adventure with a single native regiment and a company of artillery. He was believed to have been prevented from this by a point of military etiquette on receiving a copy of General Willshire's instructions. Matters being now fully arranged, Brigadier Baumgardt was dispatched on the 3d Nov. with H. M.'s 2d and 17th Foot, and the 31st Bengal N. I. The whole of the line regiments being weak, these mustered less than 1000 bayonets. (104) To these were added six light field pieces, two of the Bombay Horse and four of the Shah's Artillery; the sapper corps, and 150 irregulars, the whole in the best possible order. General Willshire and staff followed them the ensuing day. The remaining portion of the Bombay column under Brigadier Scott, consisting of the park, with the whole of the cavalry and greater part of the artillery, and the 19th N. I., proceeded through the Bolan Pass, and so by Dadur on to Sukkur, where they arrived without obstruction or adventure on the 29th November. Accounts of the fall of Kelat and of the advance of the Russians on Khiva, had reached them on the way, and in consequence of the latter event they were directed by the political agent to halt near Bhaug; but cholera had broken out amongst them in a part of the country where comforts were not procurable, and acting on the recommendation of the head of the medical department, Brigadier Scott moved on. Betwixt the 20th and 30th of November, the force, mustering short of 700 men, lost by this appalling visitation Surgeon Forbes of the 1st Bombay Cavalry, and Captain Ogle of H. M.'s 4th Dragoons, together with 56 European soldiers. The natives escaped.

To return to the operations against Kelat, whitherward, as above stated,

103. Dr Kennedy, vol. ii. p. 135.

104. Dr Kennedy, vol. ii. p. 143, *verbat.*

General Willshire had marched on the 4th November. Until the 12th of the month, when they closely approached Kelat, the column met with little opposition in their progress; it was now that active operations commenced. We shall draw on Capt. Outram's rough notes for an account of the capture of the town. (105).

"13th Nov. Marched at sunrise, the Local Horse being left in charge of the baggage. About a mile from the encampment we had just left, we were met by a body of about one hundred horse, who kept aloof until they observed that we had no Cavalry to oppose to them, whereupon they became bolder, and galloping close up to the head of the Column, discharged their matchlocks. A party of Light Infantry having been thrown out to keep them at a distance, we continued our march without further molestation about six miles, when, on our surmounting a small range of hills, the town and fortress of Kheiat suddenly burst upon our view. It was truly an imposing sight. Some small hills in front were crowned with masses of soldiers, and the towering citadel which frowned above them in their rear, was completely clustered over with human beings,—ladies of the harem chiefly, who had assembled to witness the discomfiture of the Feringees, and the prowess of their Lords, all of whom, with the Khan at their head, had previously marched out to the heights, where they awaited us in battle array!

"No sooner had the head of the British Column shewed itself, than the enemy's guns, of which there were five in position on the heights, opened upon it; but being ill directed, they were unattended with effect. In order to assemble every efficient man of his small army, General Willshire here halted the troops until the baggage had closed up, assigning the charge of it, and of the sick, to the Local Horse. It was very evident that the enemy, who greatly outstripped us in point of numbers, were fully bent upon mischief; and our total strength amounting to less than one thousand bayonets, we had nothing to spare in the contest that awaited us. During this delay two companies were sent to clear some gardens on our left; and a body of horse threatening us from that direction, a few shrapnel shells were thrown amongst them, which caused them to withdraw to the fort. The cool and determined demeanour of our veteran General inspired every one present with confidence of success, nor shall I ever forget the obvious feeling of delight with which his deep toned word of command, 'Loosen cartridges,' was received by the soldiers—evinced as it did, that an immediate attack was intended, and that serious opposition might be expected.

"The following plan of assault was then communicated by the General. Under cover of the Artillery, the three redoubts on the heights are first to be carried by four companies of each Regiment. Two companies are to advance through the gardens, on our left, and the remaining ten companies are to form the reserve. The heights, once in our possession, would serve in a great measure to cover our camp from the Artillery of the fort, and would afford us a commanding position from which to annoy the Garrison.

CAPTURE OF KHELAT.

" All being in readiness, the three columns of attack moved steadily forward preceded by the Artillery, which unlimbered at the foot of the hills, and opened a cannonade of shells and shrapnel with such admirable precision, that the masses of the enemy, crowning the heights, were compelled to abandon their position long before the Infantry had gained the summit. Observing the enemy endeavouring to draw off their guns, the General despatched me with orders to the Column of the Queen's Royals, which was the nearest to the gate, to pursue the fugitives, and if possible, to enter the fort with them—but at any rate to prevent their taking in the ordnance. I overtook the head of the column before it had attained to the redoubt (C.) and galloped on to the redoubt at the very moment that the enemy were vacating it; when perceiving them to be engaged in the attempt to carry off one of the pieces of Artillery, I called on Captain Raitt of the Queen's Royals to push down quickly with his Grenadiers, and if unable to enter the gate with the enemy, at all events to capture the gun. I accompanied this party, which rushed down the hill, but arrived too late to enter the Fort with the enemy, who however abandoned the gun outside, and hastily closed the gate after them.

" Leaving the Grenadiers to take post under cover of a ruined building, (marked E. in the plan,) within sixty yards of the gate, so as to be in readiness to enter by it, in case the general might decide upon following up this advantage by blowing open the gate before the Garrison should find time to block it up, as they doubtless would do, were the attack to be delayed, I rode back to report progress. The whole of our troops were already on the heights, and the guns were also being dragged up. Four of the latter were directed to play upon the towers commanding the gateway from the positions B. B., whilst the other two were ordered down to D. for the purpose of battering the gate itself. The General at the same time despatched me to G., with instructions to bring up the Light Companies under Major Pennycuik to H., where a mud wall about four feet in height, afforded shelter within thirty yards of the wall, on the opposite side of the gate to that near which the Grenadiers of the Queen's Royals were posted. Having brought them at double quick time across the plain to within two hundred yards of the walls, and then directed them to scatter and rush under cover, I returned to the General, taking the point E. in my way, in order to warn the Grenadiers that the gate would be immediately blown open, when they were to rush in simultaneously with the Light Companies from the opposite side. It was whilst taking up the positions E. and H. that most of the casualties during this day occurred, the troops so engaged being exposed to an exceedingly hot fire from the walls. On these two occasions I was the only mounted officer present, but although both the nature of my occupation, and the singularity of my rifle uniform, differing as it did from all others, must have attracted a considerable share of the enemy's observation, I escaped with my usual good fortune.

" From the point D., the two guns now opened upon the gate, and being admirably directed (by Lieut. Henry Creed of the Bombay Artillery,) a few rounds were sufficient to throw down one half of it. The general's signals for the advance

of the storming parties, not being immediately observed, I galloped down, and accompanied the Grenadiers to the gate, after seeing them in secure occupation of which, I returned to the General, whom I met close to the fort, bringing up the main body of the troops. He immediately despatched me with Captain Darley's Company of H. M.'s 17th Foot, with instructions to take the 31st Regiment Bengal Native Infantry along with me, and with these to storm the heights and secure the gate on the opposite side of the fort. After passing quickly round the western face, from which we were exposed to a considerable fire, I placed the Company of the 17th under cover of a spur of the hill, and thence proceeded back to seek for the 31st Regiment, which I found scouring the suburbs. Having united the two detachments, we stormed the heights at K., where we experienced some trifling opposition from matchlockmen occupying the rocks above: these being soon dispersed we rushed down to the gate L., driving in a party of the enemy with such precipitation that they had not time to secure the gate, possession of which was thus obtained, and the escape of the garrison entirely cut off.

"We were here joined by a party under Major Deshon, which had been sent round by the eastern face of the fort; when I directed the officers to leave a detachment in charge of the gate, and with the remaining portion to make their way up to the citadel, which still maintained a fire upon our troops, whilst I accompanied Lieutenant Creed for the purpose of selecting a position from whence to bombard it with the Shah's guns. Placed the guns in position at N., and opened a fire on the citadel which was continued with destructive effect, until our soldiers had obtained possession. Rejoining the General in the meantime, to report progress, I found him at the gate first carried, giving orders for attaching bags of gunpowder to the gates of the citadel, which had hitherto successfully resisted all attempts to enter it from this side. Reported that the party from the opposite quarter had already got well up, and with the aid of Lieutenant Creed's guns, would shortly surmount every obstacle. Hereupon troops were again sent up to co-operate, and a few minutes more sufficed to display the British standards waving over the highest of the towers of Khelat. All hostilities immediately ceased, and the soldiers displayed much greater forbearance than they usually do on such occasions. Quarter was never refused by them when craved by cries of 'Amen' 'Amen,' and before nightfall nearly two thousand prisoners had been removed from the fort unharmed.

"About four hundred of the Garrison are supposed to have fallen in this affair, and amongst them are the chiefs Mehrab Khan, Wullee Mahomed Khan, and other principal Beloeche chieftains—every person of note having been either slain or captured. Some anxiety was expressed by the General on the occasion of my rejoining him at the first gate, in consequence of the rumoured escape of Mehrab Khan; but I assured him that as the fighting portion of the Garrison had been driven back whilst in the act of attempting to decamp by the opposite gate, I entertained no doubt that the Khan was still within the fort, since he could not, in honor, have previously deserted his followers. This afterwards proved to be the case. Foiled on that occasion in his attempt to escape, the

Chief had returned to the citadel with Wullee Mahomed Khan of Wudd, and others of his most trusty followers, where they had all died sword in hand; the Khan himself being slain by a shot through the neck, from whose hand it is not known. Considering the small number of our troops, not one half of whom were actually engaged, the loss on our side is severe. Thirty-two were killed, and one hundred and seven wounded; amongst the former is Lieutenant Gravatt of the Queen's Royals, and there are nine officers amongst the latter.

"14th. Working parties have been employed the whole day in removing and burying the dead, as well as in collecting prize property. Scattered as the dead bodies are over every part of the town, among houses, the numerous dark chambers of which are not easily explored, it has not yet been practicable to ascertain the number of the slain. The amount of booty is supposed to be very considerable, but we unfortunately do not possess the means of carrying it away, nor is there any market here in which to dispose of it. The arms especially are of very superior manufacture, and the sword of the fallen chief Mehrab Khan in particular, which is of the most costly workmanship, is estimated to be of great value. The members of our little army have with one accord resolved upon presenting this enviable trophy to their gallant leader, General Willshire, in token of their admiration of his heroic bearing yesterday."—*Outram's Rough Notes*, pp. 141—147.

The joyous tidings of this event were carried by Capt. Outram to Bombay through the very heart of the enemy's country, until he reached Sonmeesnee by the sea. (106) The adventure was as dangerous and daring as any that could have been undertaken, and the bold adventurer only escaped on reaching the shore by about five hours before his pursuers.

There is no doubt that the capture of Kelat was not only the most creditable affair during the campaign, but that it was in itself exceedingly brilliant and meritorious,—well able to bear comparison with any exploit our troops ever performed in India. Kelat, with a garrison only one-third less numerous than that of Ghuznie, and fortifications scarcely less formidable, was captured by a force mustering little over 1000 bayonets, without cavalry, and with only one light guns. At Ghuznie we had 40 pieces of artillery, and above 6000 men; we speak comparatively; we have no wish to disparage the skill, bravery, or moderation of the last named gallant exploit which sealed the fortunes of the war. The loss of the enemy was computed at about 500 men; amongst these were numbered eight of the most influential chiefs, including Mehrab Khan himself: three others were taken prisoners. This brought up the loss of the Affghans

106, Capt. Outram had, after quitting Cabool, been, during his operations against the Ghilzies, invested with extensive political powers. These ceased on his approach to Quettah, when he was made aide-de-camp to Sir T. Willshire, and permitted to do duty with the engineers.

during the campaign to about 2500. Our casualties amounted to 31 killed, and 108 wounded. The value of the spoil taken at Kelat was at first calculated as high as £60,000, it turned out considerably less than a tenth of this. The principal item was the crown and Zenana jewels: these had been built up and plastered over in the wall of the house of the chief counsellor of the Khan. No hint had been given in regard to them until our army was about to leave, and the tonement in which they were secreted had been assigned as a habitation to our future resident. A native, fearing probably that they must by and bye be discovered without his aid, or without advantage to any of those who were in the secret, disclosed the place of concealment—which it required much labour to break open. The history of this much of our spoil is so singular as to deserve a few lines of notice; they were valued at £60,000; we have seen how nearly they were *missed*: on their way to India they were as nearly lost. The jewels were entrusted to the care of H. M.'s 17th. About 300 of this Regiment having embarked at Kurrachee on board the transport *Hannah* for Bombay, were shipwrecked at the mouth of the Indus on the 17th of March. None of the people were lost, and the jewels were saved by Colonel Pennycuik, who carried them on his back for a considerable way through the surf and marsh. They were sold at Bombay the following July for betwixt £5000 and £6000: but the premises of the salesman shortly after the sale were broken into and robbed, and he himself afterwards became bankrupt; the amount realized to the army was a sufficiently insignificant fraction of that originally looked for.

Mehrab Khan and his principal chiefs having thus been summarily disposed of by the fate of war, the field was all but clear, and Newaz Khan was at once established on the musnud. We had become so familiar with the unseating and reseating of rulers on thrones, that it seemed to be thought that it required no more than the announcement that the house of Nusseer had ceased to reign, to ensure stability to the rule of his successor. Newaz was accordingly left to maintain himself in authority as he best could over the fierce and independent tribes whom he was designed to controul and to re-subject to the new Doorannee sovereign. Although Mehrab Khan had left a son—a spirited boy of fourteen years of age, to whom his subjects seemed devoted,—and a widow—a woman of infinite courage, talent, and perseverance, no apprehension appears to have been entertained on his account, or effort made to get them into our hands. The new ruler, as if established by the prescription of half a century, was left with Lieut. Loveday as our Envoy at his court, and 30 sepoy as a guard of honour! The result was, that in six months' time he was expelled from Kelat; Loveday was taken and murdered; and an insurrectionary movement of 18 months'

duration brought about, which cost us £300,000 in treasure, the lives of 12 British officers, and some 300 soldiers, and ended in our reversing all that we had done,—pensioning the widow, and replacing the son of Mehrab upon his father's throne. This, however, comes to be treated in a subsequent chapter.

Sir T. Willshire returned by the Gundava pass into Cutchee—a fertile district in Upper Scinde; and joined the force stationed at Sukkur,—his gallant little army being shortly afterwards broken up. Sir John Keane and his staff arrived there from Ferozepore, on the 4th February, 1840, and gave the final orders for the breaking up of the army of the Indus, under instructions from the Governor-General, after which the Commander-in-Chief proceeded to Kurrachee, where he embarked for Bombay and there landed with his staff, on the 27th February, amidst the roar of cannon and other demonstrations of respect.

Thus closed the first Affghan campaign; and as the people at home appeared to have believed, concluded all arrangements exactly as had been desiderated, bringing round a period of universal peace. The war expenditure of these fifteen months seems, as near as can be guessed, to have amounted to nine millions sterling. Our loss of men, including camp-followers, appears altogether to have been under 300,—the principal part of the deaths having been occasioned by predatory attacks on our line of march. About 32,000 Government camels had perished on the march, occasioning a loss of £140,518 in this item alone, (107)—this includes about 4000 private camels, the value of which amounted to nearly £30,000, besides the loss to Government just stated. The total loss of property incurred by individual members of the service, is estimated at nearly £70,000 in the course of fourteen months, and which fell to be paid for by the officers of the force. Upper India was drained to supply this amount of carriage; (108) and we never, till the conclusion of the war, could command sufficient means of transport for our stores. The enemy had, as already stated, lost about 500 men before we reached Candahar, and 1000 at the storm of Ghuznic. We find no return of their casualties either on our advance to Cabool, or our retirement through the Khyber Pass, or during Major Outram's operations against the Ghilzies, where their loss must have been severe. We are satisfied that to set them down at 500 will be under the mark: 500 more at Kelat, bringing up the casualties on their side during the campaign to about 2500.

But though the fighting was closed, the most momentous and costly portion of our connection with Affghanistan was only just begun. The

107. Major Hough—Appendix.

108. *Ibid.* p. 7.

Shah's contingent was already about 10,000 strong; it was, within six months, raised to 13,000; it was officered and paid by us, and was chiefly composed of subjects of the British Government. The cost of this, falling on our treasury, amounted in 1841 to very nearly half a million sterling.

Of the Seikh force of 5000 men which had ascended the Khyber Pass with Colonel Wade, a single regiment alone returned with him. The rest remained at Cabool. But the aid of 25,000 foreign soldiers, even with the fear of British power, was found inadequate to assure the Shah of the loyalty or submission of his subjects. We have traced to the confines of India the Bengal and Bombay columns on their retirement; but these were the mere skeletons of the forces which, under the same name, had ascended the Bolan Pass. The whole of the Bengal division of infantry, the 2nd Bengal light cavalry, and No. 6 light field battery, were ordered to remain in Affghanistan; (109)—the clouds which began to threaten on the N. W. just as we were preparing to leave, induced the Commander-in-chief to comply with the request of the Envoy and Minister, that another brigade might be left behind beyond what had been originally contemplated.

In detail, the arrangements of the force stood thus: H. M. 13th, and the 35th N. I., with three guns, were stationed in the Bala Hissar, Cabool; together with the Shah's 1st Cavalry, with some of his Artillery. This force, amounting to about 2,000 men, were to be commanded by Lieut-Colonel Dennie. The 48th N. I., the 4th Brigade, a detachment of sappers and miners, and 2d cavalry, with a ressalah of Skinner's horse, and three guns, were to be cantoned at Jellalabad; where the King and Envoy, according to the former luxurious custom of the Dooraanee Sovereigns, proposed to spend the winter. If the Shah was slow in taking on himself the toils of King-craft, he was resolved that he should postpone the enjoyment of none of the luxuries of royalty for the sake of the tranquillization of his kingdom. The Ghuznie garrison was to be placed under charge of Major (now Colonel) McLaren, and to consist of the 16th N. I., a ressalah of Skinner's horse, and such details of the Shah's contingent as could be made available. The 42d and 43d N. I., with heavy artillery and local horse, with details of the Shah's troops, were to be stationed at Candahar. (110) The Shah's infantry mustered in all about 4000, his regular cavalry about 2000. Subsequent to the arrival at Cabool, garrison-artillery had been formed, with a mountain-train of 12 3-prs. The Affghan and Kohistan levies, raised on our arrival, amounted to about 4000, and the whole contingent to about 13,000 men. Including the British force, which consisted

109. Major Hough, p. 268.

110. General Order copied from Major Hough.

of H. M.'s 13th, 1st Bengal European Regiment, 2d Light Cavalry, and the 2d, 16th, 35th, 37th, 42d, 43d, and 48th N. I., with details of Artillery; there was, by the beginning of 1840, an organized force in Affghanistan of 20,000 men; with from 70 to 80 guns. But the most formidable-looking and unlooked-for source of outlay was the salaries of thirty-two political agents who were dispersed over the country to see after its interests: and who received amongst them a revenue of £50,000 a-year. We shall speedily see that liberal as was the scale of expenditure at starting, before six months had elapsed it was found necessary to have it vastly encreased: and the regular Indian army which, when left behind in October 1839, amounted to about 8000, was within the next twelve months more than doubled in its strength. At the outbreak of the insurrection in November 1841, we had upwards of 14,000 men, *besides the contingent*, in the Shah's dominions!

How long such a state of matters as this was proposed to be continued, does not appear:—if we might judge from the solidity and extent of the political edifice we should infer that it was expected to be occupied by British tenants for a considerable period of years. The expense of the 13,000 men added to the Indian army before the war began, necessary to make up for the troops dispatched and detained beyond the Indus, amounted to above £600,000—the cost of the maintenance of the extra field force alone exceeding a million and a quarter annually, besides all commissariat, civil, and diplomatic charges. The services of the political agencies and the army called the Shah's contingent, must, at all events, have been expected to be required for a long lapse of time. Yet the net cost of these, as we have seen, amounted to £550,000 a-year; whereas the total revenues of the kingdom screwed up to their highest pitch, could never be raised, during the three following years, to more than £250,000; and were never estimated higher than £300,000. With a country so situated,—without sea-coast or navigable rivers,—mineral produce or manufacturing industry, or any single capability or means of purchase,—it seems difficult to divine what could possibly be contemplated by further occupation. The fears of Russia and Persia had proved a dream;—the siege of Herat was raised before our troops left their cantonments in Hindostan;—apprehensions of disaffection in India had been dispelled, and the Rajah of Sattarah, and Nawaub of Kurnool, from whose Portuguese allies and hidden cannon so much was apprehended, had been reduced to the condition of state prisoners with as little trouble as a bankrupt is brought to gaol;—Runjeet Singh, one of the most important parties to the tripartite treaty, was on his death-bed when it was signed, and in ashes before we left Candahar;—the Shah Soojah was in years above 60, in constitution at least ten years older from the life he had led,—and his sons, from the atrocious dissoluteness of their characters, were worthless or scandalous as

allies to any nation :—yet with all the parties for or against, or with whom the treaty had been contracted, thus vanishing from the scene,—preparations were being made on a scale of such magnitude as if the drama had been destined for perpetuity !

The intelligence of the fall of Ghuznie, and occupation of Cabool, reached England in the middle of October ; and nothing could exceed the triumph with which it was received. There was certainly much that was peculiarly brilliant and captivating in the exploit itself, and something extremely striking in the length, the difficulty, the boldness, and the success of the march which had preceded it. At a quarterly meeting of the Court of Proprietors held on the 18th December, a series of resolutions passed the week before by the Court of Directors was read : by these it was agreed that the thanks of the court should be tendered to Lord Auckland, “for the sagacity and promptitude with which he had planned the expedition, and the zeal and vigour he had displayed in preparing the troops to take the field.” Sir John Keane and the field officers were also thanked for the intrepidity and spirit manifested by them in conducting the campaign. (111) This was cordial enough so far as it went, and was not unmerited : it was carried with dissent. Sir Charles Forbes spoke at great length on the subject,—urging the strongest objections to the policy of the Affghan War altogether, and especially adverting to the reported slaughter of the Ghazee prisoners by the Shah Soojah at Ghuznie. He said that the expense of the expedition had been estimated at three millions sterling : it was now admitted that it would cost five : and for his part he would not undertake to defray them for seven, up to the time of the return of our troops to India—about the period when the Hon’ble Baronet addressed the court. We have already seen that the war charges of 1839 have since been set down, by the best authorities, at about nine millions sterling. It now appears that so many as nine-tenths of the Court of Directors (112) were hostile to the policy of the war, however much disposed to approve of the military skill and bravery by which it had been carried into execution : and the chairman never ventured, on any one occasion, to ask the court for an approval of the policy ! Mr. St. John Tucker had, early in 1839, made a formal protest against the war ; and Sir Henry Willock a short time afterwards addressed Lord Palmerston at length upon the subject. The country were, however, so completely carried away by the clash of victorious arms, and the shout of triumph, that it was regarded as the extremity of party rancour to speak despairingly or disparagingly of a system whose commencement had been crowned with

111. Report—*Asiatic Journal* for January 1840, Vol. 30, N. S. p. 49, part ii.

112. Mr. Hogg’s speech in the House of Commons, July 8, 1842.

victory. They knew not then how much greater at one time had been the probability of failure than of success; and how much more terrible would have been the consequences of the former than those of the latter were auspicious. The general impression besides, appeared to be, that large acquisitions of territory had been gained, and ample additions made to our revenue. (113) They little expected that the laurels we had reaped had cost us nine millions sterling—that our new ally could only be maintained upon his throne by 20,000 British bayonets, and an expenditure of three millions a-year!—the return for which was NOTHING!! So cowed were the opposition into silence, or so ill-informed on the details of the policy, that scarcely any reply was made to it when alluded to in the Queen's speech of the 15th January, 1840. Sir R. Peel said he would wait and watch for the results. The Duke of Wellington had before remarked, that he never entertained any doubt but that the valour and discipline of our troops would secure victory to our arms: but it was when we had completed our first conquests that our difficulties would begin. When a vote of thanks was proposed to the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Army, the same cautious reserve was maintained by the Conservatives: no formal opposition was offered: and up till after the time of Lord Keane's pension bill being passed in February 1841, no one save Lord Ellenborough,—who declared the war to have been a folly, and said that it remained to be seen whether or not it might not prove a crime,—ventured to speak out in Parliament in terms of open and decided disapprobation; but in great praise of Lord Keane for the manner in which he conducted the military part of it.

Lord Auckland—previously a Baron—was made an Earl: Sir John Keane was raised to the Peerage by the title of Baron Keane of Ghuznie and Cappoquin;—the following February a pension of £2000 a-year was conferred upon himself, to be continued to his male representatives for two generations: Mr Macnaghten and Colonel H. Pottinger—the great diplomatists on the occasion—received Baronetcies: Colonel Wade obtained the honor of knighthood. (114) Sir Alexander Burnes had been Knighted, and raised to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on the commencement of the war;—the official intimation thereof having reached him in Scinde in January. (115)

Before concluding the present chapter, it may be as well to take leave of

113. The speeches of Sir Phillip Durham and Sir John Cam Hobhouse at a meeting of the Directors, evidenced how extensively the delusion prevailed. The error of the Minister must have arisen from something worse than ignorance!

114. These Patents are dated Whitehall, Dec. 11, 1839.

115. Gazetted September, 1839.

the principal actor,—the only one who retired from the stage no more to appear before the public in person,—almost the only one who reaped the honours and rewards of conquest, without suffering from the calamities which fast followed at the heels of original success. Lord Keane arrived at Bombay on the 27th February. He remained for five weeks, during which period he and his companions in arms received a splendid public entertainment in the Town Hall: the whole period of his sojourn, in fact, was filled up with feasts and festivities in honour of his successes in war. On his return home he received a public entertainment from the Court of Directors on the 11th July. As to his character, Lord Keane is a man of talents not entitled to be called eminent, yet considerably above mediocrity. He has had much experience in his profession, having served in Egypt, in the Peninsula, and in the American war of 1814. That he is a man of enterprise and resources—of vigour, spirit, and determination of purpose, is disputed by no one. The cool equability of his courage has repeatedly been called in question, (116) but without, as it appears to us, any sufficient reason: and though there can be no doubt that, for the master-stroke of the campaign—the capture of Ghuznie, the feat which won him all his fame, he was in a great measure indebted to the science, skill, and conduct of the Engineers, and the dauntless bravery of the troops; there are abundance of points remaining, of which he alone can claim the merit, to entitle him to the gratitude of his country. He was not the planner of the campaign; nor is he understood to have concealed his disapprobation both of the plan and the policy which led to it: though entrusted with its execution, he was not called upon for more; and this much he effected well. He was a stout Conservative in politics; and after the glowing Ghuznie despatch had been penned, he is understood to have said that “the fort was but a rotten hole after all!”—but that its capture would give the Whigs another year in office.—We have here given the bright side of Lord Keane’s character: we have omitted the darker portions for the present,—many of which would ill bear public scrutiny.

116. See Colonel Dennie’s Letters.

CHAPTER III.

Extent of the Dooranee Empire under Ahmed Shah—under Shah Soojah—Political Agents—Establishment and Expense of—Expedition to the northward, November 1839—The Shah and Envoy winter at Jellalabad—Colonel Orchard's unsuccessful expedition to Peshoot—Affair with the Hazarah Tribes—Grand Convoy arrives at Jellalabad in April—Expedition against the Ghilzies betwixt Candahar and Ghuzale—Detachments under Captains Walker and Tayler—under Captain Anderson—Colonel Wallace's Detachment—Successes of—Returns—Surrender of Nawaab Jubbar Khan and two of the Sons of Dost Mahomed—Reception of at Cabool—Dost Mahomed proceeds to Bekhara and is made prisoner—Adventures of—Escapes and returns to Khooloom—Discontented state of the country—Alarming state of Kohistan—Captain Hay compelled to fall back on Syghan, which is reinforced—Captain McGregor's mishap near Jellalabad—Alarm of the Envoy—Apprehensions that we should require to quit all our outposts and concentrate on the Capital—Colonel Wheeler's success against the Kundjah Chiefs—Afful Khan repulsed near Bajgah—Detachment abandons Syghan leaving much private property behind—Desertion of a part of the Shah's Troops—Colonel Dennie dispatched from Cabool to reinforce Bameean—Extreme apprehensions of Dr Lord—Colonel Dennie's brilliant manœuvres on the Irak mountain,—Reaches Bameean—Advance of Dost Mahomed—Battle of Bameean—Dennie's Advance on Syghan—Flight of the Affghans—The Khooloom Confederacy broken up—Sir R. Sale attacks Tootan Durrah—Death of Lieutenant Connolly—Destroys the whole of the Tootan Durrah Forts—Attack on Juglah—At first unsuccessful—Movements of Dost Mahomed—Destruction of the Village of Heibuk and adjoining forts—Battle of Parwan Durrah—Disgraceful conduct of the 2d Cavalry—Death of Dr Lord, Lieutenants Broadfoot, and Crispin—Surrender of Dost Mahomed to the Envoy—Sir Alexander Burnes's account of the State of the Country.

We have as yet been favoured with no sufficiently trustworthy materials to enable us to come to any distinct conclusion as to what might have been Lord Auckland's intentions or expectations at the beginning of the war as to the line of policy to be adopted after the Shah should have been replaced on his throne. It is probable, however, that he might have some such scheme as the following before him: as we cannot imagine any man mad enough to enter on an expedition, foreseeing that long before any thing final or effective could be brought about, it must be abandoned because the finances as well as the credit of India were exhausted. We have already seen that the withdrawal of a much larger portion of the regular army than it was found prudent to permit to return to India, had been contemplated, and that the Commander-in-Chief, on the solicitation of the Envoy, left an additional brigade behind him at Cabool in October. It is probable that, by the second or third year of the new reign, it was hoped that the services of the whole of our troops might be dispensed with, and that the charge of the empire might be committed to the contingent for a few years longer, when probably our more immediate connection with the country might either have been expected to cease, or that by this time our faithful

ally being gathered to his fathers, his kingdom might have become worthy of annexation to our other territories. When, or by whom, the marvellous scheme of political organization, immediately afterwards brought into operation, was devised,—how long it was meant to last,—or what useful purpose it was expected to serve, does not appear. There is no doubt but that it was implicitly believed that the Dooranee empire might speedily be stretched very nearly to its original limits. At the death of Ahmed Shah in 1773, it consisted of the provinces of—

Neshapoor,	Ghuznie,	Dheera Islmael Khan,
Meshid,	Candabar,	Mooltan,
Herat,	Jellalabad,	Scinde,
Cabool,	Peshawur,	Beloochistan,
Balkh,	Cashmere,	The country as far as Sir-
Bameean,	The Punjaub,	hind.
Ghorebund,	Dheera Ghazee Khan,	

The revenues of the Dooranee sovereigns at this period amounted to about three millions a-year. The total revenue of Cabool in Dost Mahomed's time was about £250,000, and it fell considerably below this after his deposition. The Shah Soojah had, in addition to these, the revenues of Candahar, his other acquisitions yielded him none—which brought up the whole financial returns of the empire to something under £300,000 a-year. The dominions of which we put him in possession were Cabool, Bameean, Ghuznie, Jellalabad, and Candahar, the last of which alone did not belong to Dost Mahomed. One of our earliest arrangements for reducing the Dooranee states to order, was the appointment of an expensive set of functionaries termed political agents; so often adverted to, that it will be convenient here to give a brief account of them. These were selected from the civil or military services—mostly from the junior grades of the latter, their chief recommendation being their familiarity with the Persian language. They resided in the larger towns or troubled districts, and were vested with the most extensive powers over the troops in their neighbourhood, without any relation to age or rank in the army;—the youngest lieutenant (and out of the thirty-two there were nine captains and seventeen lieutenants) within the limits of the corps diplomatique being competent to direct the oldest general in the service! Sir Alexander Burnes invariably denounced this variety of diplomatic organization as productive of the most detrimental consequences to the country. In his memorial to the Envoy of the 19th April, 1841, he says—"It seems to me that wherever our political officers are, collision forthwith follows;" and in his private letters he speaks of the frog-spawn and fry of politicals with which the country was overspread. The Envoy, on the other hand, conceived them indispensable as means of gaining information. We shall have

so much to do with this body of functionaries in the course of the following narrative, that we here give a list of their names, and statement of their incomes, as contained in the Bengal Almanac for 1841. (1)

Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Bart., Envoy and Minister,.....	£11,220
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes, at Cabool,.....	3,000
Major E. Pottinger, Resident, Toorkistan,.....	1,440
Lieutenant P. Lynch, do., Ghilzie country,	1,200
Captain A. Conolly, Envoy to Khiva,	1,440
Lieutenant P. Nicholson, in charge of Dost Mahomed,	1,080
Lieutenant C. Rattray, Political Assistant, Kohistan,	840
Captain G. F. P. Lawrence, Military Secretary to the Envoy,.....	1,440
Lieutenant J. B. Conolly, Military Assistant to the Envoy,.....	840
Lieutenant Rawlinson, Political Agent, Candahar, ...	1,440
Lieutenant C. A. Jackson, Assistant to ditto,.....	1,080
Lieutenant G. H. Macgregor, Political Agent, Jellalabad,	1,440
Lieutenant C. Burnes, Political Agent, Ghuznie,	720
Captain F. Mackeson, Political Agent, Peshawur,	1,800
Captain Colin Mackenzie, Political Agent,.....	840
Captain J. D. Bean, Political Agent, Quetta,	1,440
Lieutenant W. F. Hammersley, Assistant,	840
Mr Ross Bell, Political Agent, Upper Scinde,	3,900
Lieutenant E. B. Eastwick, Assistant,	840
Captain W. J. B. Knyvett, ditto,	840
Lieutenant E. J. Brown, ditto,	840
Lieutenant Sinclair, ditto,	720
Lieutenant W. Brown,.....	840
Lieutenant W. Young, ditto,	720
Lieutenant W. Broadfoot, Assistant, Toorkistan Frontier,	840
Captain J. Nash, in charge of State Prisoners, Cabool,	960
Captain E. Sanders, attached to the Herat Agency,	1,068
Captain J. Abbott, Political Agent, Herat,.....	840
Major D'Arey Todd, Herat,	1,440
Lieutenant R. Loech, Political Assistant,.....	840
Lieutenant R. C. Shakespear, Political Agent, Herat,	840
Lieutenant E. K. Elliot, Political Assistant, Candahar,	720

Being just £49,248 annually—exclusive of Major Outram's establishment in Lower Scinde, and without making any mention of the array of native attendants. Mr Bell used to employ 750 camels for the transport of his private baggage; which, at £1 10s. per month each, makes the very respectable item of £13,500.

Before the winter had set in, our people had had a brush with the refractory

1. The Bengal and Agra Annual Guide and Gazetteer for 1841. Rushton : Calcutta. 2 vols. 8vo.—a very valuable work.

Kohistanecs. In the end of September the Ghoorka corps, a troop of horse artillery, three mortars, 1,000 Affghan cavalry, and 600 infantry, marched for Bameean; those were afterwards ordered to wait the junction of additional troops. Dr Lord, political agent in that district, reported that Dost Mahomed (2) had allied himself by marriage to the chiefs of Khooloom and Khoondooz, and was rapidly gaining influence in Toorkistan. (3) His intrigues were said to have been so far matured, that his son Ukhbar Khan was reported to have reached the Ghorebund Pass, 60 miles north of Cabool, in the end of September. The 4th brigade and the local horse, a company of sappers and miners, and the 35th and 37th N. I., left in the beginning of October for the northward, with supplies for six weeks. Having joined the force previously dispatched for Bameean, they were directed to cross the pass and make a dash into Tartary—a measure afterwards abandoned. On the 31st October a small party of horse artillery acting as cavalry, with some infantry and Affghan horse, having come up with from 600 to 700 Uzbegs, near Syghan, thirty miles beyond Bameean, defeated and dispersed them. Syghan was thus re-annexed to the Shah's dominions; a worthless possession like the rest, imposing on us the necessity of maintaining it, without the possibility of its conferring benefit in return. (4) The king of Bokhara, it was said, had offered the Dost a strong force to enable him to cut off the party at Bameean, now greatly reduced:—if his Majesty ever made such a proposal he must very quickly have altered his intentions: as in December he seized on the Dost, after having invited him to his court on promise of assistance, or according to another account, when making his way towards Persia, and in violation of all the rules of hospitality, so strictly attended to in Central Asia, kept him in confinement till the following August. The force maintained at Bameean throughout the winter consisted of 600 infantry, with six guns and two mortars, the heavier detachment above mentioned having returned to Cabool. The month of December passed quietly over, though threats of insurrection in every quarter led us to look for a turbulent spring and summer: an anticipation more than realized. The Shah and the Envoy continued at Jellalabad throughout the winter. The first of the operations of any magnitude in which we were engaged, was unsuccessful. Colonel Orchard, in the beginning of January, was dispatched against the fort of Peshoot, in the mountain country to the eastward of Jellalabad, in command of a force about 2,000 strong, consisting of three 9-prs., 1 troop 2d cavalry, 1 wing 37th N. I.,

2. The Ameer is described by Wood as about 45 years of age (in 1838): according to Dr Atkinson, Prince Timor, the Shah Soojah's eldest son, who has since retired to India, was at that time 40: the Shah himself about 60.

3. *Englishman* newspaper, October 25, 1839.

4. Atkinson's Expedition into Affghanistan, p. 327.

80 of the 1st European Regt., 20 Sappers, 3d Regt. Shah's infantry, 1st Shah's cavalry, 700 strong. Severe and continued rains had for some time prevailed; but on the 17th, the weather having cleared up, the guns were placed in battery, and after two hours firing, practicable breaches were made on both sides of the principal gate. Lieutenant Pigou (afterwards blown up and killed when engaged in a similar operation about a year after), with a party of 40 Europeans and sepoys, pushed down the outer gate, and proceeded to examine the inner one, which was found to be still entire. A bugler, by mistake, on seeing this party enter the breach, sounded the advance, and the whole column began to move forwards. They were quickly made aware of the blunder, and directed to shelter themselves from the enemy's fire in a ravine close by. Two attempts were made to blow open the gates by means of gunpowder bags; but both of them, in consequence of the rain which had begun to fall again, proved failures. It having been found impossible to scale the walls, or storm the fort, in its present condition, and the troops having been for five hours drenched with rain, and exposed to a severe fire from the fortress, it was resolved to retire about noon. The enemy, perceiving that eventually we should succeed, retreated shortly afterwards with the *éclat* of victory, carrying with them all their valuables, and leaving us in possession of their naked hold. Our loss was severe, consisting of about 69 killed and wounded; Lieutenant Collinson and Ensign Hicks were severely, the former, as it proved, mortally wounded. We afterwards took possession of Khatke, on the opposite side of the river, (5) and attempted to pursue the chiefs, but found this last impossible at such a season. In January, a fall of snow, said to have been nearly five feet deep, occurred at Cabool, while the thermometer fell to 13—at one time it was 5; at Bameean it sunk to 10 below zero, or 42 under freezing, the first week of the year. Ghuznie also was for some time snowed up, the cold being very severe, the snow lying a foot thick for weeks on end. The spirit of resistance which everywhere made its appearance amongst the tribes on the return of spring, was as obstinate as it was universal. About seven miles from Bameean stood a number of mud forts, belonging to the tribe called Hazarabs, on the tableland at the foot of the mountains which form a valley stretching away to the south-west. Meer Moheb and Shah Nusseer Beg were the ruling chiefs; of whom the former was supreme; the valley was populous and well cultivated, and the people had, up to the beginning of March, shown every disposition to supply our wants. On the 13th, the Hazarabs not only refused to sell forage to the commissariat officers, but, having assembled in considerable numbers, insulted and stoned the troops sent in quest of it. To a threat from one of our people, it was replied that we were Kaffirs, and

might bring our guns against them if we pleased. All attempts at conciliation having failed, a detachment was despatched under Captain Garbett, consisting of two 6-pr. guns under Lieut. M'Kenzie, 25 Horse Artillery Troopers as Cavalry, 50 Affghan Horsemen, and 4 Companies of the 4th Light Infantry under Captain Hay, to reduce them to order. The first fort arrived at was a strong one; the occupants refused all terms, and shut their gates against us. The heights in front, which had been covered with Hazarahs, were quickly carried. The artillery played briskly on the fort at a distance of 400 yards, and in less than an hour it was in our possession. The garrison retired to an inner tower and refused to yield. Hay and straw were piled up and set fire to in the lower part of their etreat; they still continued resolute; and, when the fire had burned out, not a man of them was found alive. The women and children (18 in number), who had sought refuge with the men, had scrambled to the top of the tower as the flames advanced, and from this, after all the garrison had been destroyed, they were rescued with difficulty; a trooper having contrived to carry up a rope through the burning building, by which they were let down.(6) Our casualties amounted to 16 killed and wounded; the enemy lost about 50 killed.(7) The value of the whole property found within the fort was about £40; no satisfactory explanation is given of the cause of the enemy's recusancy, or the fatal obstinacy of their resistance. A fine was subsequently levied on the tribe. Considerable sickness had prevailed amongst our troops, and great inconvenience been experienced by them, in the course of the winter, from the effects of a climate so entirely new to them, and for which they had been so imperfectly prepared. The King and Envoy, with their escort and suite, returned from their winter quarters at Jellalabad, and reached Cabool the first week of April. The arrival, on the 9th May, of the grand convoy, as it was called, from India, helped to remove, or to enable them to meet, those sources of discomfort arising from climate, already described. The convoy referred to consisted of the 2d N. I., six depot companies of native regiments, with drafts of H. M.'s 19th and 1st European regiment, and the mountain train, amounting in all to 2,000 fighting men, 200 remount horses, with 800 camels for the use of the troops, commanded by Brigadier Wallace, who had in charge £210,000 in treasure, and a vast quantity of public and private stores. About 4,000 camp followers, and 2,000 camels, attended it.(8) It left Ferozepore in the beginning of February, and proceeded in quiet, and without annoyance, through the Punjab. The Khyberies having threatened to attack them, General Sale, with the 37th and 48th

6. *Bengal Hurkaru*.

7. *Bombay Times*, May 6,—gives the same account as the *Hurkaru*.

8. *Hurkaru*, March 5. *Delhi Gazette*, March 4.

N. I., moved down from Jellalabad to Jumrood to escort them through the Passes. They reached the former place in safety on the 16th of April, and thereafter proceeded without interruption to Cabool. As spring advanced it became apparent that so far from our being able to withdraw any portion of the large force we had left in the country, and to which 2,000 men had just been added, that a very considerable increase of their numbers would speedily be requisite.⁽⁹⁾ It was said that, at this time, the Shah could not have taken with him a hundred of his own subjects into the field unless bribed by British treasure to attend him. Around Candahar the people were in the same condition of discontent and disturbance as they were in Cabool and Kohistan. In April, the whole Ghilzie country having for some time been in a state of insurrection, cutting off the dakhs, and robbing every kafilah betwixt Candahar and Cabool, a small party of cavalry, under Captain Tayler of the European regiment, and Captain Walker of the 4th Local Horse, pushed into the centre of the enemy's fastnesses, and endeavoured to seize Sultan Mahomed and the Gooroo—chiefs who had been removed by Captain Outram the previous autumn, and who now headed the rebels. Having received notice of our approach, they retired to the mountains, but speedily returned in such force as to compel the cavalry to fall back on Khelat-i-Ghilzie. Here they were reinforced by 200 infantry and 150 cavalry proceeding to Cabool, under Captain Codrington. General Nott having received intelligence that a still larger body of Ghilzies was about to attack them, prepared a stronger force for their assistance.⁽¹⁰⁾ On the 7th May, an expedition, consisting of 46 of the 4th Local Horse, detachments of the Shah's 1st and 2d Cavalry, four 6-pr. guns of the Horse Artillery, the 5th regiment of the Shah's Infantry, and another detachment—amounting to 1,200 in all, of whom 336 were cavalry—commanded by Captain W. Anderson, was dispatched from Candahar to attack a body of insurgent Ghilzies, and form a junction, if possible, with Captains Walker and Tayler; this last was effected on the 14th. At Tazee, near Khelat-i-Ghilzie, it was reported by the spies that the enemy, about 2000 strong, had determined to give battle. On the following day (*i. e.* the 16th) Captain Anderson advanced upon them in column, the artillery leading, flanked by two companies of the 5th Infantry, the main body of which immediately followed. Captain Codrington closed the rear and covered the baggage. The Cavalry having been divided into two wings, were directed to take a wide sweep to the right and left, and so endeavour to cut off the retreat of the enemy, on whom they were to close in so soon as the fire indicated that the action had begun. In this order the detachment marched for about five miles, when the enemy were overtaken, and

9. *Delhi Gazette*, June 13, 1840.

10. *Delhi Gazette*. The *Gazette* account is given by an officer with the force.

after a sharp action were defeated and dispersed. Our casualties amounted to 10 men killed and 30 wounded; the enemy had about 100 killed.(11) The fight lasted for about an hour, after which our men continued their march till obliged to halt at Tazee, in consequence of want of carriage for the wounded. Preparations were meanwhile made to despatch a force from Cabool to co-operate with the troops under General Nott's command, the success of a portion of which has just been related. Colonel Wallace marched from the capital on the 22d of May with the 2d N. I., two troops of the 2nd Light Cavalry under his command, three 9 prs. and 2 mortars. He reached Ghuznie in safety, and having been reinforced by the addition of two companies of the recruit depot, the 1st Light cavalry, and two 6-prs., he left on the 31st, and proceeded westward. By a sudden move, Mhookah, the fort of the principal rebel chief, was surprised, and taken without resistance, and afterwards blown up. Our arrival had been wholly unexpected, and the women and families of the chiefs were almost the only persons found in the stronghold. Mhookah is 7000 feet above the level of the sea, and in the beginning of June, quilts and blankets were required over night. Colonel Wallace after this returned to camp, directing Captain Anderson, now in his neighbourhood, to join him.(12)

The combined force, now nearly 9000 strong, proceeded to destroy the forts of the malcontents in the neighbourhood. They experienced no further resistance for the present. Whooloo Khan and Marroo Khan, as well as a Vizier of the latter, remained in our hands as prisoners: several of the others were beheaded.(13) Colonel Wallace shortly afterwards returned to Ghuznie, when the 2d N. I., a squadron of the 2d Cavalry, half Abbott's Battery, and 2 mortars, were directed to remain at the disposal of General Nott. Kelat-i-Ghilzie, 80 miles eastward from Candahar, was occupied by Captain Woodburn's corps, the Shah's 5th Regiment, 4 guns, and 300 of Christie's Horse, who were directed to remain till the beginning of winter. The consideration of the affairs of Scinde and Beloochistan—where insurrection showed a still more formidable front than to the eastward of Quetta—is postponed till afterwards: it forms a perfectly independent episode, which will be taken up when the present act of the Afghan drama is closed by the surrender of Dost Mahomed.

On the 3d of July, the Nawab Jubbar Khan, with Mahomed Akram Khan,

11. Captain Anderson's despatch, *Bombay Times*, 17th May 1841; also *Agra Ukhbar*; *Hurkaru*, 12th, and *Englishman* 25th, June 1840.

12. *Delhi Gazette*.

13. An anonymous writer in the *Agra Ukhbar*, dated 23d June, states, that "three of the chiefs who made themselves over to Lieutenant Nicholson and Shahzada Timour, had their heads struck off; and now," says he, "the country is deserted and the crops standing: but worse than all, the *British Word*, which was heretofore sacred everywhere, is defiled and rotted in the dust."

and Sheik Ali Khan, sons of the Dost : together with the most of the other members of the Ex-Ameer's family, arrived at Bameean, and placed themselves under our protection. The old Chief himself, and his sons Afzul and Ukhbar, were still confined at Bokhara ; Azim Khan, a younger son, had joined us some time before. The family, amounting at this time to 250, including attendants, were directed to proceed to Ghuznie ; it was understood that Quettah was meant to have been their place of destination. On the surrender of the Dost three months afterwards, they accompanied him to India, where they remained from Christmas 1840 till Christmas 1842, when they were released from captivity. The Wullee of Khooloom sent an ambassador tendering friendship to the Shah Soojah. Jubbar Khan, on his arrival at Cabool, was very kindly received by the envoy and minister, who offered him the same terms as those originally proposed : that is, that he should have his estates restored to him and dwell in Afghanistan, provided he remained faithful to us. From this date, up to the present time, he continued to reside at his fort of Killa Caze, near the capital,—never throughout all the troubles in which his country was involved, when scarcely an Affghan failed to take advantage of our difficulties, forfeiting the character by which he had been known from the period of our earliest acquaintance with him, of "The Good Nawab—the Feringees' Friend."

We must now return to the personal adventures of Dost Mahomed, whose flight from Urgundah, and escape across the Hindoo Koosh, has been described in a previous chapter. On his arrival at Khooloom, he was handsomely received and hospitably entertained by the chief. Except the threatened incursion on Bameean by the Uzbegs, and the discontented spirit manifested by the Hazarahs, no demonstration was made for a period in his favour to the northward. Winter was too close at hand indeed ; and the consternation which our apparently irresistible success had occasioned, too general to permit any military operation to be thought of by the Ex-Ameer before the return of spring. He wrote, in the mean time, to the King of Bokhara, inviting him, as one of the Lights of Islam, to assist in expelling the accursed Kaffirs. They were to share the spoil betwixt them ; and it was urged that the Shah Shoojah and the Feringees, unless routed, would not fail to overrun the countries on the Oxus.(14) The King replied in very cordial terms, directing a vakeel or ambassador to be sent to him. Mirza Sami Khan having been deputed in this capacity, was directed to write Dost Mahomed, giving him the warmest assurances of sympathy and assistance. Troops and

14. These statements are given on the authority of Dr Atkinson : who, without any appearance of dishonesty, is prejudiced against the Barukzyes—credulous and careless in his statements to a degree.—Expedition, p. 329. Other accounts, referred to above, state that the Dost was on his way to Persia when arrested. Dr Atkinson, however, is in this likely to be correct.

money were to be supplied him so soon as a personal interview, to conclude arrangements, could be obtained. Dost Mahomed on receipt of this, set out for Bokhara in the end of Nov. 1839, with his sons Ukhbar, Afzul, and Sum-munder Khan. On their arrival at Bokhara the King was profuse in his professions of friendship,—entreating that the Dost should send for his family, that their alliance might be still more closely and firmly cemented: he wrote at the same time to the Wullee of Khooloom, requesting him to forward them by force or fraud, without respect to their wishes. It had by this time become apparent that the professions of the Bokhara chief were hollow and delusive: that he wished to get his old enemy into his hands, partly with a view to revenge—chiefly from a desire to plunder him of his last remaining property. The Dost wrote an open letter to Jubbar Khan, directing arrangements to be made to have the wishes of the King complied with: he sent a secret order at the same time, telling his brother to put every member of the family to death rather than entrust them to the tender mercies of the Bokhara chief! The Nawab, uncertain how to act, and distrusting the Wullee, thought it better to enter into a correspondence with the British Government than to remain for an indefinite period in the dangerous position in which he now stood. Negotiations were in progress in March, and ended, as already mentioned, in the surrender of his brother's family early in July. So soon as the King of Bokhara became aware that the fraud intended to have been practised by him had been discovered, and in some measure frustrated, he laid aside the mask of friendship, and threw the Ex-Ameer and his sons into prison. The Dost, meanwhile, applied for and received assistance in his extremity from the Khan of Kookan on the Persian border; who having first used remonstrances and entreaties, afterwards resorted to arms,—captured some forts, and was in full march towards Bokhara, when the King pretended to relent:—he promised to release his prisoner on condition of hostilities being suspended, but at the same time retained him in close confinement, threatening his life should he attempt to get away. Early in July, he succeeded in making his escape under circumstances of great difficulty and danger.⁽¹⁵⁾ Directing his course towards Khooloom, assisted by his son Afzul Khan, he proceeded to stir up the country to undertake a holy war against us, promising that the Wullee should be his vizier could he succeed in recovering Cabool.

Between Bameean and Cabool lie the districts of Koh-i-Damun and Kohistan. There were at this time no parts of the Doorannee empire more hostile than those to the authority of the Shah Soojah. Yet, on our arrival in the country in July 1839, it was here the King found his stoutest

15. Dr Atkinson's Expedition, &c., p. 337. The whole of the adventures connected with the escape, which are too long for quotation, will be found in Dr Atkinson's Work.

friends. "It was in those districts that Dost Mahomed ruled with a rod of iron. He put to death most of the Chiefs; he quadrupled the revenues drawn from them. His policy was to sow dissension amongst them, and he succeeded: it was the only district of the country where the name of the ex-ruler was execrated when the Shah Soojah ascended the throne. One would have supposed that here, at least, his Majesty's Government would have found favour; and the more so, as the Kohistanes flocked in numbers to welcome him on his original entrance into Cabool—expressing the strongest feelings of loyalty and devotion. By the month of May, 1840, a miserable change had been produced in their sentiments. The Governors appointed under the Suddoyze rule demanded duties which were unusual and exorbitant, and exacted taxes the king had just declared to have become obsolete. The population of whole districts had fled to the hills to avoid oppression. When complainants were preferred, the complainants were thrown into prison; and when temporary redress was forced by the direct interposition of our authority, all the acts of petty tyranny which had for a time been interrupted were again renewed. At the time of the escape of Dost Mahomed, the feeling throughout these extensive districts was feverish in the extreme; and the Envoy was warned, by Sir A. Burnes, that an insurrection might break out any day in that part of the country where circumstances had originally given his Majesty the most trusty portion of his subjects." (16) It was here, then, that Dost Mahomed looked for assistance; and no sooner was it known that he was mustering troops to the northward than the whole country prepared itself to rise in his favour. The Chiefs of Khoondooz and Khooloom, who had just before sent Ambassadors proffering friendship to us, altered their views, and allied themselves to the fortunes of the Ameer. Besides our mishaps in Scinde and Beloochistan, various misadventures at this time befel us, calculated to excite or embolden sedition. A fort, commanding one of the principal passes into Toorkistan, had been quietly given up to Captain Garbett, then on an exploring expedition, and was deemed of importance enough by the politicals to be permanently retained. Captain Hay was directed to occupy it with five companies of the Shah's infantry, one company of which was stationed at Bameean, the others at Syghan. He arrived on the 4th of July, and took charge without the assistance of any other European officer. Matters at first went on quietly, but shortly afterwards, disaffection making its appearance, a reinforcement was sent for to Syghan, where Lieut. Golding commanded. Captain Hay, meanwhile, fell sick; and

16. The portion of the text marked by inverted commas is taken, with slight abridgment, from a memorial by Sir A. Burnes, dated Aug. 7, 1840, addressed to the Envoy. We shall have frequent occasion to quote this very remarkable paper.

judging, from his information, that Lieut. Golding would be on his way with assistance crossing the Dundan Shekan Pass on the 1st inst., despatched two companies, about 100 in all, under a serjeant, to meet him. They halted during the night opposite a fort, which they supposed to be friendly; at day-dawn the occupants of the hold, probably mistaking the unexpected visitors for assailants, fired upon them. The serjeant and his little band returned the fire and retired, but had, unfortunately, to pass through a narrow defile where the enemy crowded the heights to the amount of about 300. Our men kept steadily together and retired in perfect order, but this was all they could effect. They had 13 killed, and 27 wounded; when a detachment being sent out by Capt. Hay to their assistance they returned without further obstruction. A couple of mortars, and as many 6-pounders, left Bameean on the 1st inst. to reinforce Syghan. But the quarrel just described was settled by conference—the Chiefs agreeing to cede one of their forts to us,—so no further hostilities took place. The whole of our outposts in this quarter were shortly afterwards abandoned. About this time, Captain M^rGregor having sent 1,500 of the Shah's Affghans against a place north of Jellalabad, they were defeated, lost their guns and 100 of their men—200 going over to the enemy. So insecure did the Shah himself feel, that having prepared to start on a trip into Koh-i-Damun, thirty miles from his capital, the Chiefs objected, and he was obliged to abandon his purpose, and return his tents into store.(17) The Seikhs who had been detected giving harbourage to the Ghilzie refugees some months before, were now proved by intercepted letters to have promised or forwarded supplies of money to Dost Mahomed; while a conspiracy was discovered in Cabool by Sir A. Burnes, implicating almost all the first men in the city and surrounding countries in a plot to subvert the Suddoyze dynasty, and drive us from the country.(18) Arms and ammunition were purchased up in great quantities in Cabool, and forwarded to the Camp of the ex-Ameer, while large bodies of the citizens and fighting men in the neighbourhood joined the insurgent standard. The Envoy was so greatly alarmed that he retired with his family and suite into the Bala Hissar or citadel, where mortars and howitzers were placed in a position to command the town in case of emergency. At one time it was believed that we should require to abandon all our outposts and concentrate on the capital till assistance should reach us. At Ghuzuie, the guns in the citadel were loaded, and kept pointed in the direction whence approach of danger was apprehended. The European regiment and 48th N. I., stationed at Jellalabad, were ordered up to Cabool. Cap-

17. Private note by Sir A. Burnes, dated 22d Aug., written on a copy of the report sent up to the Envoy, found amongst his posthumous papers.

18. *Ibid*, ut *supra*.

tain McGregor's mishap was speedily retrieved. Lieutenant-Colonel Wheeler, in conjunction with Captain McGregor, marched on the 19th against the refractory Kudjah chiefs. His force consisted of 340 of the 1st European regiment, and 90 of the 48th N. I., with one 6-pounder of the Shah's artillery. There was much difficulty and delay in bringing the gun to the scene of action. A fort situated on their flank greatly annoyed them by its fire. Another, which stood right in the line of their operations, was carried in brilliant style by the Grenadiers of the 48th under Lieutenant Paterson. The gun was now run up to the gate of the largest fort, which was instantly blown open; the enemy flying, panic struck, through every aperture by which they could make their escape. The fort first mentioned as annoying the left flank in its advance, next fell into our hands, and so on till five of these strong-holds were in our possession. Our casualties amounted to 3 killed and 16 wounded. The enemy, finding resistance hopeless, sued for terms,—which were conceded them on hostages being granted;—they were said to have lost 80 men in the defence, including two chiefs. On the 20th of August, Afzul Khan, eldest son of Dost Mahomed, came down on Bajjah with about 500 horse. Captain Codrington had command of this advanced post, which was occupied by 200 of the newly raised Janbaz or Affghan levies, with the Ghoorkas or sepoy from Nepaul already referred to. The Janbaz horsemen being without European officers, were headed by Lieutenant Rattray, political assistant to Dr Lord. The enemy were twice charged and driven off the field. (19.) A hazardous advance in pursuit of the Uzbegs had at first been determined on, but intelligence having reached, in the course of the evening, that Heibuk, the stronghold of a friendly chief in our front, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, it was resolved to commence a retreat on Syghan during the night, and unite with Captain Hopkins, commanding the Affghan regiment, and Captain Garbett's horse artillery; the whole of Dost Mahomed's troops being now at liberty to attack our outposts. From Syghan, having saved the public baggage and treasure, but having sacrificed a large quantity of private property on the way, they returned on Bameean and proceeded to fortify themselves for immediate defence till assistance should reach them from Cabool. The force amounted to 2000 men, with 12 guns; but of these one half were Affghans ready to join the Dost the moment he came sufficiently near to permit desertion. (20) On the way from Syghan their con-

19. *Delhi Gazette*, September 23.

20. Letter of Sir Alexander Burnes, Cabool, September 7.—Fourth troop 3rd Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery, four of the Shah's guns, two mortars, and 460 Affghan horse, with the force fell back from the outposts mentioned in the text.—*Bombay Times*, 14th October, 1840.

duct was in the last degree mutinous and disorderly ; and on their arrival at Bameean one company marched out with their arms and accoutrements and went over to the camp of the enemy ; the remainder, to the amount of 500 or 600, were disarmed and ordered to return to Cabool. On the 7th September, Colonel Dennie, with the 35th N. I., the Shah's 4th regiment, and 160 of Anderson's horse, left Cabool to reinforce Bameean. On the 11th, while on his march, he received an express from Dr Lord apprising him of the desertion of Captain Hopkins's Affghans, and intimating that Dost Mahomed, with his son Afzul Khan, the Wullee of Khooloom, and some thousands of the tribes, had advanced to and captured Syghan immediately on its abandonment by us, and that the enemy were within 30 miles of Bameean. Having pressed through the Gurdan Dawal defile, a second despatch of still greater urgency was received, intimating that the ex-Ameer had resolved to return to Bameean and occupy the passes, so as to prevent the junction of our troops. In order to frustrate this, Colonel Dennie resolved to occupy the Irack pass, and the same day the crest of the mountain, 13,000 feet above the sea, was gained, and both its sides carefully guarded. Bameean was now safe, and only twenty miles off, the troops being on the same side with it of this vast unbroken chain of mountains. Here they remained just long enough to collect their supplies, left somewhat behind them by the rapidity of their movements, and the difficulty of the ground they required to traverse. Fresh entreaties for advance induced Col. Dennie to press on by forced marches to Bameean, where he arrived on the 14th. Having drawn out the Ghoorkas, he disarmed Captain Hopkins's regiment, who, although loaded, offered no resistance. This has been referred to above. Finding no enemy in the neighbourhood, he proceeded to make arrangements for an advance upon Syghan. This turned out unnecessary, the Uzbegs being now close at hand. On the evening of the 17th, information was received that Dost Mahomed and his Uzbeg allies, under the Wullee of Khooloom, were entering the valley from the great defile seven miles in front of Bameean. They were not discouraged in their approach, in order that they might be drawn well up the valley, into a position favourable for our operations. On the morning of the 18th, a fortified village which had claims on our protection having been attacked by them, it became imperative on us to drive them off. It was reported that the Dost's troops amounted only to a few hundreds—it turned out that they numbered from six to ten thousand fighting men. Relying on the correctness of the understatement, one-third of the force, with a 6-pr. gun and howitzer, was all that were taken out. These consisted of 230 of the 25th N. I., 270 Ghoorkas, 80 of Anderson's Horse, and 200 Janbazes—800 in all. The enemy had got possession of the chain of forts in front, and Colonel Dennie was not a little surprised to find them ten times as numerous as had been represented. To have retired,

or waited for reinforcements, would have been fatal, so they were immediately charged and driven from their position. The artillery practice was beautiful, and our grape and shrapnell told fearfully on their crowded masses. They rallied four or five times, but seeing our steady and rapid advance, they lost heart, broke, and fled pell-mell towards the pass.

The cavalry, consisting of 80 of Anderson's Horse, 200 Janbazes, and 40 or 50 of Dr Lord's and Captain Conolly's escort—about 330 in all—were now let slip, and cut up vast numbers of the flying Uzbegs. The deserters from Captain Hopkins's regiment were drawn up as light infantry—no mercy was shewn them by their former comrades. The allied troops dispersed themselves in all directions over the hills—the pursuit continued for four miles, and when Dost Mahomed was last seen, he was wounded in the thigh, and had not more than 200 horsemen along with him. The ex-Ameer and his son, with the Wullee of Khooloom, owed their escape, which was a narrow one, entirely to the fleetness of their horses. Their only gun, kettle-drums, tents, standards, and baggage fell into our hands. The casualties of the enemy are said to have exceeded 500 killed and wounded. Our loss amounted to 50, of whom six only were killed. For more than a week no tidings could be obtained of the Dost or Wullee, but apprehensions being entertained that they might be endeavouring to re-assemble their scattered forces at Syghan, 37 miles from Bameean, Colonel Dennie made preparations to move out and disperse them. On the morning of the 22d, he marched with 3 6-pr. guns, and 1 12-pr. howitzer, six companies of the 35th N. I., six more of the Ghoorka battalion, 100 of Anderson's Horse, 200 Janbazes, and 100 Hazarah pioneers—1500 in all.(21) On reaching Akurabad at the end of the first day's march, he learned that the allies had passed that place after their defeat, and pushed forward without halt to Hyatoo, where a garrison was left, and continued their onward flight. The following afternoon he reached Hyatoo, and finding it abandoned, set fire to it:—here he learned that the fugitives had pushed on past Syghan, and that the garrison they had left behind them had fled. This fort was next approached and occupied; it was found most difficult of access, and capable of maintaining a determined and protracted defence. So precipitate had been the retreat of the Uzbegs on hearing of our approach, that they had left behind them the whole of the stores, tents, and arms, property, public and private, which had been abandoned by our troops, on their retreat

21. The details of the above operations are taken from Colonel Dennie's despatches. He dates from Syghan the 27th, mentioning that it had taken him two days to reach this from Bameean. He states that he left on the 27th; the two are irreconcilable, so the date of his despatch has been altered to the 25th. He was back at Bameean again on the 1st Oct.; private letters state that he reached on the 24th. He says, "Syghan was stronger than Ghuznie."

towards Bameean, three weeks before. On the 23th, an ambassador from the Wullee waited on Dr Lord with overtures of peace, and Colonel Dennie resolved to remain where he was till negociations were completed. Dost Mahomed appeared to have been for the time cast off from the Uzbeys, of whom there were 5500 in a valley 30 miles from Syghan. On the 29th September our army returned to Bameean, the terms proposed to the Wullee having been conceded him. The Dost having made his appearance at Heibuk, was refused all further assistance, and no course appeared to be left to him but to surrender himself into our hands. The duty on which Colonel Dennie and his gallant little band had been dispatched having been thus gloriously executed, they returned to Cabool on the 18th October. This series of operations betwixt the 11th and 30th September, was one of the most important, and by far the most brilliant, which had yet occupied our troops in Afghanistan. From circumstances never satisfactorily explained, the whole of the despatches of Colonel Dennie relating to them, excepting that giving an account of the battle of Bameean, were excluded from the *Gazette*. It was the custom with Lord Keane and Sir Willoughby Cotton to avenge themselves on officers out of favour with them, by passing them over in the *Gazette* or suppressing their despatches—a system subsequently practised by General Nott, and permitted to pass uncensured. Col. Dennie was offered the second class Doorannee Order for the most brilliant exploit performed during the war: he declined it. (22) He had before declined the offer of the third class Order, with which he had been insulted for the storming of Ghuznie. Meanwhile, operations equally active, but in all respects widely different in their results, had been in progress to the westward. On the 29th September Sir R. Sale marched at daylight from his camp at Robat to attack the fort of Tootundurra, at the entrance of the Ghorebund Pass. His force consisted of Her Majesty's 13th, two companies 27th, and flank companies 37th N. I., two squadrons of the 2d Bengal Cavalry, and the Shah's 2d cavalry, which joined at Charekar, five miles in advance, a couple of 6-prs., and three 9-prs. The cavalry were in advance. On arriving at Tootundurrah the enemy were found very strongly posted. A village, surrounded by garden walls, and defended by a small fort, with several detached towers, commanded the uneven ground from which the steep ascends which lead in the pass. A chain of detached forts, within musket shot of each other, and of the village respectively, extended to the eastward. One of the forts was peculiarly strong. The rear or northward of this position was protected by a deep canal along the high ground, the valley beyond being covered with gardens. A party of the

22. Colonel Dennie's letter to Sir W. Cotton, dated Cabool, 23d October; also private letters.—*Fraser's Magazine*, and *Bombay Times*.

enemy was drawn up in front, protected by a mound; a second party occupied the face of the hill to the west. The forts were all garrisoned by matchlock men, which maintained a hot fire upon us as we advanced. Strong parties, with artillery, were detached to clear the hills, and take the enemy in flank, and to get possession of two detached forts on the right. These having been completely successful, the principal column moved down upon the village. (23) The enemy were defeated, and compelled to retire from all their positions, and by 11 o'clock the whole of their strongholds were in our possession. The artillery, as usual, rained destruction on our opponents, and left them without means of resistance or hope of success. We had six privates killed,—the only officer who fell was Captain Edward Conolly. Three brothers of this talented family lost their lives during the Afghan war—Captain John died at Cabool in July 1842, and Captain Arthur, the traveller, was shortly after murdered at Bokhara along with Colonel Stoddart. The whole of the Tootundurrah forts were, at the suggestion of Sir Alexander Burnes, who accompanied the force, destroyed. Sir R. Sale having been informed by the Political Agent that a number of the rebel chieftains had taken refuge at the fort of Jugla, 16 miles from his camp at Chareekar, Captain Anderson, with two squadrons of the Shah's cavalry, the janbazes, and 500 Dooranee horse—about 1000 cavalry in all, were despatched under Captain Sanders with a view to surround and prevent the escape of the chiefs until the slower moving infantry and artillery should be able to get up and attack the place. They marched soon after midnight, and by sunrise of the 3d of October the fort was completely invested. By ten A.M., the General with Her Majesty's 13th, two companies of the 27th and 37th Native Infantry, two squadrons of the 2d cavalry, arrived, and in two hours more one 24-pr. howitzer, three 9 and two 6-prs. had joined: the mortars, which had been detained by the badness of the roads, did not get into position till late in the afternoon. A severe cannonade was maintained betwixt one and three P.M., when the breach being considered practicable they proceeded to storm. Four officers of H.M.'s 13th for some time maintained themselves on the summit of the wall with such determined gallantry as to call forth the cheers of all their comrades in the thickest of the fight. (24) The enemy crowned the crest of the shattered wall, and poured in so hot a fire, and offered such stout resistance, that the storming party was compelled to retire with loss,—the breach being quite impracticable, as was afterwards ascertained fully. They took refuge in the adjoining ravine until recalled to camp. The

23. Sir R. Sales's despatch of 29th September, 1840.

24. These were Brevet-Major Kershaw (killed on retreat from Cabool), Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, Lieutenant Edward King (who afterwards fell gloriously at Tezeen), and Lieutenant G. Wade.

garrison, notwithstanding all the precautions made use of to secure them, made good their retreat; and the fort having thus been evacuated, was taken possession of by our men a little after dusk—7 P. M. Our casualties amounted to 50 in killed and wounded. On the morning of the 13th, information was received that Dost Mahomed had come through the Ghorebund Pass at Tootundurrah, and taken up his quarters 15 miles from our camp: his cattle were described as so entirely knocked up, that it was supposed a squadron of cavalry might intercept and cut off his retreat. Lieutenant Dowson, with 500 Affghan horse, was immediately despatched on this duty, but found he was too late, the ex-Ameer having, a few hours before, left for Nijrow, 20 miles east of Chareekar. Next morning a whole company of Lieut. Maule's Kohistanese went over to their old ruler, and fears were entertained that the rest would follow. Our troops were encamped at Chareekar when information was received that the Dost had crossed the valley, apparently intending to move on Cabool, whose safety, considering the temper of the people in and around it, began to occasion serious uneasiness. A position was accordingly taken up by our troops on the 16th at Karabagh, with a view of covering and protecting the capital. On the 17th, they proceeded to attack the fort of Derveesh Khan, one of the most respectable and consistent of the friends of the late ruler. A long detour was made to avoid some difficult marching ground, and when the fort was attained, it was found empty. The walls and bastions were blown up and the stronghold destroyed. On the night of the 18th, the enemy assembled after dark within 120 yards of our camp, and continued for three hours to pour in upon us a close but ill-directed fire, which could not be replied to, but from which little damage was sustained. (25) On the 19th, the remainder of the 37th N. I. and three 9-pounders joined. On the 20th, preparations were made to attack the strong village of Kandarra, occupied as was understood by from 600 to 1000 of the insurgents. It was situated close under the inferior range of the Lughman mountains by which Koh-i-Damun is bounded on the west. Immediately to the south is the village of Beydack; and the groves, vineyards, and gardens of the two places cover a portion of the hill side, measuring about two miles north and south, and half as much from east to west. The gardens are, as usual, cultivated in terraces like a flight of gigantic steps: each house was a distinct little fort, loopholed and garrisoned; while numerous towers of great strength were scattered about: the place, in fact, was of very great strength, and if ordinarily well defended, could only have been captured at a heavy sacrifice of life. Fortunately, while we were encamped within sight of them, the people took to quarrelling amongst themselves. The warrior portion of the inhabitants refused to fight, and on the night of the 20th moved off; the

rest felt so alarmed and dispirited that they all dispersed, and on the forenoon of the 21st we set fire to the houses, destroyed the gardens, and levelled the villages; and on the 22d moved to the north of Ak Serai to resume the observation of the Cabool road. At this time a force of the 3d Shah's Khelat-i-Ghilzie Corps, and two Shah's guns, marched from Cabool and surprised Istalif by a night march. The 3rd Shah's joined us from Purwan shortly afterwards. In this position our troops remained for about a week, when they advanced towards Nijrow on hearing that the Dost had come out of the valley with a small force which was hourly increasing. On the 1st November they reached the fort of Meer Musjedee, where more exact intelligence than had hitherto been obtained of the movements of the ex-Ameer was procured. He had advanced towards Purwan Durrah, a small valley traversed by a clear rapid stream, and sprinkled over with orchards and numerous forts. Hitherward the following morning moved our troops. The advanced guard consisted of 2 6-pr guns under Lieutenant Warburton, four companies of H.M.'s 13th under Major Kershaw, the two flank companies of the 37th, and one company of the 27th N. I., under Lieutenant Rhind of the former corps; two squadrons of the 2d Bengal Light Cavalry, and 200 of the Shah's 2d Horse, under Captain Anderson,—the whole being under the command of Colonel Salter. The troops moved at daybreak on the 2d Nov.: the morning was serene and beautiful, the country in the highest degree picturesque; but the road was intersected with cuts, canals, and water courses, and was difficult in the extreme. Between eight and nine, the Gorabund river was crossed, the guns having been got over with great difficulty. On ascending the hills beyond, a fort opened fire on the advance, and compelled them to form line. By this time the villagers were flocking in from every quarter, intreating protection from the army of Dost Mahomed, said to be plundering them in all directions and preparing to decamp. (26) The forts and villages as we advanced were rapidly evacuated by the enemy, who were seen retreating towards the hills. Their numbers were computed at 3500 foot and 500 horse. (27) Dr Lord, who accompanied Col. Salter, having intimated that the cavalry, by proceeding in advance, would be able to cut off a portion of the fugitives, the 2d cavalry were ordered to skirt the hill on the right, while the left of the pass was occupied by Anderson's horse. The infantry followed, but were greatly retarded in their movements by the guns, which were impeded by the water courses. The cavalry, having got a mile or so ahead of the main body, were attacked by a detachment of about 200 Afghan horse, believed to be headed by the ex-Ameer in person. Line having been formed, Capt. Fraser, who commanded the right, ordered the troopers to

26. Correspondent in the *Delhi Gazette*, November 22.

27. General Sale's despatch, 2d November.—*Government Gazette*.

draw and charge. The first troop hesitated, and the men began to fall back by eights or tens. The officers were so completely occupied by the enemy advancing at a slow but determined pace, and now close upon them, that they merely called out to the men to come on, little anticipating that they were to have all the battle to themselves. Observing, when too late, that they were about to be left without support from their men, who had now begun to move off by threes and fours, and scamper like a flock of sheep before a force not superior to them in numbers, Captains Fraser and Ponsonby in vain used every effort to bring them on to the charge; in vain they exhorted, intreated, and implored them during the few moments permitted them. Captain Fraser at length exclaimed, "I never saw such cowards, we must go alone." The Affghan horse were now amongst our wavering or retiring ranks. Dost Mahomed led his men down the hill, calling "In the name of God and the prophet, fight and drive the Feringee Caffirs from the land, or I am gone." The European officers already named, together with Lieut. Crispin, Cornet Moffat, Assist.-Surg. Eddy, Mr Boulton, the riding master, and Mr M'Dermot, the veterinary surgeon, with some 15 or 20 men, were left fighting desperately in the midst of the enemy. Dr Lord had been killed on the advance by a shot from one of the posts. Lieutenant Broadfoot of the Engineers had followed in the rear of the cavalry, and was ridden down by them while endeavouring to prevail upon them to return to the field. His body was afterwards found mutilated by the enemy. The infantry column had observed with admiration the gallant bearing and steady advance of the Affghans, conceiving that they would be as steadily met and still more gallantly repelled; the hot charge and flashing sabres conveying for a moment the impression that all had gone well, when the enemy's high red banner dispelled the illusion. To their dismay the next moment they perceived the cavalry in full retreat flying at speed before the Affghans. Capt. Fraser arrived shortly after in camp on horseback, severely wounded in the back, and with his right hand nearly cut off. The advanced guard was now formed in line to receive the enemy, and the guns placed in position; but the horsemen were probably satisfied with their success, and were, at all events, too weak to attempt more than they had accomplished. They passed on beyond range of our artillery. Three companies of the 37th N. I., with the 2d Bengal Light Cavalry which had been sent back, were ordered to move round to the right in quest of the missing officers, while three companies, under Lieutenant Rhind, with two of Abbott's guns, proceeded towards the left to attack the enemy now accumulating in masses on a rocky eminence on the flank. Some delay occurred in these arrangements: as the second-mentioned party advanced, Lieutenant Dawes, who was in charge of the guns, opened fire with admirable precision on the Affghans. The red standard of the enemy was now placed on the top of the hill, and a detach-

ment, under Lieutenant Rhind, after experiencing the greatest difficulty in the ascent, obtained possession of the height just before occupied. This position having been maintained for about half an hour, was abandoned, the enemy having been driven off. (28) The troops had now been nine hours under arms; it would have taken them three hours more to have reached the principal portion of the enemy; who still remained in the field, so we returned to the camp for the night. (29) A new attack was arranged for next day, and the soldiers slept accoutred for the fight. When morning dawned, the Affghans were found to have fled towards Charcekar: not a shot had been fired, nor was an enemy to be seen. The loss at Purwan Durrah fell entirely on the officers. Dr Lord, the Political Agent in Kohistan, fell on the advance; Lieut. Broadfoot was killed as the cavalry began to retire, and Cornet Crispin was shot dead upon the field, and was afterwards cut to pieces. The condition in which Captain Fraser returned to camp has already been referred to; (30) the escape of Captain Ponsonby was almost miraculous. He was mounted on a magnificent Ghuznie charger, who, finding himself hemmed in on all sides, lashed furiously out and dismounted three of the Affghans. The gallant officer himself had a ball through his left arm; the top of his left thumb was cut off, with a severe sabre wound dividing his nose and laying open his cheek to the bone. His reins were severed across; his horse had lost his ears, and had a shot through his neck. Such was the battle of Purwan Durrah, which closed the career of Dost Mahomed Khan; and presented the first example of misconduct on the part of the Sepoy soldier since the commencement of the war. Of this no adequate explanation has ever been obtained; but so infamous was it regarded that the regiment was degraded and disbanded, and its number erased from the army list. The heroic conduct of the British officers met with the applause that it deserved; the Native officers and troops who had not been engaged, or were guiltless of misconduct, were drafted into other corps. Bameean had, in reality, sealed the fate of the insurgent party, who were now unable to bring into the field half the force that Colonel Dennie had defeated. Having staked his all upon this cast without further hope of success, Dost Mahomed found himself on the eve of being abandoned to his fate. He disappeared from the field of battle, no one knew how or where. On the evening of the 3d November, as Sir W. Macnaghten was returning from his evening ride, and was within

28. *Delhi Gazette*, *ut sup.*

29. Colonel Dennie's letters, Cabool, 18th April, 1841, and *India Gazette* therein referred to.

30. This officer formed one of Sir R. Sale's garrison at Jellalabad, when they were blockaded betwixt November 1841 and April 1842. In March 1843, he went home in charge of presents from the Maharajah Shero Singh to the Queen of England. His hand had not been amputated, but was at this time wholly useless.

a few yards of his own residence in the citadel of Cabool, a single horseman galloped up to him, and having satisfied himself that he was the Envoy and Minister, told him that Dost Mahomed had arrived, and sought his protection. The ex-Ameer immediately appeared; he alighted from his horse, and presented his sword.(31) His sword was returned him, and he himself requested to remount. He had quitted the field of battle late the preceding evening, and rode straight into Cabool, a distance of 60 miles, having been 24 hours on horseback. His finances were exhausted; his allies were deserting him; and the Seikhs, who had heretofore promised him all sorts of support, had consented to open their country for the march of additional troops, to reinforce the British army in Afghanistan. It had become obvious, that however he might protract the struggle it could have but one issue. With a pride peculiar to himself, he carefully eschewed our army close to(32) him, whom he considered he had foiled, and rode in straight to give himself up with flying colours. He shewed few symptoms of fatigue, and his self-possession was remarkable. He wrote to his eldest son Mahomed Afzul, the sharer of his captivity and toils, and to two of his other sons who had escaped from Ghuznie, desiring them to come in immediately, as he had already surrendered himself and been honourably treated. He left Cabool for India under escort on the 12th November, and waited at Peshawur till joined by his family. They had resided at Ghuznie since their surrender in July; they consisted of nearly 700 persons, of whom one half were females. Fourteen sons surrendered themselves; Ukhbar Khan alone having declined our hospitalities to the end. Hyder Khan, who became prisoner on the fall of Ghuznie, at this time a prisoner at large at Bombay, afterwards joined them. The ex-Ameer was permitted at his own request to visit Calcutta, where he was received with the utmost respect by Lord Auckland, and became for a time the great Lion of the City of Palaces. He was allowed an income of three lakhs of Rupees,—£30,000 a-year. He was assigned a residence first at Loodianah and afterwards at Mussooree on our north-west frontiers, where the climate was more congenial to his constitution than that of lower Bengal. He appears to have created a strong and favourable impression on all with whom he came in contact; and though watching, of course with deep interest, the struggles of his country, he was never on any occasion detected interfering with its affairs, or even during the time of our troubles, which he appeared to deplore, corresponding with the insurgents. He quitted India in January 1843, and after a sojourn of some weeks at Lahore, returned to Cabool. This, however, is greatly in anticipation of the regular course of our narrative. The surrender of Dost Mahomed reduced the country around Cabool

31. Sir W. Macnaghten's Despatches, November 4.

32. Colonel Dennie's Letters, December 27. We have borrowed in part the words of both the papers referred to.

to a state of temporary tranquillity.(33) There was no further head or definite object for combination, and though the elements of insurrection were every where abundant, and instances of individual resistance to the tax-gatherer not unfrequent, there was no hope to be indulged in, or object to be advanced, by a combined or extensive outbreak. The embers of discontent smouldered in Kohistan, but were not extinguished; a communication is said to have been intercepted, bearing the seal of the blinded Zemaun Shah, brother of the Shah Soojah, addressed to the Sultan Mahmoud Khan Barukzye, Sirdar of Kohat, urging a combination with the Seikhs to restore him to authority; a proof of the conviction of this member of the royal family, that the question was less betwixt the Suddozye and Barukzye races than the anxiety to get rid of the present ruler and his allies.(34) Winter was now at hand:—the Affghans had not as yet discovered the weak points in the position we had taken up;—and warlike operations were not thought of with the ground covered with snow, and the thermometer considerably below zero. Before directing attention to the affairs of Scinde and Beloochistan, where insurrection was rife, and rebellion had assumed a more formidable front than in any of the tramontane parts of the Dooranee empire, it will be expedient briefly to examine the causes of the unexpected continuance of hostilities, and our extreme want of success in reducing the country to obedience. The papers of Sir Alexander Burnes fortunately furnish abundant materiel for an enquiry as important in its nature as unsatisfactory in its results. The history of the operations in the countries southwest of Candahar forming an episode of themselves, will be narrated in the following chapters.

Dr Atkinson relates that, in December 1840, when accompanying Dost Mahomed on his way to India, the ex-Ameer recommended strongly the policy of taking the dominion of the country into our own hands. "The Suddozyes," he said, "had never been accustomed to obey, and never would obey; and, by their intrigues, under the anomalous sovereignty of the Shah Shoojah, we should be involved in perpetual embarrassment." The only effectual mode of crushing them was to govern them in our own way. "You will also find," he observed, "the very courtiers about the Shah who have for years been fattening on your bounty, the most forward in plotting against you." There is no doubt that the observation of the Affghan ruler fully explained our difficulties, arising, as they did, from the anomalous nature of our position. It is true that the habits of the population of Affghanistan bore scarcely any resemblance to those of the countries

33. "The surrender of Dost Mahomed has made the country as tranquil as Vesuvius after an irruption; how long it will continue it is impossible to say."
 --Letter of Sir A. Burnes, Cabool, Nov. 13, 1840.

34. Atkinson's Expedition into Affghanistan, p. 368.

with which, in India, we had hitherto been accustomed to deal:—countries which lay on the borders of our dominions, and were accessible to our armies along the whole line of their frontiers: which were familiar with the aspect, as well as with the resistless power of our authority, before they felt its influence. The Affghans had at no time for any lengthened period, submitted to a regular government of their own: they were divided into a hundred petty clans, each professing allegiance to individual chiefs, who made no ceremony in disputing the authority of the Sovereign when his behests discorded with their views. Imbued with more than the usual impatience of taxation, almost the only aid they could be induced to contribute to the state was in the shape of a contingent of men in the case of war. Difficult as it was, however, to fuse these hot, fiery, and refractory, subjects into the form of a quiet, well-ordered, and submissive tribute-paying-population; the source of all our troubles lay in the anomaly of our own position. Had we taken possession of the country for ourselves, it would not only have been totally useless to us, but would have cost some millions sterling a-year for the maintenance of from 12,000 to 15,000 regular troops to keep up the show of sovereignty. But so long as we asked no tribute, and left the tribes to themselves, it is probable they would have learned to leave us alone when they discovered how much more satisfactory was the silver and gold we scattered than the steel and lead we might have required to use amongst them. This, certainly, was the most we could ever at any time have hoped, from the entire occupation of Affghanistan.

In maintaining the Shah Soojah by force of arms on the throne in the shape of an independent sovereign, we enabled him to do as he thought fit, while we relieved him from the fear of consequences. The capricious tyranny he exercised over his subjects was carried into effect, and he protected from the results—by British bayonets! Rights long dormant or forgotten, and which in many cases had never been admitted, were resuscitated; claims were renewed on tribute for half a century fallen aside; and the whole country harrassed and annoyed by the political agent, the spy, and the tax-gatherer,—creatures equally new and unwelcome in the recesses of the Doorannee empire.

No better explanation can be given of the sources of our difficulties than that contained in the representation of Sir Alexander Burnes, laid before the Envoy on the 7th of August 1840, on the anniversary of our entrance into Cabool; with a long extract from which able, but unfortunately unheeded, document, the present chapter may be concluded:—

So much for the state of affairs in the kingdom of Cabool on this day, the anniversary of our entrance into its capital. At Court I fear we shall not find matters in a better state: much is said of the King's popularity: this is a subject I feel anxious to grapple with thoroughly. To me it would be very astonishing if any Af-

ghan King who had allied himself to the Sikhs, and the English, could be popular ; *it is not in the nature of things*. His Majesty's successor may hope for a better share of the public favor, but Shah Shoojah must I fear get on without it. I would not however dwell much on the abstract question of unpopularity, I would rather enquire into the causes for it, if they exist, or are only imaginary. Bad ministers are in every Government, solid grounds for unpopularity, *and I doubt if ever a King had a worse set than Shah Shooja*. His principal adviser is an old servant by name Moolah Shikore, who has grown grey with His Majesty in exile, where he distributed, in some hundred fractional parts, the Pension which the Shah received from the Company. He is not a man of family, but a Moolah ; his faculties are impaired by age and disease ; he once incurred His Majesty's displeasure for which he forfeited his ears, a subject fruitful in witicism to the discontented about court, and little calculated to elevate the representative of Majesty. So completely is this poor man's memory gone that he never recognizes a man he has once seen ; that the commonest business requires half a dozen of notes,—in fact, of him it might be said that his whole business is to gather money, and to this one end his remaining faculties are applied. Moolah Shikore passes by the name of Vuzeer or minister, but His Majesty gets offended at his being so called, so we may presume he thinks it possible to get on without any minister. By facts that have come under my own knowledge, I shall depict the Vizier's character, *and all of them can be tested by yourself*. In the last winter, his notions of Political economy led him to seize all the granaries around Cabool, on which he put his seal, and from which he drew forth the grain, and had it exposed for sale in the Bazaar by his own officers, and at a price fixed by himself. When spring arrived, he conceived it would please His Majesty to adorn the royal Gardens which have been long neglected, a measure most laudable to a people so fond of gardens as the Caboolies, highly popular, but this was to be done *gratis*, and by conscription on all around this district. The poor peasantry were dragged in hundreds from their homes at seed time, when their lands required their care, and compelled to labor without any reward. Discontent rose to such a height that I sent to the minister and plainly told him that he was disgracing his King and himself ; and that I would no longer stand silent, as policy dictated I should on all occasions, unless he at least gave the poor wretches bread, and if he would not do it, I would from next day open my own treasury and supply it. After this the workmen got two pice worth of bread per diem, while our Engineer officers were paying seven times that in the adjoining garden, where our Cantonments were erecting. The next freak of this minister was to reduce the number of Butchers' shops in this populous City, and to compel these to sell at his own price, thereby ensuring a monopoly of meat to a few, and injuring many. For days the loudest complaints were uttered, till free trade was at last established. As I write, the shops in which flour is sold are now shut, the minister having turned his views from meat to bread ; and it is painful to pass through the Bazaar in consequence. *With such an adviser, can His Majesty be popular*—do he, and his minister deserve it ?

You have frequently pointed out to the King, in which I have humbly seconded

you, the utter worthlessness of such a man as an adviser, and His Majesty has promised more than once a remedy to an evil so pressing. You are aware that he has appointed within this past month a man of family and character to take a share in public matters by the title of Nizam-oo-dowla, his own name being Oosman Khan Suddoozzye. This, however, I regret to say is a pure fiction, the man exercises no authority in the state. His Majesty has given to him the old revenue accounts to examine, and he is to find out such defalcations as he can, a task imperiously necessary I admit, but one by no means furnishing a remedy to the grievances above enumerated. These grievances relate to Cabool, but the surrounding country equally suffers under others. Those in the Kohistan I have described, those elsewhere are fully as common. Besides Oosman Khan, of whom I am bound to speak with favor, His Majesty tells us there is no man fit for trust; I will only say that he deceives himself, but if unworthy of trust, we shall then suppose the Shah carries on this Government himself: not at all! he has surrounded himself with four or five advisers, who were with him at Loodiana, who are engaged entirely in filling their purses, and who from long absence in Hindoostan, are quite unfit for the responsible duty which they are called on to perform. To reward old servants is noble and magnanimous, but other employments may be found for such, than those which taint the ends of justice, and with them, His Majesty's reputation.

I have spoken of the duties assigned to Oosman Khan connected with the revenue, and this brings me to that very important subject, and the system on which His Majesty conducts it, if system it can be called, and *which calls loudly for reform*. The Collectors of the revenue are the soldiers; they receive assignments on certain districts for their pay, and they proceed there, living at free quarters on the community till the peasant pays the amount of the assignment, causing thus a more fruitful harvest of dispute than any other human invention could have devised. Distant from the capital the subject refuses to submit to such oppression, and before the snow falls expeditions are sent forth to levy His Majesty's rights; if the snow does fall the people defy the officers of the Crown, and escape for the year. By one of these expeditions the system will be explained. Khan Shereen Khan, the head of the Persian faction, was dispatched in the fall of the year to the countries of Koorum and Koost, south of Suffaid Koh: he levied His Majesty's dues, *and lived for five months with 1800 men at free quarters in the country*. As he is a good man, he did his duty with more mildness than an Affghan, but to continue such a system, must clearly alienate all the people of this country from Shah Soojah and from us, *for the force we give him ensures what, if left to himself, he could not otherwise command*. It is therefore incumbent on us by sending religious men, or by demanding hostages to live at the capital, as security, to see that some other revenue arrangements be adopted; by the present we can neither govern on the Affghan system, nor on our own, for the former implied that if a subject paid his duties one year he was to be called out to plunder the Punjaub or Hindoostan the next.

After adjusting revenue arrangements, the admitted end of Shah Shooja's Government is to make his Troops fit for service, to raise in fact a national force.

The Jan Baz corps are assuredly a step towards this, and a very important one, and these with the Affghan Infantry, now being raised, promise well, but it is the object of many to destroy His Majesty's interest in them, and as they are not constantly under the King's eye, his attention is bestowed on other things, his own Irregular Cavalry, his own guns, his own Orderly Regiment, his Nujeebs, and his Sikh body guard. I would not advocate the dismissal of the Affghan Horse, because, I believe, if paid, they will do good service, but it will be seen that all the really serviceable portion of the army, the Jan Baz, and the Affghan Infantry, are paid by us, or have our security, and that His Majesty *plays at soldiers* with the other branches, which would be well enough were they not a burden on the finances of the State, (or rather *our State*;) for this country more than others cannot afford to support useless Troops, and it is not difficult to shew not only how useless are these Troops but *how dangerous they are* in this country. Of the Irregular Horse I shall not speak; of the household Artillery, however, you are aware that His Majesty left them in Cabool in the winter without pay; they pledged their swords and clothes, then mutinied, collared their native officer, and were ultimately paid by your orders out of our money left in deposit here. The King has a mountain train and two Troops of Horse Artillery in his service, besides an Artillery Officer to look after his guns. Of what use are these men? Next come the Orderly Regiment, a body of Hindoostanees some six or eight hundred strong, *who run before the King and keep his subjects at a distance with the butt ends of their muskets*, with little or no discipline though good looking men, and capable of it, and to which His Majesty has rejected all your entreaties to appoint an European officer. The result is to be expected. Six weeks ago they mutinied. You were apprehensive that the regular army would be required, but the orderly Regiment had only repaired to Moolah Shikore, His Majesty's minister; blockaded the entrance to his house, and told him, which I repeat on the Shah's own authority, that if he did not pay them, they would have his nose, his ears being already gone. The men were paid. His Majesty sought to punish this serious breach of discipline and respect, and had the offenders confined; the men laid down their arms before the King, and only took them up from there on General Cotton's approach, and from whom I heard it. With so many fine promising regiments, regular and irregular, of what use can this Orderly Regiment be, or what use the Nujeebs? One of H. M.'s regiments of the contingent would with pride discharge the duties of the Palace, and mutiny and disrespect would disappear. But if these sentiments apply to such Troops, what is to be said to a body of Sikhs in the costume of their country as the King's guard in this Mahomedan capital? A few evenings ago I was saluted by several of them with the *Wagerojee ka Futteh*, (the Sikh war cry,) in the very streets of Cabool. I assert without fear of contradiction that no Sikh (Khulaa) ever durst in the time of the Affghan monarchy appear thus in this city; and I further assert that their presence here is *odious to the people, and to the last degree injurious*. These then are the Troops kept up by His Majesty from our coffers, for his own treasure cannot defray the charge. Are there not two parties to a bargain, and is not Shah Shooja bound to attend to our wishes in discharging useless muti-

nous men, some of whom are offensive to the people, and all of whom add to the enormous expense of our occupation of this country ? A few of those men were old servants of the Shah when at Loodiana, but any one who has seen His Majesty's establishment there, knows how few these are. To use a homely simile, we by keeping up such people, are burning the family candle at both ends, and I cannot but doubt that a demonstration to His Majesty of our inability to support such people would readily rid us of such a nuisance. We all know that panic and mutiny are very infectious among soldiers. If Hindoostanees successfully demand their pay with arms in their hands, what will prevent Afghan Horse and Foot acting likewise : and where men are so irregularly paid, what so probable ; and if it occurs, are we to bayonet, and slay His Majesty's subjects, because it pleased His Majesty to live beyond his means ? Place these facts before any soldier, and I shall retract all these opinions if he deems them unsound or unprofessional.



CHAPTER IV.

SCINDE AND BELOOCHISTAN.

Mr Ross Bell, Political Agent for Scinde—State of Kheilat—Expedition under Major Billamore to Kahun and Deyrah—Attacks the Bhoogties—Captures the chief Beebruck—Sacks the village—Retires by Kahun and Nufsook to the plains—Futility of the expedition—Detachment dispatched under Captain Brown and Lieut. Clarke to occupy Kahun—March from Poolajee—Difficulties of the way—Arrive at Kahun, and find it empty—Clarke's party, and that of a Subedar, attacked and cut to pieces on their return—Captain Brown shut up in Kahun—Puts the men on half-rations on the 24th May—Patience and skill of the defence—Offers of assistance from Quettah—Hear of Major Clibborn's convoy—Are informed of its destruction—State of garrison in the end of August—Detachment under Major Clibborn dispatched from Sukkur on 12th August—Reach Poolajee—Enter the hills—Arrive at Surtof—Examine the ground where Clarke's party were cut to pieces—Difficulties of the way—Reach Nufsook—Want of water—Dreadful heat—Attempt to storm the Pass unsuccessful—Storming party driven back, four officers killed—Main body keep their ground till 10 P.M.—Parties sent out for water—Return unsuccessful—Part of them cut up—Clibborn retires on Surtof—Attacked during the night—Lose all their baggage—Return to Poolajee—Total loss of convoy generally overstated—Court of Inquiry upon—Extraordinary proceedings of—Premature publication of their report—Observations on—General Brooks and Col. Valiant recalled—Reflections.

THE Political Agent to whom the charge of Scinde and Beloochistan was, in the end of 1839, committed, was a man in every respect as unlike the Envoy at Cabool as could well be imagined. Mr Ross Bell, by whose individual management so many of the untoward events about to be described were brought around, was, at the time of his appointment, scarce thirty years of age; yet, before this, he had distinguished himself in the Secretariat, as a Persian scholar, and had been employed with high credit at the Courts of Nepaul and Lahore, and in an important political situation at Delhi. He had charge of the districts from Dadur to Kurrachee, and from the Indus to the westernmost borders of Beloochistan—the ruler of Kelat being regarded as only a tributary of higher grade than the other chieftains of the Doorannee Empire. Mr Bell was a man of great vigour, and activity of understanding, and of the most determined and reckless daring of purpose: but he was one of those who seemed to think the rules of general morality inapplicable in government, and that the maxims of common honesty essential to be observed in the intercourse of private life, might wisely be disregarded by political authorities; a frailty with which too large a portion of our statesmen in India of recent years appear to have been affected. While the Envoy and Minister clung to the last to the fond dream of the restoration, under British auspices, of the Doorannee Empire in its former extent and splendour, the Political Agent of Scinde had sagacity enough early to become satisfied of the mischievousness and untenability of our policy, and of the impossibility of long maintaining the sovereign

on the throne, or ourselves in the country. His representations to Government, like those of Sir Alexander Burnes to this effect, appear to have been utterly unheeded.

At the close of a former chapter the arrangements which took place at Kelat were adverted to. Mehrab Khan and his principal chiefs having fallen on the capture of the town, his widow, with her step-son Nusseer Khan, a boy about fourteen years of age, betook themselves to the hills.

Newaz Khan, a relative of the deceased chief, descended by a collateral branch from Abdoolah Khan, the founder of the dynasty, was placed upon the throne. It seems to have been most unaccountably assumed, that we had no more to do than to set up a ruler amongst the democratic tribes of Central Asia, to ensure the permanence of his authority. No means of maintaining our protegee in the perilous position in which we had placed him appear to have been thought of. He was to collect tribute, not for himself only, but for his superior, the Doorannoe sovereign, and procure military service from fierce and lawless races, who ill brooked the exercise of hereditary authority, scarcely of that which they themselves had conferred on an elected chief. Lieutenant Loveday was appointed Resident at his half formed and unsupported court: and a guard of honour of thirty sepoy was all that was considered necessary to make our authority known and respected throughout Beloochistan.

In the middle of December, a force, consisting of the head-quarters of the 1st Grenadiers, 150 strong, with 60 Irregular Horse, under Captain Raitt, was despatched from Lheree to take possession of Kahun, the capital of the Murrees, a fierce and warlike but chivalrous clan, occupying a portion of the mountain country which sweeps to the eastward of the Bolan Pass. Another party, acting in conjunction with this, and consisting of the light company of the 5th N.I., 50 men of the Grenadiers, and 40 Horse, under Lieutenant Clarke, with Lieutenant Jacob's Battery, proceeded to Deyrah, the head-quarters of the neighbouring tribe of the Bhoogties. The whole force was commanded by Major Billamore. These tribes were to be compelled to pay tribute to Newaz Khan or his superior the Shah Soojah. The chieftains had been persuaded to permit military posts to be established within their country: on what express understanding does not quite appear. (1) On Captain Raitt's arrival at Kahun, he found that, besides its inhabitants, there were about 400 warriors in the town: there were at least 2000 fighting men collected around. On the chief enquiring whether he came for peace or war, he was answered, that we expected to be received

1. *Bombay Times*, January 6 and March 6. Our authorities on Scinde matters are chiefly to be found in the *Bombay Times*. The writers are perfectly known to us, though we regret that we are not authorised to refer to them by name.

as friends, and he was accordingly permitted peaceably to encamp close to the walls. It had been proposed to occupy the fort, when the old chief Dodah learning this, came in person to Captain Raitt, and entreated that this intention should not be persisted in, else bloodshed would ensue, as the fury of the people was already nearly uncontrollable. The Murrees were still wholly ignorant of the object of our people having been sent amongst them; having never before seen regular troops within their hills they considered that our presence boded any thing but good; and observing the weakness of the force, they began to pelt and insult the sepoy in a way sufficiently indicative of the feelings of the tribe, though the chief excused himself by the plea of want of control over his people. Captain Raitt not thinking himself sufficiently strong to resent these insults, left a detachment of one hundred men strongly posted within a mile of Kahun, and himself returned to join Major Billamore. The part of the force under this last-named officer's command reached Deyrah without symptoms of hostility (2) further than an occasional shot from the high grounds adjoining. They were constantly watched by hundreds of eyes from the summit of the hills, and every day when the rear-guard left the camp, large bodies of men showed themselves in all directions, and signals were fired and repeated at immense distances along the mountains to give notice of our movements. On arriving within twenty miles of Deyrah, Major Billamore was met by Islam Khan, the eldest son of the Bhoogie chief, with a few followers: he was profuse in his professions of friendship, and conducted the detachment with every demonstration of politeness to the town. Here the old chief received them with the same cordiality and attention as had marked the demeanour of his son. He expressed his astonishment at the smallness of our numbers: he had himself twice as many warriors in Deyrah, with two thousand more at his command amongst the adjoining highlands. The other chiefs had hardly left Major Billamore's tent when they showed their contempt for the weakness of our force. The town was full of all sorts of supplies, but the most exorbitant demands were made for every thing required by the detachment: forage and firewood, then plentiful in the country, being at first absolutely refused. The Bhoogie warriors began now to remove from Deyrah, so that in a few days there was scarcely an armed man to be found within the walls. At last Islam Khan secretly departed, taking with him his harem and household: he had, a few hours before, visited Major Billamore, and made the most unbounded professions of eternal friendship. Before this, private information had been received that the whole tribes were

2. We have adhered closely to the statements, and in many cases to the words, of the letter of an officer belonging to Major Billamore's party, which appears in the *Bombay Times*, March 6, under the signature "Nuroosa." Afterwards acknowledged to be Captain Jacob.

collecting in the neighbouring hills to attack our troops : it was stated, that Islam Khan would first quit Deyrah, and when all was prepared, his father, the chief Beebruck, would follow, and that the circumstance of the latter joining his tribe would be the signal for them to fall upon us and destroy us by night. The camp was originally pitched a mile from the town, and a guard was placed at the gate to prevent soldiers from entering, as complaints had been made of their committing irregularities in the bazaar. On receipt of the intelligence just referred to, the camp was moved up to the walls of the town on the 3d January; and the guard was directed to prevent Beebruck's departure : this they effected first civilly as he proceeded through the gate, and afterwards by force as he attempted to make his way over the wall. Captain Raitt at this time arrived from Kahun. From the time the expedition approached the hill country, which they entered on the 25th Dec., the men had slept fully clothed and accoutred, with their loaded arms in their hands. On the night betwixt the 3d and 4th January none of the officers laid themselves down to rest. All was quiet till daybreak, when the videttes gave information that from seven to eight hundred men were within half a mile of our cantonments, flourishing their swords, and firing their matchlocks, in the most approved style of defiance. The country around was covered with brushwood and jungle, and intersected with nullahs (water courses,) and while the officers and men were intently observing the main body of the enemy, three horsemen penetrated a ravine unnoticed, and made a rush to carry off Beebruck, who had just before been allowed to proceed a short distance from the gateway of the town under charge of a dozen of sepoy. So sudden was this movement that there was not an instant left for preparation to resist it. Lieutenant Clarke saw the advancing party, he sprang upon his horse, dashed at them alone, and not only secured the old chief and brought him back again, but captured one of the adventurous horsemen, and dragged him off a prisoner, horse and all. The main body of the Bhooctics took alarm at our artillery, and swerved off to the right before coming within musket shot. A shell, dexterously thrown in the midst of them, killed or wounded thirty men and horse, and struck such terror into the remainder, that no man present that day ever afterwards dared to join battle with the infidel. Major Billamore now quartered his force within the walls of Deyrah. The place was about one hundred and forty paces square, with strong corner bastions; the walls, which were thin at the top, but broad at the base, being about twenty-five feet high. (8) A few days afterwards, they received information from their brethren within the town, that a foraging party was about to be dispatched to bring in provi-

3. Letters from camp at Deyrah, 15th January.—*Bombay Times*, 22d Feb., 1840.

sions from a distance of ten or twelve miles: it was intimated that not more than a single gun, with some 50 men, would be left behind; so that were the Bhoogties to divide their strength, keeping the foragers in play on one hand, and attacking the little garrison on the other, they could scarcely fail to rescue their chief and recover the fortress, which they might maintain in defiance of us. Major Billamore having become aware of this, left his guns, with about twenty or thirty men, within the walls, and sent out a party, commanded by Capt. Raitt, consisting of about 120 foot and 40 horse under Clarke—rightly judging that this party would be the first object of assault, and that, unless they were beaten, no attempt would be made upon the other. The conclusion was correct: the foragers were permitted to load their camels without molestation; but so soon as they began to move on their return, about 300 Beloochee footmen rushed down upon them sword in hand, and notwithstanding the steadiness of the fire poured in upon them by our infantry, approached within fifteen yards of our ranks, when the cavalry charged them and dispersed them in an instant. Lieut. Clarke, at the head of these, cut down four with his own hand: one-fourth of the enemy's force must have been killed or wounded. Had the orders against pursuit not been most imperative, few indeed would have escaped. The detachment left by Captain Raitt, under Lieut. Peacock, at Kahun, joined head-quarters at Deyrah about the 10th or 12th, (4) the Murrees having quitted their habitations, and retired to the hills with their families and property, leaving the town empty, and the garrison, now of no farther use, in danger of starvation. On the 15th, the chief Beebruck was dispatched under a guard to Scinde. Before he left, notice was sent to the people that he was about to start; as it was impossible to detach many men as an escort, the tribe was warned that, if any attempt at rescue was made, the first step would be to shoot Beebruck, and then fight it out: this had the desired effect, and rather than risk the life of their Chief, they allowed the party, consisting of only about 60 horse, to pass unmolested. He was imprisoned for eight months in the fortress at Bukkur, without reason or precedent being assigned: and was liberated after the affair of Nufosk, in the end of August, in order to enable us to make terms with the hill men. He himself had not even been in arms against us!—his tribe had given us no worse reception than such intruders into their country were entitled to expect; their retirement to the hills is said to have been occasioned by the apprehension of an attack from us: it is asserted that their subsequent demonstration on our camp was made with a view of rescuing their chief. A double treason by the guide in whom we

4. The dates are not given in any of the communications we have seen: they require to be conjectured from the general tenor of the narrative. They cannot any where be more than two or three days wrong; and these errors, if they be any, are quite immaterial.

trusted is affirmed to have been practised,—each of the contending parties having been informed that his opponent meant to assail him. Beeja Khan and Jance, two of the chiefs who surrendered on faith of honourable treatment, were, in violation of all the practices of war, kept in irons and dealt with as felons. It was with utter amazement that the Beloochees witnessed this on the part of a nation famous all over the world for the stern unimpeachability of its honour. Our officers were soon and frequently afterwards condemned to witness the ridicule heaped upon our professions of integrity. The village of Deyrah was sacked—grain, cloth, arms, every thing, down to the humblest donkey, becoming prize property. (5) Major Billamore determined to leave the Grenadiers in possession of Deyrah, and to retire to the plains *via* Kahun, taking with him the artillery. This route had been represented as absolutely impassable: but it was considered of so much importance to shew the Murrees that we could penetrate their fastnesses at our pleasure, through the most difficult of their defiles, that an attempt by Nufoosk, which saved forty miles in distance to Pooljee, was thought well worthy of encountering the danger and difficulty attending it. The route betwixt Deyrah and Kahun was fearfully difficult, and to be overcome only by the most determined perseverance and indefatigable exertions. (6) Two forced marches—one of twenty, and another of twenty-seven miles—brought the detachment to Kahun, which they found entirely abandoned. Messages were sent to the old chief Dodah Murree, to which insolent answers alone were returned. A foot path across the mountains indicated the line of march to Pooljee desired to be pursued. It was surveyed by Lieut. Jacob of the Artillery, to whom was committed the Herculean task of cutting a path through the Nufoosk hills fit for the transport of guns and baggage. It was a grim looking place: the mountains were about 3000 feet in height, and four miles across, and the narrow path, all which then existed, found its difficult way through tremendous rocks, precipices, and ravines. The work was not only attempted but completed, and a few days afterwards the astonished mountaineers saw our troops, horse and foot, with their guns, on their way through the Nufoosk and Surtof passes,—a few months after rendered so

5. There is nothing more humbling in the study of the large collection of letters of officers with the force, published and unpublished, from which the above narrative is compiled, than the constant recurrence to this most mortifying topic. The taunts that they could not believe us, were everywhere cast in our teeth by the tribes with whom we desired to treat. Such was the result of the political management of Scinde within six months of Mr Boll's appointment!

6. The reader will do well to keep these facts in special recollection when he comes to the report of the Nufoosk commission, where great fault is found with Major Clibborn that he did not select the Deyrah route instead of that by Nufoosk—the former being forty miles longer, and only a few shades less difficult than the latter: the garrison of Kahun being, meanwhile, in extremity for want of provisions.

unhappily memorable. They arrived safe at Poolajee on the plains, while Captain Raitt and his detachment retired from Deyrah shortly afterwards.

The details of this gallantly conducted, but useless expedition, have been more fully given than its magnitude might appear to warrant, because of its bearing on a series of most important, but unfortunate operations which ensued. It has been so generally overlooked, that in that invaluable repository of eastern intelligence, the *Asiatic Journal*, no notice of it is to be found. The materials at the disposal of the present writer have been supplied by some of the most talented officers of the force, and are of unquestionable authority. Here was a body of 300 gallant men sent roving amongst fearful mountains utterly unknown to us, to encounter tribes of whom we knew no more than that they were poor and warlike—to collect tribute not acknowledged or shown to be due, and obtain professions of allegiance to a sovereign whose ancestors appear never to have been recognised by them! The information subsequently obtained from the *minister* at Kelat, after all the mischief had been done, proved that never had tribute been claimed by his master, or paid by either Murree or Bhooctie, and that nothing could be more indefinite than their ideas of so much as an acknowledgment of sovereignty or superiority being due. These circumstances were notorious to the whole population of the countries around. But in 1830 we were too busy in overturning dynasties, and remodelling chiefships, to think of enquiring whether or not there were grounds of expediency or justice for what we were engaged with. (7) The expedition proved worthless: it made us acquainted with roads into a country where we had no business, and whose difficulties were shortly afterwards taught us to our cost. The occupation of Deyrah and Kahun ended in nothing, and in our subsequent attempts to treat with Dodah Murree, a twelvemonth afterwards, we appeared rather as supplicants for his friendship than as allies of his sovereign demanding his allegiance and support. Enough has been stated to shew the skill and bravery with which the military portion of the arrangement was carried out, and the wretchedness of the policy which ever called this into operation. To consummate its absurdity, neither engineering officer nor political agent accompanied the detachment; so that while it was rendered as useless as possible when in the country for the time, it was left without the means of having the routes surveyed, to ascertain their military capabilities in case it was found requisite for us to return. The system of dispersing handfuls of men up and down through the country had, the previous autumn, been objected to by Brigadier Gordon, who absolutely refused to send out detachments to be isolated in the mountains, for no end but to gratify a political whim, and give colour to

7. A very admirable series, under the title of "Cutchee Letters," on this subject appears in the *Bombay Times* betwixt April and July 1841, from the pen of an officer then in a very important position in Scinde.

the fiction that the country was every where kept in subjection to us.(8) Col. Gordon had resisted the dispatch of Major Billamore's expedition, but was overruled by the civil authorities. A quarrel and correspondence so violent had, in 1839, arisen betwixt the political and military chiefs, that the latter felt himself constrained to resign his command. Mr Bell had at this time quitted his post and retired to Simla, to pass the hot season in the bosom of the Himalayas—a month's journey from the troubled region committed to his charge. Lieut. Postans, his principal assistant, held supreme authority under the instructions and in the absence of the chief. Kahun was ordered once more to be occupied: for what end cannot be divined. We still maintained our claim to tribute and submission, and a Naib (a native tax-gatherer), accompanied Captain Brown to collect money. The previous enquiry as to whether any was due was considered entirely superfluous; of course none was ever paid us. The charge of the troops destined for this service was entrusted to two of the officers who had accompanied the expedition under Major Billamore—Captain Brown and Lieutenant Clarke—both men of the utmost courage, coolness and judgment. Captain Brown joined the detachment then assembled at Poolajee, on the 8th April. It consisted of 300 bayonets of the 5th regiment, under Ensign Taylor; two 12-prhowitzers, under Lieutenant D. Erskine; with 50 Poonah horsemen and 50 of the Scinde Irregular Horse, under Lieutenant Clarke, already named. He was directed to occupy the petty fort of Kahun, and was provided with supplies for four months. His convoy consisted of 600 camels besides bullocks. The empty camels were to be returned under charge of Lieutenant Clarke, with 80 infantry and 50 horse. About the 15th, the weather was extremely hot, the thermometer rising to 112° in the shade; fever became prevalent, and one native officer died from a stroke of the sun. At the request of the political agent, Lieut. Clarke with his horsemen were, on the 20th, dispatched in the direction of Shapoor, where they were to be joined by 100 men of the Belooch levy, under Lieutenant Vardon. The combined detachment was to proceed to the south-east, with a view of surprising a party of Culpore Bhoogties. In this they were unsuccessful, by reason of the treachery of their guide: the sufferings of the party from heat in crossing the desert were inconceivably severe: the Belooch levy alone left 25 men behind them, of whom three died. The guns were ordered back to Lheree on the 27th, in consequence of the sickness of Lieutenant Erskine

8. Statement of Colonel Gordon in the *Bombay Times*. The letters referred to in this were published in the *Bombay Times*, May 1841: as extraordinary a series as ever appeared in print. They extend from July to September 1839, and might have served to convince Lord Auckland that Mr Bell had been mistaken, and that he was unqualified for the important office to which he had been appointed. He was at this time about to have resigned: it would have been fortunate for his fame had he carried his resolution into effect.

—one only being restored to the custody of Captain Brown, who knew, from his experience with Major Billamore, how impossible it was to proceed without artillery. Lieutenant Erskine soon after so far recovered as to be able to take charge of the gun, the howitzers being left. On the 3d May the detachment entered the hills, leaving 50 horse behind who could not be relied on. The road was so heavy and difficult that a mile an hour was all the advance that could be made: water, luckily, was plentiful. Ensign Taylor became so sick on the first march that he had to return, leaving two European officers in charge of three companies of Sepoys! The heat was intolerable: the thermometer was 116°, and the wind came down the gorges like the breath of a furnace.(9) Arriving on the 7th at the spot where the road round by Deyrah, a detour of 74 miles, divides itself from the short cut of 20 miles to Kahun through the mountains, by which Major Billamore had descended a few months before, Captain Brown selected the latter; having in this matter been left, as Major Clibborn was afterwards, to judge for himself. On the 10th they reached the celebrated Pass of Nufoosk, through which Lieutenant Jacob had cut a track for artillery, *ut supra*. A hundred men ascended the acclivity in the morning; the breast works erected by the enemy were destroyed, and the cuts, three of which had been made across the road by them, were repaired. From 6 in the morning till 4 in the afternoon was occupied in getting the gun up the steep, though the distance was little more than a quarter of a mile; and it was 3 next morning before the convoy was got to the summit of the gorge. The heat was dreadful, and water extremely scarce; the camels dropped down by dozens from fatigue. A few Beloochees followed in the rear, and some shots were exchanged, but no formidable annoyance was experienced; the troops required to be kept three nights on end under arms. On the 11th they obtained a sight of Kahun from the top of the Pass; the descent from their lofty bivouack was, for a mile, so extremely steep, that their progress was difficult and tardy: it was 2 P.M. before the gun was got down. The heat continued as intense as ever, and water was extremely scarce. By 5 P.M. they reached their destination; the whole march had been as arduous as it was skilfully conducted. The convoy often stretched a distance of 2 miles, so that to guard it properly was impossible; through the exertions of the officers and men scarcely anything was lost. Kahun is a small, irregular, hexangular town, 900 yards in circumference: it is surrounded by a rugged and imperfect wall 25 feet high, with six bastions. It has no ditch, but a large tank opposite the gateway serves as a reservoir for water. It was found abandoned, the gates having been carried off and buried; they were discovered hid in the ground ad-

9. This part of the Narrative is chiefly an abridgement of Captain Brown's Journal, published by Government: a most interesting little brochure.

joining, and replaced a few days after our arrival. The fort is chiefly used as a place of retreat, its only regular inhabitants being the chief and a few followers,—the Banians or Hindoo merchants, though numerous, themselves living in huts on the plains which extend for fifteen miles around. So soon as the troops were housed, every effort was made to put the works in a state of repair; the wells were cleared, the bastions strengthened,—the detachment having apparently been dispatched to be placed in a state of siege when no succour could be sent them! The cavalry discovered some grain in the fields, and 50 camel loads of wheat, in stalk, were sent in; a second supply of similar amount was shortly afterwards met in with; the Marrees discovering this set fire to the rest.

On the 16th, the return convoy under Lieutenant Clarke, started for Poolajee at 2 in the morning. Capt. Brown, availing himself of the permission to increase the detachment originally destined to escort the returning camels, in consideration of the difficulty about to be encountered, accordingly augmented it by the addition of a subedar's party, consisting of 5 havildars and 80 rank and file. Finding no opposition in crossing the first hill, Lieutenant Clarke appears to have directed their return to Kahun. They were attacked on their way by a body of about 2000 of the enemy, and cut off to a man; one dhoolie-bearer alone escaping to tell the tale. The escort party having got so far, were enabled to proceed towards the bottom of the Surtof mountain, 13 miles from Kahun, with apparently but little molestation. The string of camels extended to a length of two miles; these had yet forty miles before them of grim passes, rugged rocks, and river beds. (10) Clarke had got his convoy safe through the ghaut and assembled in the plain, when, seeing a strong body of Beloochees following down the mountain, he left the camels in charge of the Irregular horse, while he went back a mile with the infantry, and took up a position on the crest of the hill overhanging and completely commanding the road. He appears to have thought that, considering the distance he had yet to march, a timely check would have saved him from all farther annoyance. The motive on which he acted appears not only to have been a brave, but a wise one, and would most likely have proved successful, but for one of those untoward accidents which no man could have foreseen. From the post he had taken up he could easily have kept the enemy at bay. Having sent for a supply of ammunition the messenger unhappily was killed before reaching his destination. The Beloochees, seeing that our fire had begun to slacken, crept up a shallow cut on the flank of the sepoy party and then darted on them with the utmost fury, when, after a two hours' fight, every man of them was slain. The horsemen fled to Poolajee

10. The particulars of this melancholy catastrophe are derived in part from Captain Brown's narrative, partly from a letter of an officer with Major Clibborn's force.

thrown amongst the assailants, of whom 6 were killed by it, caused them to give way; while a party of 40 men thrown out in that direction, and flanked by a couple of bastions, afforded a retiring post for the survivors, of whom 10 were by this means saved. About the same time some 8 or 10 camel men were attacked while out foraging, by 20 Beloochees, who rushed on them at speed, and would have inevitably cut them to pieces, but for the courageous conduct of two sepoys, who coolly waited till the assailants were close at hand, and then fired in their faces, wounding one of them and compelling them to return. The only sheep remaining were grazing hard by, when the attention of the enemy, luckily for the garrison, was too intently directed to the destruction of the camel-men to observe the plunder, otherwise the loss would have been serious. On the 3d July Shere Beg, a Bhooctie, to whom Captain Brown had the previous year been of service, and who from the time our troops entered the Murree hills, clung to him like a shadow, brought in 45 sheep and goats in evidence of his gratitude: a most welcome supply, the troops being reduced to their last goat. This man often visited the garrison, bringing with him small supplies of vegetables and condiments—his approach was always hailed with delight. He was the only source of intelligence or stranger who visited them, and his name as he approached was passed from bastion to bastion as that of a friend. He was believed to act the part of a spy in a small way, while the prices he obtained for his commodities, relieved our people of any alarm for excess of obligation obtained at his hands. Offers of assistance were received from Captain Bean on the 7th July, but the proffered aid never reached: while the political agent at Shikarpore wrote that it was intended to act on the defensive till the heats were over. Lieut. Erskine one day killed 3 out of 50 Beloochee horsemen who had been watching for some mischief in the dell adjoining: after this the enemy kept at a respectful distance, and heaped abuse on us beyond the range of the artillery. The same routine of disheartening duties continued throughout the month of July: the camels were getting into poor condition from the badness or scarcity of food, and many of the gun bullocks had to be shot on the advance of disease. Intelligence was received that the Kojjuks, instead of coming to our assistance, had joined the Murrees against us: the Kakurs whom Captain Bean was to send for our relief had turned to attack himself in Quettah. The men suffered severely from ulcers, upwards of 90 of all ranks being laid up with them by the middle of July: while by the 6th of August, 33 men were in hospital from fever. The camp followers were subjected to drill, and had become able to take a share of military duty. Dr. Glasse himself became sick, and the medicine chest being exhausted, hot water was resorted to and found effectual as a substitute for purgatives. A tremendous storm of wind and rain filled all the tanks and inundated the country around: and the

sight of the cultivators every where engaged in the labours of the field, exhibited to the beleaguered soldiers a scene of as much cheerfulness as could be witnessed from such a prison. By the beginning of August the Beloochees had begun to approach closer and closer every day to the fort. Their matchlocks could carry twice as far as our muskets; while little parties like picquets appeared seated round in every direction. A set of men who were watching in a ravine close by, fired on the officers while walking near the gate. A few sepoy were sent out to entice them on, when 50 Murrees immediately sprung up, and the sepoy having got out of the way, a shell was fired which killed 15 of the enemy. The following extract gives so graphic an account of the incidents at this period of the siege, that it is given without abridgment (12) :—

“10th Aug.—For the last 4 or 5 days the flocks had been coming closer and closer to the walls, eating up what little grass there was left. I had warned Hybutt Khan of this 3 or 4 times, and had also offered to purchase 100 at his own price, but he declared I should not have one. Erskine and myself had finished the last but one, of those we procured from old Sheer Bheg. We have both excellent appetites, although shut up in a fort. To-day, 2 large flocks of sheep and goats came most temptingly near, and the sepoy earnestly entreated for some fresh meat; watching our opportunity (no Beloochees being then in sight) we slipped out about 30 sepoy, flanking them with 2 bastions filled with men, and Erskine got the gun round to bear in the direction. There were only 3 Beloochees just then in charge; they immediately ran off for their lives, and the goats, by some instinct, and to our great annoyance, followed them at speed, like dogs. Two horsemen then came up looking very fierce, but soon rode off on getting a shot. To describe the delight of all on getting this flock inside the fort is impossible; there was a perfect uproar; on counting our plunder we found we had secured 300 sheep* and 57 goats; most of the latter were milk goats, so that the highest castes shared the enjoyment; we immediately made a division of the whole, charging $\frac{1}{4}$ Rupee on the head of each, for the benefit of the widows of those who fell on the 16th May. That evening the fort became one large cook-shop.

“11th.—Hybutt Khan came to-day to try and recover his sheep; told us Nusseer Khan had driven all our detachments in to Sukkur; also brought a note from Dodah, the Chief, desiring us to leave his fort forthwith, and that he and his army would escort us down to the plains! When Hybutt found he could not get back his sheep, being told that most of them were already killed, he flew into a great rage, and declared he would come and attack the fort, for which threat I told the sentry to give him a shot, when he quickly departed.

12. The whole of the narrative of the siege of Kahun is abridged from Captain Brown's journal. The entries from the 10th to the 16th are given entire. The capture of the sheep is too graphic an incident to admit of abridgment.

* These sheep were a great addition to the half rations; the latter alone being but poor food for men working all day and on guard every night.

"15th.—A cossid, to our great joy, came in this morning after a lapse of 20 days; could have hugged the old rascal, although I knew him to be the greatest of spies. A letter arrived by him from the Political Agent saying, it was contemplated to try and throw in supplies, through the agency of Jeytt Sing, * and Meer Hussain, to save moving the troops up with a convoy.

"16th.—Another cossid this morning. The system mentioned yesterday of throwing in supplies discarded, being found impracticable; and the welcome, most welcome intelligence of the following detachment leaving Sukkur for our relief;

Detachment of H. M. 40th Regiment,

1st Grenadiers, 4 Guns,

2nd ditto, 200 Horse,

under the command of Major Clibborn, 1st grenadiers; received intimation that it was arranged between Hybutt Khan and the rest of the chiefs, that the former, in making a truce, should encourage us to go out foraging, and then cut us up."

Old Dodah Murree had first sent a message, stating that if the detachment would retire, he and his chiefs would escort them to the plains; and then intimated, through his brother, that the whole tribe would assemble on the 31st of August, and put the garrison to the sword. Assemble they did—for another, but not less fatal purpose. From the 10th of August, the stir and activity in the direction of Nufoosk indicated that some evil was afoot. A fortnight afterwards, Captain Brown was informed by Hybutt Khan, the friendly chief to whom the flocks around belonged, that the Murrees, mustering 3,000 strong, had resolved to intercept the convoy if possible. They had determined to have three fights should they at first prove unsuccessful: one at Nufoosk—one somewhat nearer Kahun—and the third at a fort still farther in the rear, where they had vowed to stand to the last. We must once more borrow the words of the gallant commander of the fortress:—

"31st Aug.—A day of great and almost overpowering excitement. It commenced about 5 o'clock last evening, when the plains and hills became alive with Beloochees, and at dark, large signal fires on the tops of all the hills. At day-break, large parties of horse and foot were seen hurrying across the plain to the Nufoosk pass, on the opposite side of which, we soon learnt of the arrival of our convoy, from the report of one of their guns, a signal agreed upon between us; about sun-rise, we saw collected on the very top of the pass about 2000 Beloochees, and others prowling about in all directions; the distance, as the crow flies from the fort to the

* Jeytt Sing is a Shikarpore merchant, immensely rich, and has great sway with all the Beloochees around; our loss is always his certain gain; he buys back our stolen camels for 15 or 20 rupees, and sells them again to our commissariat for 50 or 60 Rs! a positive fact. Meer Hussain I am almost positive, was the cause of poor Clarke being attacked, and it is fully proved it was he who led Major Clibborn's watering party into the ambuscade. I hope he will yet meet with the punishment he deserves.

pass, is about 4 miles ; in fact, we were completely behind the scenes, and saw all that the Beloochees were at, and fully expecting to see our comrades crown the top every hour, we were highly amused and excited—2 P. M. no sight of convoy coming over pass, they must be repairing the road up—3 P. M. saw the shrapnells flying over the hill, and bursting in the midst of the enemy with the most beautiful effect—5 P. M. still no sight of convoy. Beloochees still crossing the plains towards the seat of action. Erskine scattered a small body of them with a shell—8 P. M. heavy firing of guns and musketry for 10 minutes, when all was silent for the rest of the night. I should be very sorry to pass many days of my life like this—I would ten thousand times sooner have been in the thick of it ; the excitement and suspense was beyond any thing I ever felt before ; knowing the difficulty of the pass, and not seeing our people crown the top, I felt certain there must be much bloodshed going on.†

“Sept. 1st.—Not a single Beloochee to be seen on the top of the hill at day-light but several passing across the plain in that direction. No sight or sound of convey all day ! Sadly perplexed to know what has become of them ; conclude that finding the pass too strongly defended yesterday, that they had fallen back to go round by the Deyrah road, as I first recommended.

“2d.—Beloochees in all directions, and busy as bees—Another day of suspense and excitement ; after 11 o'clock they pitched one of our sepoy's tents about half way up the hill, up and down which, batches of loaded and unloaded camels are going ; suppose the convoy must have dropped some of their baggage and stores in the hurry of their departure. About 12 o'clock much firing commenced and continued with intervals until 2 P. M. ; from the sound, it would appear the convoy had fallen back in the direction of the Deyrah road, some 20 miles ; cannot now expect to see them for the next 6 or 7 days ; tantalizing, when they were so close : not a drop of spirits, a cheroot or a cup of tea left, or have we indeed tasted any for some time ; sepoys very weak from short rations, only 6 bags of flour left, a bad look-out ; cannot help thinking of our having got our convoy over so snugly in May, when we had only a third of the number of the present convoy.

“3rd.—Still in suspense ; no communication from out-side ; all on the look-out, particularly at night ; upwards of 100 loaded camels going across the plain, being

* Between 2 and 3 o'clock the fight of Naffoosk commenced.

† I have since heard some surprise has been expressed that we could see and hear Clibborn's shells, and not rush out to his succour ! Had we done so the labor and perseverance of 4 months would have been thrown away in an hour, and the Beloochees would have gained the very object they had been trying for without effect, since the day we entered the fort, namely to entice us out : but the thing was out of the question. Between us and the pass were 4 miles of plain, $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile one of the most dangerous ravines I ever passed thro' : a mountain a mile in extent, and last tho' not least, 2000 Beloochees ! I might perhaps have mustered 100 bayonets, but must have left some 40 sick behind ; but the best reason of all is, that it was not until the 7th September (8 days afterwards) when we first saw the guns in the enemy's hand, that we had the slightest idea of the disaster that had taken place. Up to that date we anxiously looked out to see the convoy coming round the Deyrah road, thinking they had found the Nuffoosk pass too difficult.

some distance off, whether these are horses or camels cannot be clearly ascertained without a glass, persuaded the people in the fort that they were the former, altho' the sepoys made the shrewd remark, that they never saw horsemen look so large, or go along one after the other so regularly. About 20 horsemen with 8 or 10 spare horses came down from the hill to water near the fort, looks as if the owners of the latter had been killed—2 bodies carried across the plain on *charpoys*, with a kind of funeral party following them; suppose they are two chiefs. At 3 p. m. saw a large body of Beloochees pitching a sort of camp within $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile of the fort, no mistaking our sepoy's tents, also one officer's tent, 5 of the former and 1 of the latter, exactly the number they took from Clarke's party, trust they are those only, but appearances are very suspicious. Just as it was getting dark, saw the whole body assembled in one dense mass, in front of their tents; warned all hands to keep a bright look-out when the moon goes down.

"4th.—To-day some horsemen came and informed us 'that they had cut up our 'convoy, taken the guns and all the stores and supplies, and had killed all the 'sahib log except 3, who were prisoners in their camp'—in proof of which assertion they offered to show the guns to any person I chose to send, who could also bring a chit from the prisoners—This offer however I refused, firmly believing the report to be altogether untrue, and made with a view of getting hold of one of my people for information. They also said, that if I would leave the fort and go to the plains, they would not molest me—we had a very heavy fall of rain about 4 p. m.—More tents springing up in the Murree camp, about 300 Beloochees seated on a rising ground on one flank—great amusement in watching their movements; having a good glass, we could almost see into their very tents.

"5th.—A person came under the fort calling out, wishing to give us the news; had had already quite enough of these people's stories, so sent a bullet or two after him, to hurry his departure—all in the fort sadly perplexed to know what to think of affairs—Beloochees on the move in every direction—100 passed this morning in the Deyrah direction, the road from which we are expecting the convoy—the Beloochees do not seem in good spirits, not like men who have destroyed a large convoy—there has evidently been mischief some where—a storm occurred about 4 o'clock, which to our great delight blew down all the Beloochee tents; they however soon had them up again.

"6th.—No grain left for camels or bullocks, and little or no forage—they must take their chance, poor creatures; nothing now left but a few bags of rice and 3 or 4 of flour—10 bags of the latter, which were thrown aside as being half sand, now came into use, and were greedily devoured by the sepoys—a camel-man shot himself, being detected in a theft.

"7th.—Half expected, on taking a look at the Beloochee camp this morning, to find them all decamped; but a sad reverse met our sight—The three guns belonging to the convoy staring us in the face! they are placed on a piece of rising ground on one flank of their camp, their muzzles pointed towards the fort. What can have become of Major Clibborn and his convoy? Many officers and men must have lost their lives before they gave up the guns! There is no doubt now that something most disastrous must have occurred, and we must prepare for the

worst. Sepoys keep up their spirits amazingly well, not the slightest sign of flinching, altho' they seem to be aware that their situation is rather perilous: luckily they cannot see the guns with the naked eye, on account of the jungle. There are chances in our favor yet, and that the guns will not be of much use to them. 1st, they may be spiked, 2ndly, they may have no ammunition, and lastly, they know not how to load or fire them; luckily they are howitzers instead of field pieces; 10 A. M. all the Beloochees are assembled round the guns, and peeping into their muzzles, quite playthings to them.

"8th.—Small parties of horsemen prowling all round the fort, watching us I suppose, knowing we must soon take to flight for want of provisions; they need not be in such a hurry, as we have still some rice and gun bullocks left.

"9th.—Loaded camels still going across the plain, 2 Beloochees mounted on artillery horses; no mistaking them from their size and their having blinkers on, which they were determined should not escape our sight, as they galloped up and down in front of the fort for an hour.

"10th.—Our old friend Sheer Bhag came in this morning, but in such a suspicious manner, that I put him prisoner; he tells us, the Beloochees' report of having destroyed our convoy is all true; he mentions poor Raitt and Moore as being two of the killed.

"11th.—Made some horsemen, who were grazing their horses rather too close, scamper off, and received much abuse from them for my pains. The Murrees acknowledge to their having had 80 killed and 80 wounded in the fight. Our old acquaintance Hybut Khan and his son are, it is stated, both killed, also Kurveem Khan, who superintended the slaughter on the 29th June."

We must now leave off for a little the narrative of the heroic defence of Kahur till some account be given of the unsuccessful attempts for its relief, terminating in the bloody action at Nufoosk.

A force consisting of 1,000 bayonets, with artillery and irregular horse, had early in August been warned, by Brigadier Stevenson, for service amongst the hills. The lamented death of that able and amiable officer transferred to the hands of Major Forbes the crude and incomplete arrangements so imperiously required to be put into effect without a moment's delay. Major Forbes, a man of prudence, spirit, and activity, reached Sukkur on the 6th August, a complete stranger to the country; and on the 9th, by the casualty just alluded to, found himself senior officer in Upper Scinde. (13) The first step he took was to recommend that the garrison should not be relieved, but withdrawn. Having been informed by Lieut. Postans, Assistant Political Agent at Shikarpore, that Mr. Ross Bell had given the most positive orders for the maintenance of the Murree fort, he had no alternative left him but to use all dispatch in preparing a force for its succour. The detachment, which was allowed no more than 36 hours for preparation, consisted

13. Letter of Mr. Secretary Willoughby, 2d June 1841, in reference to the Minute of the Clibborn Commission.

of the 1st Grenadiers and flank company of the 2d, mustering altogether about 600 bayonets, with three 12-pounder howitzers,—this being the utmost number of fighting men which could be equipped at Sukkur at the time; with a convoy of 1,200 camels and 600 bullocks under their charge. This large train of animals, stretching over a space of four miles, where the Passes compelled them to move in single file, was considered no more than necessary for maintaining the garrison reinforced by the escorting party for the space of two months which they had been commanded to remain. The detachment and convoy left Sukkur on the 12th, and reached Poolajee on the 20th. Here they were joined by 200 of the Scinde and Poonah Horse, under charge of Lieutenants Loch and Malcolm. This raised the force to a strength of 850 fighting men. The heat across the desert was in the last degree oppressive; but as the marches were accomplished under night, the encamping ground being taken up by sunrise, no accident of note occurred on the first part of the way. On the 24th August they left Poolajee, and for the next six marches traversed a wild and mountainous country, abounding with water and forage, but where no human habitation was observable. (14) The march before reaching Surtof, 20 or 30 Beloochees who followed them with a view to plunder, were surprised by Lieut. Loch, and eight of them killed. On arriving at the scene of Lieut. Clarke's disaster, they found the bleaching bodies of the dead Sepoys scattered everywhere around; the guide giving a very clear account of the manner in which the sad mishap occurred. (15) A heap of stones was shown them under which poor Clarke had been buried by Meer Hussein, the guide now in attendance. Fragments of his dress were recognized scattered amongst the accoutrements and bodies of the brave men who had fallen around him. The 30th of August was occupied in getting the convoy and guns up the ghaut,—the latter had to be dragged by the men, suffering from the excessive heat of an August sun reflected from the rocks around,—the laborious task was completed by 6 P.M. At night they slept on the table-land which stretches from the top of the Surtof to the bottom of the Nufoosk Pass six miles beyond. No water was to be found nearer than the bottom of the ghaut, which it had taken them all day to ascend. The men were under arms a great part of the night, the Beloochees keeping up a fire on the camp and picquets from the opposite side of an impassable ravine. The march towards the Kahun hills was commenced at two in the morning. As they approached Nufoosk the heights were seen covered thickly with the enemy, who shouted and

14. The description of the march is taken from a letter of a very accomplished officer of the force. It appeared in the *Bombay Times* of September:—of the engagement, from this, and from Major Clibborn's despatch.

15. See above, where the guide's account is embodied in the narrative, along with that of Captain Brown's Journal.

flourished their swords in defiance as we came on, while a beacon fire, lighted up on the highest summit, called the scattered Murrees to the slaughter. The road lay along the base of the precipice, over ground intersected with ravines and nullahs, in one of which a gun which overset caused considerable delay. A heavy fire was meanwhile maintained from the hills, where the enemy were screened by the shelter and within the crevices of the rocks. On arriving at the bottom of the Pass, they found the zigzag road, formerly made by Lieut. Jacob up the steep, and by which Capt. Brown had ascended with so much difficulty, cut across and blocked up—unsit for the advance of camels, much more of guns, and only admitting men in single file. The ascent, half a mile in length, was abrupt in the extreme. Worst of all, their apprehensions of want of water, which the late rains had led them to expect, were realized. Captain Brown had written on the 27th, that owing to the recent fall, water was likely to be plentiful: a single pool, which could only be approached under the enemy's fire, was all that could be found—and this was speedily exhausted; and the puskals, or skins, they had brought along with them had leaked or dried up, and were now empty. It was ten o'clock A.M.—the heat was becoming dreadful, and it was obvious that some immediate and decisive step must be attempted, or the troops would speedily perish of thirst. It was half-past one before the rear-guard, consisting of a company of the 2d Grenadiers, one howitzer, and the Poonah Horse, came up. The guns had been placed in position to enfilade the summit of the Pass in front, and immediately on the arrival of the rear-guard, the storming party, consisting of the left and flank companies of the 1st and 2d grenadiers, were told off. These moved up the hill in beautiful order, headed by Capt. Raitt, and supported by 100 dismounted irregular horsemen: a heavy fire of shell and shrapnell being meanwhile maintained on the crest and gorge at the summit of the pass. A strong flanking party of 317 was posted at the foot of the ghaut on the right, who maintained a steady fire on the enemy, while the remainder of the regiment was drawn up on the plain facing the acclivity, and protecting the guns. The storming party gallantly overcame every difficulty, having forced their way over three tiers of breast-works, topped with thorns and bushes, built across their path. They had nearly reached the last turn in the ascent, and were just entering the gorge at its summit, when they were assailed on every side by a deadly fire from the enemy, and overwhelmed with showers of stones hurled down from the precipices on all around. One scopy reached the gap and was seen to fire through it, when the Beloochees gave a shout and rushed down sword in hand. Captain Raitt had been shot through the thigh, half way up the mountain, and asked Lieutenant Franklin to lead the advance; but seeing this officer supporting Lieut. Williams, who had just been shot through the heart, he bound his limb with his handkerchief, and nobly took his place at the head of his men. He and Lieut. Williams were both killed fighting desperately when the furious rush was

made on them. Lieut. More received two shot wounds in the body, and was afterwards cut down. Lieut. Loch, who led the dismounted horsemen, was severely wounded: he had received a bad sword cut, with numerous bruises from stones, and was forced down the hill by his orderly, reaching the guns in a fainting state. Out of the 100 men he led, 47 were left dead upon the hill. The Beloochees and sepoys were now mingled together fighting hand to hand in wild confusion. All the officers, and nearly half of the men had fallen, when the remainder were borne by main force down the hill—hundreds of the enemy leaping from every nook and overpowering them. Seeing the impossibility of making a stand on the face of the hill, the flanking party fell back upon the main body of the regiment, firing on the enemy as they retired. An attempt was made to get into square, but from the unsteadiness of the many recruits which formed the line, the movement ended in a rally round the guns, now sweeping the plains with grape shot. The Beloochees, about 800 strong, now came rushing down on all sides, pouring on our ranks showers of heavy stones, with which the place abounded, and charging sword in hand up to the muzzles of the cannon, which carried destruction amongst them. The fire at length became too hot for them, and they were repulsed with great slaughter, and fled in all directions, leaving about 200 dead on the plain. There had been in all upwards of 150 killed and wounded, including the four officers who had fallen. The scorching heat of the day continued unabated, the wind from the rocks was like the breath of a furnace, and the excessive thirst experienced was intolerable. The piteous and incessant cries of the wounded for "water, water," were heart rending. Water there was none, yet all were clamorous for drink, and the small supply of beer belonging to the officers was served out to the most necessitous of all castes, who grasped at it with frantic eagerness. Parties with camels and waterskins were sent to seek for water in the adjoining nullahs, where the guides reported that it was to be found within a mile of the pass. The artillery horses, which were in their present exhausted state unfit to draw the guns, were dispatched on a similar duty, under an escort of 50 of the Scinde irregular horse. The evening was spent in collecting and bringing off the wounded; shells were occasionally thrown on the enemy, who still kept up a straggling fire from the hills. Party after party returned with the dismal intelligence that no water was any where to be found; and to complete their apprehensions, they quickly learned that the Sowars, who had been sent with the gun horses, had been surrounded in a nullah, attacked, and cut up; through the treachery, as was believed, of Meer Hussein, a Bhoogtie chief, who acted as guide. The horses had been carried off: and the camel men and dhoolie-bearers had by this time nearly all absconded. To make a second attempt on the pass was, under present circumstances, considered hopeless; had the enemy indeed at this

time attacked them, the men were so helpless from extreme exhaustion, that they must have been cut up without resistance. They had now been under arms and without food for 16 hours; and it was resolved, that if no supplies of water made their appearance before 10 at night, the troops should retreat. Fifty pounds were offered to any one who would carry a letter to Kahun, only 14 miles off, advising Captain Brown to cut his way through and join Clibborn's detachment in the course of the night, so that the whole might retire to the plains together. No one would undertake the task,—and the garrison now believed to be almost without provisions was necessarily left to its fate: a fate which the providential supply of sheep already alluded to luckily prevented from being disastrous. At 11 A.M. this brave but exhausted band moved silently off the ground, carrying with them as many of the wounded and as much baggage and convoy as could be collected and transported. Fortunately no obstruction was experienced; on reaching the top of the Surtof Pass, 7 miles in the rear of the scene of action, all discipline was at an end. The sepoys were frantic with thirst, and rushed furiously down the hill, leaping like madmen into the pools at the bottom. At this time the rear was attacked by a large body of Beloochees, who appeared no one knew how or from whence. The flash of musketry was seen along the whole face of the hill, and the slaughter amongst the followers was severe. The men recovered themselves the moment their thirst was slaked, and, having formed a hollow square, waited till day-break should afford them a sight of the enemy. These, however, disappeared before dawn, carrying with them the whole of the remainder of the convoy which had fallen into their hands in the confusion of the night. The sepoys, before leaving Nufoosk, had been directed to put three or four days' supply of flour into their haversacks, but most of them had been too tired to do so, and they now found themselves absolutely in want of food. The tents, treasure, guns, and ammunition, every thing in short which constitutes the materiel of an army, had been lost. The men only escaped. Fortunately there were still a few camels remaining, and a number more joined on the road, as did also 35 gun-horses believed to have been destroyed. With such scanty means as these a forced march of 54 miles to Poolajes was before them. They started at seven, and sheltered themselves under some tamarisk trees during the heat of the day. Still occasionally fired at by the enemy, and seeking refuge behind rocks and banks from the fierce rays of the sun, they arrived at their destination on the night of the 2d September, having accomplished a march of betwixt 60 and 70 miles in the course of 48 hours. Four sepoys died of heat on the way, and Capt. Heighington was, from the same cause, afterwards struck with apoplexy, which proved fatal. The total loss in killed was 177—72 were wounded. The casualties amongst the camp followers is not known, they must have been numerous. The loss

of baggage was estimated at £15,000. (16) The enemy lost 350 of their bravest warriors, and amongst them were several chiefs. After a short rest the detachment returned to Shikarpore, 50 miles off, a week afterwards, where they joined head-quarters at Sukkur without further accident.

Returning to Kahun, where we left Captain Brown and his gallant party, grieved and disappointed, but not dismayed by the blight their hopes of relief had sustained, we find them making the most of the live stock they had obtained possession of so unexpectedly, and still on the alert—cheerfully waiting for what might befall. On the 12th the Murrees began to move away the captured guns, which till then had remained in position in sight of the fort; and the day after the warriors themselves dispersed. On the 17th official intelligence of the full extent of Major Clibborn's disaster was received from the Brigade Major (Forbes) at Sukkur, who intimated to Captain Brown, that he might use his own discretion as to abandoning

16. The loss was estimated by the *Agra Ukhbar* at six lakhs (60,000L) and as a considerable show of details was then given, this has generally passed current as correct. The following is from an official statement in the hands of government: its accuracy may be relied upon; its amount, as given in the text, being about one quarter that of the *Ukhbar's* estimate.

Dholl.....	8,000 lbs. at	16 lbs. $\frac{3}{4}$ oz. per	Rupce.....	Rs. 494	3	3
Rice	80,480 ..	29 ..	do	2,793	3	6
Flour.....	82,200 ..	33 .. $\frac{1}{2}$..	do	2,416	6	9
Ghee.....	5,761 ..	4 $\frac{1}{2}$..	do	1,200	3	4
Salt	3,250 ..	200 ..	do	16	1	10
Gram	40,600 ..	33 $\frac{1}{2}$..	do	1,208	5	0
Jowarree	77,840 ..	43 ..	do	1,801	13	0

Total 9,960 4 8

From this should be deducted six days' rations of troops, followers, and cattle, paid daily into the commissariat treasure chest.

The camels taken into the hills were—

Commissariat.....	978
Sick from Lherce.....	150
Private camels	50

1178

Died on the road above	130	} 330
Brought off carrying wounded ...	200	

Estimated loss at Nufoosk—

848

Grain.....	Rs. 10,000
Camels 848, at 75 Rs. a camel	63,600
Bullocks 600, at 8 Rs. each	4,800
Gun Horses 25, at Rs. 300 each	7,500
Irregular do 30, at 120 each.....	3,600
Routies old 40, at Rs. 50 each	2,000
Three Guns, at Rs. 1000 each.....	3,000
Private baggage and miscellaneous items.....	34,000

Total Rs. 1,50,000

the fort. It was ascertained, that by reducing the men to quarter rations and eating up the gun bullocks, they might contrive to subsist on this famine fare till the 15th October; and so it was determined that the fort should be maintained, unless honourable terms were offered. The old chief Dodah sent a message through Shere Beg, intimating that he had twice before, just after the fight, offered to grant any terms we should desire, provided we would quit the country; but that we drove his emissaries away, and that he was now ready to agree to the arrangement suggested. This was no offer of our seeking: the opening was fair: and our position not likely to improve by delay. Captain Brown therefore wrote in reply, "Dodah Murree, I'll give you back your fort, on conditions, viz.—that you give me personal security for my safe arrival in the plains: if not, I will remain here two months longer, having provisions for that time." On receiving this, the whole of the chiefs assembled, and, after consultation, took an oath on the Koran that, if he would leave the fort in three days, they would protect him to the plains: they wrote to this effect immediately, concluding that "whatever Captain Brown's wishes were, should to them be law." Immediately after the arrival of this, a letter was brought from Dodah himself, in answer to that which had been written to him, containing an agreement on oath, and promising to send his nephew to pay his respects, and see that the terms were observed by the people of the tribe. From this to the conclusion of Captain Brown's adventures, we must draw on his journal, which no longer admits of abridgment.

"25th Sept.—Replied to Dodah's letter, to the effect, that I would give up the fort 3 days hence, on the above terms. Surprized at their letting us off so easily, viz. simply to return to the plains without let or hindrance from his people, on condition of giving up the fort, which Dodah must well know we cannot hold a month longer; plenty of room to suspect treachery, but we must run the risk. This evening Guamaul Khan came near the fort, and sent a message to say, that he feared to venture inside, but that if I would meet him outside without my troops, he would ratify the agreement. Wishing at once to see whether it was to be 'treachery, or no treachery,' I agreed, and with Erskine and 4 native officers, met him about a mile from the fort. I never saw a man in such a fright in my life. Altho' he had 30 horsemen, armed to the teeth, and there were only 6 of us, he retreated twice before he would venture near us! He thought from our coming alone, there must be treachery; that some men were hidden somewhere: even after we had met, he had his horse all ready close by for a start. Down we all sat in a circle. A wild scene; his followers appeared to be exceedingly well armed and all fine stout built men. After compliments, &c. the nephew began to talk very reasonably. He expressed a hope that 'there would now be a lasting peace between his tribe and the British: that they had only fought at the Nuffoosk pass to save their country, and their lives; that it was the least they could do, when they had

the fate of Bejahkhan staring them in the face. That they had never killed any of our people after the fight, and that all the prisoners had been fed, clothed, and set free.' He concluded by saying that 'he should remain near the fort until we left, to prevent any disturbances between his people and mine; and that he would furnish me with trustworthy guides down.' There was not the slightest appearance of treachery. Thus ended this most interesting conference. It will not, I think, be easily forgotten by either Erskine or myself. So much depended on it, the fate of ourselves and the whole of the detachment. We found these Beloochees the most civil and polite of men! The confidence we placed in their word, by meeting them in the way we did, seemed to please them much, and from having been deadly enemies for 5 long months, became in one hour the best of friends; no doubt their joy was just as great in getting rid of us, as our's was in obtaining our freedom.

"26th and 27th.—Most delightfully employed in preparing for a start; only 10 public camels left, and those as thin as rats; none here procurable—the number of sick amounts to 40, and these require 20! Then there are the rations, ammunition, both guns and musket, water and tents. In fact, I found I could not move without sacrificing *all* private property and half the ammunition and tents; obliged to call on officers and men to give up what private camels they had—this was most willingly agreed to; and all kit, even to our bedding, was left behind—the gun ammunition I was obliged to take, as I rather expected opposition from the Bhoogties, through whose country we had 40 miles to go. At first we were almost afraid we should not be able to bring down the gun from the wretched state of the bullocks, and weakness of the men—however we determined to try, and leaving the waggon and forge-cart behind, picked out 30 of the best for the gun alone—the sepoys thinking we were going to leave it behind, came and begged me not, as they themselves would drag it down and defend it with their lives! When Erskine was burning the forge-cart and waggon, the Beloochees outside thought we were setting fire to the fort, and sent to beg us to spare it.

"28th.—Turned our backs on Kahun this morning at 2 o'clock. Much trouble in getting off, in consequence of the number of sick: obliged to tie some of the poor fellows on the camels—commenced the ascent of the big hill at 6, and after immense fatigue and labour, got the gun to the top by 2 p. m. The sepoys were regularly overpowered with fatigue half way up—the call for water now was dreadful, all that I had brought with me in the mussocks being expended. About 9 o'clock about 300 Beloochees had assembled in our front, rear and right flank, perched on the top of the hills; they seemed highly amused at our getting the gun up: but when they saw the sepoys completely done up with thirst and fatigue, they called out; 'ah! you will never get the gun down to the plains, you had better give it to old Dodah.'—I offered them money to show us some water, they said they would for 1,000 Rupees! After some talk they agreed to show us some for 100 Rupees, which was immediately given them,—there was just enough to give each man a handful or so

and then they set to, and got the gun up. I really thought at one time we must have left it behind. At the very top of the pass were about 50 of Hybutt Khan's followers; these men swore we should not go any further until we had paid for the flock of sheep we captured on the 13th August; however, when it came to the point, and seeing the gun too close to be pleasant, they thought better of it, and begged a few rupees for Hybutt Khan's family, who they said, were very poor; it was as much as I could do to restrain myself from giving this party a round of grape. It's well I did not perhaps, as it would most likely have embroiled me with the rest of the tribe, and my detachment was not in much of a fighting condition! It was now 4 p. m. and we had still to descend the Nuffoosk pass to some water, which our Murree guide reported was in abundance 3 miles from the bottom, in consequence of much rain having fallen. (17) Commenced descending, when a spectacle, the most horrible to be conceived, met our sight: the bodies of all our poor fellows, both officers and men, who fell on the 31st August, lying * unburied with all their clothes on! having been merely dragged off the road—Raitt's body was the first, being almost on the top of the pass; through this dreadful scene, we had to lower our gun down the hill, inch by inch—I would have given worlds to have buried the poor fellows, but this was out of the question; we had then been 14 hours under arms, and had still to seek for water, besides which, we had no intrenching tools. The bodies were lying on heaps, which shows what a bitter fight it must have been. The Murrees spoke highly of poor Raitt's bravery in being at the head of all; they had buried all their own dead at the bottom of the hill, but although I offered them any money they choose to ask, they refused to bury our's in consequence of the state of decomposition they were then in. After much labour, got the gun down the hill and proceeded on along the table land until 7 o'clock, when we found water in abundance, in a deep water course, on the bank of which we bivouacked for the night. Altho' the men had had no food all day, they all (save the pickets) immediately fell asleep, without tasting a bit: they had been 19 hours under arms, the 1st bugle having been sounded at 12 last night. Had this water been found when the fight of the 31st took place, what a different tale would have been told!

17. This appears to have been the passage seized upon by the Court of Enquiry for the famous deliverance which amounted to this—that Major Clibborn was culpable for not keeping a sharper look out for water: the men who were perishing with thirst might, according to the report, have found water within 300 yards of them if they had looked for it! There is no doubt of the fact, if they had just remained where they were 28 days longer, till after the rains had fallen! This entry of Captain Brown, together with that of the 9th, 10th and 11th May, will give some idea of the difficulty of forcing the pass of Nuffoosk!

* Since writing this, I am happy to say I have succeeded in getting all our poor comrades buried—their remains now lie in one large grave in the ground on which they fought so gallantly—Mundoo Khan, the nephew of Beejah Khan, accomplished this desired object for me, in which he was assisted by some of the Murrees engaged in the fight.

" 29th.—Marched this morning to the top of the Surtoff Mountain, 4 miles descended hill, lowering gun down with drag ropes; reached bottom at 10 o'clock; on examining one of the gun wheels, found the iron work of the axle-tree box split in several places; to all appearance it seemed impossible to repair it, or that the gun could travel any further; but Erskine by great exertions, got it bound up, and on we went again, starting at 2 p. m., but did not reach our ground until 10, having lost the road, got jammed in between ravines—I should have wished to have made only one march a day, in consequence of the weak state of the men, but there was no help for it, on we must go, night as well as day, having only 2 days provisions with us. Here no water was procurable; luckily the sepoys were so done up, that they soon fell asleep, and forgot all about their thirst. Received an express from the Assistant Political Agent, warning us to expect opposition from the Bhogties, whose country we are now in; not in much of a fighting train, half the men being on camels, but with the gun I think we have not much to fear from them.

" 30th.—Started at 5 a. m. and arrived at 10 at a beautiful stream of water—on this march I was obliged to throw away all the ammunition, save a few rounds of grape, otherwise I must have left 8 or 10 sick behind—men and camels regularly gave in during this march, and how we got all safe up, I hardly know—Remaining with the rear-guard, I cheered them on as well as I could—one poor fellow died on the camel's back. Our Murree guide, who had behaved as yet very well, did an act of extraordinary kindness for a Beloochee: hearing that one of our people was left behind for want of carriage to bring him on, he went back of his own accord, mounted him on his horse, and brought him into camp, walking himself by his side. From this ground, sent off an express by our Murree guide, (the only man who would venture) to Poolajee, for some spare camels and gun bullocks, and we proceeded on another 8 miles at 4 a. m., getting to some water about 10 o'clock. " October 1st.—Started at 3 a. m. and marched on 8 miles—soon after our arrival, to our great delight, up came our Murree guide, with some Scinde horse, spare camels and gun bullocks—proceeded on to Poolajee at 4 p. m., reaching that post at 12, distance 14 miles; on coming out of the hills into the plain, fired off our howitzer to give notice to our friends at Lheree, the head quarters of the 5th Regiment, of our safe arrival.

" Thus after a detention of 5 months in the fort of Kahun, was our escape from that position and the Murree hills, accomplished. The hardships and privations circumstances forced on us, were most cheerfully borne with by all. After the attack on Major Clibborn's party, it often appeared impossible to expect a release, yet not a murmur was heard. On no one occasion had I to find fault with the men, and the alacrity and cheerfulness with which they performed the exceedingly onerous duties which I was forced to exact, reflects, in my humble opinion, great credit on the Kalee (5th) Pultan and small detachment of Artillery. Of the constant aid afforded me on every occasion by Lieut. Erskine and Dr. Glasse, I note nothing; it can never cease to be

fresh in my memory; and their rank is too near my own to admit of my saying all I could wish or they deserve, even in this my private Journal."

The admirable conduct of Captain Brown earned for him the thanks of Government and the cordial applause of India at large: and he was immediately created Brigade Major, in Scinde, in room of Major Boscawen just then promoted; he was afterwards raised to the rank of Major by Brevet, and appointed to the command of the Bheel corps in Guzerat. Nor amidst the obloquy endeavoured to be heaped by a section of the admirers of Lord Auckland's policy on the Affghan tribes, who dared to resist the invasion of their country, did the generosity and honour of the Murrees, and their aged chief, wholly pass unpraised.

Though Dodah the Murree chief, and Beebruck the leader of the Bhoogties, had been induced to allow military posts to be established in their respective holds of Kahun and Deyrah, neither of them had ever made submission or acknowledged supremacy. (18) With our retirement from the country, the objects for which our troops were sent there—if indeed these had ever been understood—appear to have been entirely forgotten. We had taught the hill tribes two lessons, which were new to them and fatal to us;—they had learned that representatives of the British government could tamper with truth, and give justice to the winds; that we could break our pledges, and press demands, at the bayonet's point, of tribute which had never been our due; and that if they took advantage of the natural strength of their fastnesses for the purposes of mountain warfare, they could compel us on any occasion to capitulate, or turn us back upon our path of conquest. The nation which, throughout the East, had hitherto been known as "immutable in faith, invincible in arms," was found failing in both beyond the Indus!

The capture and imprisonment of the Deyrah chief Beebruck has already been referred to; in the instructions furnished to Major Billamore, it was stated that the Bhoogties and Murrees not only plundered in the plains, but gave shelter to robbers, and received stolen property. They were believed to have robbed us of as many as 5000 camels(!!) and they had given refuge to Beejah Khan, a notorious freebooter. (19) This man was a chief of the Doemkees, and in consequence of his power and activity he had been for some time acknowledged head of the tribe. It was said he could muster

18. We once more draw for our facts on the admirable store supplied by the Cutchee letters already repeatedly referred to. The writer subscribing himself "Nufoosk," (*Times*, 19th June, 1841,) states that "the placing of military posts within the hills was not thought of till after Major Billamore's return to the plains."

19. Cutchee Letters, No. I.; for the most part greatly abridged—in part, however, copied *verbatim*.

200 followers for a foray into the plains. Various attempts had in vain been made to capture him. At last he was induced to submit; but fearing treachery, he stipulated that Umeer Shaw, a renowned Syud (holy man) should accompany him to an interview with the British authorities. Conceiving that, with a companion the sacredness of whose person assured him of protection, he was safe, he proceeded to Shikarpore with his nephews and a few followers. He was received as became the head of a warlike clan, and for four days was treated with all honour by Lieut. Postans, the Assistant Political Agent, whom he visited daily. On the fourth day, while paying his respects to the resident as usual, he and his attendants were seized, without reason or warning given, and thrown into the prison at Bukkur, where they were detained for many months,—their horses, arms, and ornaments being sold by public auction! The order for this was given by Mr Bell, then at Sukkur, 25 miles off. The whole of the tribes regarded it as a direct breach of promise towards a man who defied us to capture him; and who, on stipulations being granted, voluntarily came into our camp. The same view was taken by the officers of the force; and if we are to judge from results, perhaps at last by the chief political himself. The money arising from the sale of the horses and other property was at Lheree paid over to the chiefs some time after their liberation! (20) This much of explanation

20. This is the version of the Cutchec letter-writer, whose narrative has throughout been very closely adhered to. The subjoined passage is a correction on this by one of the Assistant Political Agents formerly in Scinde:—

“In June 1839, Major Clibborn moved, intending to proceed to the Hills, but was unable from climate to proceed farther than Shikarpoor from Sukkur, losing on the way 1 officer, and 14 men. Beja Khan Doonkie was the most noted freebooter of the plains; and was the object of the movement, as he alone caused us a loss of about 2 Lacs of rupees. He was offered by Government Rs. 3000 a month to leave his nefarious practices and engage to protect the road between Shikarpoor and Dadur. Beja refused to do so by letter, and accompanied his refusal with *insult*! As soon as the cold season however set in, Beja sent earnest petitions to be allowed to come in, which was refused unless with conditions. The 1st Assistant then, with three or four of the Khyeeri tribe proceeded to the haunts of the Doonkie, who fled. The Khyeeris afterwards fell into an ambuscade prepared for them by Beja, and were defeated. The detachments under Major Billamore were then pushed across the desert, *accompanied by the 1st Assistant*; and the Jekranee chiefs, after several encounters with our Horse, and being pushed to desperation for want of food, surrendered themselves to the *Political Authorities*, and Beja Khan, the Doonkie chief, after a pledge sent to him verbally through Ameer Shan the Syud, to the effect that his *life should be spared*, but without other conditions, also surrendered himself to the same authority, in his own country at Shapoor. At this time he was in open hostility with us, and had been warned, that if he persisted in his freebooting practices, a price would be set on his head—Beja Khan was sent in a Prisoner to Sukkur under a strong guard commanded by Captain Erskine, and he was followed, as speedily as possible, by the Assistant Political Agent. Previous to Beja's surrender, Major Billamore marched into the Hills, and as the most important object was then considered to be the negotiations with the Doonkie and Jekranee tribes, the Political Assistant did not consider himself authorized to leave the plains until this duty was per-

in reference to these chiefs is necessary, because their case was repeatedly referred to by the Murrees in their negotiations with Captain Brown; and

formed. The want of 'Judgment' of Major B. at Deyrah in departing from his orders, which were specific to use the most *conciliatory* measures only, was the sole cause of the catastrophe which ensued."—*Bombay Times*, May 26, 1841.

This letter elicited the following reply from Lieut. (now Major) Jacob :—

"Sir,—In your paper of the 26th May, which I have just received, I perceive an assertion, given on the authority of a correspondent on whom you say you can place very implicit reliance, that 'The want of judgment of Major Billamore at Deyrah, in departing from his orders, which were specific, to use the most conciliatory measures only, was the sole cause of the catastrophe which ensued.'

"Attacks on the dead are seldom creditable, and at least should be founded on truth. In this instance your correspondent is altogether mistaken," and I beg leave to contradict his assertions most emphatically. I was on very intimate terms with Major Billamore during the whole time he was employed on the service in question, and well acquainted with the instructions received from the political authorities; I can positively assert that he neither 'departed from his orders' or displayed 'any want of judgment.' His instructions were 'to use conciliatory measures, but to resist insult or aggression to the utmost.' The latter words are not alluded to by your correspondent—for reasons best known to himself; but I can distinctly declare, that the most conciliatory measures were used by Major Billamore until the attack made on him at Deyrah by the whole Bloogtie tribe. An imperfect account of Major Billamore's proceedings in the Hills was given some time since in your paper in a letter signed '*Nafsook*;' that account is correct as far as it goes, and was written by me; the circumstances described in it will shew, not only that Major Billamore did not act with want of judgment, but that any other line of conduct but the one he pursued would, in all probability, have ensured the loss of his little detachment.

"Very many members of our little party in the hills alas I are dead, but there are enough left to bear witness to the truth of what I have said above, and I trust they will do so.—I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

"Quetta, 18th June, 1841."

"J. JACOB, Artillery Lieut."

"Sir,—In continuation of my letter of yesterday's date, I beg leave to point out other inaccuracies in the letter of your correspondent therein alluded to. Your correspondent says 'The first assistant then, with three of the Khyeeree tribe, proceeded to the haunts of the Doomkee, who fled. The Khyeerees afterwards fell into an ambuscade prepared for them by Beejah, and were defeated. The detachments under Major Billamore were then pushed across the desert accompanied by the first assistant, &c. &c.'

"On this I must remark, that the *haunts* of the Doomkees extended over the whole plain of Upper Scinde, so that it is probable 'the first assistant' did visit some of them. But the Head Quarters of the tribe, and Beejah Khan himself, were at Poolajee, and did not fly until the very day before Major Billamore reached the place; when they set fire to the town, went into the hills, and encamped in a ravine some twelve miles distant, which camp was visited some days afterwards by Capt. Brown and myself. It was *after* this that the 'first assistant' first visited Poolajee. The Khyeerees were put to flight by Beejah Khan many days *after* the arrival of Major Billamore at Poolajee, and the Major was actually present under arms in the field at the time with his whole force, yet your correspondent gravely writes, after mentioning the defeat, 'The detachments under Major Billamore were then pushed across the desert.' There are other inaccuracies in your correspondent's letter, but I have mentioned only those of which

will indirectly fall to be spoken of in another point of view. The distrust occasioned by these disingenuous proceedings was one great source of our difficulties throughout the next twelvemonth of almost incessant fighting. The secret of the almost instant pacification which ensued on the resignation of Mr Bell, and continued to the close of our connection with the country, arose from the thorough restoration of confidence by the appointment of Major Outram. This officer was well known to them; they placed the most implicit reliance on his assurances—whether promises or threats,—and they found that in this they had acted right.

In December, Captain Brown, who had been placed in political employ by Mr Bell, was sent on a mission into the Murree hills to negotiate terms of friendship, on condition of their returning to us the guns captured at Nufoosk. Mr Bell himself took up his quarters for a time at Lheree, and expected that the Chiefs of the hill tribes would come in and render submission, as a considerable force was collecting in the neighbourhood for the purpose of coercion, if necessary. Beebruck was not yet at liberty, though now present with the Chief Political Agent, and so great was the distrust of his neighbours and friends, that they, anxious to see him, could in nowise be induced to come within four miles of the Residency, though Captain Brown had gone out almost unattended on purpose to induce them. This

I was an eye witness, and in which I was a party concerned. Verily your correspondent's facts appear to be of equal value with his opinion of Major Billamore's judgment at Deyrah. But perhaps no one but a Political officer is, in Upper Scinde, allowed to possess the faculty of judgment!

"The cause of our reverses was at one time Walpole Clarke's rashness, now it is Major Billamore's want of judgment which caused the 'catastrophe'! Why these repeated accusations against dead men? the answer is obvious,—they tell no tales. Poor Clarke had been concerned in many a dangerous adventure before he ever saw Upper Scinde: his daring was so different from rashness that I doubt if many cooler or more far-seeing soldiers of his age ever existed. Major Billamore judged wrong in not allowing himself to be destroyed without resistance at Deyrah! But where was the judgment (setting aside the question of breach of faith) displayed in the imprisonment of Beejah Khan and Janee, or in writing submissive letters, in the name of the British Government, to Dodah Murree after the affair at Nufoosk, or in many other instances I could mention? Had these efforts of wisdom no influence in bringing about the 'catastrophe'? Your correspondent is apparently a political officer, and perhaps not unacquainted with 'the first assistant' of whom he writes. Let him make himself acquainted with the opinion of the Home Government with regard to the 'Judgment' of the statesmen of Upper Scinde before he presumes to lay the blame of their acts on the memory of gallant soldiers now deceased—Let your correspondent also appear in his real name.

"Anonymous accusations are in general little attended to; and nothing but your grave Editorial remark 'that your correspondent's communication is a valuable fragment of history,—' together with my own personal knowledge of its calumnious nature, would have induced me to come forward in this instance to defend the character of deceased friends.

I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

"J. JACON, *Artillery Lieut.*"

officer proceeded about 20 miles into the hills nearly alone, and then at length a secondary Murree Chief was prevailed on to visit the British Resident. To urge the return of trophies taken in fair stand-up fight seemed unreasonable—our guns could never be used against us; they had been placed in a mosque as trophies, and were valued by them and worthless to us. This point, therefore, was abandoned. Two Chiefs at length visited Mr Bell in January 1841; they pledged themselves on the Koran that they and their respective tribes would abstain from plundering on the plains, and questions of tribute and allegiance were carefully avoided. This was called submission; and so the curtain drops on the affairs of the Murrees, with which we found that we had no further occasion to interfere.

The Governor-General, it is said, was never officially informed of the intention to demand tribute from the Murrees, and he is believed to have been greatly offended with the whole proceedings. These events occurred simultaneously with those terminating with the surrender of Dost Mahomed, narrated in the previous chapter, and with the occurrences about to be enumerated in connection with the affairs of Nusseer Khan of Khelat, which for a twelvemonth kept Scinde and Shawl in a state of incessant conflict. The Deyrah and Kahun episode stands by itself, and apart from the rest: it would be incomplete without a short notice of the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry appointed to investigate the causes of the loss of the convoy at Nufosk. Major Clibborn, in closing his despatch, earnestly solicited that a rigid enquiry should be instituted in regard to his conduct as the unfortunate commander of the convoy: and the solicitation was immediately complied with by the Supreme Government. Not that there was any charge or suspicion of culpability or mismanagement, but with a view of silencing obloquy where it was unmerited, and of bringing to light the sources of misarrangements somewhere supposed to exist. Major-General Brooks, commanding the field-force in Upper Scinde, was instructed to nominate the officers required to constitute the court, over which he himself was appointed to preside, and to proceed with the investigation without delay. (21) From the tenor of what has already been stated, it will appear that the party whose character was chiefly implicated throughout for the primary occupation of Kahun, the determination to provision and reinforce the garrison when the military authorities were of opinion that it ought to have been withdrawn, and others of the unwise measures which led to the result of its final abandonment, was none other than the chief political agent himself. It has been repeatedly stated that Mr Bell was an able man: he had a singular facility of gaining

21. The Members of the Court were Lieut.-Colonel (now Major-General) Valiant, H.M.'s 40th; Lieut.-Colonel Wymer, 30th Bengal N.I.; Major Farrel, 6th Bombay N.I.; and Major Lloyd, of the Artillery.

the mastery over weaker minds with whom he came in contact, when he conceived it to be his interest to bend them to his wishes. The use made by him of the influence thus obtained was, on the present occasion, in the last degree unjustifiable. The Chief Political, who was one of the most vindictive of men, had special grounds of grudge against Major Clibborn, on whom he appears to have determined now to be avenged for the share taken by him in the most indecent controversy betwixt the political and military chiefs the preceding year. Captain Clibborn was, in 1839, Brigade-Major to Colonel Gordon, and gave some of the most important evidence before the Court of Enquiry in refutation of Mr Bell's charges against that officer. (22) General Brooks was at this time understood to be entirely under the thumb of the political agent; and three out of the five officers, who constituted the commission, were at the date of the enquiry residing under his roof. The court having adjusted preliminaries, Major Clibborn read over a statement of the case, the correctness of the whole of which was deposed to by every one of the surviving officers who had been present with him at Nufoosk. These gentlemen were afterwards examined, but that apparently with the view to inculcation rather than for the eliciting of truth. Major Forbes, then commanding at the station, and Lieutenant Postans, the chief political assistant at Shikarpore, also at hand, the conduct of both of whom became the object of special observation, were called on for no explanations, although it afterwards became apparent that they could fully exonerate themselves of the charges brought against them. Dr Kirk, (23) who had accompanied the detachment, had made numerous and valuable sketches of the scenery, and these, when produced in court, were considered evidence of the existence of water, against the testimony of the living witnesses who deposed that there was none. By a singular fatality the report of the Commission found its way into the newspapers before it had reached the hands of Government. This of itself immediately demanded investigation. The matter was involved in mystery, and clouded with a grievous amount of mis-statements, (24) and though the manner in which it obtained premature publicity was never officially accounted for, it was perfectly well understood by the public.

22. The whole correspondence on this subject, together with the evidence referred to, was published in the *Bombay Times*, May, 1841.

23. This very talented officer was sent on mission to the Court of Shoa in Abyssinia along with Major Harris, &c. in May 1841.

24. The sensation this matter created for many months warrants us in enlarging on it more than its importance demands, as connected with the Affghan war. The report was dated 20th Nov. 1840, and it appeared in the *Bombay Courier* newspaper of the 19th Dec.:—the post occupying 15 days from Sukkur to Bombay. It appears as if the copy meant for Government had been kept back on purpose until the public should have seen the newspaper account. It was known to have been handed about for some days at Poonah before being sent to Bombay.

The Court having closed its enquiries, met after a few days' adjournment to report proceedings, when the President, on taking his place, produced a paper which he said embodied his opinion, and that if the members approved it would be adopted as the report of the Commission; or, if it was not so adopted, each member should give his opinion in writing. The document in question, the same as was afterwards published, having been read, and the members having been called upon, beginning with the youngest, each gave his assent without commentary. Colonel Valiant was the last called upon to vote. He declined adopting the report, pointing out its irrelevancy, and calling attention to the numerous points which appeared wholly unsupported by evidence. The President replied that some of the matters objected to were notorious throughout India, and being irritated at the objections being pressed, Brigadier Valiant having remarked that were the report forwarded to Government in its present form, it was sure to be returned disapproved of—General Brooks replied that in this case he should himself be answerable for it,—so the objections were no longer persisted in. (25)

The commissioners were required to meet again and reconsider various points in their original report, which appeared to be set forth, on some occasions, without any evidence whatever, and on others, in the teeth of that which had been laid before them. Their revised finding was much the same as the first report, and on the parts on which they offered explanations or attempted to adduce evidence, matters were made worse. The whole was ultimately laid before the public in an admirably written *Government Gazette* of the 8th of May, 1841. It were too tedious to go over the whole entire, and the notice of a few isolated points will sufficiently indicate the character of the paper. Lord Keane's conduct in supplying the commissariat the year before, was declared to be the origin of the whole mischief. This assertion was made, without an attempt at proof, in reference to the character of a party already beyond the cognizance or jurisdiction of the court, and who had quitted India five months before the Kahun expedition was undertaken. Col. Stevenson, whose lamented death on the 9th August, before the army started, might have saved his memory from aspersion, was blamed for sending Captain Brown into the hills, although it subsequently appeared in evidence that this was done by order of Mr Ross Bell. (26) Brigadier Stevenson and Major Forbes were both blamed for not having made Captain Brown aware of the difficulties of sending him supplies, so that he might have put his men on half or quarter rations early in August. From Captain

25. General Valiant's report, dated 18th June 1841.—Government Archives.

26. Mr. Secretary Willoughby's letter in reference to the report of Major Forbes.

Brown's journal, so often quoted, and then at the command of the commission, had they desired it, it appeared that it had been intimated, so early as the 4th June, that no assistance could be sent from Sikkur, and that he, of his own accord, and in consideration of the extreme isolation of his position, had put his people on half rations on the 24th of May! The court, in its original finding, declared that Major Clibborn, in his choice of the Nufoosk instead of the Deyrah route, placed too implicit reliance on the guide, Meer Hussain,—it was subsequently shewn that Meer Hussain joined the party two marches from Nufoosk: in their revised finding, they state that it was not this man but another named Buchan Shaw: Government declared this wholly unsupported by evidence; other things were declared on equally or still more questionable grounds, of which government afterwards stated, that "they deeply regretted to find this court, composed of five field-officers of rank and experience, could, on such grounds, have recorded as a fact that which was not a fact, &c." (27) The court blamed Major Clibborn for not having been guided by the drawings of Dr Kirk, by which the difficulties of the passes were manifested,—the drawings having in fact been made on the advance; Dr Kirk never having traversed this route until with Major Clibborn's party. The court, in their first finding, observed that Major Clibborn, before entering the Murree hills, had been warned by Captain Brown that the Murrees were assembling: in their second, they admit that they came to this conclusion from the circumstance that a rumour to that effect prevailed at Hyderabad, 250 miles off, in the end of August. Captain Brown declared, that not only had no such warning as that referred to by the court ever been given by him, but that, on the contrary, he had written to Major Clibborn on the 27th August, that he had *heard* that the road had *not* been destroyed, and that the Murrees were *not* assembling, and that water might be expected, as heavy rain had recently fallen. Captain Brown was present in court, and had been examined as a witness. Major Forbes was censured for having sent out a force, under half the size of that ordered by Brigadier Stevenson, and without consulting the political authorities; as also, for the cumbrous magnitude of the convoy, as 200 camels would have been sufficient to provision the fort of Kahun for three months. Major Forbes proved that instead of a force of 1200 bayonets, six guns, and some irregular horse, having, as stated by the court of enquiry, been actually equipped by his predecessor in command, that no arrangement up to the 10th of August had been made for its equipment; that the number of bayonets *warned* was 1038, and not 1200: and that the amount of stores and camels was no more than was essential to relieve and provision Kahun, and subsist the escorting party. (28) Lieut. Postans had named a much smaller force, to which

27. Governor in Council's Minute, 7th May, 1841.

28. Mr Secretary Willoughby's letter.

Major Forbes, of his own accord, had added one third. These explanations on the part of Major Forbes,—who, till he received the commission's report, never suspected that he could have been condemned unheard, when on the spot to offer explanations, if required,—were not sent in till afterwards, Gen. Brooks having declined to receive or forward them to government. (29)

These most extraordinary proceedings were clearly exposed, and most severely and justly censured, by a very clear and able minute of the Bombay Government, which, while passing high and merited eulogiums on Major Clibborn and the officers and men under his charge, directed the immediate removal of General Brooks from his command, and the return of Colonel Valiant to the Presidency. The conduct of Government was greatly approved of by the Governor-General in Council, the Court of Directors, and the Horse Guards, and was as decided as it was upright and energetic. General Valiant had been on the point of protesting against the whole proceedings, when unhappily he permitted himself to be concussed into acquiescence by some inaccurate and confused ideas of the duties of the members of a court of enquiry; he conceiving it to be essential that an apparent unanimity should exist. The junior members of the court appear to have homologated the report as drawn up without their assistance; and presented to them by the President, who took on himself the responsibility of its accuracy, without giving themselves the trouble of examining into its contents, or reflecting on the monstrous nature of the proceedings to which they were making themselves parties. This, at all events, was believed to be the only explanation of the conduct of Colonel Wynier, Majors Farrel and Lloyd, officers of sound judgment and unimpeachable integrity, and who, had they been unprincipled enough to have made the judgment of a court of inquiry the means of indulging personal animosity—misconduct of which no one suspected them—it did not appear that in this case there existed any such feelings as those towards the parties concerned, to gratify. Of course, what has just been stated is no sort of excuse for the solemn duties of a court of inquiry having been trifled with—the ends of truth and justice perverted, and the character and prospects of officers, as honorable as themselves, destroyed by the fiat of a military commission. The report to whose accuracy they solemnly deposed was, from beginning to end, a tissue of malignant falsehoods, and which, if uttered by the humblest subaltern, would, if enquired into, have occasioned his dismissal from the service. Had the whole of the officers who constituted the Nusook commission been removed from the service, the punishment for so grave and mischievous an offence could not have been considered too severe. That General Brooks was, at this time, a tool in the hands of Mr Bell, is sufficiently notorious; but his conduct

notwithstanding this, is far more reprehensible than that of the other members. As the President of the court, and the party who was entrusted with the selection of its members, and the guidance of the forms of its procedure, he was peculiarly bound to be circumspect. He, at all events, must have known that much of what was charged against the parties inculpated was unsupported by, much more in the direct teeth of, the evidence adduced; and that, instead of searching for information, or desiring to discover truth, the parties who could have assisted them in attaining these were avoided to be inquired after. Mr Bell was the only man connected with the affairs of Scinde who escaped all notice—a circumstance in itself sufficient to have awakened suspicion. Though afterwards brought, in the most irregular manner, into the field as the voluntary accuser of Lord Keane and Sir T. Willshire, it does not appear that he ever experienced a frown from his superiors, and, at all events, he was maintained in high and confidential employ as if no suspicion had ever been entertained of his unfitness for service.

General Brooks returned to Bombay along with Colonel Valiant in Feb. 1842, and left for Europe on the 1st May, having completely lost the confidence of Government. Colonel Valiant, as a Queen's-officer, received a reprimand from the Horse Guards. He was Commander of the garrison of Bombay from February 1842 to March 1843. He had been raised to the rank of Major-General on the brevet which occurred on the birth of the Prince of Wales. This is, however, anticipating in point of time: in the next chapter we shall have occasion to mention the names of both officers in connection with the affairs of Scinde.

CHAPTER V.

Genealogy of the Khans of Kelat—Doubtful extent of Mehrab Khan's treachery in 1839—His preparations for defence sudden and imperfect—His death—Escape of his Widow and Son—Unsuitableness of Newaz Khan to rule over the Brahooes—Lieut. Loveday appointed Envoy—Dismemberment of the Khanate—Sharawan and Cutchee made over to the Shih Shoojah—Cutchee given to the Indian Government by the Shah—Rent exacted from the free Jagheers—Resistance the consequence—Bad selection of our Native agents—Mahomed Sherreef, villain of—Revocation of Jagheers—The Chiefs left in ignorance of the change in their condition—Customs of the port of Las ceded by Newaz Khan to the British Government—Claims are abandoned—Nusseer Khan pursued—Vengeance inflicted on those who protected him—Unhappy proceedings of Lieut. Loveday—Kakurs threaten Quettah—Reinforcements arrive from Candahar—Insurgents retire from Quettah and invest Kelat—Pusillanimity of the Envoy—Lieut. Hammersley defeats the insurgents at Moostung—Attempts at negotiation with Captain Bean—Lieut. Loveday and Mr Masson put in close confinement—Insurgents proceed to Moostung—Misunderstandings in negotiating with Captain Bean—Depute Mr Masson as Ambassador—He is placed under arrest on suspicion of being a Russian spy—Proceedings connected therewith—His release—Combination of mishaps—Large reinforcements sent to Scinde—Brahooes attacked and defeated at Kundah—Lieut. Vardon attacks and defeats them near Bhag and captures 1100 camels—Expertness of the Enemy in seizing camels experienced by Major Boscawen—Sack of Gundava—Three days' fighting round Dadur—The enemy on each occasion defeated—Loss estimated at from 300 to 400—Murder of Lieut. Loveday—The insurgents disperse—Nusseer Khan left a wanderer—General Nott recaptures Kelat—General Brooks, Brigadier Valiant, and Major Holland, leave Bombay and join the force—Views of the Politicals towards Herat—Colonel Marshall takes command of the Kotra Brigade—Negotiations with the enemy—Nusseer Khan makes submission—Receives pecuniary assistance—Ordered by General Brooks, who was ignorant of pending negotiations, to be attacked—Brilliant victory at Kotra—Entire dispersion of the insurgents—A large reinforcement moves towards the Bolan Pass—Colonel Stacey improves the aspect of affairs at Kelat—Cutchee affairs—Beebee tribute—Detachment advances on Kojjuck—Misunderstandings, and attack on the town unsuccessful—Inhabitants abandon it—Occupied by our troops—Reinforcements arrive—Kojjuck sacked and burnt—Submission of the Beebee Gunjani—Herat affairs—Troops ascend the Bolan Pass—Expedition to Nosky—Accident in the Bolan to Captain Haldane's Irregulars—Similar accident in the Khyber Pass—General Brooks and Colonel Valiant deprived of their command—Surrender of Nusseer Khan—Death of Mr R. Bell—Major Outram takes political charge—Restoration of Nusseer Khan—Coronation at Kelat—General state of Affairs—Memoir of Major Outram.

SINCE the earlier portion of the present narrative was issued, the valuable work of Mr Masson, entitled "A Journey to Kelat, &c.," has been published. By this, many important facts have been disclosed, of which the public were previously ignorant. These have been taken advantage of at the risk of some repetition; and where present statements differ from those formerly given,—as, on one or two points, chiefly of amplification, they may chance to do,—the newer is to be regarded as the more correct version of the matter. The Cutchee letters have been consulted with more care and minuteness than formerly, and the information supplied by them, which may hitherto have been overlooked, has been embodied in the present Chapter. The first few pages of the following chapter, in consequence of these things, are in part retrospective, and ought perhaps to have taken their place in that part of the narrative where the earlier portion of the affairs of Kelat are discussed. (1) The following genealogical table of the rulers of Kelat, copied from the work of Mr Masson, will save the trouble of much explanation and reference:—

1. These letters have been referred to in a previous chapter, in connection with the proceedings in the Murree country. They are of unquestionable authority, and their writer now holds a high appointment: the revelations they make are most mournful and disheartening; yet their accuracy will, we doubt not, be amply borne out by the papers in the archives of the Board of Control, as we are sure they will be by every officer in the Scinde field force who had the means of making himself acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE,

SHOWING THE DESCENT, ON THE MALE SIDE, OF THE PRESENT CHIEF OF KELAT, FROM ABDULAH KHAN.

Abdulah Khan; slain in battle at Jandir.

Mohabat Khan, reigned some time at Kalat; superseded by his brother, Nasir Khan, and died, a hostage, at Kandahar.

Eltarz Khan, slain accidentally by his brother, Nasir Khan, when both were hostages at Kandahar; from him descend the Eltarz Zai families of Baghwan and Kotru.

Nasir Khan, originally a hostage at Kandahar, superseded his brother, Mohabat Khan, and ruled about forty years.

Haji Khan, died, a hostage, at Kandahar.

Mahmud Khan ruled at Kalat.

Mahomed Rehim Khan, slain by sister of Mastapha Khan.

Mastapha Khan, slain by his brother, Mahomed Rehim Khan.

Barham Khan, originally a hostage at Kandahar, unsuccessfully asserted his claims to the government with Nasir Khan and his son, Mahmud Khan. Died at Kalat.

Mehrab Khan,* slain on the capture of his capital by the British.

Azem Khan, living at Kalat.

Sirafrax Khan, slain by Mehrab Khan, at the same time with Ahmed Yar Khan.

Ahmed Yar Khan, slain by Mehrab Khan the second year after his accession.

Hassan Khan, present chief of Kalat, with the assumed name of Mir Nasir Khan.

Shah Nawaz Khan.

Fati Khan.

Retained in captivity by Mehrab Khan, from which they escaped; temporarily placed in power by the British.

* Mehrab Khan had four wives. 1. A daughter of Mastapha Khan, the Beebee Ganjani. 2. A daughter of Jam Ali, late ruler of Las. 3. A daughter of Eltarz Khan, Ahmed Zai of Kotru, and mother of his son, Nusseer Khan, the present khan. 4. A daughter of Assil Khan, Shirwani, now a cripple.

From this, it appears that Mehrab Khan was descended from the younger branch of the family, and his successor on the throne from the elder, yet the ancestor of the latter had been set aside by the progenitor of the former, four generations back, and the legitimacy of the succession had never, since the reign of Nusseer Khan, been called in question.

At the time the British army crossed the Indus (Dec. 1838) the Kelat durbar was filled with councillors hostile to their own ruler, and anxious for an opportunity to betray him into any difficulty which might redound to their profit or advantage. The incessant misunderstandings which arose in our attempts at negotiation seem in a considerable measure to be accounted for by this, without imputing to the Khan a greater amount of duplicity and cunning than might have been expected and excused in an Asiatic chief under the circumstances. (2)

When Mehrab Khan heard of the intention of our march upon Kelat, he sent his son to collect troops. This step was opposed by his councillors, but the chief replied, that though he had given no cause for enmity, as we proposed attacking him he would defend his throne. Kelat had fallen before the desired levies could be brought into the field, and on becoming aware of this they departed without coming into action. (3)

The women of the harem had made their escape before the fall of the fortress:—the Beebec Gunjani, one of the widows, shortly after claimed the protection of the Scinde politicians, and for a time resided in Cutchee on a pension allowed her by government. She joined the followers of her stepson, Nusseer Khan, when the insurrection broke out in June, 1840. The young Khan, a spirited and intelligent boy of fourteen years of age, sought refuge amongst the chiefs who had been his father's friends, and who speedily became the objects of our vengeance in consequence of the hospitality exercised by them towards the fallen prince. Newaz Khan, the destined successor to the throne, quickly joined the army, and was duly invested ruler of Kelat, and vassal to the Doorannee empire. This man, who was one of the few of our proteges who did not requite our kindness with ingratitude, was ill suited for sovereignty over a people so fierce and unruly as the Brahoes, who, though aware of his being of the royal line, could in no shape recognise his claim of right. The bad odour attached to him of being our protegee, and the suspicion of his having made over to Shah Soojah the more valuable portions of the sovereignty: besides, he himself was unwarlike; he had acquired no name or position, and had no respect amongst the chiefs. The territory we committed to him was not only poor and sterile, but eminently hostile. A loan of £5000 was considered sufficient to enable him to set up a royal es-

2. Masson, p. 383.

3. Cutchee Letters, No. 3,—*Bombay Times*, May.

establishment. The jewels which belonged to the women of his predecessor, which were secured by us as prize property, had brought us more than this. For repayment of the sum just named he was to make over to us the rights of the customs along the sea-coast, which had been abandoned by the sovereign half a century before; but of this more hereafter. It was a part of our agreement with him that he was to expect no assistance from us to maintain him on his throne. Lieutenant Loveday, a young Bengal officer of some distinction as a Persian scholar, but beyond this eminently ill qualified for the post assigned him, was appointed political agent to reside at the Kelat court; he was supplied with 60 sepoy as a guard of honour, and this, with the terror supposed to invest our name, was all that was considered necessary for securing the stability of the new dynasty, and to ensure the tranquillity of eastern Beloochistan under all the changes to which we had subjected, or were about to subject it.

Lord Auckland is understood to have been from the beginning averse to the deposition of Mehrab Khan: he left, however, an amount of power in the hands of the politicals which was taken advantage of. Mr Bell pointed out with fatal accuracy the mischief, which he himself afterwards hastened and aggravated, sure to ensue from the dismemberment of the empire just about to be noticed. (4)

The valuable provinces of Sharawan, Cutchee, Harand and Dajil had been conferred by Ahmed Shah, on the first Nusseer Khan, for service performed during his wars with Persia. These were to be held by him as feudatory on the usual terms of furnishing a military contingent to the Dooranee sovereign, when required. While the monarchy remained entire, there was a force of 1000 Belooch horse furnished for the protection of Cashmeer; and the Kelat princes had ever been remarkable for the fidelity with which they fulfilled their obligations to the sovereign. When the Dooranee empire fell to pieces all semblance of allegiance disappeared. (5) Sharawan contains a population of about 150,000 souls: it was placed under charge of Captain Bean, assistant to the envoy, and chief political in Shawl. Quettah, its principal town, containing about 4,000 people, was maintained as a strong military post from the commencement to the conclusion of our connection with the country. Cutchee was taken charge of by Mr Bell; it contains about 150,000 people, and is so rich and fertile that it has always been considered the granary of Upper Scinde. Both were transferred to the Dooranee empire in lieu of a tribute alleged but not admitted to be due. They were nominally made over to us by Shah Soojah, and retained by

4. Letters in *Bombay Times*, February 13, 1841: also Cutchee Letters, ditto May.

5. Journeys in Beloochistan and Afghanistan, &c., by Chas. Masson, vol. ii. page 101—quoted, *supra* page 88, chap. ii.

us for the liquidation of a portion of his majesty's debts.(6) Like our other legacies of the kind they proved unprofitable bequests, having cost us in the course of the next twelvemonth, an outlay of some £300,000 to keep them in order.(7) The dismemberment of states is not without example in Europe ; but the precedents which history supply are not such as moralists refer to with approbation, or as England would often desire to copy. The fact of the transfer, bad as it was, was matter of small account in comparison to the manner of its accomplishment.

In the large province of Shawl, Jagheers (federal estates) had been held for many generations by influential families on military tenure. The principal chiefs so situated at the period of the fall of Kelat, were Assur Khan, Rysannee ; Mahommed Khan, Shewannee ; Mahommed Shye, Rhodeynees ; Bungoolzyrees, &c. These men had made submission to Mr Bell at Bagh, and proceeded to their estates on the understanding, that they were to hold them on the same tenure as heretofore. Their surprise and indignation may be imagined when they were called upon by Captain Bean to pay rent for their hitherto rent-free jagheers. This demand was said to have greatly incensed the Governor-General, who reproved it as at variance both with the spirit and tenor of his instructions ; but the mischief was done, the mandate had gone forth, and the appearance of the revenue moonshee sent out to collect the tribute, called down on himself and his escort immediate and condign punishment : they were attacked by Mahommed Khan Sheewannee, near Moostung, and slaughtered to a man.(8) A less barbarous and martial race would have remonstrated and petitioned against the violation of the pledge made at Bagh ; but of orderly and deliberate proceedings such as these the fiery chiefs of Shawl knew nothing : and with arms in their hands they sought, after the

6. Cutchee Letters.

7. *Friend of India*.

8. Cutchee Letters, No. 5, given *verbatim*. Masson speaks of a party of 25 Sepoys being cut off at Moostung, but says they were a portion of Lieut. Loveday's guard going on business to Quettah. We think the two narratives must relate to the same thing, and though we have referred to the other, the Cutchee writer is likely to be correct. The party accompanied Captain Bean's Moonshree to Moostung to collect revenue. On arrival at the place, the Moonshree sent in and ordered the chiefs to come out and make salaam to him ; this they refused to do, justly saying *he* was not their ruler. On this the Moonshree sent the sepoy to bring the chiefs out : an engagement took place, and the sepoy was driven back to the house where the Moonshree lived, which they gallantly defended until destroyed : this was told by a native who was present. The continuance of Captain Bean in office, and the obtaining for him a badge of the Dooraanee empire,—the last that was conferred,—is, after the repeated disapproval of his acts, and proofs of his incompetency, one of the numberless illustrations of Lord Auckland's character. He in general judged rightly, but wanted the decision or nerve to put his purposes into effect. Captain Bean had friends in the Secretariate, and Beloochistan was kept twelve months at war on this account.

fashion of their race, that redress which the justice of their cause deserved, but of which under their new rulers, it did not, or could not, assure them. They flew to arms, joined their banished chief Nusseer Khan: their cause and his became identified; and they quickly avenged their grievances, by besieging their oppressor in his stronghold. The particulars of this fall afterwards to be detailed. A process very similar to this was meanwhile being pursued in Cutchee. No intimation whatever was in the first place given to the chiefs that Cutchee had been disjoined from Kelat and annexed to the Dooranee empire, or that it had been made over by the Shah Soojah to the Government of India. Not only were the people never consulted; they were not so much as informed on these points. It was left to their own sagacity to discover that it was a Briton and not a Brahoo who now ruled over them. These omissions were trifling compared to the fatal mistakes which followed. "It was peculiarly unfortunate," observes Mr Masson, "and what might and ought to have been avoided, that both in Beloochistan and Affghanistan the traitors to the old order of things became the favoured and trusted adherents of the new: as might have been expected, the confidence so unwisely reposed in them was uniformly betrayed." Syud Mahomed himself had been appointed (by Mehrab Khan) Naib of Dajil and Hurrand, two provinces beyond the Murree Hills, and east of them. These provinces he sold to the Seikhs, and became a traitor to his master. Had it not been for his being a Syud, Mehrab Khan would have executed him. He was known to all as the greatest scoundrel in the country.

The treason and perfidy of the Syud Mahomed Sherreef to his late masters, was, as usual, recommendation enough to ensure him especial marks of our favour: and we met with the requital which those who patronize scoundrels are entitled to look for from their proteges. This man was appointed, by Mr Bell, Naib or collector of Cutchee, and in a country not famed for honesty, he could scarcely have found a more dishonest or thoroughbred rascal.(9) The territory whose supervision was committed to his hands occupied a space of from 5000 to 6000 square miles; and over this the Syud held absolute charge without the controul of a single European assistant. Within a few months of the fall of Kelat, which occurred November 1839, a letter was addressed to this man by Mr Bell, directing him to inform the chiefs that all the jagheers were attached, but that they would be restored to the lawful claimants on their appearing personally or by vakeel at Sukkur, and proving the validity of their sunnuds or charters of gift from the Crown.(10) It does not appear that Mr Bell was authorized by his superiors, without investi-

9. Cutchee Letters, No. 3, *verbatim*.

10. Cutchee Letters, No. 3, *abridged*.

gation, to deprive the whole proprietors of a province of hereditary estates even until their titles should be proved. When the measure was resolved upon, the best thing that could have been done was to make it known by proclamation, or in any other way which might render it most public and notorious. It is more than doubtful whether the Naib ever communicated to the parties most concerned the instructions he received from his superior. A few of the smaller landholders did appear at Sukkur, and had the proper seal attached to their title deeds; the rest, irritated by having rights questioned by intruders which had been held undoubted under their native sovereign, and maddened by the exactions and insolence of Mahomed Sherreef, shared in the discontent, and joined in the insurrection beginning in June to make its appearance everywhere throughout the country. The revenue from this unjust source which reached the treasury, was insignificant even at its best; the frauds and extortions by the Naib were boundless; and in a country where Syuds are almost worshipped, he alone of his class was subject of universal execration. Charges preferred against him by Europeans were not so much as listened to; his knavery was in the mouth of every native; his accounts, when called for at length, had to be drawn out afresh before they could be presented; like all the others in Cutchee, they remained for a twelvemonth, if they remain not still, unaudited. Yet no such thing was ever broached as the threat of his removal from office. Six months afterwards, when the chiefs had been driven to rebellion, and 2000 of the people slain in battle, an order was issued, though only partially carried into effect, that all the rights which had been held valid during the late reign should be so still; the whole question in dispute being, like that of the Murree tribute, abandoned after we had had our fill of fighting. But we are not yet done with the schemes which would almost seem to have been purposely contrived to drive the country to arms. The customs of Beila have already just been referred to. This province is governed by the Jam or chief, on a military tenure under Kelat. From the seaport of Sonmeanee the Khan, some generations back, had received as revenue half the duties collected—amounting to about £700 annually; these had, in consequence of an intermarriage with the Kelat family, been made over to the Jam in perpetuity: his other income derived from his jagheer amounted to about as much more. So soon as Newaz Khan was placed in power, the grant of the port duties was declared to be resumed; and they were made over to us for the liquidation of the sum of £5000 received in loan by the Khan. A British officer, who was directed not to acknowledge the local authority of the Jam, was appointed to make the collection. The chief appealed to the Bombay government, and thus managed to have his case brought to the notice of Lord Auckland, who censured and reversed every thing that had been done. Infinite alarm and irritation had been at first occasioned; but this act of the Government was

luckily in time to save the Jam and his tribe from joining the other insurgents against us.

When Nusseer Khan escaped from Kelat, on the capture of that fort by Sir T. Willshire, he sought refuge amongst the chiefs in Panjore: Newaz Khan soon afterwards set out on an expedition to expel or capture him; but though this was well planned, the youth had friends who made him aware of his danger, and so enabled him to escape: so that the first expedition in the new reign was unsuccessful. Enraged at his disappointment, the intrusive ruler avenged himself by plundering the tribes which had afforded his enemy shelter. A large amount of spoil was obtained, and the cruelties exercised were spoken of with horror long after. (11) A second expedition for a similar purpose, attended by the like results, and conducted in the same unhappy manner, was shortly afterwards made to Noosky. The allegiance of some disaffected chiefs was compelled before returning to the capital. On these occasions Lieutenant Loveday most unwisely accompanied the Khan—thus mixing himself and his government up with intestine broils in a manner said to have been highly displeasing to the Envoy and Minister. Directions to desist from these things for the future, alone prevented further expeditions from being engaged in. It did not seem that the son of Mehrab Khan had any idea of appearing for the present in arms, or that the chiefs intended to do any thing more in his favour than to afford him a place of refuge. Such was the state of matters betwixt November 1839 and June 1840. Lieut. Loveday appears to have occasionally suffered from an unsettled condition of mind: he lived in a state of the utmost seclusion, entertaining constant apprehensions of intruders upon his premises. He seems to have been a dog-fancier, and to have had with him a number of specimens of the fierce bull and mastiff races. These he is said occasionally to have hounded upon the populace, some of whom were worried to death. (12) To have ferocious beasts set loose upon them, was sufficient to exasperate people any where: it was amongst Mussulmans a heavy aggravation of the offence, that these were dogs held specially unclean by the prophet. The conduct of the Resident appears to have been such as to have occasioned excessive discontent: and the evil deeds of himself and the chief, to whose court he had been deputed, caused hatred and scorn to be mutually reflected on each of them. The garrison of Quettah had in May consisted of the Shah's 1st or Royal Regi-

11. Masson, p. 112.

12. Masson, p. 119. Masson's authority on this point we understand to be confirmed by at least one of the political agents who had the best means of being informed. We are bound to state, at the same time, that much of what is alleged against Lieutenant Loveday is believed to have had its origin amongst the Brahoes, who were glad to propagate every variety of calumny against him, to excuse their own cruel treatment of him. A camel man who had been in the employment of Lieutenant Loveday, stated at Lhereo that the dogs destroyed one man: this was afterwards confirmed by a native of Moostung.

ment, commanded by Captain Griffin, the 1st Troop of the Cabool H. A. under Lieut. Cooper, and the Bolan Rangers. These were shortly reduced by dispatch of troops to Candahar, so that by the middle of July, the force was diminished to 250 infantry, 80 horse, and 3 guns. The young prince Nusseer Khan was immediately summoned from his retreat to head the malcontents, and form a rallying point for the tribes. The Moostung insurgents moved straight upon the capital. Newaz Khan was not slow or indolent in endeavouring to collect troops from amongst the villages. Personally he was unpopular, doubly so as having been forced upon the country by infidels and foreigners, the conduct of whose representative was enough to cause general dissatisfaction. His treasury was empty, and his success in procuring succour commensurate with what might have been looked for under a combination of circumstances so eminently inauspicious. The insurgents meanwhile considering Kelat a secure prize at any time when they might find it most convenient to seize upon it, resolved to direct their efforts against Quetta, which had been nearly stripped of troops; its entire garrison mustering as already stated, under 400 men. Here a large quantity of treasure was believed to be kept, and the weakness of the force tempted to assault. It has already been mentioned that when it was found impossible to send Captain Brown relief from Scinde, that Captain Bean had promised him the assistance of the Kakur tribes, which had been taken into our pay; but that this scheme had been frustrated by these very stipendiaries turning their arms against us.⁽¹³⁾ The Kakurs had been at the same time engaged in double treaty—they were in terms with Captain Bean to assist in relieving the garrison at Kahna, and on treaty with the Murrees to secure its destruction. True to the latter and more congenial alliance, the first proof they appeared to have intended of their sincerity was the attack on Quetta, where they hoped to monopolize the spoil. The earliest assault occurred on the 22d of June, when the insurgents were repelled with considerable loss. They had taken up their quarters in a deep and narrow gorge nine or ten miles from the British camp, into which several of them had introduced themselves, pretending to be friends. These were detained, and in the course of the night the whole Kakur force, amounting to about 1000 men, advanced towards the town. They came on quickly, expecting to take the garrison by surprise, but were received with a discharge of grape, followed by a brisk fire of musquetry, which dispersed them at once. They fled towards the hills, pursued by the irregular horse, who cut up a few of them. The enemy had 20 killed, with 100 wounded and 3 prisoners: we had two sepoys killed, with 1 gunner wounded. It was considered expedient, however, to abandon the lines and place the troops within the walls until succour should

13. Vide ante, p. 180.

reach from Candahar-(14) Shortly after this, a reinforcement arrived from the eastward, consisting of the left wing of the Shah's regiment, which had been detached on duty, and a detachment from Killa Abdoola, under Lieut. Bosanquet. Thus reinforced, a party was sent out to reconnoitre the enemy at Moostung; and the result was that they were considered too formidable in point of strength to be attacked by the garrison. In this state matters continued for some time: the garrison at Quettah actually cooped up within the walls of that town for several weeks together. The assistance of Salu Khan, a Pesbeen chief, is said to have been purchased for £2,000: he forced his way through the insurgent host, and brought the effective aid of 600 horsemen to the relief of the garrison. The tribes still pressed the investment, and had actually prepared ladders for escalade, when disputes arose amongst them as to the points which each individual tribe should assail.(15) Captain Bean afterwards discovered the ladders in camp. Lieut. Cooper was dispatched from Candahar with a troop of horse artillery to assist Captain Bean: The insurgents now perceived that all hope of a successful attack on Quettah had vanished, and about the third week of July they accordingly broke up and decamped. Lieut. Jackson, with 200 Afghan horse sent to keep open the passes, had just before cut his way through their camp; he had arrived in 8 days from Candahar, 13 being in general allowed for the march. (16) When the tidings reached Kelat that the tribes had retired from Quettah, it was at first conjectured that having been foiled, they would for the present return to their homes, and defer the execution of any purposes against the capital which they might have formed. This conjecture proved erroneous. About the 22d July the insurgent host directed their steps to the southward. About the 23th, they appear to have presented themselves before the walls of Kelat. The unwillingness to assist Newaz Khan, was on the part of two important Chiefs aggravated when their cordial aid was most to be desired. It now for the first time transpired that the customs of Sonmeanee had been made over to the English, and that the estates in Cutchee, had, without any reason assigned, been confiscated. These things have elsewhere been stated in detail. Lieut. Loveday in this extremity undertook to interpose his authority, so as to

14. On reference to previous chapters, it will be found that this untoward event was nearly simultaneous with the general risings betwixt Ghuznie and Candahar, and with the earlier hostilities of the Murrees against Captain Brown: so that at Midsummer 1840, when at home Affghanistan was represented as in a state of universal tranquillity, we had three little wars raging in different portions of the Dooranee empire, on the results of two of which we had no grounds of felicitation.

15. Masson, p. 126—*Delhi Gazette, Bombay Times, Sept. 5.*

16. We have found much difficulty in making out the precise dates when those events occurred. Masson never gives one. The circumstance just mentioned is taken from the *Delhi Gazette* of the 26th Aug.

have matters settled according to the wishes of the malcontents, who were in this way for the time pacified.

All diligence was used to place the garrison in a state of defence; arms and ammunition were plentiful, but provisions unfortunately scarce. The assailants mustered from ten to twelve hundred strong, but had probably not more than five hundred matchlockmen at arms, while the garrison mustered about a similar number. This is Mr Masson's estimate, other writers uniformly guess them higher—at from six to eight thousand. The artillery on the walls unhappily proved nearly unserviceable. For three days irregular and desultory firing was kept up, when, on the fourth night, an escalade, which had proved all but successful, fifty of the insurgents having entered the town, was prevented by the bravery of the resistance of Lieut. Loveday's sepoy escort. Fear and treachery had now made their appearance amongst the garrison. Some days were spent in fruitless, and, as it appears, pusillanimous and discreditable negociation by the British resident, who by no persuasion could be induced to support Newaz Khan in his more courageous determination to resist to the last. At length, money and provisions having, bit by bit, been given over to the enemy, the town was taken possession of by permission of the rabble. Shah Newaz, indeed, had acted with zeal, determination, and perfect fidelity to us throughout. (17) The communication with Captain Bean had given them no reason to hope that assistance could be spared them, otherwise the defence might have been protracted till this arrived. Yet the town had hardly been surrendered when information was received that Lieutenant Hammersley, with fifty of Christie's Horse, and about four hundred horsemen under Salu Khan, had sallied out from Quettah, in the direction of Moostung. (18) They came up with a party of about four hundred of the insurgents, when nearly the whole of his cavalry refused to charge. The Affghan chief, and British officer, with a handful of the men, dashed in amongst the enemy, and killed great numbers: the whole would have been cut up had the troops proved staunch. Letters had been written by Lieutenant Loveday to Captain Bean, at the entreaty of the chiefs, offering to make submission, and to continue at peace with the British Government, provided the removal of Shah

17. For the whole of this we are indebted to Mr Masson's work. His account of the matter is unusually obscure. Lieutenant Loveday's servant stated that his master became a prisoner on the 20th August, and that the Brahoes immediately marched to Moostung, which they reached in three days: this man estimates the enemy at eight thousand strong.—*Bombay Gaz.*, Nov. 30.

18. *Delhi Gazette*, September 2d. There cannot have been two similar sallies by Lieutenant Hammersley. The *Delhi Gazette's* information seems derived from a Quettah correspondent, and appears to be correct. Yet Masson speaks of Hammersley having 1500 or 1600 infantry and cavalry, with horse artillery guns. This would have nearly exhausted the whole Quettah garrison, which, at this time, contained only two weak regiments, with Cooper's guns and some irregulars.

Newaz, and the restoration of the son of Mehrab, was conceded to them. To this Captain Bean replied by expressing his willingness to receive an Envoy from the insurgents, and his intention to recommend that the son of Mehrab should be acknowledged, but insisting that a letter of submissive allegiance should be written to Shah Soojah. This was the rock on which we invariably split. The Affghan tribes would have submitted to our direct and immediate rule with comparative willingness: their repugnance to the Government, and their aversion to the person, of Shah Soojah, nothing could overcome. The chiefs, on receiving this, expressed their willingness to make submission to the Lord Sahib, as they denominated the Envoy: he was, they said, the real Sovereign of the Empire, and to him they would pay homage in any form that might be desired of them, however humble: but the Shah's conduct to their late ruler had been so base and ungrateful that to him they would make no submission. (19) Though Kelat had for some time been in the hands of the insurgents, Lieutenant Loveday and Mr Masson were left at liberty, though closely watched, and their departure prevented. The Resident at this juncture unfortunately wrote to Captain Bean, recommending him to send four hundred horse to their relief, and instructing them in what manner their services would be most effective. The messenger proved treacherous, and the imprudent note was at once conveyed to the chiefs, who next night required Loveday to repair to the citadel to pay his respects to the young ruler. No escort was sent to conduct him, and it was impossible for him to have made his way through the infuriated multitude without danger, so the request was not complied with. Next night a sharp fire was opened on the residency, which was returned with interest by the sepoy guard, three of whose number unhappily fell. The musquetry speedily silenced the matchlocks of the enemy, and probably did considerable execution. The sepoys at length began to desert, and the Brahoes making their way into the building, longer resistance became futile. Lieutenant Loveday and Mr Masson being conducted to the durbar, were severely reproached by the Darogah, Ghool Mahommed; by the others they were received more civilly; but were speedily after placed in close confinement in a very loathsome apartment. The residency was completely plundered, and the whole property it contained appropriated by the multitude. From this till about the 20th of August, (20) various unsatisfactory interviews appear to have taken place betwixt the prisoners and insurgent

19. Masson, p 192.

20. Masson as usual leaves us entirely in the dark as to dates. From other sources it appears that Kelat was taken possession of on the 29th July, and that the insurgents reached Moostung, a distance of 90 miles, about the 22d August. Lieut. Loveday's servant declared the 20th August was the day on which his master became prisoner: he had been requested to recollect it.

leaders, chiefly with a view of arranging negotiations for peace with the political agent for Shawl. It was at length resolved that they should move in a body to Moostung, 25 miles from Quettah, with a view of endeavouring to promote peaceful negotiations, by being in the neighbourhood of Captain Bean. From this they were earnestly, but in vain, warned by Mr Masson; fresh troops were known to be on their way from Candahar; the insurgent followers were disorderly and intractable, and the villages sure to suffer at their hands; and the approach to the British camp seemed now the most likely thing that could be devised to provoke collision. Towards the conclusion of the march, letters were received from Capt. Bean, and the Brahoes fearing that Lieut. Loveday might attempt to make his escape, had him loaded with fetters and chained to a tent pole. Arriving at Moostung, Mr Masson and he were placed in close confinement, with a numerous guard set to watch over them. Negotiation was again renewed, and it is said that Captain Bean promised to procure the restoration of the young chief to his father's throne; he was to hold under the Shah Soojah; and though Sharawan and Cutchew were not immediately to be restored, composition was spoken of. (21) These were as conciliatory and reasonable terms as could have been desired—more so than might have been expected. A private letter to Nusseer Khan himself, accompanying this, is said to have occasioned great indignation amongst the insurgent leaders. By this it was insisted that the Khan should immediately surrender Kelat—that he should proceed to Candahar to make his obeisance to the Shah—and that after that he should do whatever was required of him. On such conditions were his claims to acknowledgment to meet with consideration. On these points Mr Masson is our sole authority; and incredible as his statements may appear, the most extraordinary nature of the proceedings was in no shape out of keeping with most of our political transactions beyond the Indus in the years 1840 and 1841. It was at length determined that a messenger should be sent with powers to see what could be effected in the way of personal treaty, and Mr Masson was selected as the party best suited for this purpose. The negotiations appear to have occupied about three weeks in all; and about the 21st of September the traveller was dispatched, at the request of Lieutenant Loveday, as ambassador to Quettah, to arrange the terms of peace, when he was immediately placed under arrest by Captain Bean, on suspicion of being a Russian spy! (22)

It must here be remarked in passing, that the Russophobia which two years before appeared to have blinded the understandings of the Teheran and Cabool missions, had not wholly, though it had in a considerable mea-

21. Masson, p. 244.

22. In a letter from Mr Masson in the *Bombay Times* of 14th Nov. 1840, we find copies of letters betwixt him and Captain Bean of the 25th and 26th September. These seem to have been written a few days after his arrival, which probably was about the 21st, as mentioned in the text.

sure, passed away. Even the better-informed and more able of the politicals, who in 1837 and 1838 actually raved about Russia, and saw an emissary or a spy in every ragamuffian who did not choose to give an account of himself, or who desired to play upon their fears, still wrote of the advance on Khiva, and of the dangers of intrigue at Herat, as things for which the British empire had cause to tremble. The printed papers on these subjects betray much futile fear and anxiety, totally unwarranted by any thing set forth by those affected by it.

The disease which had nearly exhausted itself in the quarter where it first broke out, now made its appearance and spread amongst the weaker minded of the politicals scattered everywhere over the country. That which in 1837 and 1838 affected the solid and clear understandings of such men as Sir John McNeil and Sir Alexander Burnes, in 1840 totally upset the addled brains of such weak-minded persons as Lieutenant Loveday and Captain Bean, who seemed to imagine that there was something in discovering, or even in suspecting, Russian intrigue, which allied them, if only in their frailties, with the more eminent individuals with whom they were now associated.

The possession of the most unlimited amount of absolute and irresponsible power in an enemy's country seems besides to have turned the heads of many of the younger politicals, whose freaks and caprices in the tyrannous exercise of the authority so unwisely committed to them might readily seem incredible, were our information on the subject one whit less copious or authentic than it really is. These matters will develop themselves by and bye; what has been said may be enough to assist us at all events, in accounting for the conduct of Captain Bean—a singularly weak-minded, confused, willful, and capricious man, who appeared to the end incapable of comprehending the absurdity he had committed.

The grounds on which Mr Masson was put under restraint were some mysterious and discreditable letters written by Lieutenant Loveday—but afterwards explained away by the writer,—who stated that the conduct of the imagined spy during the siege had been “noble,” and that no suspicion any longer attached to him;—and a letter from Major Outram, intimating that 200 Brahoes had assembled in Kej in favour of Nusseer Khan, with whom Capt. Bean had most unaccountably suspected Mr Masson of being connected. Major Outram, the moment he discovered the use that had been made of his letter, hastened to disclaim all suspicion—declaring that nothing was farther from his thoughts than to dream of Russian emissaries. Notwithstanding this the captive was detained for a period of four months in durance, until repeated references had been made, first to the Envoy, and finally to the Governor-General.

No more unpardonable sin could in those days be committed than for a stranger—who might, perhaps, make disclosures of mismanagement—to in-

trude himself into the region of the misrule of the young politicals. Sir W. Macnaghten had too recently been a close correspondent with Mr Masson (July 1838), and knew his character too well to sympathise with the suspicions of Captain Bean,—while, at Calcutta, the whole affair must have seemed absolutely ludicrous. His answer to Mr Masson (10th Oct. 1840) is as absurd an one as could well be supposed. He stated that he did authorize Captain Bean to detain him until the pleasure of the Governor-General should be ascertained as to his being permitted to prosecute his travels in countries subject to the crown of Cabool, seeing that he was without permission to do so, either from the Shah Soojah or the British government! The Envoy had all along insisted, when any particular act of wrong was perpetrated by the Shah on his subjects, that he was an independent prince with whom we had no right to interfere:—yet here it is assumed that no traveller could enter the states subsidiary to the Doorannee empire without permission of the British government! Alarmed Shah himself would never have dreamt that he had power to exclude travellers from Cabool in the most palmy days of his authority—much more from distant subsidiary states, which scarcely acknowledged allegiance to him. The arrogance, as well as the absurdity, of the Envoy's claim, was characteristic of the politicals of the time. The infirmity of Lord Auckland—which was the bane of his foreign policy throughout—was his want of decision of character and determination immediately to put down what was wrong in the conduct of a public servant. Instead of pursuing the dignified course of censuring the Shawl political, and ordering the immediate liberation of the wrongfully suspected spy, the matter was referred to Mr Ross Bell,—who, whatever might be his other frailties, was neither chargeable with fear of responsibility, want of talent, nor deficiency in decision: Mr Bell, on examining into the facts, saw at once the enormity of the blunder that had been committed, and the ridicule to which it exposed its authors and abettors. Mr Masson was so perfectly well known to the leading politicals and literary men who had been in any way concerned in the affairs of Afghanistan, his habits and pursuits so familiar to the literary world, and his journey from Kurrachee to Kelat in April and May so absolutely void of mystery or suspicion, that it required an amount of perverseness of perception to extort from it a charge, such as was scarcely credible even in the political agent of Shawl. The traveller was ordered to be liberated without delay, and to be permitted to proceed on his way wherever he thought fit: a guard being furnished him should he desire to proceed to Kelat or Seinde. He chose the latter route, and pursued his journey to Bombay, where he resided for many months, and thence departed for England. On the 15th September, the following reinforcements reached Quettah from Candahar—the Shah's 2d infantry, the 43d Bengal N. I., 100 Sowars of the 1st cavalry, and two of the Shah's guns: a few days afterwards General

Nott joined with the light company of the Bengal 42d N. I., and 80 of the 4th local horse, raising the force to nearly 3000 men of all arms. The Beloochees having waited for a considerable time in expectation of the arrival of their messenger, at length to their astonishment discovered the mishap that had so unexpectedly befallen him. A letter received from Capt. Bean so incensed the chiefs that they resolved at first to kill Lieut. Loveday on the spot; but speedily changed their purpose, determining instead to be revenged on us by plundering Cutchee, and attacking our troops whenever they could be taken at a disadvantage: they moved their camp from Moostung, and proceeded through the Bolan Pass, determined to inflict as much injury upon us as they were able.

These mishaps at Kelat and at Kahun occurring almost simultaneously, convinced the authorities of the necessity of immediately dispatching large reinforcements to Scinde. The 6th N. I. was ordered to start from Deesa and march by Nugger Parkur, through the sands to Omercote. Captain Del Hoste was directed to take charge of this regiment in its journey across the desert. He was left without any directions, save that he should take his own way and conduct the march with as much speed and as little risk as possible: government felt the fullest confidence in his competence for the task. The country was then almost entirely unknown; for nearly 100 miles neither villages nor inhabitants were to be found. The heat was most intense, the road difficult, and water there was none. With all these obstacles to contend with, they reached Sukkur in safety under the able pilotage of the gallant and distinguished officer who had undertaken to guide them. The 8th, 21st, and 25th were dispatched from Bombay. Betwixt the 27th January and 19th December 1840, in fact, a force of nearly 6,000 men left the Western Presidency for Kurrachee, in addition to those moved from the upper provinces; so that a larger *regular* army was found essential to keep the peace betwixt Quettah and Kurrachee, within a twelve-month of Lord Keane's return through the Punjaub, than had been thought necessary for the capture of Candahar, Ghuznie, and Cabool. (23) At this.

23. The following abstract of the number of troops dispatched from Bombay within the period referred to, is from the returns of the Commissary General's Office:—

Date of Departure.	Names of Vessels.	Officers.		Troops.
		Exr.	Nat.	
1840				
27th Jany.	Ship Hannah.....	10	0	176
1st March	Ditto.....	4	1	273
24th ditto	Ship Resolution.....	1	0	72
18th Augt.	Steamer Berenice.....	4	3	227
Ditto	Cleopatra.....	2	2	226
Ditto	Barque Benares.....	2	2	36
22nd Augt.	Brig Palinurus.....	6	2	68
29th ditto	Steamer Berenice.....	6	4	272
2nd Sept.	Cleopatra.....	8	6	398
10th ditto	Barque Benares.....	3	3	164
11th ditto	Ship Charles Forbes.....	13	7	492
21st ditto	Steamer Hugh Lindsay.....	4	0	168

time, 10,000 camels, at the cost of upwards of £80,000, were ordered to be purchased for the use of the army in Scinde.

The insurgents had threatened Lheree, then very weakly garrisoned. In the 2d week of October they had assembled in some force at Khunda.

On the 14th October a detachment, consisting of Captain Curtis's Irregular Horse, with a wing of H. M.'s 40th, reached Kundah. Information having been received immediately on their arrival, that the Brahoes were approaching with the view of plundering the town, accompanied by a large number of camels to carry away the spoil, the horse were instantly sent upon their track. But though on foot and carefully guarding their camels, the insurgents for some time succeeded in keeping the sowars at bay, amongst some close thick jowarree jungle, from which they fired their matchlocks on scouts and reconnoiterers. The Irregular Horse were led on by Captain Curtis and Lieut. Postans, assistant Political Agent in Scinde, but the enemy retired too rapidly to permit the infantry to overtake them in the tangled ground they had now reached. Our horsemen behaved most gallantly, and the enemy defended themselves with desperation as they retired. One hundred and forty are said to have been killed, and 84 camels were captured from them. Our casualties amounted to two killed and three wounded. (24) Around Bagh, where a detachment of the 5th N.I. was stationed, the same system of universal plunder appeared to have been practised. Early in October the Head-quarters of the 23d N. I. were ordered to proceed as a reinforcement from Shikarpore. About the 24th, Lieut. Vardon having been out with a party of Beloochee auxiliary horse, met a strong detachment of Brahoes about 20 miles from Bagh: he immediately attacked, and, after a sharp encounter, defeated them, capturing 1100 head of cattle, and leaving 25 of their people dead upon the field. Reinforcements in light detachments were now pressing upwards with all dispatch from Sukkur to the disturbed regions along the base of the mountains. Major Boscawen with a wing of H.M.'s 40th, the whole of the Ben-

27th Sept.	Steamer	Sesostris.....	31	12	897
Ditto	"	Cleopatra.....	5		
8th Oct.	"	Zenobia.....	0	1	40
10th ditto	"	Cleopatra.....	14	0	355
15th ditto	"	Hugh Lindsay.....	12	1	90
23rd ditto	"	Zenobia.....	7	0	47
25th Oct.	"	Cleopatra.....	16	0	321
1st Nov.	"	Hugh Lindsay.....	0	4	250
4th Nov.	"	Zenobia.....	11	5	550
24th ditto	"	Zenobia.....	4	0	125
19th Dec.	"	Sesostris.....	10	2	307
Total			140	56	5568

24. *Bombay Gazette*, Nov. 9; *Bombay Times*, Dec. 2. The latter paper states that this occurred at Kotrah, and the detachment was that of Major Boscawen, i. e. wing of H.M.'s 40th, Bengal 38th, and Poonah Horse; and that the action occurred on the 18th. The two are agreed as to the general results, casualties, &c.

gal 33th, and some guns and irregular horse, left Shikarpore on the 15th October, and directed his march towards Kotra; while the Bombay 25th N. I. were sent to watch the opening of the Moolah Pass to prevent the Brahmes from plundering the country. The latter regiment was on its way from Kurrachee, and was joined by the right wing at Latkhanah, and thence proceeded across the desert in the direction of Gundava. On its march the 25th experienced proofs, which they were scarcely prepared for, of the audacity and expertness in the art of thieving of the people into whose country they were advancing. One night about 11 o'clock, a party of marauders came quickly down on the advancing force, under cover of some jungle, and mixing themselves up amongst the baggage-camels in the rear, succeeded in carrying off six of them with their loads before anything wrong was suspected. A cry from the camel men made the officer aware of the accident, when the Grenadier company, under Lieuts. Jackson and Phayre, were ordered back to search the jungle. Their efforts were in vain: they recovered nothing, and only exposed themselves to further risk in the darkness and confusion. (25) About 10 o'clock in the morning, shortly after this, a party of 30 horsemen galloped at speed upon a number of camels feeding about a mile from camp, and, before any alarm could be given, or assistance afforded, they hamstringed six and carried off two of them, and then made good their retreat. They were pursued three or four miles but in vain; a sepoy managed to shoot one of the horses, but the rider escaped. The detachment joined Major Boscawen on the 31st October. The enemy continued to ravage the country and sack and burn the villages on the whole line of the advance. Concealing themselves from our troops during the day, they prowled abroad so soon as darkness set in, and spread devastation everywhere.

The detachment already detailed had reached Gundava under the above officer a week before (23d October,) but unfortunately too late to save it from total sack, and the demolition of all the property contained in it. "The most determined desire of destruction," says an officer of the force, writing from the spot (26) "seems to have influenced the rebels in their attack; they levelled and burnt that which they could not carry away; the value of the property destroyed is about 3½ lakhs (£35,000 Sterling). The houses of the Hindoos had been fired, and the rich and thriving Gundava presented a general scene of misery and desolation." The advance of our troops was a signal for the enemy to retire; they fell back on Kotra, which they threatened with a similar fate to that which they had inflicted on Gundava; but, fortunately, it was saved. This was the natural but fierce vengeance the Brahmes took on the estates of which they had just before been so iniqui-

25. Letter from an officer of the 25th N.I.; *Bombay Times*, Nov. 21.

26. Letter from upper Sciude; *Bombay Times*, Nov. 11.

tously deprived by us. We had stripped them of their heritage without cause, and they resolved our plunder should not profit us.

On the 28th October, the Brahoes, amounting to betwixt 4000 and 5000 men, emerged from the Bolan Pass under Nusseer Khan, and took up a position two miles to the south of the mouth of the defile, near the entrenched camp at Dadur. The force in camp numbered about 575—200 of the 5th, and 225 of the 29d N.I., commanded by Captain Watkins of the latter corps, and 120 of the Bengal Local Horse. On the 29th, they advanced to the attack at first steadily and slowly, increasing their speed as they drew near, and raising a shout as they prepared to charge. A fire of round shot and shrapnell was opened upon them from the guns on the entrenchments so soon as they got within range. Undaunted by the destruction this caused amongst their ranks, they divided their force into two parties—one advancing along the front, the other moving to the right and rear of the breast-work. The first of the attacking parties proceeded to a position where the whole detachment of Local Horse was stationed: they were gallantly charged and repulsed by the Sowars, leaving about 40 dead upon the field. Lieut. M'Pherson, 43d Regt. B.N.I., who headed the charge, was wounded, as also were 20 of his men—one only was killed. While this was passing, Captain Heath of the 5th plied the enemy so hotly with grape that they retired beyond range, ensconcing themselves in a mud village about half a mile off. About sunset, however, they again formed and advanced, taking up a position on the left of the Sower lines, from which they could not be dislodged. From this they kept up a desultory fire of matchlocks, which was replied to during the earlier portion of the night from the breast-works and fortified summit of the commissariat store room. About 2 p. m., they once more advanced in line to attack the breast-work, but were repulsed with heavy loss—one of their chiefs having fallen. Nothing daunted by these successive checks, and once more reinforced to a strength of full 5000, they, on the 31st October, advanced on the breast-work, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. They pressed on in two divisions, the one headed by the young Khan with his standard displayed: and took up a position about 200 yards from the breast-work. Having been compelled by the fire of grape and shrapnell to retire from this, about 1000 of them made for the town of Dadur, where they were at once admitted by the Beloochee inhabitants. The population of the town, which is surrounded by a thick mud wall, and surmounted by a strong citadel, amounts to about 2000. The Hindoo, that is the wealthier, portion of them, were plundered and maltreated, and the part of the town which they occupied sacked before our eyes. The fortified camp had been constructed two miles from the fort to prevent collision with the inhabitants, and avoid the filth and annoyance from which, in the neighbourhood of Indian

towns, our troops suffer. The remainder of the enemy having, about 6 p. m., taken up a position in the compound where the Bengal Horse were posted, were driven from this by our artillery, and as night drew on retired towards Dadur. Lieutenants M'Pherson and Cartwright were wounded, 3 men were killed, and 30 wounded. (27) The fighting seems to have been very severe, and 150 of the enemy are said to have fallen. Scarcely had the above gallant series of encounters closed, when a wing of H. M.'s 40th and the Bengal 38th N. I. arrived at Dadur. It has been mentioned that Nusseer Khan, with the force of the strength formerly noticed, was encamped near the mouth of the Bolan Pass, four miles off, determined, apparently, to make another attack on the town or field works. Every preparation was made for their reception—but as they did not seem disposed to attack us with so much alacrity as was desired, on the 3d November Major Boscawen, with the whole of the reinforcement just named, two guns, and the regular cavalry, proceeded in quest of them. The Brahoes hearing of his approach, retired rapidly up the Pass, leaving their camp standing. Owing to the extreme difficulty of the road, pursuit was impossible, so that they escaped for the present. Their camp, containing the jewels of the young chief, with property of the value of £1000, was taken possession of. Lieutenant Loveday was found murdered, as was supposed by some of the chiefs: the crime appeared to have been perpetrated by a horse-keeper, who, when he found that the poor prisoner who had for two months been dragged along with them must be left behind and fall into the hands of friends, returned and nearly severed his head from his body. He was found heavily ironed, and nearly naked, chained to a kajawa or camel chair. His body seemed much bruised; and it is to be feared that, from the time the tribes left Quettah, his sufferings must have been extreme. The loss of the enemy in these various encounters is estimated at from 150 to 400 men—authorities writing from the spot being in the last degree discrepant on this point—300 may perhaps be pretty near the mark: 70 are said to have fallen on the 29th, 150 on the 31st Oct., and 30 on the 1st Nov.: the casualties on the other days not being mentioned.

The Brahoes, immediately after this, appear, for a time, to have despaired; and Nusseer Khan, with his step-dame, and several of the chiefs, having separated themselves from the rest, were left to wander in the Bolan Pass almost without a follower.

Meanwhile General Nott started from Quettah with a strong detachment to recover Kelat: he encountered no resistance, and, when he arrived under the walls, found that the town had been vacated four days before. He accordingly took possession on the 2d November, and left Lieut.-Colonel Stacy, with the Bengal 43d, to maintain the now tenantless

garrison. Mr Bell was understood to have been dissatisfied with General Nott's advance, wishing probably to let the affairs of Kelat settle down of themselves, and desirous to observe the effect of a little quiescence and non-interference. At this time a strong and general disposition began to be expressed to make peace with the Brahoe chief. The various charges against his father began to be proved unfounded: and even had they been otherwise, his life had paid the penalty of his errors. Neither Nusseer Khan, nor his stepmother, the life and soul of the insurrection, were in any way implicated in the more violent proceedings of the tribes. The facility with which Newaz Khan, who had now passed through Scinde towards Hydrabad, had been discarded, clearly proved that he had no hold on the affections of the people; while it was equally apparent that no advantage whatever was to be gained by maintaining a detested ruler amongst a race at once needy, warlike, and revengeful. The Vuzeer of Kelat, who had been detained since its capture the preceding November, a prisoner at Bukkur, was set at liberty, and it was understood to be the wish of Shah Soojah himself, as well as the Envoy, and Governor-General, that submission should first be obtained, when the Khanite would be restored to the rightful heir. These humane and prudent wishes appear to have been marred by the mismanagement of the political agents; and the Brahoes had now no longer any faith in our professions of friendship and forbearance.

On the death of Brigadier Stevenson on the 9th of August, Genl. Brooks had been nominated to the command in Scinde; and Colonel Valiant, K.H., of Her Majesty's 40th, tendered his services to Government, which were accepted of, and he appointed to the command of a brigade. These officers, together with Major Holland, deputy quarter-master-general, left Bombay on the 15th of October, as soon as the state of the weather would permit, and, having reached Kurrachee by sea, arrived at Sukkur on the 1st November. The force in the field between Kurrachee and Quettah at this time amounted to nearly 10,000 men, and immediate preparations were made for moving a very strong detachment towards Quettah. It was said that the intelligence from Herat was such that the Scinde politicals were determined to march a force towards the Persian frontier. This, as it appears from the papers published by Parliament in 1843, was without the cognizance of the Bengal government, whose severe displeasure was expressed as soon as they became aware of what was intended to be attempted. The posts along the foot of the mountains had all been strengthened, the villages were mostly destroyed, and the efforts of the enemy to annoy us seemed to have slackened, partly from having suffered so severely at our hands, and in part because they had already accomplished nearly all the mischief they could inflict upon us.

Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall having taken command of the Brigade now assembled near Kotra, consisting of the 25th N. I., with detachments of the 2nd Grenadiers and 21st N. I., with details of the 5th and 6th companies of light artillery and irregular horse, on the 26th Nov. proceeded without delay to take active measures against the insurgents. Having learnt that Nusseer Khan was in strong force within six miles of his camp, he went out with a reconnoitering party to satisfy himself on the subject. He started at 3 in the morning with 250 men under Capt. Teasdale, a company of the 2nd Grenadiers 100 strong, under Capt. Boyd, 1 gun, and 20 irregular horse. (28) One of their objects was to occupy the pass, and prevent the insurgents from escaping in that direction. Having by 6 o'clock threaded the gorge and ascended the hill, with 1 gun and 250 irregulars, he at 9 discovered the enemy in great strength, occupying a difficult position commanding the entrance into the body of the hills. Our troops took up a station 300 yards from them, when Nusseer Khan sent a message expressive of his anxiety for peace. "I gave him," says Colonel Marshall, from whose despatch our extract is taken, "one hour to decide finally [the gallant officer does not state what he was to decide upon; he had before expressed his anxiety for peace without condition] before I opened fire; at the same time I immediately sent and ordered Capt. Teasdale to join us with his horse as quickly as possible, as I saw I was too weak to dislodge them should the Khan decide on fighting. The rascals opened fire on us from the hills for more than three-quarters of an hour, but did no harm. I would not allow a shot to be fired in return until the hour had expired, as I thought it might defeat the object Mr. Bell had in view of the Khan coming into camp to make terms of peace." At the expiration of the hour the Khan sent by his Vizier a letter with his seal affixed, stating that within a few days he would disband his followers, and proceed to Mr. Bell to make submission, with an assurance that he would not again be cut off from Col. Marshall's camp. On receipt of this Col. Marshall withdrew his troops and returned to camp. Mahomed Hussein, a native in our employ as a spy, having next day (Nov. 27) stated that the Khan was destitute of provisions and of the means of making his way to Shikarpore, Col. Marshall advanced him rupees 2000 (£200) to overcome the difficulty. This man had been the minister of Mehrab Khan, and was taken prisoner by us and detained at Bukkur; he was now deputed as ambassador from Mr. Bell, in negotiating a treaty not meant to be fulfilled! The letters detailing these things are dated the 27th and 28th, and could not have reached General Brooks before the 31st November. While arrangements for peace were thus being proceeded with between the

28. Colonel Marshall's letter to General Brooks, November 27th and 28th, and P. S.

British commander and insurgent force, a peremptory order was forwarded by General Brooks from Sukkur to attack the enemy without delay. The letter is dated the 27th, and must have been written without cognizance of the requests of the Khan, Colonel Marshall being then 150 miles from Sukkur.(29)

29. The letter is from Major Holland, Deputy Quarter-Master General, and is of sufficient importance to be subjoined entire :—

Deputy Quarter-Master General's Office, Camp Sukkur, 27th November, 1840.

SIR,—I am directed by Major-General Brooks, commanding the Field Army, to acquaint you that, by information received from Sehun Lal, the native agent at Kotria, it appears that a body of insurgent Brahoes, amounting to about 1200 men, located at the entrance of this Pass not more than 8 miles from your post, have been lulled into fancied security by our apparent inactivity.

2. This state of affairs leads the Major-General, in communication with the Political Agent, to consider that an attack judiciously planned, and with the utmost secrecy and caution, will enable you, without fail, to cut up and destroy this body ; and with this view I am to give you the following information.

3. The enclosed Persian letter from Mr. Ross Bell to Sehun Lal, contains that gentleman's instructions to him to place himself under your orders, for the purpose above mentioned, to furnish you with guides, to accompany you in person, and to procure and furnish you the most specific information as to the position occupied by the Brahoes,—whether on the height, in the hollow, or in the defile, and their state and numbers ; in order to enable you to concoct your plans for surprising them.

4. You will send for Sehun Lal, and deliver the enclosed letter to him—no other person being present, directing him, after he has read and made known its contents to you, to deliver it into your keeping ; you will then arrange your plans with him—placing the most implicit reliance on his good faith.

5. You are not to communicate the subject of this letter to any one, as the whole success of the plan depends on the most profound secrecy being observed ; and you will endeavour, in preparing your troops, to do so in such manner as to give rise to no suspicions of your objects.

6. You will leave 200 men, under the command of a steady intelligent officer, in your camp ; and you will take with you the remainder of your infantry, and all your cavalry ; and so arrange your march as to fall on the enemy at day-break.

7. You will take *no tents or baggage* of any kind : the men to carry one meal in their havresacks, and to fill their canteens ; their pouches are to be well supplied with cartridges.

8. You are on no account to advance more than one day's march from your camp : you will pay particular attention to the guides ; they are to be well treated, but closely watched, and in case of treachery put to death on the spot ; and you will take care that, if there is the least cause for suspicion, they shall not escape you.

9. In conclusion, I am directed to repeat, that nothing but the most complete secrecy, as to your plans and intentions, can give you success,—and the Major-General enjoins this above all things : even your officers should not know your intentions till you are close to the Pass. You will, of course, grant quarter to those who surrender.

(Signed) JAMES HOLLAND, Major,
Dep. Qr.-Mr. Genl. of the Army.

P. S.—Nusseer Khan's position is stated by Sehun Lal to be on the Kotria side of Peer Obutta. The latter place is 12½ miles from Kotria, and the road to it is good. The next march within the hills is Kuttur Kahun, distant 8 miles, and the road to it leads through a defile, and is very difficult the whole way ; I would

When the order to attack the insurgents reached Col. Marshall, he was no longer at war with the Brahoes, who had sued for peace on certain terms, which, so far as was known to the contrary, they intended faithfully to fulfil. The days granted to Nusseer Khan to disperse his followers, and proceed to surrender himself to Mr. Bell, had not yet expired; and there is nothing anywhere set down which authorises the belief that the chief designed to break his word. A new attack by Col. Marshall after he had drawn off his troops on the 26th, and advanced money for friendly purposes to the Khan on the 27th, without additional provocation or grounds for the suspicion of bad faith, was as distinct a breach of truce, and as flagrant a violation of the spirit of the treaty just entered on, as was the attack of the Affghans on the retiring army of General Elphinstone in January 1842. These were points, however, on which the Scinde politicals of 1840 felt no hesitation; in reference to which after they were over they appear neither to have experienced compunction or drawn down censure from their superiors. It was said that information had been received that strong reinforcements were expected by the insurgents,—three parties of Brahoes, one of 3000, one of 5000, and one of 2000 men! Had such a force as this been in existence, the defeat of 3000 at Kotra was unlikely to have ensured us peace from so determined a foe. The rumour was probably got up by a native spy with a view of bringing on an action. These gentry throve well on their country's disorders.

Agreeably to the instructions contained in the despatch of General Brooks, which had been forwarded express by his aide-de-camp, Capt. Smith, (30) Col. Marshall with the main body of the force, consisting of 900 men, of the 2nd Grenadiers, the 21st and 25th N. I., with 60 irregular horse and two guns, started shortly after midnight, and proceeded straight for the enemy's camp, a distance of about six miles. The Brahoes, apparently confiding in the truce entered on two days before, were taken completely by

therefore advise, that should Nusseer Khan's position have been changed since last accounts, and he be on the Kahan or Kuttur side of Peer Chuttah, although only a mile, the movement of the detachment should be suspended.

(Signed) G. BROOKS.
J. HOLLAND.

Nahomed Hussein, stated in the text as a spy, was no other than the ex-prime minister of Kelat, who had just before been released from prison by Mr Bell, and sent as an ambassador to Nusseer Khan, to treat with him for surrender! The order directing Colonel Marshall to attack the Brahoes was approved of by Mr Bell, and written in his house!

30. Lieutenant Smith of the Bengal 16th N. I.—This zealous and active officer left Sukkur at 2 o'clock on the 28th of December, and although his progress was greatly impeded by falling in with a large body of the enemy's cavalry, who followed and fired on him for several miles, he reached Colonel Marshall's camp on the morning of the 30th; completing a journey of 150 miles in 38 hours. The accounts of the whole of this affair are taken almost unaltered from the despatches.

surprise. Capt. Teasdale of the 25th, made a detour of 21 miles by Peer Chutta, with 500 men, and so took the enemy in the rear and cut off his retreat. Capt. Ennis with 200 men pushed over a portion of extremely difficult ground, and so outflanked them and drove them back upon our guns; by which means many were slain, and 180 were taken prisoners.

The resistance of the insurgents was most determined: they numbered betwixt 3000 and 4000 men: their position was strong, and they disputed every inch of ground. Nothing could have exceeded the courage and conduct of the sepoys that day; excited by the constant fighting and marauding which had occurred all around for six weeks anterior to this, when the enemy in general contrived to elude them before any serious damage had been done, they determined to pay off old scores. The death of Lieutenant Loveday had excited them to a pitch of fury, and as some charge more destructive than the rest was made, or deadly volley thrown in, the cry was "remember Loveday Sahib—let us revenge him;" and fearfully were they avenged that day. After three hours hard fighting the Brahoes were totally defeated, and made their way through the unoccupied ravines, or up the mountains the best way they could. Nusseer Khan, attended, as was believed, by Gool Mahomed, was seen crossing the heights on horseback, almost alone. Betwixt 400 and 500 of the enemy were left dead upon the field. Four of the principal chiefs were taken. The kettle-drums, standards, and camp furniture fell into our hands, together with carpets, wearing apparel, and a great number of beautifully illuminated copies of the Koran.(31) Our loss amounted to 4 killed and 30 wounded. Amongst the former was Lieutenant and Quarter-Master Lodge, 25th Regt. N.I., who was shot through the thigh, and almost immediately bled to death.

The prisoners were dispatched for Sukkur under charge of Captain Smith, aide-de-camp to General Brooks, who was directed to shoot them in case their rescue should be attempted.(32)

This victory was so complete—the battle so unexpected and so disastrous to the enemy, that for the present they dispersed and left us without annoyance. They had, since they deputed Mr Masson to treat with Captain

31. *Asiatic Journal*, April 1841, p. 303.

32. Colonel Marshall's words are—"I have directed Captain Smith, in the event of any attempt being made to rescue the prisoners in his charge, or any attempt being made by them to escape, to shoot them on the spot."—Letter to General Brooks, 3d December. We believe there is nothing unusual in this. When a report got abroad that Ukhbar Khan had directed our prisoners to be killed, should any attempt be made to rescue them, the cry was raised that he had done the most atrocious and fiend-like thing on earth. Captain Johnston, who had been the party to disseminate this rumour, found that it was untrue, and that Saleh Khan had misled him. He took every means in his power to obtain for it a contradiction, but not one in ten of the journals which propagated the error had the honesty to correct it!

Bean, lost upwards of 2000 men out of a force which at no time seems to have exceeded 7000 at the uttermost, if ever it was higher than five. The only fruits of the victory were, that any little confidence the Brahoes might before have entertained of British faith was dissipated: they fled to the mountains to bide their time, having no longer any wish or heart to treat with us. Singularly enough, the ordinary official reports of this action were not forwarded to the Governor-General, who, so late as the 29th March, remarks on this unexplained fact, and then for the first time publishes in the *Gazette*, extracts of the field orders of Colonel Marshall and General Brooks, from which this part of the narrative is chiefly abridged.

The excellent conduct of the sepoys at Kotra has just been mentioned: the whole of the correspondence from Scinde at this period bears unvarying and enthusiastic testimony to the admirable patience, courage, and spirit with which they conducted themselves throughout this harrassing campaign. Though fighting in a country which was new, and with an enemy not only strange to them, but surpassing in strength, courage, and determination, as well as arms and appointments, any they had before encountered, no Europeans could have done better service to the state. To this there had not as yet occurred a single case of exception.

Meanwhile, though the Murrees and Bhooqties had been pacified, and the Brahoes disabled, there were rumours of formidable disturbances above the pass, both to the east and west, around Candahar, and on the Persian frontier, which caused a general movement to be hastened of the principal body of the troops in Scinde.

The 1st Light Cavalry, and Irregular Horse, left Shikarpore for Dadur on the 5th January; the 4th troop Horse Artillery, and right wing of the Bombay 20th N.I. started on the 12th from the same place for Quetta; and the 1st troop H. A. and left wing of the 20th N.I. marched for Bhag on the 14th. Previously, the 2d Grenadiers, with some Irregular Horse, marched from Sukkur with a convoy of 3000 camels and 200 carts. The stores were left at Bhag; the Regt. proceeded to Dadur in order to relieve the Bengal 38th N.I., which left for Quetta on New-year's-day. The head quarter wing of H.M. 40th, which had shortly before arrived from Kurachee, the 21st N.I., with a body of Irregular Horse, left for Bhag on the 15th. The cavalry, the 41st, and Capt. Pontardent's artillery, followed a few days afterwards. (33) General Brooks with a strong force reached Shikarpore on the 5th, and Mr Bell joined him on the 7th. (34)

The confidence of the people in our protection had been so far restored that they returned to their villages and commenced the cultivation of their fields. Nusseer Khan still kept the hills, his step-dame found shelter amongst

the Dodah Murrees. The country throughout the month of January kept tranquil: it was gorged with troops, occasioning an expenditure amongst the people of many times the amount of the revenue of the whole region we occupied. Mr Bell meanwhile directed the chiefs taken at Kotra to be liberated unconditionally and sent to their own country loaded with presents. (35) The ejected Shah Newaz was now at Larkhana, Government having allowed him a pension of £1200 a year. (36) This was afterwards reduced a half, and finally altogether withdrawn by Sir C. Napier in 1843. Colonel Staey continued to conduct matters with much prudence at Kelat, where the people returned to their homes, and the bazaar once more became occupied by nearly 1000 residents. (37) So much confidence had this inspired that it was expected Nusseer Khan would give himself up. But though he must by this time have been repeatedly apprised of our friendly intentions towards him, he would not trust us: he had seen other chiefs who came into our power relying on friendly treatment, thrown into the dungeons of Bukkur. The broken truce of Kotra was not to be forgotten. At this time the sepoy in Scinde suffered from the cold of the nights, where ice constantly made its appearance.

We come now to the most unsatisfactory portion of the history of the management of the affairs of Scinde—to a portion which, whether in a political or a military point of view, no Englishman can read without a blush. The chief part of our knowledge on the first division of the subject is derived from the often-quoted Cutchee letters, and a better authority could not be desired; fortunately, indeed, there is no conflicting information to be dealt with—the intelligence from the spot was at the time copious, varied, and perfectly harmonious, and not one particle of its truth was ever called in question.

When the Army of the Indus passed through Cutchee in 1839, Major Leech wrote and sent a moonshee (interpreter) to the people of Kujjuck, to beg that they would break their bunds (weirs or dams) which retained for the irrigation of their fields the water flowing from the hills, and let it off for the use of our troops. The request was complied with, but the money offered for a piece of such valuable service, attended with much damage to the cultivators, was declined. The fields suffered from deficient irrigation, but to this they submitted without complaint! The following year Yoosiff Khan Rysannee was Naib of the Seebee country, and the Kujjuks requested he would make the battai or division of grain, on which the Government share or tything is allotted, the crops being ready for it. The revenue is paid in kind; and the corn

35. Letters from Shikarpore, 27th Jan., *B. Times*, Feb.

36. Cutchee Letters, No. 5.

37. *Times*, Feb.; letter from Camp, near Kotra, 22d Jan.

cannot be housed till the Government's quota has been determined on. The Naib of Seebee stated that he could not act in this matter without the directions of Mahomed Sherreef. What piece of roguery this worthy had in view in delaying the order, does not appear : but so it was, the time passed away, the rainy season approached, and the Kujjucks housed their grain to save it from destruction. When all this labour had been incurred, and the cultivators were led, from the delay which had been occasioned, to believe that the tax was for that season to be remitted, Mahomed Sherreef ordered the battal or division to be made. The cultivators were now loath to part with that which they had begun to regard and deal with as their own ; and they urged as a plea for exemption, the service they had performed, and sacrifice they had incurred at Major Leech's request ; stating what was admitted to be true, that they almost alone, of all the tribes, had abstained from plundering our baggage or convoys. They expressed a hope that these considerations would weigh with Mr Bell in obtaining for them exemption from payment for the present. The district is very productive, the utmost attention to irrigation being paid. It contains about thirty villages, each under its particular hakim or chief. The adult male population amounts to about 6000, of whom only one thousand are reckoned warriors : they are mostly infantry, and have no guns. The town where all the principal chiefs reside is Kujjuck. It contains a population of about 4000. The annual revenue of the district amounts to about £3600 ; the arrears now stated to be due, to £4400—of this we demanded immediate payment of the half. In this state matters were, when the chief political proceeded to Cutchee, and had, in the beginning of February 1841, an interview at Lheree with some of the chiefs. They pleaded poverty in addition to the other reasons already adduced, on which they claimed exemption : this was known to have been a mere pretence, for they were not poor : and the hardship of claiming afterwards that which was not received at the time when it was offered, was, owing to the representations of Mahomed Sherreef, not held entitled to consideration. At Munghul Keshehur, 4 miles from Bhag, eight of the chiefs had a second interview with Mr Bell, when, on the 7th Feb., a paper was drawn up by them, in conjunction with Lieut. Brown, Mr Bell's assistant, and others, guaranteeing that the revenue claim should be satisfied in full on or before the 19th of the month. (38) Not observing that any measures were taken to have this agreement fulfilled, a demonstration was directed to be made before the time fixed for payment had expired, and on the 18th February our troops arrived before the town—the people having not the most remote idea that hostilities

38. Cutchee Letters, No. 3.—Much of this letter has been taken *verbatim*, and incorporated with the text.

were intended: the same having been the impression of General Brooks when the dispatch of the force was arranged. They had not so much as provided themselves with ammunition, nor had they cut the bunds, though their unfailing practice in case of attack was to lay the country under water and render it impassable. They invariably maintained that they never thought of being attacked, or of attacking us: nor have we any grounds for believing that in this they misrepresented their apprehensions or intentions.

The troops sent, consisted of the 3d cavalry, Leslie's horse artillery, some of Skinner's and of Curtis's irregular horse, and a wing of the 20th N. I.; these were afterwards joined by 200 of the 2d Grenadiers, with Lieutenants Hogg, Falconer, and Morrison. The whole was commanded by Colonel Wilson of the cavalry. The distance they had to march from quarters, was about 40 miles: a detachment worse suited for the attack of a fortified town, could not be imagined; especially when the General had every variety of troops in such abundance at command.(39) So late as the 17th, after the troops were on their way certain of the Kojuck chiefs had an interview with Mr. Bell:—some misunderstanding appears to have arisen; Mr. Bell stated that he was left under the impression that the chiefs wished to evade payment altogether, though admitting it was due; and some of the natives on whom *he* so often so unworthily relied, assured him that the Kojucks were arming and preparing for resistance. The groundlessness of this last became obvious when our troops arrived near the fort, and the populace appeared never to dream of hostilities. Lieutenant Brown, A.P.A., was sent to join the force in consequence of Lieut. Col. Wilson reporting that the people were hostile, and *that our camel-men had been detained in the town, &c.*, which he deemed it imperative to make known! He proceeds to say—"but little forage had been promised, and the people who went for it were treated with ill-concealed ill-will. I am positively informed that an attack on our camp will be made should a favourable opportunity of doing so occur. I respectfully solicit the Major-general granting further and more explicit instructions." It was at this time that the Assistant-political Agent was ordered to proceed to Col. Wilson's camp in case of difficulty, that the commanding officer might be fully aware

39. We have heard General Brooks declare that he never in the course of 40 years service, experienced any thing so intensely mortifying as the failure at Sebee. He sent out a light detachment on the assurance of Mr. Bell that by no possibility could there be fighting,—that a mere demonstration was all that was desired. The neighbourhood of Kujjuck had been recommended as a station for part of the mounted force, and the cavalry and horse artillery were ordered there in the first instance without any idea of warfare, but simply for the benefit of forage, which was hardly procurable at Mungul-ke-Shuher."

how matters were to be managed. On the day of the fight, 20th February, a deputation of the chief men had an interview with Lieutenant Brown : they declared their readiness to pay the sum required, but requested twelve hours to make the collection. This was refused, and they were informed that unless within two hours they should produce £2,200, their town would be attacked by the troops. The attempt was made—the collection was commenced on the instant; and rupees, gold and silver ornaments were gathered in the utmost haste, in amount equal to our demands. A Moonshee with some attendants, who had been sent to the town when the two hours' leave which had been given were expired, met the chiefs bearing the treasure to our camp. Before they arrived there, however, they observed the guns getting into position, and the troops being drawn out in order of battle. Supposing some trick or delusion to be intended, that we meant both to take the money and attack the town besides, they retired within the walls, and charged the Moonshee with endeavouring to practise a fraud upon them. The fight immediately began. The fort, which contained about 4,000 people, of whom 1,200 were women, was not a strong one. It was situated in a level plain, which afforded no cover for ordnance, and surrounded with a ditch and mud wall, varying from 12 to 20 feet in height, with four open gateways respectively of 9, 10, 12, and 20 feet in width. The ditch surrounding the fortress at 12 feet distance from the wall was 25 feet broad and 4 feet deep; it was encircled on three sides by marshes and water-courses. About two o'clock P. M. the guns opened with round-shot and spherical case, at the distance of two hundred yards; after a fire of nearly half an hour's duration, they were removed to within one hundred yards of the mud wall. The defences were so thick, and numerous, that even at this distance our shot scarcely told upon the town. The enemy had kept up a brisk and galling fire upon us from the moment our artillery were in position. Colonel Wilson was wounded through the thigh, the femoral bone being badly splintered by one of the first shots. The command, in consequence, devolved on Major Rollings of the 2d Grenadiers. The storming party, consisting of two companies of the regiment just named, supported by the left wing of the 20th N.I., proceeded to a place where the men were able easily to cross, the ditch having been left unfinished, and advanced by the pathway 12 feet wide, which intervened betwixt the edge of this and the base of the wall. Captain Walter, with a troop of the 3d cavalry, proceeded round to the other side of the town to cut off the enemy's retreat. The rest of the troops remained to support Captain Leslie with his guns, and act as circumstances might require. The enemy were six or eight hundred strong just within the gate,—there being about twelve hundred fighting men in the town altogether : the guns, which otherwise kept the gate clear, required to suspend their

fire as the storming party advanced. So soon as the head of the column got near the gate, the enemy rushed out and cut down the leading men, who were unfortunately very indifferently supported, as no effort on the part of the officers could induce the Grenadiers to move forward. Lieut. Falconer was killed, and Lieut. Shaw, sub-assistant commissary general, who volunteered his services on the occasion, severely wounded in leading the assailants on. On seeing the check of the storming party, the intrepid Lieut. Creed, H.A., requested permission to take some dismounted artillerymen to head the column, and endeavour to recover the fortunes of the day. This gallant band of about 20 horse artillerymen at once advanced and endeavoured to force their way into the town. Lieut. Creed and some few got within the gateway: but here the heroic officer and five of his men were immediately cut down, and the remainder, most of whom were severely wounded, driven back by force of numbers, were compelled to retire, being unsupported. At this time some women came out with korans on their heads entreating for peace. The enemy began to flag; and had the attack been persisted in the fort must have fallen. Evening was now rapidly advancing: it was obviously in vain to maintain the struggle, so our troops retired to a distance of 1000 yards, and proceeded to encamp for the night with a view of next morning renewing operations.

The casualties in this unfortunate affair amounted to 15 killed and 25 wounded; Lieuts. Falconer and Creed were amongst the former, Col. Wilson and Lieut. Shaw amongst the latter. Colonel Wilson died in a few days afterwards from the effects of his wound. The enemy's loss is said to have amounted to about 60 killed.

A report was spread that the Kojjucks intended to attack us at night, so that the troops slept under arms. The rumour proved groundless: about 11 o'clock P.M. a Banyan arrived in camp from the fort, intimating that the chiefs had fled,—the whole of the occupants of the town, save the aged and bedridden, made their escape to the hills—so that, when morning dawned, it was tenantless. Kujjuck was taken possession of, and all the moveables contained in it declared prize property. This amounted to about £2000 in value: this, as will by and bye be seen, had afterwards to be restored by order of government.

The tidings of this mishap reached General Brooks at Mungel-ke-shuher about noon on the 21st; and he immediately ordered out a detachment to join Capt. Rollings with the utmost expedition. This consisted of the head-quarters of the 4th troop horse brigade, H. M.'s 40th, and the 21st N. I., with the sappers and miners; they marched about 5 P.M. the same afternoon. These were to proceed by forced marches without a moment's delay, as the extent of the mischance was believed to be much more serious than it turned out. But on the march the Major-General receiving authentic intelligence that

the Kojjuks had evacuated their fort, directed the infantry to remain that night at Mitree, and proceeded only with the head-quarters and 4th troop Horse Artillery to Kujjuak. The infantry recommenced their march the following afternoon. —before they had proceeded far rain began to fall in torrents, and from the night being pitchy dark, the troops remained for some time in a perfect slough of mud and water, and did not reach the camp till mid-day. The whole were detained before Kujjuak till the middle of March by the heavy rains, which caused great destruction amongst the camels of the force.

After the town had fallen into our hands, but before it was destroyed, some of the people, who were starving on the hills, returned with a view of recovering their lost property: they were driven back, some perishing in the ditch, and orders were given to fire on any one who should approach the town. Foiled in avenging our mischances on the Kojjuak warriors, Mr Bell resolved that the property of the inhabitants should suffer. An order was fulminated, directing the place to be destroyed and the country desolated. On the 6th March, accordingly, the aged, sick, and bedridden having been carried beyond the walls, the clothes on them being the only property they were allowed to retain, the fort was set fire to, and laid in ruins. The houses that could not easily be pulled down were mined and blown up,—the timbers that could not be otherwise destroyed were burnt,—the devastation was complete: the fire raged for several days—and the property accumulated, and buildings erected, through the space of seven generations, during which the place had flourished in the hands of the Kojjuks, was appropriated or destroyed by us. The crops were eaten up or trampled under foot by the horses, the camels, and the baggage-cattle of the army: the desire appearing to be to do as much wanton mischief as possible. An edict was issued when the work of ravage had been completed, that no part of the town should be rebuilt or re-occupied.(40) Shortly after this, some

40. The account of the action is chiefly given from an unpublished copy of the official despatch, with some incidents from private letters. We have been favoured with divers valuable notes from officers of the force, to whom the proofs have been submitted, and the following is one:—"Mr Bell's first letter to General Brooks was such as to lead the General to expect opposition; the second was merely saying the troops should take up a position convenient for water and forage—this was received late at night. The force was flawed on the first letter, and nothing could be more injudicious than its selection. General B. knew nothing of Kujjuak, nor did Mr Bell—a fact fully proved, for had they known what the place was, Europeans would have been sent. Well might General Brooks feel unsatisfied, not only in this instance, but in having remained from *October until January* at Sukkur, instead of being in the field with his troops. Had he been stationed at Bhag, and Mr Bell with him, the country would have had a better chance of becoming quiet and settled. How could General Brooks say he did not expect resistance, when his orders to Lieut.Col. Wilson were—"Your detachment is to march to Kujjuak, in order

Brahoes, who must have otherwise starved in the hills, came down, and were quietly feeding their flocks at Mitree, when our troops observing them mistook them for Kojjucks, and actually attacked them, dispersing them in every direction, and seizing on the women's ornaments and property left behind. The mistake was soon discovered, and every effort made to remedy it; but the mischief was done, and this untoward accident was added to the list of acts of supposed perfidy and wrong—for too few of which we could plead any excuse or extenuation.

The Cutchee letter-writer, who learned the facts on the spot, and was most familiar with every feature of the case, and with all the parties concerned, says, "We all know that Asiatics invariably plead poverty and procrastination to contribution of revenue to their despotic governments, in the hope of obtaining some remission; and that where they can, they resist with force the payment altogether, as the Kojjucks have often done. That the Kojjucks hoped, by an excuse of poverty and procrastination, to get some remission, is, I conceive, beyond doubt. It is the opinion of all the natives of Cutchee that I have seen: of our habits they knew little, what they did know was not likely to have produced the most favourable impression. A forcible resistance of our demands they knew to be useless, and accordingly

to coerce some refractory tribes in that district, in case of their refusing compliance with the demands of the political agent.' The detachment marched on the 17th, and on the 18th General Brooks writes to Mr Bell—"I have no information who are the parties to be acted against," &c. Why not have made due inquiry on the subject before sending the force? The Kujjuck force was as follows:—

2d Grenadier Regt.—1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 4 native officers, 12 havildars, 200 rank and file; killed—1 lieut. (Falconer), 8 men; wounded 20.

Scinde Horse.—1 captain, 4 native officers, 2 duffadars, 66 sowars; killed—1 sowar.

1st Troop H. A.—1 captain, 2 lieuts., 98 men; killed—5, and 1 officer, (Lieut. Creed); wounded—6, and 1 officer (Capt. Blood).

3d Lt. Cav.—1 col., 1 capt., 6 lieuts. and cornets, 201 troopers; killed—1 trooper.

Rt. Wing 20th.—2 captains, 2 lieuts., 2 ensigns, 381 men; killed—1 private, 10 ditto wounded.

Total force	Cavalry	266
	Infantry	581

847

Deduct sick and guards	182
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Present in action	665
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Killed—1 lieut.-col., 2 lieutenants, and 12 men.

Wounded, 2 lieuts., and 45 men.—*Note by an Officer of the Force.*

Another officer belonging to the Staff states that there were not above 300 warriors in the town; that so ill-defended and weak a place was unworthy of the name of fort; and that the whole affair was one of the most miserably mismanaged during the war.

they not only avoided plundering the country, but even neglected providing themselves with ammunition, trusting to procrastination as the safest diplomacy. From the fact of their having gathered in valuables in amount equal to our demand, and with which they were about to present themselves in our camp when they saw our troops advancing on the town, and from that of no earthly provision having been made for defence, does it not appear that, instead of opening our guns at two in the afternoon against the fort, if we had thrown a cordon around it, that the people would at once have seen how unlike we were to former rulers, even had they not gathered together in money and ornaments the amount we demanded." (41)

Well might Sir Alex. Burnes, in remonstrating with the Envoy shortly after this on our deplorable and calamitous mismanagement of the country, exclaim, "It seems to me that wherever our political officers are, collision forthwith follows. A native temporizes, a European officer fights; we are thus on the high road to denationalize Afghanistan instead of contributing to its stability as a kingdom; we shall subvert all its institutions, and not succeed in fixing our own in their stead, for we are not labouring to do so." * * * "That regular troops should be employed in enforcing revenue, is at all times doubtful, unless refusal to pay ends in rebellion; but it is more than ever questionable, when there is injustice on the side of the collector. A postponement to pay is at once in our notions converted into a refusal, and that which a parley and explanation between Affghans would terminate in a day or two amicably, ends with us in a battle and loss of life on both sides. But the lives are not the greatest loss: respect for us, and influence with them, go with them. When once regular troops appear, hesitation is deemed pusillanimity, they cannot stand still, they must act, and thus every trifling outbreak endangers the character not only of the English but of the whole frame of government." (42) The reader will excuse the interruption of the narrative which the introduction of those passages occasions, proving, as they do, how early and distinctly the more sagacious portion of the political authorities saw and appreciated the mischiefs we were inflicting, and the direction whitherward they were tending. Unhappily, those in whose hands the amendment of this system lay, would not, or could not, see its error.

The details of these proceedings appear to have given the greatest offence to the Governor-General: it is doubtful whether the despatches afforded him a sufficiency of particulars; but the facts in which they were defective

41. *Cutchee Letters*, No. 4.

42. Notes on the consolidation of Afghanistan, by Sir Alexander Burnes, dated April 19, 1841. A copy of these was found amongst his posthumous papers, with notes by the Envoy. Frequent occasions of referring to them will by and bye present themselves.

were amply supplied by the letters to which we have had such frequent occasion to refer, and which bore with them so much of the stamp of authority that they could not be overlooked. Early in August an order was received rescinding the edict against the re-construction of Kujjuck, and ordering the payment of the value of the property which had previously been declared prize,—abandoning all claims of arrears, and explaining as the reason, that though our troops had for a time required to occupy the country, the Kojjucks were considered our friends! We are, however, breaking through the chronological order in which events ought to be related.

A few weeks before this, the Beebee Gunjani, widow of Mehrab Khan, had made submission: she was kindly received, and seemed gratified with the attention that was paid her; she was a sprightly, pleasing, intelligent looking lady, whose influence with the chiefs friendly to her husband, as well as with her step-son, seemed to be very great. She received as a gift, the Naibship of Kotra, worth about £1200 a year, and with this she seemed contented. About 1000 of her followers shortly afterwards made submission.

Alarming reports were meanwhile gaining currency as to the state of affairs at Herat and along the Persian frontier. It may be recollected that in July 1839, Major D'Arcy Tod, with a deputation of British officers, had been dispatched from Candahar to the court of the worthless prince who was the legitimate representative of the Suddozye dynasty. After an expenditure of £300,000 in endeavours to purchase a friendship, the free gift of which was not worth our acceptance, the Governor-General resolved, that before more advances should be made, the expediency of moving a garrison of British troops into Herat should be broached to Kamran Shah. This became the source of immediate misunderstanding; and Major Tod discovered, that not only was this as unpalatable as might be, but that Yar Mahomed the Vizier, known at all times to be in his heart unfriendly to us, had usurped the actual power of the Shah, and was caballing amongst the chiefs with a view to an advance on Candahar. It was said, indeed, that it was the intention to proclaim Kamran Shah head of the Dooranee empire, and to endeavour, through the assistance of the Affghan malcontents, to place him on the throne. Major Tod had been guilty of the offence of endeavouring to put a stop to the plunder of caravans and the sale of the persons captured along with them as slaves. The English mission left on the 10th, and arrived at Ghirisk on the 21st Feb., having encountered some narrow risks but experienced no injury. This post is on the river Helmund, about 80 miles north-west from Candahar: it had been weakly garrisoned since our original invasion, and was now about to be reinforced by the

Shah's 5th Native Infantry under Captain Woodburn, and 500 of Christie's Horse. The country everywhere in fact shewed symptoms of that unquiet and uneasy state of feeling which, six months afterwards, broke out into such fearful and successful insurrection.

Preparations were on these grounds made once more to draw our troops together near Dadur, and to move a heavy force up the Bolan Pass so early as the season would permit, to await at Quetta the determination of the Governor-General. Luckily this was peaceful; though the Envoy was urgent to stretch the limits of the Dooraanee empire to their proper extent, which he conceived to be Herat on the west, and Attock on the south-east.

From the scarcity which prevailed in Cutch and Beloochistan, it was necessary that the whole of the troops, followers, and cattle, attached to the force, should be rationed by the Commissariat; and to enable that department to do so, the following enormous amount of animals was required during the campaign for the transport of the Commissariat supplies, baggage, guns, ammunition, camp-equipage, &c. of the army:—

12,000 Government Camels, valued at £8 each	£96,000
4000 Hired Camels, from Sukkur to Quetta, at £1, 10s. per month	6,000
2000 Hired Draught and Pack Bullocks,—5000 more were expected from Ferozepore, but never joined.	(43)

The 20th N. I. entered the pass about the 10th October, and betwixt the 16th and 20th March a large portion of the army, under General Brooks, had commenced moving through the Bolan. The General arrived at Quetta on the 31 April; his command having been extended so as to include Kelat, Moostung, and Quetta, as well as Scinde: Mr Bell had preceded him by a few days only. The first brigade suffered severely from storms in the pass: their tents having been blown down and property destroyed. It was believed that General Valiant's brigade would proceed to Candahar,—a determination which, if ever made, was speedily altered. Having already done nearly all we could in the way of irritation and annoyance, our policy now appeared to be to make every effort at conciliation. Colonel Stacy had, in a brief space, produced a very important alteration in the feelings of the people of Kelat. He sought communion with the chiefs, and mingled freely with the people, and his sympathy with their sufferings, and still more, his apparent confidence in them, and the fearless want of suspicion with which he alone dared to move amongst them, won sympathy and confidence in return. In the course of the month of April he set out to the Brahuc camp almost unattended, though he had to travel nearly 60 miles through a wild, turbulent, and disaffected country. He had an interview

with the young Khan and his chiefs, and seemed to consider that everything was settled, when some fresh source of misunderstanding broke out, and Nusseer Khan again sought refuge in the remote hills. Colonel Stacy had just before this advanced a considerable sum of money to the Khan. On the present occasion something occurred during his residence in camp, which so offended the chiefs that his life was in peril. The Khan warned him of his danger, and entreated that he would retire as speedily as possible, offering him a safe conduct to Kelat. Of this he accepted, and after a ride of nearly 60 miles in length, returned in safety with the utmost speed to the Brahoe capital. The Bombay 25th N. I. was about this time dispatched to Kelat. The Beebee Gunjani having occasional interviews with Mr Bell, promised him that she would speedily prevail upon the young prince to come in if made sure of being restored to his father's throne. The assurance was given, but he would not trust us, nor could he be prevailed upon to see any political save Colonel Stacy till Mr Bell was no more. Meantime an order was promulgated, that unless he surrendered himself before the 4th May, he would be put to the ban, and chased wherever he might seek refuge.

The force now at Quettah amounted to above 8000 men. No instructions had been received, nor did any definite idea seem, in any quarter, to be entertained as to their destination. The Herat panic was now well nigh over : the idea of advancing thitherwards, broached, and so far acted on by the Seinde politicals, was discountenanced by Government; and the country around Candahar was considerably less turbulent than it shortly before had been.

A petty chief called Fazel Khan had been giving some annoyance in the Noosky country, and as we had soldiers on the spot, it seemed to be thought a pity we should not keep fighting. An expedition accordingly was ordered for Noosky, consisting of the 4th Troop H.A., a squadron of the 3d Light Cavalry, 2 companies of the 41st, and the 20th N.I. They were commanded by Colonel Soppitt, an officer of conduct and experience. They left Quettah on the 3d of May, and having reached Noosky by a forced night-march of 40 miles, found that the offending chief, with his principal people, had fled. It was said they had taken the route of Kelat to render submission to Colonel Stacy. Two companies of Europeans, mounted on camels, were dispatched with the cavalry in pursuit of him, but without effect. The force returned to Quettah after incurring much hardship and fatigue, and losing many camels,—having effected nothing.

An accident as singular in its nature as unfortunate in its consequences, at this time befel a party of Skinner's horse in ascending the Bolan Pass. Capt. Haldane had been left at Dadur with orders to escort the battering-train to Quettah. When the plan was altered, and orders given that the heavy

guns should be allowed to remain at Sukkur, this officer, with the horse under his command, was ordered to join his brigade, which had just reached Shawl. Having experienced much difficulty in obtaining a sufficiency of baggage-cattle, he was at length enabled to start on the 23rd of April. Having got to within ten miles of the end of the pass, a night was passed at Sir-i-Bolan (44), and the cattle being still very much knocked up, they were allowed to rest till the afternoon to recruit. It rained very much on reaching the narrowest part of the pass, which was no more than from 30 to 40 yards wide, and Capt. Haldane having sent on the camel-men with all the baggage and 100 troopers, ordering them to keep close together, was bringing up the rear with about 80 men, when just as he entered the narrow gorge, and came to a sharp turn in the way, he saw a body of water, about a foot deep, rushing on with tremendous speed round a turn of the rock a little way ahead of him; this was immediately followed by a second, more than three feet in depth, thundering on with still greater fury than that which preceded it. On the right and left there were no means of escape, the rocks being nearly perpendicular; so they galloped back, reaching a place which enabled them to retire on one side a little way out of the reach of the torrent just as its waters were upon them. The cataract, now increased to ten feet in depth, rushed past the rock with awful fury. Then came a scene terrible to contemplate,—men, horses, and camels were swept past, and dashed to pieces against projecting rocks, against which the water flew to the height of twenty feet. No assistance could be rendered, for the stream ran faster than any horse could gallop. "I stood upon the bank," says Capt. Haldane, "quite horror-struck, for I believed that every one ahead of us had perished. In a few moments the destruction was complete, and we felt like men cast upon a desert plain, without a particle of food, wet to the skin, a cold and cutting wind blowing on us, and no means, from the nature of the country, of ascertaining the extent of our loss; as, until the water went down, all communication with any party who might have been saved was completely cut off. About sunset the stream had nearly subsided, and I perceived how matters stood. The loss of life was 33 men and 101 animals. We passed a miserable night, and next day pushed on to one of our outposts, eight miles from Dusht-i-Bedowlut. We trusted to recover some of our property in the morning before starting, but found very little: for such was the force of the stream, that the matchlocks belonging

44. Sir-i-Bolan, head of the Bolan;—a powerful spring here forms the source of the Bolan river. The ascent betwixt Abi Goom and Sir-i-Bolan in the course of 9½ miles is 1954 feet, giving a rise of about 1 foot in 25; this is the steepest acclivity in the pass. A mass of water pouring down this must rush with the rapidity of a cataract.—*Major Hough*, pp. 53 and 427.

'o men drowned had their barrels broken in two, and some of the bodies were found at Bebee Nance, 20 miles below where the accident occurred. The property lost was estimated at £1200." (45)

An accident of a precisely similar nature occurred to Sir Alex. Burnes and his party in ascending the Khyber Pass in September 1838, when a thunder shower overtook them, and the brooks swelled so rapidly, that it was with much difficulty they saved their baggage: the party was for a short while divided in two, without the power of communicating with each other. (46) So that, besides the incidents liable to occur in those defiles from the opposition of hostile tribes, which in its most formidable shape British troops have overcome—there are storms of wind and snow, with the swelling of torrents by the sudden burst of thunder storms, to be encountered, sufficient for the destruction of any army. These appear to be of by no means unfrequent occurrence, and the only wonder is that we suffered from them so little: that just detailed, and the snow-storm which overtook Colonel Wallace's party in February 1842, being the only serious accidents which really from these causes befel our troops.

Affairs in Upper Scinde and around Quettah from this time forward to the surrender of Nusseer Khan, continued in a state of tranquillity and insipid inaction. About the beginning of June, the notification issued by the Bombay Government, that General Brooks and Brigadier Valiant had been recalled—the former to be temporarily succeeded by Colonel England of H. M. 41st, the latter by the senior Brigadier at the station,—reached camp, and occasioned no small astonishment. The causes of this have already been minutely explained; (47) but the authors of the Olibborn commission never, up to the close, seem to have suspected the serious offence of which alike in a military or in a moral point of view they had been guilty. Mr. Bell was at this time suffering from a severe indisposition, which caused him to tender his resignation—and Major Outram was already understood to be assured of succeeding him; the charge devolved on the latter earlier than was anticipated, by the demise of the former on the 1st of Aug. Captain Bean also had solicited leave to retire, on the plea of ill health. The great schemes to be accomplished by the army under General Brooks, in which all of the gentlemen just named, more or less shared, one by one fell to the ground. The Candahar force proved adequate for the work assigned to it: strong bodies were posted at Ghirisk, Moostung and Kelat,

45. Letter of Capt. Haldane, given in *Asiatic Journal*, Sept. 1841; part II. p. 32. It appears as a quotation, but it is not stated where it was first published.

46. Wood's Journey to the source of the River Oxus, p. 163. Burnes's Cabool, p. 129.

47. See conclusion of preceding chapter, p. 202.

ready to act if required; there appeared no source of alarm of serious mischief from Herat, and no intention of proceeding against it for the present; and as the Brahoes no longer showed themselves in the field, there really seemed nothing for our troops to effect beyond watching the current of events.

Nusseer Khan had meanwhile fallen sick and become tired of remaining a fugitive: he had received the fullest assurance that no more evil was intended him than that of reinstating him on his father's throne—our purpose being now to add Cutch to Kelat, from which it had been so unwisely disjoined. About the 20th July, Colonel Stacy was written to, intimating that the Khan and his chiefs were in the neighbourhood, and expressive of a wish to see that officer in camp. This was immediately complied with: the boy had been suffering severely from intermittent fever, which the treatment of one of our medical officers speedily relieved. He came into camp without conditions on the 25th July—and Colonel Stacy immediately made preparations to proceed with him to Quetta.

A general order was published on the 9th August at Sukkur, intimating that Nusseer Khan and his adherents were no longer enemies to the British; while the intimation from Lord Auckland already referred to was at the same time circulated, to the effect that the property taken at Kujjuck could not be considered as prize, in consequence of its having been captured in a town of a friendly power, though it was found necessary as a temporary measure to occupy it with British troops. (48)

By the time the Khan and his party reached Moostung, intimation had been received of the demise of Mr Bell, which took place at Quetta on the 1st of August; and it was resolved to remain there until Major Outram's arrival, or until the purposes of government should be definitively made known.

Major Outram, after hearing of the death of Mr Bell, having been detained for a short time at Hyderabad, bringing some political arrangements there in progress to a close, left with a view of taking charge of the affairs of his new appointment, on the 18th of August. The unostentatious celerity of his progress contrasted as much with the pomp and circumstance with which his predecessor moved as did the other portions of the career of the two differ from each other. Mr Bell's escort consisted of 150 horsemen—his rate of travelling was about 10 miles a day. The appointments of Major Outram consisted of one palanquin, with 16 bearers for exchanging, one attendant, four troopers of the irregular horse, and three riding camels.

48. *Bombay Courier*, August 31. No allusion in this order was made to the total destruction of the town: the occupation might have been necessary, but to blow up the walls and burn the bazaars of our friends was a curious mode of manifesting amity!

The distance from Hydrabad to Quetta is 400 miles, including 96 miles of desert and 70 miles of the Bolan Pass: this was traversed in 16 days, the new political agent having arrived at Quetta on the 3d of September.

Sir W. Macnaghten, for what reason does not appear, seemed anxious to take into his own hands the task of closing an arrangement with Nusseer Khan. About the 25th of August a draft of a treaty was forwarded to Moostung, for his subscription, by the Envoy, just before Major Outram's arrival, and when he was known to be on the way. This would have seemed alike strange and inexplicable, but for the passion for diplomacy with which the leading politicals were then afflicted: they seemed never so happy as when endeavouring to over-reach the rude and semi-barbarous tribes, who understood the spirit of treaties, but were totally bewildered and misled by the complex technicalities with which they were crammed; and who, when any of them were neglected, and punishment followed the oversight, always conceived that we had misled them or dealt with them unfaithfully.

After a delay there of a month, the young Khan and his attendants left Moostung immediately on hearing of Major Outram's arrival; he reached Quetta on the 6th Sept. He was received with that kind and frank cordiality which distinguished the manners of the new resident, and he seemed delighted with his reception. Affairs of state are easily arranged when one party is disposed to concede whatever the other can desire: and so it was agreed that they should set out all together as speedily as possible for Kelat, to invest the young sovereign with regal power, and place him with becoming pomp upon the throne of his fathers. About the middle of the month they started, and on the 6th October the Khan was duly invested, the chief Sirdars being previously invited to be present at the ceremony. The following is a short notice by an officer who was present on the occasion:—

“At 2 P. M. the Khan, with his Sirdars and Officers of State, proceeded to the Durbar Tent of the Agency, where the Treaty was ready for signature—it was read by the young Khan himself, and by the Wuzzeer Moolla Mahomed Hussein. The Khan, Sirdars and all were most grateful for the liberal terms on which the British gave him back the country of his ancestors. The Treaty being approved of, it was signed on the spot, and after some quarter of an hour's conversation, the Khan took leave.

“At 4 P. M. Major Outram ascended to the citadel. A circular had been sent round in the morning, notifying that the investiture would take place at 4 P. M. The young Khan, who has ingratiated himself with every body, was ready at the hour appointed—every Officer in Camp paid the Khan the compliment of attending.

“After Major Outram, assisted by Brigadier England and Col. Stacey, had invested him with his complete Khanate Dress, he was seated between the two former, and a Royal Salute announced the completion of the Treaty between the Honorable Company and the Khan of Kelat.”

The country as usual was infested with robbers. Dr Owen and Lieut. Mac-

kenzie, 3rd Cavalry, were, in the middle of September, waylaid and robbed, and narrowly escaped murder in the Koochlak Pass, 7 miles north of Quettah; while General Brooks and his party were fired upon in descending the Bolan Pass; but from the time of Nasseer Khan's surrender, there was no hostile movement in Beloochistan of any considerable magnitude against us.

In taking a cursory review of the contents of this and the preceding chapter, which refer exclusively to the affairs of Beloochistan, it will be found that, from the time Sir T. Willshire returned to the plains, when everything was considered to have been settled, our troops in numbers varying from 50 to 2000, had been 15 times engaged with the enemy (49) and four times unsuccessfully. (50) The loss of the enemy on these various occasions must, so near as can be estimated, amount to not much under 2500; our own casualties to about 300 men slain. We lost no fewer than 12 European officers, viz. Col. Wilson, Capts. Rait and Heighington, Lieuts Clarke, Franklin, Williams, Moore, Loveday, Lodge, Falconer, and Creed. All these, save two, had fallen in action, or died of their wounds. Captain Heighington had died from the fatigue of the fight and retreat of Nufosk; and Lieut. Loveday was murdered. The climate of the countries in which these unhappy operations had been carried on, had among our officers been still more destructive of life than the sword of the enemy. There had died, chiefly from climatic causes within the period under review, Brigadier Stevenson, Major Billa-more, Major Liddel, Captains Sutherland, Robenack, Jones, Beddingfield, and Lewis; Lieuts. Revelly, Hunt, Valiant, Cuerton, Shubrick, and Oliphant, with Drs Carlow and Baines; 16 in all. The death of Mr Bell was not perhaps altogether attributable to the effects of climate.

The destruction of beasts of burthen had during this short but unhappy campaign exceeded the worst apprehensions our most disastrous experience could have led us to form. Of the twelve thousand camels which were collected at Sukkur in August 1841, scarce 3000 could be produced in October 1842; the loss occasioned by this sacrifice of animal life must alone have exceeded £80,000. The total outlay occasioned by the campaign was

49. These "affairs" took place at Deyrah 4th and 12th January (p. 172). Native officer's party of 80 men slaughtered to a man in returning to Kabun, 16th May, (p. 178). Destruction of Lieut Clarke and convoy, 16th June, (p. 179). Repulse at Nufosk, (p. 189). Destruction of 25 sepoy, the escort of Captain Bean's revenue moonshee. Attack of the Kakurs on Quettah. Attack on the Brahocs by Lieut. Hammersley at Moostang. Three days' fighting round Dadur. Destruction of Bhaug and Gundava. Attack on the enemy at Kundah. First fighting near Kotra. Affair of Lieut. Vardon in capturing 1100 bullocks. Battle of Kotra. Capture of Kujjuck. Attack on the Brahocs at Mitree.

50. The unsuccessful affairs were Sartof, Nufosk, Quettah (where the troops, though not beaten, had to retreat into the fort), and Kujjuck.

estimated by the *Friend of India* at £300,000, and no one was less likely to exaggerate in this.

The results were as extraordinary, and still more mortifying, than the expenditure of men and money by which they were achieved. Our rule seems to have been to fight first, and when we became tired of this, to enquire into what we were fighting about. By a strange fatality, every quarrel in which Mr. Bell engaged us, we were compelled to proclaim by our abandonment, unwise, unjust, or oppressive. The system was one of continual doing and undoing, of which the only memorials that were left were the heaps of slain who fell in battle, and the delapidation of a heretofore flourishing treasury.

A slight reference to what has been already related at large and in detail, will illustrate this statement.

In seeking tribute for Kelat, we attacked Deyrah, and slew some 60 of its inhabitants, carrying away the chiefs as captives: we subsequently released the chiefs and solicited their friendship, abandoning all claims of tribute,—it being admitted that none was due. On the same grounds Kahun was taken possession of, and our troops shut up for six months in the fort, one detachment having meanwhile been destroyed, and another defeated by the Murrees. We then left the country, abandoning all our claims against it, granting a free pardon to those who had handled us so roughly, and entreating the friendship of the chiefs on their own terms. Cutchee and Shawl were in 1839 detached from Kelat; the one was re-annexed to it in 1841, the other in 1842. We stripped the chiefs of the former province of their hereditary estates, because they had not made up their title-deeds according to our pleasure; and after six months' fighting with them, we restored the disputed property without making any questions about titles at all. We claimed the customs of Las, which had long before been made over to the chief of Beila, and when an armed resistance was threatened we withdrew our claim. We attacked and destroyed Kujjuck, and then proclaimed that all the property which had been captured would be restored; their town being that of a friendly power whose dominions it had become necessary for a time to occupy. Finally, we expelled Nusseer Khan from the throne of his father in November 1839, and restored him in October 1842; his claims on our gratitude being founded on the two years of war he had carried on against us; Major Outram having afterwards recommended, that, in the event of our retiring from Candahar, we should grant him a subsidy of £15,000 a year (51) instead of assisting him with troops.

The casualties we have already detailed are far from light, but they are trivial in comparison to the damage we sustained from loss of character for truth,

consistency, justice, and integrity. Of unhappy violations of all these we stood self-convicted by the repeated reversals of our policy, which we felt ourselves compelled to resort to.

Just at the very time when the tranquillization of Beloochistan was considered to have been completed, an insurrection broke out at the other extremity of the Dooranee empire, more frightfully momentous and tragical in its results than any recorded in modern history. On the 6th October, the coronation of the young prince was celebrated at Kelat: three days after, General Sale was attacked in the passes near Cabool, and after nearly a month's incessant fighting, found shelter in the fort of Jellalabad, where he was shut up for six months. The general rising which occasioned the destruction of the Cabool garrison, took place a few weeks afterwards. This, however, opens a new chapter in history, on which it is not at present proposed to enter.

This narrative would be incomplete without a short sketch of the history of Major Outram, whose management of Scinde betwixt August 1841, and November 1843, merits the lasting gratitude of his country, and reflects the highest honour on one who has well been termed the Bayard of the Indian Army.⁽⁵²⁾ Major Outram, in requital for services the most meritorious and successful, has experienced nothing but injury and insult from Lord Ellenborough: he has been stripped of office without cause, and remanded to his regiment, when his exertions as an envoy at the court of Hydrabad might have spared us the most discreditable war in which we were ever engaged.

MAJOR OUTRAM.

MR JAMES OUTRAM arrived at Bombay as a gentleman cadet in the Hon. Company's Service on the 15th of August 1819, and very shortly after having joined was appointed adjutant of a newly raised Sepoy regiment, now the Bombay 23d L.I. In those days of military activity, when every month had its conflict or scene of adventure to record, an appointment such as that with which Lieut. Outram was entrusted, was one of the most honourable and responsible so young an officer could have conferred upon him: and no man could have filled it with more credit to himself, or benefit to the army, than the subject of our narrative.

In 1824 the fort of Kittoor, in the Southern Mahratta country, was garrisoned by a party of troops much too weak to withstand severe assault, but unsuspecting, at the same time, of the approach of hostilities. On the 23d of October an insurrection broke out; the resident, Mr Thackeray, with Captains Black and Deighton, were killed, and the whole of the troops were surrounded and taken prisoners. A large force having been dispatched to

52. Speech of Sir C. Napier at a dinner given by the whole of the Officers of the force, at Sukkur, subsequent to Major Outram's loss of office, and prior to his quitting Scinde.

chastise the insurgents, and recover our captive soldiers, Kittoor was taken on the 6th December, with a loss on our side of six only: 1000 of the enemy were believed to have fallen. It was at one time supposed that it would have been necessary to storm the fort, and, at his own request, Lieut. Outram was appointed to lead the forlorn hope. This operation was afterwards found unnecessary, the place having been surrendered without assault; but in the dispatch of Col. Deacon, Lieut. Outram is particularly mentioned, as having, along with Captain Pouget and Lieut. Lawrie, been of the greatest use in the dangerous service of reconnoitering. In 1825 a rebellion having broken out in the western part of Candeish, headed, as was believed, by Appa Sahib, ex-Rajah of Nagpore, the standard of the Peishwa was raised, and the fort of Moolair taken possession of by the rebels. Troops were ordered to advance with the utmost expedition from all the posts around; and reinforcements were summoned from stations so remote as Jaulna and Surat. Lieut. Outram was then at Mailigaum. A detachment of 200 men was entrusted to his charge to relieve Moolair, not then known to have fallen. Purposely passing the fort, which he ascertained to have been captured, he pushed on by a rapid and brilliantly-executed night march till he overtook the rebels: completely taken by surprise, and without the remotest idea that an enemy was near, they were attacked, defeated, and dispersed in an inconceivably short space of time. One of the leaders of the insurrection was killed: the fort was retaken, and the first overpowering success followed up with such celerity and vigour, that the whole were reduced to submission before the other detachments, which had been put in orders, were able to reach the scene of action. About this time, Lieut. Outram was appointed to raise a Bheel corps in Candeish, and the countries of the barbarous tribes adjoining. In these remote and savage regions, he, for twelve years, laboured without intermission, laying the foundations of peace and tranquillity in quarters long a refuge for the robber, and converting the ferocious and untutored Bheel into a defender of the peasant and a cultivator of the soil. These people have, till of late, been considered the most barbarous and unteachable of any of the natives of India. They in general go about almost entirely naked; they make no attempt at manufactures, even of the rudest sort, and have scarcely any agriculture; they are all but ignorant of peaceful industry, and live almost entirely by plundering neighbouring tribes. The ruder portions of them are armed with bows and arrows,—in their hands not unformidable weapons. They pay no tax or tribute, and acknowledge no allegiance to any one. They are said to be one of the original races of Central Hindustan. Scarcely a trace of any species of religion is to be found amongst them; they are nominally of the Brahminical faith, but pay no heed to the observances considered essential to this form of belief. Whole brigades had,

year after year, been employed to no purpose to suppress or chastise the outrages committed by these barbarians on the adjoining frontier. To deal with them from within: to convert the disturbers of the peace into its preservers, appeared never to have been thought of; and indeed with such materials the task seemed hopeless and chimerical enough. Lieut. Outram, at the hourly peril of his life, proceeded at once and almost alone into the jungle, bent on the execution of his dangerous and all but desperate mission. The nature of the difficulties encountered may be gathered from the means taken to overcome them. It was at first found impossible to make the Bheels comprehend what was desired of them; and when this had been got over, it was most difficult to find any stimulant or motive adequate to induce them to comply with our wishes. The great seducer of civilised, as of savage men—intoxicating liquor—was at length resorted to. And for months and months together he managed to keep first some hundreds and then several thousands of those speedily destined to become temperate and orderly soldiers, around him by the mere influence of arrack. The men and their future officer began at length to understand each other. They had now been for a time at least detached from their kindred, as well as from their habits of depredation and pillage, and the next thing was to wean them from the excesses by the indulgence in which these things had been effected. It is needless to go into the details of the tedious and dangerous measures by which the drunken savage was converted into the sober, orderly, and steady soldier: it is enough to state, that in five years' time the Bheel corps, if not so temperate or manageable as a sepoy regiment, was equal in sobriety to any English force, and so thoroughly to be depended on, that they were employed with perfect success in the escort of treasure through the very country which so shortly before had furnished the scenes of their own most lawless acts. Succeeding officers have ably and faithfully carried into execution the system thus begun; but for its plan, and for surmounting the fearful difficulties presenting themselves at its commencement, we are entirely indebted to Major Outram. In 1830 this officer, still a subaltern, was entrusted with the command of a very important expedition, undertaken expressly on his own urgent recommendation, into the countries bordering on the scenes of his recent operations. The force committed to his charge consisted of detachments from regiments of the line, the Bheel corps, the Poonah horse, and other native auxiliaries; and its object was the invasion of Daung, a strong, jungly, robber country, dividing Candeish from Surat. Sir John Malcolm, then governor of the Western Presidency, doubted the practicability, and feared the results, of such an undertaking, even if set about with double the force which could then be spared; and he yielded only to the urgent entreaties of the officer who recommended it, and who pledged him-

self for its perfect success. Mr Outram's character and thorough knowledge of the neighbouring country and the people around, afforded assurance that any pledge he made on such a subject was likely to be redeemed. Within one month of our advance the entire tribes of a territory till now completely unknown to us, and whose jungles had never been penetrated till entered by our troops, were completely subdued, and the whole of their chiefs and rajahs, amounting to seven in number, were prisoners in Lieutenant Outram's hands. This, considering its magnitude, was one of the most brilliant and successful feats of arms from the time of the Mahratta war.

From Candeish Captain Outram was, in 1833, transferred by the sagacity of the late Sir R. Grant, Governor of Bombay, to the Mahes Caunta in Guzerat. Inhabited by turbulent and warlike predatory tribes, this country had been for years, almost for ages, a scene of desolation, pillage; and slaughter. Might constituted right, security for life and property was unknown, and year after year military operations, with their attendant evils and transient or doubtful success, became necessary for the protection of our subjects. Within the short space of three years, Captain Outram, by the strength of his intellect, and fertility of his resources, by his unwearied industry and conciliating spirit, brought peace and order where such blessings had before been unknown. This was effected without his having ever, with one single exception, had occasion to resort to arms. The experiment tried with such admirable results in Candeish was here repeated with renewed success: and so stable have these arrangements proved, that for the past seven years tranquillity has scarcely ever been interrupted. Here was organized the Coolie Police corps,—composed, as its name denotes, from the predatory races.

In December, 1838, he joined the army of the Indus, acting as extra A.D.C. to Lord Keane. We had scarcely touched the shores of Scinde when the zeal, promptitude, and indomitable activity of Capt. Outram were of the utmost service to the army. It was not very wonderful that the Ameers of Hyderabad should not be over-zealous in promoting the success of an expedition, one of the objects of which was to render them tributaries to a sovereign whose rule they had renounced, and mulct them at starting of £300,000. The carriage-cattle they had promised had not made their appearance on the arrival of our army at Vikkur, and nothing but the efforts of Capt. Outram in procuring camels from Cutch enabled them to advance at the time they did. His adventures on the expedition of Lord Keane are so fully given in the First Chapter of this narrative that they may here be safely omitted. Though he lost the favour of the Commander-in-Chief he was repeatedly thanked by the Supreme Government, as well as the Shah Soojah, for his exertions. In 1840 he was appointed Resident at Hyderabad,

d Political Agent for Lower Scinde, and as has just been seen, he, in August 1841, was promoted to the charge of the whole country from Quetta to Kurrachee.

We have had repeated occasion to refer to the sad disrepute into which our hitherto unimpeachable character for good faith and veracity had fallen under the administration of Mr Ross Bell. The bitter stigma which the order of an advance on Cabool occasioned, after the Sirdars had agreed to every proposition we had made to them, was infinitely more merited in western than in eastern Afghanistan—where we were said “to have taught every chief to lie and cheat by our example.”(53) Major Outram’s two years’ residence at Hyderabad had made the natives well aware of his character as a soldier and politician. Intimately acquainted with the principles, prejudices, manners, and feelings of the semi-barbarians with whom he had to deal; he was by nature eminently fitted to command their respect and esteem. Brave, determined, prompt and decided in all his proceedings; he was forbearing, frank, and forgiving. He was as destitute as any man alive of those jesuitical qualities which appear occasionally to be considered essential to good statesmanship amongst the class of diplomists who appear to think that no negotiation can elaim the character of skill which is not marked by dissimulation, disingenuousness, and concealment, or which would not readily avail itself of direct fraud could its objects be forwarded thereby. In Mr Bell’s time, the chiefs never appear to have treated with us without a suspicion that, in some way or other, they were meant to be overreached. In that of his successor they were told at once what was desired of them; their expostulations, if they had any to offer, were duly considered and yielded to at *first*, if found reasonable; and they knew that whatever Major Outram said, whether as threat or promise, would be made good whatever might be the consequences. He permitted his intercourse with them to be interrupted by no parade of ceremony—to be perverted by the intervention of no third parties. On all occasions they found access to him personally, and at once had their case listened to with patience, and decided on with justice and moderation without a moment’s delay. Where any thing was suspected of being wrong, Major Outram was on the spot to examine and inquire for himself, and that with a rapidity of movement which cast the celerity of their own wild forays into the shade. Before he had been three months in power, he found that distrust had vanished: that he had done as much as mortal man could accomplish in

53. Ukhbar Khan’s remark to Captain Troup on his having returned from Jellalabad with the treaty unratified. Unhappily, the charge of the Sirdar against our Government is fully borne out by the evidence of the Blue Book! Surely impeachment is barely enough for those who have done so much to defile the fair and unsullied fame of England in the East.

remedying the injury his predecessor had inflicted on our character. We once more became trusted: the veracity of the political agent, instead of being a subject of mockery and derision, was looked upon as inviolable—as it was wont throughout the east to have been, till these unhappy wars began.

The result was even more auspicious than could have been anticipated; showing what deep cause we have for grief, that the system which led to it was not earlier resorted to and practised over a far wider field.

From October 1841, when our misfortunes began, till November 1842, when they had been fully and finally retrieved, and the policy which led to them was for a time abandoned and repudiated, there occurred not betwixt Quetta and the sea, either in Scinde or Beloochistan, a single exhibition of hostility or distrust towards us: though at this time there was not one solitary tribe from Pesheen to Peshawur, including the districts around Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jellalabad, which had not attacked us. The invaluable services of Major Outram in collecting baggage-cattle, forwarding treasure, and hastening and facilitating the advance of troops, in a great measure contributed to our ultimate success. His conduct in this respect appears at the time to have been appreciated both by the late and the present Governor-General. In the despatches published in the Blue Book it is repeatedly mentioned in terms of the greatest approbation; and Lord Auckland, since his return to England, has, in Parliament, bestowed on it the highest commendations. There were few who could be persuaded of the desperate position to which the Dooranee alliance had reduced the finances of India by the end of 1841; a position which, if no insurrection had occurred, would, before the close of 1842, have compelled us, under any circumstances, to have retired from the country; and Major Outram appeared for a time to believe, notwithstanding the assurances of Government to the contrary, that so soon as the insurrection was subdued we should resume the place we held before it began. No man more deeply deplored the resolution for a time adopted by the Government, of retiring from the country before any attempt to retrieve our reverses had been made. He recommended that Candahar and Jellalabad should, at all events, be held as outposts for the year 1842,⁽⁵⁴⁾ and deprecating in the strongest manner the withdrawal of the garrison of Sir R. Sale, he stated, that he did not conceive that a measure more injurious to our interests in Afghanistan, or one more likely to endanger our character there and in India, could have been devised by our bitterest enemy. These views were fully concurred in by Mr Clerk and Major Rawlinson, who proposed a formal invasion of the country for next year. Farther on, when

54. Blue Book, p. 197. Sir J. Nicolls' letter to the Governor in Council, March 30, 1842; given *verbatim*.

General Nott had been reinforced by the brigade of General England, and fully supplied with carriage, Major Outram recommended that a direct movement should be made from Candahar on Cabool, without waiting for General Pollock, whose force was unable to proceed for want of carriage, and was, besides, not necessary,—the Candahar army being strong enough to accomplish every object the government had in view. (55) Had this advice been followed, the achievements undertaken at such enormous hazard in September and October, might have been accomplished in June—the troops retiring by Jellalabad, without General Pollock incurring the cost, risk, and tremendous labour and loss of money, in penetrating the defiles beyond Gundamuck. It is not exactly known from what cause Major Outram incurred the displeasure, and drew down the manifestations of spite so meanly vented on him shortly afterwards by the Governor-General. He remained in full favour up to the beginning of May, at which time it was intimated to him that he was to be appointed Envoy at the court of Hyderabad—hostilities against the Ameers not having at this period been dreamt of. The source of offence is said to have been the friendly interest taken by him in Lieutenant Hammersley, assistant political at Quettah. General England, with a reinforcement of 1200 men, and convoy of 1500 camels, and £45,000 of treasure, while on his way to Candahar, where the troops were suffering extremely for want of medicine, and were disabled for field service from deficiency of cash and carriage, was met at Hykulzye by a force of the enemy said to have been nearly 800 strong. An ill-advised attempt to storm *in line* a hillock which might easily have been turned or commanded, occasioned the repulse of the storming party of 180, when, to the astonishment of every officer in the force, the whole brigade was ordered to retreat a distance of 25 miles, and immediately on arriving at Quettah, commenced entrenching themselves as if for a siege, leaving the troops of General Nott to their fate. For a much more venial error Admiral Byng had been tried and shot. A despatch, making a fearful parade of dangers and difficulties, in reference to which no information had been provided by the political agent, was forwarded to the Supreme Government, and Lieutenant Hammersley was dismissed. Major Outram wrote to Lord Ellenborough entreating him to suspend judgment on this point, until enquiry had been made as to the nature of the Hykulzye defences, and the time occupied in their construction, both of which were represented by General England in such a formidable light that the political agent ought to have been informed of the matter. The officers

55. This was exactly the doctrine laid down by the *Bombay Times* so far back as March, and insisted on so long as there appeared to be any intention of advancing at all—that if a demonstration on Cabool was to be made, General Nott might advance with a brigade of 5000, leaving 5000 at Candahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and level every town in Affghanistan if deemed expedient.

of General England's army were almost unanimously of opinion that the Hykulzye despatch was a tissue of the most grievous mis-statements. To the recommendation for inquiry the Governor-General did not think fit to accede.(56) The perfect facility with which the same ground was gone over by the same detachment exactly a month afterwards, shewed that it was neither the existence of defences nor the want of information, but the gross mismanagement of the commanding officer, which occasioned the retreat from Hykulzye before an inferior force: the only disgraceful military measure (those at Cabool excepted) which occurred during the war. Lieut. Hammersley's health had suffered from the extent of his exertions and the insalubrity of the climate; and this harsh, ungenerous, and unjust decision, proved fatal to him.

Major Outram had now committed an unpardonable offence in interposing in behalf of his friend; and he also must be victimized. From the 2d of May, when the intention of appointing him envoy to the court of Hydrabad was announced to him, on to the 19th of October, he heard no more on the subject; but had no reason to suppose the resolution of the Governor-General in his favour altered. A notification in the *Gazette* of the latter date intimated his summary removal from all political employ, placing his services at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief for regimental duty; his salary and allowances to cease from the 15th November, the duties of political agent hereafter to be discharged by the extra Aides-de-Camp of General Napier.(57) On the 4th of November he received a public dinner at Sukkur previously to his departure for Bombay. General Napier presided, and except those who were detained by indisposition, of the officers belonging to an army of nearly 10,000 men scarcely one was absent. The gallant chairman wisely avoided all allusion to public affairs, especially to the treatment their guest had recently experienced. He proposed his health as the "Bayard of the Indian army—the *Chevalier sans peur et sans reproche*." On his arrival at Bombay a similar testimony of public regard awaited him; he was entertained on the 13th December by a party of upwards of 100, including the Secretaries and Aides-de-Camp of the Governor, the Secretaries of Government, heads of all the departments, the Judges, senior Civil Servants and Staff Officers, and the whole elite of the Presidency. Had he gone the round of India he would probably have met with compliments similarly gratifying at every mi-

56. Blue Book, p. 267, Lord Ellenborough's letter to the Secret Committee, 8th June; the wording of this letter has, in the text, been pretty closely adhered to.

57. It must be kept in view, that the order applied to all the *Scinde* politicals; Major Outram was included amongst the common herd; not the slightest notice being now taken of his services. The conduct of the Governor-General has been apologized for on the plea that a functionary such as Major Outram was no longer required in *Scinde*. The appointment of Lieut. Brown as commissioner, shows that this excuse is baseless.

litary station in the Company's territories. He at this time proposed to proceed to England on furlough. No sooner had Sir C. Napier taken in hand to unravel the tangled skein of Scindian politics, than he found that a task had been imposed on him which he was wholly unable to execute. He applied to the Supreme Government for assistance, and was permitted to request the services of Major Outram; the Governor-General had not the courtesy to make the nomination direct,—it was done by Sir C. Napier. After slights and insults such as these, Major Outram might readily have excused himself from assuming a subordinate appointment where he had, three months before, been supreme, on the plea that he had made arrangements for immediate return to England; he never thought of this; he had for twenty years devoted his life to the service of his Government without the most remote idea of indulging in personal feeling; and now, when required to resume the duties of an office from which he had been so lately and summarily discarded, he set private arrangements and personal considerations at naught, and started at once for Kurrachee. His appearance on the 4th January in Sir C. Napier's camp, and subsequent interview with the Ameers, made almost an instantaneous change in the aspect of affairs—it inspired confidence of our peaceful and honest intentions in the bosoms of the Chiefs, who were at once willing to accept Major Outram as a referee, and to be guided by his decisions on any question of misunderstanding betwixt them and the Supreme Government. The Governor-General had by this time resolved to have terms proposed to the Ameers so injurious and insulting, that compliance with them could never have been expected. The object was to bring them into such total subjection that their independence would hereafter be virtually annihilated; or to force a quarrel on them which might compel conflict and afford us a pretence for conquering the country. Having succeeded in inducing them to subscribe the treaty: there were certain secret and most exorbitant stipulations contained in separate instructions, which he was directed to insist upon, but which the Ameers could not be prevailed on to comply with. While yet at court, and in hopes that he might induce them to concede even these, General Napier continued to advance steadily on Hyderabad with a force of 2,700 men. The Ameers intimated to Major Outram, that unless the army halted until negotiations had finally been broken off or concluded, they would be compelled to move out and protect their capital, from which our troops, whose object could no longer be mistaken, were now only 30 miles off: and they fully warned the Commissioner, that unless he retired, they could not further be answerable for his safety. Anxious to avert a conflict which he clearly foresaw would be a desperate and bloody one, and in expectation that he might still be enabled to obtain by persuasion that which Sir C. Napier was prepared to extort by force; he remained after he had received a first, and then a second formal warning to

depart, or until he and his escort of 100 men were attacked by 8000 of the enraged Beloochees now on the eve of marching forth to the fatal field of Meeanee. Above 90 of the enemy were killed in the defence, and Major Outram expressed a fervent but not sanguine hope, "that their deaths might not be charged on him as murders." He considered the attack on himself as perfectly justifiable by the laws even of Christian war; and conceived, that so far were the Ameers from being chargeable with the treachery imputed to them by the Governor-General, that they had acted a thoroughly candid, friendly, and generous part, till forced to betake themselves to arms. Major Outram joined Sir C. Napier on the eve of the battle of Meeanee, at which he was not, however, present, having been directed to take in hand the dangerous and troublesome service of destroying by fire the Shikargurs which protected the enemy. He returned to Bombay immediately after the victory, having left Hyderabad on the 21st, and reached the presidency on the 26th February. It was resolved that on this occasion a Sword, to the value of 300 guineas, should be presented to him by his friends: the subscription list was filled up with the utmost celerity; and had it been extended to the services throughout India at large, £3000 would, in all likelihood, have been got as readily as £300. The following inscription was desired to be engraven on the blade:—"Presented to Major James Outram, 29d Regt. Bombay Native Light Infantry, in token of the regard of his friends, and the high estimation in which he is held for the intrepid gallantry which has marked his career in India, but more especially his heroic defence of the British residency at Hyderabad in Scinde, on the 15th February 1843, against an army of 8000 Beloochees, with six guns;" on the opposite side were the words—"sans peur et sans reproche." He sailed for England on the 1st April. The stand made at the residency was considered so admirable, that Sir C. Napier made it a subject of separate memorial for the Governor-General, as an example of the defence of a military post. (58) No notice was ever taken of this by government, and Major Outram now remains the only officer who did duty near Hyderabad whose services have not been publicly noticed in any way by Government. His brethren in arms who could appreciate his heroic virtues, were not slow in expressing their sentiments on the subject: the rulers he served alone remained silent! It may be added, in conclusion, that when he temporarily resumed his political duties, he declined to accept of any remuneration; and that while acting as Com-

58. This is in part an assumption; Sir Charles, at the close of his despatch of the 18th February, promises to send this, and there is no reason to doubt that the promise was fulfilled: the text gives nearly the words of the despatch—proceeding thus far on the hypothesis as to the paper having been forwarded.

missioner in Scinde, betwixt the 19th December and 20th February, he was only in the receipt of the pay and allowances of a Captain of the 23d N.L.I. He proposes to remain two years in Europe; by the time of his return it is to be hoped that the Government of India will be in the hands of some one capable of appreciating the worth of services such as his.



CHAPTER VI.

Events near Cabool in the beginning of 1841—Brigading of the Troops in Afghanistan—Shelton's Brigade leaves Porezepore—Alleged reduction of the Army—Expedition into the Nazim valley in February—Lieut. Rigou killed by an explosion—Captain Douglas shot—Arrival of the 3d Convoy at Cabool—Return of the Shah and Envoy to the Capital—Arrogance of the Shah—Seikh affairs—Death of Kurruck Sing—Of Nao Nehal Sing—Shere Sing proclaimed King—Dissipated habits of—His coronation—Queen Dowager declared pregnant—Shere Sing withdraws himself—A revolution in the Army—He is restored to the throne—Tranquillity of the Punjab—Captain Broadfoot's convoy—Death of one of the Royal Ladies—Danger of the Convoy—Coolness and good conduct of Captain Broadfoot—Arrives at Peshawur—Scene of Narrative changes—Suftur Jung Governor of Candahar—His misconduct and dissipation—Discontents in the Ghilzie country—Expedition to Ghirisk—Detachments of the Shah's troops destroyed—Captain Farrington sets out—Pursues Ukhtar Khan and defeats him on the Helmund—Major Tod's arrival from Herat—Reinforcements sent to Ghirisk—Major Lynch's management of the Ghilzie country—Resolves to fortify Kelat-i-Ghilzie—Unhappy affair at Kulla i-Ingoz—General rising of the country—Colonel Wymer's reinforcement from Candahar—Defeats the enemy—Detachment from Ghuznia quartered at Mookloor—Colonel Chambers's expedition—Success of Captain Walker and Lieut. Bazzett—Captain Woodburn's Detachment sent to Ghirisk—Battle with Ukhtar Khan on the Helmund—Misconduct of the Jantaz Horse—Brilliant victory Expedition under Captain Griffin—Battle with Ukhtar Khan's troops—Great slaughter of the enemy—Expedition under Colonel Wymer into the Teeree country—Capture of Akram Khan—His execution—Colonel Maclaren's Brigade leaves for India—Directed to return and proceed to Cabool—Advance found impossible—Posts in Western Afghanistan in October 1841—Affairs at Cabool—Expedition into the Zoomut Valley—Strength of Army in Eastern Afghanistan—Ghilzie insurrection occasioned by stoppage of tribute—Conclusion—Loss of life during the Afghan war—Loss of Treasure—Sir W. Macnaghten's letter on presenting Sir Alexander Burnes's memorial—Apathy of the people at home—Lord Palmerston's Tiverton speech—Proposed continuation and subsequent abandonment of our Afghan policy—Reflections on the conduct of the Political Agents—Noble conduct of the Army—Conclusion.

THE history of the events in Beloochistan and Scinde arising out of our connection with the Doorannee sovereign has, in last chapter, been brought down to the commencement of the Ghilzie insurrection, when our alliance may be said to have terminated, the whole of its objects having been frustrated : from this time we remained in the country, in the first place until we could find the means of retiring from it ; and afterwards, on second thoughts, till some signal mark of our vengeance had been inflicted on the Affghans for daring to dispute our right to make a causeless invasion into their territories,—and for having conducted that dispute with the falsehood, perfidy, and vindictiveness characteristic of the quarter of the globe to which they belonged.

The thread of the narrative, in order of time running parallel with this, requires now to be resumed at Cabool, where it was broken off at the close of the third chapter, with the account of the surrender of Dost Mahomed in

November 1840, and the temporary and partial tranquillity which immediately thereafter ensued. This auspicious state of repose was of short duration; so soon as the season for active operations opened, one general ferment of discontent and insurrection made its appearance from Ghirisk to Jellalabad: a condition of matters which was never remedied or allayed during the period of our continuance in the country.

The following order was issued on the 28th of January, for the brigading of the troops in Affghanistan: (1) the first brigade of infantry, stationed at Cabool, and consisting of H. M.'s 13th, the 16th, 35th, and 37th Bengal N. I., to be under the command of Sir Robert Sale; Capt. Wade, of H. M.'s 13th, acting as major of brigade. The Candahar, or second brigade, under the charge of General Nott, was to consist of the 2d, 42d, and 43d N. I. The third brigade, consisting of H. M.'s 44th, the 27th and 54th N. I., was to be commanded by Colonel Shelton: it was at this time at Jellalabad. These three brigades comprised nine regiments of the line, of which two were Queen's and seven Company's, and contained probably about 7,500 men. This was exclusive of the Bombay troops at Quetta in Beloochistan, and Scinde,—as well as of cavalry, artillery, the Shah's contingent, and all irregulars,—which brought up the strength of the army required to be paid by the East India Company for the maintenance of the Dooranee alliance, to betwixt 25,000 and 30,000 men. Loose as the statement appears, it is difficult to make it more specific, from the fluctuating strength of the irregulars, which constituted nearly one half of the contingent.

When these arrangements were made, Colonel Shelton was still on his march. He left Ferozepore on the 8th December, 1840, reached Peshawur in the beginning of January, and arrived at Jellalabad about the 25th of that month. He crossed the convoy accompanying Dost Mahomed to Hindostan, at Rawul Pindee, on the 6th January. The Kaffila escorted by Colonel Shelton's troops is commonly known as the second convoy of the season; the first having been that under Colonel Wallace, mentioned in a previous chapter, and usually termed the grand convoy. The third convoy left Ferozepore on the 31st January: it was escorted by a wing of the 5th N. I., a detachment of H. M.'s troops (details of the 13th and 44th) under Captain Havelock, and a detachment of the Company's under Captain Manning and Lieut. Pottinger, some artillery drafts under Lieut. Bingham, and a Goorkah detachment under Lieut. Crawford; the whole was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Oliver. (2) General Elphinstone and Brigadier Anquetil accompanied this force, together with Major Thane and Lieut. Eyre—all names of men speedily destined to occupy a conspicu-

1. *Calcutta Government Gazette*, January 28.

2. *Delhi Gazette*, February 3.

ous place amongst the fearful events which followed ten months afterwards. Sir Willoughby Cotton crossed them on his return three marches on their way : he reached Ferozepore on the 6th February.

The 1st Bengal European regiment, and two companies of the 27th N.I., which had accompanied the grand convoy, under Colonel Wallace, were sent back to India under command of Colonel Wheeler, as an escort to Sir W. Cotton. These were replaced by Shelton's brigade, and the troops attending the second and third convoys, about 4000 in all, as a substitute for 1100 withdrawn. These changes were afterwards censured as premature withdrawals of the troops from Afghanistan,—three men being sent where one was intended to be taken away !

The most continuous and uninterrupted series of disorders requiring to be enumerated occurred in 1841 near Candahar ; and that the narrative of these may be left unbroken, a slight departure from strict chronological order will permit the expedition of Colonel Shelton into the Nazian valley to be noticed without breaking in upon the history of the squabbles with the Western Ghilzies : those to the east and south of Cabool having given little trouble from the month of February till the great and disastrous outbreak of October.

Colonel Shelton, when on his way from Ferozepore, was directed by the Envoy to proceed from Jellalabad to chastise a refractory tribe called the Sungoo Kail, inhabiting the Nazian valley. For this purpose, a strong force marched from Jellalabad on the 21st February, consisting of a detachment of Sappers and Miners, and a troop of Horse Artillery with four guns, H. M.'s 44th, and the 27th N. I. Troops of the Shah Soojah consisting of a detachment of the mountain train, 1 squadron of the 2d Cavalry, 3d Infantry Regiment, and 1st corps of Janbaz Cavalry. This force arrived at Pesh Bolack, a distance of about twenty-three miles, on the 23d, and was joined by Captain Ferris's corps of Jezailchees, and the 3d Regiment of Janbaz. Quitting this post on the morning of the 24th, (3) the Nazian valley was entered by the Sarobi Pass soon after daybreak. The force having been divided, Colonel Shelton advanced up the centre of the valley with six companies of H. M.'s 44th under Colonel Mackerell, a similar number of the 27th N. I. under Col. Palmer, (4) and two guns under Capt. Nicholl. The 1st Shah's Janbaz regiment, the 2d cavalry, and two hundred Jezailchees, under Hyder Alii, a native commandant, proceeded from the left flank along the high ground, closing the valley on the east side : the remainder of this corps, moving from the extreme right of the detachment, under Captain Ferris, were to attack the enemy on the left : two companies of

3. Brigadier Shelton's Despatch.

4. This officer with his regiment (27th N. I.) was shut up in Ghuznie in the following November, and became a prisoner in March 1842, remaining in the hands of the enemy till September.

H.M.'s 44th, and two of the 27th N.I., supported by detachments from the same regiments, with two six-pounder guns, under Captains Scott and Swayne, moved along the heights on the west of the valley. A strong body of regulars and irregulars made a considerable detour so as to enter by the eastern pass the dell, which was thus hemmed in on all sides. Captain Ferris came in almost immediate contact with the enemy: he attacked them with great spirit, pursuing them with the most determined gallantry over almost inaccessible heights, and driving them before him under a galling fire. The Jezailchees suffered severely in the performance of this service. The insurgents were retiring with their women and children, and driving off their flocks, inclining the line of their retreat so as to get out of reach of our fire with all convenient speed, when Hyder Ali, with his two hundred Jezailchees, met them and captured most of their cattle: Lieutenant Golding, with his Janbaz, made a successful charge upon the fugitives, and destroyed a considerable number in their attempts to escape. Some skirmishing had, meanwhile, occurred up and down the valley, where the conduct of the troops was excellent, and their success complete. A few men still held out in two of the forts, till the gates were blown open by powder-bags. The explosion on the second occasion proved fatal to Lieutenant Pigou of the Engineers, who, with the utmost coolness and gallantry, conducted the operations. He was blown up and killed: his body falling at a distance of about eighty yards from the place of explosion. The Nazian valley is about eight miles in length, studded from end to end, on both sides, with forts. Nearly the whole were in our possession by a little after noon, the advance of the troops having been one continued course of success. Our casualties amounted to eighteen killed, and thirty-four wounded: those of the enemy were estimated at from forty to fifty killed and wounded. The following day the same force proceeded into a secluded valley adjoining, similarly defended, and sprinkled with forts, but of which scarcely anything was known: they continued as formerly to carry every thing before them. The ground over which the march had to be performed was difficult: the defiles were deep, narrow, and appalling; the heights requiring to be crowned by the flanking parties rugged and precipitous. The loss of Captain Douglas, who was shot dead by the side of his commander, was the only casualty which occurred, and by the evening of the 25th, eighty-two forts had been captured. (5) The force returned to camp, having fulfilled the objects of the expedition in devastating a valley whose inhabitants had proved refractory on the usual subject of tribute, it is presumed: though the occasion or manner in which the insubordination for which they were chastised manifested itself, is not stated. The third convoy of the season, which, as already noticed,

commenced its march on the 1st February, was now well on its way towards the Attock, and Captain Broadfoot, escorting a portion of the Shah's family, had just entered, or was about to enter, the Seikh territory, where the dispute for the succession betwixt the Dowager Princess and Shere Singh was threatening disorder.

The third brigade, in consequence of the disturbances apprehended in the Punjaub, was meanwhile ordered to stand fast at Jellalabad, to watch the progress of events. The third convoy arrived in safety on the 4th April: General Elphinstone having preceded them by four days. The 54th N. I. and a squadron of the Light Cavalry were ordered to proceed to Gunda-muck on the 8th to keep open the way for the convoy itself, which, accompanied by its former escort, marched on the 9th. The Shah Soojah, attended by the Envoy and court, who had, as in the first year of the new reign, taken up his winter quarters at Jellalabad, was enabled by the guard of the convoy to return to Cabool on the 30th of April, accompanied by General Elphinstone, who, as already mentioned, took the place of Sir Willoughby Cotton in the command of the forces in Affghanistan—a brief, troubled, and disastrous charge. The arrogance of the weak and unhappy monarch had grown upon him, as might have been expected, by the adulation which was paid to him, and the actual power which our friendship had enabled him to exercise compared to the mere nominal authority he had formerly possessed when on the throne. Punctilious at all times, he now gave full rein to that small-minded and miserable selfishness which furnished the most prominent feature in his character; insisting on the minutest observance of etiquette and ceremony. (6)

6. The following extract of a letter of Sir William Macnaghten's, accompanying the report of Sir A. Burnes on the Consolidation of Affghanistan, to which we have already had occasion to refer, sufficiently indicates the excessively exaggerated view taken of his majesty's excellences by the envoy in August 1840:—"His Majesty invariably evinces the greatest anxiety that justice should be done to all his subjects. His Majesty sits in durbar every morning, except Thursday, for about two hours, and listens with the greatest patience to the representations of his chiefs. One day is set apart for hearing the complaints of all those who may allege that they have not received redress from the authorities to whom their cases have been referred.—Though stern in the execution of justice (as was exemplified only the other day in the case of the murderer in whose pardon so much influence was exerted) yet His Majesty is merciful and kind-hearted in the extreme; and if the personal qualities of a monarch could ensure popularity, Shah Soojah could not fail to obtain it. My longer experience of His Majesty's character more thoroughly convinces me of the truth of what I have already asserted, that there is not an abler or a better man than himself in all his dominions."—The subjoined extract from a private journal kept by Sir Alexander Burnes up to the day before his murder, and preserved by Mohun Lal, will show how completely the opinions of Sir W. Macnaghten were shortly afterwards changed:—

"Cabool, 1st September, 1841. * * * An expression from Mac-

The Envoy, who continued to profess the highest opinion of the excellences of the Shah's character and of his capacity for government, indulged him in the silliest whims, and most absurd and troublesome caprices. On his return to the capital an order was issued that no officer should ride through, or even enter, the Bala Hissar, unless required so to do as a matter of duty. A fort which Captain Mainwaring had purchased at a large price, as a residence, as well as one of the commissariat stores, were directed to be abandoned or removed as being too near the royal gardens!

The history of Seikh affairs, from the death of Runjeet Sing, in July 1839, to the accession of Shere Sing, is well worthy of a separate chapter: it may be sufficient here to remark, that the Lion of the Punjaub having been quietly succeeded by his son, the weak and imbecile Kurruck Sing, this prince was cut off on the 5th November after a lingering and painful illness, aggravated by the proscriptions of native physicians, which alone he could be persuaded to attend to. His body was burned, and one of his wives with three or four of her hand-maidens, were immolated on the funeral pyre. His only son and heir, Nao Nehal Sing, was killed the same day by the falling of a beam in one of the city gates on returning from his father's obseques.

Two days after this Shere Sing, Governor of Cashmere, was proclaimed Sovereign. This prince was the son of one of the wives of Runjeet Sing, but born on an occasion when her husband had been so long absent from home, as to leave little doubt as to his illegitimacy. He was, however, treated as a prince of the blood, though not considered heir to the throne. He was made governor of Cashmere: was a man of both energy and ability, but of habits so extremely dissipated, that he was much estranged from the old Lion himself, whose own manner of life should have made him in the last degree forbearing towards the frailties of his imputed son. Shere Sing hastened to Lahore and was duly installed on the musnud. Meanwhile one of the wives of Kurruck Sing was declared pregnant, and shut up in the zenana;—a large party, including the European officers taken into pay by Runjeet Sing, being attached to her cause. This looked formidable, and though the people clung to the prince, the strength of his party continued for a time to decline, when at length he professed to have abdicated and retired from power. This was merely a ruse to enable him to visit those districts where he was popular, and to raise and collect his friends for a further effort. A revolution took place early in January, the

naghten to-day that 'the Shah Soojah was an old woman not fit to rule his people, with divers other condemnations.'—Aye, see my *Travels* so far back as 1831."

prince returned towards the city, the leading men joined him on the way, and the army went over to his standard under the walls of Lahore. Generals Court, Ventura, and Avitabile had been brought over, and before the end of the month, the new ruler was seated on the throne; the princess having been persuaded to abandon further claims for the present but not till after offering a stout defence, in which 2000 of her followers are said to have fallen. These events occasioned much commotion through the country, the troops becoming mutinous and disorderly, and acting as brigands on the chief lines of route. No serious mischiefs, luckily, arose out of these disorders, whose aspect at one time had been so alarming. By the commencement of the hot season matters were so far tranquillized that the Sikh troops were entrusted with the conveyance of treasure for our armies.

About the end of March, Captain Broadfoot left Ferozepore with a weak detachment of sepoys, a small body of Ghoorkas, and a detachment of Alexander's horse—in all about 1000 strong, one half only being regular infantry,—in charge of a portion of the family of the Shah Soojah, including about 100 ladies, who had not till now rejoined him. Soon after he entered the Punjaub, the country became much disturbed; several regiments had mutinied, and bands of robbers marauded all over the kingdom. As the ladies' jewels were valuable, and the convoy had a considerable quantity of property in charge, a strong inducement to attack was held out to men ever ready to plunder under the slightest of temptations. Much sickness prevailed, and nearly 150 sepoys are said to have deserted. An accident occurred early on the march, eminently illustrative of eastern manners, in reference to the seclusion in which the females of the higher ranks are maintained. A restive camel threw its load, consisting of one of the wives of his majesty, concealed with as much privacy as a camel litter would permit. The beast fell heavily upon his burthen, which now entangled him. In a moment an European officer was on the spot, anxious to release the suffering captive; who amidst all the terror and torture which the struggles of the restive animal must have occasioned, deprecated interference, and entreated that no man might approach to subject her to sufferings worse than death,—that of being seen! She was so injured that she died a few hours afterwards. Though repeatedly threatened, the prudent conduct and bold front at all times manifested by Captain Broadfoot, overawed the rebels. His chief danger was near Attock, where the occupants of a stockade first threatened an immediate attack on him. Though outnumbering his force by about six to one in strength, he sent a peremptory mandate to them, intimating that unless they immediately gave him what assistance was required to help him on his way, he would compel them; and that if they continued to maintain the present unfriendly attitude, he would attack and destroy

their fort. It was easier to make this threat than to carry it into execution; but the bold confidence it implied, served the purposes desired. Entrenchments meanwhile were dug, and defences thrown up, and the most active preparations made for hostilities. The Seikhs even proceeded so far as to plunder the women's travelling litters, having got it into their heads that they carried treasure. They next secured several of our cattle, and some of the chiefs came into camp and became insolent. Finding that Captain Broadfoot was not to be bullied, they produced a letter from Genl. Avitabile, assuring him of protection. This was thrown back in their faces—they were told that fifty letters from the General would not make thieves honest men; and that they must restore every thing they had taken, or they would be instantly attacked; and that if this was not done in ten minutes, they would be treated as criminals. They now became terrified, and did as they were desired. Alarmed and humbled, they permitted the convoy to cross the Attock and proceed towards Peshawur, where it arrived in safety on the 18th May. Such, however, had been the alarm for their safety, that Col. Shelton proceeded by forced marches through the pass with H.M.'s 44th, 1st troop 1st brigade H. A., two squadrons of the 5th L. C., with the 27th and 54th N. I., to assist him in case of need—or at all events to show the Seikhs that aid was at hand. Their duties were happily limited to those of an escort from Jumrood to Jelallabad. They reached Cabool on the 17th June; a party of the Sappers having been left behind to look after the magazine stores at Gundamuck.

To the northward and westward of Cabool though discontent was general, and casual outbreaks of a trivial nature not unfrequent, no affair of any considerable importance occurred betwixt the surrender of Dost Mahomed and the general rising which took place exactly that day twelve-month—on the 2d November 1841. To the south the Ghilzies and Khyberrees were liberally rewarded for the use of their passes; and just so long only as their stipend of £3000 a-year was paid in full, did they remain at peace.

The scene of the narrative which relates to the warlike proceedings of summer 1841 must now be shifted to the westward. At Candahar popular discontent appeared to be approaching a crisis just as matters around Cabool were becoming tranquillized by the surrender of Dost Mahomed on the 3d November. (7) Sufter Jung, son of Shah Soofah, had been appointed governor of the town and province, with a salary of £1700 a-year. The whole of the offspring of the Dooranee sovereign—Prince Timour alone excepted—appeared to have been men of the most worthless character, and depraved and dissipated habits. The Candahar governor was a wretch too execrable

7. See Chapter III., p. 162.

to live. He is said frequently to have increased an income of £140 a-month to £10,000, by extortion alone: on one occasion, he put a merchant to the torture on some frivolous pretence, and released him only when £300 had been paid by his relations for his liberation. The money thus villainously obtained was squandered in the grossest sensuality, and in shameless and excessive indulgence in a vice not uncommon in the east, which in Europe is reckoned so infamous, above all others, as to be nameless. (8) On one occasion he managed to entice some Europeans into his residence, and, having drugged them with brandy, took advantage of their helpless condition. One of them afterwards poisoned himself. The political agent was not allowed to interfere with the pleasures of the Prince, whose misconduct was thus bringing scandal on the British name. (9) The contrast betwixt the family of the late and present ruler was most disadvantageous to us: the sons of Dost Mahomed being so remarkable for their good conduct, and manly, soldier-like, and intelligent bearing, as to make a deep impression on every European who came in contact with them. (10) By the middle of December the country was threatened with a general insurrection—discontent was at its highest pitch everywhere, and the detestation of the Shah Soojah, intense and universal as it had now become, was too manifest to be disputed by the most devoted of his friends. A detachment of 800 men—a sort of armed police—provided with a couple of guns, having been sent to the westward to collect revenue on the banks of the Helmund, were attacked by the enemy and defeated, 400 or 500 of them having been killed and their guns taken. Such a casualty demanded instant attention from the authorities. About this time a detachment, consisting of the 1st troop Shah's Artillery, 2nd N.I., and 1st Cavalry, with 2 guns and some Irregular Horse, was dispatched from Candahar by General Nott, under charge of Captain Farrington, into the Zamin Dawur country, for the purpose of dispersing a body of rebels assembled under a chief named Akhtar Khan. (11) They reached Koosh-kina-Khood on the 28th December, and halted on the following day to permit Lient. Elliott, the political agent, to complete his arrangements. On the morning of the 30th, they proceeded to Sungboor, 16 miles in the direction of Saerwan-killah, where the detachment of the Shah's troops, under Mahomed Allum Khan had the evening before been completely worsted, his guns and baggage having been captured by the insurgents. This success on the

8. *Agra Ukhbar*, Nov. 7.—*Bombay Times*.

9. Letter of the medical attendant of the prince.—*Bombay Times*, October 21, 1840.

10. Letters from the late Dr. Grant, Bombay medical servioc.—*Bombay Times*.

11. Captain Farrington's despatch, 4th January, 1841.

part of the enemy was likely to acquire for them many new adherents, and as their force was now making formidable head, Capt. Farrington resolved to hasten matters as much as possible, preserving the utmost secrecy as to his intentions. On the morning of the 31st, the detachment marched 25 miles, crossing the river Helmund, here a broad and difficult stream, and occupying the fort of Ghirisk on its western bank 80 miles from Candahar.

On the 1st Jan. the march was continued 22 miles farther to Kareegha. By these rapid movements the rebels were outmanœuvred and outwitted. They became so completely misled as to the object of our movements, and nature of our position, as to believe at one time that another force was in their rear. On the 2d a halt to refresh the men was indispensable. It having been reported that the insurgent force was in the neighbourhood, a reconnoitring party, consisting of some irregular horse and a portion of the 1st cavalry, under Lieutenants Patterson and Hawkins of the horse artillery, proceeded in the direction of Lundie Nowah. The enemy were discovered to have taken up a difficult position among the sand hills in the neighbourhood. They had a strong range of heights in their front, and a canal in their rear. The irregular horse, with Lieutenant Patterson, having succeeded in driving in their outposts, gave Lieutenant Hawkins time to bring his guns, which were supported by the 2d N.I., into position. A well-directed fire of grape and shrapnell having been opened upon the rebels, they were prevented crossing the crest of the heights, behind which they ensconced themselves. The 1st cavalry followed up the advantage thus gained by the 2d N.I.: they charged under a heavy fire of matchlocks, and drove the enemy everywhere from their position. The insurgent force consisted of from 1200 to 1500 horse and foot: they were drawn up in four divisions, two of which attempted to turn our left. Their objects were frustrated by the cavalry, who charged and defeated them. They were now completely routed: sixty were left dead upon the field, amongst whom was one chief of distinction. A standard was taken. Their wounded must have amounted to several hundreds. After half an hour's halt at the conclusion of the action, the detachment posted on to Shornek, the stronghold of a rebel chief: where the guns, lost on the 29th, were recaptured. We had six killed, and fourteen wounded. Lieutenant Young was severely, and Lieut. Patterson slightly, injured. This seems to have been a very judiciously and gallantly conducted expedition altogether, and reflected the utmost credit on Captain Farrington, the military leader, and Lieutenant Elliot, the political authority. (12)

On the 9th Feb. the 39th N.I. under Colonel Wymer, arrived at Candahar, and were added to the strength of Gen. Nott's brigade. On the 20th,

the 1st regiment of the Shah's infantry, 500 irregular horse commanded by Captain Leeson, together with the 5th Shah's infantry under the command of the gallant Captain Woodburn, (13) left Candahar to reinforce the garrison at Ghirisk. Fears were entertained for Major Tod and his party, now known to have left Herat, and believed to have Ukhtar Khan in front, and Yar Mahomed in their rear. They arrived at Ghirisk on the 21st without sustaining harm: they had left on the 9th, and were aware that numerous parties of marauders were on the way ready to attack them: but the escort of the embassy was too strong, and the intended assailants kept their distance. Matters having become comparatively quiet in Shawl, Captain Anderson's troop of horse artillery, with the remainder of the 33th N. I., were ordered to return to Candahar from Quetta, at which latter place the army of General Brooks was immediately expected.

The troubles of the Ghilzie country affords a connected and almost uninterrupted series of disturbances from the surrender of Dost Mahomed—the date at which the scene was shifted from Cabool to Beloochistan,—down to the termination of our connection with the Doorannee empire.

The characters of the political administrations of Mr. Bell and Capt. Bean,—the authority of the former of whom was absolute in the countries below the Bolan pass, that of the latter being supreme in the district immediately above it, have already been detailed in a previous chapter. Major Rawlinson (14) held the chief political authority at Candahar—Major Lynch (15) being immediately under him in charge of the Ghilzie country. The latter officer unfortunately seemed to have been deeply imbued with the creed at this time unhappily of general prevalence amongst the politicians of India, whose votaries held it a maxim, that in state affairs the ordinary principles of morality were by no means to be held binding, but that something which they termed “expediency,” which seemed to warrant every variety of roguery, trick, and deceit—which furnished every man, in short, with authority to do without reproach in his public character, whatever he thought fit, was the sole rule by which statesmen, big and small, should be guided. The laws of war and of nations as recognised in Europe, were held to be inapplicable in cases where such countries as Afghanistan had to be dealt with. (16) These things, which are gathered from the published statements

13. This brave and excellent officer was, along with a party of one hundred sick sepoy on their way to Hindostan, attacked at the outbreak of the insurrection on the 3d Nov. 1841, and cut to pieces near Ghuznie.

14. Lieut. Rawlinson has the local rank of Major in Persia. At the time referred to he was a Lieut. of 1835, of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers, and is a Knight of the Lion and Sun.

15. The same is the case with Major Lynch, a Lieut. of 1833.

16. These seem still favourite views amongst a considerable class of persons, both at home and here, in reference to Indian affairs. The statement of

of Major Lynch, are necessary to be explained to account for some portions of his proceedings, otherwise not easy to be accounted for.

On the restoration of the Shah Soojah in August 1839, Sunnud Khan had been appointed chief of the Tokey (Ghilzie) tribe, more from the consideration of his having been a well-wisher to his Majesty, than for any intrinsic qualities for government possessed by him. He seemed to have been a weak-minded man, unfitted for the exercise of the authority which had been placed in his hands; and Major Lynch accordingly recommended his removal—not says he “that this was a just act, for nothing could be brought forward to impugn his loyalty or fidelity,” but because he was ill qualified to rule the tribes over whom he had been set.(17) The change was accordingly effected; Sunnud Khan was removed, and a chief more vigorous, one of his rivals of the race of Shaboodeen Killie was set up to rule in his stead. The country for a time became comparatively tranquil. In the beginning of July, Lieutenant Nicholson, who had hitherto been the active manager of Ghilzie matters, left for Cabool,—the entire charge hereby devolving on Major Lynch, who had a force consisting of the Shah's 5th Hindostanee Regiment, 4 guns, and betwixt 300 and 400 Irregular Horse placed at his disposal.(18) These were directed to remain in the field till the beginning of winter; but they were not expected to be required in actual fighting, as every effort was directed to be made to conciliate the tribes. Sultan Mahomed Khan, one of the most obstinate and refractory of the chiefs, was at length, and with much difficulty, induced to take the oath of allegiance to the Shah Soojah. He was a shrewd, cunning, unscrupulous, and enterprising man, and much value was attached to his friendship. He, so early as the month of August, recommended that the troops meant to be maintained in that quarter of the country should occupy Kelat-i-Ghilzie, which place he recommended as in itself a commanding station, and one where the government of the country had generally been located. When Dost Mahomed made his appearance on the Kohistan frontier previous to the battle of Bameean on the 18th September,(19) emissaries had been sent into the Ghilzie country, but were unable to shake the loyalty of the chiefs. In this auspicious condition matters remained till the approach of winter, when the

Lord Lansdowne, received by the House of Commons as axiomatic in 1818, seems to have become exploded before 1838. His lordship said “that he did not believe their lordships would sanction any rules of war in India, differing from those prescribed in Europe; that it was their duty to convey over every portion of the globe where their power extended, those principles of justice and moderation which governed them in Europe.”

17. Major Lynch's statement for the Envoy, June 22, 1841. *Bombay Times*, April 20, 1842.

18. The narrative of the affairs of the Ghilzie country will be found to have been brought down thus far in Chapter III., pp. 147 and 148.

19. *Vide ante*, p. 156.

severity of the cold compelled the withdrawal of the troops. They retired to Candahar on the 14th November attended by such an escort of friendly Ghilzies as had rarely been seen assembled together for any purpose save to concert for war or plunder.

In the beginning of Decr. (20) it became known that about 70 of the members of the Shaboodeen tribe, including a brother of a chief of note who had found refuge in the Punjaub the previous year, (21) had been made over to the British Government and sent prisoners to India. The Affghans appear all along to have held in special abhorrence the idea of being removed from their native country, and detained as captives in Hindostan. "It is a very common saying amongst them," observes Major Lynch, from whose statement this much of the present narrative is chiefly taken, "when they talk of the Shah Soojah in connection with the British, and when they are told that he is king of Affghanistan, and only supported by the Indian Government, that they conceive it rather a curious fact that Shah Soojah should be king of Affghanistan, and have his state prisons in India or London. I am firmly of opinion, that if there has been one measure more than another calculated to make us unpopular with the Affghans, it has been the untoward circumstance of sending into exile Hadjee Khan Kakur and the other Affghan khans."

From this time Major Lynch considered that all chance of the system of conciliation—which had previously been so promising—ultimately proving successful was now at an end, and that coercion and severe measures could alone produce or maintain tranquillity. The mode in which he proposed to change from the one to the other was certainly summary and unscrupulous enough. He writes to the Envoy under date 27th December—"It is just as well the Tokies did not know you had seized their Pet-man [one of the Ghilzies given up to us by the Seikhs, and for the possession of whose person it appears the Envoy had for six or seven months been negotiating] or the chief of the Shaboodeen Killie, or they might, in all probability, have boned me, and given you some trouble, when the Dost was at large. However, we have laughed at their boards, and hope you will now approve of my adopting a new system, for the conciliatory one will not work in the Tokey land for the future. WE CAN EASILY GET THEM TO COMMIT THEMSELVES, AND IN LIEU of their present pay, give them a few more rounds of cannister from Anderson's guns, which they will now in all probability

20. It is called March in Major Lynch's MS.; instead of 1st March it must be 1st December,—a note farther down discusses the matter.

21. "The Seikhs who had been detected giving harbourage to the Ghilzie refugees some months before, were now (Sept. 1840) proved to have promised supplies of money to Dost Mahomed Khan," *ante*, Chap. III., p. 152.

require before the winter is over." (22) A more indefensible system than this, though it was afterwards practised on a larger scale against the Ameers of Seinde, cannot be conceived:—premeditatedly to drive or to entrap men into a quarrel, for the purpose of being able to slaughter and get rid of them, is so closely allied to wholesale murder, that it gives a sad view of the political morality of the time to see such a sentiment as is here expressed, in a formal official paper, should have been passed uncensured. In the month of January 1841, so strong was the feeling of dissatisfaction through the tribe, that Major Lynch proceeded at once into the country, when a deeply laid plot to seize himself and his escort was discovered. He was met by about 1000 horse, who pretended to have been assembled to welcome him back, but were so in fact for the purpose of attacking him. He managed to make them aware that he was not ignorant of their designs, and persuaded them to abandon them, and once more to seal the Koran in the name of the king—the Affghan mode of swearing allegiance.

Shortly afterwards, intimation was sent to the chief by whom this very measure had been originally advised, that Kelat-i-Ghilzie was to be fortified and garrisoned. Sultan Mahomed Khan assembled the head men to consult on the subject; and though he pointed out the futility of resistance to our wishes, they determined to set themselves in this matter against us. A very civil but guardedly-written letter was sent back to the political agent, intimating that the measure in contemplation would be most unpopular with the tribe. They suspected our objects, and were in the last degree jealous of permitting a foreign force to be permanently established amongst them. The minor chiefs were written to in succession, but with no better success: the determination to resist the construction of fortifications and establishment of a garrison, seemed firm and universal. Failing to persuade them to permit us to establish ourselves peaceably in the capital of the country, it was resolved that a garrison should be placed there by force.

About the end of April, a detachment consisting of the 1st and 2d Shah's Hindostanee infantry, commanded by Captains Griffin and Macan, about 300 of Christie's horse (Shah's 1st cavalry), and a couple of guns, were dispatched from Candahar to occupy the ground on which the fort was to be built. The distance from Candahar is 80 miles, and the country here attains an elevation of 5773 feet, intermediate betwixt that of the place they had

22. We are unable to reconcile Major Lynch's dates with each other. In his statement, he says that it was on the 1st of March 1841 on which he made the discovery about the Ghilzies having been carried to India—yet the letter itself is dated 27th December 1840. Moreover, in a letter of 1st Dec. same year, the matter is specially referred to; and the Envoy, under date 15th same month, makes some severe remarks thereon. 1st Dec. 1840, instead of 1st March 1841, must be the date intended, though even this produces confusion with the rest of the narrative.

left, which was 3484, and Ghuznio, still 140 miles further to the north-west of them, which rose to the altitude of 7726.

The troops appear to have experienced no molestation on their advance, but no sooner had they reached their destination than they planted the British standard with much ostentation and display, and saluted it with a salvo of artillery and three volleys of musketry : a silly proceeding in itself under any circumstances ; but, on the present occasion, calculated to irritate and madden a people sufficiently discontented, and prepared to take umbrage at what they must have viewed as insult added to aggression. They were already boiling with rage and indignation at the seizure of their kinsfolks, and chafing under the oppression of the new order of things ; and were ready to rise in arms on the slightest additional provocation, and take vengeance on any one who came within reach of their wrath. It does not appear that this was even a part of the execrable system suggested "to get them to commit themselves," but a simple act of spontaneous imprudence. Just after this, Major Lynch, hearing of the discontents everywhere prevailing around, resolved to satisfy himself as to the state of matters with his own eyes, and so started with a feeble escort to take a general survey of the country. In passing the fort of Kulla-i-Ingoz, about six miles off, the people observing a body of 200 or 300 horse, as they supposed with hostile intent in their neighbourhood, turned out and made demonstrations to the extent of flourishing their swords, indicating that they would not tamely submit without resistance. (23) An officer was immediately sent back, ordering out a regiment, and a couple of guns to chastise this instance of contumely. The detachment arrived about 10 o'clock at night, and an attack was immediately commenced on the fort, which turned out to be garrisoned only by 30 men. They defended themselves stoutly till half their numbers were slain ; and not till we had blown up the gate with powder-bags, by which an officer was nearly destroyed, nor till Captains Saunders and Macan and Lieutenant Hoppe were wounded, and several sepoy slain, did we manage to get possession of the stronghold, in which *five* prisoners were taken ! It afterwards appeared that the Kulla-i-Ingoz chief was a firm friend of the Shah Soofah !

The country was immediately in arms, and the garrison at Kelat-i-Ghilzie surrounded by from 3000 to 4000 men furious for the fray. A requisition for troops was at once forwarded to Cabool and Candahar. The Envoy disapproved of the whole proceedings, and declined to permit reinforcements to be sent. He desired Capt. Macan to act strictly on the defensive, and he accordingly remained in cantonments, merely driving off the enemy, who, mistaking

inaction for timidity, attacked his pickets. So soon as the tidings of these unhappy events reached Candahar, a reinforcement under Colonel Wymer was ordered to be dispatched with the utmost speed to the Ghilzie country. This consisted of 400 men of the 38th N.I., the remainder of Christie's horse, commanded by Capt. Leeson, shortly before returned from Ghorisk, with four horse artillery guns, and a large supply of stores for the fort. When the enemy, about 4000 strong, heard of their approach they retired from the neighbourhood of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and proceeded to interrupt the advance of the reinforcement. They came upon our camp about 6 o'clock in the evening of the 29th May, at a place called Assoa Hazzarah, and immediately attacked it; rushing down upon the bayonets of our troops, who had formed in front the moment the alarm was given. They were believed by this time to have been betwixt 4000 and 5000 strong—their old enemies the Doorannees having forgotten their quarrels, and joined them in common enmity to us. They were steadily withstood and repulsed, but again and again they rushed on with the most determined gallantry. Foiled in this, the Ghilzies endeavoured to turn our flank with still worse success than that which attended their attempt to force our front. The engagement lasted till 11—the five hours' fighting being chiefly in the dark. They were beaten in every quarter, and when morning broke were found to have quitted the field, leaving 70 dead behind them. Their wounded were as usual carried away. Our casualties amounted to four killed and fifteen wounded. Col. Wymer's force was too weak, and the country too formidable, to permit of a pursuit being attempted. The conduct of officers and men is said on this occasion to have been admirable: the coolness of the commander in making his arrangements when taken by surprise, was above all praise. Next morning the detachment and convoy proceeded on their march, and reached Kelat-i-Ghilzie without further interruption. Strangely enough these events were afterwards associated with the general rising in November, a matter with which, as will appear in the narrative, they had no earthly concern. The *London Times* newspaper first took up this view—misled, apparently, by an Indian correspondent, and the error was fallen into by the writer of the *Annual Register*, who supplies one of the most inaccurate accounts of oriental affairs in existence.

The severe castigation inflicted by Colonel Wymer, and the strength to which the post at Kelat-i-Ghilzie had now been raised, appears for a time to have overawed the people; the more impatient and fiery of the malcontents having probably joined the standard of Ukhtar Khan, who was still in force on the Helmund, giving great annoyance, and about to beleague or attack the garrison at Ghorisk. The construction of the works of the intended fortress was commenced and proceeded with apace; the place was strong by nature, a beautiful eminence of about 100 feet in height, with a splendid

spring on its summit, surmounted by a cone of rock 60 feet higher still, was to be walled in and defended by a couple of 18-prs and other guns; and further to ensure tranquillity while these were in progress, a detachment was sent out from Ghuznie to the westward, and quartered in the Ghilzie country. The post they occupied was at Mookloor, six marches from Ghuznie, and nearly as much from Kelat-i-Ghilzie. The troops consisted of the 16th and 43d N.I., now set down amongst the reliefs as about to return to India by the Bolan Pass in October, (24) the 5th Light Cavalry, and a ressalah of Local Horse, with three of the Shah's guns, the whole commanded by Colonel Chambers, of the 5th Cavalry. The insurgents having made their appearance in considerable numbers in the neighbourhood, the detachment already alluded to broke up its camp on the 1st of August. About noon they arrived at Eck-au, 18 miles in advance. They here expected to have overtaken the enemy, who were found, however, to have retired to a pass adjoining, where they were reported to be in numbers, both horse and foot. On the evening of the 2d, a part of the detachment arrived in the valley of Karootoo, well knocked up with a march of 25 miles over hilly and irregular ground. (25) For the next three days the enemy continued to increase—our troops apparently remaining in camp till such a body should make their appearance as might be attacked and dispersed with effect. About eight o'clock on the morning of the 5th shots were heard on the left of the valley, where the grass-cutters were employed in procuring forage, and a troop was immediately ordered to be got in readiness. Soon after this, information was brought that the enemy were descending the Shear-Kotel Pass, in the direction of a weak reconnoitring party of the 4th Irregular horse under Capt. Walker. Lieut. Bazzett's troop being by this time in readiness, was dispatched to his assistance, with as many of the 4th ressalah as could be sent, with a view of keeping the enemy in check till the infantry and remainder of the cavalry were able to make up with them.

There were supposed by this time to be not fewer than 3000 Ghilzies bearing down upon the grass-cutters, when Capt. Walker, now strengthened by the arrival of Lieut. Bazzett, made a brilliant charge with the Local Horse, cutting up about 200 of the enemy. Lieut. Bazzett meanwhile attacked another party, of whom about 20 were slain. The last-named officer was

24. *Calcutta Englishman*, 30th August.

25. The chief portion of the above is taken from the *Delhi Gazette* of the 23d June and 28th August, and gives an abstract of letters from camp. Col. Chambers's dispatch is meagre and obscure. Mr Stoequeler in his "Memorials of Afghanistan," the most incorrect and untrustworthy work on the subject which we have seen, states (p. 159) that Colonel Chambers's detachment was sent out from Candahar in consequence of Capt. Woodburn's application for reinforcements at Ghirisk !

shot through the thigh, and Captain Walker's horse was killed under him in the charge. Colonel Chambers states, that as his column approached the scene of action, he could distinctly see Captain Walker and Lieut. Bazzett with their parties dashing boldly over the hill after the enemy, driving them off in all directions, and, in short, leaving nothing for him to do.(26) A few Horse and Foot having been observed in the Syeeghan Ghaut as the main column passed, Captain Oldfield, with a troop of the 5th Cavalry, was directed to halt at a distance and merely hold them in check until the troops returned. As they speedily increased both in boldness and numbers, the cavalry charged and dispersed them, killing from 28 to 30. Our loss in all amounted to 1 man killed and 3 wounded,—that of the enemy by the statement just given, appears to have exceeded 250,—this, we think, must be an exaggeration, —it is difficult to suppose anything like 200 to have fallen by the hands of the Irregular Horse on such ground. The detachment after this remained for a time in the valley previous to proceeding to the westward; the 16th resumed its march about a week afterwards, and arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzie on the 17th, and Candahar on the 25th August.(27) Half of the 5th Cavalry, and a similar proportion of the 43d N. I., had been sent into the Toree passes when the detachment first moved.(28)

The strength now attained by the force at Ghirisk, and the magnitude of the army assembling at Quettah, and mystery of its destination, tended to impress on the recollections of the insurgents the lesson Captain Farrington had read them in the first week of the year. Though the country continued in a state of disorder, they seem not for some months to have mustered any where in such numbers as to permit scope for a regular attack being made on them. Sometime in June, Ukhtar Khan took the field, and fairly set himself down before Ghirisk, with a body of 3,000 men, from which, by this date, Captain Woodburn's troops appear to have been withdrawn. (29)

On the news of these disturbances reaching Candahar, General Nott ordered out a force, consisting of a detachment of the 1st troop horse artillery, with detachments of the 1st and 2d Janbaz horse, and the 5th Shah's Hindostanee infantry. These were placed under the command of Captain Woodburn, with the following officers under him :—Captain Hart, Lieuts. Cooper, Golding, Ross, and Clark, and Assistant-Surgeon Colquhoun.

26. Colonel Chambers's Despatch *verbatim*. The chief part of the narrative continues to be taken from the *Delhi Gazette*.

27. *Delhi Gazette*, 8th Sept.

28. *Delhi Gazette* *ut supra*.

29. The information from this quarter is, from Jan. to June, very defective. The inference of the withdrawal of Captain Woodburn's troops is based on the fact of that officer having advanced in the end of June from the Candahar side, as related in the text from his own despatch.

It was thought likely that on hearing of the approach of the Candahar troops the enemy might retire along the river's bank, and a short detour was resolved upon with a view of meeting them. They continued, however, before the walls of the fort until Captain Woodburn approached the Helmund, and found that they were in possession of all the fords. The river, which at certain seasons of the year is 350 yards wide, and from 2 to 3 feet deep, is two miles from the fort. (30) The enemy appearing determined to prevent Captain Woodburn from crossing the stream, Capt. Hart was directed to advance three miles up its banks about daybreak on the 4th, to the ford of Sumboolee, and there cross, with the 2d Janbazes, and so move down upon the enemy while Captain Woodburn himself attempted to get over lower down, at a place where, according to the assistant political agent, it was no more than knee deep. Capt. Hart executed his portion of the movement with perfect success, when, on advancing towards the insurgent force, he luckily discovered the mishap that had befallen Capt. Woodburn: the so-called knee-deep ford, from the depth and rapidity of the water, proved impracticable, and he was condemned to see, from the high banks, the enemy's force drawn up in order on the farther side, while the Janbazes were in danger of being attacked, and cut off in detail. Captain Hart observing what had happened, was able to retire and recross in time. Capt. Woodburn, with the remainder of the force, joined him at Sumboolee about eight o'clock in the morning. The enemy having observed these movements, advanced up the farther bank of the Helmund, and posted themselves at the entrance of the ford right opposite to our troops. It was now excessively hot, and the men were fatigued with the march of the morning and previous night, having been in motion for nearly twelve hours, so Captain Woodburn contented himself with firing some round-shot, which compelled them to retire to a respectful distance. Immediately on this he pitched his camp close to the river, having resolved to wait till the excessive heat of the day was over before commencing an attack. The hills in the British rear were, for a mile up the river, crowded with horsemen, whose duty it was to watch the enemy and give information of his movements. About half-past 4 the insurgents, it was observed, began to get in motion. Lieut. Golding was detached with the Janbaz cavalry to watch their progress and prevent them from crossing the river. In the latter of these he failed in accomplishing his object, the enemy having contrived to ford the Helmund considerably further up. They were now advancing in large bodies on the position of Captain Woodburn, from which they were less than three miles distant. The British troops immediately changed their ground, taking up a strong

30. See Conolly's Travels, vol. ii., p. 384. This traveller visited Ghirisk and crossed the Helmund in October.

post on the left of the camp, the best which, under the circumstances, appeared to be attainable. The guns were stationed betwixt the 4th and 5th companies of the 5th Hindoostanee Infantry; the Janbaz regiments were formed on either flank, and 200 horsemen were placed in the rear to protect the baggage. A large mass of the enemy's infantry were shortly after this seen passing towards the left of Captain Woodburn's force, which required him to make a considerable change in his order of battle,—an alteration very speedily accomplished,—all the troops, save the Janbaz, moving with the steadiness and precision of a review. The attack was made with great boldness by the insurgents, but was repelled by the well-directed fire of the guns and infantry; the enemy on pushing towards the right, experienced a similar reception, with results similarly disastrous to them. Large bodies of horse and foot were now seen crowding along the heights, and making for Capt. Hart's Janbaz, posted on the extreme right of the infantry. These the assailants speedily forced back, driving them to the rear, and following their advantage close up to the baggage. Lieut. Clarke now faced round the rear rank of the infantry, and poured a deadly fire on the enemy, compelling them to retire. The rear was still threatened, the utmost exertions of the officers failed in recovering the Janbazes from their confusion. It became necessary to move back one of the guns, with the Grenadiers of the 5th, to disperse the masses of Infantry and Cavalry now threatening the baggage. Nor was this effected, so determined were the assailants, until three rounds of grape and a volley of musketry had been delivered within 50 paces of them, when they were fairly driven back. Captain Hart and Lieutenant Golding were now directed to pursue the fugitives, and scour the country around—but they were hurrying back, crowding in upon the baggage, and could not be induced to follow their leaders to the field. The baggage was now placed within some melon ground, so as to be easily guarded by the Infantry in case of a night attack. The enemy again made their appearance in heavy masses about 11 o'clock at night, and kept pouring in a desultory and useless fire till morning, apparently with the view of distracting attention till they had carried off their dead. At sunrise on the 4th, Lieutenant Golding was dispatched to observe the movements of the enemy: he found them strongly posted, and in considerable strength, about two miles higher up on the further side of the river. Soon after this they resumed their retreat; and Captain Woodburn's force being too weak to follow them proceeded to cross the river. This operation occupied some hours, and not till 2 o'clock on the morning of the 5th did the convoy reach Ghirisk: the troops having for thirty hours scarcely rested. The Janbazes who conducted themselves so indifferently, were a portion of the Affghan cavalry of the Shah's contingent. They occasionally fought well, but their feelings were all opposed to us—and they were never to be depended on. The rest of the

troops conducted themselves admirably: the British officers as usual exposing themselves to every danger, and submitting to every variety of fatigue. The enemy were believed to be at least 6000 strong; and though beaten, seemed neither broken nor disheartened, though 300 of them were understood to have fallen. They had lost three standards—and the villages all around were said to be full of the wounded. Our casualties amounted to 12 killed and 28 wounded. In forwarding an account of this gallant and decisive action, Captain Woodburn took occasion strongly to recommend that reinforcements should be sent to follow up the present success, the Ghirisk detachment being much too weak to take the field, with cavalry so little trustworthy as the Janbazes had just proved themselves, and the enemy still in such strength in the neighbourhood. A force was accordingly sent out under Captain Griffin, consisting of four 6-pounder guns under Captain Cooper, a wing of the 2d Bengal N. I., a portion of the 1st Shah's infantry and 5th cavalry, under Captain Woodburn, with the 1st and 2d Janbaz (cavalry) regulars, under Captain Hart and Lieutenant Golding—amounting in all, besides artillery, to 800 sabres and 350 bayonets. On the afternoon of the 16th August, information was received that the insurgents were in force near Khawind about ten miles off. At 4 A. M. our troops broke ground, and at 7 they came up with the enemy, strongly posted in a succession of small forts with walled gardens in front. The combined Doorannee and Teeree troops amounted to about 5000 in all. Immediately on our advance they opened a heavy fire of jezails and matchlocks from the efficient cover behind which they had placed themselves. After a few skilfully delivered rounds of grape, parties were detached from the 2d Bengal N. I., and the 1st Shah's infantry, to clear and take possession of the enclosures. The 5th Shah's, (31) with a wing of the 1st cavalry, deployed into line, and advancing at double quick time, drove in a body of the enemy's skirmishers concealed behind a range of broken walls, and whose fire was becoming mischievous. Simultaneously with these things, the enclosures in front of the column were speedily and gallantly carried, under a heavy fire of matchlocks, by two companies of the 2d Bengal N. I., led by Lieutenants Cooke and Travers, supported by a party of the 1st Shah's infantry, under Lieutenant Gardener. The enemy suffered severely in this charge—many of them resisting until bayoneted. The whole of our troops now advanced with a view of attacking the main body of the enemy, who were seen *en masse* in the rear of the gardens—but before the assault could take full effect, some confusion being observed amongst them, Captain Hart's Janbazes and the Shah's 1st Cavalry charged and broke them, and pursued them for several miles, taking fearful vengeance upon them. (32)

31. Captain Griffin's Despatch.

32. Captain Griffin's Despatches *verbatim*. Lieut. Golding, who we find

Prince Sufter Jung headed the pursuit in person. Lieutenant Golding's Janbazes, who had, till now, been on rear-guard duty with the baggage, were, by the request of their commanding officer, and at their own special desire, permitted to share in the close of the fray—both these regiments so conducted themselves on this occasion as completely to regain the character they had lost on the Helmund a month before. The enemy's resistance was stout and protracted—their position eminently favourable for defence; their casualties are said to have amounted to betwixt 600 and 700 killed, of whom 100 are said to have fallen by the bayonet. (33) Our losses were somewhat severe, consisting of twelve killed, and 104 wounded, for the most part slightly.

This affair seems to have been ably planned, and gallantly conducted. Captain Woodburn, though up to this time requiring to be carried in a litter in consequence of a wound shortly before received, quitted his couch and remained throughout the action on horseback at the head of his regiment.

As usual on occasions such as this, the enemy, when they found that they had been fairly beaten, and that there was no chance for them against the strong and well organized force now in their country, dispersed, and left our troops without molestation. The country, however, was still as far as ever from being tranquillized.—Akram Khan, a chief of the Teeree tribe, had joined Ukhtar Khan just before the fight with Captain Griffin, and it was against him we next prepared to direct our vengeance.

On the 11th of September, a force under Colonel Wymer, consisting of Sappers, Miners, and Bildars, under Captain Sanders, two 18-pounders and four 6-pounders—the former with European artillerymen, Leeson's horse, and the 2d and 38th Bengal N.I., were directed to proceed to the Teeree country to collect tribute and chastise the refractory. Such was the scarcity of camels, that 1200 jackasses had to do duty as draught and baggage cattle. Lieutenants North and Conolly were the politicals in attendance. The Teeree country is 100 miles north of Candahar: it had never till now been travelled through or surveyed by any European, much less traversed by our troops, and nearly all that was known of it amounted to this, that it was rocky, wild, and difficult of access, inhabited by a fierce and lawless population, eminently disinclined to pay homage, allegiance, or tribute to

fighting at Syghan in Oct. 1840; in the Nazian Valley in Feb. 1841 with Col. Shelton; with Capt. Woodburn at Ghirisk in June; and with Capt. Griffin in the Ghilzie country in August,—was, in November, murdered by the men of his own regiment, who rose in mutiny and went over to the enemy.

33. A correspondent of the *Delhi Gazette*, subscribing himself "Rienzi," states the number at 700—there is a tone of exaggeration about the letter which leads us to doubt its statements. We should think 600 more near to the mark than 700, though the latter is adhered to by several writers.

the Shah Soqjah, or to conduct themselves towards their neighbours or their Feringhee allies as peaceable and well-disposed citizens. (34) The detachment left on the 16th September, and General Nott shortly afterwards followed in person and took command. On the 21st they reached a tremendous mountain gorge at the entrance to the Duramut valley: the utmost difficulty was experienced in getting forward the artillery, and the transit of the battering guns occupied three days. Lieutenant Conolly with a small party of Janbaz horse came by surprise on the Teeree chief, Akram Khan, and captured him. He was sent as a prisoner to Cabool, and being sentenced to death, was blown from a gun. From the Teeree and Duramut valleys the inhabitants fled on our approach, so that with the exception of the capture of the chief nothing whatever was effected by it. It returned to Candahar on the 2d of October; and the 16th, 42d, and 43d N.I., which had, from the beginning of August, been under orders for relief, started on the 7th Nov. on their return to India by the Bolan Pass. But the insurrection which proved so fatal to us had by this time broken out around Cabool; and when three marches on their way towards Quettah, Colonel M'Laren's brigade as this was called, was directed to return and endeavour to make their way to the assistance of the garrison in the eastern capital;—they started on the 17th November. In this they failed, having been compelled from want of baggage cattle, and the severity of the weather, to return after they were well on their way towards Ghuznie. It is not to be supposed that the politicals were mad enough to diminish the strength of the army, notwithstanding the exigencies into which the state had now fallen in this scene of tribulation. H. M.'s 40th had been marched to Candahar, and though Beloochistan was now at peace, and all thoughts of an expedition towards Herat abandoned, a portion of the force which ascended the Bolan pass in April, still remained unemployed at Quettah. The 25th Bombay N. I. returned thither from Kelat, immediately after the coronation of Nusseer Khan on the 3d October; so that, had the Bengal brigade returned to India, there still would have been a larger force above the Bolan pass to the westward of Ghuznie, than had at any time been thought necessary betwixt Nov. 1839 and Feb. 1841. (35) But we are now approaching

34. *Bengal Hurkaru*, 6th and 15th October.

35. The following return gives pretty exactly the strength of General Nott's army, including Colonel M'Laren's Brigade, which, on the 10th Dec., returned to Candahar from its unsuccessful attempt to succour Cabool. This enumeration does not include officers; its force of all ranks amounted to 8724. (Blue Book, p. 171.)

AT CANDAHAR.

2 Troops of Shah's Horse Artillery, 12 six pr. guns.....	200
3 Co. Foot Artillery with Capt. Blood, 4 nine prs.....	70
2 Eighteen pounders.....	
H. M.'s 40th Regiment.....	800

that portion of the history of the Doorannee alliance which spreads over too large a field for being at present entered on—which is so recent and so big with events of unprecedented moment, as still to be fresh in the recollection of the public; and with the commencement of which the present narrative must be concluded.

The posts in Western Affghanistan at this time occupied by our troops, were Candahar, Quetta, Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Killa Abdoola, and Ghirisk, with sundry lesser stations up and down the country; the latter of these were wisely called in as our troubles thickened around us: afterwards the troops at Killa Abdoola fell back on Quetta, except those belonging to the Shah's service who deserted us, and ultimately the three garrisons first named alone remained in position. They maintained themselves right gloriously till it was resolved finally to abandon the country.

Turning shortly to Cabool, we find the same incessant disquietude prevailing here to the end with which the whole country, from first to last, had been afflicted. The garrison itself was so strong, and troops so easily available to move in any direction, that from the time of the victories of Colonel Shelton in the Nazian valley in February, no conflict of any moment had occurred.

2nd Bengal Native Infantry.....	850
16th do...do.....	850
38th do...do. (one wing).....	450
42nd do...do.....	850
43rd do...do.....	850
1st Shah's Infantry.....	500
2nd do...do.....	500
5th do...do.....	500
1st do...Cavalry.....	500
One Squadron Skinner's Horse.....	300

AT KELAT-I-GHILZIE.

2 Lighteen pounders.	7220
2 six do., with $\frac{1}{2}$ Co. European Artillerymen.....	70
3rd Shah's Infantry.....	500
Wing of 38th Bengal N. L.	450
	<hr/> 1020

Total rank and file, 8240

The force at Quetta, according to the Blue Book, at this time, consisted of two strong native regiments (say 1700 men), two 9-prs. with European artillery, two 9-prs. of the Bolan Rangers, with Major Southey's company of European artillerymen, in all about 2200 regular troops; so that, above the Passes, there were nearly 11,000 men to the westward of Ghuznie when the insurrection began, and about as many more to the eastward, including Sir R. Sale's brigade of 2273, the Charekar Goorkhas of 800, and the Ghuznie garrison, the 27th N.L.

In the beginning of September an expedition had been arranged for the usual purposes of punishing the refractory, and collecting tribute. A detachment was ordered to proceed to the Zoormut valley, consisting of two hundred men of H.M.'s 44th, the 5th Bengal N.I., one Shah's regiment, a detachment of sappers and miners, with two iron and four brass guns. (36) The mountain train, under Captain Abbott, with two ten-inch mortars, accompanied the force, and which was, for its magnitude, unusually well supplied with artillery, the king's regards for his subjects being manifested by knocking down the strongholds when he could not manage to secure or slaughter the inhabitants. On the 27th of the month the whole moved forward, under command of Colonel Oliver, towards the mouth of the Zoormut valley, resolved that not one stone should be left standing on another in the country of the rebels. Captain Hay, when in the same neighbourhood collecting tribute shortly before, had endeavoured to persuade the Zoormut chief to disjoin himself from his friend, a much more notorious malcontent and enemy of the Shah than even himself. His counsels had been responded to by a shower of stones and torrents of abuse: and after replying to this by our usual retort, a few rounds from his six-pounder guns, he found himself too weak to proceed further, and so withdrew. This was the immediate cause of the dispatch of an expedition of such magnitude as the present at this late period of the year. The valley was, as in the case of the expedition to Teeree by General Nott, abandoned by its inhabitants, and the force returned to Cabool on the 17th October without having fired a shot. (37)

It has already been stated that in the course of the spring and summer of 1841, about 1100 men were permitted to retire from Afghanistan,—nearly 4000 of a reinforcement having been sent to the eastern capital.

It had been resolved on the arrival of the brigade of Colonel Shelton at Cabool in July, that that of Sir R. Sale, whose term of service had now expired, should return to India. By this exchange of 2000 men about to be withdrawn for upwards of 3000 which had been sent, the Army in Afghanistan would still have been permanently increased. (38) Should the force at Cabool appear to have been too much weakened, H.M.'s 9th, with two native regiments, were ordered to be in readiness to take the place of Sale's brigade. (39)

36. *Delhi Gazette*, October.

37. *Delhi Gazette*, 17th November.

38. *Bombay Times Overland Summary*, Dec. 1, 1841. The Brigade of Colonel Shelton, it will be recollected, consisted of H.M.'s 44th and the 27th and 54th N.I., with Horse Artillery, &c.; that of Sir R. Sale, of H.M.'s 13th, and the 16th, 35th, and 37th N.I. The 16th, as will be remembered, had, in July, been sent to Mukdoor, 60 miles from Ghuznie in the western Ghilzie country, and had arrived at Candahar on 25th of August, being destined to form part of Colonel Maclaren's Brigade about to return to India by the Bolan Pass.

39. Blue Book of 1843—No. 1.

The Doorannee alliance had now so completely drained the treasury that the Government of India were compelled to enjoin economy in every quarter. An accumulated surplus of ten millions sterling (40) in the hands of Government sometime after the war began, had been entirely expended : an annual surplus revenue of a million and a half, which had existed in 1836, had, in 1840, been exchanged for a deficit of above two millions and a quarter ; (41) and so severely were the finances at Calcutta pressed, that a stoppage of payment at Fort William in September was at one time contemplated by the Supreme Council. (42)

The authorities in Afghanistan had, like those throughout India, been naturally urged to husband their means with the utmost care. The revenues of the country were in the last degree narrow, and while we seemed to contemplate bearing the burthen of the army of tranquillization for an indefinite period, the instructions given the envoy that beyond this he was not in future to rely on assistance from the British treasury, left no alternative but to attempt retrenchment in the only quarter where this seemed practicable. (43) The department in which reduction was commenced was in the pension of £8000 a-year allowed to the Ghilzies of the eastern passes for the free transit of troops, stores, and merchandize. It was resolved to curtail this by a half, and the country was in consequence in a blaze in a moment. The remonstrances of the chiefs were in a great measure disregarded, and they at once proceeded to take matters into their own hands. A kaffila with property of £2000 in value, was seized at Tezeen on its way to Cabool. The roads were stopped, and all communication with Hindostan entirely cut off. The Envoy appeared to despise the danger of the insurrection. He induced Gen. Elphinstone to dispatch the 35th N.I., with a couple of guns, to clear the way to Jellalabad. They were stopped at Bhoodhak as they entered the passes ; and, after a severe struggle, found themselves unable to proceed till joined by H. M. 13th. The fighting continued almost without interruption till they reached Gundamuck, and afterwards Jellalabad, where they were shut up for six months. Such was the commencement of the general Ghilzie insurrection,—a movement in many of its characteristics unprecedented amongst the fickle and incoherent hordes of Asia, unparalleled in the amount of calamity it occasioned us, and in the nature of the retribution exacted after our misfortunes had come to an end.

40. Parliamentary paper ; also Major Hough on the Finances of India.

41. Sir R. Peel's speech, House of Commons' Debates, 11th March, 1842.

42. Statement of the Hon'ble Mr Bird, Senior Member of Council, given in the letter of Sir H. Willock to Lord Aberdeen, Sept. 1841.—*Colonial Magazine*.

43. Sir W. Macnaghten's despatch, Oct. 23. Blue Book of 1843, page 8.

HAVING thus drawn our narrative to a close,—for, with the occurrences just mentioned the system of policy which we had for three years attempted to carry out may be said to have been brought to an end,—the war of aggression having been changed first into a struggle in our own defence, and finally into a war of vengeance,—a few general observations may be permitted as to the concomitants and consequences of what must be regarded one of the wildest adventures in which any Government ever was engaged.

It will have been seen from the preceding pages that betwixt November 1839, when the armies of Sir J. Keane and Sir T. Willshire quitted Afghanistan, till November 1841, when the Ghilzie insurrection made its appearance, our troops, varying in numbers from fifty to two thousand, had been on thirty-four several occasions engaged with the enemy; that we had had 1500 killed and wounded, and had slaughtered about 5000 of the insurgents. This was in addition to the 2500 already enumerated as having fallen in the first campaign, so that from February 1839 till October 1841, we had slain about 7500 Afghans, yet we marvelled at their ingratitude in not requiring with attachment the *blood* relationship we had established. The connexion was cemented by the sacrifice of above 5000 more in the course of the succeeding year!—12,500 in all. About 18,000 of our own army, and camp followers had been destroyed before December, 1842. We had in the course of this period, lost about fifty British officers, of whom nearly one-half had fallen by the sword. The names of twelve killed in Beloochistan have already been given: those who fell in Kohistan or near Jellalabad are as follows:—Captain Douglas, Dr Lord, Lieutenants Collinson, Conolly, Broadfoot, Crispin, and Pigou. We have not been able to make up a complete list of those who died from climatic causes. During Lord Keane's campaign we had lost 32 officers, of whom one was killed in action, three wounded by the enemy, three were burnt, and one drowned; about half the rest died from natural causes, the other half fell victims to the climate,—nearly one hundred officers having perished in the country before the insurrection. We had on thirteen several occasions been unsuccessful: by these not only dispiriting our troops, but injuring the character for irresistibility we had hitherto maintained, and which is so often more than half the battle.

No official returns of the precise cost of the Afghan war have yet been published, but we have sufficient data to enable us to make a very close approximation to this. The earliest estimate in point of date which has been

attempted, that of the *Bombay Times* of July 1841, comes singularly near the truth. The cost of the first year's campaign is set down at nine millions sterling, that of each succeeding year at three: these were deductions from the known charges of the troops, the salaries of political agents, and the pay allowed to the tribes. By the Parliamentary papers since published, it appears that there was ten millions of accumulated surplus in the various treasuries of India when the war began. Not only was this entirely expended by the end of the year 1841, but Government required a loan at an unusually high rate of interest, by which about five millions more were raised. Sir R. Peel stated in Parliament on the 11th March 1843, that there had been for some years just before the commencement of the war a surplus revenue of somewhat above a million sterling annually. The domestic government of Lord Auckland was, if not parsimonious, far from extravagant or wasteful: and as the revenues of India have for some years been growing in productiveness, we must suppose this surplus, amounting betwixt 1838 and 1841 to four millions, to have been absorbed in the one vast drain that was carrying off all our wealth. On these facts, and this assumption, the cost of the Doorannee alliance up to the time of the siege of Cabool will be found to have amounted to betwixt seventeen and twenty millions at the lowest estimate, without taking interest into account at all.

But the enormous loss of treasure thrown away without any hope of pecuniary return, was only a portion of the financial evil. The whole of the money sent from India to Afghanistan was so in the shape of coined silver—it was expended there on baggage-cattle, forage, provisions, commissariat stores, and other matters which the country itself supplied. Nearly a million sterling went for camels alone, of whom upwards of 70,000 were sacrificed within the period referred to. The Affghans are not a commercial people, and their trade with the countries below the mountains never in all appears to have amounted to a million annually in gross value, if it ever came up to anything like this. It was just beginning to set in the direction of Hindostan when it was fairly turned by us; the imports from Russia by the Herat frontier, having, according to Sir Alexander Burnes, more than doubled from 1838 to 1841. Such was one of the most natural and foreseeable results of our interference. Without any exact means of estimating, the conjecture that from four to five millions sterling was withdrawn in specie from the currency of India to which it has not yet, nor will for many years, return, may probably be found within the truth.

The more the matter is examined, the more difficult it is to discover by what process of self-delusion it was that the projectors or advocates of the Doorannee alliance could for a moment persuade themselves that the restoration and maintenance of the Shah Soojah on the throne, could conduce to any one of the ends we professed ourselves anxious to attain.

Assuming, for argument's sake, that which we know to be either unproven, improbable, or utterly untrue—that Herat was meant to become a Russian outpost—that Dost Mahomed was determined to recover Peshawur and attach himself to the Czar, without regard to our interests, wishes, or friendship, yet it seems impossible to discover by what process we supposed that matters, in any one of those respects, save that of Peshawur, which concerned us not, was to be one whit improved.

It was apparent from the beginning, to all who chose to open their eyes, that in the person of the Shah Soojah was no inherent potency or virtue to repel Russia or draw the tribes around him;—that by our arms and resources, expended directly in Afghanistan, and encumbered and deadened by the very parties the thorough efficiency of whose assistance was the only thing which, under any circumstances, could have rendered the Dooranee alliance in the most remote degree desirable, must the Northern Autocrat be repelled should he dream of advancing.

Copious extracts have already been given from a report laid before the Envoy by Sir Alexander Burnes, on the 7th August, 1840. (44) The following from a letter to Mr Secretary Torrens, by the Envoy in handing this up to Government, will throw light on the difficulties experienced at the commencement of the new reign:—

To H. TORRENS, Esq., *Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.*

SIR,—I was about to submit my sentiments to Government on the present condition and future prospects of this country, when I received a paper, of which the accompanying is a copy, from Lieutenant Colonel Sir A. Burnes, to each Para. of which I have annexed my comments as being the most convenient form of showing wherein I agree, and wherein I differ, with that officer.

2nd. It will be seen that this paper reached me originally in a private form, but with the permission of Sir A. Burnes I have placed it on record, as was done with his former paper written in February last on similar subjects.

3d. In this paper Sir A. Burnes has enumerated all the defects of the present Government, and the dangers to which our position is exposed. Of the defects, nothing certainly has been extenuated, but when they are weighed it would be but fair to take into consideration the difficulties by which we have been surrounded from the time of the assumption of authority by His Majesty up to the present period. Of the dangers to which we are exposed from the perpetual intrigues of secret foes in our front and in our rear, I have already, I fear, written too much.

4th. No sooner was His Majesty seated on his throne than his attention was attracted to the necessity of sending an Expedition against the rebellious Ghiljee Chiefs, and against the treacherous Khan of Kelat. Whilst these operations were going on, His Majesty was anxiously considering the best means of frustrating the

44. *Vide ante*, pp. 164-168.

machinations of Dost Mahomed Khan, and before they were brought to a conclusion he was compelled to proceed to Jellalabad.

5th. Whilst on his way to that place, His Majesty was informed of the insurrection of the Khyber tribes; and hardly had this been suppressed by negotiation, when the rebellion broke out in Kooner. Next followed our own negotiation with a view of conciliating Snadul Khan, Azceez Khan, and other disaffected chiefs. And just before His Majesty quitted Jellalabad to return to Cabool the disturbances broke out in Bajore which have not yet been quieted.

6th. Immediately after His Majesty's return to Cabool it became necessary to take measures for coercing the Ghiljees a second time; and scarcely had this object been effected when the disturbances in the neighbourhood of Quetta and Kelat demanded his attention.

7th. When it is considered that all these occurrences, and many others of minor importance, were crowded into the brief space of one twelve month, it must be admitted that His Majesty has quite enough to occupy his attention without the settlement of the internal affairs of his kingdom. In his efforts for the improvement of these, I know that His Majesty has been indefatigable. Governors, with their subordinate officers, have been appointed to the different districts; His Majesty himself examines his treasure accounts, and superintends, in conjunction with Capt. Trevor, the muster of his Troops. All objectionable taxes have been abolished, and His Majesty invariably evinces the greatest anxiety that justice should be done to all his subjects. His Majesty sits in Durbar every morning, except Thursday, for about two hours, and listens with the greatest patience to the representations of his chiefs. One day is set apart for hearing the complaints of all those who may allege that they have not received redress from the authorities to whom their cases have been referred.

8th. Though stern in the execution of justice, (as was exemplified only the other day in the case of the murderer in whose pardon so much influence was exerted,) yet His Majesty is merciful and kind-hearted in the extreme; and if the personal qualities of a monarch could ensure popularity, Shah Shooja could not fail to obtain it. My longer experience of His Majesty's character more thoroughly convinces me of the truth of what I have already asserted, that there is not an abler, or better man, than himself in all his dominions.

9th. But His Majesty labours under peculiar and complicated difficulties, the foremost of which is his connexion with us. We have placed him on his throne, but it will be some time before our motives in doing so are thoroughly understood. There are many who wilfully misunderstand them. The difference of our religion is, of course, the chief cause of antipathy on the part of the people. The Affghans are a nation of bigots. Besides an intolerance of our creed there is an intolerance of our customs, and it behoves us therefore to be very wary in our attempts at innovation: nor ought it ever to be forgotten that a system, though excellent in itself, may not be good as applied to this country, nor though good, may it be such as to admit the due appreciation of its advantages. It requires the most cautious steering to refrain, on the one side from alarming popular prejudices, and on the other from leaving the Government in the same imbecile state in which we

found it : a safe foundation has been laid for improving the natural strength of the country, but on this subject I shall shortly do myself the honor of submitting a separate report.

10th. It would be impossible to enumerate the various difficulties with which the British Representative has daily to contend in this country. Our enemies try to impress the people with a belief that we are the rulers of the country. We must necessarily interfere on some occasions, and the risk of exceeding or falling short of the exact medium is of daily (I may almost say of hourly) occurrence. There are other minor causes which operate against us : we have raised the price of provisions by increasing the number of consumers, and the quantity of the circulating medium, and the inconvenience from this unfortunately tells chiefly on the two classes of the greatest influence—the priesthood, and the military,—who have fixed stipends.

11th. His Majesty has found an Augean stable of iniquity to cleanse. He has to defeat the accumulated impurities of thirty years. During the whole of that period, all has been anarchy, and what little of government there was, has been chiefly supported by a system of perfidy and assassination. It is notorious by these means alone that Dost Mahomed Khan was able to prop up the little power he possessed beyond the gates of Cabool. The most virtuous Affghan would deem it no sin to break faith with a rebel ; and assassination, as a means of conquest, was of daily occurrence. His Majesty has not been exempt from those inconveniences which ordinarily beset restored monarchs. His old retainers were insatiable in their wants, and his new adherents entertained the most sanguine expectations of reward for their desertion ; whilst all looked forward to the appearance of some miraculous change in their favour. The splendour of the ancient monarchy was revived in the recollection of all ; whilst the king, succeeding to a dismembered monarchy impoverished by the struggle which placed him on the throne, as well as by the long-continued system of grinding oppression which preceded the restoration, found himself without the means either of rewarding his friends or conciliating his enemies.

12th. It appears that even at the time of Mr. Elphinstone's mission, (p. 49) the Dooranee Lords were averse to an alliance with the British Government, which might strengthen the king to the detriment of the aristocracy. How much more averse must they now be to such an alliance after having participated with Dost Mahomed, almost on equal terms, in the spoils of the country ? They are now powerless, and they feel that every additional security we grant to His Majesty, lessens their own consequence.

13th. I have on more than one occasion stated the great facilities which exist for disturbing the peace of this country. The people I have described as being rapacious, bigotted, and credulous. Sikh Agents with Sikh gold can easily set the whole country into a flame by taking advantage of their position, by power and offers of money, and by artful appeals to the religious prejudices of the people ; whilst the mountainous nature of the country, and the prevalent notions of hospitality which prevent the people from giving up a refugee however criminal, render it a work of infinite difficulty to root out the disturbers of the public tranquillity.

14th. There is one, and only one, remedy for all these evils, namely, to deprive those of the power who have the will to injure us. The Sikh Feudatories on one side, and the Herat authorities on the other, should be for ever deprived of the means of molesting us.—If such a vigorous policy as this should suit our convenience, it would further be recommended by proving to the world that there was no original miscalculation taken of the risks to be run in the bold and sagacious measures of the Governor General, but that all the evils which have happened were as unexpected as they are undeserved,—that they are attributable to the perfidy of pretended friends, which could not of course be either foreseen or provided against.

15th. I have now enumerated the principal events which have occurred in this country since His Majesty's accession to the Government ;—I have recapitulated, as succinctly as was in my power, the chief obstacles which have arisen to the successful administration of affairs ;—and I have endeavoured to show that the existing state of things is as prosperous as, under all circumstances, could reasonably have been expected.

16th. I would now respectfully solicit the expression of His Lordship in Council's opinion as to the course of policy which I have pursued. I am of opinion that it would be impolitic to alienate His Majesty's affections by suddenly and harshly calling upon him to dismiss the comparatively small number of armed attendants whom he is desirous of retaining about his own person ; especially when it is clear that we should have to supply their place by troops of the contingent, who have already more duties than they can perform, and whose discipline would be ruined by such employment.

17th. I am of opinion that it is the duty of the British representative here rather to watch carefully for opportunities of suggesting reform, and to treat His Majesty with all possible consideration, than to urge sweeping innovation, or to assume towards His Majesty anything like a tone of dictation. Such proceedings would reduce His Majesty to the condition of a cypher, and would afford to our enemies the means of successfully propagating reports to our prejudice, and to the effect that our design is to seize the Government of the country. I am of opinion (and if wrong I hope to be corrected) that it is preferable to work at minor abuses, which are inherent in every Eastern Monarchy, than to exercise frequent and authoritative interference, the good effects of which would be at least problematical.

18th. It has been my principle therefore to turn a deaf ear to all trifling complaints that are brought to me, and to refer the complainants for redress to their lawful sovereign,—deeming it of paramount importance to our interests that His Majesty's authority should be felt and respected.

19th. Where complaints appeared to me to be of such a nature as seriously to involve the interests or reputation of His Majesty's Government, I have never failed to bring them privately to His Majesty's notice, and I have not unfrequently found those complaints utterly destitute of foundation.

20th. Though fully aware of the difficulty of making a proper solution, I have never ceased to urge upon His Majesty the great importance of selecting a competent minister, of reforming his army, and of reducing his expenditure within the limits of his income. These and other objects will be gradually attained by kind and persevering counsel. This is not a country in which our objects are to be attained *per saltum*: His Majesty's wishes must meet with some little attention. The prejudices of the people must be respected, minor abuses must be overlooked, and our proceedings at every step must be guarded by caution, temper, and forbearance.

(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

August 10th, 1840.

The first portion of this is a justification or extenuation of the errors into which Government had fallen, as enumerated by Sir Alexander Burnes: in point of fact it affords precisely the picture that was at the time drawn by the opponents of the Dooranee alliance, and which was repudiated and denounced by its supporters as gloomy and exaggerated—just a representation of that state of affairs, for which, at the commencement of the expedition, the Government ought to have been prepared to look. Yet at this time, with these documents in their possession, the Ministry at home depicted everything as bright and sunshiny: the halcyon days of Affghan tranquillity were hastening on; the golden age of the Dooranee civilization was at hand; and it but required a few years continuance of that blessed peace and prosperity which was ruining the armies, draining the treasury of India, and filling Central Asia with tumult and slaughter, to prove that the Suddozye alliance was one of the miracles of modern statesmanship! A miracle it was most assuredly, but in the opposite sense to that in which it was intended to be understood as such by those who so characterised it.

It has already been stated, that the vast majority of the newspapers of India were, from the beginning, most hostile to the Affghan war; and now that we can look back on the occurrences which have happened within the last four years, and compare them with the anticipations formed of them by the press, the extraordinary accuracy with which their prophecies have been realized occasions less admiration of the sagacity of the writers than astonishment that what was so obvious to the guides or representatives of public opinion should have been so utterly lost sight of by Government.

Not only is this most marvellous, but still more so in the apathy manifested by the ministry and people of England at the fearful warnings the events of each succeeding month supplied. In May 1841 the *Bombay Times* published a corrected list of thirty-three actions in which our troops had been engaged during the preceding twelve months, in thirteen of which they had been unsuccessful; and two months afterwards an account current drawn

up on the facts supplied by the *Government Gazette*, the *Almanack*, and the *Army List*, from which it appeared, that up to that date twelve millions sterling had been expended, and three millions annually hardly covered the current charges of the Doorannee alliance. The paper referred to was at this time extensively circulated in England, yet not one of these fearfully alarming facts, or the inferences deduced from them, that the hour of our compulsory retirement or expulsion from Afghanistan was then drawing rapidly near, occasioned the slightest attention. Within ten months, the gloomy, but unheeded auguries, were all realized. (45)

This was the period of the general election of June and July 1841, when the merits of the measures, foreign and domestic, of both parties are in general pretty keenly canvassed. About this time Lord Palmerston, in addressing the electors of Tiverton (46), took infinite credit to himself and his colleagues for the excellency and thorough success of their policy towards Afghanistan, which country he described as so perfectly tranquillized, and so entirely satisfied with our management, that Englishmen might travel from the one end of it to the other without fear of danger or annoyance. At this very time the papers in the archives of the Board of Control, to which the foreign secretary had access, showed that, from the hour we had entered the country, it had been one scene of incessant bloodshed and turmoil, that the chiefs whom we subsidized were the only ones who maintained even the semblance of submission; and that our soldiers dared not venture beyond sight of the sentries without perilling their lives. Yet these observations of Lord Palmerston's,—which, in India, were received

45. The *London Times* and the *Spectator* are at this time the only papers which seemed to be fully alive to the momentous warnings then so universally neglected, and which, if attended to, might have saved the expenditure of so much blood and treasure.

46. The following extract is from the newspaper report of the famous Tiverton Speech of June 1841. At the time it was delivered Lord Palmerston must have been aware of the documents in the hands of the Board of Control, giving accounts of Shelton's operations in the Nazian valley—of the general discontents in Kohistan—the three separate expeditions then on foot betwixt Candahar and Chuzanie—the victories of Farrington and Woodburn on the Helmund, with the preparations for Captain Griffin's expedition—the Noosky expedition—the affair of Kojjuck and general movement of the troops in Scinde and Shawl—the universal marching and countermarching of detachments throughout the country, occupied as they were in five simultaneous or immediately consecutive campaigns around Jellalabad, Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Ghirisk, Noosky, and the Seebeo country. The Foreign Secretary must either have spoken ironically, or desired to ascertain how far the credulity of the people might be taxed. It must have been gratifying to him to discover, that there was no statement whatever, however enormously at variance with fact, which would not be received in England in reference to the affairs of India, if made by a minister of the Crown. The same system is at present being adopted by the conservative journals in defending the policy of Lord Ellenborough, and apparently with similar success; the statements of the *Morning Post* and

as a bitter mockery of the sufferings our troops were then enduring in Afghanistan,—were at home passed over without question, reprehension, or observation. So late did public apathy continue, that when the abstracts above referred to were reprinted after the destruction of the Cabool force, they were still regarded, and in many cases stigmatised, as exaggerated or fictitious. They are wrought into the preceding narrative, with the authorities on which they have been made given in detail; and now that abundance of corroborative official information has been supplied by Government, defy impeachment.

It appears, as already stated, from the official papers published in the Blue Book of 1843, that had the Ghilzie insurrection not occurred, Lord Auckland was anxious to have his policy carried out as long as it would hold: H. M.'s 9th, with two native regiments, were under orders to sup-

Standard on this subject may, in point of accuracy, be fairly placed beside those of the ex-Foreign Secretary: it is to be hoped that their illusions will be somewhat less rudely dispelled.

“Now let me travel a little further to the east; for there is no quarter of the globe in which we have not had occasion to uphold the dignity of the country, and to vindicate its honour, and to maintain its dearest interests. Transactions had taken place in countries which many of you have, perhaps, never heard of till they came to be introduced to your notice in consequence of events to which I allude—transactions, I say, had taken place in Persia and Afghanistan, in the centre of Asia, which threatened destruction to the vast empire which we possess in the East Indies; but, acting with promptitude and decision, we carried our armies into the centre of Afghanistan, and the noble Lord, whose name my honourable friend mentioned just now, there rendered the most important services to his country, by achieving military successes which have rendered secure to us that vast empire which we possess in India, and the importance of which it is hardly possible to over-rate, though, perhaps those who have not turned their attention to these matters may not at once sufficiently perceive their value. We brought within British influence, in one campaign, a vast extent of country, larger than France, almost as big as half Europe; and the way in which this was done, and the results which have followed, are well deserving of the attention of the people of England. There is a contrast, of which we may have reason to be proud, between the progress of our arms in the East and the operations which a neighbouring power—France—is now carrying on in Africa. The progress of the British arms in Asia has been marked by a scrupulous reference to justice, an inviolable respect for property, an abstinence from anything which could tend to wound the feelings and prejudices of the people; and the result is this, that I saw not many weeks ago a distinguished military officer who had just returned from the centre of Afghanistan, from a place called Candahar, which many of you, perhaps, never heard of, and he told me that he, accompanied by half a dozen attendants, but without any military escort, had ridden on horseback many hundreds of miles through a country inhabited by wild and semi-barbarous tribes, who but two years ago were arrayed in fierce hostility against the approach of the British arms—but that he had ridden through them all with as much safety as he could have ridden from Tiverton to John o’ Groat’s house, his name as a British officer being a passport through them all, because the English had respected their rights, had afforded them protection, and treated them with justice; thence it is that an unarmed Englishman was safe in the midst of their wilds.”

ply the place of Sir R. Sale's Brigade, should this be found necessary at the time our misfortunes began. H. M. 41st, with 2000 Bombay troops, were ready to ascend the Bolan Pass, if needed, in room of McLaren's brigade. It is equally clear, that though this was the Governor-General's determination, it was merely contingent upon the continuance of affairs in a state not more unfavourable than that in which they had been for the preceding two years,—and probably with a view of getting rid of the matter in the best way he could, leaving the difficulties of the winding-up in the hands of his successor: the moment the intelligence of the insurrection reached Government, they declared that, in the event of military possession of Cabool and the surrounding country being lost, it was not their intention to direct new and extensive operations with a view of re-establishing our supremacy;(47) and they were prepared for the contingency of our political influence in that quarter being for a time entirely subverted.(48) Mr Bird's apprehensions of immediate bankruptcy have been already noticed: the Commander-in-Chief shortly afterwards declared his belief that the state neither of the army nor treasury of India were such as to permit them to think of renewing the war.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that early in the year 1843, the Dooranee alliance must have been broken off, and Afghanistan abandoned at all events, without reservation or delay, whatever its condition. The originators of the policy, had they remained in power, would have been compelled to undo their own measures with their own hands,—to abandon a system, which, from its own inherent defects, was incapable of being maintained. The Cabool disaster was for them and their already bankrupt credit as statesmen, far the best thing that could have happened: making it appear as if the policy of 1838 had been brought to an end by a great and unlooked-for catastrophe, which no one could have foreseen or guarded against, and withdrawing public attention from the fact that, in the first place, the Ghilzie insurrection, and its results, was a natural and long-expected emanation from the system itself; and, in the second place, that if, by some rare piece of unimagined good fortune, we had contrived to escape any thing like this, the whole fabric of our policy, which the disasters of Cabool so suddenly dissolved, was ready to crumble to pieces from its own intrinsic rottenness. (49)

Such frequent mention has been made of the mismanagement of the political agents, in contrast with the excellent conduct of the military,

47. Letter of Governor-General in Council, Dec. 3. News from Cabool at this time extended to the 9th Nov., and gave details of only one week of the insurrection, which began on the 2d. Blue Book, p. 37.

48. Letter, &c. &c., Dec. 5. Blue Book, p. 33.

49. See extract from memorial of Sir Alex. Barnes, page 151.

that a misapprehension has got abroad that these gentlemen did not belong to the army at all. This is a mistake which ought to be rectified. On referring to the list given at the commencement of the third chapter (p. 143) it will be seen that at the first the Envoy and Mr Bell were the only political agents who did not belong to the military service; and that after the demise of the latter of these gentlemen, the envoy alone was a civilian. Of the thirty-two political agents employed in Afghanistan between 1839 and 1842, not one had attained the rank of major in the army, (50) ten were captains, and 21 lieutenants. Had these gentlemen continued to act in their military capacity there is no reason to doubt but that they would have done no discredit to the service from which they had been temporarily in some measure withdrawn. They were selected chiefly for their proficiency in languages and knowledge of the country: and as these accomplishments did not necessarily imply the possession of a high order of intellectual endowment, the men whose power was supreme over the various districts of the Dooranee empire were too often found wanting for the adequate discharge of the onerous and important duties imposed upon them. The amount of irresponsible authority with which they were invested was enough to have turned stronger and stabler heads than theirs—and the idea had unhappily got amongst them that subtlety and dissimulation were essential, and the most tortuous policy and Machiavellian morals permissible in the position of statesmen which they now occupied—that in fact they must fling aside the military frankness and straightforward candour which became them as officers, and assume a character from which, in their private capacity of English gentlemen, they would have shrunk. There are many, very many, to whom these observations are inapplicable, and the examples of the eminent success of Major Outram, and Captains M'Gregor, Mackeson, and Lawrence, in pursuing the straightforward system becoming high-minded soldiers and honourable men, may shew how sadly some of their brethren erred in supposing wisdom incompatible with perfect candour, frankness and simplicity. The evils which arose from the general system of political agencies might have been greatly diminished had the sphere of the labours of the agents been restricted to that of interpreters and collectors of information—leaving the political power in the hands of the military chiefs. Yet the mischiefs complained of were, in a considerable measure, inherent in the system, and it is difficult to conceive any organization which could have worked

50. Sir Alex. Burnes had merely the army rank of Captain.—Major Outram was so by Brevet.—Majors D'A. Tod, Rawlinson, Pottinger, Leach, and Lynch, were Lieutenants in the army, and held the rank of Major in Persia or Afghanistan only.

really well in carrying out the objects we had in view, considering the nature and magnitude of these, and the circumstances under which they were desired to be elaborated.

A single subject remains yet to be noticed—the conduct of the army—which we have reserved to the last, because it is the only one which can be discussed not only without a preponderance of censure, but with unmixed approbation, and unalloyed pride and pleasure.

Highly as the sepoy soldier had been appreciated by every one acquainted with the history of oriental wars, half the merit of the Company's native army may be said to have remained unknown till brought to light by the Affghan campaigns. There are no people on earth more averse to quit their homes for foreign lands than the natives of Hindostan, and no country could have been more abhorrent to them than that where the climates of the frigid and torrid zone alternated, and from which had descended those torrents of gigantic and resistless warriors by whom, from time to time, the fairest provinces of India were overrun.

From November 1838 till November 1841, the native army sustained a series of incessant and most perilous encounters, over an expanse of 800 miles of rugged, difficult, and inhospitable country, without one solitary instance of alleged misconduct, save that on the part of a single squadron of cavalry at Purwan Durrah. Patient of fatigue, tormented by extremes of heat and cold, in a country where the thermometer ranged from 120 deg. to 40 deg. below freezing—often suffering from scarcity of food and want of camp accommodation, we have not so much as an example of a threat of mutiny, or manifestation of discontent. Frequently disappointed in the expectation of returning to India, they received their orders to remain in the country and resume campaigning with the most perfect cheerfulness. With no single instance of timidity or backwardness, save that just named, and a trifling case at Kojjuck, only worth adverting to because we are anxious to extenuate nothing which the censurers of the service would desire to dwell upon—there were numberless examples of endurance, coolness under fire, and intrepidity, which would have been the boast of any service. It must be kept in view that we were on almost every occasion of conflict enormously outnumbered,—that the enemy individually were stronger and more powerful men, far better armed, and equally as brave as those they encountered: and that the advantage of choosing their battle-ground was always on their side. These observations refer exclusively to the Hindostanee troops,—the character of the British-born soldier is sufficiently known to require no commendation—it was never more gloriously sustained than in the campaigns in Afghanistan, to which this narrative relates. A portion of H. M.'s 4th dragoons, H. M.'s 13th, 17th, 40th, and 44th, and the 1st Bengal Europeans, with various

corps of artillery, all more or less shared in our Dooranee wars before the Ghilzie outbreak. The 13th alone were engaged throughout, and fought gloriously, and suffered patiently from the beginning to the end. The perfect harmony betwixt the various races, and the brotherly feeling with which they fought, side by side, is above all commendation. The fellowship which afterwards sprung up betwixt H.M.'s 13th and Bengal 35th N.I., and the admiration of H.M.'s 22d for the Bombay 25th N.I., indicate that the sympathies of the brave with each other are impeded by no difference of country, colour, or creed.

Of the British officers nothing need be said: the history of their achievements and sufferings, brief and meagre as it is, is enough. With the service of more gallant, upright, able, or efficient men, no Government need desire to be blessed or honoured. Where there was so much to irritate and excite, it is not to be forgotten that with the daring and promptitude, the mercy and humanity of Englishmen was duly mingled. More instances of individual heroism and personal gallantry, under circumstances of extreme trial, might be quoted in this campaign than in any one in which our armies ever were for a similar time engaged. To the army the Afghan war was in many ways a curse: its hardships they cheerfully surmounted—its dangers they defied. But it was a war as void of apology or justice as of honour, its objects awakened no sympathy in its favour, their attainment was unworthy of British ambition. The laurels it yielded, however ably won, were grudgingly given, and scarcely coveted, their exhibition hardly furnished food for gratification—they gained no glory in so worthless a cause. The terrors of the sword were nothing, those of sickness and poverty were less easily defied. Instead of the campaigns from 1838 to 1842 requiting the soldier for his sufferings and toils, they were, in all cases, sources of loss, in many, of absolute ruin. The extra allowances were utterly inadequate to meet the extravagant charges on the march, and expenses attending on the detention in cantonments; and unless to those to whom lucrative political or staff appointments fell, the officers, not only in health but in emolument, were grievous sufferers.

Overleaping the interval occupied by the active operations of the insurrection, it may be as well shortly to notice the fate of the leading characters which have occupied so prominent a place in the preceding pages.

Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir William Macnaghten were murdered at Cabool—the one on the 2d November, the other on the 23d December, 1841. General Elphinstone died a prisoner in the enemy's hands.

General Nott, with his army, remained at Candahar till August 1842, when he himself, with the larger portion of them, advanced on Ghuznie,

which they destroyed, and returned by Cabool and the Khyber Pass to India, gaining two victories, and attended by the most brilliant success on the way. The other portion returned by Quettah and the Bolan Pass.

The Shah Soojah is suspected to have been connected with the Ghilzie insurrection. At his own desire he was left behind when our armies quitted Cabool on the 6th January 1842, and for a time appeared likely to maintain himself in power. He was murdered a few months afterwards by the chiefs.

Of his sons, Prince Timour, the only one whose character was without reproach, remained faithful to us to the end, and retired with our armies to India, where he now lives a pensioner on government. Prince Futteh Jung succeeded the Shah in nominal authority at Cabool, but afterwards fled from the capital for fear of his life. Prince Shahpoor it was at one time believed would be able to maintain himself in power, and he was left behind after our final retirement: he quickly followed his brother, and the two are now elemosynaries of the Seikh ruler.

The miscreant Sufter Jung of Candahar went over to the enemy shortly after the commencement of the insurrection, and having continued for six months to fight against us, ultimately surrendered himself into our hands. He was left behind on General Nott's advance, but having been shortly afterwards expelled from his country, is said to have found refuge at Kelat. According to another rumour he is now in chains at Candahar, where every one who befriended us is made subject of persecution by the ruling powers.

On the 1st of October 1842, a proclamation dated Simla, announced that our connection with Affghanistan had ceased, and that the government of India would meddle no more with its affairs; our own prisoners had been recovered, and the Affghan chiefs and their families were all to be set free.

After devastating the country—cutting down the trees, and uprooting the orchards and vineyards, after having blown up or burned with fire the cities and forts of Ghaznie, Cabool, Istaliff, Jellalabad, and Ali Musjid, by which about 70,000 human beings were, on the eve of winter, left houseless—our armies were, in November, entirely withdrawn from the country.

In April 1843, Dost Mahomed, after a long sojourn in the Punjaub—where he was entertained by the Seikh ruler in a manner becoming both their stations—returned with his family, without obstruction and in safety, to Cabool, and resumed sovereignty without opposition or resistance. His indomitable son, Ukhbar Khan, for a time laying aside the sword, set himself about the reconstruction of the fort of Jellalabad, and the ruined cities.


The king of Bokhara sent an ambassador to congratulate the Ameer on his return: he was received with favour, and returned with presents.

Sarawan was once more re-annexed to Kelat, and Quettah left uninjured—Cutchee had been before made over to Nusscer Khan.

The Candahar Sirdars do not appear so easily to have regained their authority : by the latest intelligence their government was said to be in the hands of Persia—the Shah coining money—the surest stamp of oriental sovereignty—in his own name.

Kamran Shah is understood to have died about May 1843, and the sovereignty of Herat was immediately assumed by the king of Persia.

The Ameers of Scinde appear on the whole to have conducted themselves inoffensively enough from the date of the hostile demonstration near Hyderabad in January 1839—fresh treaties were urged upon them from time to time, and successively agreed to. In February 1843, terms were proposed to them by Lord Ellenborough, to which they considered it impossible to assent—they resolved to oppose the advance of Sir Charles Napier, then pressing forward on Hyderabad, with an army of nearly 30,000 men. They were beaten with a loss of 5000 killed and wounded, and having surrendered themselves prisoners, were sent to be confined in India for life. A second battle with a similar loss occurred near Hyderabad some weeks afterwards. Scinde was declared ours by right of conquest, and was added to the British territories in India. At present 16,000 men, at an annual cost of above a million sterling, are required to maintain it in peace—the share of its revenue claimed by us being less than the fourth part of this !





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