


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## P R E F A C E.

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IN consequence of the adjournment of the discussion at the India House on the very interesting and highly important question of the affairs of Sindh, the writer of this Analysis was prevented from submitting, as he had some intention of doing, his sentiments upon the subject; but the clear, able, and eloquent speeches of the two Honourable Proprietors who addressed the Court, forestalled much of what he was prepared to urge, and must have made a deep impression on the minds of all present: they also tended to convey a correct notion of the unjust treatment experienced by the Ameers of Sindh. Considering, however, that there were many points left unnoticed by these experienced and talented gentlemen, and in order to a thorough understanding of the matter by those who may not have leisure or inclination to wade through the ponderous volume of parliamentary papers, it is now proposed to take a review of them, in consecutive order, submitting such comments and reflections as may be necessary towards a full comprehension of the case.

The writer appears on this occasion with no pretensions to eloquence, or literary talent; but as a plain man of business, who has devoted much time to the

study of political questions connected with India, and with an anxious desire to see justice done to the exiled Amcers. The Court of the India House is not a fit arena for empty declamation, which has sometimes been exhibited there by a few professed orators; but it is very suitable for the display of real practical knowledge and sound argument, such as were exhibited by the mover and seconder of the proposed resolution, who delivered two of the most useful and well-digested speeches that have been heard within these walls for some time past. The Directors have too many important subjects to engage their attention connected with the administration of the mighty and weighty affairs entrusted to their management in directing the machinery of the great empire in the East, now under their control, to admit of their time being wasted in oratorical displays. The object of this Analysis is to give an unbiassed impression of the case, so that a correct judgment may be formed on a question of vital interest, not only to India, but to the British nation.

The time has not yet arrived when India is to be a toy to be played with at the caprice of every new Governor-General with impunity. Members of the Legislature do not exhibit that indifference to Indian discussions which they were wont sometimes to do; nor do they retire from the House when the subject of our Eastern empire is broached. These are now matters of all-absorbing interest, and must necessarily continue to be so. A succession of important changes has been proceeding with a railway speed, during the last few years, and the Directors are no longer the representatives of a company of merchants, but

legislators for, and arbiters of the destinies of 140 millions of human beings now under their sway. Their powers, no doubt, unfortunately for the good government of India, of late years have been much set at nought. Their position is much altered; but still they possess great weight and influence if they choose to exercise them, although the local governing authority is less under their control than formerly. The decision on the affairs of Sinde may have a material influence and effect on other measures of their extensive government in the East.

The volume now before us contains a lamentable specimen of diplomacy, and a detail of the most systematic, unjustifiable, and impolitic aggression upon an independent native State, which the annals of British connection with India afford an example of; fruitful as historians allege that region to have been in cases of minor injustice and encroachment, springing from our eager desire for supremacy and extension of territory.

The pacific negotiations with Sinde appear to have commenced in the year 1809. Tranquillity, friendship, and mutual forbearance seem to have prevailed between the British Government and the Ameers of Sinde up to the year 1836, when Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, was unfortunately seized with the apprehension that Russia and even Persia had hostile designs against our possessions, and that the former even meditated an invasion of India—a most preposterous anticipation; and the poor wretched outcast Shah Shoojah was eventually, after a long exile from his dominions, borne in triumph to Cabool, by the aid of British troops and a vast

expenditure of treasure which our finances could ill spare.

The proceedings connected with the ill-fated and disastrous expedition into Affghanistan brought us into more immediate contact with Sinde; and, in order to carry into effect the ill-advised views of the Governor-General in the restoration of the puppet, Shah Shoojah, a course of arbitrary dictation was for some time previous begun and pursued towards the Ameers of Sinde, which could not fail to excite their disaffection and distrust. It ended in the enforcement upon the chiefs of harsh treaties, the involuntary occupation of some of their most valuable possessions, and the payment of a long-suspended tribute—formerly yielded to the ruler of Cabool when Shah Shoojah was in power—but which tribute had, for many years, ceased to be exacted or demanded.

At last, upon the return of the second expedition from Cabool, Lord Ellenborough, urged on, unfortunately, by the incessant reports of the political officers employed, of supposed intrigues by the Ameers, was gradually led into angry discussion, and eventually into the dictation, literally at the cannon's mouth, of a treaty of so stringent and humiliating a character, that these princes although they reluctantly acceded to it, were unable (as they stated to the Envoy they apprehended they would be) to control their warlike subjects, the Beloochees, who, in a desperate effort to rid themselves from what they considered intolerable oppression, commenced hostilities, into which they had been goaded by the arbitrary and dictatorial style of General Napier's communications and proceedings. Thus the friendship which, in the treaty of 1809,

and subsequent treaties, was stated to be eternal, was brought to a final close in the year 1843, when the capital of Lower Sinde was taken possession of by a British force, after a hard-fought battle at Meanee, and a scene of carnage and rapine of the most deplorable character, and the poor Ameers were plundered of all they possessed, torn from their families, and sent prisoners to Bombay.

Such is a brief summary of the case as exhibited in this bulky volume, showing, as it does too clearly, the British Government in a light far from favourable to our national character, and calculated to excite the fears and arouse the worst passions of other independent and subsidiary States in that part of India, which, appalled by such proceedings in Affghanistan and Sinde, and alarmed for their own safety, may not unreasonably be expected to regard the present government of India with no very friendly feeling. Hence, there is too much reason to believe that the late disagreement with some of the more powerful states to the northward, which has required the assemblage of another large force, has, in a great degree, been produced by the course of events connected with the ill-judged operations alluded to; in which Lord Ellenborough has found himself embarrassed by the proceedings of his predecessor.—Far better that we should reign in the affections of the people under our sway, and with the good will and attachment of the surrounding States, than by the terrors inspired by the collection of large armies, which must entail a vast expense to the State. Although I am free to admit the necessity of at once putting down, by the most prompt and vigorous measures, any oppo-

sition to our power, provided always we have an honest cause or claim to enforce. The principle of coercion in such cases, must be allowed and assented to by all acquainted with the nature of our possessions in India. But, in the case now before us, we had not just or reasonable grounds for such severity.

The innocence of the Ameers of Sindh of the grave charges brought against them, on which the harsh proceedings of the Governor-General were founded, having been so triumphantly established by the facts and reasoning so ably brought forward by the mover and seconder of the Resolution at the India House, and the testimony of Captain Eastwick, who formerly held a high political office in both Upper and Lower Sindh,—who charged one of the principal witnesses with having actually been in the pay of the British Government, (though a confidential servant of one of the Ameers,) and hence a traitor of the deepest dye,—renders it unnecessary to enter into any very minute investigation on these points, although they must necessarily be incidentally noticed. My observations will rather be confined to showing, that upon the evidence of the political officers employed, and the expressed opinions and objects of both the Governors-General, there was no just pretext for the severe steps pursued, and that the final subjugation of Sindh, and the dethronement of the principal Ameers, was brought about as a natural consequence of the heavy and unreasonable demands made upon them, to effect purposes of our own—first, in promoting the wild scheme of restoring Shah Shoojah, and next, in endeavouring to remove impediments in the way of the free navigation of the river Indus, with a view to

the advancement of commercial enterprize : a chimera which never can be realized to any degree commensurate with the expectations formed by the present Governor-General or General Napier. The whole commerce of these parts will not, for a long course of years, if ever, be equal to the interest of the capital already expended in the pursuit of so visionary a scheme ; nor will the revenues of the country, if retained in our possession, repay a tithe of the expense, while pestilential disease is daily thinning the ranks of our regiments, and destroying hundreds of our brave soldiers. Indeed, Colonel Pottinger has long ago declared, that the climate was quite unsuitable for the residence of European troops. These considerations should, therefore, be powerful incentives to an early settlement of the question, and our extrication from the embarrassments and difficulties and dangers in which we have become involved.

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## ANALYSIS.

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THE first treaty with the AMEERS OF SINDE, dated 22nd August, 1809, (page 1,)\* provided that there should be *eternal friendship* between the British Government and the Government of Sinde. Here then, we treated with Sinde as an *independent state*, on a footing of perfect equality, without any reference whatever to its being, in any way, tributary to *Cabool* or any other state; and we prevented the admission of another European power, "*the tribe of the French.*" At that time, no apprehension was entertained of the two bugbears, Russia and Persia, which frightened Lord Auckland from his propriety.

The next treaty, dated 9th November, 1820, (page 2), contains a preamble that the British Government and the Government of Sinde having in view to guard against the occurrence of frontier disputes, and to strengthen the friendship already subsisting between the *two states*, Meer Ismael Shah was invested with full power to treat with the Government of Bombay, and it was agreed that there should be *perpetual friendship* between the British Government and Meer Kur-reem Ali and Meer Moorad Ali on the other; that mutual intercourse by means of vakeels should always continue between the *two governments*; that no European or American should be permitted to settle in the dominion of Sinde, &c.

We hear no more of Sinde till the 4th April, 1832, (page

\* The pages refer to the number of the Proprietors' volume.

2,) when a treaty of peace was concluded between the East India Company and the State of Khyrpore, in which, as usual, it is stipulated, 1st, that there shall be *eternal friendship* between the two states; 2nd, that the two contracting powers mutually bind themselves, *from generation to generation, never to look with an eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other*; 3rd, that the British Government having requested the use of the River Indus and the roads of Sinde, for the merchants of Hindostan, &c., the Government of Khyrpore agrees to grant the same within its own boundaries, on whatever terms may be settled with the Government of Hyderabad, namely, Meer Moorad Ali Khan Talpoor; and 4th, that reasonable duties should be fixed, and traders not to be liable to any loss or hindrance in transacting their business.

A treaty was on the 20th April, 1832, (page 2,) concluded with Meer Moorad Ali Khan, Ruler of Hyderabad in Sinde, consisting of seven articles, the three first of which were to the same effect as those in the Khyrpore, with the following conditions attached to the last, namely,

1. That no person shall bring any description of military stores by the above river Indus.

2. That no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said river.

3. That no English merchants shall be allowed to settle in Sinde, but shall come as occasion requires, and having stopped to transact their business, shall return to India; and merchants visiting Sinde were to be provided with passports from the British Government. Facilities were also to be afforded, and a tariff or table of duties to be promulgated.

A supplementary treaty (page 3), between the East India Company and the Government of Hyderabad in Sinde, which was to be considered as virtually annulled on the fulfilment of its stipulations, was concluded on 22nd April, 1832.

With reference to the fourth article of the *perpetual* treaty, that the Government of Hyderabad should furnish a statement of duties, that British officers should examine the same, and if too high, Meer Moorad Ali Khan reduce them; and with reference to the punishment and the suppression of the

plunderers of Parkur, the Thale, &c., that the British, Sinde, and Joudpore Governments should direct their joint and simultaneous efforts to the above object.

A commercial treaty between the East India Company and the Government of Hyderabad in Sinde was published by proclamation on the 23rd of December, 1834 (page 4), by order of the Governor-General in council. The first three articles related to the tolls to be levied on boats on the Indus. A British agent (not being an European gentleman) under the authority of Colonel Pottinger should reside at the bunder or port at the mouth of the river where cargoes were transferred, and the "British Government binds itself that the said agent shall neither engage in trade, nor interfere in any way with the fiscal or any other affairs of Sinde; and by the 5th and last article all goods landed shall be subject to the *existing local duties* as levied by the respective Governments within their own territories on the Indus."

Such were the subsisting political and commercial relations between the British Government and Sinde up to the year 1836 (page 5), when upon Runjeet Sing applying to be furnished with 50,000 stand of arms by the Indus, the Governor-General took occasion to remind his Highness of the *peaceful nature* of the objects for which the Indus had been re-opened, and to make him acquainted with the sentiments entertained by the British Government of the aggressive line of policy which he was pursuing towards his neighbours. Colonel Pottinger was authorized to offer to the Ameers of Sinde the protection of the British Government against the Sikhs, they consenting to receive and pay the expense of a body of British troops, to be stationed at their capital.

The Governor-General admits, that although from the long experience of Runjeet Sing's character, *little apprehension* was entertained of his persisting in the invasion of Sinde; still it was considered necessary to have a body of troops in readiness, to act upon the requisition of Colonel Pottinger. "It proved, however, as we expected," states the despatch to the secret committee, "quite unnecessary to

resort to hostilities." As soon as the Maharajah became acquainted with the wishes of the British Government, he gave orders to his officers to abstain from all hostilities on the frontier; and his communications were altogether cordial. Thus the ostensible object of our interference was gained. The Governor-General seems to have been very considerate in his offer of protection, although he admits the Maharajah's attack on the Mazaree tribe was justified by the previous insult offered to his dominions. Such was the first attempt to establish British *supremacy* in Sinde. Such was the real motive, though we afterwards pursued a much more aggressive policy than Runjeet Sing (page 9). Colonel Pottinger was instructed, in treating with the Ameers, to communicate with them without reserve, in reference to the *dangerous position* in which they stood, and to apprise them that it was essential, not to their interest only, but to their very existence, that the ties by which they were connected with the British Government should be strengthened. At the same time the Governor-General sincerely desired that the extension of British influence should be effected by *commercial and peaceful objects alone*. The Ameers do not appear to have been in any such state of alarm, nor did they evince any desire to avail themselves to the full extent of our disinterested aid. It would have been well if the Governor-General had adhered to the resolution that he desired to effect the extension of our influence in the direction of the Indus by commercial and peaceful objects alone; but, alas! subsequent proceedings demonstrate a lamentable departure from so wise and just a resolve. Still it was expected that in interfering for the protection of Sinde from *imminent danger*, the British Government might derive some corresponding advantages. No doubt this was a main object of their interference. As the Maharajah had so readily abandoned his projects there was no longer any occasion for British troops, which Colonel Pottinger was urged to press on the Ameers.

The result was, that a provisional agreement was entered into (pages 12 to 31,) with Noor Mahomed Khan of Hydera-

bad, for the residence of an agent in behalf of the British Government, at *Shikarpore*, and for other objects of an important nature. Colonel Pottinger was received with the greatest cordiality and kindness as an old friend; and as the bearer of an overture very favourable to the Ameers, in respect to the protection to be extended against Runjeet Sing's warlike operations—which the *Colonel pledged to an extent disallowed immediately afterwards by the Governor-General*. The offer (thus unconfirmed) was the sole inducement which led the Ameers to assent to the other proposals of the Envoy as the condition of such extended protection,—a point which shall be hereafter more fully adverted to. Notwithstanding that offer, however, by the Envoy, one of the most influential Ameers, Meer Sobdar, had so little inclination to treat with him, that he quitted Hyderabad, and upon being taxed with his want of respect for the Envoy, said he had not sent for him, (page 16, par. 20,) that he knew nothing about him or his objects, *that he did not want to have any connection with the English*, and that those who liked might receive the Colonel and be civil to him. This was a most significant hint, that the interference of the British Government was neither required nor desired by that chief, who possessed very considerable influence.

It is quite evident, from the foregoing undisguised expression of opinion, by one of the chiefs (afterwards, however, much favoured, while Noor Mahomed Khan, who was more friendly at the outset, was subsequently treated with the utmost severity), whose aversion to communication with the Envoy amounted to positive and undisguised rudeness, and evinced the reverse of a cordial reception of the overtures made by the British Government, that our intervention was neither courted nor willingly acceded to by one of the most influential Ameers. They had resources of their own, which, united to the natural obstacles that intervened between their possessions and those of Runjeet Sing, rendered them at least easy with regard to their position with the Maharajah. And, it is clear from the observation of Noor Mahomed Khan, that our Envoy was regarded more as a suppliant for advantages for

his own Government, than as a mediator of differences between Sindh and Lahore, or as the representative of a powerful state, tendering disinterested support and protection against the invasion or aggression of an ambitious neighbour; and such impression is manifest from the observation of Noor Mahomed Khan, that the British Government could ask for nothing that was *reasonable* (page 15, par. 16), to which that of Sindh would not accede.

At last, Colonel Pottinger persuaded Noor Mahomed Khan to agree to the terms proposed, (page 21, par. 38,) and that chief promised *religiously* to abide by stipulations, *that should it be necessary to send an army to Sindh*, he would pay whatever portion of the expense the Governor-General chose to name; and that a British officer, though not explicitly sanctioned by the commercial agreement, might come and go when he liked, and do as he liked. And with due candour, he stated that Shikarpore offered, in his opinion, vast commercial advantages over either Tatta or Hyderabad for an agent; that the Governor-General must send a regiment or two; that Roostum Khan of Shikarpore could and would do all we wished relative to duties and customs; and that he would consult the Governor-General as to any steps of external policy. Ameer Nusseer Khan expressed the same sentiments. There was one point, however, on which the Envoy could not prevail on the Ameers to agree, without restriction; *namely, the right to cut wood on the banks of the river* (page 23, par. 46). The Envoy states, "Of the great advantages of the measures pointed out in the 9th article, my personal observation, in all my trips to Sindh, have fully satisfied me, that should steam vessels be introduced on the river, or even with the warehousing system, much of the necessity for removing the *jungle* will be done away. It was, however, as well to secure the permission; and the Ameers have only required that their preserves (*Shikargahs*) shall not be molested. This is so reasonable a request that I instantly acceded to it. In fact, when I recollected that the only happy part of their Highnesses' time is passed in their *sporting excursions*, in which they seem for the time relieved from all the cares and annoy-

ances of the capital, and to experience unalloyed enjoyment, I felt I had not only no right to ask them to make a sacrifice of the kind, but it would have been wrong to do so.\* The Envoy adds

“ The people of the country are prohibited, at their peril, from touching them (the Shikargahs) even for firewood. Indeed, the *Shikargahs* are watched and prized with all the care *and anxiety that was ever bestowed on royal preserves* in any part of Europe, and which we still see shewn to game preserves in *our own* enlightened country. We must, therefore, bear all these facts in mind, before we can properly appreciate the Ameers' disposition to meet our wishes on *this hitherto ill-understood and apparently trifling point.*”

Is it possible that General Napier could ever have seen this opinion of one of the most able diplomatic officers of the present age? If not, he will have an opportunity of contrasting it with his own crude and arbitrary notions when the blue book reaches him.

The Envoy says, (page 25, par. 50), he thinks that Sindé would be a bad station for European troops for a permanency, and there appeared to be *no occasion to send any there*, as Maharajah Runjeet Sing had agreed to retire within his own frontier, (oh! that that opinion had continued to be acted on,) and he was right, as subsequent events have too fatally proved. A hint is, for the first time, thrown out, (page 25, par. 51), that the Ameers should, in part of their share of the expense, cede to the British Government the *free and untaxed navigation of the Indus*, for all boats passing up and down under our passports.

\* Let me here advert to Sir C. Napier's proceedings afterwards (page 397, par. 19). The gallant but indiscreet officer inquires, whether “to their selfish policy and *love of hunting*, such general interests are to be sacrificed? I think not. The real interests of the Ameers *demand that their peurile pursuits* and blind avaricious proceedings *should be subjected to wholesome control.*” What would the amiable and excellent consort of our gracious Queen say to this doctrine? His Royal Highness is as partial to hunting as the Ameers of Sindé, and has well-stocked preserves.

An awkward development now occurs, and the Envoy found himself in a disagreeable predicament. In the secret memorandum, (page 27, par. 3,) amongst other stipulations, is the following, which, indeed, was the chief inducement held out to the Ameers of Sinde to grant the valuable privileges conceded to the British Government, viz. :—

“ 3. That should Runjeet Sing refuse to withdraw his troops, or to desist in his designs against Sinde, the British Government will then take steps to *extend its protection to Sinde*, and that the latter State will pay such portion of the expense as may be necessary.”

In entering into this stipulation, the Envoy is informed by the Governor-General that he has exceeded his powers. The letter, however, conveying this intimation, (referred to in the Envoy's despatch of 31st January, 1837, and stated to be dated 2nd of that month,) (page 28, par. 1,) does not appear. The Envoy states that he had, in preceding communications, borne testimony to the scrupulous manner in which Noor Mahomed Khan and his colleagues in authority (including the chief of Khyrpore) (page 29, par. 3), were acting up to the engagement made with him, and he very emphatically urges on his Lordship's notice, *that his promises clearly provided for the removal of the Sikh troops from their territories, as a preliminary step, on their binding themselves, for the British becoming the medium of all future intercourse between the courts of Lahore and Hyderabad* (par. 4). And after anxiously and carefully considering the instructions conveyed to him by the Governor-General, *his humble judgment did not lead him to the conclusion that he had deviated from them in the promises above described*; and he trusted his Lordship in council would not be of a different opinion. Under this impression, he should defer acting on the despatch under reply, (the missing one), until he received further commands. Here then, was a very unpleasant dilemma for the Envoy to be placed in. The Governor-General in council, however, (page 31, par. 2,) could not admit that the original instructions contained anything which implied it to be his wish or intention that the Envoy should pledge the Government, in any case, for the immediate evacuation, as a

preliminary step to further measures, of the Sinda territory by the troops of Runjeet Sing. The object of his lordship's interference, on that occasion, was to save the Ameers from impending destruction, by the offer of mediation, and a tender even of assistance 'was made in case of the progress of the Sikh troops. But it was not the intention of the Governor-General in council, that the immediate abandonment by the Maharajah of the position actually held by him in the Mazaree country, should be the necessary consequence of our intervention, and still less did he contemplate that that measure should be forced upon him, if he, at our request, arrested the progress of his arms. This *very question*, concerning the Mazaree country, was one of the *main points* in dispute between the Maharajah and the Ameers; and if it had been intended to decide it beforehand in favour of the Ameers, there would have been obviously no advantage in entering upon any plan of mediation. Runjeet Sing, however, was a powerful independent chief, and had been a faithful and consistent ally to us, but he had no reason to suppose we should interfere to procure indemnification for the losses which he might suffer from the Ameers or their dependents. Although, therefore, it was the interest and just policy of the British Government to dissuade him from the invasion of Sinda and the annihilation of its political independence, still he appeared to be undoubtedly warranted in his advance into the Mazaree country (par. 5). If the offer of mediation should be on both sides accepted, the Envoy was authorized to give the Ameers every assurance that a full and impartial inquiry should be conducted on the spot by an officer deputed on purpose, and that they should be prepared to send an agent to aid in the inquiry on their part. The Envoy was therefore directed to proceed to act upon the instructions of the 2nd January (*not in the blue book*). If the Ameers agreed to execute the agreement proposed for their acceptance, measures would be taken for commencing an investigation on the Mazaree frontier. If not, the relations of all the parties concerned must then revert to what they were before our late interposition in favour of the Ameers, and they

would again be subjected to the state of anxiety and hazard from which they had just been relieved (page 33, par. 9). In conclusion, the Envoy was informed that “*the employment of any British armed force at Shikarpore is not thought desirable. Nor, in any manner, ought the increasing intimacy with Sinde be made the means of assuming a position, or adopting a tone offensive to other powers.*”

Captain Burnes (p. 33, par. 6) having been deputed to and received by Meer Roostum Khan, Ameer of Khyrpore, in a very flattering manner, that chief seemed most anxious to conciliate the friendship and favour of the British Government, and evinced an anxious desire to enter into a new treaty with us, apart from engagements with the Hyderabad branch of the family. This wish Captain Burnes politely, but firmly, discouraged; a repugnance on our part which was afterwards overcome. We found Roostum Khan most useful. He was of great service to us; but General Napier destroyed the power of that chief, and sided with his brother, Ali Moorad, the present chief in amity with the English, who is now held in detestation by all his kindred.

The Governor-General in council, in addressing the Secret Committee on 27th Dec., 1837 (p. 35, par. 4 & 5), adverts to the altered tone of the Ameers, (could this be a matter of surprise after the failure of the Envoy to guarantee the only stipulation worth their acceptance, as a return for all their conditional concessions, and which stipulation he had promised?), and states that Government was greatly disappointed at the result of the negotiations which were in progress for the formation of the proposed treaty with the Ameers of Sinde. The proposals made by Noor Mahomed Khan were so different from what they had been led to anticipate, (but under what circumstances?) and so totally at variance with the spirit and form of the agreement which Colonel Pottinger had been *directed to propose*, that he addressed a letter to the Ameer, expressing his surprise at the tone of his Highness's communication to the Governor-General, which might be likely to give offence, and recommended its transmission being suspended.\*

\* The letter, which must have been a very interesting one, as showing

The Governor-General in council (p. 36, par. 16) therefore directed the Envoy to state that, if the Ameers *continued to manifest so great an aversion to form a closer alliance* with the only power competent to render them efficient aid, the British Government must refrain, on any future occasion, from promoting their welfare or securing their independence. From this it would appear, that the Ameers had little desire for a more close connection on the altered terms and conditions proposed by the Envoy, in opposition to his own judgment, after we had succeeded in diverting Runjeet Sing from his avowed purpose; but still the Governor-General required some concession, and, in short, it is quite evident the Bengal Government was most solicitous to have an excuse for exercising a more complete control over Sinde, in order to promote its own ends, in effecting the restoration of Shah Shoojah, for which measures were in progress, as shall presently be shown. A flimsy veil is cast over the object; but the fact is as clear as the sun at noon day. Lord Ellenborough draws the veil aside afterwards, when he had an object to be gained, and he says at once, at your peril refuse to comply with all we require. There is no mincing of the matter. The penalty of their refusal was to be the capture of the capital, and occupation of the country; and that penalty has been most fully exacted.

In the next communication to the Secret Committee, dated 21st Feb., 1838, (page 36, par. 2), the Governor-General in council intimates that the negotiations with the Ameers *for the establishment of a British Resident at the capital of Sinde were still pending*. Noor Mahomed Khan affected to be surprised at the observations made to him by Colonel Pottinger, and requested the return of the letter he had addressed to the Governor-General. In Noor Mahomed Khan's conference with the native agent, he professed to be actuated by feelings of friendship towards the British Government, and expressed a wish for an adjustment of his differences with the Sikhs, through our mediation; *but he had great hesitation at this period about receiving a political agent at his capital*. His the sentiments of the Ameers, does not appear; and it was well observed by Capt. Eastwick, that if the Ameers could produce their blue book, the question would assume a very different aspect.

Highness was therefore warned, that unless this point was conceded, the British Government could not exert its influence or use its good offices with Maharajah Runjeet Sing, for the restoration of the Mazaree districts, and the abandonment of his designs against Sinde. In the communication subsequently made by the principal Ameers to Colonel Pottinger, a desire to accede to our proposition for the reception of a British agent was distinctly expressed, and an intimation conveyed therein, that Runjeet Sing had left the question of the restoration of the Mazaree districts, and the removal of the Sikh garrison from Rojhan to the determination of the British Government,

It became a matter of expediency, as I have before noticed, to have a treaty with the Ameers of Sinde, prior to the promulgation of the Tripartite Treaty, and in order to afford a pretext for interference, so essential to the Governor-General's other measures connected with the restoration of Shah Shoojah in Affghanistan. The treaty with the Ameers was, therefore, greatly reduced in its limits, and consisted of only two articles. It was concluded on the 20th April, 1838, with Noor Mahomed Khan and Meer Nusseer Mahomed Nusseer Khan, as follows: (page 37,)

“Article I.—In consideration of the long friendship which has subsisted between the British Government and the Ameers of Sinde, the Governor-General in Council engages to use his good offices to adjust the present differences which are understood to subsist between the Ameers of Sinde and Maharajah Runjeet Sing, so that peace and friendship may be established between the two States.

“Article II.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace which have so long subsisted between the Sinde State and the British Government, it is agreed that an accredited British minister shall reside at the Court of Hyderabad, and that the Ameers of Sinde shall also be at liberty to depute a vakeel to reside at *the Court* of the British Government,” (*what a gracious condescension!*) “and that the British minister shall be empowered to change his ordinary place of residence as may from time to time seem expedient, and be attended by such an escort as may be deemed suitable by his Government.”

No provision is made for the occasional change of residence of the vakels of the Ameers, nor any escort of course, *at the Court of the British Government*. Perhaps, that of St. James', may, in due time, be favoured with the presence of a vakeel from the exiled Ameers, to sue for justice, if the Honorable Court shall not succeed in inducing Her Majesty's Ministers to restore these chiefs, or some of them, before such an appeal can be urged.

I may here advert to the *total absence of all communications from Colonel Pottinger*, respecting the actual conclusion of the foregoing treaty, which is dated 20th April, 1838, while the date of his last letter, in the printed series is the 31st January, 1837! *This is a most extraordinary fact*—the despatches of Colonel Pottinger, during that long interval, must have been extremely important and interesting, and should have been produced, in order to show how he contrived to extricate himself from the embarrassments in which he was involved by the rejection on the part of the Governor-General in Council, of the principal stipulation in the agreement entered into with Noor Mahomed Khan; and it is but justice to the Ameers, that their arguments should also have appeared. Here is an interval of fifteen months, and the treaty appears in the blue book unaccompanied by any communication from Colonel Pottinger; the Governor-General in Council transmitting a copy of it to the Secret Committee (page 37), with a brief intimation of its conclusion.

Turning over the page, without any previous explanation, (page 38) comes the celebrated Tripartite Treaty between the British Government, Runjeet Sing and Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, concluded at Lahore on the *26th June, 1838, just two months after the date of the treaty concluded with the Ameers of Sind*, and after long protracted negotiations of eighteen months' duration. The Tripartite Treaty consists of eighteen articles, only two of which, viz. the \* 4th and 16th, relate to Sind. The last is as follows (page 40):—

“ XVI.—Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk agrees to relinquish, for him-

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\* On the subject of Shikarpore, the author adopts the words of Mr. Sullivan, which came to hand while this work was going through the

self, his heirs, and successors, all claims of supremacy, and arrears of tribute, over the country now held by the Ameers of Sinde, (which will continue to belong to the Ameers and their successors in perpetuity,) on condition of the payment to him by the Ameers of such a sum as may be determined, under the mediation of the British Government, 15,00,000 of rupees of such payment being made by him to Maharajah Runjeet Sing. On these payments being completed, Article IV. of the treaty of 12th March, 1833, will be considered cancelled, and the customary interchange of letters and suitable presents between the Maharajah and the Ameers of Sinde shall be maintained as heretofore."

And so this is the first fruits of our friendly intervention, but not all that *we* required for ourselves, as will be seen presently. Who gave the Governor-General a right to interfere between

press. That gentleman says, "But admitting, for the sake of argument, that all the charges were completely proved, then, he would ask, did they arise out of gratuitous hostility to the British Government? The answer must be, 'No; they proceeded from our treaty with Runjeet Sing and Shah Shoojah, of June, 1838.' The fourth article of that treaty said, 'Regarding Shikarpore, and the territory of Sinde lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will agree to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharajah, through Captain Wade.' That article formed part and parcel of a treaty, which was concluded in 1833, between Shah Shoojah and Runjeet Sing, to which the British Government were not then parties, though they subsequently became so. What, then, was the meaning of the article? It meant that Shah Shoojah and Runjeet Sing agreed to leave it to the British Government to determine what portion of Shikarpore should be given to Runjeet Sing for his assistance in seating Shah Shoojah upon the throne;—that the British Government, after it had acceded to the treaty, would determine what part of Shikarpore should belong to Runjeet Sing, in the event of the Shah's success in his new attempt. Thus was Shikarpore to be dealt with. It was a valuable possession of the Ameers, which they had wrested from the Affghans in 1817. It had been in their possession, with one short interval, and was the object of Runjeet Sing's invasion in 1836. This article, as it stood, was one of unqualified hostility against the Ameers; but it was qualified by another article, namely, the 16th. What, then, was the meaning of the two articles taken together? The British Government undertook to exact from the friendly Ameers of Sinde, large sums of money for the benefit of Shah Shoojah and Runjeet Sing, upon the latter foregoing all further demands for tribute, and the forfeiture of Shikarpore was to be the penalty for non-payment."

Shah Shoojah and the Ameers? That exiled chief had not been in a condition to require any tribute for a long course of years. Such was the result of our kind and disinterested interference, which was so reluctantly acceded to by the Ameers.

Mr. Secretary Macnaghten, in transmitting copy of the Tripartite Treaty (page 40) to the Resident in Sind, conveys the directions of the Governor-General of India for the Ameers to be informed—that in the opinion of the Governor-General, a crisis had arrived at which it was essentially requisite for the security of British India, that its real friends should unequivocally manifest their attachment to its interests, and that *a combination of the powers to the Westward*, apparently having objects in view injurious to our empire in the East, had compelled the Governor-General to enter into *a counter combination for the purpose of frustrating those objects*. Reference was made to the 16th article, engaging to arbitrate the claim of Shah Shoojah, (now first alluded to,) and it was stated that the Governor-General had not yet determined the amount which the Ameers may be fairly called upon to pay, *and it should not, therefore, immediately be named*; but the *minimum* may certainly be taken at 20 lacs of rupees. A precious friend and arbitrator! Shah Shoojah was a mere tool of the Governor-General. The Ameers were to be assured that the disposition of the British Government towards them was *extremely favourable*, and that nothing could distress the Governor-General more than an interruption of the good understanding which had hitherto prevailed between his government and their Highnesses. At the same time, *it would be uncandid to conceal* from their Highnesses that his Lordship expected from them, as sincere friends and near neighbours, some ostensible display, in the present exigency, of their attachment to British interests, and some concession on their part to the reasonable wishes of the British Government and its allies. It was intimated that Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk would probably arrive, *with his own army*, and the direct support of British troops, at Shikarpore, about the middle of November, in progress *to take possession of the*

*throne of Affghanistan, and that temporary possession would be taken of Shikarpore, and as much of the country adjacent as might be required to afford a secure base for the intended military operations. A threat was held out to induce the Ameers to a speedy acquiescence in the demands of the Governor-General, thus—*

Page 41. “ His Lordship is further unwilling to contemplate the contingency of offensive operations being undertaken against the Ameers by the Shah, after he shall have established, by the support of the British power, his authority in Affghanistan, for the realization of what he may deem his just claims. But the Ameers must be sensible, that if they should now deprive themselves of the advantage of his Lordship’s mediation, with a view to effect an immediate favourable compromise, the British Government will be precluded from offering opposition to any measures for the assertion of those claims which the Shah may eventually determine to adopt.”

How very inconsistent ! The Governor-General presses on the Ameers his mediation between them and Runjeet Sing on a question of invaded territory, and gets permission to establish a Residency. He professes the greatest friendship, obtains their acquiescence to measures beneficial to the commerce of the country, and he then turns round and acts as the agent of a long-deposed useless chief of a far distant country, who was utterly powerless and destitute of means but for our assistance ; and that poor man’s name is made use of to enforce a large money payment for which there was no pretext but that of *expediency and need*. This is not a creditable species of diplomacy.

In order to provide (page 42) for the possible contingency of the Ameers of Sinde having, in the interim, entered into engagements with the Shah of Persia, Colonel Pottinger had full authority to request the immediate advance of a British force from the Bombay army, *such as would suffice to take possession of the capital of Sinde*, and to declare all friendly relations between his own Government and such of the Ameers as might have been parties to the Persian alliance, to have ceased. With *any of the Ameers* whose

cause might be popular in the country, and who might shew a disposition to cultivate a British rather than a Persian alliance, Colonel Pottinger was authorized to enter into such provisional engagements, subsidiary or otherwise, as might be most advantageous to his own Government, and best calculated to support the supremacy of the Ameer whose cause might be espoused. This was a remarkable state of affairs only *three months* after the conclusion of a treaty for the admission of a British Resident. Mr. Secretary Macnaghten closes as follows :—

“ His Lordship will only add, *as a suggestion to aid your opinion on the subject, that the Ameers may fairly be supposed to be wealthy, in consequence of the long suspension of the tribute which was formerly paid to Cabool, and with reference to the known fact, that during this interval they have not been engaged in any extensive operations.*”

No; they were happy and contented till we proffered our kindness. We restore a long-deposed chief, and revive his antiquated claim. Can we wonder that the Ameers received our advances with suspicion and distrust? In Aug. 1838, (page 43,) it was reported by the native agent, that the four Ameers had decided on writing to the King of Persia; *but Colonel Pottinger did not ascribe any immediate political object to the Ureeza, (copy of which was procured,\*)* and Noor Mahomed Khan declared himself the warm and staunch ally of the British Government. Col. Pottinger, however, in a letter to the Secretary, dated 27th Aug., 1838, (page 46, par. 2,) states that he had been induced to doubt the sincerity and good faith of Noor Mahomed Khan, and he accuses him of deep duplicity, with reference to his late correspondence with the Shah of Persia; and he also entertained considerable doubts as to the Ameers acceding to the pecuniary proposal. In adverting to the opposition that might be expected to the payment of *tribute*, Colonel Pottinger observes :—

“ My recent dispatches (par. 4.) will have shown his Lordship,

\* This is an important admission; because charges of a grave nature were afterwards founded on this letter to the Shah of Persia, and the Ameers accused of treachery to the British Government.

that should the popular ferment take such a turn, Noor Mahomed Khan has in himself no power to withstand it, even supposing he was cordially disposed to cling to us. Sobdar and his party will, in all probability, even go so far as to declare, that *the demand is a breach of the late agreement, on the principle, that without our assistance Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk had no means of exacting one rea from them, consequently that the demand may be considered our own.*"

This is a very broad hint, not to be misunderstood, and the Envoy, with great *naiveté*, adds :—

"I do not, by pointing at this argument, mean for an instant to uphold its correctness, but it is one just suited to the capacity and feelings of the individuals with whom I have to negotiate, and which I feel almost certain will be brought forward."

And in allusion to the difficulties he had to contend with, and the altered tone of the Ameers, he states :—

"Had our present connection existed some years, and our resident thereby had time, by constant kindly intercourse with the chiefs and people, to have removed the *strong and universal impression* that exists throughout Sinde, as to our *grasping policy*, the case might have been widely different; *but I enter on my new duties without any thing to offer*, and with a proposal that will not only strengthen the above impressions (*for many besides the Sindees will believe at the outset that we are making a mere use of Shah Shoojah's name*), *but revive a claim to tribute which has long been esteemed obsolete.*"

For these reasons, he considered it would be requisite to take the precaution of requesting the Government of Bombay to take early steps to prepare a force for eventual service in Sinde—in order, of course, to press our friendship on those unruly Ameers, who were so blind to their own real interests. Under the discouraging aspect of affairs, the Governor-General was glad to make the most of the supposed intrigue with Persia.

His Lordship considered, (page 47 to 50,) that there was no doubt the Ameers had addressed the letter to the Shah of Persia, (never denied,) of which a translation had been sub-

mitted by the Resident ; that the tender of allegiance at the time when the opposition of the British Government to the Shah's designs had long been avowed and notorious—the hostility to British interests which might be implied from Noor Mahomed Khan's letter—and his duplicity in making, at the same moment, professions of submission to Persia, and of close alliance with the British Government—had forfeited for him, on its part, all confidence and friendly consideration ; which if it was proved that Meer Sobdar had continued faithful to his engagements, the Resident was required to consider whether that chief might not be placed at the head of the administration of affairs in Sinde, under such conditions as should secure in that country *the ascendancy of British influence*. It was then intimated, that a British force of not less than 5,000 men should be in readiness at Bombay, to be sent to Shikarpore as a reinforcement of the army under Sir Henry Fane.

It was accordingly determined to despatch (p. 43) that force to occupy Shikarpore or such part of Sinde as might be deemed eligible for facilitating operations beyond the Indus ; and it was intimated to the Resident, that not only those who had shown a disposition to favour our adversaries, but those who displayed an unwillingness to aid us in the just and necessary undertaking in which we were engaged must be *displaced*, and give way to others on whose friendship and co-operation we might be able implicitly to rely.

The Resident in Sinde (page 55), in submitting to the Ameers the expectation of the British Government that they would pay the amount stated by the Tripartite Treaty, and otherwise aid in the establishment of Shah Shoojah, informs them that they must perfectly understand that the measures described were not open to further consideration, but had been finally resolved on ; and that any hesitation on their part, or that of any other power, to comply with what was asked of them, must be deemed to be a refusal, and immediate steps taken to remedy it, which it was obvious could only be done by calling in additional troops, which were all ready, both in the Bengal and Bombay territories.

Noor Mahomed Khan admitted that he wrote a letter to Mahomed Shah of Persia (page 58), but denied that his ureeza was to the purport or effect supposed ; and Colonel Pottinger states most decidedly, that the “ *degree of treachery of Noor Mahomed Khan and his party remains to be proved.*”

The Governor-General, nevertheless, expressed a hope that if a better disposition had not been evinced by the Ameers, the Resident had entered into a provisional engagement with Meer Sobdar, or some *other member of the family* (page 59) who might be disposed to enter cordially into our views, to the exclusion of the Ameers who had shown an unwillingness to cooperate with us ; and it was expected that the Resident had called for the advance of the Bombay army.

The Resident's equanimity appears to have been much upset by the conduct of some of the “ mob screeching and yelling,” and pelting stones (page 60), on his return from an interview with Meer Sobdar ; but an ample apology was made. Noor Mahomed Khan sent his son to say he was overwhelmed with shame (page 63, par. 4) ; that he had punished all those whom it could be discovered had any share or hand in the outrage, and intended to turn them out of the city ; and finally, that he was our devoted friend and ally, and his country and resources were at our service.

A very important fact respecting the demand for *tribute* (page 63), was now brought by the Resident to the notice of the Governor-General. I give it in the Resident's own words :

“ The question of a money payment by the Ameers of Sinde to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, (par. 6,) is, in my humble opinion, rendered very *puzzling*, by two *releases written in the Koran, and sealed and signed by His Majesty, which they have produced.* Their argument now is, that they are sure the Governor-General of India does not intend to make *them pay again for what they have already bought and obtained in the most binding and solemn form, a receipt in full.* I have procured copies of the releases, and will give them my early attention ; but in the meantime I may respectfully observe, that the matter can only be properly discussed and settled when the king and his ministers shall be on the spot, to support and establish the royal claims.”

This certainly was a very *puzzling question*; but as the Resident at the same time stated (p. 7)—

“With regard to the *ability* of the Ameers of Hyderabad to pay, I have made such inquiries as lay in my power, without exciting alarm or suspicion. The result is, that the highest estimate of *their treasures* is one and a-half crores, the lowest 75 lacs. The revenue of all Sinde is reported to have fluctuated between 40 and 50 lacs per annum for a great lapse of time: when the mission was here in 1809, it was then believed to be 42 lacs; and now it is said to be 50: assuming the latter amount, the Khyrpore share is 15 lacs for the Hyderabad family.\* This is subdivided into four portions of  $6\frac{1}{2}$  lacs each, for which the Ameers drew lots some time ago, and Noor Mahomed Khan gets an extra lac and a-half for Durbar expences. Of the Khyrpore share, Meer Ali Moorad is stated to have one-half to himself, and Meers Roostum Khan and Moobaruck the other moiety. No one here knows any thing of the Meerpore financial affairs.”

It was the Resident's opinion (and how could he expect otherwise?) that it would be *foolish to hope* for the cordial co-operation or sincere friendship of the Ameers (page 9). He thought it was shown that their government would join our enemies to-morrow did it see they were stronger than we; and the assistance it was about to afford (if such it could be called) *was the fruit of its fears, and not its good-will*.

Complaints continued to be made by the Resident against Noor Mahomed Khan (page 64, par. 1), who had evinced the same suspicious, unfriendly, and despicable conduct, and who manifested a great opposition (par. 3) to the selection of a spot for the Residency (par. 4); and with reference to the proposed passage of the army at Sukkur, to which he was averse; and being shown a letter from Meer Roostum Khan, of a friendly nature (par. 7), Noor Mahomed Khan insolently and loudly observed, that “*the Governor-General's orders were not the decrees of the Almighty, and could and should be altered.*”

Sir Alexander Burnes stated (page 66) that he was most peculiarly situated with the chief of Khyrpore (Meer Roostum Khan), *as he had none of the hostile feelings* which Colonel

\* Sic in orig.

Pottinger represented to exist in Lower Sinde; and Sir Alexander also stated he had received a communication from Meer Roostum Khan, who had been informed by Noor Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad, that "*the English sought to break their treaties.*" Such, no doubt, was the conviction of the Ameers, and must be the impression of every impartial reader of these papers.

Colonel Pottinger reported (page 67) that Noor Mahomed Khan still continued to send messages breathing nothing but friendship and devotion; but still the Colonel considered he had some *sinister plot in view*, and was destitute of either truth or shame. In fact, the Resident seemed to have imbibed a strong and unconquerable prejudice against Noor Mahomed Khan, because that chief did not come into every view proposed to him, however oppressive or arbitrary. All dependence on the aid and good-will of Noor Mahomed Khan, the principal Ameer (page 69), having been abandoned by Colonel Pottinger, that officer determined immediately to request the Bombay Government to despatch a force of not less than 5,000 men to Sinde.

Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, however, continued to manifest the most friendly feelings and entire submission (page 72).

With reference to the money payment required of the Ameers (par. 9), Sir A. Burnes mentioned that it was stated the Khyrpore family were poor; that Shāh Shoojah had excused their paying anything last time, and that *his oaths on the Koran, which they had, were as so much waste paper if we did not interfere*; and finally, it was but right to expect we would reward them by friendly consideration.

Much correspondence from Sir Alexander Burnes follows (pages 75 to 80), respecting the treaty with the Ameers of Khyrpore. The proposal made by the Ameers of that State was indicative of their opposition to the British Government taking possession of any part of their country, which was unquestionably the cause of their shyness. The draft treaty (page 76) *proposed by the Ameers of Khyrpore* was as follows :

“The cause of writing this document is this,—that I, Captain Burnes, made a treaty on the part of the East India Company with their Highnesses Meer Roostun Khan, the chief and ruler of his own territories, Meer Moobaruck Khan, and Meer Ali Moorad Khan Talpoor, and concluded it in this manner:—That generation after generation, and descent after descent, as long as the glorious sun, by the command of God, gives light to this world, the Government of the East India Company *will by no means and on no account, either directly or indirectly, interfere with or claim the territories enjoyed by the said Meers, nor will take possession of a dam or drain of their country, and will never interfere in commanding or punishing in its revenue and political affairs.*” . . . . .

“Justice, decision of cases, and all other important affairs of their jurisdiction, will rest in their own hands. The friend of both parties will be considered a friend, as the enemy on both sides will be deemed an enemy.”

In the second treaty (page 77) proposed by the Ameers, to the same effect, it is added :

“If any from adjacent quarters should oppress the Meers of Khyrpore, or covet them, the Government of the East India Company will protect and assist the Meers. *Please God, no change, even equal to the point of a hair, will take place in this arrangement.*”

Copies and translations of the treaties (page 80) given to the Ameers of Sinde by Shah Shoojah, having been forwarded by the Resident (par. 2), that officer, in transmitting them to the Governor-General, gave it as his opinion, that the release granted to the Ameers contained—

“*A formal renunciation on behalf of the king of any sort of claim or pretensions in Sinde and Shikarpore, and their dependencies, and promises that none shall be made. How this is to be got over I do not myself see, but I submit the documents, with every deference, for the consideration and decision of the Governor-General of India.*”

And he adds,

“From the inquiries (par. 3.) I have been able to make subsequently to that date, I have every reason to believe that the esti-

mate I then formed of the revenue of Sinde was considerably over-rated. I understand that the shares of each of the Hyderabad Ameers have not exceeded five and a-half lacs of rupees for several years, including every item, and above one-half of this was received in kind, grain, ghee, coarse sugar, oil, forage, &c., and transferred by their Highnesses to their dependent chiefs and followers, who seldom receive above one-third of their salaries in cash, the overplus in kind being exchanged, both by these latter classes and the Ameers themselves, with merchants, for such foreign productions as they may require."

Notwithstanding the assurance given by Fukkur Shah (page 83, par. 15), that Noor Mahomed Khan had expressed a great anxiety to meet all the Resident's wishes in every way, by giving orders to collect grain, boats, and camels for the Bombay troops, Colonel Pottinger had no confidence in him; and he considered that Noor Mahomed Khan's conduct, *in several instances, places that chief "at the mercy of his Lordship the Governor-General."*

The releases of Shah Shoojah in favour of the Ameers produced (page 85), at once seemed to invalidate the claims for a money payment so arbitrarily and unexpectedly introduced into the Tripartite Treaty. The dread of this preposterous and unjust demand being enforced, and the fears of more being exacted, doubtless led to the opposition of the Ameers to the establishment of a Residency, and rendered them very naturally suspicious and distrustful.

A considerable difference of opinion seems to have existed between Colonel Pottinger and Sir Alexander Burnes (page 89), in respect to the conduct of Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore (so much commended by Sir Alexander) and the terms of the treaty proposed; the Colonel objecting to those offered by the other political agent. The two doctors, indeed, appear to have differed on several points, but Colonel Pottinger applied *powerful stimulants to his patients*.

The Governor-General, acting on the communication from the Resident in Sinde, (page 91) resolves on a decided course, and in a despatch to Colonel Pottinger of 24th Oct. 1838, his Lordship hopes that the Resident's hesitation to order the

advance of the British force had been removed by his letter of 20th Sept.; as the *treachery* of the Ameers had, in his Lordship's opinion, been established by a variety of concurrent circumstances. "Of their having written a *slavish* ureeza to the Shah of Persia" (says the secretary) "you do not express the slightest doubt," and the treatment of the *self-styled* Persian prince at Hyderabad was an additional confirmation; while the insulting letter to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, coupled with the distinct announcement made to the Resident and the native agent, regarding opposition to the Shah, afforded conclusive proof of the design of the Ameers to favour our enemies. *It was therefore determined* (page 92) *to establish a British subsidiary force in Lower Sinde, at the earliest practicable moment.* The secretary observes,—

"Whether, therefore, the present Ameers are *suffered to retain power, an arrangement which his Lordship would now, in the first instance, contemplate,*" (What, after all such imputed treachery!) "*or whether Meer Sobdar is raised to the Government under our auspices, the reception of a subsidiary force must be made a sine qua non of the new engagement.*"

In the P. S. it is again urged that not a moment's delay should be allowed in effecting the advance of the troops from Bombay.

"When the force shall have advanced into Sinde" (states Mr. Secretary Macnaghten), "you may then disclose the willingness of his Lordship still to respect the authority of the Ameers Noor Mahomed Khan and Nusseer Mahomed, *conditionally on the establishment of a subsidiary force,* under such additional instructions as may be conveyed to you; but it is prudent that you should not make premature allusion to that determination."

A very curious communication was made by Colonel Pottinger to Sir Alexander Burnes of an interview with Lalla Suddanund, (page 94) who had formerly been vakeel at the court of Runjeet Sing. The interview is thus described:—

"He went on to ask, (par. 4,) in what I considered a very flip-pant style, what could induce his Lordship the Governor-General to revive the obsolete question of the Sinde tribute to the King of Cabool?" He said, 'It is a joke talking of it as a demand of the

king's ; you have given him bread for the last five-and-twenty years ; and any strength he has now, or may hereafter have, proceeds from you, so that the demand is literally yours.' ”

A very natural observation, but the Colonel was much surprised at his impertinent communication, and after pointing out the *extraordinary kindness* of the Governor-General, in thinking as his Lordship had done, of the interests of the Sinde Ameers, Lalla Suddanund was dismissed,—that plain-spoken man having expressed his surprise that so great a man as the Colonel should report such trifles to the Governor-General, as his doubts respecting certain correspondence indicated.

Sir Alexander Burnes, in a letter to Colonel Pottinger, stated,—

“ With reference to the doubts, (Page 95 and 97,) which arise from the documents given by Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, it is proper to observe, that the reasons for Shikarpore being given up are obvious, since that district never belonged to Sinde during the monarchy, and was a subsequent addition. It is also clear from these papers, that Shikarpore and Sinde are to be held as formerly, and not interfered with ; the interpretation of which evidently is, that the Ameers are not to be disturbed in the government if they pay tribute. Had Shoojah meant anything else he would have cancelled the Rukum of the former Timor.”

Bravo, Sir Alexander, you were always ready to find an excuse for any proceeding that might be agreeable or useful to the ruling authority, just as most young politicals of your stamp, without experience and reflection upon the consequences to the interests of the poor natives, or the national honour, are too apt to lend themselves to any plan that may happen to be popular with the supreme power at the moment ; but this mode of special pleading, successful enough in small matters, will not do for India, at the present moment—we must deal with facts, not ingenious ratiocination.

Sir Alexander Burnes also gives it as his opinion (page 96, par. 3), that the documents which the Ameers of Sinde possess from Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, were “ *in his mind of small value.*” Certainly so, if the Governor-General was determined to disregard all justice, and to enforce the money payment at all hazards.

Great doubts seem now (Nov. 1838) to have been entertained of the sincerity of Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, (page 96) with whom Sir Alexander Burnes had been negotiating, and whose conduct had been so favorably noticed by that officer ; and Colonel Pottinger repeats his intention of revising the treaty with the chief when he should have obtained satisfactory and unequivocal proof of his having acted up to his professions, *but not till then*. And Colonel Pottinger expressed his *concern*, that Sir Alexander Burnes should have entered into engagements and recorded opinions from which he (the Colonel) *felt obliged entirely to dissent!*

The Governor-General, in reference to the negotiations (page 101) with Meer Roostum Khan, directed Sir Alexander Burnes to state that—

“As respects Bukkur, it would be required by this ‘Government as a depôt for treasure and ammunition’ *only during the war* ; and it will be advisable that this fact be carefully impressed upon the Meers when reference is made to the question of our occupancy of it.”

The Resident in Sinde appeared to have taken a most unconquerable dislike to Noor Mahomed Khan (par. 8) who “swore by the Almighty and the Koran, that he was ignorant of every one of the instances of unfriendliness which were pointed out,” but the Colonel put no *trust* in him ; and again, on a deputation reading a memorandum of from twelve to twenty items, (page 104) containing an enumeration of the various instances in which Noor Mahomed Khan had acceded to his demands, the Colonel *flatly contradicted* many of their assertions. On this occasion, there seems to have been too much of what is known by the term *gasconading*—very unbecoming the dignity of a British Envoy, and quite foreign, I am sure, to the wishes of the Directors of the East India Company, who do not require nor approve of these adventitious aids to support their authority or advance their interests. The Resident said,—

“That had the Ameer met us halfway, we should have been obliged to him, (par. 7,) and felt sure of his friendship ; that had the road not been given *we should have taken it* ; that the empire

of Hindoostan was a gem of too great value to be trifled with ; that the Governor-General was prepared *at one moment*, had it been necessary, in support of our rights and honour, *to go to war with Persia, Affghanistan, Nepaul and Burmah; that had Herat fallen, we should only have had the trouble of retaking it.*"

All this is in bad taste ; there was rather too much vaunting for a friend who *ostensibly* went to offer mediation and assistance. The Colonel's temper appears to have been much ruffled at times.

The memorandum submitted by Syed Ismael Shah on the part of Noor Mahomed Khan, notwithstanding the contemptuous manner in which it was treated by Colonel Pottinger, appears, in my humble judgment, to be a fair, temperate and convincing statement in reply to the Resident's manifold accusations against the unfortunate Ameers. It is briefly as follows ; that notwithstanding former treaties to the contrary, he had given British troops a passage through Sindh, allowed boats to be hired, grain to be bought, and, contrary to stipulations of former treaties, admitted a British Resident, and granted a site for a residency.

In reply to the accusation respecting *intrigues with Persia*, (page 107), the Ameer seems completely to exonerate himself from the oft repeated charge ; and if the following does not carry conviction to any unprejudiced mind, I do not know what could possibly do so. He says,

" You are constantly alluding to the letter (par. 6) I gave to Hajee Hoossein Ali Khan. I did so in the month of Seth, (June,) during the hot weather, when I knew nothing of the differences between the British Government and Mahomed Shah. *English ambassadors were always in Persia*, and my ancestors were on friendly terms with Futteh Ali Shah ; *but to please the British Government I neither sent letters of condolence on the former Shah's death, nor of congratulation on Mahomed Shah's accession.*"

After some other extremely pertinent observations, the paper of defence concludes in the following emphatic and apparently truthful style :—

" Your Moonshees have repeatedly told me (par. 13) I had shown no sort of friendship for the British Government. This is

most astonishing, for I have omitted no proof of my devotion. I have even agreed to many points that were not in the former treaties, out of regard to the dictates of friendship and dependency on the word of that personage, which is like letters engraved on stone. This I have done, even to the extent of allowing the British army to pass within a coss of Hyderabad, *although such concession is at variance with all custom and the proper safety of the country.* It is written in all the treaties, that the alliance between the States shall continue from generation to generation. I am most anxious to preserve the friendship of the British Government; you are able to judge. How, then, can we be assured (when you assert what you have done?) “If you wish for friendship, (par. 14,) *do not bring forward these cavils and stories. Keep the alliance fully in view.*”

Preparations were now (18th Nov. 1838), made for the expected arrival of the troops from Bombay at the mouth of the Indus (page 111); the officer in command being informed that as they were to be landed with the concurrence of the Sinde Government, they were to consider themselves in a friendly country, and Lieutenant Eastwick was despatched to Vikkur to assist in making the necessary arrangements for the disembarkation of the force.

A long letter from Colonel Pottinger to the Governor-General (page 112), refers to another memorandum submitted by the Ameers, and some angry discussion, as usual, on the part of the Resident, who, on this occasion, was extremely arbitrary and dictatorial in the style of his replies, and scarcely left an opening for amicable negotiation or adjustment. In fact, as the troops were expected, it evidently was not desired to enter, at once, into friendly communication (in pursuance of the direction of the Governor-General), for there were other points to gain, and which there seemed no expectation of attaining but by compulsion and working on the fears of the Ameers by the presence of a large force.

Lord Auckland (page 113), through his secretary, dwells on the *treachery and enmity* of the two principal Ameers of Sinde, but—

“His Lordship is not yet prepared to record a final opinion as to the measures which may be necessary for our future security against their machinations. Much will depend on the amount of

evidence which may be attainable as to the *extreme duplicity* of those Ameers in their intercourse with Persia, of which, although there is no doubt in the mind of his Lordship, *some difficulty may be found in obtaining positive proof.*" . . . . . "The Governor-General is *hardly disposed to concur entirely in the opinion you have expressed*, to the effect that the circumstances specified in the 21st par. of your letter, dated 25th ult., however clearly they show the want of all honour and honesty in the character of Noor Mahomed Khan, *are such as to place that chief at our mercy.*"

Reference was again made to the probable elevation of Meer Sobdar, if Noor Mahomed Khan should not agree to all the terms required; and it was recommended to form separate treaties with all the Ameers (page 116), as the Governor-General was of opinion that much of advantage may be expected *from this subdivision of authority*; it was to be made the chief object of any negotiation into which the Resident might be led, to stipulate for the free navigation of the Indus. "It would, indeed, be incompatible" (says the secretary) "with our position, as *a subsidized power in Sinde, that the article in the former treaty, guarding against the use of the Indus for the transport of military stores or munitions of war, should remain in force.*"

In reference to the estimate of the revenues having been overrated, as admitted by the Resident, he was informed that *the subsidy must ultimately be fixed with reference to the available means of the several Ameers.* And pending the consideration of the question as to the *proposed demand for the cession of Kurrachee*, contributions should be required for the, at least partial, payment of a subsidiary force in Lower Sinde. The arguments in favour of the releases granted to the Ameers of Sinde for tribute by Shah Shoojah are dismissed in the most summary manner imaginable, as follows:—

"The Governor-General refrains for the present from recording any opinion relative to the releases which his Majesty Shah Shoojah is stated to have executed. *Admitting the documents produced to be genuine, and that they imply a relinquishment of all claim to tribute, still they would hardly appear to be applicable to present circumstances*; and it is not conceivable that his Majesty should

have foregone so valuable a claim without some equivalent, or that some counterpart agreement should not have been taken, the non-fulfilment of the terms of which may have rendered null and void his Majesty's engagements. *Whatever may be the real facts of the case*, the question is one which concerns the contending parties. It will be for the Ameers of Sinde to consider whether it will not be of the first importance to them to make such a final arrangement with Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, as shall secure their being guaranteed by the British Government, in the *independence of their country after his accession to power.*"

Precious independence, indeed, and splendid reasoning! The Ameers had nothing to fear from Shàh Shoojah, and required none of our guarantees on the subject. They had discharges solemnly executed and recorded on the Koran, and they would never have heard of any claim for tribute, but for our officious intermeddling with their affairs. The conclusion of his Lordship's argument is all of a piece:—

“The Governor-General is of opinion, *that it is not incumbent on the British Government to enter into any formal investigation of the plea adduced by the Ameers*, though the *arbitration* of the question might possibly be left to the Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, if his Majesty and the Ameers should both be desirous of this mode of adjusting it.”

What was this but a solemn mockery? *Arbitration by the minister at the court of Shah Shoojah indeed!* The very party who penned these arguments,—very probably the party who suggested the preposterous claim! The Ameers were satisfied with the release, and required no arbitration in the matter, and did not court our interference at all. They would have been content to take all the consequences of a refusal, as far as Shah Shoojah was personally concerned; but they were sorely afraid of the British Government, and their fears were ingeniously wrought upon.

The Resident in Sinde (page 119, par. 3) still continued to complain of Noor Mahomed Khan, and stated that the Governor-General must, he felt assured, be fatigued with the barefaced falsehoods and unblushing assertions of the “*firm and devoted friendship,*” in which that chief persisted

with a degree of pertinacity such as was quite wonderful. Nevertheless, Col. Pottinger admits that the Ameer had told his moonshee that he and Nusseer Khan were ready to pay down their portion of the sum to be given to Shah Shoojah ool-Moolk; and after the army had passed through Sinde, he and the Resident would arrange for recovering the shares of his brothers and relations, (par. 4,) and seizing their possessions, if they did not agree. The Colonel stated to the deputation in reply, that he was not authorized to interfere on this point; but he would refer any person the Ameers chose to send to the frontier with a letter, to Mr. Macnaghten, the British minister with the Shah.

Col. Pottinger was of opinion (par. 17.) that we should demand from the Ameers of Sinde the cession of all the country lying on the right bank of the Indus, agreeably to a plan specified; by which arrangement (par. 18.) "*the Ameers would be left, with reduced incomes, it is true, in the enjoyment of the only pursuits and pleasures which they seem to think of.*" (par. 19.) The Resident has manifold and cogent reasons why the *subsidiary* force should *not be stationed at the capital*, where barbarism and prejudice would lead to continual disputes without any counterbalancing advantage. After pointing out the plan proposed, viz., to have a regiment of native infantry and a company of artillery at Kurrachee, and the rest of the troops at Tatta, the Resident observes,—“With these troops, and British agents residing at Hyderabad and Khyrpore, *I look on it that our perfect supremacy throughout Sinde will be as fully established as though we had entirely subjugated it,—a measure which, for the reasons stated in some of my former despatches, I could by no means recommend.*” But, alas! what has been the final issue?

The Bombay Government was informed, (page 122, par. 3.) in reply to an enquiry as to the object of the force, by the Resident in Sinde, that he had sent for the troops, under the impression, which he still entertained, that it was the intention of the Governor-General that they should *compel the Ameers into acquiescence now to be prescribed to them.*” Exactly so; no disguise about it.

A significant intimation is given (page 124, par. 11.) by Sir Alexander Burnes that he would not lose sight of the Governor-General's views on the subject of *Bukkur*; but if Hyderabad became the station of a subsidiary force, and Bukkur was demanded by us, *men's eyes will only see that we have seized Sinde, and make no distinction between friend and foe.* It was not military possession of Bukkur which frightened the Ameers so much as our vicinity to their families." The uncourteous, arbitrary conduct of Colonel Pottinger, in all his communications at this time (Nov. 1838), with Noor Mahomed Khan, and his obstinate refusal of concession, and disregard of friendly professions, must have been calculated to rouse the feelings of the chiefs and people. They were goaded in every possible way; no regard being had to former treaties.

At this stage, (page 125) Sir Alexander Burnes gives his sentiments to the Governor-General as follows:—

"Every succeeding event points to the policy of securing ourselves on the Indus, and that too without delay. As it is protection of what we have, and not territorial aggrandizement, that we seek for, my decided conviction is, *that we should take possession of no part of Sinde.* The specious cession of Shikarpore to us, in 1836, by the Ameers, showed how jealously, and justly so, the ruler of the Punjaub viewed our proceedings; and *if we lay claim to any of the Sinde territories, unless as sites for cantonments and protection, we shall tarnish our national honour throughout Asia, and lead to the belief that we have advanced Shah Shoojah to increase our territories.* The only exception to this would be the demand for the port of Kurrachee, which I long since suggested; or, at all events, certain immunities connected with it, so that our landing and trade be not molested. One valid objection to the plan of cession brought forward by the Resident, has struck me, that it will include a considerable portion of the jagheers of a chief whom we wish to conciliate, Meer Sobdar Khan, and for which it would be difficult to give him a return that did not cause civil commotion. It is, I think, further to be maintained, that the Ameers of Sinde, though they have exhibited hostile and rancorous feelings towards us, *have been, as yet, guilty of no act by which we could deprive them of their country.* The intention to injury is not tantamount to injury, and only justifies

precautionary measures in self-defence,—the first law of nature, and the basis of our present policy West of the Indus—that no future injury may befall us—a binding to keep the peace, as it is called in civil life, in a fine and securities, which are precisely what the Governor-General of India has prescribed, a subsidiary force of 5,000 or 6,000 men as a *sine qua non*, to be maintained by those Ameers who have intrigued against us—Noor Mahomed, Nusseer Khan, and Meer Mahomed at Hyderabad, and Meer Moobaruck Khan at Khyrpore; a levy of ten lacs of rupees per annum on these personages, will discharge our additional expenditure in the onerous and important duty of protecting British India from the West.”

It will be observed, from the foregoing observations, that the two reputed able diplomatists, Colonel Pottinger and Sir Alexander Burnes, were again at issue.

It was in vian that Meer Noor Mahomed (page 126.) endeavoured to make peace with Colonel Pottinger, or that he assured him of his friendship and good-will towards the British Government. All advances were met by rude repulses. In fact, it seems evident that it was the Resident's object to keep open the sources of complaint against the Ameers in order to afford the Governor-General a pretext for enforcing and carrying into effect precisely such measures as were deemed necessary for accomplishing the objects connected with the restoration of Shah Shoojah. Hence, when Noor Mahomed, overcome with apprehension, evinced a desire that the Resident should fix the amount to be paid to Shah Shoojah, and made the most liberal proposals even on account of the other Ameers, the Colonel met all his offers with the intimation that he could not interfere, (par. 3) as he, Noor Mahomed was perfectly aware that, could he persuade the Resident to meet his wishes on this one point, it would be virtually an act of indemnity for all his other misdeeds. The Resident stated—

“ I have held, however, but one language, and that is, I am prohibited by his Lordship from interfering further with regard to the money payment to the Shah; that, with respect to all other matters, if the Governor-General is pleased to overlook them, it will be

my duty to do the same ; but that I neither can, nor will, make any promise."

No, the object was still to keep open the sore, and still to have a grievance, so that he might dictate his own terms in all respects. The Ameers were now laid prostrate in the dust (par. 5). A moonshee was sent to Noor Mahomed Khan to inform him that part of the troops had arrived : that if grain was not sold to them, the general officers commanding *would take it by force*, paying its price, and would make a signal example of Gholam Shah and all others who might oppose the people disposing of their property to us. This message led to the usual assurances of regret and devotion, and two confidential officers were hurried off to Vikkur to *see that all our wants were supplied*. The Resident observed—

" Sobdar Khan produced an alleged copy of a written agreement, (par. 7,) which expressly states that all claims for money paid (up to the hour it was written) to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk were cancelled, and that no demands should ever be made on that account. I told the dewan I was aware that Sobdar had held his territory only a short period ; but that I was no longer empowered to discuss that question, and that I thought his master should send a vakeel to meet the Shah and Mr. Macnaghten."

The Resident also sent the moonshees to Noor Mahomed Khan to repeat the impossibility of his interference, that he could not receive a crore of rupees to settle the question (par. 8), *that the money was a very secondary consideration*, and that he might send a vakeel to the Governor-General.

" I added " (says the Colonel,) " that I had heard the purport of his recent messages to the chiefs of Khyrpore through Jan Khan, *as well of his invitation to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes to come to Hyderabad* ; and that I was astonished, after these proofs of his continued *treachery* and want of reliance in or friendship for me, he ventured to ask my advice or opinion on any subject whatever."

With whom then was the principal Ameer to communicate ? A feeling of petty jealousy oozes out here, and thus the interests of the public service are frequently sacrificed to personal sensitiveness on points of no moment.

The Colonel was again alarmed (par. 9) by a shot being fired from the Ameer's tope-khana or arsenal, directly over his tent and the flag-staff, and which fell about 300 yards in front of the camp. Fortunately no mischief ensued, and the Ameers swore they were utterly ignorant of the deed, and that they would seize the perpetrators, cut off their beards, and hand them over to the Resident, to despatch to Calcutta, to be there put to death or confined for life. But the fact could not be established: the commandant of artillery (an Armenian) denied it, and they could not punish any person without proof. The Colonel was fortunate in always having some cause of provocation. He concluded his despatch by observing that (par. 11) prior to proceeding to Vikkur, he was to have an interview with the Ameers,

“ At which, I understand, they mean to produce both the public and secret memoranda, which I handed to them on my arrival, and to challenge me to show in what part of the former they have failed, as well as to prove the allegations made in the latter. *It is almost unnecessary to say that their arguments will have no effect on me.*”

Of course not, it would have been quite derogatory. No, the gallant officer was proof against any explanation, and hence has got great credit as a diplomatic officer for carrying his points. No reason, concession, argument, or submission had any effect. An object was to be gained, no matter how.

The scheme for territorial possession for the purpose of establishing British supremacy in Sinde, (page 129, par. 2,) proposed by Colonel Pottinger, was disapproved by the Gov-General, who was not disposed to entertain any proposition having reference to such territorial possession in Sinde or any adjacent territory. His Lordship observes (13th Dec. 1838),

“ The propriety, and indeed the necessity, of a subsidiary force in the territory of the Ameer's, is for many reasons very evident; but his Lordship is prepared rather to submit to pecuniary sacrifice for the sake of a permanent political advantage in that country, *than to incur the risk of exciting the jealousy and distrust of States hitherto either friendly or neutral, by a course which might be construed by them as indicative of a desire for selfish aggrandizement, rather than of a wish simply to secure the*

*integrity of our present possessions by a course of proper precaution beyond our immediate frontier."*

This was a fair rebuke, and implied that the Resident's zeal rather outran his discretion; and it is evident Lord Auckland had begun to have a more clear perception of the proper line of policy to be adopted.

Adverting to the disposition of the Ameers (par. 4) to make a money payment to Shah Shoojah, it was intimated to the Resident that—

*"The adjustment of this payment is an object of high and immediate importance, if the Ameers should generally consent to it; and for the accomplishment of such object his Lordship might be willing even to sanction some reasonable abatement of the demands of the British Government."*

Now comes a letter, of date 13th Dec., 1838, (page 129, par. 1), from Sir Alexander Burnes, in great alarm, stating that he hastened to lay before the Governor-General his reasons for believing that all friendly relations had ceased, or were about to cease, with the Hyderabad State; but there is really nothing of importance in the despatch, consisting of nine paragraphs; and the gallant but unfortunate knight seems to have been prematurely and unnecessarily alarmed. The most trifling incident appears to have been magnified into some awful portending calamity,—a friendly communication by the Ameers with other persons construed into treachery of the deepest dye, and no confidence placed in the assurances of the poor rulers of Sinde.

There is a long and curious despatch from the Resident in Sinde to the Governor-General, (page 130, par. 4,) which demands especial notice. He complains that Noor Mahomed Khan, in an interview prior to his leaving for Vikkur, began with *his usual effrontery* to accuse the Colonel of unfriendliness, and to ask, what had caused such a change in his feelings towards him. The Ameers renewed their entreaties to fix the amount to be paid to Shah Shoojah, but he declined doing so; the information received that Noor Mahomed Khan had secretly ordered none to serve the British troops was correct. The Resident stated that he could (par. 17,)

“ Indulge no hope of carrying the Governor-General's commands into effect on the principle prescribed. My despatches subsequent to that of the 2nd of November will have shown the *abject state* to which Noor Mahomed Khan has been reduced, by my refusal to treat with him relative to the money payment to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk ; but even when labouring under his worst apprehensions, it will be observed that no such idea has apparently ever crossed his mind, as that our *ultimate plan* was to station even a company of sepoy's in Sinde ; and the moment that intention is announced, I think it will be the signal for a cordial coalition to oppose our arrangements. It will have been further observed, that although Sobdar has stood neutral in all the angry negotiations, and has announced his determination to do so, that declaration has invariably been *accompanied by the proviso that he is not to be disturbed in his possessions*. Neither he, nor any of the Ameer's, has expressed a heartfelt sentiment that bespeaks his or their admission of the *justice and necessity of the cause in which* we have embarked ; and it is obvious to me that *their sole object is to save themselves*, by doing as little as possible to further our views ; nor do I believe that any one of them, or the whole collectively, would willingly give 10,000 rupees at this instant to see the Governor-General's measures perfected to the fullest extent of his Lordship's desires.”

“ Even had I authority (par. 18.) to offer them our guarantee of their territories individually, without their paying one farthing for it, but stipulating that we were at our own expense to keep a force in this province, I think they would reject the proposal ; and, therefore, to expect that they will, without coercion, consent to make the smallest pecuniary sacrifice, or agree to our having a single regiment in their country, seems to me hopeless. They have acted all along *as though we had put their friendship and forbearance to the last test*, by requiring a passage for our troops through their country, and their recent anxiety to get me to fix the sum they were to pay to the Shah, does not, I am satisfied, spring from the sense they entertain of our friendly interposition, but from a dread that his Majesty will, before he advances from Shikarpore, compel them to less reasonable terms than we should prescribe. I am quite convinced that, were they sure the King would quit Sinde without enforcing any demand, they would run

all future risk rather than come down with one rupee, and that *it is the present pressure that alone weighs with them.*"

His Lordship seemed to assume that the Hyderabad Ameers would be inclined to listen to the proposal for their contributing in part towards the expense of a subsidiary force, as well as to its reception. But that was not the case, and if any thing is asked for beyond what has already been demanded, we must lay our account to *exact* it. The Ameers were not inclined to go to war, but it was only their dread of the power and perseverance of the British Government, which had made them succumb so much as they had done, and no demand should be made at that period, which the British Government was not resolved to *exact*.

Sir Alexander Burnes, in a letter to Sir Willoughby Cotton, (page 134) expresses his pleasure to hear that he was on his way to join them. He also stated that—

"The Ameers have ordered all their artillery to Hyderabad, and the park has started; they also called out their troops, but they await further orders. I do not see how Sir John Keane can pass them without '*giving them a licking,*' and I have great grounds for thinking he will have to do so."

Colonel Pottinger addressed an angry letter to Sir A. Burnes, complaining that the disclosure, by the latter officer, of the Governor-General's plan regarding Lower Sinde would be highly ill-advised and premature, for of course the news would be forthwith conveyed to Hyderabad, and if it did not cause the Ameers to break with us at once, it would at least enable them to make preparations for the best resistance in their power.

The Resident in Sinde states (page 137)

"It is my present intention to await the receipt of further instructions from the Governor-General of India, and should they reach me before I am required to act, to do so on the principle laid down in my despatch of the 23rd ultimo, with the view, under all circumstances, of *establishing our supremacy in Sinde*. The Ameers will still have the option of avoiding war by acceding to our demands; and if they refuse, I conceive we must settle this

province to our entire satisfaction before we can move into Afghanistan."

Colonel Pottinger recommended that either the Company's rupee, or one of equal standard, coined in *Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk's name*, should be proclaimed as a legal tender throughout Sinde, and likewise that the Ameers should provide and make over 5000 camels. There was no limit to the proposals for exaction by the Colonel. No doubt, he thought he was performing good service, and gratifying the Governor-General. He was making a complete toy of Sinde, and reducing the Ameers to the most abject state.

It was announced by Sir Alex. Burnes, (page 137) that he had had a task of delicacy, difficulty, and even danger; but *Meer Roostum Khan* had shown in the day of trial, what he professed at all times, that he was the sincere and devoted friend of the British nation (page 138). Sir Alex. reported the successful termination of his negotiations with the Khyrpore State, ending in the cession of Bukkur on his Lordship's (par. 1) *own terms, in Northern Sinde, being henceforward dependent on the British nation.* The Meer was coerced into the cession, for the Moonshee, as instructed by the Envoy, (par. 8) replied to all the Meer's objections, that nothing but the unqualified cession of the fortress of Bukkur, during the late war, *would satisfy me.* He said it was the heart of his country, his honour was centred in keeping it; his family and children could have no confidence if it were given up, and that if the Envoy came to Khyrpore, he could speak in person to him on many things. To this the Moonshee had been instructed to say that it was impossible till he signed the treaty: the Envoy had asked a *plain question, and wanted a plain answer.* The Meer stated, that if Lord Auckland did not seize Kurrachee, or some other place from the Hyderabad family, they, as their enemies, now triumphed, while he, as our dearest friend, was thus depressed. If they were let off, his only resource was to *commit suicide.* *With this, and saying "Bismilla!" (in the name of God), he sealed the treaty.* Congratulations are offered "*on this happy termination of affairs in Northern Sinde.*"

The first article of the treaty states that there shall be perpetual friendship, (page 139) alliance, and unity of interests between the Company and Meer Roostum Khan, as usual in former treaties, and just so long as our politicals chose to forbear asking something else. We profess friendship, while plundering them of their dearest possessions.

The feelings under which the unfortunate Roostum Khan ceded Bukkur, (page 142) are apparent from the observations of Sir A. Burnes, in a subsequent despatch. The Meer said :—

“That, in giving up Bukkur to the British, he had had to encounter disgrace; that his tribe and his family were alike opposed to it; but that he was an old man, with but a few years to live, and it was to *save his children and his tribe from ruin*, that he had years ago resolved on allying himself to us; *that other invaders of India might be resisted*, but if one of our armies was *swept away*, we could send another, and that such power induced him alike to fear and rely upon us; that he was henceforward the submissive and obedient servant of the British, and hoped I would avert all injury befalling him, and tell him, without hesitation, what he could do to please us. The answer to such a declaration was plain—to give us orders for supplies, *and place all the country, as far as he could, at our command*; and he has done so, as far as he can.”

What call you this but exaction? This wonderful stroke of policy would afford the witty writer of *Punch* an excellent hint for a sketch of a new way of converting an enemy into a friend, or requesting a favour by putting a pistol to his face, and demanding his purse. So much for Sir Alexander's persuasive eloquence.

There was no hesitation or reluctance on the part of the Governor-General (page 145) availing himself of the fears of the Ameers, which induced them to express a wish to have the contribution fixed which they were to pay to Shah Shoojah, unjust as that demand was, considering that there had been such ample evidence afforded of releases having been granted, and all claims on account of tribute long previously abandoned, and no inquiry or investigation of the proofs offered by the Ameers having ever been made. His Lordship, in a

letter to the Resident in Sinde, of date 31st Dec. 1838, states—

“ It is very evident the Ameers are sensible of the advantages which might accrue to them by satisfying the demands of Shah Shoojah, and they *may hope by doing so at once to conciliate* the British Government, to obtain pardon for their offences, and to secure themselves from all future claim to tribute on the part of his Majesty; and the Governor-General would desire to have this question speedily settled, *especially with reference to the approaching advance of the British troops into Affghanistan.*”

Considering that the principal Ameers of Sinde had, “ *by their treacherous and hostile conduct, exposed themselves to any act of retribution which the British Government may determine,*” and other circumstances connected with the advance of the troops into Affghanistan, which would induce the Governor-General to abate much from his other claims, however just, and however strong to enforce them; the Resident was authorized to apprise the Ameers that the Governor-General would recommend to Shah Shoojah, his acceptance of their offer in full of all demands, provided a sum on this account was paid into the treasury, within a certain number of days, to be fixed from the date of their offer, and such sum should amount to thirty lacs; *but on no account can be reduced so that the clear payment shall be less than 20 lacs.* Bravo! my Lord, what call you this? This is working on their fears with a vengeance, after all you had heard of releases, and the emphatic and not-to-be-mistaken opinion of Colonel Pottinger. What must neighbouring States think of such proceedings? Was it not provided that Runjeet Sing was to come in for a share of the spoil? But still much more was required from the Ameers.

“ Beyond the payment of this sum, you will consider facilities heartily and actively given to the British force on its advance, as the first means by which the principal Ameers may redeem any portion of the favour which they have forfeited. But they will understand at the same time, that such has been the character of their measures, as to render it absolutely necessary that military posts be occupied in their country for the safe maintenance of com-

munication between the army and the sea, and for the easy return of the British force, when all operations shall be concluded, to the Presidency of Bombay; and that by their proceedings during the present expedition, will the ultimate conduct of the British Government be regulated. They may be told that the *flagrant offensiveness* of their conduct has excited the resentment of the Governor-General. His Lordship has already stated to you his unwillingness to entertain any proposition for territorial acquisition; but, for further measures, you will look, according to your previous instructions, *to the relief of the navigation of the Indus from all toll, the maintenance of a British force and the separate independence of each chief, as amongst those the consideration and accomplishment of which are most to be desired.*"

What is this but rendering the money and resources of the country completely at our command, as if it had been one of our own provinces, in order to promote an object of policy with which the Ameers had nothing to do? It is, notwithstanding all this, coolly added:—

"It must be admitted that the terms which his Lordship is at present *willing to impose* for the facile attainment of the main object of our operations are quite inadequate to our just demands, and that our ally Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, may be especially dissatisfied with the *low amount* of commutation fixed, as regards his claims of sovereignty."

After giving his discharge on the Koran, and *eating British salt 25 years.*

If the letter attributed to Sir H. Pottinger, lately published, (page 147,) is really the production of that distinguished officer, the following passage in his letter to the Secretary to the Bombay Government may fairly be placed in juxtaposition, and will be the best defence of Lord Ellenborough and General Napier's policy, yet produced. He says (par. 4):—

"So far as it is possible to form an opinion on the information I now possess, *my idea is, that we must settle Sindh to our satisfaction, even should the Ameers force us to subjugate it, before we look beyond it.*"

Is the gallant officer disappointed that he had not the merit of doing what General Napier has since done, and missed his share of the prize-money, after all his exertions to keep up

bad blood with the Ameers? I am inclined to think that the present Governor-General may have, in no small degree, been guided by the recorded policy of Sir H. Pottinger, as to the effects of intimidation upon the Ameers; and in pursuing it, he is attacked by the very party who should have been the last man in the world to have made such observations, if, indeed, it shall be found he is the writer of the letter ascribed to him.

Lord Auckland gives the Resident in Sindé (page 148) a sort of *carte blanche* to act as he and Sir John Keane may deem best, with reference to the character of the affairs in Sindé being of a "*shifty nature.*" His Lordship still harps upon the indignities which the Ameers had offered, (for which, whether guilty or not, they had done all in their power to atone,) and significantly concludes that the Resident might possibly find, though his Lordship earnestly hoped that might not be the case, "*an unsurmountable difficulty in pursuing measures of moderation.*" The meaning of this is quite obvious, and requires no comment.

In a letter to Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, (p. 149,) the Governor-General observes:—

"The judicious mediation of *your friend* Sir A. Burnes, the highly esteemed and able agent of my government, now with you, has, by the *blessing of God*, brought about the establishing of our mutual good understanding by treaty, on a fair and lasting basis. The support afforded to you by the British Government will, I am well assured, prove a source of future strength, and, if it be God's will, *of continued prosperity to your country.*"

Let the poor old exiled Ameer now declare what he thinks of it. I marvel that Lord Auckland was not afraid to use the name of the Almighty on such an occasion, for it is clear he never had the slightest regard to the interests of the Ameer. It was, therefore, using the name of God in vain,—that just and Omnipotent Being, who cannot be supposed to regard such outrages and schemes of ambition with favour, and whose awful and signal judgments afterwards were calculated to make so deep an impression on more flinty hearts than that of the Governor-General. Oh! what a dreadful pouring

out of blood like water ! what horrors, what suffering, what distress, lamentation, and woe, have been produced by these ill-advised measures ! May they be a lesson for the future, and may the discussion at the India House and in Parliament have a salutary effect, and prove a beacon for the time to come against such unjust, such insane projects !

The mention by Meer Roostum Khan of a previous written agreement, in every instance, as to the *temporary character* of the occasional occupation of Sinde by the English, was, in his Lordship's view, calculated to convey the unpleasant idea that the compact was concluded in a spirit on the one side or the other, of jealousy or distrust, and therefore—

“ I have struck it out ; and in place of inserting a sentence which casts a doubt on the sincerity of our intentions, I address you this friendly letter, as a *lasting assurance* of the plain meaning and purpose of the words of the separate article, namely, that *the British shall avail themselves of the fort of Bukkur, the citadel of their ally, the Meer of Khyrpore, only during actual war, and periods of preparing for war, like the present.* I trust that this mode of re-assuring your Highness will have the double effect of setting your mind at ease, and of putting you *in possession of a written testimony of my intentions, such as may remain among your records in pledge of the sincerity of the British Government.*”

Have not subsequent events realized the worst apprehensions of the Ameer?—and where is now our honesty and good faith ? Let the blown-up ramparts of Emam Ghur testify. Let the Ameers now in exile declare what they think of *these pledges!* Shame ! shame upon us !

A very important paper comes next in order, (page 151,) being a letter of instructions from Col. Pottinger to his assistant, Lieut. Eastwick, (dated 13th Jan., 1839,) on proceeding to Hyderabad, with letters and a treaty, which they were required to execute. So successful had been the arbitrary dictation pursued by the Resident, that amongst other communications, he directs his assistant to

“ Tell the Ameers that Sinde (par. 8) forms a *natural and integral portion of Hindoostan, that the supremacy of that empire*

*has devolved on us, and that we cannot and will not allow any other power to intermeddle; that it thence follows, that they have now no option left to them of binding their interests irrevocably with ours, and that, if they neglect the opportunity, they may deeply repent it when it is too late."*

"Their jealous and suspicious feelings (par. 9) will probably induce their Highnesses to ask, supposing they agree to our present terms, what security they have for our not going further hereafter? The reply to this query, or anything of the same tenour, is so obvious, that I need hardly direct your attention to it. *It is the strong instance of our good faith, and wish to preserve our amicable relations, as exemplified in the treaty you convey to them. They cannot doubt our power to do as we like, and some of them, at least, must feel that their acts deserve severe retributory measures; instead of which we tender them our renewed friendship and protection on such moderate terms, and accompanied by so many advantages, that their refusal of the former will show to the world their resolution not to meet us half-way, and to oblige us to take by force what we ask as friends and protectors."*

This may be fine writing, and Anglo-Indian diplomacy; but it is a very false and immoral argument. It was presumed the 19th article would "*flatter and please* the Ameers; but it is one which I consider *a dead letter*, as the presence of troops in Sinde would be a bar and impediment to any military operations." What paltry trickery, shamelessly avowed!

Many are the arguments suggested to be used by Lieut. Eastwick in reply to the numerous objections which the Resident expected the Ameers would very naturally urge against the terms of the treaty, (page 155,) which consisted of 23 articles. Colonel Pottinger, in his letter (page 136) to Noor Mahomed Khan, expressly declared:—

"Your Highness will likewise observe, that the arrangements which have been made will interfere in no degree with the *Shikargahs*, &c. of your Highness and the other Ameers, and that your possessions are placed for ever under the *guarantee* of the British Government."

The chief of Khyrpore (page 158) consented for ever to

renounce all right of toll on the river Indus throughout his territories, 16th January, 1839.

It was represented by Lieut. Eastwick, (page 159,) that "affairs at this capital (Hyderabad) have assumed decidedly a hostile aspect, and that there is little chance of the present negotiation being brought to a favourable conclusion."

The Commander-in-chief (Sir H. Fane) urged a strong demonstration (page 160) to be made towards Hyderabad, 24th January, 1839.

Sir John Keane reported to the Commander-in-chief, (page 161,) that things were come to a crisis in Lower Sinde, the gentlemen of the Residency having been obliged to leave Hyderabad. The Ameers expressed great dissatisfaction at many articles of the treaty, particularly the subsidiary force, and Noor Mahomed Khan said, "Is this to be the reward for allowing your troops a passage through our country?" The whole country, in front and rear, was armed, and under arms to exterminate the British force, if it could.

Lieutenant Eastwick gives a very interesting and perspicuous detail of his proceedings, in a long report, (page 163,) a few passages of which only may be noticed. That intelligent and accomplished officer submits very candidly (par. 12) the strong arguments of the Ameers, who, producing a box, from which was taken all the treaties that had been entered into between the British Government and Hyderabad, inquired,

" 'What is to become of all these?' I referred him to the first article of the present treaty. 'Yes,' he said, 'here is another annoyance. Since the day that Sinde has been connected with the English, there has always *been something new*; your Government is *never satisfied*: we are anxious for your friendship, but we cannot be continually persecuted. We have given a road to your troops, and now you wish to remain. This the Beloochees will never suffer. But still we might even arrange this matter, were we certain that we should not be harassed with other demands. There is the payment to the King, why can we obtain no answer on this point? Four months have now elapsed since this question was first discussed. Is this a proof of friendship? We have failed in nothing; we have furnished camels, boats, grain; we have dis-

*tressed ourselves to supply your wants.* We will send our ambassador to the Governor-General to represent these things; you must state them to Colonel Pottinger.’”

In reply to the forcible arguments of Lieutenant Eastwick, (who seems to have performed his duty admirably,) relative to the advantages likely to accrue to the country by the conclusion of the treaty, Noor Mahomed Khan said,

“ All this may be true, but I do not understand how it concerns us; what benefit do we derive from these changes? On the contrary, we shall suffer injury; our hunting preserves will be destroyed, our enjoyments curtailed. You tell us that money will find its way into our treasury; it does not appear so; our contractors write to us that they are bankrupt, they have no means of fulfilling their contracts; boats, camels, all are absorbed by the English troops; trade is at a stand; *a pestilence has fallen on the land.* You have talked of the people; what are the people to us, poor or rich? what do we care, if they pay us our revenue? You tell me the country will flourish; *it is quite good enough for us, and not so likely to tempt the cupidity of its neighbours. Hindoostan was rich, and that is the reason it is under your subjection. No, give us our hunting preserves, and our own enjoyments free from interference, and that is all we require.*”

The gallant Envoy having stated the grounds for exempting Meer Sobdar from contributing his share towards the payment of the subsidiary force, and pleaded his poverty, Noor Mahomed Khan said:

“ ‘ Do not talk of friendship; I alone have been the friend of the English in the whole of Sindh.’ I had also pleaded Sobdar’s poverty, having so lately succeeded in his hereditary rights. Upon which Meer Mahomed remarked, ‘ All the world is aware that I have no money’ (par. 24). Meer Nusseer Khan said in Sindh, in a low voice, ‘ We are slain.’ This I heard afterwards from the native agent, who was sitting close to Meer Nusseer.”

As nothing satisfactory could be gained by further discussion, and there was reason to apprehend an attack upon the Envoy and his party, (par. 35,) Lieutenant Eastwick prudently decided on quitting Hyderabad.

An application was now made by Colonel Pottinger to the naval commander-in-chief to take possession of Kurrachee,

where all opposition must be put down, and the Resident stated that; (par. 3)

“Whether the Ameers are unwilling, or unable, from the *violence of their soldiery*, to treat with me, it matters little; and should the latter be the fact, it is not to be forgotten that those chiefs have placed themselves in this predicament by calling out their army; and referring to more recent instructions which I have received from the Governor-General of India, I should not now consider myself at liberty to ratify the treaty I have offered the Ameers, without an additional stipulation, *that such further penalties shall be inflicted as the Governor-General may think fit to direct.*”

The Resident in Sind, in a private letter to Mr. Colvin, private secretary to the Governor-General, (page 172), dated 4th Feb., 1839, states he considered

“That our *supremacy in Sind is now finally and fully established*; and I have sent word to the Ameers, and tell them personally, as well as give it them in writing, that the only chance of their bad conduct being overlooked is *total and humble obedience to his Lordship's orders*. Whilst I was writing the preceding sentence, I have received news which *greatly pleases me*. The fort of Kurrachee fired *one or two guns\** at the ‘Wellesley,’ when the reserve went there. The admiral brought his broadside to bear on it, and it is stated he has levelled it with the dust. I have sent to the Ameers to say that if ‘*they shake their lip,*’ Sir John Keane shall do so by Hyderabad, and I will insist on the removal of every person in authority from Kurrachee who is now there, before I bring away the reserve. This news has come by Nao Mull’s people mounted on express camels, *but I hope there is no doubt of it*. It will teach these *savages* to pay due respect to the British flag in time to come.”

Colonel Pottinger concludes by observing, that a “second deputation has been with me, even more humble than the first, and *I equally plain spoken.*” Rather high-flown, but such is the fashion now-a-days of some politicals, when backed by a powerful force. There was a total absence of generosity in this treatment of a *reduced foe*,—no, rather *persecuted friends*;

\* Only *one*, as afterwards proved, and that without shot, merely as a salute.

but it will be hereafter seen that Colonel Pottinger had cause to regret the harsh and unjust proceedings at Kurrachee.

The fate of *Kurrachee* not being then known, (6th February 1839, page 176), and the season for active operations in Affghanistan rapidly coming on, Mr. Macnaghten, the Envoy with Shah Shoojah, submitted to the Resident his opinion,

“ If the *door of reconciliation be still open*, and you find any difficulty in getting on, that we should be content with requiring from the Ameers an agreement to the following effect :—

“ 1st. The payment of thirty lacs of rupees to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk within six months, by instalments of five lacs of rupees per mensem.

“ 2nd. The free navigation of the Indus.

“ 3rd. The admission of our Resident, as already agreed upon in a former treaty.

“ 4th. Permission and facilities for our troops to pass through the country, and to occupy such stations as we may think proper on the frontier, pending military operations beyond the Indus. I am utterly ignorant of the present state of your negotiations; nor have I ever heard what demands you have made. There may be serious objections to receding from demands once made; but time is every thing to us, and under certain contingencies we may have only a choice of evils. You may have made a reference to the Governor-General, and it is easy to say I have come from his Lordship with powers to grant *milder terms than you have imposed; and I certainly think that those which I would impose are sufficiently humiliating.*”\*

The difficulties and embarrassments of the Governor-General (page 178) in respect to the advance of the force into Affghanistan were considerably increased by the turn of affairs in Sindh, and his Lordship intimated to Sir John Keane that

“ Intelligence from Hyderabad, under date 23rd ultimo (Jan.), has just reached me, as to the apparent show of decided hostility on the part of the Ameers, including Meer Sobdar Khan, and I am induced to conclude that circumstances may have, ere this, *established the British power as paramount in Sindh.*”

Sir John Keane was aware of his Lordship's objection to any

\* No doubt of it, but Colonel Pottinger was not so easily satisfied. His demands increased with the disposition of the Ameers to concession.

acquisition of territory in Sinde, and it was important that British troops should advance upon Candahar, without the impression attending their progress, that they were employed to reduce Affghanistan into the condition of a province of our Indian empire; but no specific declaration of our intention as regarded our future connection with Sinde was then called for. Meantime, military occupation should be held of the country of the Ameers, pending the final settlement of our relations with Sinde, the revenue being collected and the government administered, *ad interim*, by the native officers, under the superintendence of the Resident. His Lordship said,

“It will not be difficult (par. 5) to quiet the anxieties of the chiefs above named” (the Khan of Kelat, and the chiefs of other petty States and tribes intermediate between Sinde and the Candahar territory), “or others similarly situated, by citing to them our conduct when free to exercise our principles of *conciliation*; and no better instance can be given than in the policy pursued towards the Nawab of Bhuwalpore and the Meer of Khyrpore.”

A communication was made by the Resident in Sinde (10th February, 1839, page 179), to the Envoy with Shah Shoojah, that ten lacs of rupees had been received from the Meers (on account of his Majesty) who had sent a most submissive message, and were now our “*humblest slaves* ;” and they begged that the town of Larkhana, now in possession of our troops, might be given up, to which the Resident was not aware of any political objection.

It may here be noticed, that several despatches of Colonel Pottinger, particularly referred to in his despatch (page 181), to the secretary to the Governor-General, do not appear in the present series: 1st, a letter of 11th January on the subject of the reserve being landed at Vikkur, instead of Kurrachee; and also one dated 19th and 31st Jan., and lastly of 1st Feb., reporting acceptance of treaty, and other terms. The report of the 13th Feb. 1839, is one of the most important in the volume, being an account of the Resident’s proceedings in *enforcing* the treaty which he proposed (par. 8). The letter is altogether in a very vaunting style. A deputation which waited on him expressed their surprise at its tenor (par. 9), and made several

applications to be ordered back to Hyderabad, as they declared the Ameers neither would nor could come to any decision till they returned. They went off clandestinely, and it was understood, urged the Ameers to resist our demands.

An unpleasant affair, connected with the death of a Beloochee, who had been smuggling spirits into the camp, now occurred. The man had taken to his heels, sword in hand, and in the graphic language of the Colonel, “a Sepoy of the 19th regiment infantry, standing sentry over one of the commander-in-chief’s store tents, seeing the Beloochee approaching him, loaded his musket with *praiseworthy alacrity, and shot the Beloochee dead on the spot.*” . . . “The Nawab and his colleagues *talked very big* about the death of one of the Beloochees, hinted he might have been taken alive,” &c. ; and the issue was that the Colonel’s “*plain speaking silenced them,*” and when the news got to Hyderabad, the Ameers gave out that the man who had been killed “*was a dog, and richly merited his fate.*” Of course, they were glad to say or do anything, in order to have peace, and avert a worse calamity.

The Colonel still maintained the coercing or knock-me-down system. He says : (par. 14.)

“I intimated to the Ameers on the 30th, through their deputation, the *only terms* I would accept. I warned them distinctly that if a gun, and even a matchlock were fired, they *should lose their country.* I made a marked distinction between Meer Sobdar Khan and the other Ameers.”

He adds—

“On the 1st February, I reported to you the acceptance of the treaty and my other terms by the Ameers. On the 4th of this month the army arrived opposite Hyderabad. That afternoon I received intelligence from Kurrachee, that his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief in Her Majesty’s ship ‘Wellesley,’ had battered down the south face of the fort at the mouth of the harbour of Kurrachee, in consequence of the authorities there refusing to let the reserve force land. *This intelligence afforded me the highest degree of gratification,* and I expressed what I felt on the occasion in my letter of that evening to his Lordship’s private secretary, of which I now enclose a copy.”

The *money* was at last forthcoming, the poor Ameers having great difficulty to make up the amount. The Resident goes on—

“The Ameers began to pay the money for Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, on the 7th inst., and the first instalment of ten lacs was completed by the evening of the 9th. Their Highnesses wanted me to accept a *quantity of silver plate, dishes, &c. &c., in part, which I preremptorily refused.* I have stipulated that the gold and silver shall be received at the bazaar price of the day, and that any difference for or against the Ameers shall be adjusted in the last instalment. This ten lacs I have sent, under charge of Captain Scott, to Mr. Macnaghten. I found it impossible to get it packed and secured as I could have wished, for neither boxes, nor even a few nails, could be had at this place, and I did not wish to retract my intimation ‘*that the army should not pass Hyderabad till it was in my hands.*’”

Colonel Pottinger having now succeeded beyond his own most sanguine expectations, in gaining all he chose to dictate, assumes a very high tone towards the unfortunate Ameers, fully as harsh indeed as any thing alleged against the present Governor-General. He says—

“During each of the days that the force was here, that is, from the 4th to the 10th instant, I was *tormented*, amidst my more *important concerns*, by almost hourly deputations and messages from the Ameers. It would be idle to trouble his Lordship with the *nonsense* they talked; *to all of which I held but one tone, and that was the future total and unqualified submission* of the Hyderabad rulers to the pleasure of the Governor-General, as the only chance that remained of their forgiveness.” . . . . . “The Ameers have not even sent me a message about it (Kurrachee) for they know full well they have only our *mercy and liberality to trust to.*” . . . . . “I trust that what I have done will be honoured by the Governor-General’s sanction; I have endeavoured to do what I believe coincided with his Lordship’s wishes. *Every man in Sinde has seen that we had the country at our feet*; that our armies were ready *simultaneously to overwhelm all opposition*; and (as I told the Ameers) to come from all quarters, ‘*like the inundations of the Indus.*’ I hope and think what has been here effected and seen, will have a great moral effect on his Lordship’s designs

and measures to the North-West ; that it will also awe those who may be inimical to us in India cannot be doubted. It has been and will be, my study to inculcate this impression, *and the world will now acknowledge that if our power is great, our good faith and forbearance are still more to be wondered at.*"

Gracious Powers above ! can the gallant officer be *serious*? But he continues :

" I beg distinctly to record that I anticipate no such event (par. 23) ; but if we are ever again obliged to exert our military strength in Sinde, it must be carried to subjugating this country."

Can Lord Ellenborough or Sir C. Napier be so much blamed after this? It may not unreasonably be inferred that the success of Colonel Pottinger's policy may have induced the present Governor-General and the officer in command to pursue the same course of coercion and intimidation, in the full expectation that the Ameers would give way to our last demands ; and after such observations as occurred in the despatch now quoted, it is impossible to conceive that Sir Henry Pottinger could have written the letter lately ascribed to him ; for nothing that I have ever read was more severe than the Colonel's whole course of proceeding towards the Ameers of Sinde. Lord Auckland and the gallant Sir Henry Pottinger have the especial merit of all that has followed, for it was their measures which have embarrassed the present Governor-General, who might, nevertheless, certainly have extricated himself and the Government from the dilemma and difficulty in which the acts of his predecessor had placed him, with much more tact and judgment than he has done.

The Governor-General, in adverting to the bombardment of the port of Kurrachee, by H. M.S. Wellesley, (page 190,) and the *conquest achieved* by British forces, in consequence of the opposition of the officers of the Sinde Government, under whose directions the first hostile *shot*, (may it please your Lordship, the only *gun*, for there was no *shot*,) was fired against the British armament, our position as the *conquerors* of the town and fort, (what a brilliant victory for a seventy-four !) would not in any way be affected by the tardy compliance of the Ameers with the terms of the treaty ; and

it was therefore proposed to keep Kurrachee as a British port. What was the use of the Wellesley firing away so long, when there was actually no resistance at all, unless for the sake of practice, and to *astonish the natives*?

Lieutenant Eastwick was justly commended (p. 193) by the Governor-General for his firmness and ability in his negotiations with the Ameers, although he was unavoidably forced to leave.

The Resident in Sinde continues (page 194) to open the eyes of the Ameers by communicating some very plain truths, (par. 5.)

“I begged them all to look back, particularly to the important events of the last six months, and reflect if they had the slightest cause to question *our fair dealing and desire* to keep on good terms with them. I said that they had themselves literally imposed on us the necessity of dictating the arrangements provided for by the late treaty, and that they must *henceforward consider Sinde* to be (as it was in reality) a portion of Hindoostan, in which our position made us *paramount*, and entitled us to act as we considered best and fittest for the general good of the whole empire.”

What a change has now come o'er the spirit of our dream! What now becomes of the early treaties, and the stipulations upon the subject of not breaking the Tenth Commandment by coveting their possessions?

The finale of the Resident's long despatch is rather amusing after all that had taken place: (par. 14)

“To conclude, I can only repeat my belief that the Ameers will not swerve from their recent engagements; that they understand us better than *they ever did before*; that they see the utter hopelessness of coping with us; *that they are astonished at our forbearance*; that the good wishes of the great mass of the people are already on our side; that every day will extend this disposition amongst the chiefs and higher classes; that we must study the prejudices and soothe the feelings of those who may be said to still stand aloof, and not expect them at once to adopt more enlightened motives; that our language should be invariably *candid and decided, but friendly*; and that as our policy is not *to quarrel with Sinde*, we should not *hastily take offence*, but bear with the *views and faults* of its *semi-barbarous rulers* and popu-

lation, on whom our *example and intercourse* must in a few years work a most salutary effect ; and who, it is to be recollected, have for generations looked on us as a nation *of foreigners, grasping at conquest, with one guide to our actions, that of might being right.*"

And the Colonel's proceedings in Sinde were assuredly eminently calculated to confirm this impression of our national character throughout India in its whole length and breadth. Yet a few days after this most edifying episode, he writes that although the fort at the mouth of the Kurrachee (page 196) harbour might be applied to any purpose for which it may be fitted, he thought that all our military supplies should not, in course of time, come into Sinde by the mouth of the Indus, but should be conveyed in suitable vessels direct from Bombay to Vikkur. He observes—

"It is superfluous, perhaps, for me to say, that I am not alluding to the *present moment, but to times to come*. It is here, however, possibly as well that I should look forward a little, in order to call the attention to the views I entertain. It seems to me that it would be *better at once to take possession of Sinde* (or such parts of it as we require) *by force*, than to leave it nominally with the Ameers, and yet deal with it as though it were our own. The one line is *explicit and dignified, and cannot be misunderstood* ; the other I conceive to be *unbecoming our power*, and it must lead to constant heart-burnings and bickerings, if not to a rupture of all friendly relations. There is no nation with whom we have been brought into contact in Asia, towards whom I deem it so highly necessary to be undeviatingly *firm* as the Sindees. This has long been my recorded opinion, and every hour convinces me of its being well grounded. I would, in fact, at any instant, rather forego an immediate object, than lead them, by any circumstance, to think that all our proceedings were not a portion of *one great system of policy*, from which they alone forced us to deviate. The good effect of such a principle on a government and people, who may be said to be destitute of veracity or good faith, as well as of foresight, needs not to be enlarged upon."

Surely, this a defence of the present Governor-General's

system commenced; so eloquently and forcibly advocated and enforced by the prime agent of his predecessor.

The Governor-General complimented Col. Pottinger (p. 197) on his patient perseverance in effecting the object of his mission.

“ In spite of the wayward and perfidious spirit which influences all the conduct of the Ameers, from the first communication to them of the designs of the British Government, till the hour when they were *prevailed* upon to accept the terms proffered by you, you succeeded in avoiding *a resort to compulsion*, and in obtaining an acquiescence in the just demands of their Government *by pacific negotiation*.” . . . . “ You, therefore, *wisely and considerately refrained* from resenting, in the manner it deserved, the hostile demonstration of the Ameers; and with a degree of *temper and forbearance*, which cannot too highly be praised, allowed them still further time for reflection; for which moderation on your part, their ultimate acceptance of your terms must have afforded you the most gratifying reflections.” . . . . “ You had not allowed the treacherous conduct on the part of the Ameers, in their detected intrigues with the enemies of the British Government, while they were professing to you their devotion to our interests; nor their insults to yourself, nor their treatment of your assistant, to deter you from persevering in a course of *conciliation* towards them; and the Governor-General, though he considers that by the conduct of their officers at Kurra-  
chee, acting according to orders which they declared to have come from the Ameers at Hyderabad, the Ameers have forfeited all claim to the *forbearance and generosity* of the British Government, is prepared to confirm the general tenour of the treaty concluded by you.” . . . . “ The position, however, in which the Ameers are placed by the occurrences at Kurrachee, is not one from which they could claim or expect to obtain the restoration of that place to their authority (par. 10); and his Lordship considers that, while the occupation of the place is of much importance to the British interests in Sind, its retention as a conquest will be a fitting punishment of the perfidious and hostile conduct of the Ameers (par. 11).” . . . . “ The possession of the harbour and the fort of Kurrachee by the British Government, precludes the necessity for negotiating with the Ameers of Sind the terms on which we are to enter that port.”

This was plain and decisive. We wanted an excuse to

take it, and we soon found one, and as we could not well do without it, we have another pretext for retaining it, after the Ameers had made all the other concessions required of them. The Governor-General was determined not to let slip the opportunity of keeping all he desired, and therefore most unceremoniously expunged from Colonel Pottinger's treaty, the 13th, 14th, and 15th articles, having reference to Kurrachee. And in returning it, the Resident was informed (par. 14)—

“ This being the case, it was out of his Lordship's power to ratify the treaty as drawn out by you, and the impossibility of his doing so has afforded an opportunity of introducing several minor alterations in the revised treaty prepared under his Lordship's directions, which have assimilated this engagement, in a manner that appeared very expedient, with the engagements already existing between the British Government and princes of Hindoostan, *of station and rank similar to that of the Ameers.*” \*

How could the Governor-General, with any conscience write as follows? (par. 22)—

“ The provisions of the present engagement are so complete; they confer, for the first time, *such signal advantages on the Ameers*, and so entire a change is effected by them in the political relations of these chieftains, both with the British Government and all other States, *that no allusion to former treaties seems necessary in this place*; notice will be taken of them in the conclusion. This treaty should be regarded by the Ameers as a *great charter, obtained from the good will of the paramount power in India, for the future security of their independence and of their possessions*, which they will henceforth hold on condition of their fidelity and adherence to their present engagements, by virtue of a deed granted to them by the head of the British Government in India.”

Let us see a parallel case to this in our transactions in India! but the consideration of his Lordship was wonderful and beyond all precedent. In reference to the strength of the British force to be kept up in Sinde, which was specified by the Resident, his Lordship had directed that the first words of the article should be omitted, (par. 27) as they might possibly be considered by the Ameers more *offensive* than

\* You send an agent with full powers, and you strike out and add to the treaty made by him, just what you please.

leaving the number of our troops discretionary with the Governor-General, and their omission in no degree takes away from the strength of the article."

We find another flourish of trumpets, in reference to the 12th article of the Resident's treaty, (par. 43) whereby the British Government was bound not to form any treaty, or enter into any engagement, that could possibly affect the interests of Sindé, without the concurrence of their Highnesses the Ameers. It is remarked,

"The Governor-General (par. 44.) is not aware that, since the British Government became the *paramount authority in India*, an obligation so restrictive of its *supreme power* has ever been proposed for its acceptance. In our treaties with the most powerful princes of India, although we have required from them engagements not to enter into treaties, or hold political correspondence, with other States, without our knowledge or consent, it has not been usual for those princes to demand, or for the British Government to concede, any reciprocal engagements with respect to our correspondence. Such a stipulation appears inconsistent with our position, as *exercising sovereign power over all India*, and it would be particularly unsuitable in a treaty which is intended to establish the *supremacy* of one party, and the position, as *subordinate allies*, of the other party."

The same master-mind which dictated the foregoing sentiments, strove to extend our supremacy to Affghanistan also, for whatever may now be said to the contrary, that was the object. Have we sovereign power there now? We tried it, and ingloriously failed in the attempt. Are we supreme in Burmah, Nepaul, &c., with which States we have had serious differences? We do not consult the wishes of the other party.

The Governor-General makes no ceremony of rejecting what was settled by his agent, and forcing new terms and stipulations upon the Ameers just as it suited his fancy and ever-changing views. After many objections it is intimated,—

"The Governor-General (par. 62.) trusts that the rejection of the treaties *sealed by the Ameers*, and which are herewith returned for the reasons which you will explain to them, and the substitu-

tion of others in their place, are not likely, *under the circumstances of their situation*, to produce any demur on their part to closing with the terms now finally sanctioned by the Governor-General."

It was determined, upon the true Machevelian principle, to divide and govern, that four treaties,—all word for word the same, should be *granted* to each of the Ameers, and the Governor-General observes,—

" This course, it is presumed, (par. 63.) will *prove satisfactory to the Ameers* ; and his Lordship has the rather been induced to adopt it from a consideration that the *submission, if not the sincerity*, of the Ameers, since their concluding the treaties, has been evinced in their payment of ten lacs of rupees, and from his Lordship's desire that the arduous task of this negotiation should be concluded by you, to whom the Government is indebted for the success with which it has been brought so near a conclusion, and his Lordship fears that the state of your health will induce you, at no very distant period, to resign your charge of the Residency of Sinde. His Lordship regards it of importance, however, that you should be empowered, without loss of time, to conclude this negotiation by the exchange of the treaties, and trusts that these instructions will have reached Hyderabad before you have quitted that place. It has been an object with the Governor-General, throughout this negotiation,\* not to deal with the Ameers of Sinde as a *confederate body* ; and their late conduct has strengthened every argument in favour of treating with them *singly*, and allowing their respective interests to become separate, as in the natural course of events, must inevitably be the case. Our former attempts to increase our influence with them as an united government, with Noor Mahomed Khan at its head, have completely failed, and we shall henceforth, under the operation of our present treaties, *find more strength in their differences*, or at least from a want of unity among them, than could be expected from an adherence to our former course of policy."

\* Lord Auckland seems to have entirely forgotten that his object, at one time, was to deal with one chief, and pressed the Resident to negotiate with Meer Sobdar, who was, if found pliant, to be elevated to supreme authority in the country ; and General Napier has reverted to the formerly-established practice of dealing with one principal Ameer, and has upset the system adopted by Lord Auckland, as fixed above.

The Governor-General, in a letter to the four Ameers, (page 209) winds up—

“ This engagement being finally concluded, and the future relations between your Highness and the British Government being placed on a firm and lasting foundation, the past will be buried in oblivion, and it will only remain with your Highness, by a steady and faithful adherence to your present engagements, to secure for yourself and your posterity the permanence of your possessions, and the valuable friendship of the *ruling power in India*.” \*

In a despatch to the secret committee, (page 210) dated 13th March, 1839, the Governor-General dwells on the great advantages obtained in *Sinde*. A slight notice will suffice to show the spirit and feelings of his Lordship on the question. After alluding to the letter to the King of Persia, to which so much unnecessary importance seems to have been attached, his Lordship refers to the other causes of offence against the Ameers, especially the insult offered to Colonel Pottinger before adverted to, when his person was exposed to danger by the throwing of stones and ‘ other missiles by the populace of Hyderabad, his Lordship states that “ he determined, as the only course which seemed open to him,” so as to avoid the slightest appearance of harshness or bad faith,” and at the same time to acquire the security which had become indispensable, and for other reasons, to express his willingness to maintain the authority of the existing principal Ameers, “ who had conceded the unopposed admission of our troops into their territories on the condition of such a British force being established, and, as far as possible, *subsidized in Sinde*, as might suffice to fix beyond a doubt *our military and political ascendancy* on that important frontier.”

\* \* \* \* “ Upon this occasion, Colonel Pottinger (par. 13) throws out an idea† which at once appeared to have much to recommend it, of breaking up the confederacy of the Hyderabad Ameers, and declaring each Ameer independent

\* This has become a favourite phrase of late in India.

† Many novel ideas arose during the progress of the negociation, all tending to the perplexity and injury of the Ameers.

in his own possessions, upon such an amount of contribution as might in regard to each be thought equitable."

His Lordship further observes: "But fortunately it had been soon seen that the Ameers were as pusillanimous\* as they had been false and outwardly arrogant."

Advantage was taken of the alleged misconduct of the Ameers, and it was made a new stipulation that twenty-one lacs of rupees should be paid on account of Shah Shoojah, "and, in a word, the Ameers were reduced to a state of abject apprehension and submission."

A rather laughable account (par. 14), of the grand exploit of the "Wellesley" at Kurrachee.

"The landing of the troops being opposed, and a shot fired upon them from a small fort, which is situated close to the harbour, the 'Wellesley' opened her batteries, and in a very short time the southern or sea-face of the fort, the wall of which, in part, sixteen feet thick, was levelled with the ground. The troops, in the meantime, landed from the boats, and the garrison of the fort, which consisted of a *very small number of men, was immediately apprehended.*"

His Lordship then offers congratulations too long to quote, and enlarges about our "*political and military ascendancy,*" — "*the confederacy of the Ameers being virtually dissolved;*" "Sinde being formally placed under *British protection, and brought within the circle of our Indian relations;*" the objects being obtained "*without bloodshed,*" and the impression diffused in all quarters of "*futility of resistance to our arms;*" and his Lordship was especially anxious that "*our measures should bear the character of a just forbearance and moderation.*" His Lordship adds,—

"*To ourselves it is so desirable to have the military control of the Indus, that it would have been highly expedient to introduce our troops into Sinde, even were the whole cost to be paid from our own*

\* Was the force not enough to overawe them? Were they expected to fight against such odds? What would have been said, if they had attempted resistance? They would have been accused of treachery, as of late. They are not cowards, but have been shamefully oppressed, and overcome by superior strength.

*treasuries.* In fact, on the probable supposition that we shall not permanently maintain a force of more than 2500 men in Sinde, the arrangement would be, under any circumstances, inexpensive, as being little else than an advance of our frontier stations from those at present occupied by us in Cutch and Guzerat.”\*

Meer Moobaruck Khan, of Khyrpore, (page 214) whose conduct was stated to have been such as not to require from Shah Shoojah or the British Government the same indulgence of exemption of tribute as Meer Roostum Khan, was to be called upon for his quota of seven lacs of rupees.

Meer Shere Mahomed, of Meerpore, (page 251) who had been rather opposed to the British Government, now (March, 1839) makes advances. He wrote to the Resident in Sinde,—

“‘You have long been my near neighbour, but you never before asked a favour of me. I hope you will not hesitate in futurē; and you may always reckon on the satisfaction I shall feel in doing what you require.’ (par. 5). Little doubt remained in my mind, but that this tone was a part of the altered feeling towards us which is springing up; and all question on it was removed by a verbal communication made yesterday to my Moonshee by a Dewan of Meer Shere Mahomed, whom he met at Sobdar Khan’s levee, and who told him that he had now witnessed our *good faith and adherence to our word*, that he had been deceived about us, and that his desire was to enter into a treaty with the British Government.”†

And the Colonel, with advertence to the chief’s former conduct, makes a very sensible excuse for him, that “if he really believed that our troops had come into Sinde to *conquer his possessions*, we cannot blame him for making a show, at least, of defending them. Then why not make the same allowance for the Ameers of Hyderabad ?

It was understood (page 216) that Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, in consideration of his assistance and friendly conduct, was to be excused from the payment of his quota of the tribute; but Colonel Pottinger directed his assistant to give

\* Was this policy sanctioned by the Court of Directors and the Government? If so, then Lord Ellenborough must be held blameless.

† How could the gallant Colonel console himself with such an assurance as this—the effect solely of terror and anxious apprehension ?

that chief no hopes of its being excused, (par. 3,) “but endeavour to remove the erroneous impression he seemed to have imbibed, that it was a *fine*, whereas it was paying a very small price for his future *entire relief, under our guarantee, from a serious demand.*” The Colonel intimated that he had made the necessary communications to the Hyderabad Government as to the troops that were to be left in Upper Sinde. “Whatever,” says he, “may be their real sentiments, they have expressed their wish that we will do whatever *we like*, and I really believe, now that they are *satisfied that we have no sinister charges against them, they care not what we fix on.*”\*

Lieut. Leckie, the assistant at Hyderabad, (page 218,) was deputed by Colonel Pottinger with the revised treaties, which differed so very considerably from the terms agreed on, and they were to be enforced without admitting of any argumentation; for the assistant’s instructions were:—

“Should the Ameers (Par. 7.) show any disposition or wish to enter into discussion with you, it will be your duty to distinctly state to them, that neither you, nor any servant of the British Government, can presume to discuss his Lordship’s *commands*, which have been issued after full consideration, and are to be considered *final.*”

And (page 218) to the Colonel’s dear and long-tried friend, Noor Mahomed Khan, the Resident addressed a letter, informing him that his Lordship has been “*so thoughtful and kind as to vouchsafe four treaties, under his seal,*” &c., and in terms of fond endearment, on the eve of departure, he thus pathetically concludes — “*Continue to consider me your warm friend, and make me glad with happy accounts of your health and welfare.*”

The Resident conveyed to Colonel Spiller, commanding at Tatta, (page 220,) his opinions and directions respecting the *Shikargahs*, or preserves, not being interfered with, and his

\* This is just what the Ameers said afterwards, when entirely subdued. Did not Colonel Pottinger assert that the Ameers had been reduced to entire submission, and were now our humblest *slaves*? He was just on the eve of departure; and, no doubt, desired to give the most favourable impression of the state of affairs.

observations do him credit. The quotation is rather long, but it is of importance, in estimating the opinions of Sir Charles Napier afterwards, which have excited so much dissatisfaction.

“ You are aware that the Ameers attach the highest value to the shikargahs, or preserves for hunting, which are formed along the bank of the river, and some of which extend to within seven or eight miles of this place. Their Highnesses deemed them of so much importance, that they wanted to introduce an article into the treaty, expressly providing for their being held sacred ; but I told them such a *formal* procedure was unnecessary. (Pars. 2, 3, 4.) Both before I left Hyderabad, and since my arrival here, I have had messages and letters on the same subject, and I therefore do myself the honour to address you, with a view of begging that you will take such steps as seem to you proper, to ensure a rigid attention from all ranks and classes, to the *promises I have made*, that the shikargahs shall in no degree be interfered with by our troops or followers. However we may regret that the Ameers should devote so large a portion of the very finest parts of their country to such purposes, we must neither forget the *severity of our forest laws*, when England was further advanced in the scale of civilization than Sind now is, nor the strict legislative enactments that are in force, even at this time, on the subject of killing game. We must also bear in mind that the shikargahs provide the only amusement the Ameers take any interest in, and of the depth of that interest some notion will be formed, when I tell you that the preserves are kept up at so great an expense, that it is said every deer their Highnesses shoot in them costs 800 rupees. Besides this well-known fact, their Highnesses did not hesitate to distinctly avow to me, that they valued their shikargahs beyond their wives and children, which shows that we cannot at all estimate their anxiety respecting them.”

Lieut. Leckie submits (page 221) some explanation respecting the attack on Kurrachee. Meer Sobdar Khan assured him that at the time H. M.'s ship “Wellesley” was fired upon, he had only one man in the town, who collected his share of the revenue, that he had been a warm friend, and did not understand why he should be punished for the acts of others. The omission of Kurrachee in the amended treaty had

astonished their Highnesses the Ameers, (par. 6,) whose agent, Syud Tukkee Shah, said, that a messenger from Court was close to Kurrachee when the firing commenced, and who had instructions to prevent any hostile proceedings; *and the single gun that was fired was not shotted*: that their Highnesses considered it very hard that they should be severely dealt with on account of errors of the soldiers. The Syud then dwelt upon all the Ameers had done to comply with our demands in allowing a Resident at their Court, having permitted a passage for our troops through their country, given up Tatta as a military station, &c.; but the Lieutenant, in answer to all these appeals, said, that if it was supposed the treaty then in his possession, under the seal and sign manual of the Governor-General of India, could be altered, they were mistaken, as his Lordship's commands were to be considered final, and with regard to Kurrachee a communication would be received by each Ameer from the Governor-General,—thus not divulging his Lordship's determination respecting the retention of Kurrachee till after the Ameers' assent to the treaty.

Sir Alexander Burnes (page 224) writes to the Envoy with Shah Shoojah, dated Kelat, 3rd April, 1839, that he had come into possession (by intercepting letters) of the letters relating to the *intrigue* carrying on between Candahar and Sinde; but the letter of Noor Mahomed Khan to Sirdar Kohendil, chief of Candahar, does not tend to attach any evil designs to the principal Ameer. He says:—

“ You have informed me about your contracting friendship with Mahomed Shah, king of Persia. You know that we have been long the friends of the English, and lately a treaty of lasting friendship has been concluded, which has strengthened the intimacy between us; however, every one knows best what is for his own good.”

But Shere Mahomed Khan Talpoor's letter to Dost Mahomed Khan, if not a forgery, indicated dissatisfaction with the English, which could scarcely be a matter of surprise, and expressed a resolution to join and befriend the then chief of Cabool.

There is a very good plain statement (page 225) of the

Ameers' grievances contained in the native agent's communication, (7th April, 1839,) which throws further light on the Kurrachee affair. He thus writes to the Resident in Sinde :—

“Meer Sobdar Khan considered the intention of taking Kurra-  
chee to be unworthy the friendship and honour of the British Go-  
vernment; that he had never held intercourse with the King of  
Persia, or any one else. The second time I saw the other Ameers,  
they went over the same ground of argument. They observed, that  
the Beloochee chiefs would say, that the treaty had been reduced  
from twenty-three articles to fourteen, and might be so shortly to  
seven; that they (the Ameers) were helpless; that they entreated,  
first, that the cantonment might be fixed distant from Hyderabad;  
second, that the number of the troops might be defined; third, that  
the British Government might not interfere in the internal disputes;  
fourth, that the towns and cities might all be named in the treaty;  
and fifth, that three lacs of Hyderabad rupees might be fixed as the  
amount they were to pay. They further asserted, that *the only gun*  
*fired at Kurrachee was the usual signal, nor had a single sword been*  
*removed from the scabbard*; that the man who fired the signal gun  
should be turned away; that they could not pay three lacs as well  
as give up Kurrachee, and retain the means of subsisting themselves;  
that they would fall in arrears; that they had paid the tribute to  
Cabool formerly in Hyderabad rupees; and that they begged Col.  
Pottinger to settle every thing, so as to supersede the necessity of  
sending vakeels.”

The liability of Meer Moobarck Khan, second brother of  
Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, (pages 228, 229, and 231,) to  
contribute, like the Ameers of Hyderabad, to the immediate  
payment of Shah Shoojah, in release of that prince's claim of  
sovereignty over Khyrpore, having been overlooked, Lieut.  
Eastwick, the able assistant to Colonel Pottinger, was in-  
structed to negotiate on the subject, and Sir Alexander  
Burnes stated the chief was well able to pay a lac of rupees  
annually towards the payment of the British force; and as he  
was supposed to have some cash, he should be called to pay  
down at once, “*while we are strong in Sinde,*” the sum of  
seven lacs of rupees!

We now arrive at an important stage of these lamentable  
proceedings. Colonel Pottinger had returned to Bhooj, and  
had had time for reflection on all that had passed. He

accordingly submits a very interesting and comprehensive report, dated 6th July, 1839. I shall give his own words (par. 8) relative to the Kurrachee affair :—

“He, Syud Sadig Shah, repeated the *denial that the gun which was fired had a ball in it*, and declared that if we could establish that it had, the Ameers would not only resign all pretensions to Kurrachee, but would give us *Hyderabad into the bargain.*” He said, “Noor Mahomed Khan particularly desired me to remind you that just two years ago (par. 7), you wrote to him, as a friend, to allow the harbour of Kurrachee to be *surveyed*, declaring it to be an object of *curiosity*, and also worthy of a great government like the English. *You have now sent an army, and attacked and taken it.* We know you to be powerful. *You say you are just and moderate* ; now is the time to prove it, not only to Sindh, but to the whole world.”

Referring to the promise made by Colonel Pottinger, that nothing would be demanded of Hyderabad but what was reasonable and fair, he was asked, “Who is to be the judge of what is fair and reasonable?” Syed Tuppee said on behalf of the Ameers—

“If you leave it to us to decide, we will say that three lacs of Hyderabad rupees\* is such, and to that payment the Ameers have already agreed. On the latter topic (par. 9), I had no difficulty in replying to him, but on the subject of Kurrachee, I confess that a *number of facts* had come to knowledge which put it out of my power to *combat, to my own satisfaction, the arguments that were adduced* ; and although I am not prepared to go to the extent of saying that I lament what took place there, yet I do not hesitate to avow my *conviction*, that it might have been *advantageously avoided*, and that under all circumstances, it happily furnishes cause for thankfulness, and gratification that no lives were sacrificed.”\*

The Colonel goes on to say (par. 11), that he had always been aware it was usual to fire a gun from the fort at the mouth of Kurachee harbour, when a square-rigged vessel came in sight

\* Three lacs of Company’s rupees (the coin in which the Governor-General fixed the payment) are equal to four lacs of Hyderabad.

† The fort of Kurrachee was “*levelled with the dust,*” by mistake; yet Lord Auckland was determined to make the imagined hostility a pretext for retaining possession.

or approached the place. This he had seen when he went there in 1809, and it was done when H. M. S. *Challenger* anchored off it in 1830.\* The Ameers explained this to him before he left Hyderabad, and further said, they had heard that it was the custom at the lighthouse at Bombay. They then likewise made the same assertion, as to there having been *no shot* in the gun. The nephew of the Jam of the Jokeyas, a chief whose claims to the Governor-General's favourable notice had been previously submitted, was introduced with ten or twelve of his people, and made the following declaration to the Colonel (par. 12): "I commanded in the fort of Manooral the day your large ship battered it. I and my men left our arms and accoutrements in the fort when we made our escape, and you would do a great favour and kindness if you would have them restored to us." The Colonel promised compliance, but found that the "poor men's property had been sold, and that they were told when they applied for them, that no Sindees were henceforward to be allowed to carry any kind of weapon." The Colonel also ascertained that there was not a *single ball in the fort that would fit any one of the guns, that the whole supply of gunpowder amounted to six Kurrachee seers* (six pounds), which was kept in an earthen pot; that the garrison consisted of sixteen men, many of whom had only a sword; that so little did the men anticipate what followed, that when the firing began, they were all standing outside, looking at and admiring the *Wellesley*.

To such a pitch had the chiefs and people of Kurrachee been reduced by the harsh measures adopted towards them, that Colonel Pottinger makes the following pointed remarks and complaint :

"The Governor of Kurrachee (par. 15.) (Allah Rukhia Jemadar) waited on me the day after I reached that place. He came like a *common menial*, without arms or attendants; and on my afterwards inquiring the cause of this, I was informed that no one was allowed to bring even a knife into the camp, or to enter or quit it

\* This is a very candid statement of the gallant Colonel, and highly honourable to him.

after dark, though unarmed. *I refrain from enlarging on the evil and cruelty of degrading men of any class by such a system.* It seems to be calculated to excite disgust and hatred, in not only those towards whom it is immediately practised, but in the breast of any chief and man in the province, and to be equally impolitic and dangerous. The Governor sent me word that he had never entertained the smallest idea of opposing the landing of our troops; that, after the firing from the 'Wellesley' commenced, he received a peremptory order from the whole of the Ameer, not on any pretence to do so, but to supply every thing that might be procurable as far as possible."

And he added other satisfactory explanations, unnecessary here to quote.

The following passage in Colonel Pottinger's despatch must, however be given. (par. 18.)

"The native agent has several times reported, that their Highnesses had made up their minds to be guided by my recommendation, and put their seals to the treaties, leaving all future points to the moderation and justice of his Lordship; but that their relations and chiefs dissuaded them from taking this step until they should obtain from me some kind of assurance that their appeal would not be thrown aside. I by no means feel surprise or irritation, either at the Ameer's procrastination, or at this advice of the chiefs. *It would be a miracle if they felt otherwise than suspicious of our designs and motives;* and I humbly venture to think that the Governor-General will see much in this despatch and its accompaniments, to support the most respectful, but at the same time, *unqualified opinion,* which I beg to record 'that the agreement by which Kurrachee was ceded to us be abrogated; and that a supplemental treaty to that of fourteen articles should be entered into, providing for our having *free ingress and egress* to that port whenever we please, as well as for the payment by our merchants of a moderate rate of duties on goods which they may bring there; and for our maintaining, both now and hereafter, such troops at that sea-port as the Governor-General of India shall see fit to direct.'"\*

\* In penning these observations, Colonel Pottinger must have bitterly regretted the terms in which he announced the capture of Kurrachee. He gives the Governor-General a rebuke not to be misunderstood.

At length the long-desired treaties, under the seals of the four Ameers of Hyderabad, were received and forwarded by Colonel Pottinger to the Governor-General, from Bhooj, 30th July, 1839. He submitted his opinion on five points mooted by the Ameers.

1. He thought that fixing the payment in Company's rupees would press heavily on the Ameers (par. 6), especially on such as had large and increasing families to provide for; and his former estimate of the revenues of Sinde was considerably overrated (par. 8).

2. That he still retained the same opinion as to relinquishing the claim to the seaport of Kurrachee (par. 9).

3. That the cantonment should not be near Hyderabad; and Tatta, where the camp then was, was the best site.

4. That the article of the treaty regarding the employment of 3,000 Sinde troops was a dead letter, as they could be turned to no earthly purpose, either in Sinde or elsewhere, unless there was a change in the habits of the Beloochee soldiery.

5. That the proposal of the Ameers to name the possessions of the Hyderabad government was an absurdity, and anything the Ameers could desire was included in the term "actual possessions."

Mr. Ross Bell, Political Agent in Upper Sinde (page 245), in transmitting a correspondence with Meer Ali Moorad (the arch traitor now in power and amity with the British Government in Sinde), and an engagement between that chief and his brother, Meer Roostum Khan, brought to the notice of the Governor-General, that he did not find Ali Moorad even alluded to in any of the correspondence (par. 2) which formerly passed between Government and its Political Agents relative to the treaties with the Sinde Ameers. He seemed to have been overlooked, and as far as Mr. Ross could judge, to have been kept purposely in the back ground. That he was hostilely disposed towards us from the commencement there was no doubt, but he now found himself alone, since the Hyderabad Ameers signed the treaty, and he had seen that what had been passing between him and Mahrab Khan was

known, and therefore he came forward. Ali Moorad (par. 4.) is the only one among the Ameers who has any character for courage. He is a man of hasty and violent temper, and has a strong body of Affghan mercenaries in his service; it was proposed, therefore, to postpone a final adjustment with that chief till the cold weather, a suggestion which was approved by the Governor-General (page 245). Meantime, Mr. Ross was directed to submit a statement of the value and extent of the different shares into which the principality of Khyrpore was partitioned, and the footing, with respect to power and dependence, on which the family stood to one another, &c. It appears, however, that a separate treaty had been entered into with Ali Moorad by Sir Alexander Burnes, and ratified on the 13th January, 1839 (page 256); but the record in the office of the Political Agent of Lower Sindh afforded no traces of such an engagement (page 257).

The Governor-General in reply (2d Sept. 1839) to Colonel Pottinger's opinions on the several points of reference by the Ameers, (page 252) objects to the remission of any part of the amount to be paid by these chiefs, viz., three lacs of rupees per annum towards the payment of the subsidiary force, notwithstanding their poverty. His Lordship observes,—

“ You are aware that, on a former occasion, the Ameers themselves proffered, in lieu of protection and advantages, far less complete and obvious than those which they gain under the present treaties, the cession of Shikarpore, the value of which is not supposed to be less than the amount of the money-payment now required from them. This circumstance might be brought to their notice, if they persist in urging you on this point; and, though the British Government is far from desirous for *territorial occupation or aggrandizement*, a proposition from the Ameers to exchange the money-payment for such a cession of territory, might possibly seem deserving of submission for the orders of the authorities in England.

“ The second point is, (par. 8.) ‘ That the claim of the British Government to the sea-port of *Kurrachee* may be relinquished.’ The grounds on which this point is urged are, a denial of hostile demonstrations before the bombardment of the fort, *which formed a principal argument* for treating *Kurrachee* as a *British conquest*,

and the embarrassment which the Ameers will feel for the loss of the revenue of that port.

“ The Governor-General (pars. 9 to 12.) would not call in question the correctness of the reports from the naval commander-in-chief, and therefore could not admit the denial of the Ameers of hostile intentions; adverting also to other circumstances which had evinced their *inimical spirit*; and presuming no interference in the collection of the revenue experienced from the presence of the British military force, and that the civil government was still in the hands of the Ameers; his Lordship did not perceive a necessity, at that time, for abrogating the agreement of the 3rd Feb. 1839, and entering into a supplementary treaty on the subject of Kurrachee. (Par. 15.) The British Government would retain that position at the principal port of Sinda, which is indispensable, without infringing any of those rights of independence which are secured to the Ameers by the revised treaty. The wishes of the Ameers respecting the cantonment being at a distance from Hyderabad, would be complied with. The reserve force would be stationed probably at Sukkur, with inconsiderable detachments at Tatta and Kurrachee, but the Resident would remain at the capital. There was no probability of the 3,000 Sinda troops being ever required, and any uneasiness on that head might be set at rest. It was not expedient to specify the respective possessions of the Ameers, who were no longer recognized collectively as the Government of Hyderabad, we being now umpires of any dispute that may arise between them. The Resident was reminded that the Ameers had paid only the first instalment of the sum which they were to pay for their release from the demands of the *Affghan monarch*,\* and measures were to be taken for the realization of the balance, and ‘ by the time that it is realized, and the Ameers who are parties to the treaty with the British Government, will have become entitled to claim a release from his Majesty’s demands against them personally, and on the territories held by them, the arrangements which remain to be made with the Shah will probably have been concluded.’ ”

Colonel Pottinger found that his previous estimate of the

\* Where is the *monarch* now—the wretched puppet in whose cause so much blood has been shed and treasure expended, and misery brought upon inoffensive native States? This unfortunate Sinda affair is the result of the insane project of restoring Shah Shoojah.

revenues of Shikarpore and dependencies, (page 259, par. 6) three and a-half lacs of rupees, was overrated, and that they did not actually exceed two and a-half lacs. He suggested that probably Noor Mahomed Khan might be induced to cede Tatta on the same terms as proposed in regard to Shikarpore.

The Resident in Sindé communicates to the Governor-General (13th Jan. 1840, page 263) another extraordinary admission of error in respect to the extravagant estimate of the revenues of some of the chiefs. He says—

“ I formerly reported (par. 6.) that the portion of Sindé held by the Meerpore chiefs (of whom there are several) was roughly estimated to be worth *seven* lacs of rupees a-year, but this was no doubt very greatly over-rated ; and I have been assured, the total of the money-collections do not average 50,000 rupees (half a lac) per annum, the remainder being realized in kind, and apportioned out to the numerous relations and dependents of the family, amongst whom there is said to be much ill-will and division ; and the constant strife which exists for power between Shere Mahomed and his half-brothers, augments these evils.”

Colonel Pottinger, in addressing Captain Outram, Political Agent in Lower Sindé, (25th Jan. 1840, page 264) adverts to the circumstance that the question of the scale of port duties and sea customs at Kurrachee was then before the Bombay Government, and had probably been referred to the Governor-General, and that the Ameers of Sindé were very anxious to receive Shah Shoojah's release from any future demands, either on account of tribute or Shikarpore ; and as they had *punctually fulfilled* their engagements, he thought the necessary acquittance in the names of Noor Mahomed and Nusseer Khan should be procured and delivered to them at an early period. This is a very important admission, viz., that the full amount fixed by the Governor-General had been exacted.

The late Resident in sending farewell letters to the Ameers of Hyderabad, through Captain Outram, informs (page 265, par. 3.) that officer that he had told them, if they would look back to the whole course of his intercourse with them during the long period of fifteen years, and especially to the stirring events of the last eighteen months, they will find that *not the*

*smallest deviation can be discovered in our promises and acts,\** and as their sincere well-wisher, he took that last opportunity to exhort them to be guided by Captain Outram's advice in all matters, and to strictly fulfil the engagements into which they had entered.

Captain Outram, who had been appointed as Political Agent in Lower Sinde, to succeed Colonel Pottinger, arrived at Hyderabad on the 24th Feb. 1840, (page 266) and was received with extraordinary and marked cordiality and kindness at the capital, and entertained during his route with the utmost hospitality. Large quantities of sweetmeats and provisions were sent to him by the Ameers on the morning after his arrival. There was an evident joy at the change and a desire to bow to the rising sun. Only two days after Captain Outram's arrival, he communicated to the Governor-General, (page 267) that a desire had been expressed by Noor Mahomed Khan (who had received a good deal of practical instruction from, and been taught some lessons in English diplomacy by, Colonel Pottinger), to have a master to instruct his son in the English language, which was recommended to be complied with, as likely to enable them more perfectly to comprehend and "*appreciate our disinterested endeavours to benefit them, from which the happiest effects would result.*"

There is rather a high-flown letter from the native agent at Hyderabad to Meer Shere Mahomed Khan of Meerpore, (page 273) who had expressed a wish to enter into a treaty with Captain Outram, which the agent informed him was very proper and necessary for his country, and advantageous in many ways. The British Government would expect him to contribute towards the expense the British Government was put to in protecting Sinde; but it was just and liberal and would not expect him to pay so much as one of the Ameers of Hyderabad, who were richer; and the native agent concludes: "In your letter you mention that a treaty would be advantageous to both Governments. Such language is unbecoming the *dignity* of the British Government, thus to place yourself on an *equality*. *Do not again write in this style.*"

The assistant political agent in Upper Sinde (Lieutenant

\* How could the gallant officer have the assurance to write in this strain ?

Postans, page 274) having reported the arrival of the individual calling himself a Persian Prince (at Shikarpore), whom the Hyderabad Government had expelled, Captain Outram communicated the circumstance to Noor Mahomed and Nusseer Khan, who expressed their gratification that such steps had been taken to preserve their credit, and stated that "*such noxious vermin should be put to death.*"

The payment of transit duties appears from a report (15th July, 1840, page 294) of the Political Agent in Sinde to have been frequently evaded, and it is of consequence to notice this, and to quote the opinion of Captain Outram as to the right of the Ameers on this subject; because a misunderstanding of the article of the treaty is afterwards made the ground of a serious charge against the chiefs of Hyderabad. The presumed pass of a trader with a camel load of pepper, bound for Sukkur, proved, on examination by the Ameer's custom officer, to be a letter written by one gentleman at Kurrachee to another, and in this way the payment of the usual land transit duties at Tatta, had been much evaded. It was, therefore, our duty to prevent such frauds by every precaution in our power, for, as Captain Outram observed, "The representative of the Sinde Government has an undoubted right to see that nothing but what is entitled by treaty to exemption from inland transit duties, and that nothing beyond what is specified in the permits, should pass under their sanction."

The Governor-General announces to the secret committee (16th Nov. 1840, page 298) that "it will be seen by Major Outram's despatch of the 5th ult., that the conduct of the Hyderabad Ameers' officers, and demeanour of the people, towards our people, *en route* through Upper to Lower Sinde, was most friendly."

An affecting detail is given by Major Outram of an interview with the principal and much persecuted Ameer, Noor Mahomed Khan, on his death-bed.

"So feeble and emaciated had the Ameer become, that this exertion quite exhausted him, and it was some minutes afterwards before he could speak; when, beckoning his brother Meer Nusseer Khan, and youngest son Meer Hoossein Ali, to the bedside, he then

took a hand of each and placed them in mine, saying, 'You are their father and brother, you will protect them;' to which I replied in general but warm terms of personal friendship, but that I trusted his Highness would long live to guide and support them. But this the Ameer had evidently given up all hope of; and appeared to regret that he had given Dr. Owen the trouble of coming so far, though very grateful for the prompt manner in which his wishes had been attended to."

The poor chief expired on the 3rd December, 1840, (page 300,) and Major Outram lamented the loss of Noor Mahomed Khan, both *on public and private grounds*. But I must quote the major's own words. "Whatever that chief's secret feelings towards the British may have been, certainly his acts latterly were all most friendly, and I cannot but place faith in almost the last words the dying chief uttered, solemnly protesting the sincerity of his attachment to the British Government, not only because, being perfectly aware that he had but a *few hours to live and seeking nothing*, he could have had no motive for deception; but also, because I had myself always found his Highness most ready to *forward our interests*, and least ready to welcome reports prejudicial to us, which, during exciting times, were so *industriously propagated, and greedily devoured by those more inimical to us*;" and on the last occasion when the Major visited the dying chief, Noor Mahomed Khan said, "My friendship for the British is known to God. My conscience is clear before God." "The Ameer still retained me in his feeble embrace for a few moments, and, after taking some medicine from my hand, again embraced me as if with the conviction that we could not meet again." The Governor-General expressed his approval of the Major's conduct on the *melancholy occasion*, and "the sincere regret of the British Government (page 306), at the loss of a chieftain whose good sense had led him to appreciate the value of his alliance to us, and whose example and influence appear to have been, for some time past, exerted to maintain that alliance in truth and sincerity." And this is the chief who was so much harassed and persecuted by the former Resident.

The Political Agent in Lower Sinde (page 307), intimated

to the Ameers that certain subjects of the Sinde Government had taken upon themselves to forge his seal, and write letters to the chief of Sinde in his name ; on the strength of these letters, their authors had had jagheers, &c., bestowed upon them.

Mr. Ross now (page 310,) reported that application had been made to Ameer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore and his brothers, as representatives of the late Meer Moobaruck Khan, for liquidating the claim of seven lacs of rupees outstanding against the latter chief at his death, on account of Shah Shoojah ; but Meer Roostum Khan stated that Sir Alexander Burnes had promised the deceased and given him *a written document*, which he showed in the original to the same effect, that *no demand should be made on him!* Yet we find a letter from the secretary to government to Sir Alexander Burnes, (dated 15th March, 1841,) to the following purport.

“ I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 4th ult.” (*not in the blue book*), “ submitting your remarks on the demands against Meer Moobaruck’s family, with documents shewing the *groundlessness of any claim set up by the heirs of his late Highness to exemption from this demand*, which his Lordship in Council considers to be *satisfactory*.”

How is it that a document of such importance as Sir A. Burnes’s explanation is omitted ? A copy of his engagement, on which the Ameer claimed exemption, is given in the volume (page 311). A hope was expressed by the Governor-General that the Political Agent in Upper Sinde would take an early opportunity of adjusting this question (page 320).

A treaty was entered into (June, 1841, page 326,) with Meer Shere Mahomed Khan of Meerpore, agreeing to pay half a lac of rupees in part payment of the expense of the British force stationed in Sinde (page 335), and that chief shall remain sole ruler in his principality, and the jurisdiction of the British Government shall not be introduced into his territory.

The Governor-General conveys his approval of the proposal of Meer Nusseer Khan (page 329), for the cession of his own

share, and that of the late Ameer Noor Mahomed Khan, in the revenues of Shikarpore, *in part liquidation of their portion of tribute payable to the British Government*; the British Government being willing to accept a perpetual lease of the Hyderabad share of Shikarpore, paying annually for the same one-fifth more than the average net income derived by the Ameers Noor Mahomed Khan and Nusseer Khan during the last five or ten years, or any other period for which the Political Agent might have the means of striking an average. It appears that the Ameers insisted upon retaining the nominal sovereignty of Shikarpore, which was acceded to by Major Outram (vide letter, 21st August 1841, page 335,) who had much difficulty in settling the average by which the annual revenue was to be determined (page 338). The proceedings of Major Outram are approved by the Governor-General, 20th September, 1841, (page 339).

Lieutenant Postans was directed to intercept letters of the Lahore Vakeels (page 339), who had “established a correspondence with the Ameers of Hyderabad—all in the most open way—the Vakeels asking Leckie if they should receive his letters.” So states Major Outram, 10th January, 1842. Lieutenant Postans soon got two letters stated to be from Meer Nusseer Khan to Sawun Mull; that officer says, “The original letters must either be sent on, so as not to excite suspicion, and bring the parties further forward, *or I must frame some stratagem to account for their disappearance.*” This system was altogether bad; and it being known that letters were required to serve a purpose, there was no difficulty in getting them prepared to suit the object in view and to make mischief. There is really, however, nothing of the least importance in the letters; but Lieutenant Postans “could not help thinking Nusseer is brooding mischief;” and Major Outram (page 340) states that “the accompanying letter from Lieutenant Postans shows that the *childish* Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad is again intriguing with Sawun Mull, governor of Mooltan.”

All supplies for the consumption of the troops at Kurrachee (page 341), were declared by the Ameers free from duties.

There appears to have been some difficulty (page 341), in

effecting the proposed arrangement respecting the cession of the revenues of Shikarpore, before alluded to, as we find in a letter from the Political Agent, of 2nd February, 1842, that officer recommending that “the farm of Shikarpore should on no account be relinquished,” and he adds,

“My late letters have shown you that I have thought it politic to permit the Ameers to submit, through me, *a request to annul the bargain*, should they wish it, *my object being to temporize for a time*; never contemplating, however, that we should ultimately relinquish the most advantageous possession we could acquire on the Indus.”

Meer Nusseer Khan had assumed rather a high tone in his communication with Lieutenant Leckie respecting the cession of Shikarpore (page 342). He said,

“What you have said is contrary to treaty. This officer (Suffur Hubshee) is acting by my orders. If I choose to commit tyranny, I may; it has always been the custom in Sinde to make exactions, to remunerate some, and take from others; this custom I am not willing to alter. Do you wish to break the treaty by interfering with my authority? Shikarpore is mine until Major Outram and myself exchange treaties for its transfer. Who dares make a disturbance in the place? If they do it, it is my business. Pray do not interfere with the treaty, which is like a wall or bund, which lasts until compelled to give way by force of water.”

And in reply to Lieutenant Leckie’s arguments, the Ameer said, “If you wish to break the treaty, you do so by this message from Major Outram, which is contrary to the 2nd article thereof, in which it states, that the British Government shall not interfere with the subjects of Sinde;” and again, “when I give a thing, I never cavil about it as you do; and from what you have said, I begin to fear that you are making excuses to gain some other end;” and “I am ready to abide by my treaty, and pay the tribute without any reference to Calcutta. Do you want the tribute or the country of Sinde?”

Major Outram did not, however, approve of his assistant’s communication to the Ameer (page 344), his object being “*not really to annul the bargain, but to temporize;*” and Lieutenant Leckie was reminded of the instructions given

him, which were, "you will give the Ameers hopes of keeping Shikarpore after all, which you should *encourage any way short of actual pledge*, &c., until the Governor-General can decide what policy to pursue." This may be very clever and cunning, but it is not a fair or creditable mode of conducting negotiations with other states. Such a course tended more than anything else, to shake the confidence of the Ameers in our integrity, good faith, and truth. The ever shifting policy pursued towards them, and the incessant demands for something new, must have harassed them beyond endurance.

The old story of intrigue is again revived (page 346). Major Outram having been disappointed in his views respecting Shikarpore, had again taken a prejudice against Ameer Nusseer Khan, and he informed the Governor-General (22nd February, 1842), that he should "have intrigues of the more restless Ameers to expose hereafter, Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad particularly, who has been especially active of late."

The decided line of policy is again resumed (page 347), as the Governor-General was led to believe that Major Outram "*may have seen reason to doubt the fidelity of some one or more of the Ameers of Sinde*" (page 348). This was rather a vague charge; and the Governor-General, in transmitting letters to the Ameers, to be delivered at Major Outram's discretion, emphatically declared,

"You will distinctly understand that the threat contained in this letter is no idle threat, intended only to alarm, but a declaration of the Governor-General's fixed determination to punish, *cost what it may*, the first chief who may prove faithless, by the *confiscation of his dominions*. But there must be clear proof of such faithlessness, and it must not be *provoked* by the conduct of British agents *producing apprehensions* in the mind of any chief, that the British Government entertains designs inconsistent with his interest and honour."

There is no mistaking the pointed observation of Lord Ellenborough, who had no doubt studied the proceedings of the former Resident, and it is to be regretted his Lordship did not still more decidedly discourage the marked propensity of

the Political Agent to magnify every trifling act of opposition on the part of the Ameers, or unimportant communication with other chiefs, into intrigues of the most criminal character against the British Government. The present Governor-General had a glorious opportunity of carrying into effect his professed resolve to maintain peace and avoid extension of complicated connections, by a thorough change in the system pursued towards Sind, and it is a pity he did not, as the first act of his administration, effect an *entire* change in the officers employed, who appear to have been great alarmists and far too partial to listening to every whisper and idle tale against the Ameers, by designing and discontented natives; or over-zealous agents and despicable spies.

The new Governor-General in adverting (page 347) to his circular letter to all the agents of the British Government at all the courts of India, which would exhibit the principles of justice and moderation by which he was resolved to regulate his conduct, informed the Ameers of Sind that he would confide in their friendship, until he had proof in his hand of their faithlessness; but if he should obtain such proof, he would not permit them longer to exercise a power they had abused; and he concluded by the following solemn declaration:—

*“On the day on which you shall be faithless to the British Government, sovereignty will have passed from you, your dominions will be given to others; and in your destitution, all India will see that the British Government will not pardon an injury received from one it believes to be its friend.”*

We are in the next page (page 346) startled with the opportune announcement, by Major Outram to the Governor-General:

*“I shall have it in my power shortly, I believe, to expose the hostile intrigues of the Ameers, to such an extent as may be deemed by his Lordship sufficient to authorize the dictation of his own terms to the chiefs of Sind, and to call for such measures as he deems necessary to place British power on a secure footing in these countries.”\**

\* If intrigues had been developed, of so serious a nature as to warrant the

Lord Ellenborough had wisely, and considerably for the interests of the Company (page 349), resolved to reduce the number of Political Agents and assistants, some of whom, if they had nothing useful to engage their attention, were sure to be evincing their zeal by collecting intelligence of no moment and tiresome to peruse. It was high time, indeed, to make a reduction, as it is stated by his Lordship that,

“The number of officers so employed in those countries altogether new to our intervention, appears, at the commencement of last year, to have equalled the number of salaried officers employed by the *Queen's Government in Her Majesty's diplomatic service in all Europe.*”

Now (22nd May, 1842), we come to a most important despatch (page 350), conveying the views proposed to be adopted by the Governor-General towards Sind. His Lordship stated that although it would be his desire to confine our future relations to the states on the left bank of the Indus, yet the Ameers of Sind and Khyrpore having dominions on both banks of the river, and the British Government having recently contracted engagements with the Khan of Kelat, he felt that it would be necessary, *at least until the affairs of Affghanistan should assume a more settled and satisfactory form*, to retain a position on the Indus, and to have the means of acting on both banks. The continued occupation of *Kurrachee* was contemplated, and his Lordship likewise contemplated the continued occupation of the island of *Bukkur*, and the town of *Sukkur*, as a sort of *tête de point* upon the right bank of the Indus.\* The Governor-General hoped that a large portion, if not the whole, of the trade of Shikarpore might be transferred to Sukkur, if placed directly under our government. In any future negotiations, therefore, with the Ameers of Khyrpore, the Political Agent would bear in mind the wish of the Governor-General to possess the island of Bukkur and town of Sukkur, with an ample arrondissement.

It was the Governor-General's desire to put an end,† wherever it might be practicable, with any regard to our infliction of so severe a penalty, why all this delay and hesitation in at once communicating them?

\* This is at direct variance with former solemn assurances.

† This was another new plan. What right had we to tribute? We pro-

financial interests, to the system whereby a native State receives *protection* from us, in consideration of *tribute* to be paid to the British Government. It was desirable to give up any demand for tribute, in exchange for territory, or in consideration for the abolition of duties burthensome to trade. The Governor-General therefore considered it would be a desirable arrangement, if such cessions of territory as might be necessary to us at Kurrachee, Bukkur, and Sukkur were made to us by the Ameers of Sinde and Khyrpore, and all claims to tribute payable to us by the Ameers, were, after such cessions, to be cancelled, in consideration of the establishment of the perpetual freedom of trade upon the Indus, &c. The ultimate object was the establishment of unrestricted trade between all the countries of the Indus, the sea, and the Himalaya, and the total abolition of all internal duties in that vast territory, compensation being made to the native States by the payment to each of a portion of the duties collected upon the frontier. This then was the commencement of the discussion which ended in our taking possession of the country.

The Governor-General makes a merit of offering to exchange tribute for territory. How did we become entitled to tribute at all? We demanded it, in the first instance, on behalf of Shah Shoojah, and after gaining all we desired on that chief's account, we imposed it by force on our own. Shah Shoojah was now again powerless; and we had ceased to have any connection with Affghanistau. The only pretence we had for occupying Kurrachee, or any other place in Sinde, was to afford a secure passage to our troops going to and returning from Cabul. When that necessity ceased, we should have withdrawn; but the Governor-General, chose to exact concessions which, at the outset, do not seem to have been contemplated, and the only merit of which proceedings, on the part of the present Governor-General is, that it was at variance with the oft-repeated declared policy and assurances to the Ameers, by his predecessor. The solemn

fessed to protect Sinde; but we help ourselves and reduce our friends, for whose interest we at first evinced so much consideration, to absolute subjection.

pledge given by Lord Auckland, adverted to in the early stage of this Analysis, is set at nought.

Major Outram expressed his intention (page 351), to "*lay in such a train,*" as should enable Captain Brown to follow up the inquiry respecting the late intrigues; and meantime, he had deferred presenting the Governor-General's letters to the Ameers,—as "all of them being conscious that they were already guilty, would, very probably, be driven by their fears of the consequences so explicitly proclaimed to them, to commit themselves further;"—and he added, "all such intrigues are suspended for the present, in consequence of our late successes, and the re-establishment of our power; and they are not likely to renew them so long as we are in such power beyond the Indus." Still nothing tangible—all vague insinuation against the Ameers, who should have been allowed an opportunity of replying to the Governor-General's remonstrances—when they might possibly have cleared themselves from the imputations of insidious enemies, or artful spies and informers in the service and pay of the political agents.

The infidelity of Meer Nusseer Khan (page 370) and Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, seems to have been established in the mind of the Governor-General, who approved of his letters not being presented. His Lordship was anxious to know if Meer Roostum Khan's territory lay convenient for annexing a portion of it to that of the Khan of Bhawulpore, whose dominions his Lordship was desirous of increasing, in reward for that chief's uniform fidelity, and that of his ancestors. This indicated something like a determination to be satisfied with the slender proof of Meer Roostum Khan's *intrigue*, or whatever it may be called, and to inflict very summary punishment. Here it may be noticed, that it was afterwards clearly shown that Meer Roostum Khan had nothing to do with the letter imputed to him, which was sent by his "intriguing minister Futteh Mahomed Goree."

There is no end to new plans and proposals (page 373) by the Political Agent, who in addressing the Secretary to the Governor-General (21 June, 1842,) suggests that it would be

necessary to show *as a ground for requiring new arrangements*, that we had of late been exposed to the inimical intrigues of some of the Ameers, and the evidence already submitted, *even if deficient of legal proof*, he considered, gave sufficient data for *suspecting* that intrigues were in progress to overthrow our power, and to authorize precautions for self-preservation; our military position being insecure, and our communications liable to be cut off. These considerations would, he thought, justify the dictation of our terms to the Ameers, relinquishing all claims against them. Scarcely any return would induce the Ameers to waive their prejudices against making over Kurrachee, and allowing any infringement on their shikargahs. The political Agent represented that nothing could be more grating to the feelings of the Ameers than any encroachment on their shikargahs (hunting preserves), which the stipulation in the 5th article of the proposed treaty\* involved. He, however, after much argument as to the necessity of having wood for steam-vessels, and the facility of tracking boats on the banks of the river, submits that their Highnesses' "*selfish feelings*" ought not to obstruct a measure of such general public benefit, and virtually necessary for the continuance of steam navigation on the Indus, "which measure *this* may be the only opportunity for effecting that may occur for years to come." Here Major Outram proposes a gross and flagrant breach of what he must have been fully aware his predecessor had pledged, and the demand for further cessions was in direct violation of the assurance of Lord Auckland.

The draft treaty proposed by Major Outram (page 374) to be forced on the Ameers, in order to carry into effect the wishes of the Governor-General, is deserving of notice. Let any one read the articles, and say if they were not enough to produce an outbreak. There was no end indeed to our exactions. The first article stipulated for cession in perpetuity of Bukkur and neighbouring small islets; second, the cession of Sukkur and some adjoining ground; third, the town and

\* Sir Henry Pottinger gave assurances that these should never be interfered with.

harbour of Kurrachee, with the ground occupied by the town and cantonment; fourth, all articles of commerce to have a free passage between the sea at Kurrachee and the Indus at Tatta; fifth, the British Government to be allowed to cut and consume for steam navigation, wood growing within 100 cubits of the river, and to clear the bank of jungle for that space, due precaution being adopted to prevent trespass beyond that limit; sixth, no tolls to be levied on any boats whatever, in transit, on the river Indus; seventh, the Ameers to be released from all pecuniary obligations. Obligations indeed! how imposed? We entreat permission to prevent Runjeet Sing encroaching in a quarter of no real consequence, namely, on the frontier, in the Mazaree and Rojan country; we beg permission to pacify the chief of Lahore,—get a finger into Sinde, and soon intrude our whole body—force the Ameers to supply our troops—exhaust their treasuries, fix a perpetual tribute to ourselves, and when it suits our convenience or policy, demand a cession of some of the most valuable portions of their territory!

The Ameers were, of course, averse to the demands, and made a very sensible reply, 10th June, 1842 (page 376):—

“The customs of Hindoostan are different from the customs of Beloochistan; every country has its own rules and customs; but the friendship that took place between the Ameers and the British Government will increase daily, and the treaty, dated 11th March, 1839, which is written for the good of both governments, will ever be binding, and to the different paragraphs therein we agree. The justice of the British Government is well known to all the world, and the word of the British is always true and correct. The same treaty which is confirmed by the seal and signature of the British Government *is enough for us*. The contents of the 5th paragraph of the same treaty is, that the Ameers who are mentioned in that are to remain rulers of this country, and that the English Government will not interfere with their government. ‘The complaints of the ryots against the Ameers will not be listened to by the British Government.’ It is hoped that the contents of this paragraph will be acted up to by the British Government.”

This is really a good exposé. But the steam must be kept up, and fresh grounds of complaint found, else how were

the objects of the Governor-General to be attained?—and a pliant and willing agent was found in the Political Agent, as the long letter from Major Outram, (dated 26th June, 1842,) and far too long to quote, (page 377,) sufficiently indicates. All sorts of aggression and injustice are therein recommended; and the annotator cannot, with any satisfaction to his own mind, make the attempt even to separate the chaff from the wheat in this unfeeling production. Major Outram seems to have considered that the Ameers were a set of puppets to be handled and set forth, at his pleasure, just as we see displayed daily in the exhibitions in our streets of the celebrated history of “Punch and Judy.” That officer seems to have racked his inventive genius to give a pretence for despoiling the Ameers of their rights.

The Governor-General (page 380) made the following candid announcement to the Secret Committee, 8th July, 1842:—“The Ameers of Sinde have also made preparations for liquidating the arrears of their tribute, and appear to have desisted from the hostile intrigues in which there is reason to believe they were till lately engaged.”\*

Cold water is thrown by the Governor-General (page 380) on Major Outram’s over-zealous proposals for a new treaty, and it is deeply to be regretted that his Lordship did not adhere to his first impressions, and that he permitted himself to be forced, as it were, into a course of policy, so diametrically opposed to his expressed opinion prior to quitting England. His Lordship did not see any necessity for pressing a negotiation upon the Ameers precipitately, but, on the contrary, “*would rather desire to leave their minds, for the present, in tranquillity.*”

“His Lordship does not consider that there would be any necessity for taking a general power to *cut wood* within a certain distance of the Indus. Such an arrangement can hardly be necessary for the supply of our steamers, and would be naturally *very offensive* to the Ameers.”

The remainder of his Lordship’s letter is altogether very considerate and statesman-like, and it is only to be regretted

\* Why, then, not let the poor harassed Ameers alone after this?

that he had some agents so wedded to certain opinions and prejudices. These young politicals are ever suggesting extension of territory; and Lord Ellenborough has suffered from placing too much confidence in the agents he employed, which led to his committing himself so far, that he found it impossible to retrace his steps, and for mere consistency's sake he was compelled to advance, or rather, he was prevented from retreating. This may be gathered from the observations of the Governor-General here and there in the Blue-book; for instance, we find, in a communication from His Lordship, so late as 17th August, 1842, (page 382) the following:—

“The correspondence with Major Outram respecting the expediency of entering into certain engagements with the Ameers of Sind, will show you that I had no intention, in my former instructions to that officer, to press on the Ameers of Sind any hasty change in our present relations with them, as any such measures that may appear expedient had better remain for future consideration.”

Sir Charles Napier was now (26th August, 1842), sent to assume command in Sind and Beloochistan, (page 384,) and to have authority over all political and civil officers, and he was informed, that “if the Ameers, or any of them, should act hostilely, or evince hostile designs against our army, it is my (the Governor-General's) fixed resolution never to forgive a breach of faith, and to exact a penalty which shall be a warning to every chief in India.”\*

Major Outram was desired (page 385) to lay before Sir C. Napier the state of our relations with the Ameers of Hyderabad, and all the other chiefs in Sind and Beloochistan. The Governor-General (11th Sept. 1842) directed:—

“You will explain to the Major-General the actual state of things, showing him what has been done by the Ameers and chiefs in pursuance of the treaties, and placing before him, with *judicial accuracy*, the several acts whereby the Ameers or chiefs may have seemed to have departed from the terms or spirit of their engagements, and

\* Why all this apprehension, after the declaration to the Secret Committee of 8th July, that the Ameers were quite quiet?

to have evinced hostility or unfriendliness towards the Government of India."

There seems to be more and more cause for regret (page 386) that the Governor-General was so unfortunate in the selection of his agents; for his Lordship's *desire to act justly* is manifest from many of his earlier communications. In addressing Sir Charles Napier, and, in alluding to the necessity of punishing any Ameer or chief with whom we had a treaty of alliance and friendship, for any hostile design evinced against us, he emphatically said, he "would not proceed in this course without the most ample and convincing evidence of the guilt of the person accused. The Governor-General entirely relies upon your sense of justice, and is convinced that whatever report you may make upon the subject, after full investigation, *will be such as he may safely act upon.*"

Reference may be had to Sir Charles Napier's letters (No. 384, page 389, and No. 385, page 390) to show that that officer was resolved to act with determination; otherwise they are scarcely worthy of notice.

A new treaty was still not lost sight of by the Governor-General, (page 392,) who instructs Sir C. Napier that he was authorized to treat with them for a revision of the treaty; and the Governor-General was willing to relieve them, upon just and proper conditions, from the future payment of tribute to the British Government. And with reference to the permission to cut wood, perhaps English coal would be the most eligible mode of supply for our steamers; but his Lordship very properly added, "so much of prejudice, and of feeling too, is attached by the Ameers to their shikargahs being unmolested, that probably matters of much more importance might be obtained from them more easily, than the permission to cut wood for the use of the steamers."

The Governor-General, (page 393,) believing the reports against Ameer Nusseer Khan, states, that that chief must either be compelled to observe the conditions of the treaty, or be deprived of his territory; and if he should be so wrong-headed as to offer any resistance, his interest in Kurrachee, Tatta,

Shikarpore, Sukkur, the purgunnahs adjoining the Bhawulpore country and Subzulkote, shall be immediately transferred to the Khan of Bhawulpore, and the whole property of Ameer Nusseer Khan, of every description, forfeited to the British Government, and such distribution of it made among those who remained faithful, as should hold out a valuable lesson to all the chiefs of India.

General Napier (page 394) loses no time in furnishing abundant reasons and arguments for making a dash at the possessions of the Ameers. His memorandum is a perfect and most unique specimen of Machiavelism. The mere sketch of a few passages is all that can be ventured upon in this place. "It was not for him to consider *how we came to occupy Sinde*. We are here by right of treaties, and therefore we stand on the same footing as the Ameers themselves! There had been no public protest\* registered against the treaties."—"The English occupy Shikarpore, Bukkur, Sukkur, and Kurrachee, by treaties, which, if rigidly adhered to by the Ameers, would render these princes more rich and powerful, and their subjects more happy than they now are." (Here the General is a little mistaken.) After five paragraphs of what the gallant officer calls *reasoning*, he says:—"If this reasoning be correct, would it not be better to come to the results at once? I think it would be better, if it can be done with *honesty*."

"Several Ameers have broken the treaty (par. 10) in the various instances stated in the accompanying return of 'Complaints' against them. I have maintained that we want only a *fair pretext* to coerce the Ameers, and I think the various acts recorded in the return give abundant reason to take Kurrachee, Sukkur, Bukkur, Shikarpore, and Subzulkote," (and why not Hyderabad, General?) "for our own, obliging the Ameers to leave a trail way along both banks of the Indus, and stipulate for a *supply of wood*; but, at the same time, remitting all tribute, and arrears of tribute, in

\* No; the poor Ameers had no notaries public in their country, unfortunately for them—nuisances though these gentry may be elsewhere, when too numerous:

favour of those Ameers whose conduct has been correct; and finally, to enter into a fresh treaty with one of these princes alone as chief, and answerable for the others." (Bravo, General!) "I cannot think that such a procedure would be either dishonourable or harsh; I am sure it would be *humane*. The refractory Ameers break the treaty for the gratification of their avaricious dispositions, and we punish that breach. I can perceive no injustice in such proceeding."

Respecting the alleged breach of the treaty, (par. 17) which has been so much animadverted upon, Sir C. Napier says—

"The Ameers say, that they did not understand Article XI. of the treaty with Hyderabad, to prohibit the levying of tolls *on their own subjects*. It seems that they urge in proof of their misconception, that they resisted the signing of the treaty because of other articles less important, yet never objected to Article XI. because they relied upon Article V. This may be, and I would willingly, if possible, suppose that they really did conceive that the treaty gave them the right of levying tolls on their own subjects; but my answer is, that they have *attempted* to levy tolls on the boats of the Khan of Bhawalpore, &c."

So for that and other flagrant offences, you would punish them in the severe manner proposed. Is this the way that disputes of this kind are settled in Europe?

The General ridicules the idea of letting the Ameers retain their shikargahs, or hunting preserves, unmolested (par. 19)—

"To their selfish feelings and avarice," (says he) "and love of hunting, are such great general interests to be sacrificed? I think not. The real interests of the Ameers themselves demand that their *puerile pursuits*, and blind avaricious proceedings, should be subjected to a wholesome control, which their breaches of treaties, *and our power*, give us at this moment a lawful right to exercise, and the means of *peaceably enforcing*."

The memorandum of the brave general is all of a piece. He may fight well, and be able to command a force; but he was brought up in a school of diplomacy that Machiavel would have done no discredit to, as head professor. Is this the way that the States of India in amity with us are to be

treated? If so, we don't deserve to retain our present footing long.

The attention of General Napier was drawn (page 400) by Major Outram to the fact,

“That Colonel Pottinger's original treaty with the Lower Sinde Ameers, of twenty-three articles, *which was subscribed by them on the approach of an army to Hyderabad*, was not ratified by Lord Auckland, who substituted the existing treaty of fourteen articles, which, however, the Ameers *demurred to accept*, and were only induced to ratify after much delay on learning our successes at Cabul, and that our armies were on *their return*. The present treaty is more stringent than the one they had previously agreed to, which limited the number of British troops at any time to be located in Sinde, and confined them to the occupation of Tatta alone. On your third paragraph I have to remark that, by a separate article of the treaty with Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, our occupation of the fortress of Bukkur is pledged to be only temporary ‘*during the existence of the war.*’”

What do all Major Outram's complaints amount to, to justify such a new treaty as that proposed? (page 400)—1st, A letter addressed to Shere Sing of Lahore, supposed to have been by Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, but only brought home to Futteh Mahomed Ghoree; 2nd, compassing the flight of a state prisoner, Syud Mahomed Shureef, of which Ghoree was also accused, but of which, as subsequently appeared, he was innocent; 3d, placing in the stocks and maltreating the servant of a British officer, by Syud Bahadoor Ali, agent of Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore; 4th, case of stoppage and exaction of duties affecting British property, at Bhoong Bara on the Indus, under authority of Meer Roostum Khan—though Major Outram reports (pages 402 to 416) that it did not appear their Highnesses ever relinquished their right to tax their own subjects; 5th, seizing and confining British subjects, who were released on demand, but no reparation afforded.

A long letter from the Political Agent in Lower Sinde, (p. 416), dated 11th May 1840, forms one of the enclosures in Major Outram's communication to Sir C. Napier (p. 418,) and presents rather a curious contrast with some of the Major's

later productions. He therein contended that the Meerpore Chief never agreed to exempt Sincé merchants from what they had been accustomed to pay, and what in fact, was the principal source of his revenue. The Ameers of Hyderabad considered also that, by the terms of the treaty, they continued to possess the same right. A similar right over their own subjects continued to be exercised by the Khyrpore and Bhawulpore chiefs, and the Major says, (par. 7)—

“It is with much diffidence, but from an imperative sense of duty, that I now beg most respectfully and submissively to offer my opinion on the subject. It appears to me very possible, that the Ameers may have understood the 11th and 12th articles of the new treaty to be merely confirmatory of the former commercial treaties, and that they really never did contemplate that those articles had any reference to the subjects of Sincé, especially as the 5th article provides for the ‘*absolute rule*’ of the Ameers over their own subjects; otherwise, I do not think they would have omitted to protest against such an arrangement, which deprives them of their principal source of revenue, besides in a great measure undermining their authority over their own subjects, when they so pertinaciously persisted in protesting against other, and to them far less important, provisions of the new treaty.”\*

Major Outram therefore considered that, if the then Governor-General was determined to exact the enforcement of the exemption on behalf of the subjects of Sincé, he was convinced it would cause extreme discontent, much bickering, and frequent disturbances, more than counterbalancing any advantages that would accrue from granting the freedom of the river to subjects of Sincé. And mark the conclusion—

“In support of these views, which I consider myself bound in duty to submit for the judgment of the Governor-General of India in Council, I may be permitted to quote the words of the enlightened statesman, Franklin,—‘To me it seems that neither the obtaining nor retaining of any trade, however valuable, is an object for which men may justly spill each other’s blood; that the true and sure means of extending commerce is the goodness and cheapness of commodities, and that the profit of no trade can be equal to the expense of *compelling it and holding it by fleets and armies.*’”

\* No doubt the Ameers understood the commercial treaty as above described, when Major Outram was in better humour with them.

Captain Mylne's memorandum and summary of charges against the Ameers of Lower Sinde was forwarded to Sir C. Napier, by Major Outram, who stated that it was but fair to the Ameers to acquaint him, that in the toll discussions referred to, their Highnesses declared they always understood the parties alluded to, for whom freedom of trade was claimed, to be foreign traders, the treaty of 1836 alluded to being expressly confined to such! Adverting to the evil results of a divided Government, all the Ameers having been declared equal by Lord Auckland, Major Outram recommends that Meer Mahomed should be elevated to the chieftainship.\*

The only observation in Captain Mylne's letter worthy of notice (page 430,) is that,

“It is not to be supposed that the presence of a British force in Sinde, the growing influence of the British Government in the country, and the voice we hold in the Durhar, can be looked upon otherwise than with feelings of jealousy by the Ameers. Their position is becoming daily more humiliating as each vain evasion is unmasked, and they are well aware that their subjects consider them as being completely in the hands of the British.”

An intercepted letter, and a treaty written in a Koran from Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, and addressed to Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, (page 462,) were forwarded, 30th October, 1842, to Sir C. Napier by Major Outram, who stated that these documents were obtained through a party interested in Meer Ali Moorad's\* favour, and should be received *with suspicion*, as that chief had made proposals some time before, to the British Government to be elevated to the chieftainship of Upper Sinde, to the prejudice of his brother Meer Roostum Khan. The Major nevertheless considered that the documents had the appearance of being genuine,—the second enclosure, “received through a different channel, confirming the fact of an *interchange of Korans between Meer Roostum Khan and Nusseer Khan!*”

The Governor-General, with reference to the supposed infraction of the treaty by the Ameers of Upper and Lower

\* This is the chief now in power, elevated by Sir C. Napier.

Since (page 469) by Meer Roostum Khan, having addressed Maharajah Shere Sing, and Futteh Mahomed Ghoree having compassed the escape of Syud Mahomed, considers that these were acts of hostility to the British Government, for which Meer Roostum Khan was responsible. His Lordship then points out to General Napier the several objects which he desires to attain:—1st, The free introduction of all articles of consumption into the British cantonments; 2d, a cession of territory in exchange for tribute; 3d, the coinage at the expense of the British Government\* of rupees of the same value as those called Company's rupees, bearing on one side whatever inscription the Ameers might desire, and on the other side the Sovereign of England,—this being with reference to the intention of introducing an uniform currency in all India. His Lordship adds, (par. 9)—

“The exaction of a provision to this effect is but a lenient penalty for the offences which the Ameers have committed, and to this I propose to add another, strongly recommended by you, a provision securing to us *the right to cut wood upon both banks of the Indus for the use of the steamers.*”†

His Lordship afterwards intimates (par. 16-17) that he was desirous of confining the acquisitions of territory to be made by us to such as were necessary for the full protection of the trade upon the Indus, and the military command of the river. These objects would be accomplished by the possession of Kurrachee, Tatta, Suḡkur, Bukkur, and Roree, together with such arrondissement as might be necessary for the secure and convenient occupation of these places, and give ample room for the extension of the town and cantonments. It might also, if required, be advisable to insert in any revised treaty, provisions not only securing the free use of Tatta, but likewise the free use of the navigable creek between Kurrachee and Tatta, and also of the road of that creek to Tatta. The ultimate object was the entire freedom of internal trade throughout the whole ter-

\* This was a new idea, and rather an extraordinary proposal to a so-called independent State.

† A most oppressive provision. It had been previously stated, his Lordship wished to have nothing to do with the left bank of the Indus.

ritory between Hindoo Koosh, the Indus, and the sea, and his Lordship only awaited the favourable opportunity for effecting this purpose, and for introducing uniformity of currency within the same limits. The conclusion exhibits the intention of effecting very great changes indeed (par. 20)—

“To these great benefits, to be enjoyed equally by 140 millions of people, I desire ultimately to add *the abolition of all tributes* payable by one State to another, and the substitution for such tributes of cessions of territory, so made, by means of mutual exchanges, *as to bring together into masses the dominions of the several sovereigns and chiefs*. These various measures, which would impart to the people of India the most considerable of the advantages derived from union under the same empire, it may require much time to effect; but it is desirable that they should always be held in view as the ultimate object of our policy, not inconsistent with the real independence of any state, and conducive to the happiness of the subjects of all.”\*

The crisis had now arrived; the pear was nearly ripe; and the Governor-General having made up his mind on the imputed guilt of the Ameers, on the very frivolous charges so industriously collected and brought against them by the host of political officers in Sinde, determined to inflict an effectual punishment, by carrying into effect the measures he had for some time been so solicitous about, namely, the taking complete possession of valuable portions of their territory,—transmitted to Sir C. Napier, (4th November, 1842,) the draft of a treaty to be *imposed* upon these chiefs, and the gallant General was directed to nominate such officer as he might consider most competent to discharge the duty of Commissioner, for negotiating the treaties with the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sinde.

A note was addressed to the Ameers of Hyderabad (p. 472,) adverting to the *divers infractions* without any specification thereof, of the treaty by the Ameers, with the exception of Sobdar Khan, and communicating the resolution to mark his sense of their misconduct, and that the Governor-General had em-

\* What say the Honourable Court of Directors and the Board of Control to this *radical* change? Have they any voice in the matter, or can Lord Ellenborough do just as he sees fit?

powered General Napier to require their consent to the several provisions contained in the annexed draft of a treaty. The Ameers were to be released from all obligation to pay tribute after the 1st December, 1842, and they “ would see in this provision the regard which, notwithstanding their misconduct, the Governor-General of India has not ceased to entertain for the *comfort and dignity of their Highnesses, and his sincere attachment to peace.*”

A separate note was addressed (p. 473) to Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad; stating that his hostile conduct, manifested in addressing to Beebruck Boogtee a letter, having for its object the inducing of that chief to engage in acts of hostility against the British Government, and further a letter addressed by Nusseer Khan to Sawun Mull, had induced the Governor-General to empower Sir C. Napier to obtain the consent of Meer Nusseer Khan to the proposed treaty; and presuming that that chief, after carrying into effect the provisions of the said treaty, would be again admitted to the friendship of the Governor-General, who would forget offences for which clear atonement had been made.\*

The treaty provided, 1st, That the Ameers should be relieved from the payment of tribute;—2nd, The Company’s rupee to be the coin legally current in the dominions of the Ameers of Hyderabad, after 1st January, 1845. The British Government will also coin for the Ameers, such number of rupees as they may require, bearing the effigy on one side of the Sovereign of England, and on the other such inscription or device as the Ameers may prefer. The Ameers to renounce the privilege of coining money.—3rd, The British Government to have the right of felling wood for the use of steamers, within one hundred yards of both banks of the river; but the British Government being unwilling to exercise this right in a manner inconsistent or disagreeable to the Ameers, will exercise it only under the direction of British officers, and will refrain from all exercise of it so long

\* It should not be overlooked, that no steps were ever taken to require explanation from the Ameers of their guilt or innocence of the charges brought against them!

as the Ameers shall provide wood, to be paid for at such places as may be named. — 4th, Kurrachee and Tatta, with such arrondissement as may be deemed necessary by Sir C. Napier, to be ceded in perpetuity to the British Government, also the right of free passage over the territories of the Ameers between Kurrachee and Tatta, within such limits as Sir C. Napier may determine, wherein the British Government shall alone have jurisdiction.— 5th, All the rights and interests of the Ameers, or of any one of them, in Subzulcote, and in all the territory intervening between the present frontier of Bhawalpore and the town of Roree, are ceded in perpetuity to his Highness the Nawab of Bhawalpore. — 6th, To Meer Sobdar Khan, the cession of territory producing half a lac of annual revenue, such cession being in consideration of the loss of revenue he will sustain by the transfer of Kurrachee.— 7th, The Commissioner should decide what portion of territory shall be ceded by the other Ameers to Sobdar Khan, in pursuance of the above article, &c.

We now come (page 474) to the manifesto issued to Meer Roostum Khan and Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore. *No charge* whatever is made against the latter, or the other Ameers of Upper Sinde, and yet upon the two charges about to be noticed, the whole of these chiefs are punished to the extent that will be shown, in adverting to the terms of the treaty about to be enforced upon them. Is this justice? Shame! shame! The note expresses the regret, that Meer Roostum Khan, whose conduct in the early part of the Affghan war had been such as to merit the approbation of the British Government, should have been led away by evil advisers, &c.; and the specific charges against him are, that he wrote a letter to Maharajah Shere Sing;\* and further, through his minister, Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, that he compassed the escape of Syud Mahomed Shureef Khan, a state prisoner. † These were the offences which induced the Governor-General to dictate a treaty upon the whole of the Ameers, as follows:—

\* It has been proved that Meer Roostum Khan knew nothing whatever of that letter.

† It has also been shown that the Ameer had no cognizance of this affair.

The first article of the treaty (page 475) is, that “ the pergunah of Bhoong Bhara, and the third part of the district of Subzulcote, and the villages of Gotkee, Maladee, Chaonga, Dacloola, and Uzuzpore, and all the territories of the Ameers of Khyrpore, or any of them intervening between the dominions of his Highness the Nawab of Bhawulpore and the town and district of Roree, are ceded in perpetuity to his Highness the Nawab.

“2. The town of Sukkur, with such arrondissement as shall be deemed necessary by Major-General Sir Charles Napier, and the islands of Bukkur and the adjoining islets, and the town of Roree, with such arrondissement as may be deemed necessary by the General, are ceded in perpetuity to the British Government.”

There were added provisions for the appropriation of the surplus tribute to the Ameers who were called upon to make cessions,—a complicated arrangement also for exemption from tolls on the Indus, coining, supply of wood, release from tribute, &c., as specified in the Hyderabad treaty.

A willing and unscrupulous agent was found in Sir Charles Napier. That officer reported to the Governor-General (5th Nov. 1842, page 476) —

“ The Ameers have not committed any Covert act, and I only wait till I hear from you, after your Lordship receives the long letter I sent on the 25th ultimo, to draw out a fresh treaty, entering minutely into the details of exchanging tribute for territory ; and if your Lordship approves of this, I would submit it to the Ameers, at the same time sparing no pains to convince them that neither injury nor injustice is meditated, and that, by accepting the treaty, they will become more rich and more secure in the possession of power than they now are. If they refuse to listen to reason, and if they persist in sacrificing every thing to their *shikaryahs* or hunting grounds, they must even have their way, *and try the force of arms*, at their peril, if so they are resolved.”

Mr. Clerk, Envoy to the Court of Lahore, (page 476) in transmitting to the Secretary to the Governor-General (12th Nov. 1842) translations of two letters sent to him by Major Outram, purporting to be from Vizier Kurreem Khan and

Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore to Maharajah Shere Sing, and a note to Dewan Mull, states that he failed to trace the cossids to their homes, as directed by Major Outram, and he adds, "the authenticity of these letters is yet matter of some doubt to me, as it was to Major Outram when sending them." The opinion of the Political Agent in Lower Sinde (19th Dec. 1840) of Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, (page 305) the minister of Meer Roostum Khan, should be here noticed, as that man was the cause of the accusations against the Ameers. It is stated that he was ever opposed to the alliance with the British Government, and upon the agent remonstrating with Meer Roostum Khan, that chief admitted he had many causes of complaint against his minister, that the latter had been his servant (originally a slave) from boyhood, and begged the political agent to speak to him privately. Why then should the whole of the Ameers of Upper Sinde suffer so grievously for the acts of a servant who might have been punished or dismissed, on the representation of the British Government, and the justice of the case fully satisfied. But alas! it was essential to have a pretext for the extension of territory, and the other arrangements so earnestly desired by the Governor-General.

The communications by the Governor-General to Sir Charles Napier about this time, (Nov. 1842) evince no disposition to relax in the demand made on the Ameers, nor to yield one iota of the stern decree issued against them, but on the contrary, a fixed determination to enforce all that was required, *coute qui coute*. From the reports received by his Lordship, he hardly thought the General would be able to carry the instructions into effect (page 483); and if a large force was required, it should be sent. The designs of the Ameers appeared, however, to be of a "defensive character only," but the least sign of hesitation on our part would convert these defensive preparations into measures of a hostile nature, and "to yield the smallest point in negociation would have all the effect of a defeat in the field." His Lordship therefore, adhered to his original intention with respect to the Ameers. If any of them committed an overt act of hostility, his pos-

sessions should be altogether confiscated, and he be dependant upon the charity of his own family for his future subsistence. The example of punishment should produce an effect throughout all India, calculated to deter any chief within its limits, from encountering the just resentment of the British Government, while the reward bestowed on our faithful ally, the Khan of Bhawulpore, would tend to confirm all our allies in the loyal observance of their engagements.

General Napier considered the charge against Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, of writing a letter to Brebruck Boogtie was proved by the seal. But the General's argument is unique of its kind. The seal he procured did not correspond in size and distance of the letters with the one on the letter, as he found by measuring it with *a pair of compasses*, but in all other respects they agreed; so he was told by those who understood Persian. But then the Ameers were stated to use two seals, one on occasions of secrecy, and another on ordinary occasions; so that whether it was a forgery or not, the Ameers were to suffer. There were doubts on Major Outram's mind, of Meer Roostum Khan having addressed Maharajah Shere Sing. If his minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree wrote it, without his knowledge, and if the prince gave his signet and power *blindly* to his minister, such folly was not to excuse him from the consequences. The General considered that Futteh Mahomed Ghoree had assisted in the escape of Syud Mahomed Shureef, and if the Governor-General deemed that the above was sufficient to act upon, Sir Charles Napier would lose no time in proposing the draft of the new treaty to the Ameers. "I am" (says he) "perfectly prepared, should they resist, to act in a way which I imagine will bring them to reason without bloodshed. *Not but that I have troops enough (and ready enough) to thrash them heartily if they resolve to try their strength.*"

The General recommended the recal of Major Outram from Bombay, to be employed as commissioner. Under what circumstances, and when the latter officer quitted his office in Sinde, does not appear.

Preparations were made by General Napier for advancing

to Hyderabad, (page 487) should the Ameer resolve to take the field, and he had made up his mind to cross the Indus at once, and march to the capital by land.

Next on this busy scene, comes an intrigue of Meer Ali Moorad Khan (p. 488), which ended in the overthrow of Meer Roostum Khan, who had been the earliest and best friend of the English in Upper Sind, till he was charged with writing a letter, of which he was utterly ignorant. The object of Ali Moorad was to secure the turban, and the communication of General Napier tended to encourage his ambitious views. It was hoped the Governor-General would approve of what had been stated by the General, who says :—

“It lays a train to arrive at a point which I think should be urged, viz., that we should treat with *one Ameer instead of a number*. This will simplify our political dealings with these princes, and gradually reduce them to the class of rich noblemen ; and their chief will be perfectly dependent on the Government of India, living, as he will do, so close to this large station (Sukkur), and I have no doubt that it will quickly be a large town.”

The charge against Meer Nusseer Khan is not alluded to by the Governor-General in his reply, (page 489) except that his Lordship was prepared to abide by and support General Napier's decision, but—

“Undoubtedly, Meer Roostum Khan must be held responsible for the acts of his minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree. With respect to the escape of Syud Mahomed Shureef, the evidence of Futteh Mahomed Ghoree's having assisted in that escape seems to be as conclusive as any evidence likely to be obtained upon any point connected with the conduct of a native chief. If a Government were to wait, in every case of suspected hostility, until it obtained such proof of the hostile intention as would be sufficient to convict the person suspected in a court of justice, it would, in most cases, expose itself at once to disgrace and disaster. It is necessary to proceed upon a strong presumption of intended hostility, where hesitation might seriously affect great national interests. Your force being now collected, I am disposed to think that no delay should take place in communicating to the Ameer the ultimate decision of the British Government, with respect to the revision of our engagements with them, which their conduct has compelled us to demand.”

Sir Charles Napier still manifests the most zealous desire to carry into effect the views of the Governor-General, (pages 491, 494, 498, 499, 503) and is not inclined to put any trust in the assurances of the Ameers. The representations of Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, and Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, are really most affecting documents, (vide Nos. 446 and 447.) The latter, after alluding to the permission given to Sir A. Burnes to travel through his dominions, which was obtained by him, in opposition to the wish of the late Ali Moorad Khan, stated that he (Nusseer Khan) and Meer Noor Mahomed Khan had urged Sir H. Pottinger to come into the country, and finally succeeded in introducing a British force; they had cheerfully given up money for the construction of the cantonments, and even consented to the payment of tribute. He adds—

“We were then perfectly happy and contented; but now the arrival of your letter has caused us some surprise. I beg you to recollect that every one in this world has his enemy, and it is very possible that some designing person has forged these letters to the Boogties and others. It is quite impossible that I should ever have been guilty of a thing of this sort. Pray who are these individuals, that I should take the trouble of writing to them? God is my witness, that up to this moment, I know not whether the name you mention as belonging to the Boogties, *is that of a man or a whole tribe. I know them not.* As to Sawun Mull, it is true that, in accordance with Article VIII. of the new treaty, I have occasionally corresponded in a friendly way with that person, but always, I would observe, with the knowledge of the political agents of the British Government. This correspondence has never related to other than trifling matters, and I court investigation into the charges preferred against me. It is impossible that you can have made these allegations so seriously affecting me, without some kind of apparently strong evidence; and I trust that the matter may be sifted, and the author of the falsehood brought to punishment. *I know that the kings of England never sanction injustice; still, if you think proper to deal harshly with me, I shall submit and be silent. Even now I am setting out to pay my respects to you.*”

All these appeals are just so much waste paper; the General would not be pacified, and the Governor-General still

confessed his apprehension (page 507), that until the Ameers had felt the strength of our arms they would never abandon the thought of hostility; and an offer was made (15th Dec. 1842) of additional troops, if required. The intelligence obtained by Major Clibborn certainly indicated preparations for resistance on the part of the Ameers (page 508), which could scarcely, under the circumstances, be a matter of surprise.

It has been the object of the writer, throughout this analysis, to submit a fair statement of the whole case, and to give both sides of the question, in the most impartial manner; and he can with truth and sincerity declare that he opened the volume now under review, with the firm belief, and in the anxious expectation, of finding a complete justification for the course pursued by the present Governor-General, and he may add, the late Governor-General. Although a conservative in politics, it was not his wish to treat this as a party question, which, in point of fact, it is not; and he feels confident, that Her Majesty's present advisers will evince, by their decision, that they know how to discriminate between right and wrong, and that they will not tolerate injustice, whether perpetrated by one of their own adherents or opponents; and as Meer Nusseer Khan expressed a firm reliance that the kings of England would never countenance such harsh proceedings as had been adopted towards him: so, by the blessing of an all-wise Providence, it will, the author firmly trusts, be found that our gracious Queen will equally repudiate, when the facts shall come to her knowledge, proceedings so arbitrary and uncalled for, as those which have marked the progress of our negotiations with Sinde.

The author, therefore, feels himself bound to notice the complaint preferred by Sir Charles Napier (under date 18th Dec. 1842), that the Mails had been robbed near the town (Sukkur) by Meer Roostum's people (page 509). The General says,—

“The poor old fool is in the hands of his family. I have sent him orders to disband his troops instantly. I suspect he has no power,

and I must rule his band for him. The Beloochees are plundering all between this and Shikarpore. This intelligence reached me this morning. But these things must be expected where such wild and unmanageable tribes of robbers are collected and form an army. I hope soon to quiet them."

Here the reflection naturally presents itself, that if the Governor-General had been more fortunate in the choice of an agent, who would have endeavoured to soothe his Lordship's feelings instead of urging him on, from anxiety, it may be, for the display of military enterprise, and in the expectation of glory and renown, and hope of plunder at Hyderabad, all this calamity would have been averted; but the temptation seems to have been irresistible, which prompted the General to use his utmost efforts to keep open the breach and work on the feelings of the Governor-General. Oh! Lord Ellenborough, I pray you, be more cautious in the selection of your agents in future.

A letter from General Napier (dated 20th Dec. 1842) proves (page 520), beyond a doubt, that Meer Roostum Khan had been the dupe of Ali Moorad, and was sacrificed afterwards, as he truly observes, in consequence of following the advice of the General, who in the most triumphant style announces to the Governor-General what he considers a most clever stroke of policy. He had completely upset Meer Roostum Khan, our old ally and friend. Ali Moorad, the most powerful of the Talpoor family, was secured in our interest, by the promise of the turban; and our future policy was now simple, being merely to secure the ascendancy of the chief Talpoor. Excellent! General; the perusal of your despatch will amply repay the time devoted to it, by those who desire to know how India is now to be governed, when such men of decision and intrigue as you are employed on diplomatic service, backed by well-disciplined force. This is the commencement of a new era in India. God grant that the controlling authorities may speedily see to what an undesirable result such a course will lead, and without unnecessary delay, suggest the retirement of the gallant General from this kind of employment, for there can be no

doubt of his merit in his own profession. A P.S. is added, to the effect that Meer Roostum Khan had agreed to the draft of the treaty.

The Governor-General still maintains a bold front, and is resolved not to give way (page 511); and with reference to the pathetic letters of Meer Roostum Khan and Meer Nusseer of Hyderabad, he says—

“Nothing said or done by the Ameers will, in the least degree, alter my general determination, as already announced to them by you. The continued collection of troops by the Amcers is totally inconsistent with their declaration of submission; and I conclude that you will have already insisted upon the dispersion of those troops, and have enforced your requisition by a movement towards Khyrpore, should it not at once have been obeyed.”

His Lordship still expected resistance: (page 511)

“The divisions amongst the Ameers of Sinde, both at Hyderabad and Khyrpore, will prevent any serious combination of their forces against us in the field; but forces were collected by these chiefs, before they had any intimation of our intention on the part of Government to insist upon a revision of treaties; and although at Khyrpore they profess a readiness to acquiesce in the arrangements now proposed to them, I have no very confident expectation that there will be a final and satisfactory settlement before they have felt the weight of our arms.”

The conduct of Sir Charles Napier now becomes perfectly intolerable (page 511). Elated by his success in the manœuvre of effecting the elevation of Ali Moorad, and the destruction of the family of our old ally Meer Roostum, the gallant General fancies he has nothing to do but to make and unmake chiefs at his pleasure. Accordingly, we find him stating that Meer Ali Moorad being in possession of Upper Sinde, his interests are identical with ours; he considered Upper Sinde perfectly settled, and was of opinion that Lower Sinde would always be troublesome, unless the Ameers of Hyderabad, like those of Khyrpore, possessed a chief like the one he had himself succeeded in establishing. “Perhaps your Lordship,” says the General, “will favour me with your commands on this subject, and whether you

would authorise me to insist upon their choosing a chief, or else separating, so that each may hold and be responsible for his own possession, and for his own conduct.”

The successful issue of the intrigue by Ali Moorad (page 512) through General Napier, is approved of by the Governor-General, who had no doubt that the establishment of hereditary succession, in the direct male line, to the turban, would materially conduce to the domestic peace of the Ameers, and to the better government of their territories. His Lordship concludes—

“ I shall, therefore, gladly see established the right of primogeniture in the direct line, and this you may, if you should deem it advisable, communicate to Meer Ali Moorad ; and I have little doubt that, once established in the possession of the turban, with our support, he will be able, with the concurrence of a majority of the family, to establish the more natural and reasonable line of succession to the turban, and clothe the measure with the forms of legality ; but recognizing, as I do, Meer Ali Moorad as the successor to Meer Roostum, according to the present custom, whereby the eldest son of Meer Roostum is superseded, *I could not at once recognise the eldest son of Meer Ali Moorad as his successor, in contravention of the very principle on which his father's rights are founded.*”\*

\* I find the following under the head of intelligence from Sinde, of date 5th of August, 1843 :—“ Indeed, all our correspondents appear to think that, so soon as the weather and the inundations will permit, an active campaign will be opened, and that the policy pursued, if backed from home, will be of the most active kind ; but we regret to see that the course followed at present augurs unfavourably for the future, entangled as we are with an ally (?) who must naturally, from the disposition of the other chiefs towards him, interfere with our views. Ali Moorad, after all that has been done for him, will be in possession, we are told, of spoil to the amount of eighteen lakhs a-year, in addition to his former income, said to be about ten lakhs ; and such is the reward a British Government bestows upon a man who by his intrigues has betrayed his brothers and nephews, and a whole host of blood relations, and aided strangers to bend the country to their yoke. It is well for us that no reverse has given him the opportunity of deceiving us. One of our correspondents emphatically says, ‘ Sinde howls at this traitor, and cries out against our conduct to old Roostum. Even the Hindoos, who hated the Talpoors, exclaim against us ; for though they suffered under their yoke, they pity their fate.’ If our object was, as given out, to free an enslaved people, we are doing so with a vengeance, in

It was announced by General Napier (page 517), that Meer Roostum Khan had decamped, but whether from fear of being made prisoner by the General, or driven to this step by his brother, Ali Moorad, was uncertain. Meer Roostum had resigned his turban to Ali Moorad in the most formal manner, writing his resignation in the Koran. The General thought it better for Roostum Khan to keep the turban, and let Ali act for him. It struck the General that Ali Moorad had frightened the old man into the foolish step he had taken, on purpose to make his possession of the turban more decisive; and to do this, he told him the General intended to make him (Roostum) prisoner, Ali pretending to be his friend, and only waiting for his opportunity to betray us. This is a very sensible admission; but why, afterwards, should we have promoted such a scoundrel as Ali Moorad notoriously was and is?

The suggestion of General Napier (page 518) for promoting one of the Ameers of Hyderabad to the chieftainship, does not meet the approval of the Governor-General, unless he had the power of compelling the other Ameers to act according to his orders. Neither did his Lordship know whom to select, if he had, indeed, the power of doing so. The Governor-General was, therefore, not disposed to go further than he had already done, in requiring a modification of the treaty, and drawing what benefit he could from the divisions amongst the Ameers, instead of endeavouring to derive a new advantage from the union of authority in one hand.

A splendid manifesto is addressed (page 525) by Sir Charles Napier, in the Bonapartean style, to Meer Ali Moorad, to the effect that Meer Roostum Khan voluntarily went to his Highness's fortress of Dejee; where he there publicly and formally placed the turban on Ali Moorad's head; and wrote in the sacred Koran that he had given the turban to the Talpoor.

“When I heard those things, I asked permission to wait upon the Ameer to speak with his Highness as to the new treaty, and

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making them over to the hands of Ali Moorad, whilst we fear that the power and riches we are bestowing upon him, when we might have taken them for ourselves, will in the long run furnish weapons to be turned against the Government.”

to hear from his own lips that he had given up public affairs to your guidance. What was the course pursued by his Highness? He abandons your roof, he flies from me, he places himself at the head of those Ameers who have been intriguing against the English, and who, as you inform me, collected bands for the resistance to the authority of the turban. This is strange conduct in the Ameer. The only course for me to pursue is, to advise your Highness publicly to proclaim to the Sindians that you are the legitimate chief of the Talpoors, to caution the other Ameers to obey you as such, and to dismiss their armed followers. If they refuse, *I will disperse them by force.* To these Ameers you will preserve their lands; but no force shall be held in Upper Sinde but by your Highness's killedar."

What says the Governor-General (page 526) of General Napier's special favourite, Ali Moorad? (And here the writer cannot refrain from the expression of his deep regret that Lord Ellenborough had not employed a more discreet agent, brave as a lion as the veteran Napier may be.) His Lordship declares—

*"I have no confidence in Ali Moorad. I believe he managed the flight of Meer Roostum. I think Meer Sobdar must have been forced into an apparent junction with the other chiefs of Hyderabad; and he will leave them as soon as he can." . . . . . "It is my impression that nothing but a severe blow will make the chiefs generally true to their engagements."*

The Governor-General, however (page 528), afterwards approves of General Napier's letter to Ali Moorad.

General Napier (page 528) destroyed the fortress of Emaum Ghur; and as an excuse for this act, which was the commencement of hostilities on either side, he says—

*"When I reflected that the existence of Emaum Ghur can only serve to foster confidence in the Ameers of both Sinds when discontented or rebellious, and will, sooner or later, force us to another and more perilous march perhaps, I made up my mind to *blow it down.* It belongs to Ali Moorad, who consents to its destruction; I have, therefore, undermined it. The vast quantity of powder which we cannot remove, will be better destroyed. It is well stored with grain, which I have distributed as rations."\**

The gallant feat was again repeated (page 529); the demo-

\* Who, then, first commenced hostilities? Was this not enough to rouse the Ameers against us?

lition of Emaum Ghur was completed on the 15th of January, 1842, when thirty-four mines were sprung; the last, finishing the whole of the powder found in the fortress, viz., about 20,000 lbs.

Major Outram (page 530) was now (Jan. 15, 1843,) sent to treat with the Ameers, to whom notice was given by General Napier, that they should send vakeels with full powers; and that if any vakeel shall declare he had not full powers, he should be excluded from the meeting, and the General would enter the territories of such Ameer with the troops under his orders, and take possession of them in the name of the British Government. Such was the General's mode of negotiating for a new treaty. He reported (page 530) to the Governor-General that he should not require a stronger force than that at his command.

The approval (page 531) of the Governor-General of the demolition of the fortress of Emaum Ghur is conveyed to General Napier; and his Lordship entertained a hope that all the arrangements, consequent upon the new treaties accepted by the Ameers, would be carried into effect without bloodshed,—a result, on every account most desirable, which would be mainly owing to the decision and enterprise with which General Napier had been acting.

Again (page 532) his Lordship says—

“I congratulate you on having destroyed Emaum Ghur, and being well out of the desert.” . . . “You are quite right in fencing their (the Ameers') procrastination. The hot season will soon be upon us, and no time is to be lost in finishing the transaction, and placing the troops in secure and healthy positions.”

Symptoms (page 534) of relenting are now (Feb. 9, 1843,) exhibited by the Governor-General, who, no doubt, if he had been left to his own judgment, and not urged on by the General and others, would have extricated himself with more tact from the dilemma in which he was placed; and would have evinced more liberality towards the Ameers. His Lordship observes—

“The object of giving to the Nawab of Bhawulpore the country between Bhoong Bhara and Rorec, was to establish a communication

between our territories on the Sutledj and Roree, through a friendly state, *rather than to inflict any punishment on the Ameers of Khyrpore*. The object of establishing this communication may probably be effected without giving to the Nawab the whole of the pergunnahs intervening between Bhoong Bhara and Roree. Enough will be done if we secure a good military and commercial communication. If you should be of opinion that the cession originally demanded presses too heavily upon the Ameers, I shall be glad to receive any suggestion you may wish to offer for its modification. All the Nawab of Bhawulpore has lost should be restored to him. I do not know whether he ever had any country to the south of Bhoong Bhara. The restoration to the Nawab of all he has lost, would be felt everywhere to be a measure at once of generosity and of justice."

Major Outram's conference (page 534,) with the Ameers of Sinde, on the 8th and 9th Feb. 1843, is, perhaps, the most interesting document in the volume. The Ameers of Hyderabad producing former treaties, and Meer Nusseer Khan especially pointing to the one dated April, 1838, and signed by Lord Auckland, which pledged his Lordship *never to covet any portion* of the Ameer's territory, or "one rea" of his property, asked—

"Why is it that you now make new demands? Four years have only passed since your Sirkar thus pledged that nothing more should be required of us. We deny that we have infringed one iota of the existing treaties. In what have we done so? It was written that treasonable letters had been sent to Beebruck Boogtee and Sawun Mull. Why were those letters not produced? Why don't you give us an opportunity of disproving them? We never wrote them. You say the seals prove them. How easily seals are forged, you yourself know, having required us to punish one of our own subjects who forged yours, when you resided here two years ago.' Meer Nusseer Khan said, solemnly, 'I deny that it was written by my authority. Why was not the paper shewn to me?' The Ameers intimated, 'If the army advances, our Beloochees will not be restrained, and we shall be blamed for the consequences. You little know how little under our control the Beloochees are. If the army advances, they will plunder the whole country. We deny the charges on which the new treaty is imposed, but still we will subscribe it, and the Ameers of Upper Sinde will also subscribe theirs, on one condition, *i. e.* that Meer Roostum Khan be restored

to his rights. Why was he deposed? Meer Roostum Khan then said, 'By the General's own direction I sought refuge with Ali Moorad, (here he produced the letter directing Meer Roostum to place himself under Meer Ali Moorad's protection, and to be guided by his advice,) who placed me under restraint, and made use of my seal, and compelled me to do as he thought proper. Would I resign my birthright of my own free will? I did not write that letter. Anything I did was by Ali Moorad's advice, whose advice I was directed by the General to be guided by.' Meer Mahomed Khan of Khyrpore said, 'What fault have I committed, and why has my house been destroyed and my property been plundered?' (Emaum Ghur.) The Ameers at last ended by saying that they protested against the charges on which the new treaty was required, as unfounded, but that they would comply with the terms, provided I advised them to do so, and that they might petition the Governor-General with a view to represent the *falsehood of the charges*."

On the evening of the 12th Feb. 1843, Major Outram had a long conference with the Ameers, when, after much discussion, their seals were affixed to the draft of the new Treaty; but on returning home, after leaving the fort, Major Outram and his companions had to pass through a dense crowd of Beloochees, who gave unequivocal evidence of bad feeling in their manner and expressions, but were kept from giving further vent to their feelings by a strong escort of horse the Ameers sent, under some of their most influential chiefs. After getting clear of the crowd, Major Outram was informed that one of the officers of his company had been struck with a stone; but the officer, in the darkness, did not see by whom. The Ameers, however, were acquitted of all blame, and no representation was deemed necessary.

Another conference, with a deputation from the Ameers, took place on the 13th February (page 538). It was intimated that the Ameers had lost all control over the Beloochees, who were violent in supporting Meer Roostum Khan's cause; and the Ameers were anxious to dismiss the Beloochees, but as the Belooch Sirdars had sworn one and all to uphold the rights of Meer Roostum Khan, the Ameers were helpless. "At least," said the deputation, "give us some pledge that justice shall be done, by which the Ameers may

endeavour to allay the excitement of the people, and persuade them to disperse—we fear it will be impossible; but their Highnesses will try once more, if you will authorize them to hold out hopes of the ultimate restoration of their lands which have been made over to Ali Moorad.” The Commissioner assured them that the General would give a favourable consideration to their representation, but he could make no pledge. At last the deputies said, “If you will not promise the restoration of the lands Ali Moorad has taken, the Khyrpore Ameers must fight for their bread. Why should we be answerable?” “The deputies said they would report what had passed; but that they had no hope of allaying the excitement of the Beloochees unless I would authorize some more positive assurance to the Upper Sinde Ameers, that, if any reply was to be given, they would bring it that night; otherwise, I was to consider that their masters could do nothing further.”

Preparations not to be mistaken, were now (13th February, 1840), in rapid progress for an outbreak (page 540), which might reasonably have been anticipated: and General Napier intercepted some letters which put him upon his guard, and showed the duplicity, as he called it, of Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad. It was plain, (he thought,) the Ameers wanted the General to delay his march till the 9th, to get their people together.

Three days after the Ameers had affixed their seals to the draft treaty, viz. on 15th February, 1843, (page 541), an attack was made by a large force on the Residency, which was gallantly defended for some time by Major Outram and his small party, who eventually effected their retreat on board two steamers, fortunately a few hundred yards from the Residency; and now the long-expected hostilities had commenced in right earnest.

General Napier was at no great distance (page 543), and advancing with his force with all haste, encountered a large army of Beloochees and Sindeans at Meeanee, on the 18th February, 1843, and gained a decided victory, after a long and hard-fought battle. Three of the Ameers of Khyrpore and three of Hyderabad, immediately went into camp and

surrendered their swords as prisoners of war ; Hyderabad was at the same time surrounded, and taken possession of on the 19th February.

The Governor-General (page 548), in announcing the splendid victory of General Napier to the Secret Committee, states that that achievement had placed us in a more advantageous position than his Lordship had endeavoured to secure by *pacific treaty*. He observed,

“ The war, which could not be for ever avoided, would have been forced upon us at the most inconvenient time, and might have produced a serious diversion of our force when we most needed it. Fortunately, the treachery of the Ameers, and the overweening confidence and the reckless violence of the Beloochees, have brought on a crisis at the period at which we could with least embarrassment encounter it ; and the result has been, the most decisive victory gained on the best fought field.” . . . “ The firmness of the language he” (General Napier,) “ adopted, and the energy of his measures, were best calculated to control a barbarous Durbar ; and had the Ameers been entirely masters over their own troops, it seems to be doubtful, even now, whether he would not have effected his purpose, and carried the treaty into execution without actual hostilities.”

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### CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

On closing the volume, of which the foregoing is an Analysis, the author cannot withhold the expression of his deep regret that any representative of the British Government in India, should have been capable of devising and carrying into effect measures of such harshness and severity towards a neighbouring friendly and independent state, with which we had been so long on terms of amicable alliance, and which was goaded by exactions beyond endurance.

We first of all obtained a footing in Sindh in the year 1836, by offering our friendly mediation for the adjustment of differences between that state and Runjeet Sing, the Ruler of Lahore ; we soon afterwards acted as agents of Shah Shoojah,

the long exiled chief of Cabool, to enforce tribute to a large amount. We then acquired a passage for our troops through Sinde, and availed ourselves of all the resources of the country, in boats, grain, and camels, &c., for our army proceeding to Affghanistan. We obtained leave to establish a Residency at the capital, imposed a subsidiary force and a tribute of three lacs of rupees towards defraying the expenses; took possession of Kurrachee, Tatta, and other places, received a cession of Shikarpore in lieu of tribute which the Ameers were too poor to pay, and finally took possession of Bukkur, Sukkur, and other places, and eventually of the capital; displaced the Ameers in authority, despoiled them of all their treasure and property, made prisoners of them, and now virtually hold possession of the country, having set up a treacherous chief (Ali Moorad) as a puppet.

A course so impolitic and uncalled for, must have the effect of tarnishing the name of the East India Company (heretofore famed for acts of liberality), and attaching an indelible stigma to the character of Britain in the remotest parts of the East. And it is impossible not to feel deep sorrow that the blood of so many of the gallant defenders of our country's honour has been spilt in such an unworthy cause, and that such a vast number of brave officers and soldiers should have fallen victims to the pestilential diseases incident to that climate and locality. But an awful fate has attended our ambitious projects beyond our natural limits. The hand writing is on the wall; may we take warning ere it is too late!

The author had occasion, some two years ago, at the very time the disasters were taking place in Affghanistan, to state his opinion, in one of the leading journals, in reference to China, Burmah, Affghanistan, &c., as follows; and he considers his views are also very applicable to the present case of Sinde:—

“ Why should we not observe towards those nations, as nearly as circumstances will admit, the same policy as pursued towards European states with which we have been at war? No doubt, as the safety of all states depends upon the observance of the law of nations, all acts done in systematical defiance of its principles, give a right of

war to all other states against the wrong doers ; and, therefore, while we may be prompt to repel aggression, and to demand reparation for insult or encroachments, we should be careful to manifest, by our subsequent conduct, that we are not actuated by views of ambition or conquest, and that we do not aim at universal empire in the East ; but that all we seek is, to maintain our own rights, to resist aggression, and preserve the balance of power amongst the independent rulers in that part of Asia, precisely upon the same principle as the British Government has done as regards the states of Europe. I venture to predict, that ere long the correct course in our dealings with these semi-barbarous nations, as we call them, will be to revert to the same principles, and to adopt towards them the same policy, as have been found, by the experience of ages, most suitable in our negociations with those in a more advanced state of civilization ; and we may be assured, that although temporary success may attend our efforts, and we may, at great cost and sacrifice, bring them into subjection, still, if our claims be not founded in strict justice, or are adverse to what are considered the inherent and established right of nations—whether in Europe or Asia,—we shall not succeed in imposing a yoke so galling to their pride. We should not take advantage of the unguarded conduct of those native states, wantonly to dispossess them of their territory or their rights, and thereby provoke a continued enmity and a combination for our destruction ; even by those with whom we have long been connected, and some of whom are still far from being reconciled to their subjection.”

This Sinde question is second in importance to none that has been submitted to the consideration of the controlling authorities of this country for a long time past. It involves the character of two Governors-General, the welfare of India, the prosperity and even safety of our vast East India possessions, and the honour of the British nation. The secret springs of action which have guided the machinery of administration in political measures of great moment, have now been exhibited to the observation of the world ; and it well becomes those who possess the power of supervision, to ponder well on the stirring events which have lately occurred on the north-western frontier of India ; to devise a remedy for those generally acknowledged evils which have marked our career in that quarter ; and to grant redress to those chiefs who have

innocently suffered by the unfortunate measures deemed necessary for upholding our supremacy in a quarter where no apprehension should, in any rational mind, have been entertained. This is not a party question at all, involving Whig or Tory principles: neither of the great parties in the State can always be responsible for the imprudent acts of the governors of distant possessions. Men who may have established a reputation for great ability and temper, may, when placed in an important charge, by one single act of heedlessness or bad policy, at once destroy their character for discretion, and render them unfit longer to hold the reins of government: just as an eminent lawyer, raised to a distinguished post in the service of the administration, may, by the exhibition of a warmth of temper, injure his reputation to such a degree, that even the ministers cannot cast their mantle of defence over him. As, in the case before us, both Governors-General are to be blamed, the Government will have the less difficulty in effecting a change.

When, at the late Court at the India House, the Author looked around, and beheld such a large assembly of venerable men, most of whom had spent the best of their days in the East, and many of whom had gained honour and distinction by services really beneficial to their country and the natives of India; when he considered the talent and experience of Indian affairs, and kindly feelings of many whom he recognised within and without the bar, he felt assured that the subject on which he has been endeavouring, however feebly and inadequately, to enlist public sympathy, would receive due and attentive consideration; and that such justice as could be rendered to the Ameers of Sind would not be denied. We all profess to believe in an omniscient, superintending Providence, in whose sight national must be as hateful as individual injustice; and we acknowledge that the Almighty will punish or reward according to our deserts. The Directors of the East India Company have a heavy responsibility, and the eyes of the public are upon them. They are therefore entreated, by considerations of humanity and justice, by a regard for the true interests of India and the

opinions of surrounding states, not to lose any time in bringing this question to a decision, by effecting the restoration of the Ameers of Sinde to their possessions; on such conditions, as a wise, safe, and equitable policy may dictate and so will our power and authority be established on a firm basis, and nations shall speak well of us, and our Government shall be prosperous and blessed.

In mercy to our brave soldiers, European and Native, let us not longer persevere in the attempt to retain, by the power of the sword alone, a country which has proved so pestilential; and thus keep open, as it were, a yawning grave for multitudes of our gallant and devoted troops. Retain if you will, our supremacy, by the establishment of one or more Residencies, under a very few discreet and experienced officers—civil or military, who might guide and direct the chiefs in power, whoever they may be; stipulating for all the privileges, political and commercial, that may be necessary. The Ameers have now seen the futility of resistance to our arms, whether our claims be just or otherwise. They have gained experience by their misfortunes and their exile. The tenour of all their appeals indicates that they may now be converted into real friends and dutiful tributaries, or even subjects. The continued heart-burnings of their relatives and supporters in Sinde would speedily cease, and tranquillity, confidence, and the march of improvement begin. The certainty of punishment, in case of infraction of such stringent engagements as might be imposed on them, would keep the restored chiefs faithful and obedient to us, and our finances be very much relieved.



## SUPPLEMENT.

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WHILE the foregoing sheets were in the press, the *additional papers* relative to Sindé, presented by Her Majesty's command to both houses of Parliament, on the 1st February, were distributed to the East India Proprietors.

The contents of the supplementary volume confirm the author in the correctness of all the opinions advanced in the preceding pages. It is evident that Sir Charles Napier and Major (now Colonel) Outram have been at issue upon several very important points, and it is quite apparent that there must have been much difference of opinion and recrimination between those two principal actors in the affairs of Sindé. A considerable space is devoted to the defence by General Napier against the charges of the Ameers, the Bombay papers, &c. The representations of the Ameers to the Bombay Government, and the Court of Directors, likewise occupy a large portion of the supplementary volume, which may not inappropriately be termed these victims *blue book*, a desideratum significantly alluded to by the gallant Proprietor, who seconded the resolution at the India House.

The Governor-General, in a letter to Sir C. Napier, dated 28th Sept., 1842 (page 1), directing the General to hear all that Major Outram and the Political Agents had to allege against the Ameers of Hyderabad and Khyrpore, tending to prove the intention, on the part of any of them to act hostilely against the British army, states, with praiseworthy candour and consideration,—

“ That they may have had hostile feelings, there can be no doubt. It would be impossible to believe that they could entertain friendly

feelings; but we should not be justified in inflicting punishment on the thoughts."

And in a subsequent despatch (8th October) his Lordship states, that the assembling of men by the Khyrpore Ameers was only for the settlement of a quarrel amongst themselves, and had nothing in it of hostility to us. This is an important admission indeed.

The following observation by Major Outram (page 12), will at once come home to the apprehension of every man who has been any time in India, as showing the necessity not only of diplomatic officers employed, but even of the Governor-General having some little knowledge of the customs and prejudices of the Mahomedans, who form such a large portion of the population of India. After adverting to the *inutility and mischief* of appropriating Tatta, he points out the inexpediency of impressing the Queen's image on the coins of Sinde, one of the provisions of the new treaty. He states truly, that "*the Mahomedan religion prohibits the use of such emblems;*" so that article is tantamount to prohibiting the privilege of coining to the rulers of Sinde altogether. Either the article should be altered to that effect (*i. e.* depriving the Ameers of the right of coining), or should be modified to an English inscription on one side, (to which there could be no objection on the score of religion,) and Persian by the Ameers on the other; but General Napier in his reply, states there will be no necessity for concession, as the coins will be the Queen's. The question naturally arises, was General Napier ever in India before? He might have done very well to command a force; but as an Indian diplomatist of the present day, he was as unfit a man as could have been selected, and in point of temper, was totally disqualified for the office in which he was employed. The style and tenor of his communications, whether to the Ameers, or the Governor-General, in denying charges or commenting on the conduct of that most respectable and brave officer, Major Outram, betray an irritability which leaves an unfavourable impression of the discretion and judgment of the gallant General.

Major Outram, in submitting a memorandum (page 13),

upon the objections to the occupation of Tatta, from its unhealthy state, the cost of maintaining it, the heart-burnings of the Ameers, and other points, sums up with one forcible argument, viz.

“The objectionable grasping appearance which thus seizing on Tatta, the ostensible, though not really so, principal support of the state, where no necessity can be shown for its occupation; as in the case of Sukkur and Kurrachee, the sites of our cantonments.”

The trickery of Meer Ali Moorad in entrapping his brother and our old and faithful ally, Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, has already been exposed. Major Outram, in a letter to Sir C. Napier, 22nd Jan. 1843 (page 16), states—

“My misgivings as to Meer Roostum have proved well founded. He has fallen into the snare Ali Moorad laid for him; and, instead of marching to join me here, has gone off, I am informed, to consult with the other fugitive Ameers, who are somewhere near Kohera, between Dingee and Hyderabad, or thereabouts.” . . . . . “Pray recollect, that they were misled into flight; that they had agreed to subscribe to the treaty, and would have done so, had it not been Ali Moorad’s policy utterly to sever them from us, *that he might obtain their confiscated estates*; that they were innocent of the acts laid to their charge (robbing dawks, &c.), which led them to fly and you to pursue; that they had not armed to the extent that was represented; \* and that whatever rabble soldiery they had assembled, was solely with a view to self-defence, in misapprehension of our real objects, misrepresented as they were to them by Ali Moorad; and much more that may be urged in excuse for such suspicious people, *who have had little reason, heretofore, to estimate our good faith very highly*. At least, if you are not satisfied on these points, as I hope you are, I shall not fail to prove them to you, *opposed although I am by the bribed tools of Ali Moorad who surround me*.”

The villanous manœuvres of Ali Moorad are laid bare by Major Outram, in a communication to Sir C. Napier (page 21). He says,—

“By the bye, in answer to your remark, that had Ali Moorad brought you back from Emaum Ghur by the other road, in order that

\* The Governor-General says—This was all a mistake, and nothing intended against us.

you should avoid an interview with Meer Roostum, he would not have taken you the road we went to Emaum Ghur; I forgot to mention, *that, in going, he relied on causing Roostum to fly*; and doubtless he would have done so, had I not anticipated him by riding over to the old chief's camp, before he had time to effect his purpose. Recollect, that very morning, just before I told you, Roostum was there; Ali Moorad had told you he had fled to a distance."

A caution was given to Sir C. Napier by Major Outram, not to advance with his force; but it was disregarded:—

"These fools" (says the Major, 12th Feb. 1843,) "are in the utmost alarm, in consequence of the continued progress of your troops towards Hyderabad, notwithstanding their acceptance of the treaty, which they hoped would have caused you to stop. If you come beyond Halla (if so far), I fear they will be impelled by their fears to assemble their rabble, *with a view to defend themselves and their families, in the idea that we are determined to destroy them, notwithstanding their submission*. I do hope, therefore, that you may not consider it necessary to bring the troops any further in this direction; for I fear it may drive the Ameers to act contrary to your orders to disperse their troops (or rather not to assemble them, *for they were all dispersed yesterday*), and thus compel us to quarrel with them."

In announcing to Sir Charles Napier that the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sinde had accepted the treaties, Major Outram (page 37) informs him that the old story of *justice to Roostum was the reiterated cry*, notwithstanding the Commissioner's constant replies that the abdication was his own act:—

"This they higgled at more than signing away their own property, which is *confiscated* by the new treaty, and would insist on saying that your letter, telling them *that I was sent to settle every thing*, empowered me to settle that also; although I as positively told them, that I had nothing to do but with the draft treaty." . . . "He" (Meer Roostum) "has always been consistent in his story and brings forward strong proofs; and, indeed, it appears notorious that he was, in the first place, actually surrounded by Ali Moorad's sentries, and his own people removed from him, and that Ali Moorad afterwards caused him to fly, to avoid, as he (Ali Moorad) led him to believe, a worse evil." . . . "From what I saw yesterday

of the spirit of the people, it appears to me that the Ameers are now execrated for their dastardly submission (as they consider it) *to what they style robbery.*"

Adverting to the friendly interference and exertions of the Ameers, even at the last hour, and amidst all their provocations, in protecting the Commissioner from the outrages of the Beloochee soldiery, exasperated by the treatment of Meer Roostum Khan and denial of any assurance that that chief would be righted, Major Outram requests the attention of General Napier (page 38) to the fact, that—

"The Ameers had reason to fear that their Beloochees might attempt mischief, having been engaged the whole day in paying off and *dismissing* those who had flocked to the city since the night before last, *on hearing the continued advance of your troops*; before I went to Durbar they had got the city quite clear, but after dark great numbers flocked in again."

Meer Roostum Khan's answer to the proclamation of Sir C. Napier, (page 66,) evinces more clearly than ever, that that chief was the dupe of the vile traitor Ali Moorad, as he denied having ever conveyed any message (as alleged) to the General that he was in the hands of his brothers and children, and had not the power of acting that friendly part towards the British Government he would desire, and that, if an opportunity offered, he would join the British forces; and with reference to the counsel given him to act according to the advice of Ali Moorad, he stated,

"Afterwards, on the night before he left Dejee-Kote, Noor Mahomed Hafiz (a confidential servant of Ali Moorad) brought a message at midnight from that chief, to the effect that it was the purpose of the General to come to Dejee-Kote; that there he would meet Meer Roostum, from whom he intended to extort three lacs of rupees, and otherwise to degrade him; that if the money was not paid, the jewels and property of the Zenana were to be seized; therefore, that Ali Moorad advised him to go off to the desert at once. He (Roostum) accordingly did so early in the morning."

Nothing could be more friendly than the conduct of the Ameers to Major Outram personally. They had sent (page 41), to say that the Beloochees had become quite uncon-

trollable ; had taken an oath on the Koran to have (term) Yageo, unless Roostum was righted ; and refused to obey them in any way. They begged the Commissioner to *depart as soon as possible*, and gave the advice from pure friendship, &c.

Numerous intimations were made to Major Outram (pages 42, 43), by the Ameers, that unless some pledge could be held out that Meer Roostum Khan should be reinstated, and the land given to Ali Moorad restored to the other Ameers of Upper Sind, so that justice might be rendered to them, it would not be in their power to control the Beloochees, who had taken a solemn oath to unite to oppose the British, and not to sheathe the sword till they were righted ; but the Major could only promise that their representations should be fairly placed before the General, which, however, would not satisfy them.

The seizure by an officer under General Napier's orders, of twenty-five Murrees (page 43), was much deprecated by Major Outram ; he was afraid it would bring matters to a crisis, and cause the Beloochees to commence plundering. He considered hostilities likely to occur in consequence, although he believed the Ameers had not had any intention of commencing them, they only hoping to get Roostum's party benefited by making an appearance of ferment amongst their Beloochees ; but the appearance would probably change to reality, since the capture of these men.

An extract of a letter from General Napier to the Governor-General, dated 13th March, 1843, (page 48,) is given, but it would have been more satisfactory to have had the whole despatch, as we may infer from the following quotation, that it was peculiarly interesting :—

*“I had no prejudice against the Ameers. I certainly held their conduct as rulers to be insufferable by any strong government ; but as individuals I felt pity for them, as weak princes, whose folly had brought them into difficulties. It was this feeling that made me restore them their swords ; for assuredly I was not insensible to the honour it would be to the family of a private gentleman to possess the swords of so many princes, surrendered to him on the*

field of battle; and I believe, by all the rules and customs of war, their swords were mine. This was an undoubted proof of my feelings then. Since then I have seen their real character developed, and I do think that such thorough villains I never met with in my life. Meer Sobdar is even worse than the others. He had 5,000 men in the action; I doubted this at first, as he was not there in person. Being now assured that your Lordship *will occupy* the country, I can act decidedly, and shall have cause for the troops very soon."

The address of Sir Charles Napier to the poor captive Ameers of Hyderabad (page 89), is a fine specimen of *temperate* remonstrance; it cannot be omitted.

"I am also much surprised by the *falsehoods* which you tell. I will no longer bear this conduct; and if you give me any more trouble by stating gross *falsehoods*, as you have done in your two letters, I will cast you into prison as you deserve. You are prisoners, *and though I will not kill you*, as you ordered your people to do to the English, *I will put you in irons on board a ship*. You must learn, *Princes*, that if prisoners conspire against those who have conquered them, they will find themselves in danger. Be quiet, or you will suffer the consequences of folly. Your friend, Meer Shere Mahomed, has prevented the letter from the Governor-General, as to your fate, from reaching me; his soldiers intercepted the dawks. He is a very weak man, and will soon cause himself to be destroyed; and so will you, unless you submit more quietly to the fate your own rash folly has brought upon you. I will answer no more of your letters, which are only repetitions of gross *falsehoods* that I will not submit to."

The victory gained by Sir Charles Napier near Hyderabad, on the 24th March, 1843, (page 50,) over the force commanded by Meer Shere Mahomed, is too well known to be further noticed here. Lord Ellenborough, in the General Order (page 91), bore ample testimony to the gallantry of the British forces, which were certainly entitled to all the praise bestowed on them. His Lordship rather exultingly observes:—

"To have punished the treachery of *protected princes*; to have liberated the nation from its *oppressors*; to have added a province, fertile as Egypt, to the British Empire; and to have effected these great objects by actions in war unsurpassed in brilliancy, whereof a

grateful army assigns the success to the ability and valour of its General; these are not ordinary achievements, nor can the ordinary language of praise convey their reward."

There was not much cause for triumph, for the Governor-General might, with the large armies at his command, very easily take possession of every other independent State in India, if it were his pleasure; but the question is, would it be just or right to do so?

Many pages of the volume (viz. from page 56 to 71), are occupied with the representations of the several Ameeris to the Governor of Bombay, all much to the same effect. We shall select a few sentences from the first in order, that of Meer Nusseer Khan, who gives a very temperate and feeling statement of his hard case. He says,

"It is to be found in history, that *Christianity* requires its followers, above all things, to observe the rules of friendship and good treatment towards mankind; for friendship is the result of honesty and goodness. Expecting therefore to meet with the same friendship from the British Government, I, in spite of the enmity of the Affghans, and the indignation of the Beloochees, never allowed any thing to prevent my giving satisfaction to the English Sahib Bahadoors."

And after a long detail of the events connected with the execution of the new treaty and the opposition of the Beloochees, on account of the injustice done to Meer Roostum, already noticed, and also the circumstances under which he was compelled to offer resistance to General Napier's force; the Ameer adds,

"As long as Major Outram was there, every thing went on well; after his departure, Moonshee Ali Akbar brought a message that the English gentlemen wished to see the fort, and asked me to send some confidential servants with them. I accordingly sent Bahadoor Akhoond Buchal and Moonshee Mhetaram to accompany them. Colonel Pattle, Captain Brown, and Mr. Fallon, together with two regiments of cavalry and infantry, entered the fort on the pretence of looking at it, plundered the treasury, the ferarh khanas, and other establishments, and carried off gold and silver, swords, muskets, knives, daggers and shields, together with valuable property, jewels, jewels of the ladies, cloths, clothes, korans, books, horses, camels, mules, valuable pots, copper pots, china ware, and the ornaments prepared

at Jyepore, by the English Government, for the marriage of my son Meer Hoossien Ali Khan. They also rushed into my seraglios. The Sepoys who guarded the gate of the Fort of Hyderabad deprived every female they met of her ornaments. My ladies, who had never left the house, went out of the fort, throwing away their nose and earrings, in fear for their lives, and dreading to be seen by strangers."

Others were stated to have been plundered and ill-treated, and the Ameer says,

"I have seen in books and histories, that oppression is no way allowed by the religion of Jesus Christ. From the time the English Government took possession of the country of India, never was such oppression, tyranny, and disgrace experienced by any one." . . .  
 "Under such circumstances I solicit redress, and trust the oppression to which I have been subjected will, in accordance with the commandments of Jesus Christ, and the justice and equity of the British Government, be removed. Whatever civility and kindness your Excellency may show me will tend to redound to your fame in the world. I further beg that the above circumstances may be brought to the notice of Her Majesty the Queen and the Governor-General."

It was a rather extraordinary circumstance, that the whole of the women of the Ameers refused to accompany them and remained at Hyderabad (page 71). They said they had no means of subsistence; this was stated to be untrue. The General positively forbade their personal ornaments of gold and jewels to be taken from them by the prize agents, but whether they carried out treasure or not he could not say. The General was very indignant at an "infamous article" which appeared in the Bombay Times, which "*is one lie from beginning to end.*" There was not, he said, a single irregularity, nor was there a woman, much less one of the ladies of the Zenana, in any officer's quarters, nor did he believe any one of these ladies had ever been seen by any officer of the army. The Governor-General remarked (page 77), that

"The separation of the women from the Ameers appears so extraordinary and unnatural, that I can hardly think the women will persist in their refusal; however, if they should do so, *it is essential to our character*, that they should be treated with all respect and honour, according to the feelings and prejudices of the East, and I

shall be prepared to sanction any arrangement you may think it expedient to make for their maintenance, and for their residence.”\*

There is a Memorial from Meer Hoossein Ali Khan to the Court of Directors, 5th June, 1843 (page 81), in which he adverts to the friendly services rendered by his late father, Noor Mahomed Khan, in allowing the army to pass through Sinde (although he thereby incurred the enmity of the Affghans and Beloochees), and collecting boats, carriage, and supplies. Captain Eastwick was sent with a treaty, in which a demand was made of twenty-one lacs of rupees, to be paid at the time. His father was to pay seven lacs, and fourteen lacs were to be paid by Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer Mahomed Khan. It was also ordered, that the three Ameers should pay a lac of rupees each annually to the British Government.

\* “This (says he) was the first fruit of their friendship for my father; but the British army having arrived at Jeruck (through my father’s exertions) unopposed, all former professions were disregarded, and my father, with the other Ameers, was compelled to submit to the terms imposed. He felt that they were arbitrary and unjust; but being helpless, and at his (Sir J. Keane’s) mercy, he complied with them. Subsequently, a treaty of twelve articles was concluded with Sir Henry Pottinger, in which it was declared, that thereafter no demand should be made upon us, nor would the English ever look upon our country to covet it. The English army continued its march to Cabool; and from the time Major James Outram was appointed Resident in Sinde, my father was guided entirely by his counsels. When my father was on his death-bed, he took my hand and placed it in that of Major Outram, consigning me to his care and protection; after which he breathed his last. After this Major Outram treated me as if I was his son, and I lived happy and contented until Sir Charles Napier arrived in Sinde,” &c.

The memorialist took no part in the attack on the British force; and he went and met the General, to whom Major Outram, who was present at the time, said, “*There is no charge against this boy:*” nevertheless he was deprived, after

\* This was like a gallant and generous nobleman, and relieves his Lordship from much of the odium attached to the disgraceful proceedings at Hyderabad.

Major Outram's departure, of everything, and sent to Bombay.

Meer Nusseer Khan's representation (page 82) is much to the same effect as his address to the Government of Bombay. There is just one passage that must be noticed. He admits he was present at the action, although he had done all in his power to allay the excitement of the Beloochees. He went next morning, of his own accord, and delivered his sword into the General's hands.

“He kindly returned it to me, and buckled it round my waist, using many consoling expressions, and telling me that in twenty-five days my affairs would be satisfactorily settled, and that I should be placed in Hyderabad as formerly. . . . If the General says he conquered Sinde, I reply, that, as we were tributaries and subjects of the English for many years, he can hardly claim a victory over your own subjects. Truly, this slaughter of the people of Sinde, plundering their property, was at the expense of the Queen of England. . . . I have read that Christianity is opposed to oppression of every kind; but, from the time the British first arrived in India, to the present date, no such tyranny was ever practised on us. Had a shot been fired from the walls of Hyderabad, the British army might have lawfully plundered it; but the fort was given up on a pretence that it was merely to be inspected, and after a pledge of security was given, peace declared, and assurances made that we should be restored to power; after this to plunder the treasury, and to disgrace the rulers of the country, is not allowed by any law; and I had heard from experienced persons, that it was not the custom of the English to punish a man before he was proved guilty, nor to disgrace him on the hearsay of others. I, therefore, hope that you will first investigate my case, and then determine by the laws of Christianity, whether or not we are suffering from injustice. I look to you for justice, and to be sent back with my former honour and dignity to my country, where I pledge myself to be bound by the kindness of the English, as long as I live to serve and obey them, and this will exalt the renown of the English all over the world. Restore me, therefore, to my plundered country.”

A peculiar degree of sensitiveness is evinced by General Napier (page 87) to the complaints made against himself and the three Prize Agents and the Commissioner, Lieutenant

Brown, respecting the plunder in Hyderabad ; which accusation the General knew to be concocted by a hostile party at Bombay. These and other complaints were “ *gross, impudent falsehoods all.*” The gallant officer, as usual, deals in no measured terms. The statements of Majors M·Pherson and Reid, Captains Blenkins and Bazett, and Lieutenant Brown, contradict the assertion of ill-treatment of the ladies of the Zenana and the plunder of their ornaments ; but one of the parties, Captain Bazett, admits, “that the jewels found with other state property in the toshakhanas, these being entirely detached from the Zenanas, were considered as state jewels, and as such retained by me ; as also the jewelled swords and matchlocks found in them.”

There is a very long paper of “ Observations by Sir Charles Napier on the Memorials of the Ameers of Sinde,” 12th June, 1843, (page 91,) beginning with his oft-repeated, favourite phrase, that “ the complaints of the Ameers form a tissue of falsehoods.” He is particularly severe on Meer Mahomed Khan, who solemnly signed the draft treaty in full Durbar, attacked the residence of the Commissioner with the intention to massacre the said diplomatist and all that were with him, and afterwards tore the treaty to atoms ; and although none of the Ameers went by his orders to fight, they did fight, and he was bound to have prevented them—if not, he must take the consequences : but the General disbelieved the facts as stated by the Ameer. Sir Charles certainly adduces some strong *arguments*, tending to show that Meer Sobdar had not been the faithful ally he was always supposed ; but if all the General’s *suspicious* had been *facts*, they would not have justified the subsequent cruel treatment of the Ameer. The General observes—

“ The Ameer Sobdar says, ‘ No sepoy in my service fought in the recent battle by my orders.’ This hypocritical quibbling is of a piece with that of the Ameer Mahomed. The answer is, ‘ Your chiefs lie dead at Meancee, by the side of our men, whom they slew ; and for this his Highness must answer, or the responsibility of Government for the conduct of its subjects has become a farce, and a by-word among men.’ . . . . In regard to another Ameer, Major

Outram was deceived in the intentions of Meer Shere Mahomed, and the battle of Hyderabad was the result."

The General makes out rather a strong case against Meer Nusseer Khan, viz.—

“The words attributed to me, when I returned him his sword on the field of battle, *are utterly false*. The Ameer proceeds to say, ‘as long as Major Outram was there, every thing went on well;’ *as if Major Outram had the power in any way to interfere with his treatment. Major Outram had no power whatever in Sinde, or over the Ameers*; and I have given the charge of the Ameers to Lieut. Brown, the accusation against whom, together with Lieut.-Col. Pattle and Major McPherson, which immediately follows this sentence, has already been answered by those gentlemen.”

And the gallant Commander winds up with an astounding tirade of his favourite phrases. “The Ameer again says, ‘After granting quarter, making peace, promising satisfaction, and agreeing to restore the fort,’ &c. That we granted quarter, is true; nobody was either injured or even insulted, after the fight was over: but the ‘making peace,’ is a falsehood; ‘promising satisfaction,’ another; and ‘agreeing to restore the fort,’ a third. What remains of the complaint, is an *accumulation of falsehoods*.”

A very remarkable omission on the part of General Napier now comes to light. It appears, by a despatch to the Secret Committee, dated 13th June, 1843, (page 94,) that the Governor-General *had never seen, till that day*, the very important Notes of Conference\* between Major Outram and the Ameers, while he was acting as Commissioner under Sir Charles Napier, for the settlement of the details of the treaty; and his Lordship knew absolutely nothing of what may have passed. General Napier’s explanation of his omission in not having forwarded these documents to the Governor-General, is very far from satisfactory. Now observe, the General expressly intimated to Major Outram, on the 11th Feb. 1843, (page 32,) with reference to these Notes of Conference,—

“I have no power to discuss former treaties, but I will state to

\* These conferences will be found in the first series of papers, commencing at page 534.

Lord Ellenborough all the Ameers say, because it is fair to them; *but I am sure that we should not tell them so now*, because they would build interminable discussions thereon; but *I will at once* send Lord Ellenborough a copy of what passed; for though I do not think he will alter one iota, he may incline to show them favour in the Roree district affairs."

The excuse made to the Governor-General by Sir C. Napier in his letter of 11th July, 1843 (page 105), was, that—

"The notes of the meeting of the 8th of February, I received on the 11th. These I could not forward to your Lordship, because, after the 13th, our communications were intercepted; but the enclosed copy of a letter to Major Outram shows that I intended to do so, although I did not think it necessary, as *we were on the eve of a battle*, which I knew could not take place, if the Ameers were honest, and spoke the truth. After the action the Ameers placed my small force in such danger, by their intrigues with Meer Shere Mahomed, that I never thought more of Outram's 'minutes' till I received your Lordship's present letter."

But behold, after making the above excuse, Sir Charles Napier finds he has grossly committed himself, and in point of fact, it was an egregious oversight (to use the mildest term), for what does he say only two days after, in a letter to the Governor-General, dated 13th July, 1843 (page 107).

"*I was much vexed* at myself for not having sent Major Outram's notes of his interview with the Ameers, because I received them on the 11th of February, and *the post was open to the 13th*, as *I find by a long letter written by your Lordship on that day.*"

Mark the contradictions, also, in the following paragraphs.

"We were all hard worked at that time, and I recollect thinking that, as a battle would take place, or peace be made in a few days (if Major Outram's assertions were correct), *the face of affairs would change. I therefore delayed* sending this paper till I heard of the Ameers having signed the draft treaty. I had, however, made preparations for sending the notes of Outram's meeting to your Lordship; for I have just found among my papers a copy of this paper prepared for transmission to your Lordship, and with it I find my private notes on reading it. *I had by that time discovered that there was a party resolved to support the Ameers through thick and thin.*"

The General then proceeds to say, that he received the notes

on the 11th; his notes must have been made that evening, the copy could hardly have been ready before the 12th. He required time for reflection upon the conflicting information sent by Major Outram, and the reports of his own spies. "*It was impossible to jump at conclusions.*" Major Outram's character and local experience gave great weight to his assertions; yet they were diametrically opposed to the statement of the scouts. There remained little doubt of the way in which "*Outram had been duped.*" He thought it essential that copies of the letters found on the Murree chief, Hyat Khan, should be sent to his Lordship, in case of any misfortune befalling the troops. He still hoped for the promised treaty, and must have intended to send that and the notes of the interview together. This is altogether a very lame excuse. The copy was ready on the 12th, and a long letter written to the Governor-General on the 13th; and not one word communicated to his Lordship on the subject of the conferences, without exception, perhaps, the most important documents in the whole series of papers; and upon the due consideration of which—events of such magnitude depended. The General concludes, that after the 14th all communication was at an end.

"The march upon an enemy of such force was alone so engrossing, that really, *if I had thought these papers important* (which I neither did nor do now) *I could not have attended to them.* If they produce annoyance or throw difficulties in your Lordship's way, very deeply shall I regret that I forgot to send them after the battle."

In the letter of 11th July, Sir C. Napier in impugning the judgment of Major Outram, in several instances, observes—

"Major Outram had been deceived by the Ameers. On the 10th and 11th February he sent two letters to me, following each other, by express; these letters contained three important things. 1. A request that I should halt the troops. 2. A request that I should go in person to Hyderabad. 3. The information that the Ameers had dispersed all their troops." [The General refused compliance with all these, and submits his reasons for thinking that the Ameers did not want peace, but time to get our troops into a snare; and if he had gone to Hyderabad 'my throat would have been cut of course.'] (Page 106.) He adds, "As Major Outram seems to have forwarded his notes, I think he ought also to have forwarded my denial of Meer Roostum's assertions."

The General's wrath is much excited (page 103) by attacks upon him at Bombay. He remarks to the Governor-General,—"A private letter from Bombay informs me that a letter received from——" says he, "considered the destruction of Emaum Ghur as a more *flagitious act* than the attack upon the Residency." His answer to this is, that it was done by the consent of Ali Moorad (the usurper, by the bye), reluctantly obtained, however; and his highness joined in the fun by firing some of the guns, and once or twice three shells into the fort. A precious ally indeed!

Another charge against him was, that—

"My continued march upon Hyderabad, in despite of the advice of Major Outram, *was that which forced the Ameers to war*. I certainly did reject Major Outram's advice, because I soon saw that he was grossly deceived by the Ameers. I had several proofs of this, one or two of which I now feel it right to state to your Lordship."

The General then enters into an explanation of his course of proceeding, in entire opposition to the views and solicitations of Major Outram, the experienced commissioner who was negotiating the treaty and communicating personally with the Ameers, after having had a long acquaintance with them, and being fully informed of their feelings and character; but the General thought he had got amongst a set of desperate, irreconcilable, and untractable savages, on whose professions no confidence could be placed; although our object was to induce them, by persuasion, to execute a treaty, conferring upon ourselves great privileges.

A provision for the support of the ex-Ameers of Sind and their attendants (page 96), is made by the Bombay Governor at the suggestion of Lieut. Gordon, in charge, to the amount of 15,000 rupees per month, exclusive of the expense of providing carriages, horses, and other articles of outfit; and a proportionate increase would be required when the ladies of the Seraglio and their attendants, 400 in all, should arrive. Here then is an expense of several lacs of rupees per annum entailed upon the East India Company, by an attempt to enforce a harsh treaty really of no use to them; but which treaty, even oppressive as it was, would have been acceded to and observed by the Ameers, if Major Outram had only been per-

mitted to yield a little in one or two immaterial points, and to give assurance of redress to Meer Roostum ; and had General Napier been less hasty and bent on battle and the capture of Hyderabad. Will the revenues of Sinde, even under the best management, or the increase of commerce, ever repay us for all this wasteful expense and the miseries entailed upon the Ameers and others ?

The Governor-General, in a long despatch to the Secret Committee, dated 26th June, 1843 (page 98), gives a recapitulation of his objects and views in proposing the new treaty to the Ameers of Sinde. His Lordship observes,—

“I have endeavoured to judge my own conduct as I would that of another, and I cannot think, in reviewing it, that in the circumstances in which I stood, I was unjustified in requiring from the Ameers, the specific modifications of their engagements, which I instructed Sir Charles Napier to propose to them. These modifications in the existing treaty involved on our part the abandonment of a considerable revenue,\* payable to us every year by the Ameers, under the name of tribute. They involved, undoubtedly, the sacrifice, on their part, of lands of more than equivalent value ; but the penalty imposed did not seem disproportioned to the offence I had reason to believe they had committed.” . . . “They had no claim to consideration on the ground of ancient possession, or of national prejudice. Certainly they had none arising out of the goodness of their government. To take advantage of the crime they had committed to overthrow their power, *was a duty to the people they had so long misgoverned*. It was essential to the settlement of the country, that I should take at once a decided course with respect to the Ameers ; and having no doubt that I was justified in dethroning them, I determined on at once adopting and announcing that decision.” . . . “Any half measure would have failed. Adopting the decisive measure of taking the province into our hands, I determined to adapt the means to the end, and not to omit any step by which security could be given to the new possession.” . . . “The vast tracts which the Ameers have converted into shikargahs, will also be surveyed. Such of the woods as it may be necessary to retain, will be carefully preserved ; and extensive portions of land, having the richest soil, lately reserved for hunting grounds by the Ameers, will be

\* Not revenue, but tribute imposed originally to reimburse us for protecting Sinde ! Protection indeed !

restored to cultivation." . . . "It is impossible to calculate the extent to which, by opening ancient courses to the waters of the Indus, and by extending means of irrigation, we may improve the productiveness of the soil. As little can we calculate the extent to which the assurance of protection given to the people may increase their industry, and thus finally promote their prosperity. You may be assured, that no exertion of mine shall be wanting to make the conquest of Sindh by the British arms no less the source of happiness to the inhabitants of the country than of advantage to our own."

The ladies of the Zenana had, at length, says General Napier, on the 27th June, 1843, (page 102,) consented to take a monthly allowance of 4,500 rupees for their maintenance; and if the General had at the same time returned them some of their ornaments and various useful articles taken from the Zenana, it would have evinced a praiseworthy degree of gallantry towards these unfortunate grass widows and fair damsels, left unprotected by their husbands and fathers removed into captivity. Whether he did so, is not stated; but it may be presumed, perhaps, that many of the valuables seized at Hyderabad, will hereafter be exhibited in this country, as trophies of the valour of our troops under the great conqueror Napier. Oh! what a delusion often exists in the public mind, in respect to the means by which some of our victories in the East have been achieved! While we are rejoicing, only reflect how many are weeping and wailing; the innocent victims of cruelty, rapacity, and insatiable ambition! And we may judge of the intensity of feeling under which they suffered from oppression, by the exclamation of one of the Ameers, "that there would be no justice till the Almighty sat in judgment."

The Governor-General assured Sir C. Napier 13th July, 1843, (page 108), with reference to the charges made against His Excellency, the officers and troops, by the ex-Ameers, that he never attached any weight to accusations, monstrous in themselves, under any circumstances, as directed against soldiers of honour, and certainly not deriving any peculiar and unusual value from the character of the persons from whom they were made to proceed. And on the 7th August, 1843, (page 112,) the Governor-General in Council intimated

to Sir C. Napier, that after reading his explanations with respect to the correspondence with Major Outram, immediately before the battle of Meeanee, and the position of the army at that period, the supreme Government could not but feel that it was to the penetration and decision of the General that the army owed its safety.

“ Major Outram’s confidential letter to you, of the 11th of Feb., he had intended to send by a servant of Meer Roostum, who was then betraying him by a false statement of his force at Kohera; yet that letter contained a suggestion, which, if communicated to Meer Ali Moorad, might have added him to the confederacy against us.”

“ On the 15th Feb., Major Outram observed, that his despatches of the last few days would have led you to expect that his earnest endeavours to effect an amicable arrangement with the Ameers of Sindé would fail; yet, on the previous day, the Ameers had affixed their seals to the treaty, a proceeding usually viewed in the light of an amicable arrangement, or at least an arrangement intended to preclude hostilities—not immediately, as in this case, to precede them.”

There are two long papers by Sir Charles Napier (pages 112 to 115), of “recollections of conversations and circumstances,” and a “conversation with Ali Moorad,” the chief object of which appears to be, to prove the correctness of his own judgment, and the want of foresight and sagacity on the part of Major Outram, who had given him offence, by submitting to the Government his side of the question. The two concluding paragraphs can alone be quoted:—

“ Well, what the law of England would have done for him, Ali Moorad did for himself, and by his own power. However, upon these matters, Major Outram, or Major *Anybody*, may form their own opinions—they are indifferent to me; but Major Outram had not a right to say that I had given power and riches to Ali Moorad, and that that caused the war, because there is no foundation for such an erroneous assertion. And by giving his notes of a conversation with Meer Roostum and the other Ameers at Hyderabad, in which I am represented—and, certainly, by implication, made—to have forced Meer Roostum into his brother’s power, and to the surrender of the turban and all his territory, without accompanying such notes by my denial of the circumstance, I do consider Major Outram to have acted very unjustly towards me, if Major Outram did so; of which I have no proof, except hearing of these notes being in the

hands of high and influential authorities without any notice being taken of my contradiction. All this I am determined shall be cleared up."

"With regard to returning Sinde to the Ameers, I consider it would be a match for the imbecility of old Roostum. With regard to the depriving Ali Moorad of his territory, I think the more we take into our own hands the better for the Sinde people, and for humanity; but, as Aristides said to the proposal of Themistocles, '*it would be advantageous, but not just,*' I do not see how it is possible to deprive a man of his territory, who has not committed a single breach of treaty, or even been suspected of having done so, and who has always been ready to be a mediator between the English and his family. I have now stated facts, from which every one who reads them can form his own opinion. My own are formed, and immovable."

The Governor-General in Council, in addressing the Secret Committee, 14th August, 1843, (page 117,) observes,

"We strongly feel that it was to Major-General Sir C. Napier's penetration and decision that our army owed its safety; and we are astonished at the extent to which Major Outram suffered himself to be deluded by the Ameers."

Here an observation naturally occurs; what business had the army to advance so near Hyderabad at all? Was the threatening attitude of Sir C. Napier's force, his seizure of the Murrees, and the destruction of Emaum Ghur, with his thundering proclamations and notices to the Ameers, not sufficient to cause apprehension that he would not even be satisfied by their signing the treaty, but intended to attack Hyderabad; and was it not proper that they should make preparations for resistance? Even rats will make an attack when they see no way of escape. The Ameers were goaded, and the Beloochees driven to desperation by the General, and hence the outbreak, which would never have occurred if a more *mild*, but not so *far-seeing* a general as Sir C. Napier had been employed, and the vile intrigue of Ali Moorad not been countenanced; for it is evident the last circumstance mainly brought on the struggle. The legal opinion (page 120), obtained from the Mahomedan professors, on Ali Moorad's title, is really unworthy of notice, when the facts of this extraordinary case, as already detailed, are known; and it is beyond a doubt, that

the title on which he founds his claim, was obtained by fraud and force from Meer Roostum, when under duress.

Additional memorials, dated 22d and 24th Sept. 1843, (pages 125 to 134,) were transmitted to the Court of Directors by Meer Nusseer Khan, Meer Sobdar Khan, and Meer Mahomed Khan; and it is hoped they will meet the attention they deserve. These memorials are little more than a repetition of former statements of all the circumstances connected with their services and fidelity, and their subsequent ill-usage and hardships. They all pray to be restored to their country, where they will continue grateful as long as they live.

Another exculpatory letter, against the statements of Major Outram, relating to the case of Ali Moorad, is submitted by Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General, under date 29th Sept. 1843 (page 134).

A statement of evidence, given by Meer Budroodeen, the pliant Moosahib, or confidential servant of the ex-Ameer, Sobdar Khan, of Hyderabad (page 136), is transmitted through Sir C. Napier, to the Governor-General in council, 24th Oct. 1843. It appears from this, that so late as the 10th Feb. 1843, the Ameer remained the faithful ally of the British Government, and on the night of that day had actually sent to the General to say, "if he comes quickly, it will be well; but if he delay, the force will very greatly increase;" and the Ameers did not commence collecting troops until Meerza Khoorsoo returned from the General, when that person wrote from Nowshera to the Ameers:—" *The General is bent on war, so get ready.* When the Meerza returned to Hyderabad, the order for collecting troops was given." The collection of troops had commenced before Major Outram reached Hyderabad; and if the Ameers had gained the victory, every soul of the British force would have been massacred. It is unnecessary to offer any comment upon this statement, given by a discarded native servant, who might find it convenient to serve under the new government; and the same observation applies, with equal force, to the paper with which the volume concludes, namely, a memorandum of a conversation between Meer Gholam Shah, Meer Fuzzil Ali, Meer Bijjur, and Lieutenant Rathbone, relative to the part taken by

Meer Shahad, in the attack of the Residency on Feb. 15, 1843. There is just one passage worthy of being noticed :

“ Meer Gholum Shah, on the morning of the attack, also waited on Meer Sobdar, *who desired him to join in the attack also*. Meer Ghulam Shah replied, that he was not going to put himself under the orders of an inexperienced child like Shabad, especially as he thought the business a bad one; but, if Meer Sobdar chose to go himself, he would, as in duty bound, accompany him; *Meer Sobdar then laughed, and said that would never do.*”

From the foregoing digest, it will be observed, that the supplementary papers add very little to the information previously conveyed in the first series, or alter the principal features of the case, as before known; except as exhibiting a lamentable discrepancy between the statements and opinions of the two principal actors on the occasion, viz., Sir Charles Napier and Colonel Outram; and it will rest with the superior authorities to decide whose judgment of the two is most to be relied upon; while it is hoped the scale of justice will be fairly balanced, in weighing all the evidence for and against the unfortunate Ameers of Sinde, now in exile from their native land. By the happy consummation of their restoration, so devoutly to be desired, we should retain all the political and commercial advantages that can be required in our connection with that country, at a much less cost to the State than at present; and Britain would thus display to the world an act of magnanimity—greatly redounding to her credit and repute.

NOTE.—It will not fail to be noticed, that in the papers presented to Parliament, there is not a single communication from the India Board or the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or the slightest intimation whatever, of the sentiments entertained by those controlling authorities, upon the proceedings of the Governor-General. The author's views are the result of many years' experience, as a civil functionary of the Company, in another and a distant part of India, and an attentive study of the politics and commerce of the East generally. He has considered that the same principles which have so beneficially regulated our conduct in other divisions of our vast Eastern Empire, may likewise be applied to our intercourse and proceedings with Sinde, with which we have but recently had any intimate connexion:

*London, 3rd. Feb., 1844.*

## NOTICE.


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A LITTLE delay has taken place in the publication of this work, which was entirely written, and a great part of which was printed, prior to the discussion in Parliament, on Friday, the 8th inst. Just as the two last sheets were throwing off, the Writer's attention was drawn to the leaders in the "Morning Chronicle," of the 9th, and the "Times," of the 10th inst., of which he subjoins short extracts, bearing on the Sinde question.

"Really, were the circumstances written as a romance, neither characters nor events would need one touch of exaggeration. The more simply the tale of the poor Ameers is told, the more touching, convincing, and overwhelming was it."—*Morning Chronicle*, 9th Feb. 1844.

"It cannot be denied, that, up to the present moment, SIR CHARLES NAPIER has been almost as successful as SIR JOHN KEANE; but the future is not wholly *couleur de rose*. Scarcely ever, perhaps, since the days of SENNACHERIB—if the late accounts are to be trusted,—has an army, lying at peace in its tents, experienced the sweeping losses of our Sindian detachments. In the utterly helpless state to which some of them are said to be reduced, it rests with our relentless enemies and double-dealing friends to cut them in pieces or not, as they please. Disease appears to have done already the greater part of the work; let us hope the Beloochee swordsmen will not take in hand the rest. Meanwhile, we have to

154  
The object of the Writer has been to give a simple narrative, allowing the principal actors in this complicated drama to strut their little hour upon the stage, and tell their story.  
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